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Speaker 1 discusses the human cost of Venezuelan and regional instability, noting that Venezuelan people have suffered and that many Hondurans have migrated due to conditions in their own country. He argues that the opposition in Venezuela had been winning elections, but the regime led by Maduro “stole every election,” stating that they have a copy of poll results on the cloud and that the government did not want to see them because they knew they lost. He attributes a high death toll in Honduras to drug trafficking flowing through their country, largely coming from Venezuela, and asserts that the U.S. framework designating drug trafficking as terrorism is justified because the flow of drugs harms the United States and Honduras, causing bloodshed and economic damage. He claims that illegal drug flight and sea routes brought jobs to Honduras but also bloodshed, and that the highest number of lives lost in fifteen years in Honduras occurred due to these drugs. Speaker 0 asks about the stance on U.S. intervention, whether intervention is sometimes warranted, as with Maduro, or if there should be no U.S. intervention in Latin America regardless of administration. He notes that Maduro’s regime has involved U.S. military actions and leadership changes, with claims that the U.S. bombed Venezuela, captured Maduro, killed members of his government, and sent him to jail, a situation some view positively while others see as a breach of international law. Speaker 1 responds from a human perspective, emphasizing the suffering of Venezuelan and regional populations and the mass migration from these countries. He argues that Maduro’s regime stole elections and contrasts this with the citizens’ desire for democracy. He states that the Trump administration’s framework to label drug trafficking as terrorism has implications for Honduras and other neighboring countries affected by drug flows, corruption, and violence. He suggests that President Trump confronted a long-standing attempt by Venezuela and its allies to influence elections in the region, and he asserts that Maduro should be given a chance to defend himself in a trial. He acknowledges sovereignty concerns but argues that many people worldwide do not understand what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. He concludes that intervention decisions depend on whether there is another way to save Venezuela and notes the broader regional consequences of the Venezuelan crisis.

The discussion centers on a tense moment over Iran, with President Trump issuing an ultimatum to Iran: come to the table for a new nuclear agreement or the United States will hit Iran again, with the next strike described as far worse than the last. An armada led by the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln is reportedly moving toward Iran, framed as a ready-to-go force for a potential rapid strike if necessary. The hosts question whether this is genuine leverage for negotiations or a countdown to war. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter joins to analyze the buildup. Ritter argues that Trump has backed down twice before in decisive engagement with Iran, citing the downing of a Global Hawk and the aborted bombing in support of protesters. He suggests that what is unfolding is part of a broader campaign strategy, including economic pressure that led to protests in Iran, which he attributes to Mossad and CIA-controlled agitators during a “shaking the tree” phase. He contends that Israel has signaled the next strike against Iran must be the last, and believes the planned attack would be a full-spectrum assault involving air strikes, cyberattacks, and support for CIA/Mossad-backed groups inside Iran to dismantle the government quickly. Ritter claims Iran will respond with cyber warfare and possibly shut down critical infrastructure and temporarily seize control of the Strait of Hormuz; he predicts the result would be severe consequences for the region and the United States, including economic fallout. He asserts that Iran will not back down on its nuclear program, characterizing negotiations as unacceptable to Iran and linking Iran’s enrichment program to national pride and existential survival. He also argues that the United States is acting in support of Israel, with Trump’s actions influenced by Israeli money and policy, and labels Iran as not pursuing a nuclear weapons program at this time—though 60% enrichment shortens timelines and complicates intelligence efforts. Ritter emphasizes that Congress should declare war, not the president, and warns that the United States could lose an aircraft carrier and suffer broader devastation if conflict escalates. He also critiques the characterizations of Iran as imminently threatening, arguing that the preemption narrative is not supported by imminent threat criteria and suggesting diplomacy and restraint are warranted. The conversation then shifts to US preemption rhetoric and the role of Congress. A speaker argues that the baseline presence of 30,000–40,000 American troops in the region, within range of Iranian missiles and UAVs, requires a credible defensive posture. They criticize Marco Rubio for framing preemption as legitimate self-defense, noting that Article 51 of the UN Charter allows preemption only for imminent threat and that such immediacy is not demonstrated. The discussion suggests a need for congressional scrutiny and potential impeachment if war is pursued without proper authorization. On nuclear questions, Ritter shares his intelligence assessment: Iran is not currently pursuing a nuclear weapons program and has not reconstituted a full enrichment program, though 60% uranium enrichment represents a concern. He asserts that while Iran is capable of cyber warfare, a broader strike against Iran would likely trigger significant retaliation, including against Israel, which he describes as vulnerable to Iranian missiles. The dialogue moves to Cuba, with Rubio and Trump signaling aggressive moves toward regime change. Ritter sees Cuba as more resilient than Libya and notes the long-standing US effort to topple the Cuban government, complicated by Cuba’s limited leverage and its trade relations with China, Russia, and Venezuela. The panel discusses the Monroe Doctrine reinterpretation and the broader geopolitical contest with China and Russia, suggesting that Cuba will be a tougher target than the US expects. In closing, Ritter reiterates that an attack on Iran is unlikely and would be disastrous, cautioning that internal political calculations, including midterm consequences, will influence presidents’ decisions. The show thanks Ritter for his analysis.

Mario and John discuss the potential Venezuelan regime change and the broader implications of U.S. policy. - If a coup proceeds, the first step in the plan would be to remove Maduro. There are reports that Maduro sought amnesty from the U.S. to step down, and Trump reportedly refused amnesty. - John notes that when the U.S. government is serious about attacking a country, naval movements are a key indicator he learned at the CIA. He observes that the U.S. recently sent the USS Gerald R. Ford and its 11 accompanying battleships and supply ships, signaling seriousness about action. - The CIA’s alleged use of drugs to weaken other countries is mentioned. John asserts that drugs in Venezuela are not Venezuelan; they originate in Colombia and Ecuador and transit Venezuela en route to West Africa, ultimately to Europe. - In considering what would happen in Venezuela if Maduro steps down, the expectation is chaos. The discussion notes that the narrative around Venezuela has shifted alongside discussions of Iran, Russia, Ukraine, and China, and asks what the initial reaction would be when seeing this narrative shift. - John reiterates the naval-movement heuristic for assessing U.S. seriousness about regime change, noting the presence of carrier groups as a sign of intent. He questions the upside for the U.S. in removing Maduro, given that the U.S. excludes Venezuelan oil from purchase and refining and there seems to be no clear upside. He adds that the U.S. would ideally want to strengthen Venezuela’s economy to reduce immigration, but that is not reflected in current policy. He also discusses drugs, reaffirming that Venezuelan drug flows are primarily transiting to Europe, not the U.S., and adds that China’s five-year-ago decision to build a Caribbean refinery is a factor, arguing that the refinery shift is a strategic move opposed by the U.S. - Mario notes Maduro’s offer of full access for U.S. oil, but John emphasizes regime survival as Maduro’s main concern and questions whether Maduro’s offer would be a valid solution. He points out that China is expanding and becoming a major trading partner in Latin America, but he does not see this as a direct solution to regime change. - The conversation touches on the possibility that naval movements could be a bluff to force Maduro to withdraw. John says such moves happen in the South China Sea and could lead to Maduro fleeing, but they would create a power vacuum with pro-M Maduro factions within the military and without regional support from Colombia, Brazil, or Mexico, complicating U.S. aims. - They discuss the possibility of the U.S. offering Maduro safe passage rather than an outright coup. John suggests that a large-scale ground invasion is unlikely, given public opinion and the country’s size and terrain. He compares potential post-regime outcomes to Libya, warning that U.S. attempts to impose a peace post-regime change often fail, leaving chaos and long-term instability. - The dialogue turns to the opposition figure Maria Machado, with John stating that she does not command armies and is not clearly more viable than Juan Guaidó; he suggests the next leader, if Maduro leaves, might be a senior military officer. - They consider the long-term consequences of regime change, including the risk of chaotic transitions and a military-based government. John shares a cautionary Libyan analogy about a constitutions project that never materialized into stable governance. He recalls a 2003 Iraqi intervention example to illustrate misjudgments that history often repeats. - The discussion closes with references to Hezbollah and Iran connections in Venezuela and the hope to avoid another Libya-like outcome, emphasizing the potential heartbreak for Venezuela and the complexity of foreign involvement.

Speaker 0 notes that land strikes to stop drug trafficking specifically will start soon, and questions whether Speaker 1 has been promised anything. Speaker 1 responds that he does not know and, even if he did, he wouldn’t say it, adding, “we are not involved, and we will not get involved into another nation's policy, for their own national security.” Speaker 0 then asks whether Speaker 1 would welcome U.S. military action. Speaker 1 says, “I will welcome more and more pressure so that Maduro understands that he has to go, that his time is over.” He emphasizes that this is “not conventional regime change” and that it “cannot be compared to other cases like countries in The Middle East.” He states, “We had an election,” and asserts that “Regime change was already mandated by over 70% of the population,” arguing that the goal is “support to enforce that decision.” Speaker 0 asks how to square military action with receiving a peace prize and whether the moment has become necessary. Speaker 1 answers that what they are fighting for is “precisely freedom in order to have democracy and democracy in order to have peace.” He argues that “to maintain freedom and to achieve freedom, you do need strength,” contrasting this with the idea of a peace that would come from oppression or mere concession. He contends that it is “absolutely absurd” that Maduro’s regime gets support from Russia or from Iran, while democratic countries and democratic leaders are not being asked for support. He rejects the notion of appealing solely to peaceful means without addressing the regime’s international backers. Speaker 1 concludes by saying they do not have arms, but they have “our will. We have the power of organization and the power of love,” and adds, “peace is ultimately an act of love.”

The United States government decides to send the CIA to Venezuela. They say the CIA will conduct operations against Venezuela, against the peace of Venezuela. This is claimed to be unprecedented; the speaker notes that never before has any government since the CIA’s existence publicly said it would order the CIA to kill, to derange, and to topple countries. A historian named Alejandro is invoked to support this claim. The speaker lists past Latin American coups, asserting that all involved the CIA and resulted in governments being overthrown and presidents assassinated, with documents allegedly published by the U.S. government that have since been declassified. Specific examples named are: 1974, Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz; 1965, Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch; 1964, Brazil, Joao Goulart; 1973, Chile, Salvador Allende. The speaker says these are “a few” among many coups in Latin America, all documented through declassified U.S. government documents. Additionally, the case of Mosaddegh in Iran (1952) is cited as another example of a national leader toppled. The speaker asserts that, over time, the CIA apologized for overthrowing these presidents, stating the pretenses were that they were communists or terrorists, but later acknowledging the deception. The speaker uses the term “immorality” to describe those past actions and contrasts them with the present claim, stating that for the first time in history, a U.S. government says it has given authorization and issued orders to attack a country. The speaker concludes with a call to the Venezuelan people, saying their people are clear, united, highly conscious, with “1000000 of eyes and 1000000 of ears,” and that they possess the means to defeat this “open conspiracy” against the peace and stability of Venezuela. The ultimate aim asserted is to restore the peace and stability to which the people of Venezuela have a right, and to ensure they regain and sustain that peace and stability.

Speaker 0: Decision on whether to supply Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine or sell them to NATO and let them sell them to Ukraine. Speaker 1: Yeah. I've sort of made a decision pretty much if if if you consider. Yeah. I I think I wanna find out what they're doing with them. Yes. Speaker 0: Yes. Speaker 2: Donald Trump's recent statement to the press about mulling over sending Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine has elicited a response from the Kremlin today. Putin announced that the peace process with the Trump administration to end the Ukraine war is officially, quote, unquote, exhausted. Trump and Putin have had a very, you know, strange relationship, a little touch and go since Trump returned to the presidency. At first, to end the Ukraine war on his very first day in office, Trump has meandered a bit on the issue and is now apparently settling on the Biden administration's policy of arming Ukraine and NATO to the hilt. But can Tomahawk cruise missiles even make much of a difference given that the Russian military has achieved supremacy on the battlefield and maintained that dominance for at least the last year and a half, maybe even longer, if you will. We're now joined by, and we're so pleased he's with us, retired US Army colonel Douglas MacGregor. He's the author of I'm sorry. We also have Brandon Weichert with us, the author of Ukraine. Go cross wires there, a disaster of their own making, how the West lost to Ukraine. Thank you both for being with us. Speaker 3: Sure. Speaker 4: Thank you for having me. Speaker 2: Colonel McGregor, welcome to the show. We're so glad to especially have your perspective on this. And what we're gonna kinda do is a tour, if you will, around the globe because there's several, ongoing and pending conflicts. Right? So let's start with this breaking news out of Russia where Putin says that these talks, these negotiations are exhausted. Are they, as a matter of fact, exhausted, colonel? Speaker 3: Well, I think he was referring specifically to what happened in Alaska. And I think president Trump showed up, you know, in grandiose fashion with the goal of overwhelming, president Putin and his team with his charm and grace and power, and it all failed miserably. President Trump never really listened carefully to anything the Russians said to him. He didn't read any of the material that was pertinent to the discussion. He came completely unprepared, and that was the the message that came out after the meeting. So the Russians were very disappointed. If you don't read their proposals, you don't read what they're doing and what they're trying to accomplish, then you're not gonna get very far. So now, president Trump has completed his transformation into Joe Biden. He's become another version of Joe Biden. Speaker 2: What it is so unexpected. And, you know, it's hard for a lot of a lot of Trump voters to hear because specifically part of voting for him and the mandate that he had going into this term was in these conflicts. Right? Specifically, the one in Ukraine. He didn't start any new conflicts while in office in the first term. Why this version of Trump this term? I know you, like I, look into the hiring, the administration, the pressures from the outside on the president. What is influencing where he is now on Ukraine, colonel MacGregor? Speaker 3: Well, that's a that's a difficult question. I mean, first of all, he grossly underestimated the complexity of the of the war. If you don't understand the foundations for the conflict, how this conflict came about, I mean, I I was standing around listening to someone like Brzezinski in the nineteen nineties trying to tell president Clinton that it was critical to address Ukraine's borders because Eastern Ukraine was, quote, unquote, Russified and effectively not Ukrainian. Nobody would listen to Brzezinski, and so we walked away from that very problem. And in the run up to this thing back in 2014, I was on several different programs, and I pointed to the electoral map, And it showed you who voted for what where. It was very obvious that the East and the Northeast voted to stay with the Russian pro Russian candidate, and everybody else voted against the pro Russian candidate. So none of this should come as a surprise, but I don't think president Trump is aware of any of that. I don't think he studied any of that. And so he's got a lot of people around him pushing him in the direction of the status quo. He went through this during his first term, disappointed all of us because he could never quite escape from the Washington status quo. So he simply returned to it, and I don't see anything positive occurring in the near future. Speaker 2: That's sort of the same as well, with other agencies like the the DOJ, which I wanna get into a little bit later. Brandon, you've been writing about this as a national interest. So what what do you make of it? Speaker 4: Well, I think that right now, this is a lot of vamping from Trump. I think the colonel is a 100% correct when he says Trump really didn't come prepared to the Alaska meeting. I think ultimately Trump's default is to still try to get a deal with Putin on things like rare earth mineral development and trade. I think it's very important to note, I believe it was Friday or Thursday of last week, Putin was on a stage at an event and he reiterated his desire to reopen trade relations with The United States and he wants to do a deal with Trump on multiple other fronts. So that's a positive thing. But ultimately, I think that people need to realize that Trump says a lot of stuff in the moment. The follow through is the question. I am very skeptical that he's actually going to follow through on the Tomahawk transfer if only because logistically, it's not practical. Ukraine lacks the launchers. They lack the training. The the targeting data has to come exclusively and be approved exclusively by the Pentagon, which means that Trump will be on the hook even more for Joe Biden's war, which runs against what he says he wants to get done, which is peace. Regardless of whether it's been exhausted or not that process, Trump I think default wants peace. So I think this is a lot of bluster and I think ultimately it will not lead to the Tomahawk transfer. Last of all because we don't have enough of these Tomahawks. Right? I mean, that that is a a finite amount. I think we have about 3,500 left in our arsenal. We have 400 we're sending to the Japanese Navy, and we're gonna need these systems for any other potential contingency in South America or God forbid another Middle East contingency or certainly in the Indo Pacific. So I think that at some point, the reality will hit, you know, hit the cameras and Trump will not actually follow through on this. Speaker 2: So speaking of South America, let's head that way. Colonel McGregor, I I don't know if you know. I've been covering this pretty extensively what's been going on with the Trump administration's actions on Venezuela. So a bit of breaking news. Today, the US State Department claims that Venezuela is planning to attack their embassy, which has a small maintenance and security board other than, you know, diplomatic staff. Meanwhile, Maduro's regime argues they're just foiled a right wing terrorist plot that's that was planning to stage a false flag against the US embassy to give the US Navy fleet. There's a lot off in Venezuela's coast the impetus to attack Maduro. I've been getting some pushback, you know, on this reporting related to Venezuela, because, you know, Trump's base largely doesn't want any new conflicts. They're afraid this is sort of foreign influence wanting wanting him to go there. Are we justified in what Trump is doing as far as the buildup and what we are hearing is an impending invasion? Is it is the Trump administration justified in this action, colonel MacGregor, in Venezuela? Speaker 3: No. I I don't think there's any, pressing pressing need for us to invade or attack Venezuela at all. But we have to go back and look at his actions to this point. He's just suspended diplomatic relations with Venezuela, which is usually a signal of some sort of impending military action. I don't know what he's being told. I don't know what sort of briefing he's received, what sort of planning has been discussed, but we need to keep a few things in mind. First of all, the Venezuelan people, whether they love or do not love Maduro, are very proud of their country, and they have a long history of rebelling against foreign influence, particularly against Spain. And they're not likely to take, an invasion or an intervention of any kind from The United States lately. Secondly, they've got about 400,000 people in the militias, but they can expect, at least a 100,000 or more paramilitaries to come in from Brazil and Colombia and other Latin American states. It's why the whole thing could result in a Latin American crusade against The United States. And finally, we ought to keep in mind that the coastline is 1,700 miles long. That's almost as long as the border between The United States and Mexico. The border with Brazil and with Colombia is each of them are about 1,380 kilometers long. You start running the math and you're dealing with an area the size of Germany and and France combined. This is not something that one should sink one's teeth in without carefully considering the consequences. So I don't know what the underlying assumptions are, but my own experience is that they're usually a series of what we call rosy scenarios and assume things that just aren't true. So I I'm very concerned we'll get into it. We'll waste a lot of time and money. We'll poison the well down there. If we really want access to the oil and and gas, I think we can get it without invading the place. And they also have emerald mines and gold mines. So I think they'd be happy to do business with us. But this obsession with regime change is very dangerous, and I think it's unnecessary. Speaker 2: That is definitely what it seems they're going for. When I talk to my sources, ChromaGregor, and then I'll get your take on it, Brandon, they say it's a four pronged issue. Right? That it's the drug that, of course, the drugs that come through Venezuela into The United States, Trend Aragua, which we know the ODNI and Tulsi Gabbard, DNI, Tulsi Gabbard was briefed on specifically, that the right of trend in Aragua and how they were flooded into the country, counterintelligence issues, a Venezuelan influence in, you know, in some of our intelligence operations, and, just the narco terrorist state that it is. But you feel that given even if all of that is true and the Venezuela oh, excuse me, in the election fraud. Right? The election interference via the Smartmatic software. Given all that, you still feel it's not best to invade, colonel. You how do we handle it? How do we counter these threats coming from Venezuela? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, you secure your borders. You secure your coastal waters. You get control of the people who are inside The United States. We have an estimated 50,000,000 illegals. Somewhere between twenty five and thirty million of them poured into the country, thanks to president Biden's betrayal of the American people and his decision to open the borders with the help of mister Mayorkas that facilitated this massive invasion. I would start at home. The drug problem is not down in Venezuela. The drug problem is here in The United States. If you're serious, anybody who deals in drugs or is involved in human trafficking, particularly child trafficking, should face, the death penalty. Unless you do those kinds of things, you're not gonna fundamentally change the problem here. Now as the narco state title, I think, is a lot of nonsense. The drugs overwhelmingly come out of Colombia. They don't come out of Venezuela. A very small amount goes through Venezuela. I'm sure there are generals in the Venezuelan army that are skimming off the top and putting extra cash in their banks, but it's not a big it's not a big source from our standpoint. We have a much more serious problem in Mexico right now. Mexico is effectively an organized crime state, and I don't think, what Maduro is doing is is really, in that same category. On the other hand, I think Maduro is courting the Chinese and the Russians. And I think he's doing that because he feels threatened by us, and he's looking for whatever assistance or support he can get. And right now, given our behavior towards the Russians in Ukraine, it makes infinite sense for the Russians to cultivate a proxy against us in Central And South America. This is the way things are done, unfortunately. We there are consequences for our actions. I don't think we've thought any of them through. Speaker 2: Well, in in in talking about turning this into a broader conflict or a bigger problem, I I I I know, Brandon, you had heard that that Russia basically told Maduro, don't look to us. Don't come to us. But now this was a couple weeks ago. Yep. Yep. Like you just said, colonel MacGregor, things have changed a little bit. Right? Especially looking at what Putin said today. So will Russia now come to Venezuela's aid, to Maduro's aid? Speaker 3: I think it's distinctly possible, but it's not going to be overt. It'll be clandestine. It'll be behind the scenes. The Chinese are also gonna do business with Maduro. They have an interest in the largest known vindicated oil reserves in the world. The bottom line is and this you go back to this tomahawk thing, which I think Brandon talked about. It's very, very important. The tomahawk is a devastating weapon. Can they be shot down? Absolutely. The Serbs shot them down back in 1999 during this Kosovo air campaign. However, it carries a pretty substantial warhead, roughly a thousand pounds. It has a range of roughly a thousand miles. And I think president Trump has finally been briefed on that, and he has said, yeah. I I wanna know where they're going to fire them, whom they're going to target. Well, the Ukrainians have targeted almost exclusively whatever they could in terms of Russian civilian infrastructure and Russian civilians. They've killed them as often and as much as they could. So the notion if you're gonna give these things to these people or you're gonna shoot for them, you can expect the worst, and that would precipitate a terrible response from the Russians. I don't think we understand how seriously attacks on Russian cities is gonna be taken by the Russians. So I would say, they will provide the Venezuelans with enough to do damage to us if if it's required, but I don't think they expect the Venezuelans to overwhelm us or march into America. That's Mexico's job right now with organized crime. That's where I think we have a much more serious problem. Speaker 4: I I agree with the colonel on that. I think also there's an issue. Now I happen to think we we because of the election fraud that you talk a lot about, Emerald, I think there is a threat in Maduro, and I I do think that that there is a more serious threat than we realize coming out of that sort of left wing miasma in Latin America. And I I think the colonel's correct though in saying that we're we're making it worse with some of our actions. I will point out on the technical side. I broke this story last week. The Venezuelan government, the military Padrino, the the defense minister there, claimed that his radar systems actually detected a tranche of US Marine Corps f 35 b's using these Russian made radars that they have. This is not the first time, by the way, a Russian made radar system using these really and I'm not going get into the technical details here, but using really innovative ways of detecting American stealth planes. It's not the first time a Russian system has been able to do this. And so we are now deploying large relatively large number of f 35 b's into the region. Obviously, it's a build up for some kind of strike package. And there are other countermeasures that the f 35 b has in the event it's detected. But I will point out that this plane is supposed to be basically invisible, and we think the Venezuelans are so technologically inferior, we do need to be preparing our forces for the fact that the Venezuelans will be using innovative tactics, in order to stymie our advances over their territory. It's not to say we can't defeat them, but we are not prepared, I don't think, for for having these systems, seen on radar by the Venezuelans, and that is something the Russians have helped the Venezuelans do. Speaker 2: Very complex. Before we run out of time, do wanna get your thoughts, colonel MacGregor, on, the expectation that Israel will strike Iran again. Will we again come to their aid? And do you think we should? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, stealth can delay detection but cannot resist it. Yeah. I think the stealth is grossly exaggerated in terms of its value. It causes an enormous price tag Yeah. When you buy the damn plane. And the f 35, from a readiness standpoint, is a disaster anyway. So, you know, I I think we have to understand that, yes, mister Netanyahu has to fight Iran. Iran has to be balkanized and reduced to rubble the way the Israelis with help from us and the British have reduced Syria to chaos, broken up into different parts. This is an Israeli strategy for the region. It's always been there. If you can balkanize your neighbors, your neighbors don't threaten you. Now I don't subscribe to the Israeli view that Iran is this permanent existential threat that has to be destroyed, but it doesn't matter what I think. What matters is what they think. They think Iran is a permanent existential threat and therefore must be destroyed. Your question is, will they find a way to attack Iran? The answer is yes. Sooner rather than later. The longer they wait, the more robust and capable Iran becomes. And, I think that's in the near term that we'll see we'll see some trigger. Somehow, there'll be a trigger and Iran will strike. And will we support them? Absolutely. We're already moving assets into the region along with large quantities of missiles and ammunition, but our inventories, as I'm sure you're aware, are limited. We fired a lot of missiles. We don't have a surge capacity in the industrial base. We need one. Our factories are not operating twenty four hours a day, seven days a week. The Russian factories are. Their manufacturing base can keep up. And by the way, the Chinese are right there with them. They have the largest manufacturing base in the world. So if it comes down to who could produce and fire the most missiles, well, we're gonna lose that game, and Israel is gonna lose with us. But right now, I don't see any evidence that anyone's worried about that. Speaker 4: Yeah. Speaker 2: You know what? Colonel McGregor, I I I don't know if I feel any safer after you joined us today. It is very concerning. It's it's a concerning situation we find ourselves in, and I feel like so many people because they feel the election turned out the way they wanted to wanted it to, are not concerned anymore. Right? But we are in Speaker 1: a finite amount of time and there's still great pressures upon the president. There are many voices whispering in his ear. And so we constantly have to be calling out what we Speaker 2: see and explaining to people why it matters. Speaker 3: Remember, this president has said this. Everybody dealing with the administration has said this. It's a very transactional administration. Yep. Follow the money. Who has poured billions into his campaign and bought the White House and Congress for him? When you understand those facts in, you can explain the policy positions. Speaker 1: And I think that's also why we're, the leading conversation we're seeing on acts and social media. Right now, Colonel McGregor, thank you so much for joining us today. We hope you'll come back soon. Speaker 3: Sure. Thank you. Speaker 2: And, Brandon, as always, good to see you, my friend. Thank you. Speaker 4: See you again. Nice to meet you, colonel. Speaker 3: Very nice to see you. Bye bye.

The discussion centers on the Venezuelan political crisis, U.S. involvement, and historical precedents of regime change in the region. The speakers contrast current military buildup around Venezuela with past Latin American coups, and they assess domestic support, international dynamics, and potential outcomes. - Venezuela under Maduro: Speaker 0 notes a broader deployment of military infrastructure than in recent Latin American coups, implying heightened risk or intensity of any intervention. Speaker 1 counters that domestically there is a “rally around the flag” effect in response to U.S. threats, with about 20% of Venezuelans supporting U.S. military intervention and over 55% opposing it. - Regime-change calculus: The conversation asks for the value of regime change when Maduro is willing to open the Venezuelan market to the U.S. Speaker 1 responds that there is no clear political or economic value to regime change; the predicted consequences would include a massive migration wave, civil war, and higher oil prices. They discuss the implications of implementing a regime-change strategy in the Venezuelan context. - Cartel of the Suns: The Cartel of the Suns is discussed as a U.S.-designated terrorist group. Speaker 1 explains that the designation emerged from a DOJ/intelligence collaboration during the Trump era, with William Barr involved in pursuing Maduro. The term traces back to the Reagan era, when the CIA and DEA allegedly allowed drug trafficking through Venezuela to monitor routes, revealing a long history of U.S. involvement in narco-trafficking networks as a tool of influence. Ramon Guillen Davia is named as a Venezuelan National Guard contact, with broader exposure through media such as a 60 Minutes segment and a New York Times expose by Tim Weiner. The cartel’s earlier existence and its resurfacing in U.S. legal actions are tied to broader U.S. efforts to delegitimize Maduro’s government. - Venezuelan political history since Chavez: Speaker 1 outlines Chavez’s rise and popularity (e.g., reducing extreme poverty by 60% before sanctions), the 2002 coup attempt led by opposition figures including Leopoldo Lopez, and the subsequent public support for Chavez when the people protested to restore him. They describe “La Salida” in 2004–2014 as an opposition strategy funded by U.S. entities (NED, USAID) to depose Chavez, with various protests and riots that damaged the economy. After Chavez, Maduro faced U.S. sanctions and a narrative of illegitimacy framed by the opposition’s efforts to install Guaidó as a parallel government in 2019, enabling asset seizures and embargos on Venezuela’s Sitco assets. - 2019 events and aftermath: The 2019 U.S.-backed attempt to install Juan Guaido as interim president is described, including the staged “humanitarian aid” convoy at the Colombia border which failed; Guaidó’s association with Las Bratas (the Las Frastrojos cartel members) is cited as a public-relations embarrassment, corroborated by major outlets. Leopoldo Lopez is described as a persistent organizer of opposition efforts, connected to a broader U.S.-funded framework through the CIA’s ecosystem (Canvas, Einstein Institute), and by extension to regime-change policy. The possibility of Maduro arresting Guaido is discussed as strategically unwise for Maduro to avoid bolstering U.S. claims of repression. - Opposition fragmentation and polling: The panel debates whether the opposition has broad support. Speaker 1 says a November poll by Datanalysis shows Maria Carina Machado at roughly 14–15% and Maduro around 20%, with most voters undecided and younger voters leaning toward external media narratives. Older, rural, and poor Venezuelans—Chavista base—remain a significant portion of the population. Young people are described as more influenced by social media and potentially more susceptible to pro-U.S. messaging but not broadly supportive of the radical opposition. - External actors and drug-trafficking links: The dialogue links narco-trafficking networks to geopolitical strategy, arguing that the U.S. has used or tolerates narcotics channels to fund political aims in Latin America. The discussion covers broader examples, including Ecuador and the Balkans, and references to U.S. figures and policies (e.g., regime-change agendas, naval movements, sanctions, and strategic partnerships) to illustrate how narcotics intersects with geopolitics. - Geopolitical trajectory and outcomes: The speakers speculate on possible futures: (1) a negotiated deal between Trump and Maduro or U.S. diplomacy (with the oil sector’s re-entry and debt relief) being preferable to open intervention; (2) a decapitation strike leading to destabilization and civil war with severe humanitarian and migration consequences; (3) ongoing sanctions and coercive measures as a long-term strategy. They caution that a direct, large-scale military invasion seems unlikely due to political and logistical risks, including American public opinion and potential backlash if U.S. troops are lost. - Global context and strategy: The broader international framework is discussed, including the U.S. strategic doctrine shifting toward a multipolar world and hemispheric dominance concerns. The conversation touches on how U.S. policy toward Venezuela fits into wider ambitions regarding Russia, China, and regional partners, as well as potential domestic political changes in the U.S. that could influence future approaches to Venezuela and Latin America. - Concluding note: The discussion closes with reflections on the complexity of regime-change ambitions, the difficulty of predicting outcomes, and the possibility that diplomacy or limited, targeted pressure may emerge as more viable paths than broad invasion or decapitation strategies. The participants acknowledge the influence of regional personalities and U.S. domestic politics on policy direction.

Speaker 0 states that in a recent explosion, many on the boats died while two survived. He asks whether those two were detained and checked for drugs or drug residue, whether evidence from the wreckage was gathered, and whether they were prosecuted, noting that instead they were simply sent back to their country. He argues that policy cannot allege someone is guilty and then kill them. He notes that interdictions occur off the coast of Miami and off the coast of California, and cites Coast Guard statistics: about 25% of the boats stopped to search don’t have any drugs. He asks what kind of person would justify blowing up people when “one out of four boats may well not have drugs on them,” and he concludes, “So don't do it again. Is that the message?” He continues by stating that the message, which has been thought in the Senate and will be thought again next week, is that “you do get to kill people when you're at war.” He clarifies that if there is a war, “the constitution says congress has to vote for a declaration of war.” He says he is not in favor of declaring war with Venezuela and despises socialism, communism, and authoritarianism, but he does not support starting a war with Venezuela. He emphasizes that if you have a war, you can kill the enemy; if you don’t have a war, you have international crime, and you must treat it as such. He concludes by noting that seas, even in international waters, have had rules of engagement for over a century, and they “don’t involve blowing people up without first asking them if they were allowed to be boarded to be searched.”

The speaker opens by citing James Madison, who wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1789 that “the constitution supposes what the history of all governments demonstrates, that the executive branch of power is the most interested in war and most prone to it,” and notes that the constitution itself vests in the legislature the question of war (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11) while giving the president operational powers of war (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). Even if one claimed the 1973 War Powers Resolution supersedes the constitutional language, the speaker argues the president has not met its conditions: the president may only introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities under three circumstances—declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack on the United States—none of which exist today because Iran has not attacked the United States, Congress has not declared war, and Congress has not granted specific statutory authorization. Beyond this constitutional framing, the speaker asks why the United States would go to war with Iran and emphasizes that servicemembers deserve a clear mission. He questions how such a war would help American families with groceries, housing, or safety in schools and neighborhoods. He cautions against past interventions in the Middle East, arguing they have produced a debt of at least $8 trillion from wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan, and contends a sustained war with Iran will not stabilize the region but will radicalize new generations of terrorists and generate more refugees to Europe and the United States. The speaker argues Iran is not Venezuela, and that Ayatollah Khomeini was not a president but a religious leader in a region notorious for radical Islamists; he asserts that the United States and Israel turned him into a martyr, contributing to broader conflict and casualties, including six American families who have lost loved ones. He claims the administration cannot provide a straight answer for why the preemptive war was launched, noting contradictory statements about imminent Iranian strikes and the rationale of stopping a nuclear program. A candid answer, he says, came from the Secretary of State, who said Israel forced the United States to act, implying that Congress must decide war. If American lives are to be risked, that decision must be debated and voted on by representatives, and the debate should be arduous with a hard vote. He offers a theory that colleagues do not want to go on record due to a poor track record of meddling in the Middle East and a desire to avoid their names being associated with an unfavorable outcome. The speaker asserts Congress is not here to declare war today; the vote on the War Powers Resolution is to reassert that Congress must decide questions of war. Some say war is authorized by paying for it through the budget, but the speaker asserts that defining the mission for the troops is not included in the budget and has not been done. He thanks the men and women engaged in combat, prays for their safety, and states that the resolution is written for them—to ensure they know when they achieve their mission and can come home.

Speaker 0 argued that Maduro was not democratically elected and was not cracking down on drug trafficking to the U.S. and other countries, contrasting this with Honduras’ crackdown on drug trafficking supported by agencies like the DEA and Southcom, which earned praise for the Honduran government. The discussion then turned to U.S. policy. Speaker 0 asked whether the interviewee supports what the Trump administration did, or believes there is a line that should not be crossed. They noted that the U.S. military action against Maduro—bombing the country, entering, capturing Maduro, killing members of his government, and taking him to jail—was seen by some as positive, with Maduro described as a criminal who destroyed the country and economy. Speaker 1 responded by focusing on the human impact in Venezuela and other Latin American countries. They stated that a large portion of the population has suffered, with a notable number of people migrating from Venezuela and Honduras. They asserted that elections in Venezuela were stolen by Maduro’s regime, stating that the opposition’s poll results were stored in the cloud and the government did not want to see them because they knew they would lose. They described this as not democracy. They added that, since Hondurans left the country due to trafficking, vessels by sea and illegal flights were bringing jobs to Honduras, but also causing deaths and bloodshed. They argued that if the Trump administration framed Drug Trafficking as terrorism, it was warranted because the drug flow to the United States harmed not only U.S. citizens but also Honduras, which faced the highest death toll in fifteen years due to drugs coming through its borders, largely from Venezuela, and that nothing was done about this by prior administrations. Speaker 0 then asked for the stance on U.S. intervention in general: should intervention be allowed only in certain cases (e.g., Maduro), or should there be no U.S. intervention in Latin America under any president? Speaker 1 shared a Venezuelan friend’s view that there are no options to change Venezuela and that intervention might be necessary if there is no other way to save Venezuela. From a Honduran perspective, they believed Trump’s actions helped not only Honduras but also other Central American and regional countries along the drug-trafficking routes, by reducing corruption, bloodshed, and deaths. They argued that the political machinery Chavez created and used to stall elections in other Latin American countries had previously gone unchecked by the U.S., and that Trump faced Maduro with a confrontation. They concluded that many people in the world do not know what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. They stated that Trump confronted Maduro, who now has a chance to defend himself in a trial, and emphasized the issue of sovereignty for every country.

- The discussion opens with the possibility of a coup in Venezuela, with Speaker 0 suggesting the first step would be to “take out Maduro.” Speaker 1 notes reports that Maduro sought amnesty from the US to step down, which Trump allegedly refused. - A recurring theme is the idea of watching naval movements to gauge US willingness to attack a country. Speaker 2 emphasizes that an aircraft carrier battle group signals seriousness, citing the USS Gerald R. Ford and 11 associated ships as the indicator that the US is “serious.” He also questions any upside for the US in regime change in Venezuela, noting the US has avoided buying or refining Venezuelan oil and arguing that the policy lacks a clear benefit. - On drugs, Speaker 2 asserts that the drugs in Venezuela are not Venezuelan but come from Colombia and Ecuador, transiting Venezuela to West Africa and then to Europe, with the claim that Europe is the primary market and the US a smaller one. He argues this reflects broader flaws in US foreign policy. - The speakers discuss the potential consequences if Maduro steps down, predicting chaos, and reflect on the broader narrative shift from Iran, Russia, and Ukraine to Venezuela. They discuss whether the military and regional powers would support intervention. Speaker 2 argues that regional powers (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico) are opposed to American intervention, complicating any possible regime-change effort. - The issue of amnesty is revisited. Speaker 2 speculates Trump might want a “scalp” as a symbol of seriousness on drugs, drawing a parallel to Manuel Noriega’s capture, while noting that a post-overthrow stability plan is often missing in US operations. - The conversation touches on China’s role. Speaker 2 suggests China’s refinery investments in the Caribbean represent a strategic shift away from US-dominated refining, arguing that this creates incentives for China and reduces the US’s influence, with Maduro’s regime survival as a central concern. - On whether Maduro would offer US full access to Venezuelan oil, Speaker 2 says he can’t see it changing the strategic calculus, and argues China’s expanding influence makes regime change less sensible for the US. - They discuss the plausibility of using naval movements as a bluff to force Maduro to depart, noting such tactics are used in the South China Sea. However, Speaker 2 cautions that removing Maduro would create a power vacuum, and the military’s stance remains uncertain since the region’s powers oppose intervention. - Regarding the opposition, Speaker 2 downplays Maria Machado’s prospects, suggesting she lacks military backing and that a senior military officer might be the likely successor if Maduro leaves. The Juan Guaido episode is cited to illustrate the fragility and divisiveness of Venezuelan opposition movements. - The feasibility of decapitation-style strikes against Maduro is debated. Speaker 2 stresses Maduro is the internationally recognized president and emphasizes that any coup would require ground forces and a day-two plan, which historically has been lacking in US interventions. - They compare potential outcomes to Libya’s post-overthrow chaos and caution that US-imposed peace rarely lasts. The risk of a renewed crisis in Venezuela, including possible Hezbollah or Iranian connections, is acknowledged as a troubling possibility. - The discussion ends with a somber note that even seasoned policymakers may overestimate the success of regime change, and a reminder of historical lessons about coup outcomes and long-term stability.

Speaker 0 argues that most Americans oppose the war, citing polling and the president’s failure to make a case for it. The speaker asserts that people don’t feel threatened by Iran and don’t fear an Iranian ballistic missile landing in the United States. The speaker lists a set of American concerns: 72% can’t afford health insurance, 58% can’t afford car insurance, 67% live paycheck to paycheck, 31% can’t afford back taxes, and 50% carry massive credit card debt. They state they campaigned with the president and were among the few Republicans supporting Donald Trump when others opposed him in a primary, emphasizing a “America first” stance focused on American problems rather than foreign countries or foreign peoples. The speaker expresses concern for the Iranian people and hopes for a government that treats women fairly, but asserts that “we have seen over 100 little girls killed at a school from a bomb,” and claims that “America and Israel attacked Iran,” implying this is not good for Iranian women. They criticize the president’s claim that the Iranian people will topple their regime, saying the Iranian people won’t topple their regime while being bombed by the United States and Israel in an unprovoked attack, which the speaker claims is true. They reference Pete Hegseth’s comment that the U.S. did not start the war, but the speaker counters that America and Israel definitely started it and states, “you can’t lie that away to the American people.” The speaker declares being irate and furious about the situation, noting the national debt approaching $40 trillion and questioning the war’s cost. They argue that American troops have been killed and murdered for foreign countries, and that four Americans have died for Israel and the Iranian people, not for Americans. The speaker laments the loss of American military members and acknowledges the families who may be grieving. They mention Trump’s past statements that he doesn’t think he will go to heaven, and question what that implies about his decision-making, given that the president has said he may place troops on the ground and that what began as “a few day war” could extend to four weeks or more. The speaker recalls prior commitments by JD Vance and Tulsi Gabbard to end foreign wars and regime change, but notes that “we’re a year in” and yet “we’re in another fucking war” with Americans killed. The speech ends with a call for America to “rip the Band Aid off” and to have a serious conversation about who is making these decisions and for whom.

Speaker 0 discusses the legality and practicality of stopping drug-running vessels versus fishing boats. He asks, “If you can seize a tanker without killing anyone, shouldn’t that have been the way that these fishing boats were also stopped?” He clarifies the confusion: “Fishing boats? Well, the drug runners? The drug runners. Those aren't fishing boats.” He explains that the discussion involves two different authorities: “article two authority” and sanctions. He states that “the president and the commander in the chief has identified and designated terrorist organizations who are cartels who run drugs that kill hundred thousand Americans a year,” and asserts, “there’s no legal question that he has the legal ability to blow those boats out of the water.” He contrasts this with sanctions: “these were economic sanctions by the president as delegated by congress. Those were enforced by civil authorities with the aid of the US Navy.” He emphasizes a distinction between violent drug-trafficking activity and the legal framework of sanctions, insisting, “If you’re asking me if I have sympathy for narco terrorists killing Americans whose boats that are carrying the drugs that kill Americans, I don’t.” He adds, “I have sympathy for my neighbors in Missouri who’ve been poisoned, who die. And we finally have a president who cares about them more than the Democrats care about going down to El Salvador to drink margaritas with terrorists.” Regarding policy toward Venezuela, he states, “Are you open to troops in Venezuela?” and notes, “That’s not that we’re not talking about that at all. We’re talking about actually enforcing sanctions.” He mentions the president being open about the consideration and says the administration is weighing options, including actions in the hemisphere and the broader competition with China. Asked specifically if the Trump administration should try to overthrow Maduro’s regime, he replies, “That’s not that we’re talking about at all.” He asserts, “The president was kind of open about that. I don’t know what you’re talking about.” He references Senator Hawley’s opposition to U.S. ground troops in Venezuela and reiterates his confidence in the president’s decision-making, calling Trump “a realist who understands that we have to pivot away from Europe’s overreliance on the generosity of Americans,” and emphasizing there are “real interest here in our hemisphere” and in countering China. He concludes, acknowledging “we have real interest here in our hemisphere.”

A Venezuelan American speaker describes the impact of the regime on their family and millions of others. Their family lost everything—work, savings, investments—wiped out by a narco dictatorship that has held Venezuela in a death grip for over twenty-five years. The Venezuelan exodus is described as the second largest displacement crisis on Earth after Syria, a humanitarian disaster and not just tragedy. The regime has jailed hundreds of political prisoners and thousands have been murdered for speaking out. More than a third of the population has fled, not for opportunity or the American dream, but to survive because staying often means death. The speaker contends Venezuela is not merely a collapsed state but an occupied one, with territory, natural resources, and institutions overrun by hostile foreign powers: Iranian militias, Chinese corporations, Russian intelligence, all exploiting the country with impunity. Venezuela, they argue, is no longer a local crisis but a geopolitical threat endangering the Western Hemisphere, a launchpad for authoritarian expansion in the Americas. Amid this, Maria Corina Machado is highlighted as a leader who dared to push for freedom. In 2024, she supposedly led a peaceful democratic uprising that won the election. Her team allegedly smuggled physical voting receipts out of the country—hard proof of victory the regime attempted to bury. The speaker says her courage has sparked belief among millions of Venezuelans that change is possible. Some people have questioned Machado’s decision to dedicate her Nobel Prize to Donald Trump. The speaker accepts the criticism but argues it was a brilliant strategic move on the global political stage. Machado is portrayed as understanding Trump’s character, his campaign for the prize, and the symbolic, personal value of the recognition to him. The claim is that this gesture might keep Trump’s attention focused on Venezuela at a time when U.S. presence and pressure in the Caribbean is rising. The dedication is described not as flattery or optics, but as a strategic act to protect and preserve a form of power that could shift history, grounded in the belief that the ultimate aim is freedom. The speaker emphasizes that Machado is not asking for a U.S. invasion or war; Venezuela is already invaded and held hostage by a narco state with foreign agents and enemies of democracy—Russians, Iranians, Chinese—operating freely to expand influence across Latin America. Machado is calling for the support of the only military capable of countering that threat, framed as liberation rather than imperialism. The argument is that the fight is for Venezuela’s life, not theory or politics, and that the world should recognize what’s at stake. The fight for Venezuela is a fight for freedom, democracy, and continental stability, and if liberty, human dignity, and peace in the Americas matter, Venezuela’s fight must matter to all.

Speaker 1 discusses the human toll of Venezuelan and regional instability, noting widespread Venezuelan suffering and massive migration from the region, including Honduras and other countries, driven by the situation in Venezuela. He contends that elections in Venezuela were stolen by Maduro’s regime, insisting that the opposition’s poll results were stored on cloud and the government refused to view them because they knew they had lost, labeling this as not a democracy. He adds that the drug trade through Honduras caused significant bloodshed and deaths, attributing much of this violence to shipments that originated in Venezuela and stating that the U.S. had not acted on that flow, which has cost Hondurans many lives. Speaker 0 then asks about the stance on U.S. intervention, whether intervention is sometimes warranted, such as against Maduro, or whether there should be no U.S. intervention in Latin America at all, across different administrations. Speaker 1 responds by recounting a Venezuelan friend’s view that options to change Venezuela are limited and that intervention might be necessary if there is no other way to save Venezuela. From the Honduran perspective, he says Trump’s actions helped Honduras and other Central American countries by addressing drug trafficking routes that harmed regional security, corruption, and lives. He asserts that Maduro created a political machine used to stall elections in regional countries, a tactic previously overlooked by the Obama-era U.S. administration but confronted by the Trump administration. He believes Trump’s administration provided options to Maduro, who did not accept them, leaving Maduro to defend himself in his upcoming trial. Speaker 1 emphasizes the sovereignty of countries and argues that many people worldwide do not understand what has happened in Venezuela and how it affects both Venezuelans and neighboring nations. He states that Maduro is going to have a chance to defend himself in court, and reiterates that intervention has implications for sovereignty and regional stability, implying that the situation has prompted broader regional consequences and debates about the legitimacy of elections and governance in Venezuela.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of a coup in Venezuela and the implications of U.S. actions. They emphasize naval movements as a signal of U.S. seriousness, noting the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford and associated ships as a trigger that indicates a real threat or action. They remark that if Maduro steps down, chaos could follow, and acknowledge that Maduro has discussed amnesty with the U.S. that Trump reportedly refused. Speaker 2 repeatedly highlights naval movements as a metric for U.S. intent to attack a country, recalling lessons from the CIA. He argues the U.S. is not strategically benefiting from intervention in Venezuela, given that the U.S. has decided not to buy or refine Venezuelan oil, and questions what upside there is for the U.S. in such action. He asserts that drugs in Venezuela originate from Colombia and Ecuador and transit through Venezuela to West Africa and Europe, rather than serving the U.S. market, and he links this to broader critiques of U.S. foreign policy. Both speakers discuss the regional calculus: China’s increasing influence in Latin America, including a Caribbean refinery operation that refines Venezuelan crude, challenging U.S. refinery interests. They suggest China’s refiners and pipelines complicate U.S. strategies. They also discuss the potential role of Pakistan, Iran, or other powers in shaping outcomes, noting that many regional players (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and others) oppose U.S. intervention. Speaker 1 notes that a regime-change operation could undermine U.S. trust as an ally and references a platform called Polymarket where Maduro’s potential departure had been speculated, though newer developments show Maduro mobilizing the military. They raise a question about whether Maduro sought amnesty for the U.S. to step down, and say Trump’s refusal could reflect a desire for a political “scalp” to prove anti-drug policy, comparing this to the Panama case of Manuel Noriega. Speaker 2 elaborates that covert action programs are highly classified, and that even discussing them publicly is risky. He suggests that any coup would require a limited force to seize the presidential palace, pacify the military, and control key communications, with no clear plan for post-coup governance. They discuss the opposition leadership, noting Maria Machado as potentially not more effective than Juan Guaidó and suggesting the military would likely take power after Maduro’s departure. They compare possible futures to Libya post-NATO intervention, warning that anticipated constitutions and reforms often do not materialize in practice, leading to prolonged conflict. Speaker 2 emphasizes the international unpopularity of regime-change in Venezuela and argues that U.S. actions could provoke regional instability and further migration. The dialogue ends with reflections on the inherent dangers of regime change, the lessons from past interventions, and the possibility of Venezuelan instability if Maduro leaves. They caution against assuming flowers will greet invading forces and stress that historical outcomes often diverge from planners’ expectations, with a warning that a hypothetical post-regime-change period could be chaotic and military-led.