reSee.it - Related Video Feed

A computer science expert demonstrated how easy it is to hack voting machines in a federal court in Atlanta. Using a pen, he breached security, altered vote totals, and entered superuser mode. The reaction in the courtroom was shocked, with gasps from the plaintiff's counsel and onlookers. The state's defense downplayed the demonstration, claiming precinct security measures would prevent such hacking. The theatrics of the courtroom were evident as each side tried to sell their argument.

Dominion Systems, the owner of Sequoia and Premier, has a customer portal called dominion.dominionvoting/portal. This portal can be easily accessed and manipulated, allowing customers to view and modify data, including election results. It doesn't require a nation state's level of sophistication to manipulate these sites or gain unauthorized access. Even with limited resources, someone could potentially manipulate the election using these systems.

A senate report revealed that voting machines are aging and vulnerable to exploitation. A hacker demonstrated how easy it is to gain full admin access to a model used in 18 states. Professor Ed Felton documented how unattended voting machines can be manipulated by anyone. Additionally, some machines that claim not to be connected to the internet actually are, while others use cards programmed on internet-connected computers. In summary, all voting machines can be tampered with in some way. As an axe murderer once said, "pretty much everything is hackable."

I am concerned about the upcoming election because this voting machine, used in 18 states, can be easily accessed by anyone. I will demonstrate how it can be done in less than 2 minutes without any tools. By opening the machine, removing the card reader and unplugging it, then picking the lock with a ballpoint pen, I gain admin access. I encounter a few error messages, but by clicking Cancel and okay, I bypass them and gain full admin control.

John Warner, a security tester at Argonne National Laboratory, also spends his time hacking into real electronic voting machines. He explains that these machines are easily hackable due to their modular design. Roger Johnston, who leads Argonne's vulnerability assessment team, adds that the lack of security extends beyond the machines themselves. The warehouses where the machines are stored have weak security, and they are transported by low bid trucking companies with no background checks. This leaves ample opportunity for tampering. Johnston's team tested two machines and believes their demonstrated attacks could work on many others. The push for faster election results globally is increasing the demand for electronic voting machines, but if they are not secure, it could undermine the integrity of elections.

In 2016, there was controversy surrounding the hacking and recount of voting machines in Michigan and Wisconsin. Hillary Clinton was upset because the machines she had hacked got unhacked, and Jill Stein demanded a recount. It was believed that Hillary expected the same treatment as Joe Biden in the election. She had been promised that the game would be rigged for her, but it didn't happen. This caused her to lose her mind and throw things. In 2016, someone counterhacked the people who were going to hack on Hillary's behalf, but that didn't happen this time. The speakers know who did it but will save that for another discussion.

We demonstrated how easily election machines can be hacked, raising concerns about the limited number of companies controlling voting technology. 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some states lack a paper trail to verify results. The lack of transparency in cybersecurity practices is alarming.

I was invited to investigate the Mesa County server to compare the before and after images. I wanted to test the system's security, so I used a backdoor utility called SQL Server Management Studio, which is not certified software and should not be on a voting machine. I quickly accessed the presidential election results in Mesa County, showing Biden with 31,000 votes and Trump with 56,000 votes. I will explain later how easily I could manipulate the election results if I wanted to.

A computer programmer testified that programs exist to secretly fix elections. He claims that in February, he wrote a prototype for Congressman Tom Feeney that could rig an election. The program could flip the vote to 51-49 for a candidate in any race. He stated that election officials would never detect the program.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines even violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in the US. Antiquated machines in many states are particularly vulnerable. Demonstrations have shown how easily these machines can be hacked, with workers switching votes. Approximately 43% of American voters use machines with serious security flaws. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them even more susceptible to cyberattacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could significantly impact a close presidential election.

In this video, the speakers discuss how the voting system can be easily manipulated using a USB drive. They explain that election officials are unaware of the potential misuse of USB drives in voting machines. The speakers demonstrate how a USB drive can be used to run a backdoor utility and manipulate the election results. They show that the screen does not display any indication of this manipulation. By inserting a specific USB drive, they are able to fix the flipped election results. The speakers emphasize the simplicity and affordability of USB drives, highlighting the vulnerability of the voting system.

A voting machine, which the speaker calls the "worst voting machine used in the United States," was vulnerable to USB attacks. The machine was used in Maryland and Virginia until 2012. By plugging in a pre-programmed USB device, costing around $120, an attacker could gain complete control of the system in seconds. With full control, an attacker could change votes, add candidates, or manipulate results without leaving evidence, because the machine lacks a paper ballot. The speaker demonstrated how easily the machine could be hacked, emphasizing that the process was slowed down for demonstration purposes. The speaker also mentioned that a professor from Denmark wirelessly hacked the same machine in under 30 minutes at DEFCON. Because of vulnerabilities like these, the speaker believes hand-marked paper ballots are necessary to verify election outcomes.

The video discusses the vulnerabilities in election systems and the potential for manipulation by hackers. It mentions that voting machines, campaign networks, and registration databases are all at risk. The speaker explains that attackers can cause mischief without physically accessing the machines, such as by messing up voter files. It is noted that Russia was able to influence the election by breaching DNC computers and targeting election-related systems in multiple states. The speaker emphasizes that manipulating vote counts on every machine in America would be difficult, but flipping a few senate seats could still impact the US Congress. The video concludes by suggesting that nation states and criminals likely have knowledge of these vulnerabilities.

Before every election, voting machines need to be programmed with the ballot design and candidate names. This is done by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker infects the memory card with malicious code, it can change the programming on the voting machine and manipulate the election results. The election programming workstation, called an election management system, is often connected to the internet, making it vulnerable to hacking. In Michigan, during the 2016 election, 75% of counties outsourced their pre-election programming to just three small companies, making it relatively easy to target voting machines. By hacking into the election management system, an attacker can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and manipulate the votes without detection.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

The speaker demonstrated how they were able to boot up the Electionware system on a non-conforming laptop, highlighting violations of security protocols. They revealed that default passwords for election machines are easily accessible online, posing a significant security risk. The speaker emphasized the urgent need for updating security measures and changing passwords to enhance election security. They also pointed out the lack of antivirus protection on crucial election machines, putting counties at risk. The speaker concluded by stressing the importance of immediate action to address these vulnerabilities.

Before every election, voting machines need to be programmed with the ballot design and candidate names. This is done by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker infects the memory card with malicious code, it can change the programming on the voting machine and manipulate the election results. The programming is done on a desktop PC or workstation, often connected to the internet. In Michigan, during the 2016 election, 75% of counties outsourced their pre-election programming to three small companies. These companies had weak security measures, making it relatively easy to hack into their systems. By targeting vulnerable states and hacking into their election management systems, attackers can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and manipulate the votes. Even if there are paper records, they are often not thoroughly checked.

Cybersecurity experts agree that electronic voting machines are dangerous and obsolete. These machines can be easily hacked, as demonstrated by a computer scientist who has hacked multiple machines and even turned one into a video game console. The vulnerability of these machines puts our election infrastructure at risk of sabotage and cyberattacks. In the 2016 election, millions of Americans voted on paperless electronic machines. The speaker reveals a step-by-step process for hacking these machines and stealing votes. The solution proposed is to use paper ballots, which can be quickly scanned and verified by humans. It is emphasized that all elections should be run with paper ballots and audits. The importance of having a paper backup system is highlighted. The concise transcript emphasizes the need to replace electronic voting machines with paper ballots for secure and reliable elections.

Speaker 0: Totals being awarded to Biden and Jorgensen's totals being awarded to Trump. After gaining access to a forensic image of the Dominion election management system in Mesa County, Colorado, IT experts demonstrate how easy it is to switch tens of thousands of votes from Trump to Biden in seconds by simply changing the index number next to each candidate's name. Speaker 1: This is a a backdoor utility called SQL Server Management Studio that is actually installed on the image of the voting system. So is it certified? It is not on the list of certified software. What I'm gonna do first, I'm just gonna pull up the presidential results in Mesa County for that election. And here they are. You can see Biden has 31,000. Trump has 56,000. K. So I'm gonna come up here now, and I'm going to make a quick change. Change that to a two? Yep. I'm changing Trump to a one. Okay. And then I'm going to come up here, and I'm gonna rerun the port. And there you go. Biden, 56,000. Trump, 31,000. So I just flipped the results of the election using a tool that's actually built in to the voting system. And what I did is not even logged. There's no trace of what I just did now. For some reason, the logging of activities by a user that has the password are not retained. Speaker 0: In Pennsylvania on live TV, Trump had 1,690,589 votes, while Biden had 1,252,537 votes. The time was approximately 11:08 Eastern Standard Time. The next interval report shows Trump's votes decreasing to 1,670,631 and Biden's votes increasing to 1,272,495. The time is approximately 11:09PM. Live on CNN, exactly 19,958 votes were switched from Trump to Biden. This means Trump lost 39,916 votes.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines within minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates basic cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. Three companies control the majority of voting machines, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of American voting machines. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close presidential election. Concerns about the possibility of a successful hack are high.

In Mesa County, Colorado, IT experts demonstrate how easy it is to switch thousands of votes from Trump to Biden using a backdoor utility in the Dominion election management system. The tool allows them to change the results without leaving a trace. In Pennsylvania, live TV footage shows nearly 20,000 votes being switched from Trump to Biden, resulting in Trump losing almost 40,000 votes. The manipulation occurs within minutes, highlighting vulnerabilities in the voting system.

To hack a US presidential election, the speaker suggests a four-step plan. First, use pre-election polls to identify closely contested states. Second, target large counties or their service providers and compromise their election management system computers. Third, infect individual voting machines using the compromised system. This can be done easily by purchasing a government surplus machine on Ebay. Finally, manipulate the votes on the computer, knowing that most states discard the paper ballots without checking them.

A computer science professor explains how a voting machine can be easily manipulated by gaining physical access to it. By connecting a computer to the machine's serial port, one can rewrite the code and control the election results. The professor also highlights the lack of security measures on these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Another expert shares their experience of being left alone with voting machines after an election, emphasizing how easily someone could insert malware into them. The central count scanner discussed is widely used in America for counting ballots. The speakers mention the ease of obtaining the machine's software from a Russian server and the numerous individuals who have access to the machines, including potential adversaries. They conclude that the multitude of possible hacks and entry points make it unlikely that someone isn't taking advantage of these vulnerabilities.

Voting machines in the US are vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, according to security researchers. These machines, which come in various models, have been found to have security vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious software and change election data. The most efficient way to hack the machines is through the machine used to program them, as it can pass rogue software to the voting machines. Contrary to popular belief, many voting machines are connected to the internet, either through wireless modems or other means, making them susceptible to cyber attacks. The lack of proper security measures and outdated systems make it only a matter of time before election results are compromised.

In this video, the speakers demonstrate how a USB drive can be used to manipulate voting systems. They explain that election officials may not be aware of the potential misuse of USB drives. The speaker inserts the USB drive into the voting system, running a backdoor utility that is preinstalled. They show that the screen does not display any indication of the manipulation. By executing commands, they change the election results back to the original numbers. The speakers emphasize the simplicity and accessibility of this method, as USB drives are widely known and inexpensive.