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Iran reportedly wants to talk, but according to Speaker 1, they should have done so sooner, during the allotted 60-day period. Speaker 1 stated that on the 61st day, they declared that there was no deal to be made. Speaker 1 believes Iran is not winning and should talk immediately before it is too late.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

"Proxy, the PLO, international terrorism would collapse. If you take out Saddam, Saddam's regime, I guarantee you that it will have enormous positive reverberations on the region." "Obviously, we like to see a regime change, at least I would, in Iran, just as I would like to see in Iraq." "The question now is a practical question. What is the best place to proceed?" "It's not a question of whether Iraq's regime should be taken out, but when should it be taken out?" "The answer is categorically yes." "The, the two nations that are vying competing with each other, who will be the first to achieve nuclear weapons, is Iraq and Iran." "But, a third nation, by the way, is Libya as well."

Question: 'Why should the world tolerate you having nuclear weapons and not, say, Iran?' The speaker replies that 'we never admitted to have such weapons,' and says the comparison is 'very insulting.' They note, 'We fought suffered one holocaust. We listened to our neighbors.' They ask, 'Is it because of the holocaust that you should be allowed to have nuclear weapons?' The exchange centers on accusations of moral justification for nuclear armament. The passage concludes with the speaker's abrupt exit: 'You know what? This interview was finished now. Your attitude is so hostile, and your questions are so arrogant. I don't want to'

Iran has kicked out IAEA inspectors, potentially concealing parts of its nuclear program. Israel, which won't allow inspections and is secretive about its nuclear weapons, is also a concern. The speaker does not blame Israel for wanting nuclear weapons but finds it hypocritical to push for regime change wars over secret nuclear weapons when it has them. The speaker suggests a deal where both Iran and Israel give up their secret nuclear weapon programs. The speaker references South Africa's denuclearization before ending apartheid and notes that if Israel recognizes sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, it may have to enfranchise millions of Palestinians. The speaker believes that the South Africa model for denuclearization is not totally off base. The speaker criticizes the Iraq War, stating it cost America $3 trillion and aided the rise of China and ISIS. The speaker questions whether those advocating for attacks on Iran understand the country.

If the Soviet Union and the PLO were removed, international terrorism would collapse. Removing Saddam's regime would have positive effects on the region. Regime change is desired in both Iran and Iraq. The practical question is not if Iraq's regime should be removed, but when. When asked if the U.S. should launch preemptive attacks on other nations, the answer is yes. Iraq and Iran are competing to be the first to achieve nuclear weapons, and Libya is also rapidly trying to build an atomic bomb. These three nations must be stopped to halt Iran's conquest, subjugation, and terror. Everyone stands with Israel.

Iran and its proxies may threaten retaliation, but if they act on it, they would face severe consequences. There would be nothing left of them. I've made it clear that any attack would lead to total obliteration. This should have been communicated by Biden, but he failed to do so, possibly due to a lack of intelligence. If a leader or their associates are targeted, the response should be the complete destruction of the responsible state, which includes Iran.

Speaker 0 questions the rationale for the war, noting that “the intelligence did not suggest that an attack was imminent from Iran,” and asking, “What is left? Why are we at war with Iran?” He also remarks that “the nuclear program isn’t the reason” and that he never expected to hear Ted Cruz talking about nukes. Speaker 1 suggests the simplest explanation given, which has been backtracked, is that “Israel made us do it, that Bibi decided on this timeline, Netanyahu decided he wanted to attack, and he convinced Trump to join him by scaring Trump into believing that US assets in the region would be at risk, and so Trump was better off just joining Netanyahu.” He adds that this may not be the full explanation, but it’s a plausible one. He notes that “the nuclear program is not part of their targeting campaign,” and that “harder line leadership is taking hold,” with the Strait of Hormuz “still being shut down even as we get their navy.” He asks what remains as the explanation, suggesting it might be that Israel forced the United States’ hand and questions, “How weak does that make The United States look? How weak are we if our allies can force us into wars of choice that are bad for US national security interests?”

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

Speaker 0 argues that Washington’s thinking reflects the belief that the ultimate goal for Iran must be regime change and the destruction of the country. He describes this as a core mentality that could manifest either through installing a puppet regime (such as “Shah junior” or another successor) or by breaking the country up. This, he says, is not just a tactic but a fundamental objective in Washington’s approach toward Iran. He then connects this to broader discussions about Ukraine and Russia, suggesting that some countries are reluctant to admit a stark reality: it’s not merely a matter of what agreements can be reached, but rather a conviction that those countries “must be destroyed.” He emphasizes that for these actors, the rhetoric of negotiation collapses into a belief that Russia “must be destroyed,” illustrating a mindset in which agreements are viewed as gimmicks or mere stops along the path to that end. The speaker asks how one negotiates with anyone who holds such a mentality against you. He contrasts two possibilities: negotiating with someone who is seeking a modus vivendi—finding a way to live on the same planet without escalating conflict—with negotiating with someone who openly asserts a desire to destroy you. In short, he argues that the presence of a destruction-driven mindset fundamentally alters the nature of feasible negotiations, making it unclear how a mutually acceptable agreement could be reached when the other side preclaims annihilation as a goal.

Speaker 0 asserts that removing the Soviet Union and its chief proxy, the PLO, would cause international terrorism to collapse. Speaker 1 argues for regime change as a strategic goal: removing Saddam’s regime would have enormous positive reverberations in the region, and there is interest in regime change in Iran as well. The question is not whether Iraq’s regime should be taken out, but when. It is not a question of whether to seek regime change in Iran, but how to achieve it. He also asks whether there are other nations the United States should consider launching preemptive attacks against, answering yes: Iraq and Iran are competing to be the first to acquire nuclear weapons, and Libya is also attempting to rapidly build an atomic bomb capability. He identifies three nations in focus: Iraq, Iran, and Libya. Speaker 2 emphasizes a unified front: they are together to stop Iran’s march of conquest, subjugation, and terror, and asserts that no matter one’s political stance, you stand with Israel.

Saeed Mohamed Marandi explains that Iranians view current events as an extension of the twelve-day war, where Israel and the Trump administration allegedly collaborated to undermine Iran and failed. He cites US Treasury remarks at Davos about manipulating Iranian currency to provoke protests, which he says led to peaceful demonstrations followed by highly trained groups that caused destruction and police casualties. He asserts that Israel claimed responsibility, with Mossad statements and Channel 14 reporting that weapons brought into Iran caused police deaths, and he notes Western media glossed over these facts. He argues this campaign aimed to push Trump toward confrontation with Iran, while messaging about Iran’s nuclear program and regional alliances shifted over time. Iran’s response, he says, has been that any attack will be treated as all-out war with an overwhelming Iranian retaliation. He contends Trump is boxed in: a larger strike would provoke a massive Iranian response across the region, affecting oil and gas flows through the Persian Gulf and potentially collapsing the global economy. He suggests the “smart” outcome would be to back off and end peacefully, potentially declaring victory without concessions, as Trump did in Yemen, though he believes Iran will not accept any deal that compromises sovereignty or core capabilities. Marandi lays out Iran’s view of the regional and strategic landscape: Iran’s counterstrike would target US interests across the region, not just bases, and would involve allies in Iraq, Yemen, and other areas. He argues the Persian Gulf is highly vulnerable because regional regimes hosting US bases are complicit, and a war would disrupt global energy supplies. He asserts Iran’s capabilities are primarily directed at the United States, given US threats since the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, and that Iran has strengthened missiles and drones, along with air defenses. He contends Israel is vulnerable, and the aim of some in the US political circle is to sacrifice US interests for Israeli interests. He asserts that Iran’s real objective is to prevent a repeat of the “sword over Iran”—to avoid six-month cycles of provocations—and to end the possibility of ongoing CIA-backed unrest being used as pretext for further strikes. On the possibility of negotiation, Marandi says Iran will not give up nuclear enrichment, missile capabilities, or regional alliances. He notes there was a JCPOA, but Iran would not accept a repeat of that deal; any future agreement would need to be better for Iran. A deal could be discussed about the nuclear program, but not one that cedes sovereignty or enrichment rights. He suggests Trump could try to retreat by declaring victory or offering a hollow concession, but Iran is ready for all-out war if attacked. He emphasizes that if the US backs down, it would be a major defeat for Washington; if it engages in war, it would be a world tragedy and the US would be defeated, with global implications. He argues Iran’s stance is clear: they will respond massively to any attack, and the only viable path for the US would be to walk away and pretend it gained something it did not. Glenn notes that regional allies feel exposed as world power shifts toward multipolarity, and asks about whether Iran would treat this as an existential threat and how it would fight. Marandi responds that Iran views the objective as balkanization, supported by Israeli interests, and that Iran would confront attempts to seize control of the country. He reiterates that Iran will not compromise sovereignty or support for Palestine, and that a conflict would be devastating for the world, with Iran prepared to fight to defend its existence.

The United States will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. An attack on Iran would occur if, during the next ten years, they considered launching an attack on Israel. The U.S. would be able to totally obliterate them. A nuclear-armed Iran is a challenge that cannot be contained. It would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations, and the stability of the global economy, risking a nuclear arms race and the unraveling of the non-proliferation treaty. The United States will do what it must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Ensuring that Iran never achieves the ability to be a nuclear power is one of the highest priorities. Iran's key nuclear and nuclear facilities have been completely and totally obliterated.

Iran faces three options: compliance with the US and IAEA, further integration with China and Russia, or seeking a nuclear bomb. Compliance would mean humiliation and loss of sovereignty, without stopping Israeli aggression. Increased integration with China and Russia, especially in air defense, would mean some loss of independence but aligns with Iran's current partnerships. Seeking a nuclear bomb would provide deterrence like North Korea, but could trigger nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, opposed by Russia and China. The speaker believes compliance is unacceptable. Stronger alliances with China and Russia are more probable, given Iran's importance for oil and transit. Securing a nuclear bomb is the second most likely path. The speaker warns that current ceasefires are a trick to rearm Israel for further escalation. Given Israel's actions in Gaza, the speaker wouldn't be surprised if Israel dropped a tactical nuclear bomb on Iran, enabled by Western control of the narrative. The war is far from over.

Host: Welcome back. We’re joined by Larry Johnson, a former CI analyst, to discuss what looks like a war with Iran coming sooner rather than later. The world is watching as the US mobilizes more military assets to the region. How should we read this? Is this preparation for war, or a show of strength during negotiations? Larry Johnson: I hoped it was intimidation, but people I trust in national security say this is far more serious. It’s described as one of two things: either a reprise of Midnight Hammer, when US and Iran coordinated two raids into northern Iran, or they’re preparing for an Israeli attack and to back Israel. It’s not just to force concessions at the negotiating table; it’s a warning indicator. Steve Bryan, a former undersecretary of defense, reacted emotionally to US–Iran negotiations, arguing that Iran is using a rope-a-dope strategy. This pressure toward attacking Iran is enormous, and Netanyahu’s visit suggests coordination. The issue has moved beyond nuclear weapons to ballistic missiles and support for Hamas and Hezbollah. The rhetoric around Hamas and Hezbollah is, in my view, a red herring; Israeli claims don’t match the facts. Trump is under heavy pressure from the Zionist lobby to act, and I think a violence outbreak in the next two weeks is plausible, though I hope I’m wrong. Host: The debate you referenced about motives is revealing. If the goal is to destabilize or create chaos to justify action, which past interventions show that hasn’t produced sustainable stability. If the aim is negotiation leverage, what can be achieved now? It seems the US insists on tying any nuclear deal to Iran abandoning its allies and deterrence. Johnson: Iran has built a formidable arsenal: 18 types of ballistic missiles, a recently reportedly successful intercontinental ballistic missile test, five types of cruise missiles, and over 15 types of drones. They’ve learned from decades of conflict with the US and see themselves as at war with the United States. The US narrative of Iran as the aggressor clashes with historical US actions that damaged Iran’s economy and civilian life. Iran’s patience has been tested; they’ve drawn a line in the sand and are prepared to defend themselves, retaliating massively if attacked. They now have support from China and Russia, including advanced radar and air defense, with Chinese and Russian ships headed to the Arabian Sea for a joint exercise. If conflict escalates, Iran could retaliate across the region, with regional actors potentially joining in. Host: You mentioned the tactical realities of the region. The US has deployed many F-35s to the region, including land-based F-35s for SEAD. There are reports of a large US presence in Armenia, and Iran’s potential to strike Haifa or Tel Aviv if attacked. The geopolitical picture is complex, with Russia and China providing support to Iran. The US carrier fleet in the Gulf would face Iranian, Russian, and Chinese air defenses and missiles, including hypersonics. The question is whether the US can sustain a prolonged, scalable war against Iran. Johnson: The US’s sea-based strength is being tested. In the Red Sea, the US faced difficulties against the Houthis with two carriers and a robust air-defense screen; in the current scenario, Iran’s capabilities—air defenses, missiles, drones, and support from Russia and China—make a quick, decisive victory unlikely. Moreover, Israel’s own readiness for a broader war is uncertain; Netanyahu’s visit to the US could signal coordination, but Israeli media note that they may join only if Iran is on the back foot. There’s concern about intelligence reliability: Mossad assets that aided last year’s operations in Iran may be compromised, while Iran benefits from new radar and integrated air defenses. Host: Regional reactions could be pivotal. Iran has contingency plans against regional targets, and Armenia/Azerbaijan might be used as launch pads. Saudi Arabia and Qatar may sit this out if possible, while Iraq has aligned with Iran. The broader question is whether diplomacy can prevail, or whether the cycle of treating conflicts with force will continue. There’s a critique of Western policy: the idea that Iran wants to destroy the US is simplistic, and the region’s dynamics are far more nuanced. Johnson: Iran’s potential to escalate, regional dynamics, and great-power backing mean this could be more than a localized conflict. The overarching point is that there are limits to military power; politics and diplomacy remain essential, and the West’s current posture underestimates the complexity of Iran’s deterrence and regional links. Host: Thanks, Larry. I’ll link to Sonar 21 for more of your writings.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of striking Iran to eliminate its nuclear program and the broader implications of regime change. - Speaker 0 acknowledges arguments that Israel has wanted to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, and that American involvement with B-52s and large bombs might be needed to finish the job. He notes the idea of a strike that proceeds quickly with minimal American casualties, under a Trump-era frame that Iran will not get a nuclear bomb. - He observes a shift among Washington’s neoconservative and Republican circles from opposing Iran’s nuclear capability to opposing Ayatollah rule itself, suggesting a subtle change in objectives while maintaining the theme of intervention. He concedes cautious support if Trump executes it prudently, but warns of a “switcheroo” toward regime change rather than purely disabling the nuclear program. - Speaker 0 criticizes the record of neocons on foreign policy (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the Arab Spring) and argues that the entire Middle East bears their failures. He emphasizes a potential regime-change drive and questions what would come after removing the Ayatollah, including possible US troop deployments and financial support for a new regime. - He highlights the size of Iran (about 92,000,000 people, two and a half times the size of Texas) and warns that regime change could trigger a bloody civil war and a large refugee crisis, possibly drawing tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths and destabilizing Europe. - Speaker 1 presents a more vocal stance: he would like to see the regime fall and leaves to the president the timing and method, insisting that if the nuclear program isn’t eliminated now, “we’ll all regret it” and urging to “be all in” to help Israel finish the job. - In cuts 3:43, Speaker 1 argues that removing the Ayatollah’s regime would be beneficial because staying in power would continue to threaten Israel, foment terrorism, and pursue a bomb; he characterizes the regime as aiming to destroy Jews and Sunni Islam, calling them “fanatical religious Nazis.” - Speaker 0 responds that such a forceful call for regime change is immature, shallow, and reckless, warning that certainty about outcomes in foreign interventions is impossible. He asserts that the first rule of foreign policy is humility, noting that prior interventions led to prolonged conflict and mass displacement. He cautions against beating the drums for regime change in another Middle Eastern country, especially the largest, and reiterates that the issue is not simply removing the nuclear program but opposing Western-led regime change. - The discussion frames a tension between supporting efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and resisting Western-led regime change, with a strong emphasis on potential humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. The speakers reference public opinion (citing 86% of Americans not wanting Iran to have a bomb) and critique interventions as historically destabilizing.

Netanyahu may be pushing for regime change in Iran to distract from his political troubles at home, as he recently survived a vote of no confidence by only two votes. The speaker believes the focus on Iran's nuclear program is a pretext, as North Korea poses a greater nuclear threat to the U.S. because they possess the bomb, delivery system, and reentry vehicle, unlike Iran. While Iran's rhetoric is hostile, North Korea openly threatens to wipe out US cities. The speaker suggests a diplomatic approach with Iran, similar to Trump's approach with North Korea, but acknowledges Iran has expelled IAEA inspectors, raising concerns about a secret nuclear program. The speaker points out that Israel, which also possesses nuclear weapons, allows no international inspections. While not judging Israel's nuclear ambitions, the speaker deems it hypocritical to initiate a regime change war over secret nuclear weapons when Israel has them too. The speaker proposes a deal where both Iran and Israel give up their secret nuclear weapon programs, suggesting Trump could broker such a deal.

- The discussion references the Samson option described by Sy Hirsch, noting that Israel supposedly has the option to retaliate against a perceived enemy even if it destroys Israel itself. The question posed is what a war on Iran would look like and how Israel would respond if Iran retaliated with hypersonic missiles. - Speaker 1 asserts that if Israelis were to use nuclear weapons against the Iranians, it would be “the end of Israel the way we know it today.” - Speaker 0 asks for clarification: “So they wouldn't use them?” - Speaker 1 replies: “No. According to the Sampson option, they would use them nevertheless.” He adds that they would “use it nevertheless” and “wouldn't think about the future. They would just use it,” describing the decision as coming from “a desperate group of people” in the Israeli cabinet and government that “want to stay in power and alive.”

Speaker 1 states that 20 years ago, the situation with Iraq was different because there were no weapons of mass destruction, and it was pre-nuclear age. Speaker 1 claims that Iran has gathered a tremendous amount of material and will be able to have a nuclear weapon within months, which "we can't let happen." When asked about intelligence that Iran is building a nuclear weapon, Speaker 1 claims that if the intelligence community says there is no evidence, then "my intelligence community is wrong." When told that the director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, said there was no evidence, Speaker 1 reiterated that "she's wrong." Speaker 1 denies helping Iran to stop reports of claims slamming Iran from China, stating that "they're there to take people out."

A nuclear-armed Iran would bring stability to the region because nuclear weapons are weapons of peace and deterrence with hardly any offensive capability. If Iran had a nuclear deterrent, the United States and Israel would not threaten to attack, similar to how the US didn't invade Iraq when Saddam potentially had nuclear weapons or attack Libya when Gaddafi did not. While some proliferation is possible with countries like Turkey or Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons, Iran would not be able to blackmail anyone because the US would extend its nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia and Turkey, similar to Germany and Japan during the Cold War. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, which is why states pursue them. The US and Israel would back off from threatening Iran if Iran obtained them. Gaddafi was targeted after giving up his nuclear program, and North Korea would be foolish to give up theirs. The US, Israel, Britain, India, and Pakistan aren't giving up their nuclear weapons either because they are the ultimate deterrent.

Attacking a nation like Iran would quickly teach them to acquire nuclear weapons to prevent future attacks. Israel, North Korea, France, the United States, and Russia all obtained nuclear weapons for this reason. The speaker references the United States killing 250,000,000 people in two days in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, stating that it was not a high moral moment for America. The speaker suggests that attacking Iran could push them to develop nuclear weapons.

Colonel Daniel Davis joins the discussion to address the idea of a forthcoming false flag attack aimed at provoking Iran into a broader war. The conversation threads through claims that key US and Israeli military hardware is in place, Russia has countermeasures ready, and that Israel and a US “deep state” war faction coordinated by the CIA are driving the move. There’s also the assertion that a US carrier strike group is in place for the operation, and that the New York Times reports Trump has received intelligence suggesting Iran’s position is weakening. The host questions the reliability of this intelligence flow, asking who is really transmitting such assessments and whether the CIA or others are shaping Trump’s view. Davis pushes back on the weakening Iran narrative, stating he has followed Iran for years and sees no evidence that Iran is weakening; to the contrary, he notes Iran used a forceful response to suppress a rebellion—an action that, in his view, suggests strength. He references outside voices, including Mossad and Pompeo’s New Year’s Eve tweets, to illustrate how Western narratives have portrayed the protests. He challenges the idea that the protests reveal Iran’s weakness, arguing that the regime’s security apparatus remained in control and that no IRGC defections or regime desertions appeared visible. He warns that if Trump is led to believe Iran is at its weakest point, a more aggressive push could backfire, potentially producing a strong repudiation. The discussion turns to what a “deal” with Iran might entail. The co-panelists note claims that Trump says they can make a deal, while Davis explains that reports indicate any deal would require Iran to remove enriched uranium, cap long-range missiles, change its regional proxy policies, and ban independent uranium enrichment—red lines Iran has repeatedly rejected. The implication is that such terms would, in practice, preclude a peaceful settlement and push toward a military strike. The debate then moves to the military buildup and international reactions. The host asks about possible actions in the next few days, given reports of an Israeli target date around January 30. Davis rejects the notion of a simple, quick conflict, arguing that some Trump administration insiders want a regime-change outcome, whereas he sees limited attainable objectives beyond bombing or destroying infrastructure. He emphasizes the risk of a miscalculation leading to American or Israeli casualties and the potential for a prolonged conflict. He warns there is zero upside to a strike on Iran and a high downside if Iran responds forcefully. Turning to regional dynamics, the panel discusses how Russia, China, and a new Saudi axis might respond. Davis suggests China and Russia would offer logistical support or dual-use equipment rather than direct military aid, preferring to watch the confrontation and preserve their own interests. He also speculates that Beijing and Moscow hope to avoid provoking a broader conflict that could erode their own alliances, while watching Western infighting. A brief, cautioned aside notes Pakistan’s stated red line response to any Israeli nuclear escalation, indicating a potential chain reaction in the region. The panelists acknowledge the risk of escalation but maintain that Israel, if pressured, might pursue a broader conflict with Iran, while noting the uncertainty of Iran’s exact response should a strike occur. The exchange ends with a consensus that the scenario described contains significant risk and complexity, with the overall sentiment that pursuing such a conflict could have catastrophic consequences. Note: Promotional content for ExpressVPN was removed from the summary.

A nuclear-armed Iran would bring stability to the region because nuclear weapons are weapons of peace and deterrence with hardly any offensive capability. If Iran had a nuclear deterrent, the United States and Israel would not threaten to attack, similar to how the US didn't invade Iraq when Saddam potentially had nuclear weapons, or Libya when Gaddafi did not. While proliferation is possible with countries like Turkey or Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons, it's unlikely because Iran wouldn't be able to blackmail anyone. The US would extend its nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia and Turkey, deterring Iran from blackmail. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, which is why states pursue them. The US and Israel would back off from threatening Iran if it obtained nuclear weapons. Gaddafi gave up his nuclear program and was killed, while North Korea won't give up its nuclear weapons because they are the ultimate deterrent. The US and Israel aren't giving up their nuclear weapons either. There are powerful incentives for countries in dangerous neighborhoods to acquire nuclear weapons.

Speaker 0 asserts that Donald Trump decided to bomb Iran because Israelis said, for the first time, that if Trump did not bomb Iran to take out deep bunkers, Israel would use nuclear weapons; they had never threatened that before, and bombing Iran might save them from the start of World War III by preventing Israeli nuclear use. Speaker 1 asks for clarification, restating that Israelis told the U.S. president to use military power to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities, or Israel, acting on its own, would use nuclear weapons. They note the problem with that statement, since Israel has never admitted having them. Speaker 0 concurs, and Speaker 1 points out the contradiction: they are saying Israel just admitted to having nuclear weapons, yet the U.S. does not have them in the IAEA treaty. Speaker 0 adds that, if Israeli nuclear whistleblowers are to be believed, Israel has had nuclear weapons, and began working on them in the 1950s.

I'm not sure what happened, but he didn't break it off with me; he wants to make a deal. The problem is I've empowered you, and without the United States, you don't have the leverage. Your people are brave, but you either make a deal, or we're out. If we're out, you'll have to fight it out, and it won't be pretty because you don't have the cards. Once we sign a deal, you're in a better position, but you're not acting thankful, which isn't nice. I think we've seen enough; this will be great television. We'll see what we can do and stay out of the way.