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A speaker emphasizes shifting focus away from Saudi Arabia and toward Venezuela, stating that the country has more oil, infinite potential, and will open markets. The plan is to privatize all industry and move government operations out of the old sector. The speaker highlights Venezuela’s huge resources—oil, gas, minerals, land, technology—and notes its strategic location relative to the United States. The message asserts that American companies are in a “super strategic position to invest,” and that Venezuela will be “the brightest opportunity for investment of American companies, of good people that are going to make a lot of money.”

Over the next two decades, $150 billion worth of oil and gas will be extracted off the coast, releasing over 2 billion tons of carbon emissions. Guyana has a forest storing 19.5 gigatons of carbon, with the lowest deforestation rate globally. Despite oil exploration, they maintain biodiversity. The speaker questions if the listener, possibly a head of state, values and pays for Guyana's environmental efforts or is influenced by those harming the environment.

The United States has the largest reserves of oil and gas in the world, and we may soon see significant growth in our country. For years, we have remained the same size, but that could change. Our focus will be on increased drilling, which is expected to lower prices and boost the economy.

Speaker 0 makes a series of conspiracy-oriented claims about Venezuela, the global financial system, and precious metals. He asserts that the coup in Venezuela is tied to control over the country’s silver, gold, and oil reserves, and that the Federal Reserve exerts influence over other nations through financial systems. He references two books as explanatory aids: Secrets of the Federal Reserve by Eustace Mullins (spoken as “Eustace Mullen’s Secrets of the Federal Reserve”) and Behold the Pale Horse by Will Cooper, describing the latter as highlighting how “bread and circuses” distract people while more significant issues—such as Epstein files and pedophiles—are overlooked. The speaker links the Venezuelan developments to metal markets, noting that silver is hitting a record high near $80 per ounce and gold near $4,300 per ounce, suggesting a correlation between the upheaval and precious metals dynamics. He states that the country “has tons of silver,” implying that the takeover is connected to bearing and extracting mineral wealth. A central premise is that the stated aim of such interventions is to “free the people,” but the speaker questions this motive, asking whether liberation would not have been possible earlier. He argues that if the leadership in Venezuela had been, for example, communist for decades, liberation could have occurred long ago, implying that the actual trigger for intervention is tied to resource wealth rather than humanitarian concerns. The speaker further contends that the intervention occurred specifically because Venezuela “has the highest silver reserves, gold reserves and also oil reserves,” prompting readers to consider whether actions were driven by resource significance rather than benevolent intent. He concludes by asserting that the true timing—liberating people when gold and silver prices are at record highs—reflects the strategic value of mineral wealth in the intervention. The overall narrative ties political upheaval in Venezuela to financial influence, resource wealth, and a broader pattern of outside powers advancing a banking-oriented agenda, as interpreted through the lens of the referenced books and current metal price movements.

Over the next decades, $150 billion worth of oil and gas will be extracted off Guyana's coast, releasing over 2 billion tons of carbon emissions. The President argues that Guyana's preserved forest, storing 19.5 gigatons of carbon, justifies their stance on climate change. Despite oil exploration, Guyana maintains a net zero carbon footprint and questions the world's hypocrisy in valuing biodiversity. The President challenges if others are influenced by those who harm the environment.

Donald Trump has argued that the US interest in Venezuela, including ships off its coast, is driven by drugs and smuggling, but there may be another factor at play: oil. The speaker notes that US oil production has surged thanks to shale and fracking, pushing the US past Saudi Arabia in output and leaving Venezuela as a much smaller producer (now around the 20th largest). Despite this boom, the US still relies heavily on imports. Crude oil comes in different types, notably by density. Light crude—often described as a “smoothie” or even clear when it comes out of the ground—dominates American shale oil production today. In contrast, heavy crude is gloopy and viscous. Refineries, particularly in the US, were built to process heavy oil into gasoline and other products. There are over 100 refineries in the US, with many located in Texas, Louisiana, and around California. Historically, California processed heavier oil, and key refineries in California, Texas, and Louisiana were designed to handle heavy crude. The shift to light shale oil has changed the feedstock mix for US refineries. Even with record oil production, the US imports remain high because the refineries still demand heavy crude. The share of heavy crude in US imports rose dramatically: it used to be about 12% of imports, but now it’s around 70%. Major sources of this heavy crude include Canada and Venezuela, with Canada’s share of US oil imports rising from around 15% to about 61%. Venezuela, once a larger supplier, has fallen to a comparatively small role in US oil imports. The geography of heavy oil matters because the world’s oil reserves are unevenly distributed by type. Venezuela tops the list of oil reserves, and the heavy, tar-like oil it holds is particularly relevant to those refineries optimized for heavy crude. The other significant sources of heavy oil include Canada and Russia. The speaker emphasizes that the type of oil a country needs matters for geopolitics, since heavy oil from Venezuela (and Canada) has been integral to feeding US refineries that were built for heavy crude, even as US production has become light and shale-driven. In short, while US shale has boosted domestic output, the reliance on heavy crude imports—especially from Canada and Venezuela—remains structurally important due to refinery configurations and the nature of available crude, making Venezuela’s oil context geopolitically significant beyond just drug-related concerns.

The speaker announces plans to open Venezuela for foreign investment, describing a $1,700,000,000,000 opportunity across multiple sectors. The opportunity is not limited to oil and gas, which are highlighted as huge, but also spans mining (including gold), infrastructure, and power. The speaker emphasizes that the opportunities will touch the entire energy value chain, stating that they will open all upstream, midstream, and downstream activities to all companies. In addition to energy, the speaker identifies opportunities in technology, AI, and tourism. They note that Venezuela has 2,800 kilometres of pristine Caribbean coastland ready to be developed, suggesting significant potential for coastal or tourism-related projects. A central part of the plan is to establish a favorable environment for foreign investment. The speaker asserts that they will bring rule of law, open markets, and security for foreign investment. They also mention a transparent massive privatization program that is waiting for investors, implying a broad and clear path to privatizations as part of the reform agenda. Key points highlighted include: - A $1.7 trillion opportunity encompassing oil and gas, mining (gold), infrastructure, and power. - The energy sector potential described as DRIP with 17 gigawatts of opportunity that needs rehab, indicating substantial modernization and development needs. - Broad openness to investment across the entire oil and gas value chain: upstream, midstream, downstream. - Additional growth areas in technology, AI, and tourism. - 2,800 kilometres of Caribbean coastline ready for development. - Commitments to rule of law, open markets, security for foreign investment, and a transparent privatization program designed to attract international investors. The overall message is that Venezuela is positioning itself as a major, diversified investment destination with a comprehensive framework to protect and promote foreign investment, underpinned by large-scale privatization and development of a broad range of sectors.

Over the next decades, $150 billion worth of oil and gas will be extracted off the coast, releasing over 2 billion tons of carbon emissions. Guyana boasts a forest storing 19.5 gigatons of carbon, with the lowest deforestation rate globally. Despite oil exploration, biodiversity is preserved. The speaker questions if the listener, possibly a head of state, values and compensates for Guyana's environmental efforts or is influenced by those harming the environment.

We are ready to offer our American partners, including administrative and governmental structures, as well as companies, the opportunity for collaboration. We have significantly more resources of this kind than Ukraine. Russia is a leader in reserves of rare and rare earth metals, located in Murmansk, Kabardino-Balkaria, the Far East, and other regions. These are capital-intensive projects, and we would be happy to work with any foreign partners, including Americans. Regarding the development of new territories, we are also ready to involve foreign partners in our newly integrated historical territories, where there are also certain reserves. We are open to working with our partners, including American companies, in these areas as well.

Speaker 0 outlines a discussion on global threats and resources. The audience quickly names Russia as the major threat, with China and North Korea also suggested; Venezuela is mentioned by one participant as well. The speaker then pivots to a question about natural resources: which place has the largest oil deposit on the planet, more than Saudi Arabia or Iran? The answer highlighted is Venezuela, noted as arguably the single greatest source of oil and minerals on the planet. The focus shifts to Venezuela’s leadership: President Nicholas Reyes, who rose to power on nationalist pride and, in six years, has crippled the national economy by half and raised the poverty rate by almost 400%. Reyes is up for reelection. His opponent is Gloria Bonaldi, described as a history professor turned activist, running on a social justice platform. The speaker adds a claim about predictions for Venezuela’s future, stating that as of today the chances of total economic collapse are 87%. Media framing is contrasted: on the news, Venezuela would be called a crisis, but on the world stage it would be called a failed state. The speaker notes other examples of failed states in recent history—Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. A further point is made that Venezuela is the only one of these places within a thirty-minute range from the US of “next gen nuclear missiles.” The claim continues that you will not hear about any of this on the news because the biggest players on the world stage do not want you to; unstable governments are seen, in their view, as opportunities. The closing assertion is that Russia and China can never be the most major threat until countries like Venezuela leave the door open to the United States’ backyard.

Over the next decades, $150 billion worth of oil and gas will be extracted off Guyana's coast, releasing over 2 billion tons of carbon emissions. Guyana boasts a forest the size of England and Scotland combined, storing 19.5 gigatons of carbon. Despite low deforestation rates and preserving biodiversity, the speaker questions if the world values Guyana's environmental efforts and if they are influenced by those who harm the environment.

In this discussion, the guests analyze the implications of a United States military attack on Venezuela and its broader impact on Latin America, Asia, and the evolving world order. The Chilean ambassador to BRICS describes the event as a historic milestone: it is “the first time we have seen a US military attack on the South American mainland,” differing from past interventions in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. He notes that at a Saturday press conference, President Trump warned Colombia and Mexico that they might be next, and Secretary of State Rubio warned Cuba to watch out. This is presented as potentially the beginning of a larger shift, not an isolated incident like the 1989 invasion of Panama. The ambassador points to Trump’s 2025 national security doctrine, which places the Western Hemisphere at the center of US strategy, marking a significant departure from Bush’s focus on the Middle East and Obama’s pivot to Asia. He argues the motive is not humanitarian or stabilizing Latin America, but subjugation, resource extraction, and domination of governments in the region, a stance he characterizes as an attempt to reassert empire in the Western Hemisphere. On the macro level, the discussion addresses Latin America’s changing economic architecture, including a shift from the United States as the primary trading partner to China as a dominant partner for many countries. The US response, including the Venezuelan action, is framed as a mercantilist impulse to secure resources and influence, rather than a pro-democracy or pro-human rights initiative. The conversation emphasizes that the region’s instability is intertwined with oil, minerals, and strategic resources, and that the US move may be more about controlling these assets than about leaders’ legitimacy. The speakers then examine regional dynamics within Latin America. The region is fragmented, with SELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) weak and unable to unify a response. Some governments—Argentina, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Costa Rica—have openly sided with the US, while others are more cautious about Maduro’s leadership. The ambassador reiterates that Maduro’s regime was unpopular domestically due to authoritarianism and incompetence, yet the US action targets Venezuela’s oil and sovereignty more than Maduro’s personal legitimacy. He suggests that anti-American sentiment could grow across the region, regardless of specific governments. A key theme is the emergence of BRICS as a counterweight to US hegemony. The ambassador notes that Trump has attacked BRICS members—South Africa, Brazil, and India—through trade measures and visa policies, highlighting BRICS’ rise with the New Development Bank and expanding membership (including Indonesia). He argues that BRICS represents a shift toward a multipolar world where the Global South seeks to diversify dependencies and leverage different centers of power. He differentiates BRICS from the Global South, describing BRICS as a forum aligned with Global South demands, while acknowledging that neither China nor Russia are part of the traditional Global South, though China and India are influential within BRICS. The conversation argues for active nonalignment as a guiding principle for the Global South in a multipolar order. The ambassador cites examples like Brazil under Lula who resisted US pressure, and contrasts European concessions in trade deals (e.g., the EU-US golf-course agreement) with the need for greater strategic autonomy. He asserts that Europe’s capitulation has weakened its economic and political independence, while Latin America must avoid overreliance on the US and diversify with China and other partners. He argues that the long-term consequences of US military actions could be counterproductive, weakening US standing and strengthening China’s position by eroding a sense of predictable community in the Americas. In closing, the ambassador emphasizes that the Maduro-led Venezuela episode underscores the rise of Asia, the relative decline and fragmentation of the West, and the importance of multipolarity for smaller and medium-sized states. He reiterates the value of active nonalignment as a compass for Latin America, Africa, and Asia in navigating a turbulent, power-shifting world. He and the host note that the discussion will extend to the ambassador’s work on active nonalignment and BRICS, with a link to his writings provided.

We would be ready to offer our American partners, including administrative, governmental structures, and companies, to work together. We have far more resources of this kind than Ukraine. Russia is a leader in reserves of these rare and rare earth metals, located in the north in Murmansk, in the Caucasus in Kabardino-Balkaria, in the Far East, in the Irkutsk region, in Yakutia, and in Tyva. These are capital-intensive investment projects. We would be happy to work with any foreign partners, including American ones, and on new territories as well. We are ready to involve foreign partners in our newly acquired historical territories, which have been returned to the Russian Federation, as there are certain reserves there too. We are ready to collaborate with our partners, including American ones.

The discussion highlights lithium mining in Chile, part of the "lithium triangle," where nearly a third of the world's lithium is produced. One plant can power about 50,000 electric vehicles annually, with potential to reach 75,000. The Salar de Atacama boasts the best lithium brines globally, containing approximately 2,000 parts per million of lithium, making it the most cost-effective production location. Lithium is extracted through brine mining, where salty water is evaporated in ponds, concentrating the lithium. Despite high demand and limitless resources, Chile is losing market share to Australia and Argentina. Experts emphasize the need for Chile to quickly increase production before other countries surpass them or new battery technology emerges. Chile's president has announced a state-led plan for lithium industry development. Separately, it is mentioned that Piedmont Lithium has bought homes in North Carolina for a project.

Speaker 0 emphasizes the strategic importance of the region by detailing its international alignments and vast natural resources. He notes that he maintains relationships with Russia, describing Russia as a number two adversary in the region, and he references Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua as countries connected with Russia. He argues that the region matters precisely because of its rich resources and rare earth elements, making it a critical area for national interests. A central point is the Lithium Triangle, which he identifies as containing 60% of the world’s lithium. He specifies the countries of the Lithium Triangle as Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, underscoring the triangular region as the primary source of one of today’s essential technologies. In addition to lithium, he highlights Guyana for its energy potential, mentioning the discovery of the largest oil reserves of light sweet crude off Guyana over a year ago, which he presents as a significant development in regional energy resources. He also notes Venezuela’s substantial natural resources, listing oil, copper, and gold as part of the region’s economic assets. Beyond mineral and fossil energy riches, he points to the Amazon, describing it as the lungs of the world, and he emphasizes environmental and geopolitical importance by noting that the region contains 31% of the world’s fresh water. Overall, Speaker 0 paints a picture of a region with extraordinary resource wealth and strategic significance. He stresses that these assets—lithium, oil, copper, gold, vast freshwater supplies, and the Amazon—coupled with geopolitical relationships, render the region extremely consequential. The speaker concludes by asserting that the region’s importance extends to national security and that it is necessary to “step up our game” to address the opportunities and challenges that come with these resources and connections.

Speaker 0 mentions a lack of coordination, but it is unclear what they are referring to. Speaker 1 questions the wisdom of becoming more dependent on and vulnerable to a perceived enemy. They express concerns about the enemy's actions in Latin America, America, and with currency, suggesting they are trying to take down America. Speaker 0 then brings up the supply chain of critical metals for electric vehicles and defense. Speaker 1 acknowledges the information about the need for a 2,000% increase in mining for 20 years to meet the demand for EVs and critical metals.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss Venezuela policy and leadership. Speaker 0 asks if "secretary Hagsef and Rubio are going to be running Venezuela" and whether US military troops will be sent in. Speaker 1 responds that they are "working with the people of Venezuela to make sure that we have Venezuela" and questions who would take over if the US left, noting there is "a vice president who's been appointed by Maduro" who "was sworn as president just a little while ago." She had a long conversation with Marco and said, "we'll do whatever you need," though she "really doesn't have a choice." Speaker 1 asserts they will "have this done right" and "not gonna just do this with Maduro then leave like everybody else" or let it "go to hell." If the US left, it would have "zero chance of ever coming back." They will "run it properly," with "the greatest oil companies in the world" investing "billions and billions of dollars" and using that money "in Venezuela." The biggest beneficiary, per Speaker 1, will be "the people of Venice."

The speaker asks, why are we doing this and why are we so opposed to Nicolas Maduro. On the street, most people would say they don’t know who Nicolas Maduro is. But in places like South Florida, where people recognize Maduro and can identify Venezuela on a map, the typical answer shifts: because he’s a communist or a socialist. The speaker asserts that this is true: Nicolas Maduro and his government are very left wing on economics. The speaker notes an interesting distinction: this left-wing stance is economic, not social. In Venezuela, gay marriage is banned, abortion is banned, and sex changes for transgender individuals are banned. The speaker describes Venezuela as one of the very few countries in the entire hemisphere with those social policies, emphasizing that these policies are conservative socially. The speaker adds that Venezuela is one of the very few nations in the region with those social policies, specifying that it is on social policy, not defending the regime. The speaker mentions that only El Salvador comes close in conservatism, though El Salvador is much smaller. Additionally, the speaker brings up a political point: the US-backed opposition leader who would take Maduro’s place, if Maduro were removed, is described as eager to implement gay marriage in Venezuela. This is presented as a counterpoint to the idea that the opposition is globally liberal or that the regime is uniquely opposed to liberal social policies. The speaker references the notion of a “global homo” project and implies that the reality is different from that belief, labeling the project as not crazy after all. The overall argument ties Maduro’s economic leftism to social policy conservatism, and contrasts Venezuelan social policy with potential shifts under the opposition, while noting public recognition differences about Maduro.

A Venezuelan American speaker describes the impact of the regime on their family and millions of others. Their family lost everything—work, savings, investments—wiped out by a narco dictatorship that has held Venezuela in a death grip for over twenty-five years. The Venezuelan exodus is described as the second largest displacement crisis on Earth after Syria, a humanitarian disaster and not just tragedy. The regime has jailed hundreds of political prisoners and thousands have been murdered for speaking out. More than a third of the population has fled, not for opportunity or the American dream, but to survive because staying often means death. The speaker contends Venezuela is not merely a collapsed state but an occupied one, with territory, natural resources, and institutions overrun by hostile foreign powers: Iranian militias, Chinese corporations, Russian intelligence, all exploiting the country with impunity. Venezuela, they argue, is no longer a local crisis but a geopolitical threat endangering the Western Hemisphere, a launchpad for authoritarian expansion in the Americas. Amid this, Maria Corina Machado is highlighted as a leader who dared to push for freedom. In 2024, she supposedly led a peaceful democratic uprising that won the election. Her team allegedly smuggled physical voting receipts out of the country—hard proof of victory the regime attempted to bury. The speaker says her courage has sparked belief among millions of Venezuelans that change is possible. Some people have questioned Machado’s decision to dedicate her Nobel Prize to Donald Trump. The speaker accepts the criticism but argues it was a brilliant strategic move on the global political stage. Machado is portrayed as understanding Trump’s character, his campaign for the prize, and the symbolic, personal value of the recognition to him. The claim is that this gesture might keep Trump’s attention focused on Venezuela at a time when U.S. presence and pressure in the Caribbean is rising. The dedication is described not as flattery or optics, but as a strategic act to protect and preserve a form of power that could shift history, grounded in the belief that the ultimate aim is freedom. The speaker emphasizes that Machado is not asking for a U.S. invasion or war; Venezuela is already invaded and held hostage by a narco state with foreign agents and enemies of democracy—Russians, Iranians, Chinese—operating freely to expand influence across Latin America. Machado is calling for the support of the only military capable of countering that threat, framed as liberation rather than imperialism. The argument is that the fight is for Venezuela’s life, not theory or politics, and that the world should recognize what’s at stake. The fight for Venezuela is a fight for freedom, democracy, and continental stability, and if liberty, human dignity, and peace in the Americas matter, Venezuela’s fight must matter to all.

The speaker argues that Venezuela has already been invaded, naming Russian agents, Iranian agents, and terrorist groups such as Hizbola and Hamas operating freely in alignment with the regime. They also point to the Colombian guerrilla and drug cartels as factors that have taken over 60% of the population, not only in drug trafficking but also in human trafficking and networks of prostitution. This, the speaker says, has transformed Venezuela into the criminal hub of The Americas. The regime’s sustainability, according to the speaker, relies on a powerful and heavily funded repression system. The speaker asks where this funding comes from, answering with multiple illicit streams: drug trafficking, the black market of oil, arms trafficking, and human trafficking. They assert that these flows must be cut, arguing that once repression is weakened, “it's over” because violence and terror are all the regime has left. The speaker urges the international community to cut these sources of funding and support. They claim that the other regimes that back Maduro and the criminal structure are active and have turned Venezuela into a safe haven for their operations, extending their influence into the rest of Latin America.

The conversation centers on Venezuela and regional concerns. Speaker 0 notes that there were voices suggesting Venezuela isn’t so bad and that Latin America isn’t either, but they remain unconvinced. They ask Abe for good reasons not to be convinced. Abe responds that there are good reasons: Venezuela is getting worse, little by little, as long as oil money continues to flow. Speaker 0 then relays information from experts: Venezuela, apart from Iran, is the only government that propagates anti-Semitism around the world. The claim is that it’s already formalized, first within the country and then outside. The discussion moves to what actions might be taken. Speaker 0 asks whether there is any pressing effort underway. They say they’ve talked to Jesse Jackson, noting the relationship, but it’s not for Kenra; there are other plans, which will be discussed in a moment.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of a coup in Venezuela and the implications of U.S. actions. They emphasize naval movements as a signal of U.S. seriousness, noting the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford and associated ships as a trigger that indicates a real threat or action. They remark that if Maduro steps down, chaos could follow, and acknowledge that Maduro has discussed amnesty with the U.S. that Trump reportedly refused. Speaker 2 repeatedly highlights naval movements as a metric for U.S. intent to attack a country, recalling lessons from the CIA. He argues the U.S. is not strategically benefiting from intervention in Venezuela, given that the U.S. has decided not to buy or refine Venezuelan oil, and questions what upside there is for the U.S. in such action. He asserts that drugs in Venezuela originate from Colombia and Ecuador and transit through Venezuela to West Africa and Europe, rather than serving the U.S. market, and he links this to broader critiques of U.S. foreign policy. Both speakers discuss the regional calculus: China’s increasing influence in Latin America, including a Caribbean refinery operation that refines Venezuelan crude, challenging U.S. refinery interests. They suggest China’s refiners and pipelines complicate U.S. strategies. They also discuss the potential role of Pakistan, Iran, or other powers in shaping outcomes, noting that many regional players (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and others) oppose U.S. intervention. Speaker 1 notes that a regime-change operation could undermine U.S. trust as an ally and references a platform called Polymarket where Maduro’s potential departure had been speculated, though newer developments show Maduro mobilizing the military. They raise a question about whether Maduro sought amnesty for the U.S. to step down, and say Trump’s refusal could reflect a desire for a political “scalp” to prove anti-drug policy, comparing this to the Panama case of Manuel Noriega. Speaker 2 elaborates that covert action programs are highly classified, and that even discussing them publicly is risky. He suggests that any coup would require a limited force to seize the presidential palace, pacify the military, and control key communications, with no clear plan for post-coup governance. They discuss the opposition leadership, noting Maria Machado as potentially not more effective than Juan Guaidó and suggesting the military would likely take power after Maduro’s departure. They compare possible futures to Libya post-NATO intervention, warning that anticipated constitutions and reforms often do not materialize in practice, leading to prolonged conflict. Speaker 2 emphasizes the international unpopularity of regime-change in Venezuela and argues that U.S. actions could provoke regional instability and further migration. The dialogue ends with reflections on the inherent dangers of regime change, the lessons from past interventions, and the possibility of Venezuelan instability if Maduro leaves. They caution against assuming flowers will greet invading forces and stress that historical outcomes often diverge from planners’ expectations, with a warning that a hypothetical post-regime-change period could be chaotic and military-led.

Speaker 0 initiates by linking events in Venezuela and Israel to broader regional dynamics, including Iran, and asks the ambassador for his reaction to the military and law enforcement operation in Venezuela. Speaker 1 responds that his first reaction was to praise the lord and thank president Trump. He explains that many people may not connect the issue to the Middle East, but asserts that Hezbollah is very active in Venezuela. He states there has been a twenty-year partnership between Iran and Venezuela under two previous dictators, describing the ties as deep. He claims Hezbollah operates in 12 different countries throughout South America. He emphasizes that this is not just a threat in the Western Hemisphere but also a threat to the Middle East. He argues that the president’s action against Venezuela addresses narco-terrorism and the deaths of Americans from drugs, and he contends that it will “make life for those of us living in The Middle East much better, much safer” by taking Maduro out. He connects this to Hezbollah’s activity, saying Hezbollah is active in Venezuela and targeting Jewish people all over South America, and that those tentacles can reach into the United States. He concludes that this development is good news for America and for the world.

Speaker 0: Have you considered talking to the president of Colombia who you called a drop leader? Speaker 1: No. I haven't really thought too much about him. He's been fairly hostile to The United States, and I haven't given him a lot of thought. He's he's gonna have himself some big problems if he doesn't wise up. Speaker 2: Did you say Colombia is producing a lot of drugs. Have cocaine factories that they make cocaine, as you know, and they sell it right into The United States. So he better wise up or he'll be next. He'll be next too. I hope he's listening. Speaker 0: So was this operation a message that you're sending to Mexico, to Claudia Scheinbaum, president there? Speaker 2: Well, it wasn't meant to be. We're very friendly with her. She's a good woman, but the cartels are running Mexico. She's not running Mexico. The cartels are running Mexico. We could be politically correct and be nice and say, oh, yes. Is no. No. She's very, you know, she's very frightened of the cartels that are running Mexico. And I've asked her numerous times, would you like us to take out the cartels? No. No. No, mister president. No. No, no, please. So we have to do something because we lost the real number is 300,000 people, in my opinion. You know, they like to say a 100,000. A 100,000 is a lot of people, but the real number is 300,000 people. And we lost it to drugs, and they come in through the southern border, mostly the southern border. A lot plenty come in through Canada too, by the way, in case you don't know. But but they come in through the southern border, and something's gonna have to be done with Mexico. Cuban government, the Trump administration's next target, mister secretary, very quickly. Speaker 3: Well, the Cuban government is a is a huge problem. Yeah. The the the the Cuban government is a huge problem for Speaker 2: some So is that a yes? Speaker 3: Cuba. But I don't think people fully appreciate. I think they're in a lot of trouble. Yes. I'm not gonna talk talk to you about what our future steps are gonna be and our policies are gonna be right now in this regard, but I don't think it's any mystery that we are not big fans of the Cuban regime, who, by the way, are the ones that were propping up Maduro. His entire, like, internal security force, his internal security opera apparatus is entirely controlled by Cubans. One of the untold stories here is how, in essence, you talk about colonization because I think you said Dulce Rodriguez mentioned that, the ones who have sort of colonized, at least inside the regime, are Cubans. It was Cubans that guarded Maduro. He was not guarded by Venezuelan bodyguards. He had Cuban bodyguards. In terms of their internal intelligence, who spies on who inside to make sure there are no traitors, those are all Cubans. Speaker 0: He felt very strongly. We we needed for nationals. We need Greenland for national security, not for minerals. We had some we have so many sites for minerals and oil and everything. We have more oil than any other country in the world. We need Greenland for national security.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.