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In this video, the speaker discusses the importance of securing election systems. They highlight the risk of connecting these systems to the internet, as it can make them vulnerable to hacking. The speaker suggests that using paper ballots might be a smarter option, as they cannot be hacked like computer systems. By having something tangible to hold on to, like a piece of paper, we can ensure the integrity of the election process.

A senate report revealed that voting machines are aging and vulnerable to exploitation. A hacker demonstrated how easy it is to gain full admin access to a model used in 18 states. Professor Ed Felton documented how unattended voting machines can be manipulated by anyone. Additionally, some machines that claim not to be connected to the internet actually are, while others use cards programmed on internet-connected computers. In summary, all voting machines can be tampered with in some way. As an axe murderer once said, "pretty much everything is hackable."

Mark Cook, an election cybersecurity subject matter expert in threat assessment and common sense mitigation, introduces himself: he’s been working on elections nonstop for about six years and has forty years of IT industry experience. He states that he has evidence he hopes to show that there are backdoors built into electronic voting systems that allow flipping, changing of votes. He references a demonstration clip, saying, “backdoors built in to electronic voting systems that allow flipping, changing of votes,” and notes that the testing labs miss this, leaving the systems blindly certified and supposedly safe. He highlights audio he believes was clipped from a recording, insisting that the content shows voting systems are vulnerable: “that allow flipping, changing of votes,” and that testing labs are blind to these issues. He says, “I can demonstrate this to you even while I'm still here in this building.” Cook argues that there is a lack of government transparency, claiming, “the testing labs all miss this, then they're blindly certified, and then we're told, it's shut down our throats, that everything is safe and secure.” He describes the entire system as “built on a pyramid of lies,” and asserts that it must be stopped. He offers to educate and show problems, insisting he can do so, but emphasizes the need for a common-sense approach. He emphasizes practicality and accessibility, arguing that the problem can be solved with straightforward methods: “We're literally filling dots out on paper. We're counting the dots, adding the dots up, and whoever has the most dots wins.” He calls for a change that keeps elections under the control of the people and avoids simply “kicking the can down the road.” He reiterates that the resolution is not complicated and frames the solution as a simple, transparent counting method using paper records rather than electronic manipulation. In summary, Cook asserts the existence of covert backdoors in electronic voting systems, criticizes testing labs for blindly certifying these systems, condemns what he calls a “pyramid of lies,” and advocates a return to a basic, paper-driven, dot-counting approach where the person with the most dots wins, to restore public control over elections. He offers to provide demonstrations and education to support this view.

At the Capitol, we witnessed the hacking of outdated election machines, which are used in many states. This raises concerns as only three companies control these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Researchers have discovered serious security flaws, including backdoors, in voting machines used by 43% of American voters. These companies refuse to answer questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the larger companies avoid answering any questions altogether. Additionally, five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the voting machine results. This undermines the notion of cybersecurity in our elections.

The speaker states they are investigating dangerous and negative consequences with the "best of the best." They claim electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a long time and open to exploitation, allowing manipulation of vote results. This vulnerability purportedly reinforces the need for paper ballots nationwide, so voters can have faith in election integrity.

We demonstrated how easily election machines can be hacked, raising concerns about the limited number of companies controlling voting technology. 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some states lack a paper trail to verify results. The lack of transparency in cybersecurity practices is alarming.

Voting machines in the U.S. are highly vulnerable to hacking, with researchers demonstrating that even those with limited skills can breach them quickly. Many machines are outdated, using unsupported software, and some states lack adequate paper trails for verification. Remote access software on machines increases risks, and several states have been hacked without detection. The use of cellular modems for transmitting results further exposes systems to cyber threats. Election management systems, often connected to the internet, can be compromised, allowing attackers to manipulate vote tallies. Despite assurances from vendors, the reality is that many machines can be hacked, raising serious concerns about election integrity in close contests. The lack of forensic evidence makes it difficult to confirm whether votes have been altered, leaving the electoral process at risk.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines even violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in the US. Antiquated machines in many states are particularly vulnerable. Demonstrations have shown how easily these machines can be hacked, with workers switching votes. Approximately 43% of American voters use machines with serious security flaws. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them even more susceptible to cyberattacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could significantly impact a close presidential election.

In this video, the speakers discuss the risks associated with modems in voting machines. They highlight concerns about hacking and the potential for cheating in future elections. ES&S, a voting machine manufacturer, claims that their modems are separated from the public internet by firewalls. However, last summer, ES&S voting systems were found online in some precincts across 11 states. Cellular modems are commonly used to transmit election results, but this introduces vulnerabilities. Intruders can intercept data between the cell tower and voting machines, allowing them to alter votes and software. Despite claims that voting machines are not connected to the internet, many new machines have wireless modems for faster result uploads, raising concerns about their security during elections.

A voting machine, which the speaker calls the "worst voting machine used in the United States," was vulnerable to USB attacks. The machine was used in Maryland and Virginia until 2012. By plugging in a pre-programmed USB device, costing around $120, an attacker could gain complete control of the system in seconds. With full control, an attacker could change votes, add candidates, or manipulate results without leaving evidence, because the machine lacks a paper ballot. The speaker demonstrated how easily the machine could be hacked, emphasizing that the process was slowed down for demonstration purposes. The speaker also mentioned that a professor from Denmark wirelessly hacked the same machine in under 30 minutes at DEFCON. Because of vulnerabilities like these, the speaker believes hand-marked paper ballots are necessary to verify election outcomes.

In this video, the speaker discusses the importance of securing election systems. They highlight the risk of connecting these systems to the internet, as it can make them vulnerable to hacking. The speaker suggests that using paper ballots might be a smarter option, as they cannot be hacked like computer systems. By having something tangible to hold on to, like a piece of paper, it becomes more difficult for entities like Russia to interfere with the election process.

Voting machines in the United States are vulnerable to hacking and tampering, according to experts. These machines, including touchscreen and ballot recording machines, have been found to have serious security flaws that can be exploited by hackers. In some cases, electronic voting machines have deleted or switched votes. The use of remote access software on voting machines also poses a significant cybersecurity risk. Outdated software and unsupported systems further increase the vulnerability of these machines. Modems in voting machines, which are used to transmit results, can also be hacked. The lack of proper audit trails and forensic evidence makes it difficult to detect and prove hacking incidents. Overall, the current state of voting machine security in the US is a cause for concern and poses a threat to the integrity of elections.

The video discusses the vulnerabilities in election systems and the potential for manipulation by hackers. It mentions that voting machines, campaign networks, and registration databases are all at risk. The speaker explains that attackers can cause mischief without physically accessing the machines, such as by messing up voter files. It is noted that Russia was able to influence the election by breaching DNC computers and targeting election-related systems in multiple states. The speaker emphasizes that manipulating vote counts on every machine in America would be difficult, but flipping a few senate seats could still impact the US Congress. The video concludes by suggesting that nation states and criminals likely have knowledge of these vulnerabilities.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

The speaker demonstrated how they were able to boot up the Electionware system on a non-conforming laptop, highlighting violations of security protocols. They revealed that default passwords for election machines are easily accessible online, posing a significant security risk. The speaker emphasized the urgent need for updating security measures and changing passwords to enhance election security. They also pointed out the lack of antivirus protection on crucial election machines, putting counties at risk. The speaker concluded by stressing the importance of immediate action to address these vulnerabilities.

Cybersecurity experts agree that electronic voting machines are dangerous and obsolete. These machines can be easily hacked, as demonstrated by a computer scientist who has hacked multiple machines and even turned one into a video game console. The vulnerability of these machines puts our election infrastructure at risk of sabotage and cyberattacks. In the 2016 election, millions of Americans voted on paperless electronic machines. The speaker reveals a step-by-step process for hacking these machines and stealing votes. The solution proposed is to use paper ballots, which can be quickly scanned and verified by humans. It is emphasized that all elections should be run with paper ballots and audits. The importance of having a paper backup system is highlighted. The concise transcript emphasizes the need to replace electronic voting machines with paper ballots for secure and reliable elections.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines within minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates basic cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. Three companies control the majority of voting machines, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of American voting machines. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close presidential election. Concerns about the possibility of a successful hack are high.

Voting machines in the US are vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, according to researchers. These machines, which come in various models, have been found to have security vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious software and change election data. The machines can be hacked through the machine used to program them, and many of them have wireless modems that can connect to the internet, despite claims that they are not connected. The vulnerabilities in the voting machines, along with the lack of secure systems for voter registration and result reporting, pose a significant risk to the integrity of elections. It is crucial to address these vulnerabilities to ensure the trustworthiness of election results.

The speaker states that the best investigators are pursuing election integrity. They claim there is evidence that electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a long time and can be exploited to manipulate vote results. This vulnerability allegedly drives the mandate to implement paper ballots across the country, so voters can have faith in election integrity.

A computer science professor explains how a voting machine can be easily manipulated by gaining physical access to it. By connecting a computer to the machine's serial port, one can rewrite the code and control the election results. The professor also highlights the lack of security measures on these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Another expert shares their experience of being left alone with voting machines after an election, emphasizing how easily someone could insert malware into them. The central count scanner discussed is widely used in America for counting ballots. The speakers mention the ease of obtaining the machine's software from a Russian server and the numerous individuals who have access to the machines, including potential adversaries. They conclude that the multitude of possible hacks and entry points make it unlikely that someone isn't taking advantage of these vulnerabilities.

Voting machines in the US are vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, according to security researchers. These machines, which come in various models, have been found to have security vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious software and change election data. The most efficient way to hack the machines is through the machine used to program them, as it can pass rogue software to the voting machines. Contrary to popular belief, many voting machines are connected to the internet, either through wireless modems or other means, making them susceptible to cyber attacks. The lack of proper security measures and outdated systems make it only a matter of time before election results are compromised.

As a computer scientist specializing in election system security, I want to highlight the vulnerabilities in computerized voting equipment used in polling places. These systems can be easily compromised, allowing corrupt candidates or foreign adversaries to disrupt elections and potentially alter vote tallies without detection. The poor design and implementation by equipment vendors contribute to these vulnerabilities. Additionally, voter registration databases and systems reporting final results are attractive targets for disruption, with even fewer standards for securing them. It is unrealistic to expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services. We need to address these issues to ensure the integrity of our elections.

Contrary to the current political narrative, the speaker emphasizes that voting machines are not connected to the Internet, making them secure. However, in 2018, there were instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes. The speaker mentions that even hackers with limited knowledge and resources were able to breach these machines easily. They also highlight concerns about remote access software making the machines vulnerable to fraudsters and hackers. The speaker clarifies that Dominion, the company in question, has no involvement in switched or deleted votes, and has no ties to communism or China. However, there are indications that some machines may be connected to the Internet, despite being designed as closed systems.

Contrary to the current political narrative, the speaker emphasizes that voting machines are not connected to the internet and the Department of Homeland Security claims the 2020 election was secure. However, in 2018, there were instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes. The speaker mentions that hackers were able to breach these machines easily, even with limited knowledge and resources. They also mention the concern of remote access software making the machines vulnerable to fraudsters and hackers. The speaker then addresses the controversy surrounding Dominion, stating that there were no switched or deleted votes involving their machines and that the company has no ties to communism or China. However, there are concerns that some machines may be connected to the internet despite being designed as closed systems.

Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines in minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in different states, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of voting machines used by American voters. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close election.