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There is an old joke that goes God created war so that Americans would learn geography. In 2026, they seem to be learning it the hard way. They’ve discovered that 10,900 kilometers from Washington DC lies the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical choke point, a narrow strip of water between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman that stretches 167 kilometers in length, narrows to just 34 kilometers at its tightest point, and carries roughly 30,000 vessels a year. Around a fifth of the world’s traded oil and LNG flows through this corridor on normal days. Most of that oil heads to Asia, but oil prices don’t respect geography. They’re set globally. So when West Asia sneezes, fuel prices spike everywhere. Oil is only the start. Over 30% of global ammonia trade, nearly half of urea, and 20% of diammonium phosphate, key fertilizer inputs, move through this same choke point, along with about half the world’s sulfur for metal processing. If the sulfur didn’t arrive, the factory was shut down. It didn’t arrive because of the war and because the Strait of Hormuz was closed. Unlike oil, these can’t be rerouted. There are no pipelines for ammonia or urea. If Hormuz closes, the nitrogen supply chain doesn’t slow. It stops. And since synthetic nitrogen fertilizers support roughly 48% of the global population, missing the mid April application window in the Northern Hemisphere means lower yields by September. Major importers like India, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and many African countries would quickly face fertilizer shortages, leading to higher food prices, inflation, and a widespread food security crisis affecting billions. 85% of Brazil’s fertilizer is imported. And under these conditions, we can only bring part of the land under cultivation. Meanwhile, about a third of the world’s helium, critical for semiconductors and MRIs, passes through these strait. So does nearly 10% of global aluminum and a significant share of Persian Gulf produced plastics. Even the Persian Gulf states themselves are exposed. This passage is their food lifeline. The biggest one, Saudi Arabia, imports over 80% of its food. The smallest one, Qatar, 85%. If the strait stays closed for another month or two, the food situation here is gonna get really critical. If anyone thinks the so called first world would be immune, the reality says otherwise. Since the war began, Brent crude has swung from $73 to nearly $120 at one point, adding about €500,000,000 per day in EU energy costs. In late April, the IEA warned Europe may have only six weeks of jet fuel left as West Asian imports falter. Prices have surged past $1,500 per ton. The IEA calls this “the greatest energy crisis in history.” By April 22, Lufthansa had canceled 20,000 flights with more disruptions and price hikes expected. In Germany, the industrial heart of Europe, 78.6% of firms report uncertainty about their future, rising to 87.7% in manufacturing and over 90% in chemicals, rubber, and plastics. The US isn’t insulated either. Gas prices jumped more than $1 per gallon in just six weeks, surpassing $4.10, the highest level since 2022, while the Hormuz shock fuels inflation. They said the consumer price index rose 0.9% in March, almost 1% in just one month. I haven’t seen a jump like that in years. Meanwhile, a Reuters/Ipsos poll put Trump’s approval rating at 36%, its lowest since his return to office. Forty-eight hours into the Iran war, marine insurers began canceling war risk coverage in the Persian Gulf. By March 5, commercial insurance had effectively vanished. No insurance means no shipping. No shipping means no trade. This isn’t a new insight. Back in 1507, Portuguese admiral Alfonso de Albuquerque understood that Whoever controls this choke point controls the flow between India and the Mediterranean. And by extension, global trade itself. So far, the largest empire in history finds itself with remarkably little to say against one of the oldest. Perhaps this time, the Americans picked the wrong country to learn geography.

Michael Hudson discusses how the Iran war is accelerating a global economic crisis and signaling a struggle over what the world economic order will look like after the current system breaks down. He emphasizes that energy markets are central to the ripple effects, since disruptions affect fertilizer and agricultural inputs, pharmaceuticals, helium for hospital and tech uses, and highly refined fuels for transportation. In India, fertilizer prices are rising; in the U.S., farmers face constraints from higher input costs and the need to borrow to plant, risking profits as crop prices may not compensate the costs. He notes that crop traders may profit more than farmers, and that the wider impact cascades into electronics and manufacturing through electricity-intensive processes like aluminum refining. The broader point is that energy is the linchpin of the economy; a disruption in energy flows threatens production across sectors, raising unemployment and undermining manufacturing. Hudson argues that the Iran threat, and the possibility that the United States and Israel would destroy Iran’s refining capacity and electricity, would provoke a depression larger than the 1930s because the physical flow of goods would be constrained beyond what debt relief or wartime Keynesianism can fix. To avoid this, he says, the world must restructure how trade, payments, and international reserves work, which would require reform—or replacement—of the United Nations, since U.S. veto power and international-law violations hinder cooperation and the transition away from fossil fuels toward atomic, solar, or wind energy. He characterizes the current dynamic as an economic mutually assured destruction: Iran resists being crushed by U.S. and Israeli aggression, while the U.S. seeks to maintain dominance by weaponizing energy and finance. He attributes extreme risk to the U.S. political leadership, describing the internal White House tensions and the possibility of a nuclear impulse as driven by political personalities who would gamble with civilization rather than accept a loss of dominance. Hudson then contrasts Iran’s position with the U.S. and its allies, noting that U.S. military capability is constrained: the United States has burned through missiles and bombers and cannot easily invade Iran on land. Iran, despite punitive actions against its navy and air force, retains a resilient defense and decoupled administrative networks, and it wields moral authority by opposing what it sees as American-dominated, one-sided control of oil, food, and the dollar. He argues that other countries confront a choice: align with a more independent, multipolar order or accept continued pressure from the United States to surrender sovereignty or face economic isolation. He critiques the Western use of the term liberalism as misapplied, arguing that the term in contemporary discourse often denotes neoliberals who favor deregulation and reduced government, whereas, historically, public control of essential services and strategic sectors—transportation, banking, health care, education—guided growth. He compares China favorably for keeping banking under public direction and maintaining state-led credit for productive investment, arguing that Western economies have shifted toward financialization and rent-seeking, fueling inequality and instability. He posits that open, liberal trade and investment are not genuinely open under U.S. dominance, since the dollar’s supremacy and centralized control enable coercive extraction. In closing, Hudson emphasizes that the real question is what economy and political system will replace the current liberal order, with attention to why China’s model—combining public banking, subsidized infrastructure, and state-led development—has produced higher productivity and living standards. He calls for a realistic redefinition of democracy and economic policy to prevent further polarization and decline, and for an international framework that supports productive investment and equitable growth rather than financial extractivism.

For weeks the focus has been the food side of the Strait of Hormuz story—fertilizer, shipping routes, diesel, natural gas, and the inputs that keep the global food system moving. Now the war with Iran has shifted this from theory to reality: oil spikes, shipping insurance surges with Lloyd’s of London canceling many contracts through the Strait, fertilizer prices jump, farmers are squeezed, and food prices rise. The host notes this is not a surprise; warnings were issued years in advance. Mike Adams, founder of Brighteon and naturalnews.com, joins to discuss the looming global food crisis. The Financial Times warned of disruption hitting before the fall harvest. Higher fertilizer prices and lockdowns reduce fertilizer use, leading to less planting and lower future food production. Adams warns Western countries will face higher food prices, while mass starvation could occur in other nations, including Sudan, Yemen, Bangladesh, with India and Egypt also at risk. Tens of millions in these regions rely on food aid, which could become less available or affordable. A double hit compounds the problem: fertilizer exports from China and Russia have halted; China refused fertilizer to India to feed its own population, and Qatar Energy has declared force majeure, meaning even countries with local fertilizer plants may not receive fertilizer. Adams predicts hundreds of millions could face extreme famine later in 2026 and into 2027. Speaker 2 emphasizes the humanitarian impact on allies and the potential for global instability and conflict as populations face hunger. Adams adds the phrase “nine meals away from anarchy” to illustrate social upheaval when people cannot feed themselves. He points to Egypt’s Suez Canal as a potential leverage point that could be affected if food aid is insufficient. He frames current events as the end of decades of global abundance linked to controlled routes and resources, suggesting a broader energy-food geopolitical shift tied to the war. The discussion broadens to Europe, with criticism of German leadership and the push to militarize Europe. Adams challenges the idea that depopulation is a conspiracy and references historical coverage of population-control discussions in 1969, including Paul Ehrlich’s Population Bomb and alleged infertility chemical ideas. He cites vaccines in Kenya allegedly tested for infertility and asserts the COVID years were a pilot program. He asserts that the UN and other bodies show famine risk, including in South Sudan. Adams argues the United States could face higher food prices even if shelves aren’t emptied, and he envisions a mid- to late-2020s scenario where many Americans, especially those earning under $100,000 annually, struggle to feed themselves. He calls for resilience through decentralization: breaking away from the banking system, the medical system, public education, and the energy grid; promoting homepower with solar and batteries, local farming, and community-supported agriculture. He suggests stockpiling food, diversifying wealth (gold and silver), and growing food locally as preparation. The conversation then covers civil liberties and surveillance. They discuss the extension of FISA Section 702, describing it as an erosion of Fourth Amendment protections and a system enabling widespread spying on Americans, often used for blackmail against public officials. Adams argues that data sharing with foreign nations, including Israel, exacerbates privacy concerns and that tech devices in homes—Alexa, Ring, Windows—provide backdoor access to agencies. He warns that robots and smart devices will intensify surveillance, and advises privacy-focused measures like using Linux and de-Googled devices. Finally, Adams promotes his resources: naturalnews.com for articles and infographics, brightvideos.com for daily videos, and brightlearn.ai offering free books and Spanish translations at Brightlearn. He reiterates the need for self-reliance, local communities, and preparedness, including solar power and homesteading as resilience strategies.

- Speaker 0 notes that the United States Postal Service is adding a fuel charge to every package due to fuel cost increases tied to Iran–Israel tensions and says fuel costs have jumped more than 30% since the war began. - Reuters/Financial Times mention: US inflation to surge to 4.2% on energy shock; OECD warnings. Fuel lines are long worldwide, with coverage of shortages in Slovenia, parts of Europe, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines; some countries have run out of petrol or declared a state of emergency. - Speaker 1 paraphrases Putin, saying the energy shock from the Iran war is devastating globally, harming global logistic and production chains and the fuel industry. He claims Europe will beg Russia for oil and gas, referencing a pipeline blown up by the United States. - Mike Adams (Speaker 2, Health Ranger) joins to discuss fuel and food shortages and global impacts. He asserts: energy is the primary driver of affordable food, transportation, and personal freedom; farming is hydrocarbon-intensive due to energy inputs for fertilizer and for planting/harvesting; the Strait of Hormuz constriction worsens scarcity. He argues the Strait was open before the war and that actions against Nord Stream pipelines and the Strait have created energy constraints, predicting severe economic and food shortages until Hormuz reopens. - Speaker 3 (a senator) is shown commenting on the war costs ($2,000,000,000 daily) and casualties; notes that policy decisions and actions have led to escalating prices and potential long-term impacts on Americans. - Speaker 4 and Speaker 2 discuss a pattern of energy lockdowns, global shortages, and potential government controls: universal basic income (UBI) tied to digital control via a CBDC, with quotas on food and energy consumption; off-ramps include off-grid solar power and EV adoption. They suggest this could lead to government-delivered food and fuel, and to a broader move toward centralized control. - The conversation covers the European angle: Putin and the diplomats say Europe may beg Russia for cheap energy as Nord Stream pipelines were disrupted; China–Russia energy deals and Mongolia–Northern China gas transmission are noted as supporting Chinese industry. - Speaker 4 observes European leadership as having pursued energy restrictions and nuclear shutdowns, calling it “energy suicide” and expressing sympathy for European people, while criticizing their leaders for energy policy. - Speaker 2 discusses the petrodollar system’s fragility, noting potential shifts as allies and non-allies trade outside the petrodollar; warns of inflationary effects on the U.S. and potential mass selling of U.S. Treasuries by indebted economies like Japan. - The discussion touches on broader implications: a potential shift toward AI and robotics replacing human labor, with energy scarcity viewed as a driver for social and economic controls; concerns about large-scale power disruptions and rationing, and the possibility of a 10-year horizon for significant changes in labor and energy policy. - In closing, Mike Adams emphasizes the need for viewers to be informed and distinguishes between differing levels of information sources, inviting continued engagement.

The speaker argues that the war in Iran and associated U.S. and Israeli actions are presented as a complex, intractable crisis, but in reality follow a simple pattern of a “controlled collapse” already underway. The collapse is said to be visible in everyday life, such as rising gas prices after the Strait of Hormuz being effectively closed and tensions around the conflict; the war is described as having caused thousands of deaths and sending energy markets into upheaval, with oil at a four-year high and inflation fears resurging as the Fed is expected to raise rates. Key events cited include the February 28 to March 1 strikes launched by the United States and Israel, the 48-hour ultimatum from President Trump demanding Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and the deployment of thousands of Marines to the Middle East. The speaker asserts Iran’s threat to respond by closing the Strait of Hormuz and targeting U.S. linked energy infrastructure and IT networks, including desalinization plants and data centers, stating that this represents not de-escalation but the architecture of a broader war. The narrative challenges conventional claims that Iran is degraded or cornered, noting that Iran has fired long-range missiles toward the U.S. base on Diego Garcia and conducted strikes near Israel’s Demona nuclear facilities, contradicting the idea that Iranian military capability has collapsed. The speaker argues that war messaging routinely declares the enemy weakened while the conflict expands, and asks why thousands of Marines are being deployed if victory is close and missiles are supposedly diminishing. The broader thesis is that this is part of a larger, premeditated shift toward centralized control. War and energy shocks are said to destabilize prices and justify intervention, with examples of strategic petroleum reserve releases and sanctions easing to calm markets. The speaker links this to a longer-running plan to install emergency governance and digital control systems: surveillance, mobility restrictions, and a move toward digital money, identity, and movement management. They point to developments such as China’s digital yuan expansion, Europe’s digital euro, and the push toward “15-minute cities,” arguing that these are precursors to a digitized, programmable money system. The speech asserts COVID-19 demonstrated how governments can impose sustained fear and centralized control, with digital gatekeeping and state-corporate coordination seen as a live test. It is argued that the “rollout” is not about a temporary crisis but a permanent, durable control grid, with airports adopting faster digital processing and biometric scanning, and the public gradually accepting reduced freedoms and increased dependence as a solution to emergencies. The speaker concludes that the conflict is not as complex as claimed; it is about control and the expansion of a surveillance, monetary, and movement-management system under the guise of crisis management, and invites audience feedback on this perspective.

The discussion centers on how an Iran war would affect global economies, and why energy-price dynamics may not be a sustainable path to stability. The professor says that even without a war, energy prices are expected to remain very high through the rest of the year due to existing delays. He argues the situation would worsen because a war is “breaking out very soon,” possibly by Sunday or Monday, with “no real negotiations” so any negotiation could not affect the military or peace situation. He describes conditions for preconditions to negotiations as impossible to meet. He says one requirement is that Iran be given back confiscated Iranian funds, including “many billions of dollars” intervened by the United States and references stablecoin. He states the United States cannot return any money because Congress has set positions including “Not one penny for Iran,” characterizing Iran as a terrorist country. He also says the United States has repeatedly reneged on prior commitments, giving an example that Trump annulled an Obama administration atomic weapons contract, so Iran would not concede without return in advance. According to the professor, market expectations are being driven by announcements and the belief that a peaceful negotiation might be reached, citing stocks and bonds rising and a perceived chance to profit when markets open Monday or Tuesday. He claims the announcements are aimed at creating that expectation rather than producing a durable settlement. He describes alleged U.S. messaging to Netanyahu about allowing attacks, and says the war secretary Hegseth spoke with Oman and Qatar. He states that if Oman did not agree not to join Iran in imposing tariffs (presented as Iran’s effort to obtain reparations for illegal attacks), the U.S. would “let Netanyahu kill you,” and that this reportedly ended negotiations. He predicts Iran is not ready and that the peak of the war will come as the build-up since Trump took office. He argues the conflict would create shortages of oil, fertilizer, sulfur, chemicals, and helium, plunging the world into a depression “worse than the nineteen thirties.” He cites ExxonMobil’s estimates of pushing oil prices to “over the hundred fifty, hundred sixty dollar a barrel range,” causing chemical industry shutdowns throughout Asia and the global South and Europe, blocking fertilizer exports, and reducing agricultural yields amid extreme-weather conditions. He says fertilizer blockades and agricultural disruption would drive food price increases and industry closures. He then describes an economic mechanism: chemical-industry closures reduce demand for oil, so oil prices might fall to “maybe a hundred twenty, a hundred thirty dollars a barrel,” but he expects “large scale defaults and bankruptcy.” He says debt leverage across economies would turn an industrial depression into a financial crisis because companies depend on lending and credit, and that collateralized debt obligations have created patterns resembling the 2008 bank crisis. He states central banks cannot “simply create more credit” because banks would avoid lending to prevent turning economies into a “Ponzi scheme.” He also argues U.S. negotiation demands are designed to prevent serious talks, describing Trump’s stated premise that nothing will happen until Iran transfers all atomic weapons as a “red herring” and likening it to a deal-breaker. He says sanctions aimed to starve Iran have not worked since they were first put in place in 1979, and that the U.S. intends to provoke Iran into a defensive response. The professor expands from economics to international law and institutions. He claims U.S. attacks would treat civilian activity as military, referencing alleged attacks on fishermen in other regions and arguing similar logic would apply in the Strait of Hormuz. He says the UN is a “casualty” because it has been unable to enforce its charter, blocked through U.S. veto power, and says the alternative would require “a new United Nations” independent of the United States, with China, Russia, and Iran as leading members. He proposes a broader strategy focused on control of the global oil trade, stating the U.S. aims to prevent other countries from using alternative supplies by destroying oil facilities and weaponizing the oil trade. He links this to actions involving Nord Stream, sanctions, and scenarios involving Venezuela and grain trade. He states Venezuela oil revenue is paid into a Florida bank account under Donald Trump’s direction and says the same approach is sought for Iran. He further claims the U.S. would aim to restrict alternative energy (wind and solar), portray it as rival to oil, and maintain dependence on U.S. LNG and oil exports. He concludes that chaos is used to lock in foreign dependency and that a U.S.-centered outcome would involve closed European industry, subsidies or market opening demands, and client political alignments. He predicts Europe would relocate industry outside Europe but not necessarily to the U.S., while still facing political revulsion and seeking an alternative system as the depression deepens. He also says future wars would be air wars with missiles, bombs, and drones rather than invasions.

Speaker 0: The GCC allies are largely blockaded and not getting anything through; only UAE or Oman might be getting a few shipments due to being on the Gulf of Oman side. This is driving higher oil prices. We can’t simply bluff or "play a game of chicken" because it affects the entire world—Asia, Africa, Europe, and the United States. The shortage extends beyond oil to things like helium, and it’s impacting chip manufacturing and broader economic activity. These are medium-term issues already baked in and in short supply, so we’re facing real problems and a question of how long we can endure this. Speaker 1: As energy becomes more expensive—oil at $110, then $120, $130, $140, $150, rising until this crisis ends globally—the risk is a financial collapse worse than 2007–2008, potentially a depression in much of the world. Economists predict a serious recession, possibly a depression, and these dynamics are what Putin was trying to convey to Trump because Americans are perceived as potentially catastrophic. China is dependent on energy but is expanding nuclear power, has substantial coal, and is investing in renewables; China will survive this. Japan and Korea are on the edge; India is affected; Egypt is trying to feed 100,000,000 and facing famine; Turkey is involved. These states are being pushed toward war not just with Israel but with the United States, since without Israel none of this would be happening, and they know it. Russia, China, Egypt, Turkey, India, and possibly others may join a coalition to force the United States to stop. The speaker would prefer not to go there and believes President Trump should end the blockade, which was adopted because it was the only measure short of returning to war, but the blockade won’t work because the world won’t tolerate it. The president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has publicly said it’s time for Korea to defend itself. It’s been time for Korea to take control of its own armed forces for a long time, but the U.S. currently controls all their armed forces and Koreans have not liked that for at least twenty years. Now they want control of their own armed forces. The speaker expects the dissolution of the United States’ unofficial overseas imperial holdings, predicting the Koreans will expel the U.S., with Japan likely following. In the Pacific, trilateral efforts among Korea, the Philippines, and Japan are forming to cooperate with the U.S. in a future war with China—not in our lifetimes or on the planet, as no one wants war with China. Nobody wants war with China; China is increasingly seen as a safer place for cash and investments in the U.S. This shift began when the U.S. began telling Russians they would not allow them to access billions of rubles and may seize funds, possibly giving cash to Ukrainians. People are watching and asking whether they want to depend on the U.S. financial system or face interference with bank accounts. There are many bad developments right now, and the last thing the American people need is a war, certainly not one involving China, Russia, or any other powers along with Iran, yet that seems to the direction in which things are headed.

Ashwin Rutansi introduces New Order, a global show tracing how India and its allies sit at the center of a transformation in world history. The program aims to explore partnerships, shifting alliances, and how structural changes ripple from global powers to streets, villages, markets, and boardrooms. The show promises to examine diplomatic architecture, networks of power, money flows, and levers of influence, presenting a fundamental reordering rather than mere turbulence. Zara Khan will join later to field viewer questions. Guest: John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago professor and coauthor of The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. The discussion opens with the recent incident of Iran firing missiles at an F-35 and what it implies given anticipated US and allied arms purchases. Mearsheimer notes that aircraft over adversary territory face real risks from surface-to-air missiles and air defenses, even if the US and Israel have degraded Iran’s defenses. He suggests this is a factor behind why the US and Israel refrain from flying over Iran. Geopolitical framing: Who benefits from the ongoing war (in Iran) at the time of the interview? Mearsheimer identifies two clear winners: Russia and China. Russia benefits from sanctions relief on oil and gas pushed by Trump-era policies, and the war diverts munitions away from Ukraine, aiding Russia in its position. China gains as US credibility in foreign policy deteriorates, increasing its influence in the Middle East and globally as nations worry about an unreliable US, with Europe showing signs of leaning toward China. India’s position is discussed as a potential loser in this new order. The discussion asserts that India’s relations with Israel and Iran, and its ties to both the US and the Gulf, place it in a precarious position. The possibility of a summit or peace conference is deemed unlikely to solve inflation, gas prices, fertilizer costs, or Indian food production challenges; the war is characterized as bad news for India, as reflected in Indian media. On US policy and the Israel lobby: Mearsheimer contends that the Israel lobby has significant influence over US foreign policy and that its role in dragging the United States into wars, including Iraq in 2003, was central. He notes with some irony that the lobby’s power is increasingly in the open, referencing Joe Kent’s statements and public figures like Tucker Carlson and Bernie Sanders endorsing similar criticisms. He points to Francesca Albanese, UN official on Palestinian territories, describing the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocidal, and notes the lobby’s efforts to undermine her career. Policy advice for the Global South, focusing on India: Mearsheimer argues that India should maintain distance from excessive US alignment to avoid heavy leverage over Indian policy. He suggests speaking up against US policy when it harms national interests but avoiding becoming overly dependent on the United States. He cites examples such as Indonesia where maintaining friendly ties with China while balancing US relations would be prudent. He warns that excessive closeness to the US invites sanctions and pain, whereas diversifying partnerships could reduce vulnerability. BRICS and multipolarity: The war could benefit BRICS and the Global South, with Russia and China gaining, while some BRICS members like India and possibly Indonesia could suffer. The conflict may prompt a strategic rethinking of US ties, encouraging greater independence from Washington. The discussion also touches on Europe’s economic strain and NATO’s perceived setback if Russia prevails in Ukraine, describing a “double whammy” for European leadership from the Gulf conflict alongside Ukraine. End of interview: The program teases future exploration of the Israel lobby’s influence and the potential for a broader discussion on the end of the Israel lobby era, followed by viewer questions. Zara Khan presents questions from the audience, including whether the broader humanity will gain a say on the world stage and how the Iran war might differ from Vietnam and Afghanistan, emphasizing asymmetrical warfare and the risk of ground involvement. The show signs off, inviting viewers to follow and watch future episodes.

A war against Iran could disrupt not only Iranian oil supply, but all supply from the Persian Gulf countries. It could also disrupt China's Belt and Road Initiative and obstruct Russia's international North-South transportation corridor, where Iran, India, and Russia are key nodes. Energy prices could skyrocket, markets could crash, and supply chains could collapse. Some Gulf countries don't want this to happen. Trump's attacks on Yemen make Abu Dhabi and Riyadh vulnerable to Yemen escalating against these countries. There isn't a global actor except Netanyahu in Israel who wants war with Iran.

The discussion opens with a provocative Iran-related development. Iran announces that as of April 1, any execution of its government staff will trigger a massive response, with threats to attack worldwide facilities of major tech and defense companies, listing Microsoft, Google, Apple, Cisco, HP, Oracle, Meta, IBM, Dell, Palantir, Nvidia, JPMorgan, Spire, GE, Tesla, Boeing, and others. The speakers urge employees of these institutions to leave their workplaces and residents near these “terrorist” companies to relocate within a kilometer to safe areas. They say the companies should expect the destruction of related units from 8 PM Tehran time on April 1 for every assassination in Iran, framing the move as direct pressure on Western power structures, including the Trump administration. The conversation notes the potential leverage over American tech assets given heavy investments in U.S. manufacturing and technology. Speaker 1 joins to discuss implications of the threat. The panel views the Iranian response as a serious, professional escalation, describing Iran as a capable force that counteres U.S. moves with reciprocal actions. They note a pattern of tit-for-tat escalation: the U.S. has targeted Iranian leaders and economic levers (oil, gas, tourism, helium for semiconductors), and Iran appears to be shifting focus to tech companies operating in the region. They connect Iran’s targeting to concerns that Western tech could enable regime change in Iran, citing the discovery of thousands of Starlink terminals during protests in Iran as an example of Western tech enabling internal opposition. Speaker 2 (Brandon Weichert) provides context on the broader strategic scene. He argues Iran has demonstrated professional military capability and escalates in response to Western actions. He suggests that the war has moved beyond a limited conflict, with Iran pursuing economic and regional disruption of Arab states to undermine regimes pro-American and pro-Israel. He links this to a broader narrative about the 2017-2020 era where security and tech development tied into U.S. and allied interests, including a prior Trump diplomacy tour that promoted joint tech development. Weichert asserts Iran aims at Middle Eastern tech sectors as a strategic front, and notes proxy usage of social media and intelligence infrastructure tied to Western tech firms. He points to a translation/editing challenge in Iran’s communications and stresses the Iranians’ potential to strike regionally rather than domestically, arguing that provoking American home-front action would risk alienating Western publics. Speaker 0 presses on whether the threat is regionally contained or could affect the U.S. home front, noting the discrepancy between Iran’s capacity and the claim of “decimation” of Iran by U.S. officials. Speaker 1 emphasizes that the U.S. has faced a sustained escalation and that public messaging sometimes underplays the ongoing threats, including the operational reality of airspace and force posture in the region. The conversation shifts toward troop deployments and potential ground operations. They debate whether American boots on the ground are imminent or merely a bluff, and whether any invasion would align with targets like Konark or Kalghar Island. Weichert warns of a potential escalation trap, questioning the feasibility of a major ground campaign given Iran’s terrain and air defenses, and suggests any decision would hinge on political calculations in Washington. A subthread examines U.S. and Israeli military coordination. The panel discusses whether Israel has participated in past operations and the limits of Israeli involvement in ground campaigns, noting Israeli airpower relies on U.S. refueling assets, which are currently constrained, and that Israel has not historically deployed ground forces alongside the U.S. The group returns to battlefield developments, referencing alleged damage to U.S. assets such as AWACS and fighter aircraft, and claims that Iranian actions have degraded early warning radar networks, prompting the use of mobile radar planes. They also speculate about strategic moves like relocating the USS Gerald R. Ford to mitigate Iranian targeting risks and allude to Iranian intelligence networks operating in Arab states. Toward the end, the panel contemplates the domestic economic ramifications for Americans, including oil supply, prices, and inflation, forecasting higher prices and potential economic downturns as the conflict persists. They discuss the political consequences in the U.S., including potential shifts in party fortunes tied to the war's trajectory, and reference public tax implications and the potential for policy shifts as the conflict unfolds.

Mario and the Professor discuss the scale and spread of the current oil and energy shock and its broad economic and geopolitical ripple effects. - Severity and scope: The Professor calls the crisis “pretty catastrophic,” possibly the biggest oil crisis experienced, potentially surpassing the 1970s shocks. He notes a gap between Washington rhetoric and underlying economic reality and emphasizes the war’s effects beyond oil, including fertilizer and helium, all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz or related chokepoints. - U.S. economic backdrop (before the war): The Professor provides a pre-war table: - U.S. GDP growth in 2024 was 2.3%, 2025 about the same after a dip in 2024 to 2.2%. - Jobs: 2024 added 2.2 million; 2025 added 185,000, with tariffs contributing to a manufacturing job loss of 108,000. - Productivity declined from 3% to 2.1% in 2025. - He argues the U.S. economy was already slowing and that the war exacerbates existing weaknesses rather than creating a boom. - Immediate physical and downstream effects: - The closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects more than oil: up to 20% of world oil, a third of fertilizer, and helium used in chip manufacturing (notably in Taiwan) pass through the strait. - The closure’s ripple effects include fertilizer shortages and higher prices (fertilizer up about 50%), and broader supply chain dislocations as related infrastructure and inventories (oil, fertilizers, helium) become depleted and must be rebuilt. - Relative impact by region: The U.S. is more insulated from physical shocks than many others, but financial markets (stocks and bonds) are hit, with higher interest rates and a rising 10- and 30-year bond yield. Europe and Asia face larger direct physical disruptions; India, Taiwan, and others bear notable hits due to fertilizer and helium supply constraints. - Global energy and political dynamics: - The U.S. remains a net importer of oil, though it is a net exporter of petroleum products; fertilizer reliance and pricing reflect broader global constraints. - The professor highlights the political costs: protectionism (tariffs), militarism (increased defense spending and involvement), and interventionism (policy actions). He notes polling is negative on these directions, suggesting policy headwinds for the administration. - The escalation and motivations for war: - A theory discussed is that the war was driven by a belief in decapitating Iran’s leadership to force regime change, a strategy the professor says many experts have warned against. He cites New York Times reporting that Mossad and Netanyahu supported decapitation, but that former Mossad leadership and U.S. intelligence warned it would not work; the escalation suggests a divergence between theory and outcome. - He acknowledges another view that controlling Hormuz could economically benefit the U.S., but ranks it as a lesser driver than regime-change objectives. - Possible outcomes and scenarios: - If the Houthis control the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and the Beber/Mendeb is blocked, the consequences would intensify; the professor describes a “freeway turned into a toll road” scenario in Hormuz and greater disruption in the Gulf, including potential attacks on desalination plants. - The economic signaling would likely worsen: downward revisions to growth, higher import prices, and increased financial market strain; a prolonged closure would intensify these effects. - The escalation ladder and endgame: - The professor warns that escalating with boots on the ground would favor Iran and could trigger widespread disruption of Gulf infrastructure, desalination, and regional stability. He suggests Russia would be a clear beneficiary in such a scenario. - He concludes with a stark warning: if Hormuz and the Beber/Mendeb remain closed, and desalination and critical infrastructure are attacked, the situation could resemble or exceed the scale of the 2008 financial crisis—“look like a birthday party” compared with what could unfold. - Overall takeaway: The crisis is multi-faceted, with immediate physical shortages (oil, fertilizer, helium) and cascading financial and political costs. The duration and depth depend on how long chokepoints stay closed and whether escalation occurs, with the potential for severe global economic and geopolitical consequences.

Larry Johnson and the host discuss the extraordinary and escalating tensions around Iran, the Middle East, and the United States’ role in the region. - The guests reference recent remarks by Donald Trump about Iran, noting Trump’s statement that Iran has until Tuesday to reach a deal or “I am blowing up everything,” with a quoted line describing Tuesday as “power plant day and bridge day all wrapped up in one in Iran,” followed by “open the fucking straight, you crazy bastards or you’ll be living in hell.” They describe this rhetoric as madness and suggest the rhetoric signals a potential for a severe U.S. action. - They contrast Trump’s stated plan with the capabilities and willingness of the U.S. military, arguing there are three distinct elements: what Trump wants to do, what the U.S. military can do, and what the U.S. military is willing to do. They discuss a hypothetical ground operation targeting Iran, including possible actions such as striking Natanz or a nuclear-related site, and potentially hitting a “underground missile factory” at Kesheveh, while acknowledging the risk and uncertainty of such plans. - The conversation details a Friday event in which a U.S. F-15 was shot down, and the implications for the broader operation: A-10 Warthog, F-16s, two Black Hawk helicopters (Pave Hawks), and two C-130s were reportedly lost, with speculation about additional losses. They discuss the Pentagon’s statements about casualties and the possibility that other aircraft losses were connected to a rescue attempt for a downed pilot. They estimate several U.S. airframes lost in the effort to recover one pilot and discuss the high costs and risks of attempting CSAR (combat search and rescue). - The speakers reflect on the status of U.S. combat leadership and the debates surrounding purges of senior officers. One guest emphasizes that the fired leaders (Hodney and Randy George) were not operational decision-makers for Iran and argues the purge appears political rather than war-related, describing it as part of a broader pattern of politicization of the senior ranks. - They discuss the Israeli war effort, noting significant strain from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and questions about Israel’s manpower and reserve mobilization. They mention reports that 300,000 reservists have been activated and talk of an additional 400,000 being considered. The discussion touches on claims that Israel is attacking Iranian negotiating participants and how the U.S. could be drawn into a broader conflict. They critique the Israeli military’s leadership structure, arguing that young officers with limited experience lead a reserve-based force, which they view as contributing to questionable battlefield performance. - The Iranian strategy is analyzed as aiming to break U.S. control in the Persian Gulf and to compel adversaries to negotiate by threatening or constraining energy flows. The guests detail Iran’s actions: targeting oil facilities and ports around Haifa and Tel Aviv, Damona (near the suspected nuclear sites), and claims of missiles hitting a major building in Haifa. They describe widespread civilian disruption in Israel (bomb shelters, subway tents) and emphasize the vulnerability of Israel given its manpower challenges and reliance on U.S. and Western support. - The broader strategic landscape is assessed: Iran’s goal to control the Gulf and oil, with potential consequences for global energy markets, shipping costs, and the international economy. They discuss how Iran’s actions may integrate with China and Russia, including potential shifts in currency use (yuan) for trade and new financial arrangements, such as Deutsche Bank offering Chinese bonds. - They discuss the economic and geopolitical ripple effects beyond the battlefield: rising U.S. fuel prices (gas increasing sharply in parts of the U.S., including Florida), potential airline disruptions, and the broader risk to European energy security as sanctions and alternative energy pathways come under stress. They note that Europe’s energy strategies and alliances may be forced to adapt, potentially shifting energy flows to China or Russia, and the possibility of Europe’s economy suffering from disrupted energy supplies. - Toward the end, the speakers acknowledge the difficulty of stopping escalation and the need for major powers to negotiate new terms for the post-unipolar order. They caution that reconciliations are unlikely in the near term, warning of the potential for a broader conflict if leaders do not find a path away from continued escalation. They close with a somewhat pessimistic view, acknowledging that even if the war ends soon, the economic ramifications will be long-lasting. They joke that, at minimum, they’ll have more material to discuss next week, given Trump’s actions.

Syed Mohamed Marandi discusses the collapse of the Islamabad negotiations and the wider implications of the current U.S.-Iran confrontation. - On what happened in Islamabad: Iran participated despite low expectations, aiming to show willingness to resolve the crisis if Americans are reasonable and to ensure the world sees Iran’s efforts. The Iranians believed the United States lacked will to make progress. During talks there was some progress on various issues, but near the end the United States shifted to a hard line on the nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Vance claimed Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, a claim Marandi notes was contradicted by former counterintelligence official Joe Kent’s resignation letter. Netanyahu reportedly maintains direct influence, with Vance reporting to Netanyahu daily, which Iran views as undermining an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on control and “being the boss” is presented as a central obstacle to any deal. The ceasefire in Lebanon was touted as failing, with Netanyahu and Trump accused of conspiring to wreck it, and Iran’s actions after the ceasefire aligned with this view. The Iranian delegation flew back by land after the flight to Tehran was diverted, reflecting the perceived danger and the Washington Post piece calling for the murder of negotiators. Iran’s approach is framed as attempting to resolve the problem while signaling willingness to negotiate if U.S. policy becomes reasonable. - On the blockade and its consequences: The U.S. blockade on Iranian ports has just begun and will likely worsen the global economic crisis, pushing more countries to oppose the United States. China is angry as Washington dictates terms against oil and trade in the region. The blockade could be used to strangle China’s energy supplies, creating a double-edged impact by simultaneously worsening the global crisis and pressuring U.S. allies. Iran says it may respond by striking ships in the Red Sea and blocking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman if the blockade continues. Iran notes it has substantial financial resilience from oil sales at higher prices without middlemen, with about 100 million barrels left to sell after selling half of its declared oil stock, and it views energy shortages as likely to trigger broader economic disruption, including shortages of helium, LNG, and fertilizers. - On war readiness and possible outcomes: Iran anticipates a major assault and is preparing defenses and offensive capabilities. Iran argues negotiations were not taken seriously by the United States and believes the U.S. is buying time. Iran would view victories as having the United States back down, preserving Iran’s rights, and protecting its regional allies, with a long-term ceasefire. Iran contends it should control the Strait of Hormuz to prevent future aggression and seeks compensation for damages caused by the conflict, emphasizing sovereignty over Hormuz and peace for Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran states that if the U.S. and its regional proxies strike, Iran would respond by targeting energy and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. - On broader geopolitical shifts and regional dynamics: Marandi argues the current crisis accelerates a move toward a multipolar world, with the United States’ hegemonic position eroding. The UAE is portrayed as pushing for war, while other Gulf states are increasingly wary. He predicts a possible land invasion of Iran, but emphasizes Iran’s long-term preparedness and resilience. Weather and terrain are cited as factors likely to complicate a potential U.S. invasion, particularly in the hot summer conditions of the region. - On potential definitions of “victory”: Iran’s victory would involve U.S. backing down, Iran preserving its rights, a long-term ceasefire, and sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. A broader victory would see the end of supremacism in Palestine and the end of genocidal actions in Lebanon, with peace across the region as a key objective. The discussion ends with the notion that a shift toward an American focus on its republic, rather than empire, would benefit global stability.

Afshan Rutansi hosts New Order, a program touting a global view of how India and its allies sit at the center of a transformation in world history. The episode centers on the Trump administration’s war against Iran and its wider regional and global consequences, claiming the conflict has killed, wounded, or displaced over a million people from Iran to Lebanon to the South Caucasus, with the global South paying for shortages of fertilizer, fuel, food, and medicines as the Strait of Hormuz is mined and contested. The discussion also touches on Iran’s targeting of Israel’s nuclear program and Israel’s targeting of Iran’s nuclear reactor, and references the IEA’s view that Trump-era energy crises are worse than the 1970s oil shocks. The panel notes Pakistan’s perceived threat after Iran, and a claim by a former US DNI that Pakistan might be a concern if the US touches its WMD program. India, as this year’s chair of BRICS, says it will not broker peace between the USA and Iran. Dennis Kucinich, a former US congressman from Ohio who gave 155 speeches in the US Congress against war with Iran, joins the show. He has run for the Democratic presidential nomination twice and led RFK Jr.’s 2024 campaign. He describes the war as a “catastrophe, a circus of miscalculation,” and says Iran could be “the graveyard of the American empire.” He criticizes the US for bombing Iran while negotiations were ongoing, killing a negotiator and, with Israel, continuing bombing, and notes the death toll approaching 2,000 Iranians. He asserts that the USInduced negotiations to give up enriched uranium were under way, then bombed Iran, undermining diplomacy. He states there was “no imminent threat,” citing testimony by Joe Kent, a former official in the directorate of national intelligence, who resigned and described the threat as non-existent, and argues that the US strategy is to dominate the Middle East’s energy, currency, and trade. Kucinich argues that the war has led to higher oil and LNG prices, greater military spending in the Gulf, more fragile shipping routes, and increasing alignments with Iran and anti-western economic partners. He contends the global South bears a disproportionate burden from higher food, fuel, and grain prices, and that ordinary Americans are affected as well. He rejects the idea of neutral broker roles, noting India’s attempt to avoid binary alignment and maintain channels with both the US and Iran, arguing India’s BRICS leadership seeks de-escalation, energy security, and stability in food and fertilizer prices. On the broader strategic landscape, Kucinich says there is no real strategy to this war, only an attempt to capture supplies and control the oil market, with petrodollar dominance challenged by BRICS’ move toward local currencies. He predicts higher oil and food prices, inflation, and greater difficulty for the United States to maintain its global position, calling for the removal of bases in the Middle East. He references the “March of Folly” and suggests the new world order will follow, but not the one envisioned by current leaders. The latter portion shifts to viewer questions with Zara Khan, addressing whether BRICS will revive the UN, the nature of the January 2026 Iranian protests, and media portrayals of Iranian casualties. The discussion reaffirms skepticism toward Western media narratives, the CIA’s alleged role in provocations, and questions about international law amid perceptions of a US-led invasion. The program closes by inviting viewer engagement on whether India should maintain neutrality.

Einar Tangin and Glenn discuss the forthcoming Xi Jinping–Donald Trump meeting and the broader strategic landscape shaping U.S.–China competition. - On the Trump–Xi meeting: Tangin expects very little substantive outcome. China’s strategy toward the United States is to keep engagement open rather than push Trump into a corner, despite Trump’s past actions and their consequences. He notes a narrow scope to be discussed in a California meeting, with Trump volunteers unprepared and pushing “the usual maximist stuff.” China is signaling that Taiwan will be a red line. Beyond that, the Chinese may accept limited concessions such as grain, gas, or oil purchases, but no sweeping arrangements. The overall takeaway: continued engagement, but not a game-changing breakthrough. - U.S. energy and global strategy: Tangin argues the United States uses energy as a tool of influence, aiming to control access and shape markets (the petrodollar legacy, strategic chokepoints). The Ukraine war has accelerated Europe’s decoupling from Russia and the U.S. seeks to expand similar dynamics in East Asia. He emphasizes that the energy game is dynamic: oil prices impact inflation, and long-term, demand destruction and a shift to alternatives (electricity, renewables) will reshape markets. He points to new energy tech and scale: batteries and storage (CATL’s battery capacity) enable large-scale decoupling from fossil fuels; China’s plans to deploy up to 50 nuclear plants at a time and to pursue commercially available fusion power could transform the energy landscape. The U.S. may face higher exploration costs and geopolitical risk in sustaining high oil output, while heavy reliance on fossil fuels could erode long-term economic viability. - Global consequences and who bears the pain: In the short term, countries without reserves (notably parts of the Global South, including India) will face fertilizer and diesel shortages during planting seasons, with potential 15–25% yield reductions and elevated inflation. Food security risks loom as energy costs ripple through fertilizer, transport, processing, and farming inputs. The analysis highlights fertilizer nitrogen production’s energy intensity and the cascading nature of energy in food supply chains. The discussion stresses that global south economies will be hit hardest early on, with food and fuel inflation compounding social and political pressure. - The Iran war and maritime strategy: The discussion connects the Persian Gulf crisis to broader blockades and maritime competition. A naval blockade approach risks escalation and confrontation with China, which has extensive trade links through ASEAN and other partners that would be harmed by disruption. Tangin notes that China cannot be easily forced into combat in Europe or the Middle East; any escalation involving tactical nuclear use would be dangerous. He suggests that Europe’s elites may push for confrontation against Russia, but the political climate and energy constraints could destabilize Western allies and push towards alternative alignments, particularly with China. - China’s strategic posture and alternative world order: Tangin emphasizes that China has a model that emphasizes no ideology between states, sovereignty, and mutual non-interference, echoing a Westphalian framework. He describes China’s global governance concept as a peer-to-peer, negotiation-centered approach, where disputes are settled at the table rather than through force. He frames China’s proposition as simple: “No more ideology between countries. Every country should be secure. Security should not depend on the insecurity of another country. Every country has the right to choose its own path of development.” This is presented as a peaceful, governance-based alternative to U.S.-led hegemony. - Europe’s strategic crossroads and the future: Europe faces existential economic strains, competitiveness challenges, and the temptation of isolationist or right-wing governance. The conversation predicts prolonged political volatility if energy prices and inflation persist, with potential swings between different leaderships. China’s strategy, in this vision, is to promote internal diversification and consumption-led growth while engaging with international partners on a governance framework that reduces the incentives for confrontation. - Concluding note: The speakers agree that Europe’s willingness to embrace China’s model, rather than clinging to a confrontational U.S.-led paradigm, could shape a more stable global order. They caution that the old order has ended, and creative destruction is underway, with China advocating a negotiated, governance-based path forward.

Professor Michael Hudson and Glenn discuss how the war against Iran is reshaping the global economy and international order. Hudson contends this is World War III in the sense that energy, fertilizer, and oil exports are fundamental to the world economy, and the conflict targets these choke points. He notes a recent US stock market rally of about a thousand points, driven by hopes of reversibility, while insisting the war’s effects extend far beyond Iran and are irreversible. He asserts the US is waging a war to maintain control over the world oil economy by preventing any sovereignty that could export oil outside US influence. This includes sanctions on Iran and Russia, and earlier sanctions on Venezuela, with the aim of ensuring oil proceeds flow to US-controlled channels. He argues the US sought to control the Strait of Hormuz to decide who gets Gulf oil, but Trump’s advisers warned that attempting to seize Hormuz would leave troops as “sitting ducks,” yet the underlying goal remains “grab the oil.” He claims Iran’s objective is to guarantee security by removing all US bases in the Middle East and by relief of sanctions imposed by US allies; without that, Iran claims the world will not return to the previous order. Hudson emphasizes that the war disrupts key supply chains: oil, fertilizer, helium, sulfur, and related inputs. Although Iran allows oil exports via Hormuz for payments, it does not permit fertilizer exports, impacting the upcoming planting season. He forecasts the world entering the most serious depression since the 1930s due to these interruptions and the consequent financial ripples. On the financial system, Hudson explains that since the 2008 crisis, the US pursued zero or near-zero interest rates to rescue banks, enabling asset price inflation in real estate, stocks, and bonds. He describes a shift where non-bank lenders and private equity could borrow cheaply and buy up assets, creating a debt-led, Ponzi-like dynamic that depended on continued access to credit and rising asset prices. As long as rates stayed low, this system could keep rolling; now, with 10-year treasuries around 4.5 percent and 30-year mortgages above 5 percent, the cost of rolling over debt intensifies. The war-induced disruptions to energy and inputs threaten defaults and a feedback loop of debt collapse, catalyzing a depression. Regarding the broader international system, Hudson argues Europe is following sanctions on Russia at great economic cost, with Germany already experiencing GDP declines after energy sanctions in 2022. Europe’s shift away from Russian energy, the Ukraine-Hungary/gas dynamics, and the broader energy choke points threaten the cohesion of NATO and the EU. He predicts Europe may suffer consumer price increases and living standard cuts as deficits expand to subsidize heating and energy, leading to a reordering of alliances and economic blocs. He characterizes Asia–Russia–China as increasingly separate from Western systems, with a shift toward Asia as the growth center and Europe/US lagging. He asserts the West’s operational vocabulary frames the conflict as a clash of civilizations, but the underlying dynamic is a clash of classes, where the US seeks to subordinate others through energy and trade controls. Hudson argues the current trajectory signals not simply a decline but an abrupt systemic change: the end of the postwar Western-led order. He calls for rethinking international institutions and law, including a new framework to replace a discredited United Nations and to organize economic and military arrangements that protect sovereignty outside US-dominated systems. He highlights the need for energy and food self-sufficiency to resist weaponized foreign trade and to avoid being drawn into US-imposed economic chaos. In closing, Hudson points to Britain’s looming non-viability under deindustrialization and limited energy resources, illustrating how advanced economies may struggle to adapt to a new multipolar order.

Speaker 0 expresses concern that Iran’s escalation leads to automatic draft registration and that many people voted against the Biden administration and Kamala Harris because of floated draft ideas for Russia. They reference a report on Liberty Report about this automatic involuntary draft registration. Speaker 1 describes the NDAA as a must-pass bill that often includes dangerous language. He says the bill will automatically register young men aged 18 to 26 for the draft and create a database, removing any choice about whether to register or not. He argues this presumes the government owns you and your body, equating it to slavery. He contends that if a war is unpopular or unconstitutional, people will still be forced to register. He notes a belief that the current war is obviously unconstitutional and asserts confidence in young Americans defending their country if attacked, though he questions whether an attack has occurred. Speaker 2 counters that the threat is not existential from Iran, but argues it comes from elsewhere, including issues at the southern border. He reframes the concern as domestic rather than a direct external threat from Iran. Speaker 3 agrees and adds that the U.S. lacks a sufficiently large army due to prior cuts and a focus on exotic weapons and a large surface fleet. He contends the army is too small to project power, and any ground invasion into the Middle East would face immediate, formidable opposition, including precision missiles and drones, making a conventional ground war implausible. He criticizes naval power’s utility in modern conflicts and suggests an invasion would be impractical. Speaker 2 asks for more detail about Karg Island, a strategic island off Iran’s coast, noting 90% of oil flows through Iran from that area. He mentions talk among Trump administration officials about capturing the island and asks how the U.S. could secure it. Speaker 3 explains that much of the oil from Karg Island goes to India, China, Japan, and South Korea; destroying or occupying the island would require moving ground forces and crossing water, which would be extremely dangerous. He warns that destroying oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf would lead Iran to target refineries, drilling rigs, and storage tanks, and notes that Gulf States heavily rely on desalination plants. He cautions that destroying these plants could cause mass death and devastate Gulf economies. He adds that the Israelis previously struck a desalination plant in Iran, which would amplify consequences for regional economies. Speaker 0 asks how the public should feel about the conflict, noting that the government started it on false pretenses and that the country’s leaders and military performance have been disappointing. They seek guidance on how to view the situation and how to respond. Speaker 1 expresses domestic concern about a potential false flag, citing FBI warnings that Iran may have launched attack drones off the West Coast, suggesting a false flag could be used to erode civil liberties. Speaker 2 agrees with the false-flag concern and notes that Israel has a history of false flags and mentions events in Azerbaijan and Turkey. He emphasizes the need for Americans to understand the consequences of U.S. actions for people in the region and to push the president and administration to stop inflammatory language. Speaker 3 clarifies that Iranian officials have instructed contacts in the Western Hemisphere not to harm the United States, arguing that causing harm would benefit Israel. He concedes that false-flag analysis is plausible but unlikely in the long run, and stresses the importance of public awareness of consequences and maintaining peaceful regional relations after the war ends.

The discussion argues that India is paying a price for being a US ally. It claims that, not long ago, Trump imposed about a 50% tariff on India and attempted to dictate which energy India could buy or sell from Russia. Later, the US reversed this after needing oil prices to go lower, un-sanctioning Russian oil that India was purchasing. The speaker says that Modi or other Indian leaders would be frustrated by trying to ally with the United States. The conversation then focuses on fertilizer and food costs. The speaker states that the Indian government subsidizes fertilizer costs for farmers to keep end prices low. They claim that Israel is effectively cost-shifting by ensuring the war continues and sabotages peace deals, creating an ongoing need to subsidize higher fertilizer prices to prevent starvation. The response agrees that India will face fertilizer shortages and that subsidies may not cover total costs, so the Indian government will bear a huge expense that ultimately comes out of ordinary people’s pockets. The speaker adds that rising oil costs and shortages of diesel and LNG are worsening the situation. The transcript also reports survey-based claims: according to polls shared by Indian colleagues, most Indians oppose Trump and have become critical of the Israeli regime compared to a year ago. The speakers say this is likely to get worse as fertilizer shortages continue into 2027. One speaker, identifying as a food scientist running a food laboratory, says their published projections show some level of famine in marginalized countries including Bangladesh and Yemen, and potentially India, with Somalia and Egypt also affected. The speakers then discuss whether countries will blame political leaders. They say it is already happening that global public opinion has turned against the Israeli regime, and that as economic conditions deteriorate, anger and hostility will increasingly target the Israeli regime and the United States, since Trump is US president and the economic effects reflect broadly on the country. Finally, they argue the US is paying a heavy price militarily and economically and that its international reputation is being damaged due to the war. They reference the resignation of Joe Kent, the Trump-appointed counter-terrorism chief, who resigned at the beginning of the war; the resignation letter is described as stating that Iran was not developing a nuclear weapon, not a threat to the US, and that the war is about the Israeli/Zionist regime rather than something carried out for the American people. They conclude that as things worsen in the US, people will blame Trump, Netanyahu, and the Zionist lobby, and that the war’s costs and ongoing genocide are driving hostility worldwide.

Speaker 1 argues that the outcome mentioned in the headline is already baked in due to the lack of energy and fertilizer coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. He notes we are in week nine of the conflict, and there doesn’t appear to be a solution in sight. If the conflict lasts a few more months, it becomes catastrophic on a global scale. The countries most impacted will not be the United States but nations that already have tens of millions on the edge of famine, including Sudan and Yemen. Egypt is close to that category, and India and Bangladesh will also have a lot of difficulty. He explains that Bangladesh has its own nitrogen production plants but relies on imported natural gas to produce nitrogen. Two of Qatar Energy’s 14 natural gas trains, which are production pipelines, are out of commission for three to five years, taking 17% of Qatar Energy’s gas offline. The Haber-Bosch chemical process, which turns gas into ammonia and then into urea and other nitrogenous fertilizers, underpins this. Therefore, the world is already going to face starvation of millions in 2027, and that number could grow to tens of millions or even hundreds of millions if the Strait of Hormuz is not open soon. Speaker 0 asks for a global explanation of how the food system works and why countries depend on inputs from abroad. Speaker 1 responds that about 8,000,000,000 people globally, or roughly 4,000,000,000 or more, live today because of the Haber-Bosch process that turns hydrocarbons into ammonia and then nitrogenous fertilizers. If the supply chain is lost, and while not all natural gas comes from the Strait of Hormuz, a large amount—25% or more—comes from there for fertilizer production. The destruction of Nord Stream pipelines affected BASF (BASF is a German company) which produced nitrogenous fertilizers from Russian gas, and that cut off years ago. China and Russia have now halted all exports of fertilizers, including to India, which asked China for emergency fertilizer and was told that China needs it for its own populations. The bottom line is that not only is the natural gas feedstock being cut off that would normally feed 4,000,000,000 of the 8,000,000,000 on the planet, but countries are becoming more nationalized with their supplies, leaving vulnerable countries like Bangladesh, Thailand, and India hanging in the wind.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the escalating tensions over Iran and the possibility of drastic military action. He notes that President Trump says the deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz and negotiate a ceasefire is tomorrow, and that if they don’t, “the entire country will be taken out in one night,” raising questions about whether a nuclear weapon is at the ready. The discussion suggests that Trump’s line may be hyperbolic, with Speaker 1 positing that a nuclear weapon is unlikely and that conventional methods or power-grid disruption could be used to “take out the entire country” without permanently ending the war. He invokes George Kennan’s view on nuclear weapons and argues the goal is not to wage a nuclear exchange but to disrupt Iran’s energy infrastructure; he questions whether such measures would be permanent or decisive. The conversation shifts to censorship and satellite imagery. Speaker 2 reports that Planet Labs received a U.S. request to blackout images in and around Iran dating back to March 6, possibly earlier, with threats of sanctions if companies don’t comply. The panel discusses how to verify reality amid conflicting signals. The panel turns to a tactical assessment of potential actions around the Strait of Hormuz. Speaker 1 predicts Trump would pursue a coordinated air force and naval air strikes aimed at destroying petrochemical plants and energy infrastructure to deprive the government of power, though he doubts this would alter the strategic outcome given Iran’s continental capacity and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities. He explains Iran’s ability to use satellites and strike systems to counter, and notes Iran’s large force structure within the country. He warns that even if power is disrupted, Iran can respond and that the Gulf states would be affected due to a loss of energy and desalination capacity, potentially threatening regional stability and the Gulf’s populations. The discussion broadens to regional dynamics and Israel. Speaker 2 cites Trump’s remark about scrapping the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal to prioritize Israel, suggesting this shift contributed to the current conflict. Speaker 1 argues the global economy could enter a depression, highlighting how energy, plastics, fertilizer, and feedstock shortages would ripple through the Global South, Japan, Korea, and Europe as energy prices rise and supply chains falter. He asserts that oil is a global commodity and that a price rise worldwide is likely; he predicts a stock market crash and a long-term energy system rebuild. The hosts pivot to financial consequences and media appeals, with Speaker 0 promoting gold and silver investments through Lear Capital, citing Ed Dowd’s view on panic buying and shortages of fertilizer and energy, and predicting higher prices. The discussion notes a claim that about $42 billion has been spent on the conflict so far, with spending accelerating. On leadership and assessment of U.S. strategy, Speaker 1 raises concerns about President Trump’s current mental acuity and notes that some U.S. leaders are calling for a 60-day limit on hostilities without a formal declaration of war. He argues that Israel’s aims dominate the U.S. stance, complicating potential compromises with Iran and wider regional settlements. He asserts Israel seeks to expand its influence and dominance in the region, which undermines potential settlements and constrains U.S. options. In Israel, Speaker 1 explains that Hezbollah is not out of action and has launched rockets into Northern Israel; Israeli public unrest and evacuation patterns hint at severe internal strain. He contends that Israel relies heavily on U.S. support, which could be leveraged for broader regional aims, but may be unsustainable given regional opposition to Israel’s expansion. He suggests Arab populations and governing elites in the Gulf and Egypt grow discontent with Western-backed leadership. Finally, the panel probes the potential use of ground forces and the plausibility of a doomsday scenario, with Speaker 1 arguing that a large, sustained ground operation in the Gulf is unlikely to change the outcome without comprehensive disruption of Iranian strike systems and satellite networks. He emphasizes that a nuclear option would be catastrophic, and expresses concern about Israeli actions and regional reactions, including possible involvement by Russia, China, and other powers. Colonel MacGregor closes by pointing readers to his Substack for ongoing strategic analysis and reiterates the anticipated economic and geopolitical upheaval from the conflict.

Speaker 0 contends that the world economy is severely damaged and worsening, blaming Israel’s influence, Trump’s policies, and BlackRock. They say Trump reversed the downturn but that his current behavior worsens the situation, describing him as a degenerate gambler who keeps betting with the people’s money. They warn that the global economy is being sunk by these decisions and that any recovery would be unlikely if he does not shut down the current course. Speaker 1 argues a simple plan: Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon and they won’t have one. They claim the president didn’t want to go that far, but there is no pressure from elsewhere. They assert victory will come, stating that militarily they have already achieved a complete victory in theory, with Iran’s navy effectively nullified and ships sunk by the U.S. They emphasize Iran’s strategy hinges on closing the Strait of Hormuz, not their blue-water navy. They note Iran has now made larger financial demands—a claim of $500,000,000,000 in reparations—describing these as part of a broader disaster. They accuse globalists and BlackRock of engineering the war to derail the Trump recovery, leading to inflation, fertilizer shortages, and a planetary downturn. They say there is no way to reverse this and warn that threats of further strikes against Iran could worsen the situation. They also accuse media and political figures of misrepresenting the war’s trajectory, and criticize those who supported the war for claiming to have been right. They suggest the debt situation is dire, with the national debt approaching or exceeding GDP in service, calling this a banana republic scenario. They describe a coming period of permanent austerity and a “great reset” via a central bank digital currency system, and contrast this with the supposed prior plan that could have rebuilt the economy. Speaker 2 adds that the United States holds all the cards if escalation occurs, but the goal is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and restore open access without mines in the water or tolls. They emphasize the aim to return to the previous open state of the strait. Throughout, Speaker 0 revisits earlier warnings about the start of the war, insisting Schmoyle (Schmoy/ Schmoyle) had warned this would derail the global recovery. They recall personal discussions with Tucker Carlson about Trump’s assessment of the war’s consequences, noting that Trump claimed “everything I do always turns out okay,” even as the analyst contends the consequences have been severe. They reiterate that the “globalist trap” and the Iran war were designed to undermine the U.S. and world economy, with the goal of bringing about a prolonged austerity and a global cashless system. They describe demonstrably worsening indicators—stocks, oil, and rates rising; inflation accelerating; fertilizer shortages; and a deepening recession—arguing these dynamics confirm the planned malaise. They reference headlines about inflation, the Iran confrontation, and potential sleeper cells, and they criticize the left, Democrats, neocons, and “MAGA knob polishers” for supporting the war. They reiterate that the globalists’ objective is to derail the U.S. and Western economies and to push toward a controlled, austerity-driven global order, while claiming the administration’s responses are failing to reverse the trend.

Ken Griffin, CEO of Citadel, warned that energy costs will lead to a global recession. Jeff Curry of the Carlyle Group said we are in a deficit for oil in the United States, and once shortages hit, “it's game over.” He stated he’s never seen anything like this. The discussion continued with a guest predicting that Europe could hit “tank bottoms” in May and the US around July 4, with inventory numbers acting like sharks circling a beach in the movie Jaws. They defined a deficit as demand above supply and inventories being drawn, with shortages not yet global but appearing in Asia, while Europe and the United States were in a deficit and would not hit shortages until tank bottoms. The panel emphasized the immediacy of the situation, noting that the fin of the inventory numbers signals risk. Colonel Douglas MacGregor joined to discuss the energy shock in the context of the war with Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. He reported that in India, oil was $118 a barrel and jet fuel over $250 a barrel, predicting airlines would go under. Distillates, LPG, LNG, and other fuels would be at premium prices, with all energy forms becoming more expensive. He warned that if fertilizer doesn’t move and feedstock doesn’t arrive, crops won’t grow and livestock won’t eat; if fuel doesn’t flow, trucks won’t run, and diesel is in short supply. He argued the situation is driven by “the stupidity in the Persian Gulf” and criticized Secretary Rubio for advocating free flow of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, noting that that was the status quo before attacking Iran. The hosts and guests discussed popular sentiment against further military action, with social feeds showing resistance to engaging Iran further. The conversation drew a comparison to Vietnam, highlighting that the public perception of the war has shifted, and questioned who governs the United States. They argued that the government derives its legitimate power from the consent of the governed, not foreign interests, and criticized a State of the Union moment about Iran having to never have a nuclear weapon as pandering. The question arose: if Trump succeeds with no new wars and Iran remains Nuclear, how would that be viewed? One participant remarked that Iran having its own nuclear power would support its people, while noting a prior claim that the US “blew their nuclear weapons last.” The dialogue explored the reality that both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, and North Korea’s deterrence is shaped by statements from China and Russia about consequences of using nuclear weapons. Iran developing a nuclear capability was framed as Iran’s business, given it has not opened a war against anyone for two hundred years. The future was described as a multipolar world with resource sovereignty and energy self-reliance becoming central; Europe, according to the panel, would struggle with “resource sovereignty” and access to cheap energy and credit, while Africa and Europe would shift alignments, and rare earths and critical minerals in the Arctic could alter dynamics. The panel warned that cheap energy and cheap credit have been eroded, inflation would rise, and the private equity and banking sectors would face liquidity issues. The discussion concluded with a sobering outlook: if the United States withdraws from the region on humanitarian grounds, Israel would be unhappy, and the war’s current trajectory could be sustained or escalated. The hosts urged viewers to wake up to the mounting economic and geopolitical pressures, and to reverse course.

The U.S. and Israel are negotiating a proposed 20-year security aid pact to replace a current 10-year memorandum of understanding that expires in 2028. Israel hopes the new agreement will provide at least as much as, or more than, the previous $4 billion per year. Negotiations paused amid Israel’s genocide campaign in Gaza and restarted with an aim for closure within a year, while the White House remains quiet. Israeli officials and Israel lobby groups such as APAC present the effort as innovative “outside the box” thinking, but the transcript frames it as a subsidy for Israel’s defense sector funded by U.S. taxpayers, enriching Israeli firms while offering scant returns to America. The transcript describes Israel’s economy as under strain, citing a “zombie economy” conclusion by Israeli economists including Dr. Sherever. It attributes strain to foreign investment and loans, and lists vulnerabilities including BDS impact reducing foreign investment, a tech sector collapse with a stated 90% drop in tech investments, tourism “virtually stopped,” port damage and bankruptcy (Elot Port declared bankruptcy in 2024), and weapons dependency. It states Israel buys weapons from the U.S. using U.S. taxpayer money but depends on European supply chains facing sanctions. It also cites Israel’s economic contraction in Q2 2025 after a stated 12-day war with Iran in June: GDP shrinkage of 3.5% annually and 0.9% quarterly, with major components falling, including a 12.3% drop in investment and a 4.1% decline in private consumption; exports down 12% and imports down 3.5%. The Bank of Israel is said to have lowered its 2025 growth forecast to 3.3%. In 2024, the transcript claims Israel ran the largest budget deficit as genocide in Gaza and a shrinking economy widened the gap between spending and revenue collection. It then focuses on the “U.S.-Israel Defense Partnership Act” (S.554 and H.R.1229), sponsored in the Senate by Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska) and Gary Peters (D-Michigan), and in the House by Joe Wilson (R-SC) and Donald Norcross (D-NJ). The transcript describes the act as shifting from straightforward military handouts to cooperative research, development, testing and evaluation in fields including artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, quantum computing, robotics, and automation. It claims the U.S. is giving Israel access to U.S. technological supremacy while Israel repackages U.S. technology as “Israel innovation” under U.S. taxpayer funding. The transcript describes proposed creation of a defense innovation unit office inside Israel, funded at $50 million yearly, as well as Israel’s admission into the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB), described as granting strategic benefits such as streamlined access to cutting-edge U.S. military technology and dual-use items and eased international traffic and arms/export regulations (ITAR and EAR). It cites U.S. intelligence officials indicating high levels of Israeli political, military, and economic espionage in the U.S. for decades and says the U.S. has not fully trusted Israel for highly integrated initiatives like NTIB. It also claims NDA provisions in 2024 established a working group and that the 2026 NDA provides additional authorization and funding for the working group, building Israel’s military capability under the guise of U.S. stockpiles. The transcript further claims the agreement expands and extends placement of U.S. military stockpiles in Israel. A related “Bunker Buster Act” is described as requiring the U.S. to build bunker-buster capability in Israel for Israeli use with U.S. taxpayer money, stating the bunker-buster technology belongs to the U.S. until Israel wants to use it. It lists proposed annual amounts for RDT&E for unmanned systems countermeasures ($150 million), anti-tunnel technology ($80 million), and drone defense ($75 million). The transcript claims these measures build on prior “grifts,” citing Israel’s Iron Beam. It alleges U.S. Army provision of tactical high energy laser capabilities in 1996, with Israel having little to provide at the time, followed by a program cancellation in 2006 and later phases leading to Iron Beam. It states Congress and the Biden administration gave Israel $1.2 billion to procure Iron Beam from Rafael and Elbit, and claims U.S. taxpayers also funded Israeli companies’ development through $500 million annual cooperative R&D appropriations, with the original technology coming from the U.S. It argues the outcome leaves the U.S. taxpayer as the primary loser through diversion of public funds and subsequent transfer of proprietary U.S. technology to Israeli firms that can profit and potentially market to strategic competitors such as China. Finally, it describes a “propaganda campaign” and political influence apparatus led by APAC and “27 other Israel lobby groups,” combining media efforts (including the Salem Media Group and “The Aaron Mullen Show,” featuring an interview where Benjamin Netanyahu tries to sell the agreement) and a stated Hizbollah propaganda budget of $726 million for targeting the West in 2026. It claims that when combined with $150 million for 2025 plus an October supplemental of $40 million, the total approaches $1 billion, excluding additional funds funneled into political campaigns to influence Congress toward the U.S.-Israel Defense Partnership Act.