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Speaker 1 argues that Cuba should make a deal and asks what that deal would entail and what Cuba should do. He describes Cuba as currently a failed nation, noting that they “don’t even have jet fuel to get for airplanes to take off” and that they are “plugging up their runway.” He says that the United States is talking to Cuba and to Marco Rubio, and asserts that Cuba should absolutely make a deal because it is a humanitarian threat. He emphasizes that many Cuban Americans will be very happy when they can return to greet their relatives and do things that they should have been allowed to do for a long time. He states his interest in the people who were “treated so badly by Castro and the Cuban authorities” and notes that they “have been treated horribly,” adding that they will see how it all turns out as “Cuba and us, we are talking.” Speaker 0 asks whether that would be a good deal. Speaker 1 responds by outlining the current situation: there is an embargo, there is no oil, there is no money, and there is “no anything.” He then asks rhetorically whether, if a deal isn’t made, the United States would consider an operation like the one in Venezuela. He says he doesn’t want to answer that, suggesting it would not be a very tough operation if he did answer, but states he does not think such an operation will be necessary. He concludes with “Mister president.”

Speaker 1 discusses the human cost of Venezuelan and regional instability, noting that Venezuelan people have suffered and that many Hondurans have migrated due to conditions in their own country. He argues that the opposition in Venezuela had been winning elections, but the regime led by Maduro “stole every election,” stating that they have a copy of poll results on the cloud and that the government did not want to see them because they knew they lost. He attributes a high death toll in Honduras to drug trafficking flowing through their country, largely coming from Venezuela, and asserts that the U.S. framework designating drug trafficking as terrorism is justified because the flow of drugs harms the United States and Honduras, causing bloodshed and economic damage. He claims that illegal drug flight and sea routes brought jobs to Honduras but also bloodshed, and that the highest number of lives lost in fifteen years in Honduras occurred due to these drugs. Speaker 0 asks about the stance on U.S. intervention, whether intervention is sometimes warranted, as with Maduro, or if there should be no U.S. intervention in Latin America regardless of administration. He notes that Maduro’s regime has involved U.S. military actions and leadership changes, with claims that the U.S. bombed Venezuela, captured Maduro, killed members of his government, and sent him to jail, a situation some view positively while others see as a breach of international law. Speaker 1 responds from a human perspective, emphasizing the suffering of Venezuelan and regional populations and the mass migration from these countries. He argues that Maduro’s regime stole elections and contrasts this with the citizens’ desire for democracy. He states that the Trump administration’s framework to label drug trafficking as terrorism has implications for Honduras and other neighboring countries affected by drug flows, corruption, and violence. He suggests that President Trump confronted a long-standing attempt by Venezuela and its allies to influence elections in the region, and he asserts that Maduro should be given a chance to defend himself in a trial. He acknowledges sovereignty concerns but argues that many people worldwide do not understand what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. He concludes that intervention decisions depend on whether there is another way to save Venezuela and notes the broader regional consequences of the Venezuelan crisis.

"Who cares if Venezuela is run by some corrupt, petty tyrant? It's South America. They're all like that. It's always been like that. Just take their shit. Get as many countries on our side of the ledger so that we can take their shit. I don't know. Is that complicated? But on the other side of this debate, you have the ideological neocons like Rubio, like John Ratcliffe, the CIA director. You have these other people that insist. No, that's not good enough. We need a US puppet in place. We need a this female resistance leader that's pro democracy. Their election was fake. Dude, our election was fake. You think our elections are real? They said Maduro lost the twenty twenty four election. Yeah, Biden lost the twenty twenty election. We wanna start with that? This is a historic phone call. I actually probably favor regime change in Venezuela, to be honest. I think that that is a perfectly legitimate strategic goal of The United States. You know, we talk all the time about Israel and the war over there. And those are wars that don't benefit The United States at a pro American regime in Venezuela. Probably would be good for us because of the resources they have."

- Speaker 0 asks for the first reaction to the news and whether it was clearly a special operations effort to capture Maduro or a larger military operation. Speaker 1 says it quickly became obvious it was a special operations mission, citing the ships and platforms ideal for this, and the ability to fly helicopters into Venezuela as supporting evidence. - On how the operation penetrated Caracas and Maduro’s defenses: Speaker 1 says cyber operations were used to turn off power and to blind the air defense by making tracking and identification difficult, in addition to traditional jamming and excellent on-the-ground intelligence built up over weeks. He also suggests internal help within the Venezuelan regime was likely. - On the possibility of an inside asset and the defensive protections: Speaker 0 notes Cuban intelligence and Venezuelan National Guard protection for Maduro and asks how insiders could have enabled the operation. Speaker 1 says insiders could have assisted, and acknowledges the intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts was very strong. He cautions the president’s administration should not publicly reveal inside help, as that could cause paranoia within the command structure. - On the operation’s execution and its comparison to past regime-change operations: Speaker 1 emphasizes training and technology, noting the unit would include special operations aviation, Delta, and other components; argues this is a joint operation involving army, navy, air force, marines, cyber, and space-based platforms, requiring extensive rehearsals over weeks. He references Noriega’s capture as a point of comparison, but notes Maduro is on a different level. - On the electricity outage in Caracas: Speaker 0 asks if it was a cyber disruption or a kinetic strike. Speaker 1 responds that a cyber disruption to power is more likely than a kinetic strike, given the context. - On Venezuela’s air defense systems (S-300s, BUKs) and the $6 billion investment: Speaker 0 questions whether it’s fair to criticize these systems given the operation. Speaker 1 acknowledges they are sophisticated and capable but not sure of their maintenance and training levels. He notes the United States had telegraphed expectations for weeks and suggests negligence or incompetence in air-defense command and control if surprised. - On possible inside help and seniority of the asset: Speaker 0 asks who within the regime might have cooperated with the CIA. Speaker 1 is reluctant to speculate beyond confirming there was very good intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts. He finds it unlikely that the vice president would have been an internal asset, though he concedes nothing is impossible, given a mix of factions in the regime and third-party interference. - On geopolitical repercussions and messaging to China, Iran, and Russia: Speaker 0 points to the timing with a Chinese delegation in Caracas and asks what message this sends to China and whether the date had symbolic resonance with other events. Speaker 1 says the date was probably driven by weather and other operations rather than a deliberate China signal; he suggests China would reassess oil dependencies and potential leverage now that Maduro is captured. He predicts the next target could be Cuba and discusses logistical challenges, such as Cuba’s island geography and Guantanamo Bay. - On US strategy in the Western Hemisphere and potential targets: Speaker 1 opines that Cuba is a plausible next target and explains why, including electoral considerations in Florida. He notes that a Cuba operation would be more difficult than Venezuela due to geography but could be motivated by domestic political calculation and the Monroe Doctrine as a signal. - On China, Russia, and Iran in the wake of Maduro’s capture: Speaker 1 argues the US demonstrates strong capabilities, and China would need to reassess oil supply and leverage; Russia’s and Iran’s interests could be pressured as the US asserts influence in the region. He mentions that the US might not directly engage in large-scale intervention in Iran but warns against overreach due to domestic political constraints. - On the broader pattern and future: Speaker 1 cautions about the risk of hubris and notes domestic political constraints and upcoming congressional pressures that could shape how far the administration pursues this strategy beyond Venezuela. He stresses the importance of not overestimating the ability to sustain similar moves without a plan for the post-Maduro environment.

In this conversation, the speakers discuss a high-profile operation centered on Maduro’s kidnapping, its implications, and broader geopolitical consequences. - The operation to capture Maduro is described as not a regime change but an action intended to “hold off Maduro, get US control of the oil, and get China and Russia and Iran out.” A senior Venezuelan security official is identified as a full cooperator with the United States, allowing US forces to enter “the front door” with minimal resistance and no return fire. The plan reportedly involved a coordinated assault with Venezuelan forces, and while several air defenses were destroyed or not activated, most were not deployed due to a stand-down order. The operation did not replace the Venezuelan government; Maduro remained in power, at least for the moment. - For context on the execution, Speaker 1, who has experience scripting Delta Force and SEAL Team Six exercises, notes the mission took place in full moonlight (unusual for planned clandestine night operations). He claims the Venezuelan air defenses were substantial but largely avoided activation because of the stand-down order, enabling a seamless entry for US forces. He compares this to a counterterrorism exercise in the US years earlier—staged surveillance and pre-positioned access that eliminated obstacles in advance. - Casualties and aftermath are uncertain. There are conflicting reports on casualties among Cubans and Venezuelans, with no clear names or numbers yet confirmed. The operation involved collaboration with Venezuelan forces and did not topple the Maduro regime. - On the motive and internal dynamics, Speaker 1 suggests multiple potential actors within Maduro’s circle could have incentives to cooperate with the US, possibly including financial or visa-based incentives. The possibility of infiltrators within intelligence, military, or police is raised. The role of a specific senior official who allegedly ordered a stand-down is mentioned, though not named. - Questions about the rocket attack on a US chopper are raised, with speculation that it might have been a lone actor or a malfunction rather than a deliberate act by a large organized force. - The discussion turns to the interim president Delcy Rodríguez. While theories exist that she cooperated with the US, Speaker 1 says that the theory of her involvement is likely a cover story designed to divert attention from those actually involved. - The broader geopolitical frame emphasizes that this is not about regime change in Venezuela, but about oil access and limiting adversaries. The conversation suggests a recurring US strategy: remove Maduro, gain oil leverage, and push rivals like China, Russia, and Iran out of influence. The hypothesis includes using economic and political pressure and, if necessary, military options, while acknowledging the risk of drawing wider regional opposition and potential escalation. - The discussion then broadens to the US role in the multipolar order. The speakers debate whether the world is tilting toward a multipolar system or a reinforced US unipolar order. They agree that the reality is mixed: Russia and China are building a new international order with India and Brazil, while US actions—such as threats against Venezuela, arms packages to Taiwan, and support for Ukraine—signal both erosion of hegemony and attempts to sustain influence. - The Monroe Doctrine is critiqued. The speakers contend that the so-called Dunro Doctrine (a term they use to describe perceived US interference) misreads the historical framework. They argue that the Monroe Doctrine was never a proclamation of exclusive US dominance in the Western Hemisphere; instead, the US has historically faced resistance as other powers gain influence. - Iran and the Middle East are discussed at length. The twelve-day war (in reference to Iran’s confrontation with Israel) is described as not severely weakening Iran militarily, though it has economic and political strains. Iran’s allies (Russia, China) have become more engaged since sanctions relief began in September, and Iran has pursued stronger economic ties with both Russia and China, including a potential North–South Corridor. Iran reportedly rejected a mutual defense treaty with Russia initially but later pursued stronger cooperation after the conflict. Iran’s leadership is described as consolidating power and preparing for potential future conflicts, while the protests inside Iran are depicted as largely manufactured or at least amplified by Western intelligence networks, though there is genuine internal discontent over currency and economic conditions. - The panelists debate whether the US could or would attempt another targeted strike on Iranian leadership. They argue that the US would face greater risk and likely casualties if attempting a similar operation without a compatible insider network, making a repeat Maduro-like capture unlikely. - Final reflections acknowledge that the US’s global influence is eroding, but the US remains deeply involved in global affairs. The discussion ends with a cautionary stance toward US hegemonic assumptions and recognition of a rising multipolar framework in which China, Russia, and allied states exert greater influence in Latin America, the Middle East, and beyond.

Speaker 0: Decision on whether to supply Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine or sell them to NATO and let them sell them to Ukraine. Speaker 1: Yeah. I've sort of made a decision pretty much if if if you consider. Yeah. I I think I wanna find out what they're doing with them. Yes. Speaker 0: Yes. Speaker 2: Donald Trump's recent statement to the press about mulling over sending Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine has elicited a response from the Kremlin today. Putin announced that the peace process with the Trump administration to end the Ukraine war is officially, quote, unquote, exhausted. Trump and Putin have had a very, you know, strange relationship, a little touch and go since Trump returned to the presidency. At first, to end the Ukraine war on his very first day in office, Trump has meandered a bit on the issue and is now apparently settling on the Biden administration's policy of arming Ukraine and NATO to the hilt. But can Tomahawk cruise missiles even make much of a difference given that the Russian military has achieved supremacy on the battlefield and maintained that dominance for at least the last year and a half, maybe even longer, if you will. We're now joined by, and we're so pleased he's with us, retired US Army colonel Douglas MacGregor. He's the author of I'm sorry. We also have Brandon Weichert with us, the author of Ukraine. Go cross wires there, a disaster of their own making, how the West lost to Ukraine. Thank you both for being with us. Speaker 3: Sure. Speaker 4: Thank you for having me. Speaker 2: Colonel McGregor, welcome to the show. We're so glad to especially have your perspective on this. And what we're gonna kinda do is a tour, if you will, around the globe because there's several, ongoing and pending conflicts. Right? So let's start with this breaking news out of Russia where Putin says that these talks, these negotiations are exhausted. Are they, as a matter of fact, exhausted, colonel? Speaker 3: Well, I think he was referring specifically to what happened in Alaska. And I think president Trump showed up, you know, in grandiose fashion with the goal of overwhelming, president Putin and his team with his charm and grace and power, and it all failed miserably. President Trump never really listened carefully to anything the Russians said to him. He didn't read any of the material that was pertinent to the discussion. He came completely unprepared, and that was the the message that came out after the meeting. So the Russians were very disappointed. If you don't read their proposals, you don't read what they're doing and what they're trying to accomplish, then you're not gonna get very far. So now, president Trump has completed his transformation into Joe Biden. He's become another version of Joe Biden. Speaker 2: What it is so unexpected. And, you know, it's hard for a lot of a lot of Trump voters to hear because specifically part of voting for him and the mandate that he had going into this term was in these conflicts. Right? Specifically, the one in Ukraine. He didn't start any new conflicts while in office in the first term. Why this version of Trump this term? I know you, like I, look into the hiring, the administration, the pressures from the outside on the president. What is influencing where he is now on Ukraine, colonel MacGregor? Speaker 3: Well, that's a that's a difficult question. I mean, first of all, he grossly underestimated the complexity of the of the war. If you don't understand the foundations for the conflict, how this conflict came about, I mean, I I was standing around listening to someone like Brzezinski in the nineteen nineties trying to tell president Clinton that it was critical to address Ukraine's borders because Eastern Ukraine was, quote, unquote, Russified and effectively not Ukrainian. Nobody would listen to Brzezinski, and so we walked away from that very problem. And in the run up to this thing back in 2014, I was on several different programs, and I pointed to the electoral map, And it showed you who voted for what where. It was very obvious that the East and the Northeast voted to stay with the Russian pro Russian candidate, and everybody else voted against the pro Russian candidate. So none of this should come as a surprise, but I don't think president Trump is aware of any of that. I don't think he studied any of that. And so he's got a lot of people around him pushing him in the direction of the status quo. He went through this during his first term, disappointed all of us because he could never quite escape from the Washington status quo. So he simply returned to it, and I don't see anything positive occurring in the near future. Speaker 2: That's sort of the same as well, with other agencies like the the DOJ, which I wanna get into a little bit later. Brandon, you've been writing about this as a national interest. So what what do you make of it? Speaker 4: Well, I think that right now, this is a lot of vamping from Trump. I think the colonel is a 100% correct when he says Trump really didn't come prepared to the Alaska meeting. I think ultimately Trump's default is to still try to get a deal with Putin on things like rare earth mineral development and trade. I think it's very important to note, I believe it was Friday or Thursday of last week, Putin was on a stage at an event and he reiterated his desire to reopen trade relations with The United States and he wants to do a deal with Trump on multiple other fronts. So that's a positive thing. But ultimately, I think that people need to realize that Trump says a lot of stuff in the moment. The follow through is the question. I am very skeptical that he's actually going to follow through on the Tomahawk transfer if only because logistically, it's not practical. Ukraine lacks the launchers. They lack the training. The the targeting data has to come exclusively and be approved exclusively by the Pentagon, which means that Trump will be on the hook even more for Joe Biden's war, which runs against what he says he wants to get done, which is peace. Regardless of whether it's been exhausted or not that process, Trump I think default wants peace. So I think this is a lot of bluster and I think ultimately it will not lead to the Tomahawk transfer. Last of all because we don't have enough of these Tomahawks. Right? I mean, that that is a a finite amount. I think we have about 3,500 left in our arsenal. We have 400 we're sending to the Japanese Navy, and we're gonna need these systems for any other potential contingency in South America or God forbid another Middle East contingency or certainly in the Indo Pacific. So I think that at some point, the reality will hit, you know, hit the cameras and Trump will not actually follow through on this. Speaker 2: So speaking of South America, let's head that way. Colonel McGregor, I I don't know if you know. I've been covering this pretty extensively what's been going on with the Trump administration's actions on Venezuela. So a bit of breaking news. Today, the US State Department claims that Venezuela is planning to attack their embassy, which has a small maintenance and security board other than, you know, diplomatic staff. Meanwhile, Maduro's regime argues they're just foiled a right wing terrorist plot that's that was planning to stage a false flag against the US embassy to give the US Navy fleet. There's a lot off in Venezuela's coast the impetus to attack Maduro. I've been getting some pushback, you know, on this reporting related to Venezuela, because, you know, Trump's base largely doesn't want any new conflicts. They're afraid this is sort of foreign influence wanting wanting him to go there. Are we justified in what Trump is doing as far as the buildup and what we are hearing is an impending invasion? Is it is the Trump administration justified in this action, colonel MacGregor, in Venezuela? Speaker 3: No. I I don't think there's any, pressing pressing need for us to invade or attack Venezuela at all. But we have to go back and look at his actions to this point. He's just suspended diplomatic relations with Venezuela, which is usually a signal of some sort of impending military action. I don't know what he's being told. I don't know what sort of briefing he's received, what sort of planning has been discussed, but we need to keep a few things in mind. First of all, the Venezuelan people, whether they love or do not love Maduro, are very proud of their country, and they have a long history of rebelling against foreign influence, particularly against Spain. And they're not likely to take, an invasion or an intervention of any kind from The United States lately. Secondly, they've got about 400,000 people in the militias, but they can expect, at least a 100,000 or more paramilitaries to come in from Brazil and Colombia and other Latin American states. It's why the whole thing could result in a Latin American crusade against The United States. And finally, we ought to keep in mind that the coastline is 1,700 miles long. That's almost as long as the border between The United States and Mexico. The border with Brazil and with Colombia is each of them are about 1,380 kilometers long. You start running the math and you're dealing with an area the size of Germany and and France combined. This is not something that one should sink one's teeth in without carefully considering the consequences. So I don't know what the underlying assumptions are, but my own experience is that they're usually a series of what we call rosy scenarios and assume things that just aren't true. So I I'm very concerned we'll get into it. We'll waste a lot of time and money. We'll poison the well down there. If we really want access to the oil and and gas, I think we can get it without invading the place. And they also have emerald mines and gold mines. So I think they'd be happy to do business with us. But this obsession with regime change is very dangerous, and I think it's unnecessary. Speaker 2: That is definitely what it seems they're going for. When I talk to my sources, ChromaGregor, and then I'll get your take on it, Brandon, they say it's a four pronged issue. Right? That it's the drug that, of course, the drugs that come through Venezuela into The United States, Trend Aragua, which we know the ODNI and Tulsi Gabbard, DNI, Tulsi Gabbard was briefed on specifically, that the right of trend in Aragua and how they were flooded into the country, counterintelligence issues, a Venezuelan influence in, you know, in some of our intelligence operations, and, just the narco terrorist state that it is. But you feel that given even if all of that is true and the Venezuela oh, excuse me, in the election fraud. Right? The election interference via the Smartmatic software. Given all that, you still feel it's not best to invade, colonel. You how do we handle it? How do we counter these threats coming from Venezuela? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, you secure your borders. You secure your coastal waters. You get control of the people who are inside The United States. We have an estimated 50,000,000 illegals. Somewhere between twenty five and thirty million of them poured into the country, thanks to president Biden's betrayal of the American people and his decision to open the borders with the help of mister Mayorkas that facilitated this massive invasion. I would start at home. The drug problem is not down in Venezuela. The drug problem is here in The United States. If you're serious, anybody who deals in drugs or is involved in human trafficking, particularly child trafficking, should face, the death penalty. Unless you do those kinds of things, you're not gonna fundamentally change the problem here. Now as the narco state title, I think, is a lot of nonsense. The drugs overwhelmingly come out of Colombia. They don't come out of Venezuela. A very small amount goes through Venezuela. I'm sure there are generals in the Venezuelan army that are skimming off the top and putting extra cash in their banks, but it's not a big it's not a big source from our standpoint. We have a much more serious problem in Mexico right now. Mexico is effectively an organized crime state, and I don't think, what Maduro is doing is is really, in that same category. On the other hand, I think Maduro is courting the Chinese and the Russians. And I think he's doing that because he feels threatened by us, and he's looking for whatever assistance or support he can get. And right now, given our behavior towards the Russians in Ukraine, it makes infinite sense for the Russians to cultivate a proxy against us in Central And South America. This is the way things are done, unfortunately. We there are consequences for our actions. I don't think we've thought any of them through. Speaker 2: Well, in in in talking about turning this into a broader conflict or a bigger problem, I I I I know, Brandon, you had heard that that Russia basically told Maduro, don't look to us. Don't come to us. But now this was a couple weeks ago. Yep. Yep. Like you just said, colonel MacGregor, things have changed a little bit. Right? Especially looking at what Putin said today. So will Russia now come to Venezuela's aid, to Maduro's aid? Speaker 3: I think it's distinctly possible, but it's not going to be overt. It'll be clandestine. It'll be behind the scenes. The Chinese are also gonna do business with Maduro. They have an interest in the largest known vindicated oil reserves in the world. The bottom line is and this you go back to this tomahawk thing, which I think Brandon talked about. It's very, very important. The tomahawk is a devastating weapon. Can they be shot down? Absolutely. The Serbs shot them down back in 1999 during this Kosovo air campaign. However, it carries a pretty substantial warhead, roughly a thousand pounds. It has a range of roughly a thousand miles. And I think president Trump has finally been briefed on that, and he has said, yeah. I I wanna know where they're going to fire them, whom they're going to target. Well, the Ukrainians have targeted almost exclusively whatever they could in terms of Russian civilian infrastructure and Russian civilians. They've killed them as often and as much as they could. So the notion if you're gonna give these things to these people or you're gonna shoot for them, you can expect the worst, and that would precipitate a terrible response from the Russians. I don't think we understand how seriously attacks on Russian cities is gonna be taken by the Russians. So I would say, they will provide the Venezuelans with enough to do damage to us if if it's required, but I don't think they expect the Venezuelans to overwhelm us or march into America. That's Mexico's job right now with organized crime. That's where I think we have a much more serious problem. Speaker 4: I I agree with the colonel on that. I think also there's an issue. Now I happen to think we we because of the election fraud that you talk a lot about, Emerald, I think there is a threat in Maduro, and I I do think that that there is a more serious threat than we realize coming out of that sort of left wing miasma in Latin America. And I I think the colonel's correct though in saying that we're we're making it worse with some of our actions. I will point out on the technical side. I broke this story last week. The Venezuelan government, the military Padrino, the the defense minister there, claimed that his radar systems actually detected a tranche of US Marine Corps f 35 b's using these Russian made radars that they have. This is not the first time, by the way, a Russian made radar system using these really and I'm not going get into the technical details here, but using really innovative ways of detecting American stealth planes. It's not the first time a Russian system has been able to do this. And so we are now deploying large relatively large number of f 35 b's into the region. Obviously, it's a build up for some kind of strike package. And there are other countermeasures that the f 35 b has in the event it's detected. But I will point out that this plane is supposed to be basically invisible, and we think the Venezuelans are so technologically inferior, we do need to be preparing our forces for the fact that the Venezuelans will be using innovative tactics, in order to stymie our advances over their territory. It's not to say we can't defeat them, but we are not prepared, I don't think, for for having these systems, seen on radar by the Venezuelans, and that is something the Russians have helped the Venezuelans do. Speaker 2: Very complex. Before we run out of time, do wanna get your thoughts, colonel MacGregor, on, the expectation that Israel will strike Iran again. Will we again come to their aid? And do you think we should? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, stealth can delay detection but cannot resist it. Yeah. I think the stealth is grossly exaggerated in terms of its value. It causes an enormous price tag Yeah. When you buy the damn plane. And the f 35, from a readiness standpoint, is a disaster anyway. So, you know, I I think we have to understand that, yes, mister Netanyahu has to fight Iran. Iran has to be balkanized and reduced to rubble the way the Israelis with help from us and the British have reduced Syria to chaos, broken up into different parts. This is an Israeli strategy for the region. It's always been there. If you can balkanize your neighbors, your neighbors don't threaten you. Now I don't subscribe to the Israeli view that Iran is this permanent existential threat that has to be destroyed, but it doesn't matter what I think. What matters is what they think. They think Iran is a permanent existential threat and therefore must be destroyed. Your question is, will they find a way to attack Iran? The answer is yes. Sooner rather than later. The longer they wait, the more robust and capable Iran becomes. And, I think that's in the near term that we'll see we'll see some trigger. Somehow, there'll be a trigger and Iran will strike. And will we support them? Absolutely. We're already moving assets into the region along with large quantities of missiles and ammunition, but our inventories, as I'm sure you're aware, are limited. We fired a lot of missiles. We don't have a surge capacity in the industrial base. We need one. Our factories are not operating twenty four hours a day, seven days a week. The Russian factories are. Their manufacturing base can keep up. And by the way, the Chinese are right there with them. They have the largest manufacturing base in the world. So if it comes down to who could produce and fire the most missiles, well, we're gonna lose that game, and Israel is gonna lose with us. But right now, I don't see any evidence that anyone's worried about that. Speaker 4: Yeah. Speaker 2: You know what? Colonel McGregor, I I I don't know if I feel any safer after you joined us today. It is very concerning. It's it's a concerning situation we find ourselves in, and I feel like so many people because they feel the election turned out the way they wanted to wanted it to, are not concerned anymore. Right? But we are in Speaker 1: a finite amount of time and there's still great pressures upon the president. There are many voices whispering in his ear. And so we constantly have to be calling out what we Speaker 2: see and explaining to people why it matters. Speaker 3: Remember, this president has said this. Everybody dealing with the administration has said this. It's a very transactional administration. Yep. Follow the money. Who has poured billions into his campaign and bought the White House and Congress for him? When you understand those facts in, you can explain the policy positions. Speaker 1: And I think that's also why we're, the leading conversation we're seeing on acts and social media. Right now, Colonel McGregor, thank you so much for joining us today. We hope you'll come back soon. Speaker 3: Sure. Thank you. Speaker 2: And, Brandon, as always, good to see you, my friend. Thank you. Speaker 4: See you again. Nice to meet you, colonel. Speaker 3: Very nice to see you. Bye bye.

The discussion centers on the Venezuelan political crisis, U.S. involvement, and historical precedents of regime change in the region. The speakers contrast current military buildup around Venezuela with past Latin American coups, and they assess domestic support, international dynamics, and potential outcomes. - Venezuela under Maduro: Speaker 0 notes a broader deployment of military infrastructure than in recent Latin American coups, implying heightened risk or intensity of any intervention. Speaker 1 counters that domestically there is a “rally around the flag” effect in response to U.S. threats, with about 20% of Venezuelans supporting U.S. military intervention and over 55% opposing it. - Regime-change calculus: The conversation asks for the value of regime change when Maduro is willing to open the Venezuelan market to the U.S. Speaker 1 responds that there is no clear political or economic value to regime change; the predicted consequences would include a massive migration wave, civil war, and higher oil prices. They discuss the implications of implementing a regime-change strategy in the Venezuelan context. - Cartel of the Suns: The Cartel of the Suns is discussed as a U.S.-designated terrorist group. Speaker 1 explains that the designation emerged from a DOJ/intelligence collaboration during the Trump era, with William Barr involved in pursuing Maduro. The term traces back to the Reagan era, when the CIA and DEA allegedly allowed drug trafficking through Venezuela to monitor routes, revealing a long history of U.S. involvement in narco-trafficking networks as a tool of influence. Ramon Guillen Davia is named as a Venezuelan National Guard contact, with broader exposure through media such as a 60 Minutes segment and a New York Times expose by Tim Weiner. The cartel’s earlier existence and its resurfacing in U.S. legal actions are tied to broader U.S. efforts to delegitimize Maduro’s government. - Venezuelan political history since Chavez: Speaker 1 outlines Chavez’s rise and popularity (e.g., reducing extreme poverty by 60% before sanctions), the 2002 coup attempt led by opposition figures including Leopoldo Lopez, and the subsequent public support for Chavez when the people protested to restore him. They describe “La Salida” in 2004–2014 as an opposition strategy funded by U.S. entities (NED, USAID) to depose Chavez, with various protests and riots that damaged the economy. After Chavez, Maduro faced U.S. sanctions and a narrative of illegitimacy framed by the opposition’s efforts to install Guaidó as a parallel government in 2019, enabling asset seizures and embargos on Venezuela’s Sitco assets. - 2019 events and aftermath: The 2019 U.S.-backed attempt to install Juan Guaido as interim president is described, including the staged “humanitarian aid” convoy at the Colombia border which failed; Guaidó’s association with Las Bratas (the Las Frastrojos cartel members) is cited as a public-relations embarrassment, corroborated by major outlets. Leopoldo Lopez is described as a persistent organizer of opposition efforts, connected to a broader U.S.-funded framework through the CIA’s ecosystem (Canvas, Einstein Institute), and by extension to regime-change policy. The possibility of Maduro arresting Guaido is discussed as strategically unwise for Maduro to avoid bolstering U.S. claims of repression. - Opposition fragmentation and polling: The panel debates whether the opposition has broad support. Speaker 1 says a November poll by Datanalysis shows Maria Carina Machado at roughly 14–15% and Maduro around 20%, with most voters undecided and younger voters leaning toward external media narratives. Older, rural, and poor Venezuelans—Chavista base—remain a significant portion of the population. Young people are described as more influenced by social media and potentially more susceptible to pro-U.S. messaging but not broadly supportive of the radical opposition. - External actors and drug-trafficking links: The dialogue links narco-trafficking networks to geopolitical strategy, arguing that the U.S. has used or tolerates narcotics channels to fund political aims in Latin America. The discussion covers broader examples, including Ecuador and the Balkans, and references to U.S. figures and policies (e.g., regime-change agendas, naval movements, sanctions, and strategic partnerships) to illustrate how narcotics intersects with geopolitics. - Geopolitical trajectory and outcomes: The speakers speculate on possible futures: (1) a negotiated deal between Trump and Maduro or U.S. diplomacy (with the oil sector’s re-entry and debt relief) being preferable to open intervention; (2) a decapitation strike leading to destabilization and civil war with severe humanitarian and migration consequences; (3) ongoing sanctions and coercive measures as a long-term strategy. They caution that a direct, large-scale military invasion seems unlikely due to political and logistical risks, including American public opinion and potential backlash if U.S. troops are lost. - Global context and strategy: The broader international framework is discussed, including the U.S. strategic doctrine shifting toward a multipolar world and hemispheric dominance concerns. The conversation touches on how U.S. policy toward Venezuela fits into wider ambitions regarding Russia, China, and regional partners, as well as potential domestic political changes in the U.S. that could influence future approaches to Venezuela and Latin America. - Concluding note: The discussion closes with reflections on the complexity of regime-change ambitions, the difficulty of predicting outcomes, and the possibility that diplomacy or limited, targeted pressure may emerge as more viable paths than broad invasion or decapitation strategies. The participants acknowledge the influence of regional personalities and U.S. domestic politics on policy direction.

The discussion centers on Venezuela and whether to engage with Nicolás Maduro. The dialogue notes that there has been consideration of talking to him, with uncertainty about the approach: “What Venezuela, sir? Are you planning to talk to Nicolas Maturo? I might talk to him. We'll see. But we're discussing that with their with the different steps.” The speakers acknowledge that Venezuela may be a topic of discussion and mention that “We might talk about Venezuela.” A key point raised is the United States’ designation of Maduro as the leader of a foreign terrorist organization. The exact assertion stated is: “The US this week did, of course, name him the leader of a foreign terrorist organization.” This designation is presented as a context for questioning the desirability of talking to him. In response to whether diplomacy with Maduro is prudent, there is a conditional stance expressed: “Why do you wanna talk to him if he's the leader? If we can save lives, if we can do things the easy way, that's fine.” This line frames the decision to engage in talks as potentially justified if it can save lives and if it can be accomplished through an easier route. The speakers also acknowledge flexibility in method: “And if we have to do it the hard way, that's fine too.” This phrase indicates willingness to pursue stronger or more challenging measures if necessary, depending on the outcomes or constraints involved in engaging with Maduro. Overall, the exchange highlights a tension between pursuing dialogue with Maduro and the U.S. designation of him as a leader of a foreign terrorist organization, balanced against the potential to save lives and the spectrum of possible approaches, from easy to hard. The conversation suggests that the decision to engage or not would be influenced by the prospect of saving lives and the practicality of the approach, given the current designation by the United States.

The speaker questions where the alleged Nobel Peace Prize winner is when Venezuela is attacked by US imperialism, asking, “Where are these countries that have not spoken?” They state that as workers they demand respect and are marching because they believe in democracy. They recall voting on July 28 for President Nicolás Maduro and note that all sectors of the country recognized the victory. They demand that the US government, imperialism, and all transnationals—whom they claim are behind this—return President Nicolás Maduro to them safe and sound.

Mario and Max discuss the January 3 operation in Venezuela, its potential objectives, and the wider geopolitical implications. - The operation raised early fears of a full amphibious invasion or a new war, with rapid questions about how Maduro could be kidnapped with so little resistance and whether a single downed helicopter could have produced a catastrophe for Donald Trump. Max notes that 16 guards of Nicolas Maduro were killed, including his personal bodyguard who had guarded Hugo Chavez, and suggests this could indicate the operation was choreographed or left open to a deal through Maduro. - Max says he had woken late and watched the event unfold, and he entertained theories about a negotiated exit for Maduro that would leave the Pesuv (Chavista) structure in place, enabling a transition to a figure like Delsy Rodriguez (the vice president) who would work within Chavismo to exploit Venezuelan resources for Trump’s cronies. He states he predicted that Trump would claim Maria Carina Machado did not have enough support to rule and would not be returned to power, a point he supported with sources and his reading of Trump’s behavior, including Trump’s condemnation of Machado’s Nobel Prize and disregard for Juan Guaido. - Max describes a theory of a deal and questions whether the Venezuelan military stood down. He notes that the US military is dominant but that losing a single helicopter could have become a political disaster for Trump. He mentions Joaquin Padrino Lopez (defense minister) and Diosdado Cabello as other power centers, suggesting that even if Maduro was abducted, a power vacuum could destabilize Venezuela. He cites Cabello signaling resistance by appearing on the street with military figures and the Second Republic flag. - The conversation covers whether Delsy Rodriguez has broad support in Venezuela. Max recalls Rodriguez’s 2021 interview and her role during the COVID response, portraying her as stabilizing economically and presiding over ministries, which aided an economic revival supported by China and others. Max suggests her potential as a US-friendly figure but notes she lacks the military backing to consolidate power against other Pesuv factions. - Mario asks about Maduro’s leadership, and Max rejects the idea that Maduro is purely incompetent, noting corruption under the Bolivarian regime and Maduro’s own background as a student of Simon Bolivar, a former bus driver who rose through the ranks. He argues Maduro was not a stupid leader and contrasts his profile with Trump’s. He warns that achieving regime change would not be simple, given Venezuela’s polarization and the military’s importance. - The discussion turns to the economic situation in Venezuela. Mario references statistics: economy shrinking by around 80% since 2013, 95% in poverty, oil production down, living standards collapsed, and out-migration. Max acknowledges some statistics may be flawed but agrees that Delsy Rodriguez had presided over an economic revival and that China played a central role, purchasing a large share of Venezuelan oil and helping with oil infrastructure, while Iran and Russia also provided support. He notes the impact of US sanctions and the broader “financial terrorism” narrative, arguing that sanctions and IMF-style measures contributed to economic decline and the diaspora’s views. - They debate who bears responsibility for the crisis. Max emphasizes longstanding US sanctions and political interference as primary factors, arguing that the US sought to undermine Venezuela’s sovereignty and to plunder its resources, with Maduro’s government framed by Western outlets as corrupt; he cites evidence of corruption and suggests a pattern of coercive measures against Venezuela. - The conversation covers the purpose behind capturing Maduro. Max suggests the aim might be to replace Maduro with a more pliable figure who would cooperate with US oil interests and allow greater control over Venezuela’s PDVSA structure. He discusses the possibility of grooming a candidate from within Pesuv or returning Machado, though he notes Marco Rubio’s public stance that elections could be delayed to avoid destabilizing Venezuela. - The role of China and the broader multipolar dynamic is addressed. The Chinese envoy’s meeting with Maduro hours before the strikes is seen as signaling China’s interest and as part of a broader message to China, Russia, and Iran about US reach. Max believes the operation sends a wider message of US willingness to act in the hemisphere and to police resource access. - The interview ends with a comparison to the Panama regime change (Manuel Noriega) and a reminder that Maduro will be tried in the Southern District of New York. Max notes that Machado’s supporters and US associates are calculating future power arrangements, while Maduro remains central to ongoing debates about Venezuela’s political and economic future.

The conversation centers on accusations about Venezuela’s leadership and the international response to Middle East conflict. Speaker 0 asserts that “the woman” who is supposedly taking over Venezuela is pro Israeli and pro Likud, noting she signed a cooperation deal in 2020 with Netanyahu’s Likud party and fully supports Netanyahu’s war on Gaza, asking, “This is why we're seeing the bombing of them right now?” Speaker 1 counters by outlining a pattern of what they view as permissive international inaction. They assert that “The UN has allowed the bombing and destruction of Beirut and Lebanon. They've allowed the bombing and destruction of Syria. Every day, they permit the bombing of Yemen's Arab people.” They then ask what major Western capitals—Berlin, Paris, London, Washington—will say as they “keep encouraging the Hitler of the twenty first century now against the noble peaceful people of Iran.” They declare, “The Bolivarian humanist peaceful people of Venezuela say no to war,” urging that the madness must be stopped. Speaker 1 then addresses Israelis and Jews directly, framing themselves as a Christian and Sephardic heir who tells them to “stop Netanyahu's madness.” They state that only “the people of Israel can stop this madness.” They question where warmongering will lead and warn about the consequences of racism, intolerance, hatred, and violence. They ask whether missiles and bombs will subdue the will of the world’s peoples and call for an end to aggression against Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians, Yemenis, and the noble people of Iran. The speaker emphasizes that “The ball is in the court of Israel's Jewish people” and urges an end to this “immoral war, this criminal war.” The exchange conveys a sense of urgency and moral appeal, framed as a call for stopping perceived aggression and imperial complicity, while highlighting the interconnections between Venezuelan solidarity with peaceful movements and opposition to ongoing bombardments in the region. We shall see.

Speaker 0 argued that Maduro was not democratically elected and was not cracking down on drug trafficking to the U.S. and other countries, contrasting this with Honduras’ crackdown on drug trafficking supported by agencies like the DEA and Southcom, which earned praise for the Honduran government. The discussion then turned to U.S. policy. Speaker 0 asked whether the interviewee supports what the Trump administration did, or believes there is a line that should not be crossed. They noted that the U.S. military action against Maduro—bombing the country, entering, capturing Maduro, killing members of his government, and taking him to jail—was seen by some as positive, with Maduro described as a criminal who destroyed the country and economy. Speaker 1 responded by focusing on the human impact in Venezuela and other Latin American countries. They stated that a large portion of the population has suffered, with a notable number of people migrating from Venezuela and Honduras. They asserted that elections in Venezuela were stolen by Maduro’s regime, stating that the opposition’s poll results were stored in the cloud and the government did not want to see them because they knew they would lose. They described this as not democracy. They added that, since Hondurans left the country due to trafficking, vessels by sea and illegal flights were bringing jobs to Honduras, but also causing deaths and bloodshed. They argued that if the Trump administration framed Drug Trafficking as terrorism, it was warranted because the drug flow to the United States harmed not only U.S. citizens but also Honduras, which faced the highest death toll in fifteen years due to drugs coming through its borders, largely from Venezuela, and that nothing was done about this by prior administrations. Speaker 0 then asked for the stance on U.S. intervention in general: should intervention be allowed only in certain cases (e.g., Maduro), or should there be no U.S. intervention in Latin America under any president? Speaker 1 shared a Venezuelan friend’s view that there are no options to change Venezuela and that intervention might be necessary if there is no other way to save Venezuela. From a Honduran perspective, they believed Trump’s actions helped not only Honduras but also other Central American and regional countries along the drug-trafficking routes, by reducing corruption, bloodshed, and deaths. They argued that the political machinery Chavez created and used to stall elections in other Latin American countries had previously gone unchecked by the U.S., and that Trump faced Maduro with a confrontation. They concluded that many people in the world do not know what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. They stated that Trump confronted Maduro, who now has a chance to defend himself in a trial, and emphasized the issue of sovereignty for every country.

- The discussion opens with the possibility of a coup in Venezuela, with Speaker 0 suggesting the first step would be to “take out Maduro.” Speaker 1 notes reports that Maduro sought amnesty from the US to step down, which Trump allegedly refused. - A recurring theme is the idea of watching naval movements to gauge US willingness to attack a country. Speaker 2 emphasizes that an aircraft carrier battle group signals seriousness, citing the USS Gerald R. Ford and 11 associated ships as the indicator that the US is “serious.” He also questions any upside for the US in regime change in Venezuela, noting the US has avoided buying or refining Venezuelan oil and arguing that the policy lacks a clear benefit. - On drugs, Speaker 2 asserts that the drugs in Venezuela are not Venezuelan but come from Colombia and Ecuador, transiting Venezuela to West Africa and then to Europe, with the claim that Europe is the primary market and the US a smaller one. He argues this reflects broader flaws in US foreign policy. - The speakers discuss the potential consequences if Maduro steps down, predicting chaos, and reflect on the broader narrative shift from Iran, Russia, and Ukraine to Venezuela. They discuss whether the military and regional powers would support intervention. Speaker 2 argues that regional powers (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico) are opposed to American intervention, complicating any possible regime-change effort. - The issue of amnesty is revisited. Speaker 2 speculates Trump might want a “scalp” as a symbol of seriousness on drugs, drawing a parallel to Manuel Noriega’s capture, while noting that a post-overthrow stability plan is often missing in US operations. - The conversation touches on China’s role. Speaker 2 suggests China’s refinery investments in the Caribbean represent a strategic shift away from US-dominated refining, arguing that this creates incentives for China and reduces the US’s influence, with Maduro’s regime survival as a central concern. - On whether Maduro would offer US full access to Venezuelan oil, Speaker 2 says he can’t see it changing the strategic calculus, and argues China’s expanding influence makes regime change less sensible for the US. - They discuss the plausibility of using naval movements as a bluff to force Maduro to depart, noting such tactics are used in the South China Sea. However, Speaker 2 cautions that removing Maduro would create a power vacuum, and the military’s stance remains uncertain since the region’s powers oppose intervention. - Regarding the opposition, Speaker 2 downplays Maria Machado’s prospects, suggesting she lacks military backing and that a senior military officer might be the likely successor if Maduro leaves. The Juan Guaido episode is cited to illustrate the fragility and divisiveness of Venezuelan opposition movements. - The feasibility of decapitation-style strikes against Maduro is debated. Speaker 2 stresses Maduro is the internationally recognized president and emphasizes that any coup would require ground forces and a day-two plan, which historically has been lacking in US interventions. - They compare potential outcomes to Libya’s post-overthrow chaos and caution that US-imposed peace rarely lasts. The risk of a renewed crisis in Venezuela, including possible Hezbollah or Iranian connections, is acknowledged as a troubling possibility. - The discussion ends with a somber note that even seasoned policymakers may overestimate the success of regime change, and a reminder of historical lessons about coup outcomes and long-term stability.

Speaker: The speaker argues that a “plan of pedophiles” aims to end democracy in Colombia, stating that despite the harsh reality, they would not allow themselves to be silenced or betrayed by invading neighbors. They claim people would not applaud invading a brother country or a neighbor, emphasizing that the Colombian people are not the enemy, and that invading Venezuela would be traitorous. Speaker: They reject the idea of Venezuela as a villain and say they do not mock the Venezuelan people or trap them in an invasion driven only by oil greed and violence. They warn that such actions would turn this corner of South America into a place like Syria, Iraq, or Libya, filled with slavery and slave trading, and would degrade the region. Speaker: They criticize those “friends of STEIN” who do not want the list to appear in the United States and assert that these friends want to use violence to force the United States to ignore its own government, fueling xenophobia, racism, and ideas of racial superiority to distract from domestic issues. Speaker: They state that the Colombian president has long denunciated narcotraffickers, but note that the narcotraffickers who have been denounced have always been in power in Colombia, in the State. Speaker: The speaker reiterates a stance against betraying bloodlines or supporting invasions of brother countries, condemning any move by the Colombian president to seize lands for invasion from Colombia into a neighboring country. They denounce the president as “maldito” (damned) for generations to come for such a betrayal. Speaker: They emphasize that they do not belong to those who wanted to kill Bolívar, defending Bolívar’s legacy and the dignity of the region, while criticizing external powers’ influence and urging a stance against internal complicity with narcotrafficking and imperialist motives. Overall: The speaker frames a narrative of political betrayal, invasion threats, and manipulation by external actors framed as defending democracy and regional unity, while opposing violence against neighboring peoples, denouncing narcotrafficking within Colombia, and calling out alleged foreign influence and manipulation aimed at destabilizing the region.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss Venezuela policy and leadership. Speaker 0 asks if "secretary Hagsef and Rubio are going to be running Venezuela" and whether US military troops will be sent in. Speaker 1 responds that they are "working with the people of Venezuela to make sure that we have Venezuela" and questions who would take over if the US left, noting there is "a vice president who's been appointed by Maduro" who "was sworn as president just a little while ago." She had a long conversation with Marco and said, "we'll do whatever you need," though she "really doesn't have a choice." Speaker 1 asserts they will "have this done right" and "not gonna just do this with Maduro then leave like everybody else" or let it "go to hell." If the US left, it would have "zero chance of ever coming back." They will "run it properly," with "the greatest oil companies in the world" investing "billions and billions of dollars" and using that money "in Venezuela." The biggest beneficiary, per Speaker 1, will be "the people of Venice."

The speaker asks, why are we doing this and why are we so opposed to Nicolas Maduro. On the street, most people would say they don’t know who Nicolas Maduro is. But in places like South Florida, where people recognize Maduro and can identify Venezuela on a map, the typical answer shifts: because he’s a communist or a socialist. The speaker asserts that this is true: Nicolas Maduro and his government are very left wing on economics. The speaker notes an interesting distinction: this left-wing stance is economic, not social. In Venezuela, gay marriage is banned, abortion is banned, and sex changes for transgender individuals are banned. The speaker describes Venezuela as one of the very few countries in the entire hemisphere with those social policies, emphasizing that these policies are conservative socially. The speaker adds that Venezuela is one of the very few nations in the region with those social policies, specifying that it is on social policy, not defending the regime. The speaker mentions that only El Salvador comes close in conservatism, though El Salvador is much smaller. Additionally, the speaker brings up a political point: the US-backed opposition leader who would take Maduro’s place, if Maduro were removed, is described as eager to implement gay marriage in Venezuela. This is presented as a counterpoint to the idea that the opposition is globally liberal or that the regime is uniquely opposed to liberal social policies. The speaker references the notion of a “global homo” project and implies that the reality is different from that belief, labeling the project as not crazy after all. The overall argument ties Maduro’s economic leftism to social policy conservatism, and contrasts Venezuelan social policy with potential shifts under the opposition, while noting public recognition differences about Maduro.

Speaker 0 discusses the legality and practicality of stopping drug-running vessels versus fishing boats. He asks, “If you can seize a tanker without killing anyone, shouldn’t that have been the way that these fishing boats were also stopped?” He clarifies the confusion: “Fishing boats? Well, the drug runners? The drug runners. Those aren't fishing boats.” He explains that the discussion involves two different authorities: “article two authority” and sanctions. He states that “the president and the commander in the chief has identified and designated terrorist organizations who are cartels who run drugs that kill hundred thousand Americans a year,” and asserts, “there’s no legal question that he has the legal ability to blow those boats out of the water.” He contrasts this with sanctions: “these were economic sanctions by the president as delegated by congress. Those were enforced by civil authorities with the aid of the US Navy.” He emphasizes a distinction between violent drug-trafficking activity and the legal framework of sanctions, insisting, “If you’re asking me if I have sympathy for narco terrorists killing Americans whose boats that are carrying the drugs that kill Americans, I don’t.” He adds, “I have sympathy for my neighbors in Missouri who’ve been poisoned, who die. And we finally have a president who cares about them more than the Democrats care about going down to El Salvador to drink margaritas with terrorists.” Regarding policy toward Venezuela, he states, “Are you open to troops in Venezuela?” and notes, “That’s not that we’re not talking about that at all. We’re talking about actually enforcing sanctions.” He mentions the president being open about the consideration and says the administration is weighing options, including actions in the hemisphere and the broader competition with China. Asked specifically if the Trump administration should try to overthrow Maduro’s regime, he replies, “That’s not that we’re talking about at all.” He asserts, “The president was kind of open about that. I don’t know what you’re talking about.” He references Senator Hawley’s opposition to U.S. ground troops in Venezuela and reiterates his confidence in the president’s decision-making, calling Trump “a realist who understands that we have to pivot away from Europe’s overreliance on the generosity of Americans,” and emphasizing there are “real interest here in our hemisphere” and in countering China. He concludes, acknowledging “we have real interest here in our hemisphere.”

A Venezuelan American speaker describes the impact of the regime on their family and millions of others. Their family lost everything—work, savings, investments—wiped out by a narco dictatorship that has held Venezuela in a death grip for over twenty-five years. The Venezuelan exodus is described as the second largest displacement crisis on Earth after Syria, a humanitarian disaster and not just tragedy. The regime has jailed hundreds of political prisoners and thousands have been murdered for speaking out. More than a third of the population has fled, not for opportunity or the American dream, but to survive because staying often means death. The speaker contends Venezuela is not merely a collapsed state but an occupied one, with territory, natural resources, and institutions overrun by hostile foreign powers: Iranian militias, Chinese corporations, Russian intelligence, all exploiting the country with impunity. Venezuela, they argue, is no longer a local crisis but a geopolitical threat endangering the Western Hemisphere, a launchpad for authoritarian expansion in the Americas. Amid this, Maria Corina Machado is highlighted as a leader who dared to push for freedom. In 2024, she supposedly led a peaceful democratic uprising that won the election. Her team allegedly smuggled physical voting receipts out of the country—hard proof of victory the regime attempted to bury. The speaker says her courage has sparked belief among millions of Venezuelans that change is possible. Some people have questioned Machado’s decision to dedicate her Nobel Prize to Donald Trump. The speaker accepts the criticism but argues it was a brilliant strategic move on the global political stage. Machado is portrayed as understanding Trump’s character, his campaign for the prize, and the symbolic, personal value of the recognition to him. The claim is that this gesture might keep Trump’s attention focused on Venezuela at a time when U.S. presence and pressure in the Caribbean is rising. The dedication is described not as flattery or optics, but as a strategic act to protect and preserve a form of power that could shift history, grounded in the belief that the ultimate aim is freedom. The speaker emphasizes that Machado is not asking for a U.S. invasion or war; Venezuela is already invaded and held hostage by a narco state with foreign agents and enemies of democracy—Russians, Iranians, Chinese—operating freely to expand influence across Latin America. Machado is calling for the support of the only military capable of countering that threat, framed as liberation rather than imperialism. The argument is that the fight is for Venezuela’s life, not theory or politics, and that the world should recognize what’s at stake. The fight for Venezuela is a fight for freedom, democracy, and continental stability, and if liberty, human dignity, and peace in the Americas matter, Venezuela’s fight must matter to all.

Speaker 1 discusses the human toll of Venezuelan and regional instability, noting widespread Venezuelan suffering and massive migration from the region, including Honduras and other countries, driven by the situation in Venezuela. He contends that elections in Venezuela were stolen by Maduro’s regime, insisting that the opposition’s poll results were stored on cloud and the government refused to view them because they knew they had lost, labeling this as not a democracy. He adds that the drug trade through Honduras caused significant bloodshed and deaths, attributing much of this violence to shipments that originated in Venezuela and stating that the U.S. had not acted on that flow, which has cost Hondurans many lives. Speaker 0 then asks about the stance on U.S. intervention, whether intervention is sometimes warranted, such as against Maduro, or whether there should be no U.S. intervention in Latin America at all, across different administrations. Speaker 1 responds by recounting a Venezuelan friend’s view that options to change Venezuela are limited and that intervention might be necessary if there is no other way to save Venezuela. From the Honduran perspective, he says Trump’s actions helped Honduras and other Central American countries by addressing drug trafficking routes that harmed regional security, corruption, and lives. He asserts that Maduro created a political machine used to stall elections in regional countries, a tactic previously overlooked by the Obama-era U.S. administration but confronted by the Trump administration. He believes Trump’s administration provided options to Maduro, who did not accept them, leaving Maduro to defend himself in his upcoming trial. Speaker 1 emphasizes the sovereignty of countries and argues that many people worldwide do not understand what has happened in Venezuela and how it affects both Venezuelans and neighboring nations. He states that Maduro is going to have a chance to defend himself in court, and reiterates that intervention has implications for sovereignty and regional stability, implying that the situation has prompted broader regional consequences and debates about the legitimacy of elections and governance in Venezuela.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some sort of action. They could say, oh, well, we gotta go respond to this to set the stage for our military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert action by the CIA to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective, get control of the oil. That's the number one priority. And I think it's being done with an eye looking forward, recognizing the potential risk. If conflict is renewed with Iran, prospect of the shutdown of Persian Gulf— Mario: Ukraine defeated Russia. Larry: Yeah. That was the plan. Russia's military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: Let’s talk Venezuela. What’s your initial reaction? When John Kuriaki suggested the best indicator is naval movements, and the buildup off Venezuela is significant. I’ve heard they have 14, twelve warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing? Is this Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the CIA’s Central America branch. They tried to provoke Noriega into action to justify invasion, which happened in December 1988. What’s different now is the base infrastructure. In Panama, Quarry Heights was full; Southern Command was there. Southern Command has moved to Miami. The weaponization of the idea of a “supported vs. supporting” commander is reversed here: Southern Command would be subordinate to Special Operations Command. SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war; they’re light infantry, raids, hostage rescue. So the question is: what will the ships actually do? Shells into Venezuela won’t defeat Venezuela. Ground forces would require mass, and Venezuela is three times the size of Vietnam with rugged terrain that favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, you’d stack body bags far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Mario: Do Venezuelans have the will to fight Maduro? Larry: Yes. It will rally insurgents from Brazil and Colombia. If we decapitate Maduro, there are loyalists with weapons; an insurgency could follow, and the US would be hard-pressed to pacify it. The State Department’s INL/INSCR reports on narcotics note Venezuela as a transit point for marijuana and some cocaine, with fentanyl less central than claimed by Trump. The 2018 emphasis on Trendy Aragua looked CIA-driven. Trump reportedly signed a covert action finding in 2018 to remove Maduro, leading to the Guaidó fiasco; that covert action included some public diplomacy via USAID. The objective now, as you asked, is oil control and curtailing Russia, China, and Iran’s influence, with an eye toward BRICS. Mario: Could there be a decapitation strike on Maduro, and would someone like Maria take over? Larry: A decapitation strike could spark insurgency; the US would not be able to pacify it. The broader agenda seems to include a strategy to seize oil and reduce regional influence by Russia and China. Venezuela’s role as a transit point and possible BRICS alignment complicates any straightforward regime-change scenario. Mario: Moving to general foreign policy under Trump. The national security strategy (NSS) for 2025 signals a shift, but you question how binding NSS papers are. What did you make of it, and how does it relate to Ukraine? You’ve noted Trump isn’t serious about peace in Ukraine on some occasions. Larry: The NSS is a set of guidelines, not a blueprint. Europe is being asked to step up, the US distancing itself from Europe, and the strategic relationship with Europe is damaged by the perception of long-term reliability and sanctions. The document highlights China as an economic rival rather than an enemy; it criticizes Europe’s defense spending and censorship, and it frames Russia as less of a direct threat than before, though the reality is nuanced. The US-EU relationship is strained, and the US wants Europe to shoulder more of the burden in Ukraine while maintaining strategic pressure. Mario: What about Ukraine? Zelensky’s negotiation posture, security guarantees, and the Moscow terms? Larry: Putin spoke on 06/14/2024 with five Russian demands: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk are permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw its forces from those republics; there must be an election in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president (the Russians argue Zelensky is illegitimate for not holding elections); they suggest a successor to Zelensky and elections within 90 days. Freezing lines in Donbas is not accepted by Russia; the Russians claim further territory may be annexed with referenda. If peace talks fail, Russia is likely to push to occupy Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Odessa, potentially Kyiv. Western support is insufficient to alter that trajectory, given Russia’s large artillery and drone production. The US and Europe cannot match Russia’s drone and shell output; even if they supply Tomahawks, escalation risks, including nuclear considerations, grow. Russia’s economy and war capacity remain robust, and the BRICS poles are strengthening as Western leverage wanes. Mario: What about sanctions strategy and Russia’s oil revenues? Larry: Oil remains a significant but not decisive portion of Russia’s GDP. The West’s sanctions are not enough to force collapse; Russia has endured the 1990s and remains resilient. BRICS cooperation and the shift to the Global South are changing the global order, with Russia and China deepening ties and reducing Western influence. The war in Ukraine has not produced a decisive Western victory, and the global south is moving away from Western-led sanctions, reshaping geopolitical alignments. Mario, it’s been a pleasure.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of a coup in Venezuela and the implications of U.S. actions. They emphasize naval movements as a signal of U.S. seriousness, noting the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford and associated ships as a trigger that indicates a real threat or action. They remark that if Maduro steps down, chaos could follow, and acknowledge that Maduro has discussed amnesty with the U.S. that Trump reportedly refused. Speaker 2 repeatedly highlights naval movements as a metric for U.S. intent to attack a country, recalling lessons from the CIA. He argues the U.S. is not strategically benefiting from intervention in Venezuela, given that the U.S. has decided not to buy or refine Venezuelan oil, and questions what upside there is for the U.S. in such action. He asserts that drugs in Venezuela originate from Colombia and Ecuador and transit through Venezuela to West Africa and Europe, rather than serving the U.S. market, and he links this to broader critiques of U.S. foreign policy. Both speakers discuss the regional calculus: China’s increasing influence in Latin America, including a Caribbean refinery operation that refines Venezuelan crude, challenging U.S. refinery interests. They suggest China’s refiners and pipelines complicate U.S. strategies. They also discuss the potential role of Pakistan, Iran, or other powers in shaping outcomes, noting that many regional players (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and others) oppose U.S. intervention. Speaker 1 notes that a regime-change operation could undermine U.S. trust as an ally and references a platform called Polymarket where Maduro’s potential departure had been speculated, though newer developments show Maduro mobilizing the military. They raise a question about whether Maduro sought amnesty for the U.S. to step down, and say Trump’s refusal could reflect a desire for a political “scalp” to prove anti-drug policy, comparing this to the Panama case of Manuel Noriega. Speaker 2 elaborates that covert action programs are highly classified, and that even discussing them publicly is risky. He suggests that any coup would require a limited force to seize the presidential palace, pacify the military, and control key communications, with no clear plan for post-coup governance. They discuss the opposition leadership, noting Maria Machado as potentially not more effective than Juan Guaidó and suggesting the military would likely take power after Maduro’s departure. They compare possible futures to Libya post-NATO intervention, warning that anticipated constitutions and reforms often do not materialize in practice, leading to prolonged conflict. Speaker 2 emphasizes the international unpopularity of regime-change in Venezuela and argues that U.S. actions could provoke regional instability and further migration. The dialogue ends with reflections on the inherent dangers of regime change, the lessons from past interventions, and the possibility of Venezuelan instability if Maduro leaves. They caution against assuming flowers will greet invading forces and stress that historical outcomes often diverge from planners’ expectations, with a warning that a hypothetical post-regime-change period could be chaotic and military-led.

Speaker 0 initiates by linking events in Venezuela and Israel to broader regional dynamics, including Iran, and asks the ambassador for his reaction to the military and law enforcement operation in Venezuela. Speaker 1 responds that his first reaction was to praise the lord and thank president Trump. He explains that many people may not connect the issue to the Middle East, but asserts that Hezbollah is very active in Venezuela. He states there has been a twenty-year partnership between Iran and Venezuela under two previous dictators, describing the ties as deep. He claims Hezbollah operates in 12 different countries throughout South America. He emphasizes that this is not just a threat in the Western Hemisphere but also a threat to the Middle East. He argues that the president’s action against Venezuela addresses narco-terrorism and the deaths of Americans from drugs, and he contends that it will “make life for those of us living in The Middle East much better, much safer” by taking Maduro out. He connects this to Hezbollah’s activity, saying Hezbollah is active in Venezuela and targeting Jewish people all over South America, and that those tentacles can reach into the United States. He concludes that this development is good news for America and for the world.

Speaker 0: Have you considered talking to the president of Colombia who you called a drop leader? Speaker 1: No. I haven't really thought too much about him. He's been fairly hostile to The United States, and I haven't given him a lot of thought. He's he's gonna have himself some big problems if he doesn't wise up. Speaker 2: Did you say Colombia is producing a lot of drugs. Have cocaine factories that they make cocaine, as you know, and they sell it right into The United States. So he better wise up or he'll be next. He'll be next too. I hope he's listening. Speaker 0: So was this operation a message that you're sending to Mexico, to Claudia Scheinbaum, president there? Speaker 2: Well, it wasn't meant to be. We're very friendly with her. She's a good woman, but the cartels are running Mexico. She's not running Mexico. The cartels are running Mexico. We could be politically correct and be nice and say, oh, yes. Is no. No. She's very, you know, she's very frightened of the cartels that are running Mexico. And I've asked her numerous times, would you like us to take out the cartels? No. No. No, mister president. No. No, no, please. So we have to do something because we lost the real number is 300,000 people, in my opinion. You know, they like to say a 100,000. A 100,000 is a lot of people, but the real number is 300,000 people. And we lost it to drugs, and they come in through the southern border, mostly the southern border. A lot plenty come in through Canada too, by the way, in case you don't know. But but they come in through the southern border, and something's gonna have to be done with Mexico. Cuban government, the Trump administration's next target, mister secretary, very quickly. Speaker 3: Well, the Cuban government is a is a huge problem. Yeah. The the the the Cuban government is a huge problem for Speaker 2: some So is that a yes? Speaker 3: Cuba. But I don't think people fully appreciate. I think they're in a lot of trouble. Yes. I'm not gonna talk talk to you about what our future steps are gonna be and our policies are gonna be right now in this regard, but I don't think it's any mystery that we are not big fans of the Cuban regime, who, by the way, are the ones that were propping up Maduro. His entire, like, internal security force, his internal security opera apparatus is entirely controlled by Cubans. One of the untold stories here is how, in essence, you talk about colonization because I think you said Dulce Rodriguez mentioned that, the ones who have sort of colonized, at least inside the regime, are Cubans. It was Cubans that guarded Maduro. He was not guarded by Venezuelan bodyguards. He had Cuban bodyguards. In terms of their internal intelligence, who spies on who inside to make sure there are no traitors, those are all Cubans. Speaker 0: He felt very strongly. We we needed for nationals. We need Greenland for national security, not for minerals. We had some we have so many sites for minerals and oil and everything. We have more oil than any other country in the world. We need Greenland for national security.

The speaker invokes James Madison to emphasize that war and peace decisions belong to the legislature, calling it the “crown jewel of Congress,” and warns that concentrating war-making power in one person erodes liberty. If the president believes military action against Venezuela is justified, the case should be made to Congress and Congress should vote before American lives and treasure are spent on regime change in South America. The speaker questions the likelihood of Maduro being replaced by a modern-day George Washington, asking how past interventions fared in Cuba, Libya, Iraq, or Syria. He notes that previous presidents used weapons of mass destruction as a justification for war, referencing the WMD narrative and suggesting a parallel with today’s rhetoric about drugs as a supposed WMD. He asserts that if the objective were drugs, actions would have targeted Mexico, China, or Colombia, and highlights the pardon of Juan Orlando Hernandez as inconsistent with a drug-war narrative. He contends that the policy for regime change is driven by oil interests, and asserts that the United States has already pursued this path in Venezuela without success. The speaker recalls the 2019 recognition of Juan Guaido, the seizure of Venezuela’s embassy in Washington, and claims that regime change was promised but Maduro remains in power years later. He mentions contemporary exiled figures as hopes, specifically naming Edmundo Gonzalez and Maria Carina Machado, but warns that Congress should not provide a blank check for military escalation and American lives. A central contradiction highlighted is the administration’s labeling of the Maduro regime as narco terrorists while at the same time potentially causing countless refugees through escalation, alongside moves to end temporary protected status (TPS) for hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans and deport them to the regime it condemns. The speaker poses questions about whether the nation should absorb millions of Venezuelan refugees and spend billions to destroy and rebuild the country, or risk creating a “miniature Afghanistan in the Western Hemisphere.” If the cost is deemed acceptable by Congress, the speaker argues it should be decided through a vote, aligning with the Constitution. He clarifies that the current vote is not for declaring war or authorizing force, but for a war powers resolution that reaffirms Congress’s authority over war decisions. He urges support for the resolution and closes as time expires.