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A senate report revealed that voting machines are aging and vulnerable to exploitation. A hacker demonstrated how easy it is to gain full admin access to a model used in 18 states. Professor Ed Felton documented how unattended voting machines can be manipulated by anyone. Additionally, some machines that claim not to be connected to the internet actually are, while others use cards programmed on internet-connected computers. In summary, all voting machines can be tampered with in some way. As an axe murderer once said, "pretty much everything is hackable."

I am concerned about the upcoming election because this voting machine, used in 18 states, can be easily accessed by anyone. I will demonstrate how it can be done in less than 2 minutes without any tools. By opening the machine, removing the card reader and unplugging it, then picking the lock with a ballpoint pen, I gain admin access. I encounter a few error messages, but by clicking Cancel and okay, I bypass them and gain full admin control.

At the Capitol, we witnessed the hacking of outdated election machines, which are used in many states. This raises concerns as only three companies control these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Researchers have discovered serious security flaws, including backdoors, in voting machines used by 43% of American voters. These companies refuse to answer questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the larger companies avoid answering any questions altogether. Additionally, five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the voting machine results. This undermines the notion of cybersecurity in our elections.

John Warner, a security tester at Argonne National Laboratory, also spends his time hacking into real electronic voting machines. He explains that these machines are easily hackable due to their modular design. Roger Johnston, who leads Argonne's vulnerability assessment team, adds that the lack of security extends beyond the machines themselves. The warehouses where the machines are stored have weak security, and they are transported by low bid trucking companies with no background checks. This leaves ample opportunity for tampering. Johnston's team tested two machines and believes their demonstrated attacks could work on many others. The push for faster election results globally is increasing the demand for electronic voting machines, but if they are not secure, it could undermine the integrity of elections.

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerabilities, and there is concern about the security of voting machines across the country. Researchers have shown that voting systems can be tampered with, and hackers with limited resources can breach machines in minutes. Instances of electronic voting machines deleting or switching votes have been reported. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making the machines susceptible to hacking. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in the US. Many states have outdated and vulnerable machines, and some lack backup paper ballots. The machines often run on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. The use of modems in voting machines also poses a risk, as they can be connected to the internet. The lack of forensic evidence and audit trails further undermines the security of the machines. The vulnerabilities in the voting system could lead to a compromised election and a loss of faith in the democratic process.

We demonstrated how easily election machines can be hacked, raising concerns about the limited number of companies controlling voting technology. 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some states lack a paper trail to verify results. The lack of transparency in cybersecurity practices is alarming.

The video discusses the vulnerabilities of a specific voting machine, the ES&S Model 650, and the potential for hacking and manipulation of election results. The machine lacks security measures and can be easily accessed through a serial console on the back, providing full root access. With physical access, someone could rewrite the machine's code to manipulate vote counts. The machine's operating system has never received security patches and can be compromised by simply plugging in a zip disk. The video highlights the lack of security in these machines and the potential for widespread hacking.

Voting machines remain highly vulnerable to tampering, as researchers have shown. Even those with limited skills can breach these systems quickly. In 2018, machines in Georgia and Texas were reported to have deleted or switched votes. Major manufacturers are compromising security by recommending remote access software, making machines targets for hackers. Many states still use outdated machines that are easy to hack, with 43% of American voters relying on systems known to have serious security flaws. Demonstrations have shown how easily these machines can be compromised. Additionally, aging systems often run unsupported software, increasing their susceptibility to cyber attacks. A successful hack could significantly impact close elections by targeting key swing states or counties. Concerns about potential breaches are growing.

The Defcon Voting Village is the only independent team assessing voting machines worldwide. They aim to understand machine vulnerabilities and improve election security. One machine, the AccuVotes TSX, used in 18 states (including swing states), can be easily disrupted without a card reader. Gaining admin access to the machine allows manipulation, damaging public trust in elections. While machines are necessary due to the complexity of US elections, they are hackable. To verify results and prevent cheating, a risk limiting audit is conducted. However, complete trust in machines is not possible, highlighting the importance of paper ballots.

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerabilities, and there is concern about the security of voting machines across the country. Researchers have demonstrated that these machines can be easily tampered with, and hackers with limited resources can breach them in minutes. Instances of electronic voting machines deleting or switching votes have been reported. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making the machines susceptible to fraud and hacking. Additionally, many states have outdated and vulnerable machines, and some lack backup paper ballots. The use of modems in voting machines also poses a risk, as they can be connected to the internet and hacked. The overall consensus is that the current voting systems are insecure and vulnerable to manipulation.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines even violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in the US. Antiquated machines in many states are particularly vulnerable. Demonstrations have shown how easily these machines can be hacked, with workers switching votes. Approximately 43% of American voters use machines with serious security flaws. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them even more susceptible to cyberattacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could significantly impact a close presidential election.

A voting machine, which the speaker calls the "worst voting machine used in the United States," was vulnerable to USB attacks. The machine was used in Maryland and Virginia until 2012. By plugging in a pre-programmed USB device, costing around $120, an attacker could gain complete control of the system in seconds. With full control, an attacker could change votes, add candidates, or manipulate results without leaving evidence, because the machine lacks a paper ballot. The speaker demonstrated how easily the machine could be hacked, emphasizing that the process was slowed down for demonstration purposes. The speaker also mentioned that a professor from Denmark wirelessly hacked the same machine in under 30 minutes at DEFCON. Because of vulnerabilities like these, the speaker believes hand-marked paper ballots are necessary to verify election outcomes.

Virginia stopped using touchscreen voting machines due to vulnerabilities. Voting machines across the US are at risk of being hacked. In Georgia and Texas, votes were deleted or switched in 2018. The biggest voting machine seller violated cybersecurity practices. Many states have outdated, vulnerable machines. Hackers can easily breach voting machines, potentially altering election results. The lack of paper trails in some states raises concerns about election legitimacy. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them susceptible to cyber attacks. The vulnerability of voting machines poses a threat to the integrity of elections. Stalin emphasized the importance of who counts votes. It is crucial to secure the future of elections and upgrade outdated systems to prevent interference.

DEFCON Voting Village assesses voting machines to improve election security. Attendees explore vulnerabilities in machines like the AccuVote TSX, gaining admin access to disrupt elections. While machines are necessary due to the complexity of US elections, they are hackable. Verification through risk limiting audits is crucial as machines cannot be fully trusted like paper ballots.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

The speaker demonstrated how they were able to boot up the Electionware system on a non-conforming laptop, highlighting violations of security protocols. They revealed that default passwords for election machines are easily accessible online, posing a significant security risk. The speaker emphasized the urgent need for updating security measures and changing passwords to enhance election security. They also pointed out the lack of antivirus protection on crucial election machines, putting counties at risk. The speaker concluded by stressing the importance of immediate action to address these vulnerabilities.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines within minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates basic cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. Three companies control the majority of voting machines, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of American voting machines. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close presidential election. Concerns about the possibility of a successful hack are high.

Voting machines in the US are vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, according to researchers. These machines, which come in various models, have been found to have security vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious software and change election data. The machines can be hacked through the machine used to program them, and many of them have wireless modems that can connect to the internet, despite claims that they are not connected. The vulnerabilities in the voting machines, along with the lack of secure systems for voter registration and result reporting, pose a significant risk to the integrity of elections. It is crucial to address these vulnerabilities to ensure the trustworthiness of election results.

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerability, highlighting the need to assess all voting machines for potential hacking. Researchers have shown that ballot recording machines and other systems are susceptible to tampering, even by hackers with limited resources. Instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes have been reported. The leading seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. The control of voting machines by just three companies poses significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines, leaving the election system vulnerable to interference. The lack of backup paper ballots and reliance on unsupported software further exacerbate the security flaws.

A computer science professor explains how a voting machine can be easily manipulated by gaining physical access to it. By connecting a computer to the machine's serial port, one can rewrite the code and control the election results. The professor also highlights the lack of security measures on these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Another expert shares their experience of being left alone with voting machines after an election, emphasizing how easily someone could insert malware into them. The central count scanner discussed is widely used in America for counting ballots. The speakers mention the ease of obtaining the machine's software from a Russian server and the numerous individuals who have access to the machines, including potential adversaries. They conclude that the multitude of possible hacks and entry points make it unlikely that someone isn't taking advantage of these vulnerabilities.

Voting machines in the US are vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, according to security researchers. These machines, which come in various models, have been found to have security vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious software and change election data. The most efficient way to hack the machines is through the machine used to program them, as it can pass rogue software to the voting machines. Contrary to popular belief, many voting machines are connected to the internet, either through wireless modems or other means, making them susceptible to cyber attacks. The lack of proper security measures and outdated systems make it only a matter of time before election results are compromised.

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerability, highlighting the need to assess all voting machines for security. Researchers have shown that voting systems are easily tampered with, even by hackers with limited resources. Instances of electronic voting machines deleting or switching votes have been reported in Georgia and Texas. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters. The control of voting machines lies with three companies, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines, and unsupported software further increases vulnerability. The potential consequences include compromised election results and a loss of faith in the democratic system.

Contrary to the current political narrative, the speaker emphasizes that voting machines are not connected to the Internet, making them secure. However, in 2018, there were instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes. The speaker mentions that even hackers with limited knowledge and resources were able to breach these machines easily. They also highlight concerns about remote access software making the machines vulnerable to fraudsters and hackers. The speaker clarifies that Dominion, the company in question, has no involvement in switched or deleted votes, and has no ties to communism or China. However, there are indications that some machines may be connected to the Internet, despite being designed as closed systems.

Contrary to the current political narrative, the speaker emphasizes that voting machines are not connected to the internet and the Department of Homeland Security claims the 2020 election was secure. However, in 2018, there were instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes. The speaker mentions that hackers were able to breach these machines easily, even with limited knowledge and resources. They also mention the concern of remote access software making the machines vulnerable to fraudsters and hackers. The speaker then addresses the controversy surrounding Dominion, stating that there were no switched or deleted votes involving their machines and that the company has no ties to communism or China. However, there are concerns that some machines may be connected to the internet despite being designed as closed systems.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines in minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in different states, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of voting machines used by American voters. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close election.