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Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined by professor Syed Mohammed Marandi, from Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back. Marandi: Hi, Glenn. Thank you. It shows how much I like your show because I went through a lot of trouble to get online. Glenn: I appreciate it. Regarding the riots in Iran, Tehran included, it seems every time there’s a buildup to regime change or invasion, the script follows a pattern: first destabilize with sanctions and an information war, then build on public grievances and instigate violent protests. You announce the intention to help locals in their aspirations for freedom, with rhetoric reduced to a binary: either you don’t care about the protesters or you support sanctions or intervention. After a coup or invasion, the US and its allies have a zero-sum geopolitical interest and power interest, not altruism. The result, from the Arab Spring onward, is that the country to be liberated is destroyed. Iranian protests are an internal issue, but once international, geopolitics intrudes. How do you assess the situation on the ground in Tehran, domestic grievances, and the geopolitical component? Marandi: Western media and think tanks periodically declare Iran on the verge of collapse, but the state has popular support and a strong constitutional adherence. Currency suddenly fell—perhaps 30–50% in a brief period—and was managed from abroad, with pressure from the US and Western allies on currency-exchange places. Peaceful protests in Tehran and other cities followed mainly by business people whose shops were threatened by rising prices; if the currency isn’t stabilized, they’d go out of business. Protests continued into day two, with larger crowds in some cities. Then infiltration occurred: small, well-disciplined groups began to riot. Over the past days, over 100 officers were murdered, some beheaded or burned alive, some police faces smashed. A nurse in a clinic was burned alive in the top floor; ambulances and fire engines were burned; a Red Crescent worker was killed. Western media claims “protesters” and ignores footage. Across the country today, demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic and the constitution were large—city by city like Isfahan, Tabriz, Ahvaz, Mashhad, Tehran. The crowd in Tehran was among the largest ever. Despite rioters, millions showed up in demonstrations across the country. The Iranian state’s media is outspent by a global Persian-language media empire in the West, with billions spent on online campaigns, bot armies, and networks. Yet millions demonstrated in support of the state. People can see the footage themselves. The internet was shut down to coordinate rioters across groups including ISIS-related elements, monarchists, and Kurdish groups. The rioters’ coordination collapsed when the internet went down. The regime’s supporters remain, and demonstrations in Tehran and across Iran show broad, diverse perspectives, all affirming support for the constitution and the state. Glenn: I’ve seen pro-government marches here as well; they’re huge, though not always covered in Europe. Marandi: There’s a narrative control to label the government illegitimate to topple it. The rhetoric claims Iranians are freedom-loving, yet those who claim to support them have bombs and blood. Pompeo’s tweet suggesting Mossad agents among protesters, and Mossad’s Persian-language statements, indicate foreign interference. The internet blackout aimed to prevent coordination among rioters; footage shows violent acts—two men burned in a mosque, a nurse burned in a clinic, ambulances and public buses destroyed. The “millions on the streets” claim is contradicted by the actuality of coordination via foreign paymasters. Glenn: Trump claimed Iran had fallen and would negotiate; is this about a new nuclear deal, stalled or about missiles and Iran’s regional support? What are Washington’s aims? Marandi: No one contacted him; his claim about the second-largest city falling is baseless. His ignorance shows inchoate knowledge of ground realities. Trump’s past statements about surrendering Iran suggest aims aligned with the Israeli regime’s goals: a broken West Asia and North Africa, fragmentation of states, and meddling across the region. Erdogan’s miscalculation—allying with Israel and Qatar—empowered Israeli policy at the expense of Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and Iran. The “woman, life, freedom” protests were initially fueled by Western narratives; BBC Persian and other outlets spread misinformation about Massa Amini, which was later corrected, but the cycle repeats. The West uses propaganda to push riots; Iran’s endurance of sanctions and propaganda demonstrates broad legitimacy for the Islamic Republic even amid external pressure. The demonstrations today show support for the state, the constitution, and Iran’s policies while denouncing the US, the Israeli regime, and their supporters. AOC’s stance and Trump’s stance reflect a uniparty tendency toward empire preservation. Glenn: Regarding potential war, Lindsey Graham floated strikes; how likely is war? Marandi: The currency manipulation aimed to justify instability for war. The CIA, Mossad, and others would seek to justify strikes, but Iran is prepared for war. If the US attacks, Iran may strike back; the population that stood with the state could unite in the face of aggression. Iran’s capabilities include underground drone and missile bases, short- to medium-range missiles, more easily moved than long-range missiles. Iran could devastate US installations if attacked. If war occurs, Iran could retaliate in the Persian Gulf and beyond, potentially impacting global economies. If the US begins, Iran could respond decisively, targeting American interests abroad and in the region. The Zionists allegedly favor war for their regional aims, regardless of Western consequences. Glenn: Professor Malandy, thank you for traveling and for the discussion. Marandi: Always a pleasure, Glenn.

The discussion centers on how Iran’s mass funeral processions for Ali Khamenei’s funeral revealed a strong “rally around the flag” effect, surprising many outside observers who had expected large-scale opposition to the regime. The speakers connect the scale of public unity to Iranian nationalism and Shia martyrdom culture, arguing it is not simply the reaction of a “backwards country” but evidence of widespread emotional and cultural commitment. One speaker notes personal surprise after seeing the processions and says the emotional reversal will take years, not decades or generations, to undo the perceived damage to US standing in Iran and other countries. They also discuss how the killing of the supreme leader changes negotiation dynamics. The argument is that even if some Iranians revere figures like Qasem Soleimani as military commanders, the circumstances after the assassination are “completely different,” making it hard for Iranian leaders—especially those who attended the funerals—to offer concessions at negotiations. Another speaker adds that Iranian public sentiment on the streets is pressing leaders toward hardline positions, with chanting about “death to the compromiser,” suggesting many people are not excited for a deal. The conversation then broadens to related US and Israel political signals, including Rahm Emanuel’s speech positioning an end to unconditional US support for Israel and calling for conditional support such as sanctioning violent Israeli settlers. It also references the Trump–Erdogan meeting and the NATO summit context, including Turkey lifting sanctions on Turkey and possible approval of disputed F-35 sales, alongside claims that this might reflect a US–Israel split. The speakers tie these developments to domestic and election pressures affecting how any leadership might act. On the Middle East battlefield, they emphasize escalating risk in Syria involving Turkey and Israel. They describe looking at potential clashes and expect proxy dynamics rather than a purely conventional Turkey–Israel war. The speaker portrays Syria as a proxy-pulled battleground involving actors tied to Kurdish and Druze communities, while Sharaa’s forces could be pushed toward conflict that includes ethnic cleansing and further intervention by conventional Israeli forces, potentially including Turkish forces and even US involvement. They also discuss the likelihood of pressure on Sharaa to target Hezbollah when his support is threatened, stating it is possible only if he is “truly against the wall,” but still unlikely, and that Hezbollah may not initiate a fight either. The speakers discuss Syria’s instability as a “powder keg,” including past patterns where fighters in uniforms are used in ways that blur responsibility and create opportunities for further escalation. They describe how US and broader involvement in Syria was driven by proxy-war concerns and the role of Turkish intelligence in fostering or supporting extremist-linked elements, and they discuss ISIS detainees and repatriation from refugee camps—framing it as a key source of ongoing volatility. Finally, the conversation returns to whether a direct war has ended while proxy war expands—Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and possibly Iraq—creating a prolonged, unresolved power struggle. They argue Iran is enforcing the MOU through control of the Straits of Hormuz, making diplomatic off-ramps difficult and raising the possibility of additional bombing campaigns or more aggressive naval actions. The speakers also connect Middle East conflict to US homeland terrorism risk, citing blowback patterns such as attacks referencing the Gaza war and arguing that more large-scale fighting increases radicalization and the chance of attacks in the US. They conclude with the idea that the situation is largely about waiting for what happens next, particularly regarding proxy warfare and the evolving Iran–MOU–Straits dynamic.

Nigel Farage is said to be the subject of an in-depth investigation in The Times into “illicit funding,” undeclared and running into millions, attributed to a convicted criminal. The betting markets are described as nearly closed on the proposition that Nigel Farage is poised to resign over mounting financial scandals. The speaker predicts that reform is finished “with Nigel Farage,” especially if he is forced out by House of Commons authorities. The speaker then claims that the BBC has used “the law to force you to pay them,” and says the BBC has informed YouTube that it must prioritize “trusted news sources.” The speaker argues that prioritizing BBC One, BBC Two, Channel Four, Sky News, and “Uncle Tom, Cobbly and all” would deprioritize other outlets, and claims YouTube must comply “on pain of financial sanction or worse.” The speaker adds that after this, a BBC license fee may be charged for watching YouTube, which is currently exempt. They say many people watch television only on computers via YouTube and other platforms and therefore avoid a license fee, but predict this will not last. The speaker moves to international stories, describing the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (Sayyid Ali Khamenei), the leader and theologian of Iran, and says he was slain by “the United States and Israel” on the first day of the Ramadan war. The speaker claims Khamenei’s wife, daughter, and her children were also killed, and says a 14-month-old granddaughter was burned to death while playing with toys. The speaker further claims Washington, D.C., and “occupied Tel Aviv” were locations of attacks involving children, and says 160 schoolgirls were murdered in Minab while sitting at desks. They describe a funeral process lasting six days because coffins of Khamenei’s family are moved around cities in Iran, then to Karbala in neighboring Iraq, and finally back to Mashhad where he will be buried. The speaker says funeral commemorations involve “10 million people” in Tehran and calls it “the biggest funeral in human history,” adding that Trump’s July 4th celebrations were overshadowed. According to the speaker, Donald Trump reacted to Axios accounts of “millions of people weeping,” despite claims that they “didn’t like him.” The speaker says Trump is now seeing the same pictures, and claims the grieving crowd is shifting toward revenge, with “red flags of revenge” replacing other flags. They argue the chant “death to America” would be expected because, they say, it was America that caused the funeral and murdered Khamenei and others, leading to further war dynamics. The speaker then delivers a history of “American imperialism,” saying the U.S. is 250 years old and that only 19 years have passed without the U.S. being at war with other people. They claim the U.S. and Western Europe have invaded other countries, “stealing their land,” “stealing their wealth,” and taking people as slaves, and they assert that the U.S. was founded on “the genocide of the Native American people.” They claim Spanish, French, English, and “Western, settler colonialism” murdered “a hundred million Native Americans,” and say Africans were taken into slavery and later subjected to apartheid systems “until this day.” They also mention celebrations by people in Beirut and by “lunatics in Japan” after U.S. atomic bombs. Finally, the speaker returns to Trump’s July 4th events, calling him a “thief,” a “betrayer,” and accusing him of abusing women and allegedly “little girls,” associating him with “Epstein class degenerates,” and says it is a misfortune that the time has been “Donald Trump.” They end by saying two guests will appear, beginning with Professor Mohammad Marandi, “direct from Tehran.”

The discussion focused on multiple current geopolitical developments: Iran’s ongoing funeral proceedings for Ali Khamenei, Iran–Israel tensions around ceasefire negotiations, and the risks of escalation involving Russia, NATO, and Ukraine. Regarding Iran, the conversation cited a New York Times report that the United States was worried Israel might kill Arachi and Ghalibaf. The claim was that the Americans warned Iran through Pakistan and Qatar—via negotiations mediated by Pakistan—that Israel may assassinate them. The report also alleged that Ghalibaf’s plane, while returning from negotiations, made an emergency landing in the north after Israeli fighter jets were spotted in Iraqi airspace near or entering Iranian airspace, after which the plane drove to Tehran. Netanyahu’s press office denied the claim. The funeral context was described as a multi-day event underway, with world leaders including Medvedev in Iran. The question raised was whether Israel might assassinate Mustafa Khamenei (or other Iranian leaders) during the funeral. The response suggested it would be “too much” due to the large international delegation and the reputational and collateral-damage concerns such an assassination would create, while also arguing the news indicates Israel “becoming more reckless” if the claims were true. The discussion also touched on the idea that international warnings and mediation could be either real or “political theater,” but either way could damage U.S.–Israel relations by suggesting Israel is “extremely reckless” and that Americans felt the need to warn Iran about potential Israeli intent. On negotiations, the conversation shifted to the Strait of Hormuz. It noted that Europeans accepted Iran would charge a fee, with a Bloomberg report saying they want standardization and not pay more than countries like China or Russia. The U.S. was described as still trying to convince Iran not to charge a fee, offering unfreezing of $6 billion in exchange for Iran not charging a fee; Iran rejected the offer. The response argued Iran would interpret the situation as establishing new “realities on the ground,” and would position the charge as a fee tied to assistance and other concerns rather than a simple toll. It also argued that trust issues make the U.S. asset-unfreezing proposal “absurd,” and that renegotiation and sanctions returning would lead Iran to avoid trading control of the strait for “empty promises.” Broader regional tensions were listed: Lebanon on edge with Hezbollah; the Lebanese government seeking to disarm Hezbollah; mobilizations in Yemen involving Saudi-supported factions and Iran-aligned Houthis; and a crackdown in Iraq on figures close to Iran aligned with anti-corruption efforts. The discussion concluded the outlook was not good and that both sides would try to do something with the MOU rather than implementing it fully as outlined. The conversation then moved to Ukraine and Russia. It cited a Telegraph report claiming U.S. intelligence warned Poland that Russia may prepare a limited provocation on Polish territory within months to test NATO resolve, including missile/drone strikes on critical infrastructure, cyber/hybrid attacks, or a small cross-border incursion from Kaliningrad or Belarus disguised as accidental GPS failure or a rescue mission, followed by leverage via withdrawal and demands to end Western aid to Ukraine. The response expressed skepticism due to elaborateness and the vulnerability of Kaliningrad, but acknowledged the possibility that Russia could strike a European country given prior arguments that weapons sent to fight Russia are legitimate targets and the European build-up. It also argued that Article 5 does not automatically force all NATO countries to go to war and that each country can decide its response, while warning escalation—including the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons—could be difficult to control if NATO becomes directly involved. Additional updates were discussed: Bloomberg said Prime Minister Tusk urged Poland to be cautious with further aid for Ukraine at an upcoming NATO summit; Medvedev commented that Finland lifted its ban on hosting nuclear weapons; and the Lithuanian president initiated a constitutional amendment to remove restrictions on nuclear weapon deployment to participate in NATO’s collective nuclear deterrence. The response connected these changes to perceptions of increased targeting risk and the idea that expanded deterrence can increase danger rather than reduce it, describing Finland as becoming a frontline close to St. Petersburg and arguing European “reassurance” had become politically impossible. Finally, the discussion summarized the Ukraine war. It claimed Ukrainians were “going from bad to worse,” contested claims that Ukraine is retaking territory and that Russians are taking larger casualties, and emphasized exchange ratios and map changes as evidence. It described specific battlefield concerns: increased exposure around Zaporizhzhia, Russian pressure and vulnerability near Orekhova, Russian advances threatening supply lines, and the fall of Konstantinovka and Krasny Liman in the north that would enable a pincer affecting Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. It also highlighted Russia’s talk of needing a bigger buffer zone and potential territorial aims beyond Donbas, including references to Novorossiya. The response added that Russia’s attacks behind the front include energy infrastructure and fuel logistics, targeting gas stations and transportation routes in order to disrupt Ukraine’s logistics, while arguing Ukraine has not yet collapsed but could unravel quickly once it begins. The segment ended with thanks and a brief aside about a parrot in the office.

The discussion focused on how growing numbers of people feel the public “story” doesn’t add up—particularly economists’ emphasis on inequality gaps and stock market performance versus everyday Americans not seeing lifestyle improvements. A comedian guest described giving up on voting because every four years a new president repeats the same behavior, and the conversation said this year broke many people who had put hope into Trump, especially after a perceived move away from “swamp” behavior toward actions described as swampy: money-making from the presidency, “forever wars,” and increasing debt. Chris said he recently attended a Feds for Freedom conference in Washington, D.C., led by federal workers connected to “Feds for Medical Freedom.” The group expanded from COVID jab refusal into broader concerns about the country’s direction and reported extraordinary pressure tactics despite constitutional and legal rights to refuse. Chris also said CIA-related attendees filed a suit against the CIA after investigations were shifted to a counterterrorism task force, treating them like terrorists or known spies for refusing vaccination. Mario linked political developments to a piece of news about Tucker discussing starting a new party that referenced Joe Kent, and argued it may be less about winning votes as a third party and more about forming a block with enough voting power to shift policy influence between Democrats or Republicans. Both described political “homelessness,” arguing that regardless of who is elected, they see similar war and foreign aid policies and lack of reform in major health institutions. The conversation turned to information control and political inevitability. Mario said the UK is trying to influence YouTube’s algorithm in the UK. He described a pattern in which people might not notice or may become complacent if they do notice censorship, and suggested that people may feel there’s nothing they can do. Chris added that under Trump there has been faster progress toward a “technological dystopia,” citing government data integration initiatives and surveillance expansion as examples he believed would not have happened under a Democratic president. Israel/Iran developments were discussed, including whether there is a shift in Israel-related support and whether actions match rhetoric. Chris said he trusts actions, not words, and pointed to a Section 224 issue he described as moving toward harmonizing and merging Israeli military with U.S. structures. He and Mario argued that many Americans likely don’t know what Section 224 is and said dissemination of information is the main issue, connecting this to broader freedom of speech concerns. Mario cited survey figures claiming 58% of U.S. voters believe Trump’s war with Iran was not worth the cost, and noted that objective-cost judgments differ from disputed outcomes. They discussed a UK-themed concern about social and cultural breakdown, referencing policing decisions and how people in the UK might consider “bailing” as conditions worsen. Mario described speaking with the producer of the movie “The Vigilante” (referred to as “The Citizen,” with clips), summarizing a plot he said is inspired by gang rape dynamics in the UK and arguing that the “mind virus” behind such narratives reflects a real worrying mindset. Mario also referenced Neil Oliver (from GB News) expressing concern that the UK is heading toward civil war. Economics and stock market interpretation were revisited: Chris argued that the top portion of households owns most equities, so stock market gains are not a general indicator. He said they need to look at other measures like household formation, labor force participation, and happiness, and claimed leaders appear indifferent to average people, with the feeling that dissenting citizens are treated as enemies. Mario asked what “average Americans” say about these conditions. Chris responded that social conversation has shifted: topics once considered impolite—like COVID jab harms—are now more openly discussed, as well as inflation and the cost of insurance. He explained a framework based on “private knowledge” becoming “common knowledge,” using “The Emperor has No Clothes” and the Weinstein example to argue that change happens when people realize everyone knows the same underlying reality. He said his role is to help move issues from private to common knowledge through repeated open discussion. They returned to Israel-first versus America-first perspectives, with Mario arguing they are crossing a “chasm” where it’s increasingly discussed openly and censorship is trying to act too late. Chris said Israel-firsters have lost the younger generation and suggested this was tied to global reactions to a major Iranian funeral procession, describing large-scale mourning and world leader attendance as turning public sentiment and as creating consequences he linked to long-term hatred and regional conflict dynamics. Mario described clips and messaging about the Khamenei funeral, including the U.S./Trump-related claim that Trump said the crowd was “all there, one shot, and we can take them all out,” but that bombing wouldn’t be done because there would be nobody left to negotiate with. Chris said this was shocking, and Mario argued that such statements make it harder to criticize opponents because they can respond that their own president said such actions are possible. On negotiations, Chris said he believes the U.S. has limited military options left, emphasized “actions not words,” and argued that airstrikes alone don’t change wars’ shape. Mario asked about oil and whether Netanyahu and Trump meeting next week matters given claimed U.S. constraints. Chris said Israel has a strong interest in keeping the U.S. engaged in the Iran conflict, while the U.S. and Israel have limited capability to stop missile launches. They discussed the Strait of Hormuz control and ship passage numbers described as lower than U.S. claims, with Oman and European proposals focusing on fees and management structures. A major segment addressed oil pricing mechanisms, especially the “crack spread” and futures-driven prices. Mario said guest Philip Pilkington argued that refined-oil margins suggest either price gouging or higher costs than spot prices, and claimed that futures and spot markets may be manipulated. Mario also suggested U.S. leverage could weaken if reserves are used while prices remain artificially low. Chris explained that futures are paper markets with high speculative trading versus real production/consumption, creating a “noise-to-signal” problem, and said managed-money algorithmic trading can shift prices through momentum cascades. Chris elaborated that algorithms follow momentum rather than fundamentals and that coordinated headlines plus “nudges” like large sell orders can trigger cascades. He described how he detects these events through sudden spikes in one-minute bar volumes aligned with headlines. They also discussed China’s relative behavior in oil demand and market dynamics, with uncertainty about China’s actions and incentives. Finally, Chris said he worries the U.S. is draining SPR and gasoline/diesel inventories at multi-year lows while demand remains higher than would be needed for demand destruction. He said if negotiations fail and conditions “get spicy” again, the U.S. could face oil shortages, and he suggested that if futures were manipulated lower for short-term political gain, it could create severe downstream outcomes. He also tied the broader future to expanded data infrastructure and surveillance capabilities, describing an “easy when they want it” approach to data centers and cameras and “hard when they don’t” approaches to certain other initiatives.

The New York Times report says that during U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations in April, the U.S. feared Israel planned to assassinate Mohammad Ghalibaf and Arachi to derail the talks. The report says Washington asked several countries to warn Iran, while Iran sought guarantees through Pakistani and Qatari mediators that its delegation would not be targeted. Iranian security officials later warned that Israel might attack Ghalibaf’s plane; the aircraft made an emergency landing in Mashhad, and the delegation traveled to Tehran by road. Three senior Iranian officials said Ghalibaf narrowly survived Israeli strikes in June last year and “in this war.” The discussion claims Pakistani fighter jets escorted the Iranian delegation’s aircraft between the Iranian border and Islamabad, and that on the return flight Iranian intelligence warned that two Israeli fighter jets entered Iranian airspace from the Iraqi border. The overall takeaway presented is that Israel attempted to kill the negotiators while talks involving U.S. figures were underway. In the broader debate, one participant argues that Israel’s actions aim to derail negotiations and drag the U.S. into a losing or worsening war; another participant responds that this assumes Iran would not retaliate, emphasizing that in previous rounds Israel has sought an “out” rather than Iran. The discussion also raises questions about why the U.S. would warn Iran through mediators instead of directly pressuring Israel, and suggests skepticism about how U.S. leadership is controlling foreign policy. The conversation then turns to U.S. military posture and planning. It claims “Crisis Action Teams” (CATS) have shifted from 24-7 operation to five days a week, eight hours a day, implying deactivated planning and deactivation of certain operational cells; it says reactivation would be a sign the U.S. is preparing military action. There is also dispute over claims that the USS Boxer recently arrived in the region, with one participant asserting the dates indicate it would have taken far less time than presented and calling the claim “bullshit.” Another section addresses the possibility of assassination during a major diplomatic gathering. The discussion links escalation risk to an alleged targeting scenario involving a religious ceremony and foreign dignitaries, and argues that prior attempts to eliminate figures tied to negotiations have not stopped attacks or improved Israel’s security. The transcript also covers negotiations over shipping fees in the Strait of Hormuz. Bloomberg and other reports are discussed: the U.S. reportedly offered Iran to unfreeze $6 billion in funds if Iran did not charge a fee for the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran rejected it. Another report says Oman offered to charge a fee, and European powers accept that a fee at the Strait of Hormuz is inevitable, seeking a “non-discrimination” approach so ship owners from different nationalities would all pay. The discussion frames U.S. interest as concern for allies or for avoiding cost burdens tied to Iran’s leverage, and says Iran would insist on receiving money first before committing to terms. A major segment then focuses on oil and diesel/aviation fuel constraints. One participant cites claims attributed to Trump that the U.S. had only about four weeks of oil left if the Strait remained closed, arguing that what runs out is heavy crude needed for diesel and aviation fuel rather than sweet oil for gasoline. The transcript describes a drawdown from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, asserts supply dropped by about 20%, and says tanker flows to Asia do not resolve U.S. heavy-crude shortages quickly due to transport and refining delays. It argues the remaining reserve could be down to only “six, seven days” before running out, and that any shortages would force cuts to aviation fuel or diesel. Additional updates include: Pakistan announcing its prime minister Shahbaz Sharif will travel to attend Ali Khamenei’s funeral; Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson saying more than 100 countries will attend and that countries supporting Iran’s wartime attacker will not be invited. The transcript also mentions repeated claims of radar destruction on Sirik Island and a clip in which Trump boasts about blowing up Iran’s radar multiple times while claiming Iran has to rebuild again. Finally, the transcript mentions reports that Saudi Aramco resumed full crude exports through the Strait of Hormuz, with supertankers carrying about 10 million barrels departing Ras Tanoura and offering July-loading crude on a spot basis. A separate claim is discussed that U.S. naval forces are supporting and protecting supertankers transiting through the Omani corridor, followed by debate about whether such movements would help U.S. heavy-crude needs. The discussion closes with an Axios report that Kamala Harris privately contacted and met with pro-Palestinian activists and other figures as groundwork for a possible 2028 campaign, while the debate emphasizes how the Israel/Gaza issue may continue to shape U.S. politics and elections.

The day starts with the 10 Iranian plan being accepted by President Donald Trump as the basis for negotiation. JD Vance was headed to Islamabad to lead the American negotiating team, with former leaders persona non grata toward Iran. The speaker notes this contrasted with what happened the last time Iran negotiated with Kushner and Witkoff. Lebanon was in a ceasefire on paper, written by the prime minister of Pakistan, whose efforts were praised. If the 10-point plan was the basis for negotiation, this represented a major victory for the Islamic Republic, a point echoed in a Moscow conference addressed by the Iranian ambassador in those terms. But by sunset, the situation “appeared to have gone to hell in a handcart.” Just before going on air, Tehran’s air defenses were engaged with what were said to be American bombers, implying the ceasefire didn’t even last twelve hours. The Islamabad negotiation is now in grave doubt. In an RT interview, the question was asked whether Iran had really won as claimed. The response asserts that the greatest superpower cannot achieve its objectives and thus has lost; if the U.S. “definitely lost,” then Iran has won. Iran is described as a global south emerging country under sanctions for forty-seven years, surviving two nuclear superpowers (regional and global). The speaker contrasts Trump’s regime-change talk for Iran with Afghanistan’s experience, noting the U.S. spent a trillion dollars to remove the Taliban only for the Taliban to return to power as the U.S. withdrew. There is a claim of “replacing one Khamenei with a second Khamenei,” with the son being less moderate than the father, and referencing the dead father, mother, wife, and children from the initial American attack. The speaker recounts an attack on a 169-schoolgirl incident near Bandar Abbas, asking listeners to imagine daughters or granddaughters incinerated in an instant, and labels it a day of infamy akin to Pearl Harbor. Iran was allegedly negotiating with “the sneak attackers,” with thousands of Iranian civilians killed, mosques and churches destroyed, and even a synagogue destroyed; the speaker notes having filmed a synagogue outside of which there are “100 synagogues in Iran,” with Jews in Iran and a million Christians having an honored place in the Islamic Republic. The claim is that these acts occurred while the United States and Israel bombed, killed front-rank commanders, and destroyed the leader of the Iranian revolution, achieving nothing. The speaker contrasts Trump’s harsh rhetoric against Obama over the JCPOA with Trump’s support for a 10-point plan that supposedly is less restrictive than the JCPOA, including allowing Iran to charge a toll on every tanker through the Strait of Hormuz, potentially earning about a hundred billion dollars per year in perpetuity, and criticizing Obama for returning Iran’s own money. Trump is said to claim Lebanon was included in the ceasefire, but the plan and the prime minister of Pakistan say Lebanon is included; nonetheless, Israel launches a frenzy of violence on Lebanon, including bombing a funeral, with a death toll rising. The speech notes Israeli attacks on Beirut, and describes a seventy-two-hour bombardment and the Arab League’s response, with the UAE allegedly attacking two Iranian islands eight hours after the ceasefire, threatening a broader war between Iran and the UAE. The Strait of Hormuz is claimed closed again, despite Trump’s boast of unblocking it, and oil prices are cited at $144 per barrel, with implications for Russia, Europe, and Asia if prices surge. The speaker asks where this is heading and reflects that, while exultant in the morning, the evening leaves doubt about resolution. The commentary concludes that this is a global crisis bigger than past financial crashes, and introduces Professor Syed Muhammad Marandi as the guest to explain further after a break.

The first speaker rails against what they see as uniform media consensus about Iran, saying “Time, CNN, The Wall Street Journal. I looked at them all last night, and they're all saying, oh my god. It's murder in the streets in Iran.” They dismiss a London-based human rights organization as being funded by “the Israelis and Iranians in exile,” noting another group in Washington that reports “500 dead” and is funded by “the CIA,” concluding that “you can't” trust these sources. They acknowledge that “people are being killed in Iran” but question the reliability of the reported numbers and raise the possibility that Israeli-backed protesters could be responsible. They claim protesters set “on fire 48 fire engines in Tehran” to hinder emergency response, arguing this was done by “the Israeli backed protesters” to worsen the situation. The second speaker pushes back on the claim of unreliability, noting that Iran is known to have Mossad-related activity, referencing past reporting about Iran providing targeting information for Israeli and U.S. military actions against atomic scientists and military sites, and asserting that Iran has a “serious Israel problem” in terms of infiltration. They acknowledge the prior discussion on the show about infiltration and context. The first speaker emphasizes the need to consider multiple sides of a story, arguing that “we’re only getting the Israeli side.” They assert that “the Israelis are backing Reza Pahlavi,” are backing these so-called human rights organizations, and are the ones “demanding that US policy be that Iran doesn’t have any missiles.” They conclude with a call to be cautious, insisting that there are “two sides to a story” and urging careful consideration of sources.

Sayyid Professor Mohammad Marandi discussed Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, arguing that U.S. actions have long been destructive and that current events point to further instability. On Iraq, he said the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein in an eight-year war against Iran, gave a green light for an invasion of Kuwait, and then occupied Iraq, keeping “lots of control” over government and influence through wealthy collaborators. He claimed Iraqi oil export flows to a bank in the United States, with the U.S. deciding “how much oil and when” to give it to Iraq. He described a pattern in which the Iraqi parliament’s choice of prime minister is blocked by American objections, forcing compromises. He also argued that while the U.S. claims Iran is destructive, Iran provides electricity and natural gas that Iraq often cannot pay for due to sanctions, and that Ayatollah Khamenei insisted Iran continue supply so Iraqis would not suffer in extreme summer heat. Marandi said American support for key Iraqi figures created corruption and danger for Iraqis, adding that it is unclear whether events in Baghdad’s Green Zone were a coup but that American involvement—he argued—creates the possibility of a ground invasion of Iran, potentially using Iraqi territory. The conversation then turned to potential U.S. escalation and Iran’s military readiness. Marandi said the U.S. has brought extra forces and extensive logistical equipment for a ground offensive, but that Iran is prepared for missile, drone, and ground capabilities. He claimed Iran planned for a ground defensive for decades and described Iranian strategy as preparing for a longer war to punish the aggressor in a way that prevents future attacks. He also argued that U.S. invasion plans would face consequences from Iraqi resistance and Iranian armed forces, asserting the U.S. and Israel have underestimated multiple resistance movements, including Hezbollah, Ansarallah in Yemen, and the resistance in Iraq. On Iran, George framed the situation as restarting hostilities, with missiles flying and Trump issuing nuclear-war threats. Marandi replied that Iranians are “utterly skeptical” about U.S. intentions and that prior agreements were not expected to be implemented willingly. He said the difference is Iran’s own leverage: Iran is exporting “huge amounts of oil,” disproportionate to other Persian Gulf countries, while the U.S. is holding back obligations regarding Iranian assets and sanctions. He argued the U.S. is not honest, and said Iran is preparing for a potential second war, emphasizing that the U.S. threatens annihilation and does not operate under international law. He claimed Western media does not cover large-scale killings in Lebanon and Gaza, and said Iran believes international law and agreements will not restrain the U.S. Marandi added that Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral arrangements will include holding funerals in Iran and also in Iraq, with Khamenei returned to Iran afterward, presenting this as a major show of strength and urging attention to public reactions. He also said U.S. political and economic constraints exist, including falling support for war in the U.S., limited time before midterms, and obstacles such as a Senate resolution limiting Trump’s ability to resume war. Discussing allies and Europe, Marandi said European governments have facilitated flights and bombing operations and that European leaders involved in the war did not acknowledge their role. He referenced UN language on genocide in Gaza and argued that continued European support has allowed further bombing of civilian targets, including in Tehran. Finally, he criticized Lebanon’s government for an agreement with Netanyahu and the United States, calling it treason and comparing it to comprador-class collaboration in historical empires. He argued that exposing these actors is “a good thing” because it removes the ability to justify them. Addressing whether Lebanon could face civil war, he said he is “optimistic” because masks have been removed and the Lebanese public will have to choose between the Israelis and the resistance, with no middle ground. He added that he believes Hezbollah will prevent a ceasefire and, if escalation occurs, he expects Lebanon’s people to defeat civil war attempts, while also arguing that any effort involving the Jolani regime would fail due to Iranian and Iraqi resistance capabilities.

The discussion began with speculation about whether Mustafa Khamenei would attend the funeral for his father, Ali Khamenei, after claims that Israel might attempt to assassinate him. One participant expected Mustafa Khamenei to appear, describing it as his first public appearance and an “intent to show courage” in the face of Israeli threats. They argued that killing the “accommodation argument” would make destroying Israel the objective, and also claimed Iran has the missile technology to do so while Israel lacks air defense to prevent it. Another participant said they would be surprised if Mustafa Khamenei did not show because of uncertainty about the severity of his injuries. They discussed the scale of past funerals, referencing 1989 and describing expectations of millions on streets. They also said the mourning period extends for about seven days (July 2 to July 9) and is not confined to Iran, noting Shia commemorations throughout the Levant. Attendance estimates were given as 30 million in Iran and 5 to 10 million in Iraq. The conversation then shifted to “today’s news,” described as involving hostilities across multiple countries. They cited an explosion in Lebanon tied to underground tunnels, reports of Israeli bombing and demolition activities in southern Lebanon, airstrikes in Gaza in a camp, clashes and Israeli strikes in Syria, and mobilization in Yemen involving Saudi-backed and Emirati-backed militias. They debated who is mobilizing against whom in Yemen, ultimately describing mobilization as involving the Saudi group versus the Houthis, with another claim that it is not between Saudis and Emiratis uniting against someone else. They framed Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq as likely locations for intensified proxy conflict, contrasting with a shared reluctance among major powers to fight directly with Iran. They discussed a statement by Israeli Defense Minister Katz saying the IDF has no intent to withdraw from areas captured since October 7 across Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. The same statement was described as saying the U.S. agreed with CENTCOM’s chief Brad Cooper’s visit, and that if Iran attacks with ballistic missiles in response to actions in Lebanon, Israel would be prepared to operate independently. Concerns were raised about scenarios involving Iran responding to Lebanon and about what alternatives remain if Iran does not withdraw from South Lebanon. On Hezbollah’s role, they said Hezbollah is not dependent on Iran in the same way as earlier decades, describing Hezbollah as having multiple business ventures. They also discussed reported Israeli breaches of a ceasefire, including a strike in southern Lebanon around Al-Qantara and Deir Serian, and showed photos and details of large Hezbollah tunnel infrastructure. They said one explosion network was described by Israelis as 200 meters long under the town of Majdal zoo, with the blast heard widely and triggering earthquake detection systems. They then covered diplomacy involving Iran and the U.S. in Doha. They referenced claims that Trump posted Iran requested a meeting, while Iranian statements were described as denying scheduled technical talks with the U.S. and saying an Iranian delegation would visit Doha to follow up on implementation of the MOU, particularly frozen funds. They said the Iranian delegation’s purpose is monitoring U.S. implementation of MOU clauses, not negotiating final agreement with the U.S., and highlighted expectations of $6 billion to be unfrozen from Qatar. They also discussed Oman’s first meeting with Iran about future management of the Strait of Hormuz. For the Strait of Hormuz, they emphasized MOU language described as giving Iran sole responsibility for arranging safe passage of commercial vessels using “best efforts” through PGSA protocols, while they also discussed Iranian measures against ships attempting to transit outside the stipulated protocols. They noted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz reportedly surged after the MOU and then collapsed again after clashes. They also returned to the day’s regional military actions: reiterating Israeli strikes in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and mentioning discussion about whether the U.S. retaliated after Sunday. The show closed with the idea that the next day might be calmer, with a brief tangent about World Cup developments and mention that Paraguay had apparently removed Germany from the tournament.

In the conversation, Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, addresses multiple interwoven geopolitical issues, centering on Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader strategic rivalry with the United States and its allies. Syria and ISIS release - Marandi asserts that the Damascus regime, described as al-Qaeda/ISIS-aligned factions, would not tolerate Kurdish forces backed by the United States. He notes prior violence against Alawites, Christians, and Druze as context for the current disturbing images from Syria. - He argues the United States is not a reliable partner for its allies, pointing to past episodes such as Obama’s refusal to support Arbil when ISIS threatened the Kurdish government, and Soleimani’s rapid military response to save the city. - He states that ISIS prisoners have been released in Syria, implying that thousands of ISIS members are now free and could destabilize Syria and possibly Iraq. He emphasizes that both Jolani (an ISIS-linked figure) and the Kurdish groups in northeast Syria are allied to the United States, making it unclear who released the prisoners but suggesting that those actors are aligned with the U.S. - The broader implication is that the release increases instability in Syria and potentially across the region. Border security and spillover fears - The discussion turns to Iraq’s border with Syria, with Marandi weighing whether U.S.-backed jihadist forces might spill into Iraq or Lebanon. He suggests a likelihood that ISIS/Al-Qaeda remnants could be used to pressure Lebanon and Iraq to prevent closer Iranian influence. - He notes that Iran’s potential responses could include its missile and drone capabilities, should security worsen on a front involving its allies in Lebanon and Iraq; however, Iran currently refrains from large-scale involvement in Syria but would consider action if threats to Iran or its allies escalate. Regime change, fragmentation, and U.S.-Israel aims - The conversation shifts to Iran post-riots, with questions about U.S./Israel strategies for regime change. Marandi contends the plan is to destabilize and fragment Iran, not to establish a unified post-regime scenario. - He cites alleged Israeli and Western involvement in organizing riots as evidence of a broader conspiracy to create chaos and justify military action. He claims Mossad and other intelligence agencies were on the ground, and public statements from former CIA officials acknowledged Israeli involvement. - He describes the riot phase as highly organized, with foreign funding (including Bitcoin), online recruitment, and careful targeting of police and infrastructure. He portrays the protests as initially legitimate grievances that devolved into violent chaos fueled by external coordination, with widespread destruction and deaths, including the killing of police officers. - In contrast, he highlights large pro-government demonstrations, especially a national day of demonstrations that he says showed widespread popular support for the Islamic Republic and condemnation of rioters. He points to extensive media coverage highlighting peaceful protests, while arguing that the riot narrative dominated Western coverage. Internal Iranian dynamics and public opinion - Marandi emphasizes the fragmentation among Iranian opposition groups: MEK, monarchists, Takfiri remnants near the Pakistan border, and Kurdish separatists, all of whom he asserts lack credible popular support. - He argues that even if the regime were at risk, fragmentation would prevent any single faction from stabilizing the country post-regime change. He suggests this aligns with his view of broader Israeli aims to weaken and fragment Iran and neighboring states, as seen in Syria and Iraq. Military capability and deterrence - He asserts Iran’s substantial missile and drone capabilities and asserts that Iran could defend allies in Lebanon and Iraq if needed. He notes Iran’s long-term preparedness against U.S. threats, including underground bases and extensive drone/missile stocks. - He contends that if war occurred, it would have wide regional and global economic consequences, potentially destabilizing oil markets and prompting broader geopolitical upheaval. He argues that U.S. restraint may be influenced by the risk of a global economic meltdown. Russia, China, and Starlink - Regarding technological assistance for countering communications, he mentions rumors of Russian or Chinese involvement in aiding Iran's internet disruption and Starlink-related issues, acknowledging uncertainty but highlighting a growing trilateral closeness among Iran, Russia, and China in the face of U.S. pressure. media narratives and leadership - He criticizes Western media for portraying protests as peaceful, while Israeli claims and cyber/disinformation around the events are presented as demonstrations of foreign involvement. He maintains that internal Iranian unity—visible in large-scale demonstrations—contrasts with the portrayal of a fractured nation. - He closes by suggesting that while some European leaders may align with U.S. policies, the overall strategic outlook remains uncertain, with a warning that Trump’s approach could escalate tensions rather than yield stability.

Talk focuses on the scale and impact of Iran’s protests in Tehran and how that signals support for Iran’s position amid broader regional conflict. One guest cites reports of very large crowds—“11 million”—and argues that the main roads in Tehran (Azadi, Enqelab, Damavand) could be fully filled, with additional people still arriving. They compare expected turnout to the crowd size reported for Imam Khomeini’s funeral. The discussion then shifts to Donald Trump’s comments threatening to “knock down their bridges” and “knock out their energy supply,” and whether Trump is either ill-informed or sending messages after comments by Benjamin Netanyahu. The guest argues Trump’s remarks function as a direct message to Netanyahu, saying Netanyahu’s prior claims to Trump resulted wrong in multiple scenarios: hammering Iran’s ruling system, sending weapons to the Kurds without accounting for Turkey’s reaction, destroying Iran’s missile system and negotiation leverage, and maintaining stability goals while Netanyahu allegedly pushes for continued war. The guest says Trump’s threats are presented as business as usual while technical teams talk in Doha, and claims the Iranians would use violations of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to suspend technical talks. The guest describes Iran’s posture as strong leverage—especially regarding Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz—while arguing that energy infrastructure threats are framed as civilian targets and would create major humanitarian and regional consequences in extreme heat. They link regional events to future escalatory risk, including a Yemen story involving a plane reaching Sana’a and returning, and argue it was not done with Saudi permission, pointing to Saudi jets attempting to intimidate an aircraft. From the Yemen angle, they raise the question of whether Yemen could close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait if sanctions are not lifted, describing it as paralleling steps Iran takes around the Strait of Hormuz. They then play a clip of Trump saying the goal is either a deal or “finish the job,” claiming he can destroy bridges and energy infrastructure quickly. The guest says escalation timing matters around U.S. midterm elections, arguing Trump would try to preserve his legacy and avoid decisions before midterms. They claim Netanyahu’s objectives are to negotiate and potentially shift focus to Lebanon while keeping “freedom of action,” whereas Trump wants peaceful continuation of the MOU until the midterms. They argue Israel’s actions and Netanyahu’s language about “tunnels” suggest disputes over escalation boundaries in Lebanon, including an example where Netanyahu allegedly said Trump did not ask him to stop destroying tunnels. Iran’s “red line” is described as “paragraph one,” covering Lebanon and all allies, including: ending the war, ensuring Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and complete withdrawal of Israeli forces without a timetable. They claim advances on Iran’s nuclear program depend on implementing MOU paragraph one, and they describe a scenario where Iran would not concede on nuclear issues unless clause one is met. They also argue that closing the Strait of Hormuz is not enough on its own; Iran seeks guarantees against renewed carpet-bombing in southern Lebanon. The conversation turns to Israeli politics and future leadership, listing possible Israeli figures and arguing that regardless of which leader replaces Netanyahu, the stance would remain similar unless Americans force withdrawal. They discuss Golan Heights and Lebanon withdrawal conditions, emphasizing that Israeli leaders would not withdraw without American pressure. Finally, they assess risks of renewed strikes, with attention to whether Trump prepared for confrontation over nuclear monitoring (no inspectors) and the Strait of Hormuz, and how the MOU could be managed rather than fully applied—especially through gradual handling of funds and humanitarian exceptions for food and medicine.

The discussion centers on multiple claims about the U.S., Israel, Iran, and regional conflicts. One topic is a reported “cool story” from Channel 15 J about a CIA and Musa plan to arm the Kurds to cause regime change. Channel 15 J claims JD Vance learned of the secret plan and immediately told Erdogan, leading Erdogan to reject plans to arm the Kurds to fight Iran; the plan then failed after details were leaked to Erdogan. The speakers discuss whether a vice president could leak information to sabotage a president’s plans and whether the story could be driven by Israelis trying to discredit Vance. They connect this to long-standing U.S.-Turkey contention over arming Kurds, saying Turkey has bombed Kurds and that Erdogan would likely make a fuss. They further mention that the Kurds were said to be armed “to march on Tehran,” which the speakers frame as unlikely and as suggesting “desperation.” A second major topic is the funeral in Tehran and the possibility of an Israeli attempt to assassinate Mustafa Khamenei during or around the ceremony. The speakers say airspace is being closed in Tehran. They cite comments from Professor Izadi, who said he does not know if Mustafa will show up but hopes he does not and would not be surprised by an Israeli attempt. They also mention the expected presence of Russian Dmitry Medvedev and possibly a high-level Chinese representative, with China’s participation used as context for fears of an attack. The conversation shifts to internal Iranian politics and reactions to an MOU. One professor, Behrooz Gamari Tabrizi, is described as critical of aspects of the MOU and as explaining Iran’s governance as decentralized with factions presenting options to the Supreme Leader rather than a single autocratic command. The speakers reference a statement attributed to the Supreme National Council (described as more than two-thirds of its members) stating there are issues with the MOU but that the Supreme Leader decided to proceed anyway. They say the professor identified a “loud minority” within Iran that thinks continuing war would better serve Iran, including arguments that the U.S. and Israel did not suffer enough to deter future aggression. They also debate a translation dispute about comments from Ghalibaf regarding purchases from the United States, with one speaker asserting translators differed: one account says there was no commitment to buy U.S. products, while another says agricultural purchasing authorization was already agreed under President Raisi and was not new. Another portion covers media and messaging within Iran, including claims that Iranian media does not disperse news effectively and comparisons to Iran International as well as discussion of how external funding and surveys were used to influence perceptions of Iranian public support. They contrast claims of an anonymously conducted survey with claims that conventional polling indicated majority support for the government. On unfreezing of Iranian assets, the speakers cite Al Arabiya about a preliminary agreement to release $3 billion of frozen Iranian assets, followed by a report (I-24) from a U.S. official saying no frozen funds would be released unless Iran meets MOU requirements, that release would require U.S. approval, and that funds would be used to purchase U.S. agricultural products. They discuss a quoted MOU clause stating the U.S. would make funds available for use upon implementation of the MOU, with procedures mutually agreed during negotiations, and argue that the U.S. is trying to impose conditions Iran is not accepting. They further discuss claims that Pakistan is working with Saudi and Qatar to release funds directly to Iran, arguing there is nothing in the MOU preventing third-party release. The speakers also discuss negotiations in Doha focused on Strait-related issues, saying the U.S. message is “think bigger” and that sanctions relief under a broader deal would be more valuable than charging tolls on shipping. They mention a one-week understanding to avoid further clashes in the Strait while negotiations continue, and that talks also cover frozen assets and a Lebanese ceasefire. They dispute how sanctions are lifted, distinguishing between oil-and-related waivers already addressed in the MOU and broader secondary sanctions that allow broader access to the global economy. Regarding potential escalation, the Wall Street Journal is cited as saying Trump considered returning to full-scale war with Iran, holding discussions with Heketh and General Kane, but decided to continue diplomatic negotiations and potentially delay an August 18 deadline. They also mention a question to JD Vance about committing the U.S. would not return to combat operations before the MOU’s 60-day clock ends, with JD Vance giving a “nothing answer.” The speakers add that U.S. force withdrawals were not rescinded, and discuss logistical and fuel constraints as reasons abrupt reversal would be difficult. The conversation also references a report that Iran hit Israel’s Haifa oil refinery harder than authorities initially admitted, with claims of destruction of gasoline storage and major losses in domestic production, alongside a dispute over source credibility and claims that other reporting describes only limited disruption. Finally, they discuss the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, saying there is a “legal danger line” at 252.4 million barrels and that the U.S. is about 325 million barrels; drawing down 73 million barrels would trigger limited drawdown authority. They connect this to the idea that renewed bombing campaigns would stress aviation fuel demand, forcing further drawdowns and creating major economic and political risks. The speakers conclude that while talk of war exists, continuing full war is portrayed as extremely costly and constrained in the short term.

The discussion centers on contrasting narratives about the U.S.-Israel confrontation with Iran and what is actually happening on the ground and inside Iran. - Speaker 0 relays the “fog of war,” noting Western media claims that the U.S. and Israel are delivering a rapid victory in Iran, with leadership and navy wiped out and the war ending soon, referencing statements by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth that the war “should not be protracted” and will wrap up “very soon.” Speaker 1 and Speaker 2 push back, asking whether the war could spiral into a longer conflict and what the timeline may be, noting top general Dan Cain’s warning that the objectives will take time and that President Trump also suggested the operation could take weeks. - The program then goes to Tehran with Professor Syed Mohammed Morandi, a geopolitical analyst at the University of Tehran. Morandi explains the succession process after the death of the Ayatollah: the constitution provides a council of three that runs the government until the leader is chosen by the council of experts, which should happen in the next few days. In the meantime, the president, the head of the judiciary, and a representative from the Guardian Council run the state. He notes the councilors are being arranged to meet from abroad to avoid being targeted. - On the ground in Tehran, Morandi counters the idea that a rapid regime change is possible, detailing that U.S. and Israeli strikes have targeted Tehran and civilian infrastructure, including a claim that the government ordered people to leave the city and that an elementary school was bombed, killing about 165 girls in Minab. He describes a situation where rescue teams are struck again at the scene. He asserts that the U.S. and Israel are striking civilian targets and that there is a pattern of double tapping at sites like Fair Doce Square. - Morandi disputes U.S. claims of destroyed leadership and navy: he says that ships of the Iranian navy are in port, there are thousands of small speed boats prepared for asymmetrical warfare, and the U.S. has not touched them. He argues that the underground bases and missiles/drones remain intact, and that senior commanders were not all killed—only a handful. He notes that Iran is firing missiles at Israel and striking U.S. targets in the Persian Gulf, and that oil facilities and tankers could be attacked if escalation continues. He warns of an energy crisis if oil facilities are destroyed and notes that the price of energy has risen. - Regarding public sentiment inside Iran, Morandi states that there are no celebrations; instead, people are mourning. He describes gatherings across the country under missile fire, with demonstrations in Tehran despite security concerns. He shares that slogans included “We are prepared to die. We won’t accept humiliation. Death to Trump, death to Netanyahu,” and that millions were seen on the streets via his Telegram channel, though many left the city due to danger. He characterizes Western media portrayal as propaganda and says the sentiment on the ground is in opposition to U.S. and Israeli actions. - The host suggests that the Iranian perspective views this as a prolonged confrontation, with Iran prepared to sustain resistance for years because the United States is “completely unreliable.” Morandi notes that while negotiations have repeatedly failed, Iran aims to compel the U.S. and Israeli regime to recognize that military assault has consequences, including economic and political costs. - The program later notes that U.S. and Israeli figures frame the conflict as epically swift, while Morandi’s account emphasizes Iran’s resilience and long-term resistance, highlighting the discrepancy between Western media narratives and on-the-ground Iranian realities.

The conversation starts with Mario describing phases of backlash on X, which he says can spike with the Gaza war and due to changes in following behavior, such as Elon unfollowing and then refollowing him. He explains that his team warned him that a particular tweet would be “the most controversial thing” he had ever posted. He then shares the tweet’s content: “the refs did not rob Egypt,” and that the match was “not fixed nor rigged,” followed by text encouraging research and “bring on the hate,” while noting readers would click the image. He says his interactions after years on X left him with “no feelings left,” and he mentions a prior viral tweet about Khamenei’s funeral processions and his feelings “about Iran,” which he says went “crazy viral.” He and Larry Johnson then discuss censorship and platform migration, with Larry saying his YouTube account removal “wiped out a lot of material” and that content has been backed up on BitChute. They also reference Larry’s “Transition Protocol” channel. Turning to news, Mario says “today is genuinely bizarre.” He recounts early reports from Iranian media that multiple locations across Iran—including Shabahar, Bandar Abbas, Ahvaz, and others—were hit, with many people immediately concluding this was a new wave of U.S. airstrikes. He says the narrative became confused when Axios reported U.S. officials said the U.S. was not striking Iran and that radar showed no indications of American aircraft active. He then describes further shifting assumptions: some believed Israel had joined after Israel reportedly sought U.S. green light, while Israeli media denied Israel involvement and suggested Gulf countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait instead. Mario describes a sequence where Iranian media initially denied explosion reports, then later reaffirmed that some attacks occurred. He cites IRNA reporting a projectile hit a military headquarters near Bashir, with no casualties reported early on, and Tasneem later reporting airstrikes on an Iranian Navy site in Qanarak “but they don’t know who.” He summarizes that multiple Iranian outlets gave conflicting details and that other claims included missiles allegedly launched from Kuwait and Saudi drones reported off the coast, making “it confusing.” He concludes that he can only speculate but “would guess Bahrain and Kuwait,” adding that it “definitely looks like there were strikes.” Larry then shifts to what he describes as U.S. de-escalation: he says regional efforts deescalated the situation after the U.S. did not launch new strikes on Thursday, referencing a deconfliction cell that was reportedly redeployed home and crisis action teams not being reactivated. He says Iran retaliated against previous U.S. strikes by hitting Muwaffaq al-Salt air base among others, and he claims the U.S. responded by “quit while we’re ahead,” rather than further escalation. Mario says he sees the conflict as a struggle over control of the Strait of Hormuz and suggests Iran would continue retaliating in limited ways rather than escalating into a full-blown war. He lists targets he says Iran struck: Muwaffaq al-Salt Air Base in Jordan; Ali al-Salam Air Base in Kuwait; and Bahrain’s Fifth Fleet Headquarters, plus an airfield tied to Sheikh Issa. He mentions that the New York Times said the American attack was “14 times larger” than earlier strikes and that someone involved in early targeting said it “didn’t even come close.” The discussion then focuses on Strait of Hormuz control and war-resumption indicators. Larry says no ships attempted to go through the Omani Channel, and Mario says “Pretty hard to dispute… Iran,” while also saying the U.S. cannot break Iran’s control without incurring major losses. Mario reports indicators he says suggest Iran is preparing for potential resumption: tanker trackers showing “10 million barrels” shipped out overnight from the Strait of Hormuz; Iranian armed forces entering highest alert with “scatter orders”; and further estimates that Iran exported about “60 million barrels” over three weeks. He also mentions a claim that oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Homs is near standstill with only two tankers transiting, and that a statement attributed to the IRGC warns foreigners to get out while not ordering closure. Mario adds that the Omanis told the UN IMO they do not support imposing transit fees and reaffirmed transit passage rights under international law, contradicting earlier reports. He also says another Axios report claims mediators believe Iranian attacks on commercial ships were initiated by elements inside the Iranian government opposed to the MOU, which Larry disputes by pointing to compliance protocols he says are “in black and white.” They then discuss additional claims about Khamenei-related funeral and leadership attendance. Mario says reports changed regarding whether Khamenei would attend funeral prayers, with Tasnim saying he will attend a commemorative prayer at the shrine of Fatima Massoumi “tomorrow after Maghreb and Isha prayers.” Larry adds that the oldest son led prayers in Mashad. Mario then mentions ongoing concerns about whether Israel would target Khamenei and references an Israel-Washington warning described via the Wall Street Journal quoting Larry Johnson: Israel warned Washington of an Iranian plot to assassinate Trump, with Trump alluding to being on lists and with funeral banners reading “we will kill Trump.” The conversation includes a dispute between Larry and Mario about whether Iran would consider assassinating Trump and what goals Iran has regarding keeping the U.S. out of the Persian Gulf. They also discuss claims that Pakistan and Qatar are working to bring the U.S. and Iran back to negotiations after recent escalations. Finally, Mario mentions other regional developments he says include Iranian deployment of thousands of special forces to the border with Iraqi Kurdistan and warning that a security zone would be established if Kurdish groups backed by the U.S. and Israel attempt to infringe Iranian sovereignty. He also discusses a France-reported idea of alternative energy corridors, including Syria as a possible route for Gulf oil to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, and recalls prior Israeli discussions of a pipeline alternative. The segment ends with plans for upcoming coverage, including interviews about sabotage of a railway line in Iran, further discussion of U.S.-Iran back-and-forth, and additional guests.

Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a full-throated warning to the United States and Israel against attacking Iran, saying any attack would be a grave mistake with devastating consequences. Russia also cautioned that threats of new military strikes on Iran are categorically unacceptable and criticized Washington for external interference in Tehran’s internal politics. Amid these tensions, Putin’s anger over Israel’s handling of Syria was referenced, with reports that Russia sent multiple large freight flights into Tehran in recent days. There was discussion about whether this could be connected to comments from President Trump that killings in the region might be winding down, with a reporter noting that the killing has “now stopped” and a follow-up remark that it is “winding down” despite uncertainty. The program suggested that pro‑Zionist accounts and MAGA influencers are circulating propaganda—fake death numbers from Iran and videos of protests—while questioning the reliability of such footage and calling out what was described as propaganda used to push for war in Iran. Claims were made that “the number of people killed is far higher than the 12,000” from Mark Levin’s reporting, and that Iranian body bags and mass casualties were being publicized by certain viewers, though not all claims could be independently verified due to a media blackout. Laura Loomer was cited showing footage of body bags claiming nearly 20,000 Iranians had been murdered for protesting for their freedom, while noting Mossad’s heavy involvement in Iran’s protests, including arming protesters with live firearms per Israel’s Channel 14. The discussion raised the possibility that Reuters and other sources were reporting imminent U.S. bombing of Iran within 24 hours, while also noting Trump’s pattern of weekend bombings when markets are closed. Anya Parampil of the Grey Zone, who had recently been in Iran, joined to discuss on-the-ground realities. She explained that the initial demonstrations in Iran began around rising inflation and economic hardship, worsened by sanctions that the United States has openly admitted using as a weapon. She noted that early protests were largely by pro-government or conservative segments, with the government making concessions and the president, Hassan Rouhani’s successor, acknowledging responsibility for policy decisions. Violent elements subsequently appeared, and a blackout on information has followed, with Internet cuts, complicating independent reporting. Parampil suggested outside support and covert interventions could be destabilizing the country and providing a pretext for international intervention, comparing the current situation to Syria in 2011. Parampil described the escalation from peaceful economic demonstrations to violent street actions involving armed extras, questions about who is killing whom, and the risk of a Syria-style CIA or covert foreign-backed civil conflict in Iran. She emphasized sovereignty and the Iranian people’s own trajectory, arguing that sanctions and external pressure complicate genuine domestic grievances and can undermine authentic movements. The discussion also touched on the nature of domestic sentiment: some protests were pro-government, driven by sovereignty and economic concerns, while others involved calls for reform. The participants urged skepticism about casualty figures, questioning sources funded by Western organizations and the reliability of reported death tolls amid the information blackout. They warned against rushed military action and suggested that the window of opportunity for U.S.-Israeli action might be closing, given the political clock in the United States and Israel. The program closed with notes that the Israeli media reported Mossad’s involvement and arming on the Iranian side, while U.S. reporting remained less transparent, and that the situation remained highly uncertain with conflicting narratives about who is directing violence and protests on the ground.

In Tehran early in the morning, thousands of people have gathered on a street to commemorate the great, the martyr Ayatollah Syed Ali Khamenei. The people of Iran and Tehran are here to seek revenge.

George spoke with Professor Saeed Mohammad Marandi, Professor of English Literature and Orientalism at the University of Tehran, during funeral commemorations for Ayatollah Khamenei. George noted that he had watched the crowd and seen “the red flag of revenge” being hoisted, asking what it means. Marandi said the crowd was unprecedented even by comparison with massive Iranian rallies for figures such as General Soleimani, Imam Khomeini, and President Raisi. He described leaving home almost three hours before prayers but being stuck with hundreds of thousands of people and unable to reach the prayers, saying the gathering involved “many millions” and that the crowd could not move. Marandi said emotions had been running high since the previous day and that crowds kept coming and going. He said he had gone to the Mosalla for the prayer again after visiting with friends mentioned by George. He described tomorrow’s funeral procession going from the east of the city to the west with “the martyrs, Ayatollah Khamenei and his family members,” including Khamenei’s granddaughter and a one-year-old son-in-law and other family members who were described as “martyred,” stating they were not husband and wife. He said the event would likely be “the largest funeral in history, human history,” and that it was sending a message to the United States and the Israeli regime. Marandi said people he spoke to emphasized demands for revenge, pointing to posters and banners “demanding revenge,” and said Iranians felt an urgent need to punish aggressors and those who murdered loved ones, including children at “Minab school and hospitals and elsewhere.” He said he did not know what revenge would ultimately lead to, but said it showed anger toward the United States, “the Trump regime,” and the Israeli regime. He also said Western estimates were often smaller than what he described as “many millions,” and that he believed there was increasing acknowledgment in the West of how massive the crowds were. George responded with reported figures: Tehran metro recorded seven million journeys, and Reuters reported nine million at the actual funeral. Marandi agreed that it was the biggest crowd and funeral in human history, and discussed Donald Trump’s remarks that he had been told people didn’t like him. Marandi referenced prior U.S. admissions that the U.S. was running out of fuel and argued that if senior intelligence officials met with Trump, then either the officials were lying or intelligence was misleading, while Western media repeatedly described Iran using the framing of “the regime” while not applying the same label to other countries. George asked about consequences for neighboring states, and Marandi replied that Saudi Arabia sent a delegation that behaved respectfully at the funeral, saying it was a lesson for neighbors. Marandi said ordinary Iranians had noticed Saudi Arabia allowing U.S. refueling for Israeli aircraft and Saudi aircraft to bomb Iran and kill Iranian children. He said Iranians wanted regional change and sovereignty from “the empire,” and claimed Iran was conducting one-on-one negotiations with Persian Gulf countries involved in the war. He said there were signs of restraint during ceasefire violations, describing that Iran bombed U.S. bases in Bahrain and Kuwait but did not bomb Saudi Arabia or Qatar or the Emirates, and said this implied reasons and possible agreements. He added that when Iran broke the blockade on Yemen, Saudi actions against an Iranian passenger plane were mentioned, suggesting uncertainty about which way things would go. George suggested that the demonstrations in Tehran could improve negotiations and asked how optimistic Marandi was that negotiations would end war rather than return to it. Marandi said he was “not terribly optimistic,” arguing that “the nature of empire” cannot reform itself and collapses as it pursues failing models. He said the funeral would also go to Iraq and that crowds there would be another show of force. He said Iranians were counting on “leverage” through “trade of hormones” and patience, but if patience ran thin they would pressure the United States. He said Israel’s leadership and the Israeli economy would not want a deal, and referenced Joe Kent’s resignation statement that Iran was not pursuing a nuclear weapon and that the war was about “the Zionist lobby and the Israeli regime.” Marandi argued that the main potential driver for change would be Iran’s strength, with the show of force part of it, and suggested that U.S. economic problems could influence U.S. decisions regarding Netanyahu. He said differences between Netanyahu and Trump were real, while acknowledging Zionism’s power in U.S. politics, concluding that he would not bet on peace.

To the people of Iran, help is on the way. In a brief exchange, Speaker 1 questions whether a hat reading “Make Iran Great Again” was on Air Force One with President Trump over the weekend, asking, “Did you really have this hat on Air Force One with president Trump this weekend? The one that says am I reading that right? Does that say make Iran great again? Did you give that to the president?” Speaker 0 confirms, “I did.” He adds that Trump “is not Barack Obama. He’s not turning his back on the people of Iran who are demanding that their oppression end.” He then directs a warning toward the Ayatollah and “his thugs,” stating, “if you keep killing your people in defiance of president Trump, you’re gonna wake up dead.” The message concludes with the assertion that the regime “is on verge of falling.”

The speaker argues that the pure soul of Said Ali Khamenei returned to God as a martyr, joining his grandfathers and all the prophets, including Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him, and asks Allah to raise their ranks in paradise and shower them with mercy. The speaker contends that “Trump did a huge mistake by killing our beloved leader, Said Ali Khamenei,” asserting that the attempt to subdue believers through his death will fail. Instead, the speaker states a resolve to continue on the path, to “hold his blood, his ideology,” and to learn it and teach it to their children and grandchildren.

The conversation begins with a discussion of vesselfinder.com as the focus of attention rather than the World Cup, with talk of making bets on how many ships will depart. Attention then shifts to Iran and Israel around the death and funeral arrangements for Iran’s Supreme Leader. Ali Adolahi, a commander in Iran’s army, warned Israel and the U.S. against attacking during the funeral processions. The discussion includes differing views on what retaliation would look like if Israel struck: one speaker argues that while an attack would be heavy, Israel would mainly face long-term consequences through a major global “red line,” such as killing a supreme leader at a funeral attended by world leaders during peace negotiations against U.S. wishes. The other speaker argues that retaliation would likely continue until every Israeli military base was unusable, pointing to patterns of escalating strikes in prior exchanges and to pressure from Iran’s hardliners. The speakers also discuss risks tied to the funeral timing and the public appearance of IRGC leaders during the ceremonies. One concern raised is not an attack on the day itself, but the possibility that the funeral could reveal whereabouts of key figures currently in hiding, enabling Israel to track and potentially conduct a decapitation strike weeks later. A separate focus is the scale of the funeral: it is described as unprecedented, potentially the largest in history, with more than 100 leaders or countries represented between the start of the commemoration and the 9th, including Russia, China, India, and major countries. The conversation contrasts it with prior benchmark funerals and states that Iran already holds Guinness records for attendance percentages, while this event would set a new record. Political and military reporting is also mentioned. Netanyahu’s press office denies New York Times claims that Israel fabricated plans to assassinate Ghalibaf and Arachi during Pakistani negotiations. The discussion also notes recent movement of U.S. military aircraft away from forward positions: B-52 Shadow Fortress strategic bombers leave RAF Fairford in the UK and return home, and additional F-15 Strike Eagles return from Jordan to the UK, with aircraft markings described as reflecting use against Iran. On U.S. signaling about the USS Boxer and broader regional military posture, one speaker says the U.S. statement about the USS Boxer being in position is meant to draw attention away from other assets already present, arguing that the timeline suggests the ship did not arrive as quickly as claimed. The discussion then returns to negotiations affecting Hormuz and the Strait of Hormuz/Homs-related fees: Axios is cited as reporting that sanctions lifting and unfreezing of assets are part of a “carrot” offered by the U.S. Iran reportedly rejects a proposal about charging a fee. A negotiation detail is shared from a source in Doha: an Iranian delegation was reported to have not shown up despite claims that a delegation was present. The transcript then covers a separate topic: reporting that an IDF delegation visited Venezuela, described as the first significant bilateral engagement since Caracas severed ties with Tel Aviv in 2009. Israeli deployment is described as humanitarian in nature, with Venezuelan officials welcoming the mission, and skepticism discussed regarding whether it reflects deeper alignment under a new Venezuelan leadership. Another speaker connects the claim to long-running intelligence links in Central and South America. Returning to regional proxy dynamics, the discussion mentions Houthi media reporting that two Saudi fighter jets breached Yemeni/Houthi airspace to bomb a capital airport to prevent an aircraft carrying a Houthi delegation from departing and missing the funeral. The incident is described as ending after Houthi air defenses attempted to shoot down the jets and threatened retaliation on Riyadh. The conversation also ties this to broader regional tensions, including an Iraqi anti-corruption campaign targeting Iran-linked figures and speculation about how power struggles might play out. The main “big story” becomes Poland and NATO risk. One speaker cites reports that the U.S. warned Poland Russia may prepare a limited provocation on Polish territory within months to test NATO’s resolve. Possible actions are described as missile or drone strikes on critical infrastructure, cyber/hybrid attacks, or small cross-border incursions from Kaliningrad or Belarus. Another scenario described includes soldiers crossing into Poland claiming GPS failure or a rescue mission, followed by negotiations using withdrawal as leverage to demand an end to Western aid to Ukraine. Poland’s prime minister is referenced as warning that coming months may be critical. The conversation frames “testing NATO resolve” as probing whether Article 5 would be triggered and whether the U.S. would respond, while also debating assumptions about Russian restraint and cost-benefit calculations. A Reuters-related mention describes an incident in the Baltic where a NATO effort to stop a Russian tanker was met by a fast Russian approach, raising the possibility of future miscalculation. Finally, a reference is made to NATO unity concerns amid reports of proposed U.S. troop reductions in Europe, with those cuts described as being reviewed and blocked by Rubio and other senior Trump officials, followed by a six-month review instead. The segment ends with emphasis from one speaker on the Iranian funeral’s historical scale and that it is not being covered by Western media, alongside plans to continue with an emergency interview focused on Poland.

The interview is delayed and then resumes, with discussion shifting to major international developments. On Iran-related negotiations scheduled for Saturday, July 11, Speaker 4 says the Pakistanis believe talks will resume by then, but multiple parties (Iranians, the U.S., Israel) can still disrupt events before that date. Speaker 4 says the first thing to check is whether the parties meet; if they meet, the MOU remains viable. He lists unresolved issues including failure of the United States to fulfill Article 1, efforts to control Iran’s duties under Article 5, Iran not relenting, and the issue of unfreezing assets. Speaker 1 adds that total relief of all sanctions is also still on the table, and raises the ongoing Lebanon issue. On maritime activity near the Strait of Hormuz, Speaker 1 cites a UKMTO statement claiming the southern route is open again for all traffic, with a corridor expanded for day or night travel if ships keep AIS on, radar on, and lights on. The threat level is described as substantial due to mine danger areas and concern about naval forces hailing ships over VHF. Speaker 4 says he is monitoring ship tracking and describes container ships and other cargo vessels returning, with most traffic going through Iranian channels and only one or two via Omani channels. The conversation then turns to a Netanyahu–Trump meeting during the NATO summit context. Speaker 1 relays an Axios report quoting a senior Trump official: Netanyahu made promises about the Iran war that didn’t come to pass, showing trust is broken, and the report’s leak is framed as significant. Speaker 4 references criticism of Netanyahu coming through reports attributed to Barak Ravid. Both discuss that any public warmth may mask deeper concerns, and they emphasize that what matters is what happens afterward. Speaker 1 worries about U.S. decisions that could greenlight Israel in Lebanon and undermine negotiations with Iran due to Israel’s violations of ceasefire and MOU language that Speaker 1 says is tied to Lebanon. Speaker 1 describes conversations with people from Lebanon (Laith Malouf of Free Palestine TV, and Sharmeen Narwani of The Cradle) and explains his focus on what the Lebanese government is thinking. He argues the Lebanese government’s actions contradict the MOU Iran made with the U.S. regarding Lebanon and references leaked clauses that he says require the Lebanese army to disarm Hezbollah across all Lebanon, which he says could trigger civil war. Speaker 4 replies that the deal represented only a portion of Lebanon’s population, with the rest split among Sunni and Shia Muslims and the Druze. Speaker 1 also relays an Axios item saying Netanyahu urged Trump to reign in Erdogan over increasingly anti-Israel rhetoric, and asked Trump to avoid approving weapon sales that would help Turkey modernize its air force. Discussion includes claims of mutual hostile rhetoric and disagreements between Israel and Turkey, as well as debate over whether economic escalation like oil pressure should occur. A clip of Trump’s comments is discussed, describing threats to attack Iran’s infrastructure and promises about enriched uranium. Speaker 1 then reads Iran’s response, attributed to Muhammad Bagheri, criticizing the threats and urging respect, with a statement that the Iranian people are “strangers to the language of threats” and warning of response “in another language.” Speaker 4 says the language was prohibited in the MOU and frames it as a violation, while Speaker 1 counters that violations may not be expected to be perfect in an MOU context. The transcript then focuses heavily on the scale of Ali Khamenei’s funeral as reported by Al Jazeera and other estimates: Speaker 1 cites projections of 14 to 20 million across Iraq and Iran over the entire period, and gives specific city estimates: Iran 15 million, Qom 2 to 4 million, Iraq 3 to 5 million, and Mashhad 7 to 10 million, with combined attendance projected around 30 to 40 million. Speaker 4 responds that the size indicates Sayyed Ali Mohammed’s unpopularity. Speaker 1 describes a viral post and a quote broadcast on Iranian national television from a person who says they were previously against the government, engaged in protests, and now begs forgiveness, portraying a shift in sentiment after the war. Speaker 4 compares the funeral’s impact to the U.S. unity shift after December 7, 1941, and says it will affect Iranian culture for the next 50 years. Speaker 1 agrees, adding that even critics may mourn and respect due to the defense of the country and the war’s narrative. Israel/Iran-related moral and protest comparisons appear next, including discussion of alleged violence by Israeli police and prisons versus claims about Iranian guards. The conversation then reports a new maritime incident: Speaker 1 says an unknown projectile hit a Qatari-owned LNG tanker, Al-Raqayat, on the port side near the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz, causing fire with no casualties or environmental impact reported. Authorities advise vessels transit with caution, report suspicious activity to UKMTO, and Speaker 1 frames the incident as showing escalation risk despite ongoing negotiations. On Ukraine, Speaker 1 relays comments attributed to Russian spokesperson Peskov calling it “a war,” and Zelensky’s statements about nuclear weapons as a form of security and vulnerability if lacking them. Speaker 1 connects this to reports that Ukraine may consider obtaining a nuclear capability and mentions a large Russian attack allegedly with drones intercepted but few or no missiles intercepted. Trump’s remarks are also discussed, including a claim that a 90-minute call with Putin and efforts by Trump could bring talks to an end, and that NATO summit discussions may help. Speaker 4 responds by shifting to arguments about escalation and retaliation patterns, then provides a long historical breakdown of Russia’s shifts in tactics and force posture: from early invasion framed as special military operation, to mobilizations, shifting operational focus (e.g., Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Pokrovsk), the Kursk invasion, and later expansion across multiple regions. Speaker 4 claims Kyiv has been struck repeatedly and discusses air defense failures, and he asserts Russia has reserves while Ukraine does not. The transcript then returns to military, economic, and political pressures. Zelensky’s Financial Times quote is read: once attacks reach “1,000 flying towards Moscow” Putin will “feel it personally,” and farther from Moscow means closer to ending the war. Speaker 4 counters with skepticism about Ukraine’s ability to match Russia’s scale of attacks, and discusses glide bombs and claimed casualty impacts. Speaker 1 asks about pressure from energy infrastructure strikes and oil market impacts, while Speaker 4 says Russia exports increase, premiums are obtained, and the broader oil-market impact is limited. Additional regional updates include Lebanon: the Lebanese president denies reports of meeting Netanyahu and says he would immediately leave if in the same room while Israeli attacks and violations continue. Speaker 1 also cites a Lebanese government preliminary report placing direct damage from the war between $3 billion and $4 billion, excluding indirect economic losses of $16 billion, and Speaker 4 responds by calling the deaths “priceless.” Yemen is described as a major development: Speaker 1 says Saudi imposed a blockade preventing Iranian airplanes from going to Yemen for the first time in 11 years, and Iran breached it with an Iranian Mahan air flight to Sana’a transporting injured people and a high-level delegation. The conversation frames this as strategically favorable for Iran, with proxy-war consequences and ongoing clashes linked to Houthi activity and Saudi-backed forces. Speaker 4 adds that Yemen heating up could affect Saudi exits through Bab el-Mandab and change logistics depending on where oil is being sold. On Gaza, Speaker 1 discusses claims that Hamas government bodies resigned or were dissolved and describes other circulating reports (from Emirati outlets) saying these were false and that Hamas instead renovated an emergency committee into an interim committee led by Abdul Hadi al-Aqra (as stated). Speaker 4 accepts this alternative framing as more credible, and Speaker 1 says Hamas aims to expand political control in Gaza and the West Bank. Speaker 1 adds news that an International Security Force presence (described as Trump’s “peace” border force) may bring 20,000 personnel mostly from Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, and Albania, while Gaza continues to be bombed. The episode ends with discussion of negotiation prospects: Speaker 1 argues Trump needs a political win after the Iran war and is more optimistic about Ukraine negotiations, while Speaker 4 says Europe may push confrontation with Russia and risks of escalation at sea. Both agree that the conflict’s end may happen while Trump is still president, but not on Trump’s terms, and they conclude after exchanging commentary on future tracking tools and other unrelated remarks.

The hosts discuss an unusually intense Iranian funeral, with estimates of 9 to 10 million attendees and widespread anger expressed in the streets, including chants calling for death to Israel and the United States. A temperature conversion is debated (mid-to-high 90s Fahrenheit), and the discussion focuses on concern about where the hatred and anger could lead over “years from now.” They then turn to remarks by Donald Trump about the funeral turnout, with Trump initially saying he was surprised by the number of people and later calling the turnout “very impressive,” comparing it to crowds at his campaign rallies. The conversation shifts to whether Trump could be operating within a “bubble,” with claims that information is curated for him and that supporters may tailor what he sees, including an anecdote about people buying ad space to get onto Fox News at times Trump is watching. A separate U.S.-Israel discussion is driven by clips from Benjamin Netanyahu. When asked whether Israel is in a permanent state of war, Netanyahu says Israel is not, citing “four peace deals” and the Abraham Accords, attributing weakening of Iran to common “military action.” He argues Lebanon has “more cards in play,” asserting Lebanon wants to free itself from Hezbollah and that Christians, Druze, Sunni Muslims, and some Shiite Muslims seek protection. He also says that “some” Christian villages in Lebanon asked to be annexed to Israel because he says Israel protects them from Hezbollah. Additional Netanyahu remarks address anti-Israel sentiment in the United States. In the clip discussion, Netanyahu links hatred of Israel to hatred of America, claims protests often burn both Israeli and American flags, and says supporters of Israel wave both flags. He also describes social-media influence and “bot farms,” arguing it correlates with declining patriotic feelings and support for Israel, while insisting the alliance is based on “common values.” The hosts react by questioning how many Americans believe Netanyahu’s four main claims (that anti-Israel sentiment is anti-American; that Lebanese Christians want annexation; that younger and online shifts come from bot farms; and that Israel is a small self-defending country facing evil neighbors). They conclude that while a minority may accept those ideas, they argue the majority opposes them and that this represents a major change compared with prior U.S. history. Discussion then returns to regional military developments tied to Iran. There are claims of U.S. air asset repositioning: B-52s pulling out from England, F-15s leaving Jordan for the UK, and reports that at least six A-10s have flown into Jordan. The conversation connects this to potential escalation involving the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian actions against ships. They cite updates that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains around the same level over several days (about 30-something ships per 24 hours) and mention an escort of ships, suggesting no major change in that narrow snapshot. A statement by Mohammed Medvedev is discussed, presented as claiming Iran has two maritime “weapons,” with the other not yet used besides the Strait of Hormuz—also referring to the Bab al-Mandib Strait. On Lebanon and Gaza, Netanyahu’s claims are summarized by the hosts: Iran trying to remove Israel from southern Lebanon, pressure on Lebanon, and Netanyahu’s assertion that Trump did not ask Israel to ease attacks on tunnels and did stop action earlier according to the hosts’ recounting of Netanyahu’s position. The conversation also includes Gaza: “no reconstruction in Gaza without disarmament and demilitarization” in a designated area, with Hamas not having given up, and discussion of impacts on Israel’s economy such as tourism. The hosts then mention a viral video of USS Liberty survivor Phil Turney saying he burned an “evil flag” on July 4 in remembrance of 34 brothers tattooed on his arm who were “slaughtered” June 8, 1967. They also discuss the broader idea of perceptions shifting in the U.S., comparing it to the process of mainstreaming beliefs (described through an “emperor with no clothes” example) and referencing COVID as an analogy for when information becomes widely accepted. They wrap up by broadening to U.S. society and recurring themes of “forever wars,” debt, inequality, and concerns about instability. They discuss a trending film, “Citizen Vigilante,” described as inspired by European rape-gang-related controversies and reflecting frustration with political handling of immigration and related social tensions. The conversation ends with stories about local law enforcement programs in Florida (rehabilitation-focused jail programs and sheriff-managed community structures), and a final return to the Iranian funeral photos showing Max Blumenthal and Jackson Hinkle attending, with Jackson described as attending multiple controversial international events.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel Tony Aguilar discusses events affecting him personally and broader U.S. and international developments. Aguilar says that about a month and a half earlier, much of his social media was “disabled,” and that his accounts were “erased” and shut down along with his bank accounts, forcing him to rebuild his online presence and legal identity, including getting a new passport. He characterizes this as an attack tied to speaking out against “brutality” and “the regime,” meaning the United States. Aguilar and the host connect these events to concerns about U.S. policy and escalation, arguing that the U.S. is retreating and becoming reckless, and comparing current actions to a “highway to hell.” They reference international and domestic measures that, in Aguilar’s account, increase U.S.-Israel integration through provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act (including “Section 224” described as the U.S.-Israel Technology Cooperation Initiative with a U.S.-based executive agent/secretariat-like function) and the Intelligence Authorization Act (described as blending CIA, DIA, NSA with Mossad). Aguilar says Netanyahu’s statements about not needing U.S. money align with this structure because, he argues, it allows Israel to have direct access to U.S. budget funds, prompting concern that U.S. founding fathers would be “rolling over in their graves.” Aguilar also addresses U.S. domestic politics, including the possibility of Mitch McConnell’s mortality and how that could affect political outcomes in Kentucky, mentioning Thomas Massey and asserting that campaign spending tied to pro-Israel groups would have consequences for these contests. In discussing Iran, Aguilar points to the funeral procession for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, saying it included official delegations from “over 100 nations” and listing countries attending, while noting the United States and others were not among those represented. He frames this as evidence against the idea of international isolation and describes ongoing diplomatic discussions during the funeral period. The host and Aguilar turn to U.S. allegations of corruption. Aguilar portrays the Trump administration as an “American crime family,” citing insider trading admissions involving Donald Trump’s children, and broad claims that Trump and his family profit from political and business activities. He also claims that members of the Trump circle—including people connected to Mar-a-Lago contracts and overseas negotiations—benefit personally. He adds assertions about spouses accompanying senior officials during work and implies fear about substance issues. The host compares alleged corruption under Trump to prior allegations involving the Biden family. On Iran after the funeral, Aguilar describes a continued diplomatic and negotiation process involving dignitaries and funeral events, then asserts that hostilities resumed and that the U.S. and Israel could not accept a proposed off-ramp. He claims the Strait of Hormuz has come under new Iranian administrative control despite earlier U.S. opposition, and says future steps require technical talks in Qatar related to sanctions relief and unfreezing assets. He also argues that Lebanon negotiations are in conflict with a U.S. MOU, and says the U.S. has armed and enabled Kurdish groups (PJAK and KDPI) in western Iran, reporting active clashes involving IRGC and Iranian forces as part of a peripheral conflict. Finally, they discuss Ukraine and Russia’s battlefield progress, mentioning Konstantinovka’s fall and describing alleged U.S. reallocation of assets away from Ukraine toward Israel. Aguilar claims a four-star general, Chris Donahue, resigned, was retired, and was fired after pushing back on Ukraine-related issues, and argues the loss of U.S. defense support creates tactical and political advantages for Russia. They also reference additional corruption allegations involving Zelensky’s parents and reported cash found during a raid, and conclude by characterizing U.S. leadership and its family as directly profiting from decisions, including claims about Barron Trump’s financial trades tied to war-related speculation.