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China will face a crisis that will spread globally, leading to a third world war with nuclear exchanges. There are preparations for a major geophysical event every 11,500 years, possibly linked to Atlantis. Information on this is rumored to be in the Vatican library, not public knowledge.

Chinese military doctrine aims to induce societal panic in their adversary. The ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline in May 2021 gave the Chinese government a taste of this. Now, imagine this on a larger scale: multiple disrupted pipelines, telecommunications failure, polluted water causing sickness, derailing trains, malfunctioning port control systems, and a disrupted air traffic control system. The Chinese government believes that this scenario would crush American will to defend Taiwan in a major conflict.

The speaker discusses whether Xi Jinping will attack Taiwan. They mention that in a previous interview, Xi Jinping stated that he would not attack Taiwan until 2027 or 2035. However, many people doubt the credibility of his statement. The speaker also reveals recent information about large-scale power outages in Xinjiang, Fujian, and Beijing, suggesting that these outages may be part of military preparations. They mention that this information is a leak. The speaker concludes by mentioning that the US government officials want to verify Xi Jinping's statements.

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine is not just a battle between two countries, but a larger struggle between democracy and dictatorship, specifically involving the Chinese Communist Party and the United States. The CCP's strategy includes creating chaos in multiple regions to overwhelm the US, with conflicts in the Middle East, Russia's aggression towards Ukraine, and CCP's intimidation of Taiwan. These actions highlight the global impact of the Chinese Communist Party's influence.

A meeting discussed the potential impact of biological weapons on China, suggesting a pandemic could spread globally, leading to panic and military lockdowns in the West. This chaos could escalate into a third world war with significant nuclear exchanges. The conversation shifted to the motivations behind these actions, hinting at a belief among powerful groups, referred to as the Illuminati or cabal, that a major geophysical event is imminent. They have invested heavily in underground bases and emergency preparedness, possibly in anticipation of a catastrophic event that could threaten humanity. The idea is that with totalitarian control established, Western governments would be better positioned to manage the aftermath of such a disaster.

The conversation centers on escalating US-China tensions, with a focus on trade restrictions, rare earths, Taiwan, and the broader economic and political systems of the two powers. Professor Yasheng Huang, born in China and now a US-based academic, provides a framework for understanding how these moves fit into longer-term strategic aims and implications. Key points about rare earths and export controls - The Chinese Ministry of Commerce described the move as an export control rather than a pure export ban: those who use the Chinese rare earth processing must submit applications, with civilian usages allowed and defense-related usage scrutinized or prohibited. Huang notes the definition of civilian versus defense usage is unclear. - He emphasizes that rare earths are ubiquitous in electronics (phones, computers) and that magnets produced in China are essential for US missiles, air defense, and other military equipment. If China fully implements the controls, it would “send shock waves globally” and amount to a sudden stop in production of equipment and devices, with a broad, non-targeted impact on the global economy. - Huang argues that the policy is not well targeted as a bargaining chip against the US; it would affect any user of the Chinese rare earth processing. He suggests the move may have been intended to pressure for a summit with Xi Jinping and Trump but notes China may have overplayed its hand, especially given weaknesses in US agricultural exports and domestic farming pressure. Timeline and strategic context - The dialogue traces recent US-Chinese trade steps: fentanyl tariffs by the US; subsequent broad tariffs; a Geneva truce; halting five-nanometer chip exports; then relaxing some restrictions to seven-nanometer chips with revenue caps on Chinese sales. The rare earth move is positioned as a broader leverage tactic around a forthcoming summit in South Korea. - Huang highlights a mid-September US docking-fee announcement on Chinese ships and a China retaliatory “stocking fee” on US ships, underscoring asymmetry in leverage. He views the rare earth restriction as potentially aiming to strengthen bargaining ahead of the Xi-Trump meeting but notes it may not be well calibrated. Implications for the US and the global economy - The rare earth restrictions would create a global shock given their role in electronics and defense tech, with a diffuse target that affects multiple sectors across nations. - In the short run, the move gives China substantial bargaining leverage over the US and over allied economic planning; in the long run, it could spur other countries to build processing capacity and reduce dependence on China. - Huang compares this to Apple’s 2022 diversification away from China after COVID-19 controls, suggesting that strategic shifts toward diversification take time, even if motivated by short-term shocks. Economic outlook for China - Huang distinguishes between China’s impressive infrastructure and manufacturing prowess and underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. He notes debt-to-GDP has risen since 2008, with productivity trends trending downward, and widespread inefficiencies—that is, “net” productivity is negative when counting unseen inefficiencies. - He describes overbuilding in real estate (empty cities and warehouses) that increases debt while not translating into enduring demand, contributing to strains even as headline growth remains around 5%. He argues that the perceived efficiency from visible factories does not capture systemic inefficiencies. - The distinction is drawn between hard assets (like infrastructure) and “soft” financial advantages (dollar-based financial power). He asserts that while hard assets like rare earth resources and manufacturing capacity are real, the long-run relyability of autocratic efficiency is not guaranteed; personal income growth in China has historically been higher when the political system was more open, such as in the 1980s. Taiwan and the future of cross-strait relations - Regarding Taiwan, Huang notes that the day China invades Taiwan would mark the end of the Chinese economy because wartime adjustments would disrupt the export-driven model and debt-financed growth. He stresses the importance of delaying a potential conflict to preserve the status quo. - He also points out that the Taiwanese leadership’s push for formal recognition of independence, alongside US rhetoric, creates risk, while acknowledging China’s strategic aim of reunification but calling the timing and rationale crucially tied to economic and geopolitical calculations. Democracy vs. autocracy - The discussion turns to governance models. Huang argues that the US system is flawed in ways—such as gerrymandering and the electoral college—that undermine democratic ideals, though he cautions against oversimplifying comparisons with China. - He contends that China’s autocracy has enabled rapid growth but that long-run household income growth in China has not kept pace with GDP growth, especially under more autocratic leadership like Xi Jinping’s. He highlights that openness correlated with higher personal income growth in China’s history, suggesting that “open autocracies” or relatively less autocratic regimes may yield stronger household outcomes than outright autocracy. Trump’s China strategy and Europe - Huang suggests Trump’s approach has elevated autocratic leaders’ legitimacy globally, including Xi’s. He notes that Europe could move closer to China if China repositions on Ukraine, but that the rare earth move complicates that alignment. European reliance on Western security and American leadership remains a factor. Overall, the conversation frames rare earth controls as a high-stakes, potentially destabilizing move with mixed long-term consequences, while exploring the connected dynamics of China’s economy, cross-strait tensions, and the comparative advantages and vulnerabilities of democratic versus autocratic governance in shaping future geopolitics.

The Evergrande crisis in China is predicted to cause a chain reaction, leading to the collapse of domestic and international stock markets, financial institutions, and the entire financial system. The speaker suggests that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may resort to destructive measures, such as imprisoning people in their homes or causing harm. Additionally, they warn of a potential global virus outbreak. It is advised to be cautious and prepared.

The speaker discusses a plan involving biological weapons targeting China, leading to a global pandemic and eventually a third world war. The reasoning behind this plan is believed to be preparation for a major geophysical event that could threaten the world's resources. The goal is for western governments to have totalitarian control to rebuild after the cataclysm.

The speaker discusses a plan involving biological weapons targeting China, leading to a global pandemic and a third world war. The reasoning behind this plan is believed to be preparation for a major geophysical event, prompting the need for emergency preparedness to ensure survival and control in the aftermath. The goal is for western governments to have totalitarian control to rebuild the world post-cataclysm.

Many Western corporations are unaware of the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leader, Xi Jinping. Throughout history, no organization has survived when dealing with the CCP. Xi Jinping has transformed the party into his own, and it is no longer representative of communism. It is crucial for corporations to realize this for their long-term benefit. The New Federal State of China is a group that possesses internal intelligence about the CCP. They can provide valuable information and protection, not just for profit.

Mario interviews Professor Yasheng Huang about the evolving US-China trade frictions, the rare-earth pivot, Taiwan considerations, and broader questions about China’s economy and governance. Key points and insights - Rare earths as a bargaining tool: China’s rare-earth processing and export controls would require anyone using Chinese-processed rare earths to submit applications, with civilian uses supposedly allowed but defense uses scrutinized. Huang notes the distinction between civilian and defense usage is unclear, and the policy, if fully implemented, would shock global supply chains because rare earths underpin magnets used in phones, computers, missiles, defense systems, and many other electronics. He stresses that the rule would have a broad, not narrowly targeted, impact on the US and global markets. - Timeline and sequence of tensions: The discussion traces a string of moves beginning with US tariffs on China (and globally) in 2018–2019, a Geneva truce in 2019, and May/June 2019 actions around nanometer-scale chip controls. In August, the US relaxed some restrictions on seven-nanometer chips to China with revenue caps on certain suppliers. In mid–September (the period of this interview), China imposed docking fees on US ships and reportedly added a rare-earth export-control angle. Huang highlights that this combination—docking fees plus a sweeping rare-earth export control—appears to be an escalatory step, potentially timed to influence a forthcoming Xi-Trump summit. He argues China may have overplayed its hand and notes the export-control move is not tightly targeted, suggesting a broader bargaining chip rather than a precise lever against a single demand. - Motives and strategic logic: Huang suggests several motives for China’s move: signaling before a potential summit in South Korea; leveraging weaknesses in US agricultural exports (notably soybeans) during a harvest season; and accelerating a broader shift toward domestic processing capacity for rare earths by other countries. He argues the rare-earth move could spur other nations (Japan, Europe, etc.) to build their own refining and processing capacity, reducing long-run Chinese leverage. Still, in the short term, China holds substantial bargaining weight, given the global reliance on Chinese processing. - Short-term vs. long-term implications: Huang emphasizes the distinction between short-run leverage and long-run consequences. While China can tighten rare-earth supply now, the long-run effect is to incentivize diversification away from Chinese processing. He compares the situation to Apple diversifying production away from China after zero-COVID policies in 2022; it took time to reconfigure supply chains, and some dependence remains. In the long run, this shift could erode China’s near-term advantages in processing and export-driven growth, even as it remains powerful today. - Global role of hard vs. soft assets: The conversation contrasts hard assets (gold, crypto) with soft assets (the dollar, reserve currency status). Huang notes that moving away from the dollar is more feasible for countries in the near term than substituting rare-earth refining and processing. The move away from rare earths would require new refining capacity and supply chains that take years to establish. - China’s economy and productivity: The panel discusses whether China’s growth is sustainable under increasing debt and slowing productivity. Huang explains that while aggregate GDP has grown dramatically, total factor productivity in China has been weaker, and the incremental capital required to generate each additional percentage point of growth has risen. He points to overbuilding—empty housing and excess capacity—as evidence of inefficiencies that add to debt without commensurate output gains. In contrast, he notes that some regions with looser central control performed better historically, and that Deng Xiaoping’s era of opening correlated with stronger personal income growth, even if the overall economy remained autocratic. - Democracy, autocracy, and development: The discussion turns to governance models. Huang argues that examining democracy in the abstract can be misleading; the US system has significant institutional inefficiencies (gerrymandering, the electoral college). He asserts that autocracy is not inherently the driver of China’s growth; rather, China’s earlier phases benefited from partial openness and more open autocracy, with current autocracy not guaranteeing sustained momentum. He cites evidence that in China, personal income growth rose most when political openings were greater in the 1980s, suggesting that more open practices during development correlated with better living standards for individuals, though China remains not a democracy. - Trump, strategy, and global realignments: Huang views Trump as a transactional leader whose approach has elevated autocratic figures’ legitimacy internationally. He notes that Europe and China could move closer if China moderates its Ukraine stance, though rare-earth moves complicate such alignment. He suggests that allies may tolerate Trump’s demands for short-term gains while aiming to protect longer-term economic interests, and that the political landscape in the US could shift with a new president, potentially altering trajectories. - Taiwan and the risk of conflict: The interview underscores that a full-scale invasion of Taiwan would, in Huang’s view, mark the end of China’s current growth model, given the wartime economy transition and the displacement of reliance on outward exports and consumption. He stresses the importance of delaying conflict as a strategic objective and maintains concern about both sides’ leadership approaches to Taiwan. - Taiwan, energy security, and strategic dependencies: The conversation touches on China’s energy imports—especially oil through crucial chokepoints like the Malacca Strait—and the potential vulnerabilities if regional dynamics shift following any escalation on Taiwan. Huang reiterates that a Taiwan invasion would upend China’s economy and government priorities, given the high debt burden and the transition toward a wartime economy. Overall, the dialogue centers on the complex interplay of China’s use of rare-earth leverage, the short- and long-term economic and strategic consequences for the United States and its allies, and the broader questions around governance models, productivity, debt, and geopolitical risk in a shifting global order.

Wang Wen, professor and dean of the Changyang Institute of Financial Studies and the School of Global Leadership at Renmin University of China, discusses Beijing’s view on the Iran war and its broader implications for China and the international order. - China’s position on the Iran conflict: Beijing emphasizes a resolution through political negotiation and opposes unilateral military action not authorized by the UN. China calls for a ceasefire, an end to hostility, respect for sovereignty and development rights, and opposes the maximum pressure campaign and long-term sanctions. This stance reflects adherence to international law, multilateralism, and safeguarding global peace, while aligning with China’s strategic interests as a major energy importer and advocate of multilateral solutions. - Context of a shifting world order: The justifications for a multipolar world are growing. The U.S. and Germany are viewed as nearing the end of their post–Cold War order, with the world entering a multipolar era. Two features cited: the U.S. has largely lost the capacity to dominate globally and may retreat to regional influence, while emerging powers (China, Russia, India, Brazil, and others) rise and constrain U.S. ability to contain them. Iran is seen as part of this broader transition, with the possibility of greater regional and systemic shifts over the coming decade. - China’s cautious but steady approach: China maintains a low-profile stance and continues normal trade with all sides (including the U.S., Israel, and Iran) while urging ceasefires and political resolution. US sanctions targeting Chinese banks and Iran are deemed unreasonable threats; Beijing signals it will counter such measures if pressed. - Belt and Road and Middle East investments: China’s Middle East investments and the Belt and Road Initiative (BI) face disruption due to the war. Oil imports via the Strait of Hormuz (about 35% of China’s oil) and China’s broader energy security are affected. China’s approach emphasizes diversification: expanding overland corridors (e.g., North–South routes, Eurasian Railway Express, Trans-C-Cascadia paths, Central Asia Land Corridor) and increasing energy sourcing from non-Middle Eastern suppliers (Russia, Central Asia, Africa, South America) to reduce reliance on maritime routes. Investment in Iran (about $5 billion, with projects across the region) has slowed as the war continues, with evacuations and impeded progress, though China’s strategic emphasis on diversified transport and energy remains central. - Taiwan issue and potential conflict: Wang argues that if China intends to resolve Taiwan by force, the U.S. would have already lost the capacity to stop it; a peaceful resolution is increasingly likely. He states that any use of force would target independence rather than the general public in Taiwan, and reiterates China’s long-standing preference for peaceful unification. - US–China–Russia triangle: The conflict reshapes this triangle. The U.S. is constrained by Iran, becoming more erratic, and signaling toward China and Russia. Russia benefits from higher oil prices and the Ukraine situation, while China faces oil-import pressures and market volatility. Overall, the U.S. strategy appears less capable of containing both China and Russia; both Beijing and Moscow gain strategic leverage in this environment. - Risks and opportunities for China if the war continues: Energy security risks rise due to higher oil costs and potential disruption to Middle East trade, complicating BI projects and regional diplomacy. The situation increases the appeal of diversification of energy sources and transport corridors. However, China typically prefers peace and stability as the best path for growth. - The new book and strategic opportunity: Wang promotes his book, New Strategic Opportunity: China and the World toward 2035, arguing that the world’s turbulence highlights China’s peace, stability, and prosperity as valuable. He contends that no matter the adverse environment, China can seize new strategic opportunities by focusing on domestic development, reinforcing that the longer the U.S. seeks conflict, the more China upholds peace and rises. - Closing observations: The interviewer notes the broader perception of China’s growing influence and responsibility in shaping a responsible international system, with Wang affirming a peaceful, opportunity-driven path for China’s rise.

Speaker 0 argues that there is extreme manipulation of oil futures prices in the paper market, diverging from the physical price of oil. He claims the paper market price for oil is around $92–$95, which is heavily manipulated by the U.S. government, while the actual physical price is about $142 a barrel. He asserts the manipulated paper price will eventually collide with the physical price, but the U.S. government and treasury will prevent that from happening soon, noting that markets no longer have true price discovery across gold, silver, stocks, and treasuries due to central bank actions. He contends that from the White House outward, messaging is fake, including a staged DoorDash incident and the claim that there is no inflation, as well as misrepresentations about Iran. He references JD Vance, stating that Vance characterized Iran’s blockage of the Strait of Hormuz as economic terrorism and suggested, “two can play at that game,” while later claiming we will abide by international law. He views Vance as revealing a contradiction in good-faith negotiations, alleging Vance did not have authority to negotiate and had to consult Netanyahu to decide to walk away, portraying Netanyahu as driving the push to keep the war going. Turning back to oil, Speaker 0 discusses global oil supplies and an estimated daily deficit of around 8–10 million barrels per day, projecting that by June the world will run out of above-ground oil. He explains that “above ground oil” is what matters for immediate demand, and that even though oil remains underground, it won’t help fill immediate needs like for tractors. With oil running short, he says desperate buyers could bid prices higher, potentially reaching $200–$250 per barrel if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed. He views this as a scenario in which the United States could face economic pain and allied countries could experience industrial, power grid, and economic collapse, possibly even regime collapse, with prolonged damage taking years to recover. Speaker 0 predicts that the United States could lose Taiwan as an ally, risking loss of Taiwan’s semiconductor supply, which he says would be devastating to the U.S. and Western countries but a victory for China. He argues that the opposite narratives about “winning” are incoherent; he portrays a cycle of changing claims about whether the Strait is open or closed as evidence of a lack of consistent “winning conditions.” Finally, Speaker 0 urges preparedness, promoting his podcast and websites for further information, and endorses satellite communications as part of resilience planning. He does not endorse the promotional content at the end in this summary.

The United States believes China will attack Taiwan because America is always looking to start new wars to justify defense spending. America needs to find new enemies, and it believes that the greatest threat to American empire right now is China, even though there's no evidence of this. Currently, China sends America cheap goods, and the U.S. gives China U.S. dollars. The Communist Party is storing the wealth of the Chinese people in American banks, which benefits America, Wall Street, and the Chinese Communist Party. If China takes over Taiwan, America doesn't lose much. The semiconductor industry in Taiwan could be moved elsewhere. However, America has hubris and must save face.

The next US president needs to clearly state that the US will defend Taiwan and strengthen its relationship with India to counter China's influence. The speaker believes that the Second Amendment can also deter foreign autocrats, as it has in America. The lack of a specific deterrent strategy allows Xi Jinping to encroach on Taiwan. The reason for this is fear, stemming from the US's economic dependence on China. The speaker highlights the double standards in economic relations, where China is given preferential treatment despite its actions. The US cannot rely on China for pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, and an outsider is needed to fix the broken establishment.

There's a perception that the pandemic is either natural or engineered by China, but it's actually a state of war. The U.S. has been using bioweapons against China for some time, leading to heightened military readiness in China. This explains the widespread mask-wearing, constant testing, and city lockdowns. Both nations are decoupling, and the world is in a state of war that hasn't yet reached its peak. The worst-case scenario could involve nuclear escalation, but systems are in place to prevent that. For instance, Russia and China are taking preemptive actions to avoid conflict, as seen in Ukraine, where Russia intervened when agreements were not honored.

China is predicted to face a significant crisis, leading to widespread panic across the Western world and resulting in totalitarian military lockdowns. This situation could escalate into what some are calling the Third World War, potentially involving nuclear exchanges. There are also concerns about a major geophysical event, with substantial investments made in deep underground bases, the purpose of which remains unclear. Historical patterns suggest these geophysical events occur approximately every 11,500 years. Additionally, it is believed that crucial information about Atlantis, possibly contained in the ancient Library of Alexandria, has been lost but may now be retrieved from the Vatican library. This information is not widely available to the public.

Chinese President Xi Jinping plans to visit the United States to meet with President Biden. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a long-standing strategy of using this approach. Their internal propaganda convinces the Chinese people that when they meet Americans, they will persuade them that the US has no other option. Once in the US, they urge Americans to remain calm and optimistic, emphasizing the desire for China and the US to be friends again. This tactic has previously allowed the CCP to gain entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which some argue has had detrimental effects on the US economy.

Professor Jiang discusses the Iran war and its wide-ranging implications, framing it as a protracted conflict with potential strategic recomposition rather than a quick end. - Trump’s posture and off ramp: Jiang says Trump is frustrated by the war, expected a quick strike and Iranian capitulation, and has sought an off ramp through negotiations (notably in Islamabad) that the Iranians rejected. He states there is no clear, real off ramp at present, with Iran “holding the global economy under siege” and controlling the Strait of Hormuz despite a naval blockade. He notes two alleged off ramps discussed by Kushner and others: (1) Trump paying reparations to Iran (about a trillion dollars) and granting Iranians sovereignty over Hormuz while removing US bases; (2) deploying ground forces to topple the regime and install a more US-friendly government. He predicts the war will drag on, potentially for months or years, and suggests Trump may distract with other conflicts (such as Cuba or actions against Mexico’s cartels) to avoid losing face. - Long-term, three-pillar US strategy: The first pillar uses ground forces to strangle Iran by controlling the Strait of Hormuz, destroying Iran’s oil export capacity and finanical leverage. The second pillar involves forward operating bases in Iran’s ethnic enclaves (e.g., southeast near the Pakistani border with Baluchis, and northwest with Kurds) to stir ethnic tensions and foment civil conflict. The third pillar aims to “suffocate Tehran” by targeting infrastructure, water reservoirs, power plants, and rail networks to starve the population, all while trying to minimize troop casualties. Jiang emphasizes that this would be a gradual process designed to pressure Iranians toward a political settlement. - Perception and domestic storytelling: The speakers discuss how to frame this as not a real war but as economic consequences or recalibration, with ongoing disruption and potential shortages as a form of pressure. Jiang notes the goal of creating a new strategic equilibrium that reduces domestic desire for prolonged engagement unless casualties rise substantially. - Domestic and global economic concerns: The conversation shifts to the economy, with Christine Lagarde warning that one-third of the world’s fertilizer passes through Hormuz and discussing risks of price inflation, shortages, and potential rationing. Lagarde argues that disruptions could lead to inflationary pressures and supply-chain fragility, with ripples in aviation fuel and European airports imposing rationing. Jiang agrees Lagarde foresees a major catastrophe approaching the global economy, highlighting just-in-time supply chains as particularly vulnerable and suggesting policy responses may involve greater control over populations, possibly including digital currency and digital IDs. - How the war could influence American society and policy: The discussion covers the possibility of a wartime footing in the United States, including a broader move toward control mechanisms such as digital currencies and surveillance. Jiang and the hosts discuss the potential for an AI-driven control grid, the role of hypersurveillance agencies like ICE, and a “Stargate”-level expansion of data-centers. They raise concerns about the implications of a draft, and Palantir’s stated push to bring back conscription, arguing that an AI surveillance state could justify such a mechanism. - War as a narrative and distraction tool: The hosts explore the idea that the public may be gradually desensitized to ongoing conflict, with the war in Iran serving as a backdrop for broader geopolitical maneuvers, including space and defense initiatives. They discuss how narratives around space programs, alien-invasion scenarios, and “control-grid” technologies could function as social control mechanisms to maintain obedience during economic or political crises. - Final reflection: Jiang cautions that a shift in mindset is needed, urging viewers to consider the worst-case scenarios and to prepare for economic and social stress, including the possibility of a prolonged, multi-pillar strategy aimed at reshaping Iran and embedding a wider, domestically straining economic order. Overall, the conversation centers on a predicted transition from a rapid conflict to a calculated, multi-pillar strategy aimed at eroding Iran’s capacity and potentially fracturing its social fabric, while simultaneously highlighting impending domestic economic distress and the possible expansion of control mechanisms in the United States.

The CCP, with its extensive knowledge of the COVID-19 virus and future events, anticipates being held accountable by Western countries and the world. As a result, they plan to initiate economic, technological, and military conflicts against the United States, the West, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Cuba, and South America. The CCP's weapons development aims to bring about global destruction. The party, now dominated by Xi Jinping, is engaged in a fierce internal political battle, sidelining Hu Jintao's faction. Disregarding people's livelihoods, Xi's party will eventually face destruction due to the Taiwan conflict and internal issues.