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Since 2013, mobile devices are now the primary focus, with smartphones constantly emitting signals to cell towers even when idle. These signals contain unique identifiers like IMEI and IMSI, allowing tracking of a user's movements. Companies store this data for unknown purposes, leading to privacy concerns and mass surveillance through bulk collection.

Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and Speaker 2 discuss Dominion’s access to election systems during the 2020 election period in Georgia, with Gwinnett County cited as a specific example. The dialogue confirms that the questioning period was during the 2020 election, and the focus is on whether Dominion remotely accessed election systems and whether such access occurred in Georgia. Speaker 2 asks if there is any indication of nonelection personnel remotely accessing a Dominion system. Speaker 3 responds that they have reviewed a series of emails produced by Dominion in which they’re discussing remoting into Gwinnett County, Georgia. Speaker 1 then notes that Speaker 0 had mentioned Dominion remote collection or connection to election systems but lacks evidence that it occurred in Georgia. Speaker 0 asserts that there was one county and that they have seen many Dominion emails, requiring translation from Serbian to English to verify technical questions and translations. Speaker 1 asks specifically: “So it's your testimony that there is evidence of dominion remotely accessing Georgia election equipment?” Speaker 0 answers: “Yes, on the one county. It was included with stuff that I was researching and reading through considering Colorado. Michigan was also involved and there were other ones.” Speaker 2 inquires about Dominion’s ability to remotely connect to these election systems and whether they could do so without detection. Speaker 0 responds: “Yes.” Speaker 2 then asks if the interviewee is aware of any instances in which that has occurred, and Speaker 0 confirms: “One would be the Denver, Colorado server was granted or requested to grant Belgrave, Only Belgrade. Did search. There is a Belgrade Montana.” The speaker questions why Montana would need to connect to a Colorado file transfer server as part of the election system, noting there are other components and things done in the background concerning the database and the configuration of the database server that still do not have an engineering change order. Speaker 0 explains that in operational environments, things sometimes break and need fixing, leading to the submission of a change request or, in this case, an engineering change order that is retroactive. The goal is to record the process to ensure change management and integrity of the system. If changes are not recorded, it leads to a bad situation, according to Speaker 0.

We partnered with Starlink to launch hundreds of satellites, creating a unique space-based network. It automatically connects to your existing phone, regardless of your carrier. Because connectivity is crucial, we're offering a free trial to everyone. You'll be amazed at how easily you can connect – T-Mobile Starlink provides coverage virtually anywhere with a view of the sky. If you can see the sky, you're connected.

The speaker describes a rented car equipped with built-in tracking technology, saying a cell phone tower is installed in the vehicle to track the driver continuously. They claim that while settings allow turning off features like Bluetooth and Wi‑Fi, the “cell phone” function cannot be turned off, meaning the car has an always-on connection for tracking. They further state the car uses location tracking and that apps in the vehicle also track location. The speaker points to a microphone feature they say can be turned off to prevent listening while driving and talking to friends or family. They characterize the overall system as everything syncing together so Google can access location and related data. The speaker argues that car companies sell built-in features approved by car manufacturers that enable access to the car’s location for assistance while driving, ticket generation, and police use to identify speeding based on GPS and location. They claim authorities can use an app to send tickets to a person’s house. They mention a “speed camera audio warning” feature, saying it informs the driver when a speed camera is coming so they can slow down, rather than banning speed cameras. They also reference a climate change or air quality feature, claiming the system reports “denied” climate and air quality access to location and associates it with “punishment.” Finally, they advise that under location settings, the driver must disable location permissions for installed apps; otherwise, they claim the car tracks location 24/7/365. They conclude by emphasizing that the collected data could be sold to Google.

Over 500,000 square miles of the US lack cell service, leaving many areas unconnected. This means emergency texts, emotional messages, and precious memories go undelivered. But T-Mobile is changing that. We've partnered with Starlink to launch hundreds of satellites, creating a space-based network that automatically connects to your existing phone, regardless of your carrier. Connection matters, so we're offering free access to anyone. With T-Mobile Starlink, if you can see the sky, you're connected.

Voting systems are designed to be closed systems without internet connectivity or external devices. Dominion, the company mentioned, does not have any remote access to the equipment or machines. No one has access to the information on the machines remotely.

The speaker wants to install Starlink to demonstrate it's the only way they can connect with their convoy.

In this video, the speakers discuss the risks associated with modems in voting machines. They highlight concerns about hacking and the potential for cheating in future elections. ES&S, a voting machine manufacturer, claims that their modems are separated from the public internet by firewalls. However, last summer, ES&S voting systems were found online in some precincts across 11 states. Cellular modems are commonly used to transmit election results, but this introduces vulnerabilities. Intruders can intercept data between the cell tower and voting machines, allowing them to alter votes and software. Despite claims that voting machines are not connected to the internet, many new machines have wireless modems for faster result uploads, raising concerns about their security during elections.

ICE is using fake cell towers to turn your phone into a tracking device. It's a technology called Stingray. They put it in a vehicle and drive through a neighborhood broadcasting a signal stronger than a real cell tower. Your phone automatically connects to the strongest signal, so it connects to the fake one, and you never know what happened. Once you're connected, they can pinpoint your exact location in real time. Here's the most terrifying part: the Stingray doesn't just connect to the target's phone. It forces every phone in the area to connect to it. Your phone, your neighbor's phone, anyone just walking down the street, it scoops up data from hundreds of people to find one person. This isn't a theory. Forbes just uncovered a warrant showing ICE used one to track a person across a 30 block area in Utah, and they've spent millions on these cell site simulator vehicles. Your phone is constantly looking for a signal. You just have to hope it's a real one. ICE

I noticed an Ethernet cable connected to a router, which was linked to the local data center and the voting machines. This suggested an external internet connection. I also found a wireless network called AV_connect, which probably refers to absentee voting.

We partnered with Starlink to launch hundreds of satellites, creating a unique space-based network. It automatically connects to your existing phone, regardless of your carrier. Because connectivity is crucial, we're offering a free trial to everyone. You’ll be amazed at how well it works, even in the most unexpected locations. T-Mobile Starlink: If you can see the sky, you're connected.

The speaker wants to install Starlink to demonstrate it's the only way to connect with their convoy.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

We are on a fiber optic cable that will be laid from here to Brazil, not satellite. This cable will carry phone calls under the ocean, with robots burying it in the seabed. 95% of all telephone and data is transferred through submarine cables, not satellites.

Speaker 0 describes living about 120 miles north of London in a pleasant countryside setting with a city about 10 miles away. There could be a five G tower about a mile from them, so they acknowledge that five G is everywhere now. Speaker 1 responds with a metric they use for risk mitigation. In the United States, big cities require you to be 75 miles away due to airports and military bases. Then they offer a counterpoint: five G antennas aren’t always as bad as they’re made out to be. The key factor with a five G antenna is how many obedient idiots are connected to it. They illustrate this with Destin, Florida, a place known for its beaches. In December, Destin has hardly anyone there, maybe 20,000 residents, but in the summertime, there can be a million people in the city because of vacations. Therefore, those five G antennas in the summertime are way worse than in the wintertime due to the number of people connecting to the tower and radiating. They then discuss how light interacts with the inverse square law, noting that the inverse square law is not only about the closest distance to the antenna but also how much use the antenna is getting. They emphasize that people often forget that second part of the inverse square law. The speaker’s advice is to consider population density when deciding where to live. The speaker acknowledges that the listener has already chosen a place with sparse population density and supports that choice. They conclude by suggesting that when living in an area where light is plentiful, one should embrace all the other good things that nature brings. Overall, the conversation juxtaposes practical geographic placement with how population dynamics influence exposure to five G antennas, arguing that the number of connected users, driven by population density and seasonal occupancy, can significantly affect potential exposure. It also highlights the importance of considering natural surroundings and density when choosing where to reside.

Marshall says law enforcement has a system that identifies people using signals emitted by the devices they carry. He refers to the system as SignalTrace, made by Leonardo, and claims it collects Bluetooth, WiFi, and RFID signals from a phone, smartwatch, headphones, a car, and the car’s radio—“absolutely everything.” The system then builds an “electronic fingerprint” from those collected signals. Marshall says the website for SignalTrace demonstrates the approach using “Seventy cars” driving by one of these systems. He claims each car has an iPhone but that not every car has the same iPhone model, the same smartwatch, headphones, and other device details. According to Marshall, SignalTrace uses these differences to build a profile based on an individual rather than relying only on a car’s license plate. He adds that the system does not require a license plate or a picture of a face, asserting it only needs the signals devices are already broadcasting. Marshall further states that the system can operate in malls, subways, and “any public place,” wherever such signal collection can occur. He concludes that the claims described are “real” and says he will provide a link to the product page in the comments.

Modems in voting machines are vulnerable to hacking as they are network connections. ES and S claims that their modems are separated from the public internet by firewalls. However, once a hacker gains access through the modem, they can manipulate the voting machine software to cheat in future elections. Some jurisdictions use cellular modems or the internet to upload election results, introducing additional vulnerabilities. Voting machines with embedded modems transmit vote totals to the county elections office via cellular networks, which pass through routers and switches used for regular internet traffic. An intruder can intercept data between the cell tower and the voting machine, altering votes and software. Despite claims that voting machines are not connected to the internet, many have 4G wireless modems for faster result uploads, raising concerns about their security during elections.

Speaker 0 notes that there were at least more than two of your direct employees and one indirect at the TCF center, up to nine, though no names are provided to avoid threats; they request clarification on each person’s responsibilities and roles during the process. Speaker 1 states backups were created by Tina Peters, Mesa County, Colorado county clerk. They are receiving information across the country that Dominion reps were going in under the guise of trusted build maintenance and wiping records. Under one dash 12 dash 69, those records by law have to be preserved. They caution not to blame staff, explaining a knee-jerk reaction by Dominion in Michigan to convince clerk staff they must have done something wrong. When discussing county liability, they emphasize listening to Mr. Lindbergh’s expert opinion. Speaker 0 asks about Ethernet access for adjudicators and tabulators in the TCF Center. Speaker 2 responds that the devices are not connected to the Internet; they are designed to be completely standalone and connected locally in a local area network separate from the Internet. Speaker 3 explains the vehicle for transmission from the ICP is a cellular modem, which can be configured in a VPN; Chicago and Cook County work with Verizon to secure that network, implying the same capabilities are available elsewhere. They note that multiple wireless chipsets/modems are supported, depending on jurisdiction preferences and network compatibility. Speaker 4 adds that some jurisdictions use a 3G modem (GSM) but can support multiple modem varieties, including latest 4G/5G standards. They confirm applicability across different networks (Verizon, AT&T, Sprint). They mention transmitting from the ICP in Mongolia, indicating no network limitations. In Puerto Rico, three vendors are used (Claro, AT&T, and T-Mobile) due to incomplete island coverage. Speaker 0 asks again about Ethernet setup to join the LAN. Speaker 5 paraphrases a claim that Dominion could fix the problem, implying Dominion can communicate with the device. Speaker 6 explains, by analogy to Apple remote support, that permission was given to take over the device to reprogram it from Adams Park to SSO 2 A and B at West Balding Drive Elementary. Speaker 7 shares observations from the TCF Center on the third and fourth, noting irregularities on election day. Randy Bishop, who owns radio stations and is IT-savvy, showed him high-speed scanners and tabulators with Ethernet lines running out of the tabulators, all bundled together and connected to routers and a main computer, which he says are connected to the Internet and that such connectivity is illegal and should not happen because it opens them to hacking. Speaker 2 reiterates that the computers in the local area network are connected via an RJ45 connector.

Voting systems are designed as closed systems without internet connectivity or external connections. Dominion does not have remote access to information or the machines themselves. No one has access to the machines to the best of the speaker's knowledge.

Voting systems are designed as closed systems without internet connectivity or external connections. Dominion does not have remote access to information or the machines themselves. No one has access to the machines to the best of the speaker's knowledge.

The speaker says they use an iPhone, claiming “everybody I know” and “everybody at the CIA” uses an iPhone. They explain that when iPhones were unusual and hard to find, they used Android phones, and that all staff were assigned Androids; they also mention that they were originally assigned Nextels, described as walkie-talkie devices. The speaker recounts taking a Nextel to Bulgaria, where it beeped all night and people tried to send walkie-talkie-style messages, leading them to turn it in. They say the group transitioned to iPhones because Android phones are “so hard to crack,” and they advise against using Android devices. The speaker associates the risk with “the Chinese, the Russians, the Iranians, the Cubans,” and “most importantly, the Israelis,” and urges not to “do an android.” They then broaden the point beyond phone choice, suggesting people should consider what other aspects of life expose their secrets. They conclude by recommending that people assume “these bad guys are everywhere,” since, they say, they actually are everywhere. The speaker’s key takeaway is to make stealing personal secrets as hard as possible, and they close with a directive: “number one on your things to do today list, drop that android,” repeating “drop that Android.”

Our technology teams discovered a concerning issue with connected devices at a polling location. Despite the devices not supposed to have Wi-Fi, they were found to be communicating in real time, both receiving and sending data. This should never happen, and we have documented the incident. We cannot disclose the location, but we have confirmed it in multiple places. There are three types of machines involved: a scanner, a ballot marking device, and a polling pad. The communication is happening through the polling pad, which is used for checking everything. This access could potentially allow someone to manipulate and modify the data being exchanged in the system.

Speaker rents a car for repairs and asserts, 'These new cars are cell phone towers. That's what that is right there. See that?' and, 'you can't turn them off.' They suggest buying an old car to avoid being blasted with radio frequencies the entire time checked out, like a cell phone tower while you're driving around. 'So when they ask where all the chat GPT information is coming from, guess what? Here you go.' They mention 'GSR speed assist app.' 'This tracks your speed so that Google gets your information the entire time,' and claim, 'Google knows and they can get send you a ticket.' Finally, 'In the newer cars, you're not allowed to turn this LTE off. You can turn off Bluetooth and Wi Fi, but you can't turn off your car being a cell phone.'

The speaker believes cell phone towers are actually antenna arrays for the "largest harp network on planet Earth." They claim testing facilities in Alaska allowed for the creation of a larger-scale harp technology. The speaker shows several towers in West Coast Florida, suggesting the bottom part of the towers are for cell phones, while the top part is for harp. They claim that when these devices are turned up, cell phone service extends much farther offshore than normal, up to 12 or 13 miles, and when shut off, service is lost. The speaker highlights a larger tower, suggesting it contains relays for various services, including police, fire, harp, and cell phones. They note the towers are spaced closely together, and when the power is increased, "harp waves" or "gravity waves" become visible in the sky. The speaker believes these towers are part of a weapon and that radar anomalies attributed to birds are actually caused by these devices.