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Chas Freeman and the host Glenn discuss how sea power has shaped global politics and why the current era may be signaling a shift toward land power and new kinds of strategic leverage. - Historical context of maritime dominance: Freeman traces a long arc from British naval hegemony after the Seven Years’ War to American preeminence after World War II, noting that naval power helped sustain a rules-based order and open sea lanes. He argues that dominance of the seas is no longer guaranteed, highlighting evolving ranges of weapons and the emergence of land-based controls that can threaten naval movements. - The evolving limits of naval power: He notes that artillery ranges kept territorial seas limited to about three miles in the eighteenth century, but advances in missiles and shore-based defenses have eroded that traditional maritime advantage. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’s 12-mile territorial limit is described as a political compromise rather than a fixed physical law. Modern missiles with ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers enable coastal forces to threaten carriers far from home waters, while shore installations can enforce blockades from land, as seen with Yemen’s Houthis in Bab El Mandeb and Iran in Hormuz. - The Strait of Hormuz as a strategic focal point: Freeman describes the current blockade as a sea-change that challenges the historic assumption that ships can freely operate in open waters. Aircraft carriers must stay well back from Iranian batteries, and surface ships at risk from Iran’s cruise missiles and drones. He emphasizes that control of Hormuz now rests more on land-based capabilities than on naval forces, making open-sea dominance increasingly untenable. - Implications for the traditional order: The discussion suggests that Anglo-American naval dominance, which helped sustain a liberal international order, is becoming less viable. Freedom of navigation operations and the appearant stability they created are no longer sufficient or sustainable in the new environment, where land-power and non-military instruments (energy, finance, and partnerships) matter more. - Energy, finance, and the petrodollar: The energy-trade dimension is central. Freeman and Glenn consider how the Strait of Hormuz underpins the petrodollar system, and discuss recent currency-swaps and dollar-reliance questions. They propose that if Gulf states shift toward the yuan or other currencies, U.S. financial hegemony could be challenged, catalyzing broader strategic realignments. China’s willingness to tolerate sanctions resistance and issue directives to its banks suggests a pushback against U.S. financial dominance. - China, Iran, and strategic realignments: Freeman notes China’s rise as a major sea power but argues China will not inherit Western maritime hegemony. He highlights China’s land-based connectivity initiatives (rail, roads, free-trade zones) that have maritime dimensions but are primarily land-centric, including Iran’s overland oil transport to China. He underscores a broader multipolar shift and the potential for Chinese and Iranian strategies to erode the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. - Negotiations and potential outcomes: The conversation concludes that there is no viable military path to open Hormuz or a negotiated settlement in sight. Freeman describes the situation as a high-stakes stalemate with no clear diplomatic avenue. He suggests that the war could subside into a lower-intensity conflict reminiscent of Israel-Iran dynamics in the region, with ongoing tensions and episodic explosions rather than a decisive end. - NATO, Europe, and Israel: The hosts discuss the potential decline or reform of NATO, the pivot of U.S. strategy away from Europe toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere, and how these shifts could affect European security. Freeman questions the future viability of Israel given shifting U.S. stance and waning Western consensus, noting domestic and international criticisms of Israeli actions and leadership. He observes growing Western skepticism toward Netanyahu’s approach, and the broader political costs for Israel on the world stage. - Final reflections: Both speakers anticipate profound, systemic changes in international relations—multipolarity, weakened sea-power advantages, a possible redefined European security architecture, and a reevaluation of essential alliances. They caution against overreliance on any single power’s hegemonic framework and emphasize gradual, incremental reforms over abrupt, destabilizing shocks.

In this discussion, Zhang Shuay Shin and Speaker 1 analyze the evolving U.S.-Iran confrontation through the lens of global power dynamics, the petrodollar, and the shifting balance among major powers. - The war is framed as primarily about preserving the petrodollar. Speaker 1 argues the United States, burdened by enormous debt, seeks to maintain the dollar’s dominance by controlling energy trade through naval power and strategic choke points. The belief is that the U.S. can weaponize the dollar against rivals, as seen when it froze Russian assets and then moved to stabilize oil markets. BRICS and others are moving toward alternatives, including a gold corridor, challenging the petrodollar’s centrality. The aim is to keep Europe and East Asia dependent on U.S. energy, reinforcing American hegemony, even as historical hubris risks a global backlash turning growing powers against Washington. - The sequence of escalation over six weeks is outlined: after the American attack on Tehran and the Iranian move to close the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. eased sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil to maintain global stability, according to Treasury statements. Escalations targeted civilian infrastructure and strategic chokepoints, with discussions of striking GCC energy infrastructure and desalination plants. A U.S. threat to “bomb Iran back to the stone age” was countered by Iran proposing a ten-point framework—encompassing uranium enrichment rights, lifting sanctions, and security guarantees for Iran and its proxies. The Americans reportedly suggested the framework was workable, but negotiations in Islamabad stalled when U.S. officials did not engage seriously. - The broader objective is posited as not simply a tactical war but a strategic move to ensure U.S. imperial supremacy by shaping energy flows. Speaker 1 speculates Trump’s motive centers on keeping the petrodollar intact, potentially forcing China and other partners to buy energy with dollars. Iran’s willingness to negotiate in Islamabad is linked to pressure from China amid China’s economic strains, particularly as energy needs and Belt and Road investments create vulnerabilities for China if Middle East energy becomes unreliable. - The proposed naval blockade is discussed as difficult to implement directly against Iran due to ballistic missiles; instead, the plan may aim to choke off alternative routes like the Strait of Malacca, leveraging trusted regional partners and allies. Iran could respond via the Red Sea (Bab al-Mandab) or other leverage, including the Houthis, challenging Western control of energy corridors. The overarching aim would be to force a global energy reorientation toward North America, though it risks long-term hostility toward the United States. - The roles of great powers are analyzed: the U.S. strategy is described as exploiting Middle East disruption to preserve the petrodollar, with short-term gains but long-term risks of a broader alliance against U.S. hegemony. Europe and Asia are pressured to adapt, with China’s energy needs especially salient as sanctions tighten Middle East supply. Russia is identified as the principal challenger to U.S. maritime hegemony, while China remains economically entangled, facing strategic incentives to cooperate with the United States if required by economic pressures. - The dialogue considers NATO and Europe, arguing that the real contest is between globalists and nationalists in the United States, with Trump viewed as an agent of empire who may threaten the existing globalist framework. The speakers discuss whether this competition will redefine alliances, the future of NATO, and the possibility that a more Eurasian-led order could emerge if Western powers fail to maintain their maritime advantages. - Finally, Russia’s role is emphasized: Moscow is seen as the key counterweight capable of challenging American maritime dominance, with the war in Iran serving, in part, to counter Russian actions in Ukraine and to incentivize alignment with Russia, China, and Iran against U.S. leadership over the next two decades.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Xu Qinhua, host of Dialogue at CGTN, joined Glenn to discuss Donald Trump’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing on 05/14/2026, including the atmosphere, objectives, and key issues shaping China–U.S. relations. Xu Qinhua said the day’s atmosphere was “very positive.” Trump was impressed by the welcoming ceremony, reviewing the ceremonial guards with Xi Jinping, visits to the Temple of Heaven, and a state banquet. The leaders spent the morning in discussions with their teams, then met at the Temple of Heaven in the afternoon. In the evening, they attended a state banquet hosted by the presidency. Xi Jinping’s speech emphasized that China–U.S. should be “partners rather than rivals,” while Trump’s warm response highlighted shared values between Chinese and Americans and referenced long engagement between the peoples over about 250 years. Trump cited early U.S. contact with China in 1784, including the arrival of a U.S. ship, Chinese terms for newcomers, Chinese workers helping link the Pacific and Atlantic through a continental railroad, the establishment of Tsinghua University, U.S.-China allied cooperation during World War II, and Confucius being respected in the U.S. Xu Qinhua said both sides agreed on a vision described as “strategic constructive… strategic stability” to guide the relationship for the next three years or even beyond. Glenn raised the broader concern that Trump’s administrations, and more broadly U.S. views that China is the main peer rival, often place China in the spotlight. He referenced Xi Jinping’s idea of overcoming the “Thucydides’ trap” and asked about prospects for easing the economic war shaped by trade, technology, and tariffs. Xu Qinhua said Xi Jinping meant overcoming the trap and setting a new model for major-power relationships. Xu described China and the U.S. as peers in terms of economy, high-tech development, innovation, and military capabilities, arguing that how they handle the relationship affects not only both countries but global stability. He said trade used to serve as a “ballast” stabilizer because of investment and exports, but the relationship is now again at a challenging time involving trade war, tech war, and tariffs. Xu said both sides were discussing the possibility of a “new model” of coexistence, emphasizing “cooperation” and limiting “zero sum” thinking. Glenn asked what specific issues must be resolved, including whether the focus is tariffs, chip export limitations, or China’s willingness to export rare earths, and noted U.S. interest in Chinese purchases of U.S. energy and agriculture. Xu Qinhua responded that they were discussing building a “border for trade” and a “board of investment” to institutionalize dialogues and communications to address individual issues regularly rather than in isolated cases. Xu said from China’s perspective the trade war has brought suffering to both sides; China’s exports continued to grow even as U.S. tariff efforts did not stop Chinese exports. Xu said the Chinese side was pragmatic about expanding trade in areas that are not sensitive, such as advanced chips, and that U.S. companies could be willing to sell items like oil, agriculture products (including soybeans and beef), and Boeing airplanes if trade targets fall outside high-tech and national-security sensitivities. He said China’s theme is cooperation-focused “strategic stability,” with limited competition, and communication across multiple areas including military and trade. Xu argued trade itself is mutually beneficial and that trade imbalance is not the real issue, tying underlying concerns to the U.S. role as the supplier of the major reserve currency. On energy security, Glenn described U.S. efforts to reduce exports from key energy exporters and replace them with U.S. supplies, including claims about Europe after Nord Stream and a push for U.S. centrality in energy infrastructure and sales. Xu Qinhua said China has concern about over-reliance on U.S. oil and LNG and forming reliance on the U.S. market amid negative U.S. media coverage and low trust. He said China has diversified exports to ASEAN, Southeast Asia, African countries, Latin America, and European markets, and diversified energy sources so reliance on a single source is usually not over 20%, with oil and gas coming from Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Ghana, among others. Xu said China is rapidly developing renewable energy (EVs, solar panels, and wind turbines), investing in nuclear power plants under construction, and also has coal resources and technology to transform coal into gas so that coal can provide electricity in worst-case scenarios. He linked this to energy security being both about sufficient supply and access to energy resources globally. Glenn raised Taiwan as a central security issue and asked how central it was in talks and whether a reduced-tension common meeting point existed. Xu Qinhua said Xi Jinping raised Taiwan as expected in discussions with Trump, calling it the most important issue between China and the U.S. and warning that mishandling it could put the overall relationship in jeopardy. Xu said the Chinese side increased the volume and severity of its messaging, warning that Taiwan separatist activity threatens regional peace and stability; Xu said arms sales to Taiwan embolden secessionists and create security risks. Xu said the U.S. “one China” principle has been hollowed out, citing that while a 1982 communiqué foundation includes that the U.S. would reduce arms sales until zero, Xu claimed the U.S. has increased arms sales to Taiwan. Xu argued that if Washington truly cared about peace, it would make clear to separatists that it opposes Taiwan independence and support peaceful reunification efforts, which Xu said would remove a persistent irritant and allow cooperation on issues such as AI governance and crises including the Strait of Hormuz and Ukraine. Xu added that even with U.S. intervention, Taiwan purchases of arms would not match Mainland capabilities, and he said U.S. support for separatists would fail to slow China’s modernization. Glenn asked about Iran and the Strait of Hormuz as an issue discussed between Xi and Trump. Xu Qinhua said the leaders’ discussions covered the Iranian crisis. Xu said some U.S. media coverage claimed Trump should pressure China to pressure the Iranians, but Xu said the “wrong approach” would be pressure from Washington; Xu said Beijing has nothing to do with the crisis and that the crisis is tied to a war launched by Washington and the Israelis without UN authorization, without proper explanation, and without legitimacy. Xu said China and the U.S. share some common interest in opening the Strait of Hormuz because Gulf nations’ exports rely on it and because China purchases about 50–40% of its energy from the region. Xu said Washington would need to restrain demands, respect the fact that it launched the war and failed to achieve its goals, and accept reality, while the Chinese side would help seek a long-term deal and stable relationship between the U.S. and Iran. Xu said the U.S. side had not been seen as earnest or faithful in resolving the problem. When Glenn asked how this aligns with a common stance that Iran should not have nuclear weapons, Xu Qinhua said he did not see tensions upcoming between China and Iran. Xu said multiple oil tankers were navigating the Strait of Hormuz with limited disruption, and that about 90% of Iranian oil exports go to China, meaning there is no point for China to ask for tolls on tankers destined for China. Xu said if Iranian control or tolls occur, China would not oppose, especially if the U.S. refuses compromise, refuses to lift sanctions, and does not allow normal business with other countries. Xu described the key issue as how long the U.S. will tolerate inflationary pressure and how the U.S. continues its approach against what he characterized as an Iranian blockade against the U.S. blockade. In closing, Glenn asked whether the meeting would produce a “grand bargain” or only minor tweaks to resolve disputes. Xu Qinhua said the encounter was significant, not only between the leaders but also because top executives mingled and talked, which Xu said could increase understanding and opportunities for engagement that had been absent for nine years or longer. Xu said 2026 could be a milestone year for China–U.S. relations due to frequent future meeting opportunities: Trump’s invitation for Xi to visit the U.S. in late September, plus further opportunities on the sidelines of APEC in Shenzhen and the G20 summit in the U.S. Xu said they had found the “right approach” of constructive strategic stability with cooperation-focused limited competition, moving away from zero-sum mentality, which Xu said could benefit both sides and the world.

The Quincy Institute’s executive vice president Trita Parsi discusses the risk that the U.S. goes to war with Iran again and how the dynamics of the last round may shape a new one. He says the risk of war has significantly gone up, though it is unclear whether it is above 50%. He argues the Beijing meeting between Trump and Xi delivered very little to the American side, noting that the Chinese statement about wanting the Strait open is described as “vanilla” and not meaningful because it depends on definitions of “open” and Iran’s control versus traffic flow. Parsi contrasts U.S. desires to “regionalize” the mechanism with China’s arrangement to get its ships out. He links recent increases in hostile rhetoric to a pattern of failures: the blockade of the blockade failing after the blockade itself and war threats failing, suggesting the Trump administration is being pushed toward another escalatory move. He also says Iran is “almost counting on an attack” while negotiations remain far apart on key issues, and he describes U.S. inflexibility in meeting “maximum demands.” On nuclear and related Chinese positions, Parsi says China’s stance aligns with the NPT and that China and other P5 states seek to preserve privileged status as nuclear weapon states. He contrasts China never saying Iran should not enrich with a hypothetical supportive signal that would have been made by calling for no enrichment. Discussing what could differ in a second round, Parsi critiques how Trump handled Iran’s “10 plan”: Trump publicly claimed the ceasefire would be based on Iran’s 10 proposal, but once negotiations started, he pursued a different approach. He then outlines U.S. hawks’ pushes for attacking Iran’s power grids and oil installations and even potentially destroying the state. He says assassinations and limited actions have not led to regime collapse, and that what has not been done is going in with ground troops, taking an island, or going after energy infrastructure. Parsi argues that targeting energy assets would prompt Iranian counter-escalation against GCC oil infrastructure, shifting the crisis from a bottleneck to a production problem that would drive oil prices above $180–$200 for a long time and throw the global economy into recession or depression. He says Trump has threatened these actions but did not carry them out. He adds that Iran expects retaliation at a higher level than before, including targeting the UAE for its role during the war and its increasing strategic partnership with Israel. He claims Iranian targeting could include companies and industries connected to Trump, such as AI and data centers used by Palantir, potentially harming the UAE’s investment as an AI hub. He also says Iran may close the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, and explore targeting undersea fiber optic cables that handle 99% of internet traffic in GCC states. He compares potential impact to a “second” Strait of Hormuz, noting Iran’s existing reliance on internal networks due to Iran’s internet being cut off. When asked about Iraq, Parsi says he has not followed it as closely but notes revelations that Israelis may have set up air bases in Iraq with U.S. pressure, and that GCC states and Iraq territories were used in attacks against Iran, whether voluntarily, without full knowledge, or under coercion. He argues this fits a broader view of Iraq becoming weak and unable to resist U.S. demands. He says it is plausible that Iran could use Iraq as a theater for horizontal escalation, though he does not know if it is likely in the first or second round. He says the U.S. underestimated Iranian horizontal escalation and attributes part of the miscalculation to Israeli efforts to depict Iran as weaker than it is. Parsi further explains Trump’s worldview: he says Iran’s refusal to talk directly with Trump reinforced an American belief that Iran was weak and would not escalate. He argues that Trump expected the war not to last more than four days, though he was mistaken. On U.S. primacy and multipolarity, Parsi argues that the U.S. did not achieve a military or political win in Iran: the U.S. “lost it,” with Iran establishing escalation dominance and the U.S. begging for a ceasefire. He says global repercussions include fuel shortages and energy crises across Australia and countries in South Asia and East Asia dependent on Persian Gulf oil. He adds that if the U.S. cannot establish escalation dominance in the Persian Gulf and is not willing to pay the price to open the Strait of Hormuz, this undermines questions about U.S. ability to sustain primacy and hegemony. In diplomacy, he emphasizes that military options are limited and costly, because defending islands and taking control of the straits would require actions and troop presence the U.S. is not willing to sustain. He claims diplomatic options are more promising, arguing Trump may be in a better position than previous presidents because he is willing to put all sanctions on the table and lift primary sanctions, which he says are executive-order based and do not require Congress, unlike secondary sanctions imposed by Congress. Parsi says sanctions relief beyond the JCPOA matters, and notes that in Iran’s last proposal Iran became open to a “moratorium” framing of not enriching for 12 years, a “remarkable shift.” He says the talks are currently deadlocked over Iran’s 60% stockpile but that both sides have shown some flexibility on other points. He also says Iran needs sanctions relief even more after the war, citing $300,000,000,000 in damages. Addressing Iran’s trust and the Strait of Hormuz, Parsi says Iran is unlikely to give up control, arguing it can reopen and reclose the strait due to assets along its coastline. He discusses a GCC proposal for an “environmental management fee” that he describes as functioning as a toll. He says any such payment would not compare to the scale of investments Iran could attract if sanctions were lifted. Finally, Parsi argues that peace depends on shifting rhetoric from zero-sum, hegemonic messaging toward diplomacy-based expectations of mutual concessions. He says Trump’s counterproductive social media rhetoric can disrupt breakthroughs and raises Iranian questions about his discipline and trustworthiness, while also claiming Trump is uniquely capable of making statements that break political taboos, including saying he wants Iran to flourish.

Glenn opened by noting the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing and recalling Nixon’s 1972 visit as a historic opening, asking Chas Freeman for an assessment of why Trump is going, what’s on the agenda, and what to expect. Chas Freeman replied that Trump’s trip seems driven more by ego and the desire to feel honored in public pomp, rather than any clear strategic preparation. He contrasted the current visit with Nixon’s, which occurred amid a perceived Soviet expansion threat that made China a “protected state.” Nixon’s approach aimed to bind China to the West against a common threat, leveraging China’s sovereignty to counter Japanese expansion and Soviet influence. Freeman said the current moment lacks evidence of serious preparation or sherpa-style groundwork; there is a hurried, last-minute negotiation underway in South Korea between China’s trade negotiator and U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s administration. He suggested Trump is accompanied by senior American business figures seeking deals—likely Boeing sales, soybean trade, AI topics—and noted the China-U.S. contrast in AI strategies: the U.S. pursues general intelligence with heavy investment, while China applies AI to practical projects with open software. Freeman argued that beyond trade and tech issues, the broader context is muddled, with no obvious shared interests that would compel China to act concretely to help the U.S. in the Gulf or Hormuz, despite China’s interest in free trade and openness. He projected the question of how this meeting might affect West Asia: the war’s outcome signals a post-Iraq-Iran era emerging not favorable to the West, and he anticipated China’s strategic calculus would be to avoid being drawn into U.S. missteps while advancing its own interests in energy corridors and regional stability. Glenn speculated about wanting a grand power compromise (with Putin included) and suggested more is needed on Iran. He referenced Robert Kagan’s “The Jungle Grows Back,” noting that the West’s disregard for international law now clashes with a rising Sino-Russian-Iran axis. Freeman agreed with Kagan’s assessment of the war as a strategic debacle for the U.S., arguing that Iran’s retention of the Strait of Hormuz is likely and that international law is endangered in sea-navigational terms. He described a broader shift: Gulf Arabs may diversify away from the U.S., leaning toward Sino-Russian partnerships, and sea-power norms could be devalued. He emphasized that the conflict reduces the likelihood of a favorable new status quo and could push proliferation in the region; Iran may have or soon develop a nuclear capability, while others might follow. The war’s main strategic consequence, Freeman asserted, is a move toward a Sino-Russian axis and a transformed balance of power in the Middle East, with diversification away from U.S. security guarantees. Glenn added that the Nixon move was strategic, while Trump’s engagement seems tactical, and Freeman underscored the broader transformation in West Asia. They discussed the rule-of-law crisis in the West, the difference between “rule of law” and “rule by law,” and how domestic and international norms influence each other. Freeman argued that China has become a defender of the UN Charter and international law, in contrast to perceived Western unilateralism, and that the “jungle” is reconstituting a new order under Westphalian principles with many middle powers maneuvering. They debated whether China would want Iran to succeed to push the U.S. out of the region, and Freeman reiterated that the Chinese aim aligns with Westphalian sovereignty and peaceful coexistence, not ideological missionary diplomacy. They concluded that the Trump-Xi meeting could yield either a cautious pause or a dangerous misstep, given Trump’s temperament and Xi’s steadiness, and Freeman voiced cautious relief that nothing catastrophic occurs, while Glenn expressed a wish for a constructive outcome that could open space for rethinking Western hegemonic strategies.

Ashton Rutanski hosts Going Underground from a region tensioned by ongoing missiles and drone attacks and the wider aftermath of what he describes as the Trump-era wars in the Middle East. He notes that Xi Jinping canceled and rescheduled a meeting with Trump in Beijing, shortly after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met Wang Yi, with China and Russia blocking UN Security Council efforts to condemn Iran's actions in the Strait of Hormuz and China directing its companies to ignore Washington’s oil sanctions on Tehran. Rutanski frames the current sanctions as part of a long tradition of U.S. sanctions and cites figures from The Lancet Health Journal on deaths linked to those sanctions. He then introduces Paul Craig Roberts, former US assistant secretary of the treasury for economic policy under Reagan and former associate editor of the Wall Street Journal. Roberts argues that if Iran had prevailed in the Gaza conflict, the outcome could have reshaped world events, claiming Iran could have “pummeled the American bases and Israel into a surrender” if not for a ceasefire. He says the ceasefire was a mistake that prevented solidifying a victory and criticizes negotiations as ineffective against hegemonic powers like the United States and Israel, which he characterizes as pursuing greater Israel and broader regional hegemony. He suggests that negotiating with such powers is pointless when their aim is existential, and he contends that Iranian taktics were good but the strategic plan was flawed. Rutanski asks about media and political rhetoric, including allegations that Japan’s Financial Times (as a stand-in for Western media) reports Iran warning the U.S. not to enter the Hormuz Strait and to launch drones at the UAE. Roberts reiterates his view that negotiations with hegemonic powers are futile when those powers deny others’ right to exist, and stresses that the broader issue is the Zionist agenda of Greater Israel. He asserts that Arab and Muslim states have never confronted this agenda and argues that Iran should use its position to raise the Greater Israel issue as a matter of diplomacy and regional sovereignty, rather than focusing solely on uranium enrichment or coastal control. The discussion turns to Neoconservatism and American policy history. Roberts recalls the Iran-Contra affair as an early neoconservative moment, and cites Norman Podhoretz’s call for “the elimination of seven countries in five years” (Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon). He contends that U.S. policy has long aimed to reshape the Middle East in support of Greater Israel, with ongoing Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Western support for Israel. Regarding Trump, Roberts dismisses Trump’s statements as nonsensical and references an official U.S. State Department document claiming that the United States attacked Iran “at the request of Israel.” He criticizes mainstream journalism and suggests much reporting has become aligned with official narratives, while noting that Iran’s strategic posture should be to confront the Zionist agenda rather than to engage in other points of negotiation. The conversation touches on Vladimir Putin and Ukraine, arguing that Putin’s long-running war has widened and become increasingly dangerous; Roberts criticizes Putin for not seizing opportunities and notes that the broader regional conflict is expanding into NATO airspace, which could destabilize regimes in the region. The program closes with Roberts emphasizing the need for the Muslim world to frame its negotiations around the Greater Israel issue and for internal Israeli politics to reflect on the Zionist agenda, then signs off with condolences for those affected by NATO-era wars and invites viewers to continue watching on Going Underground.

Speaker 0 argues that control over the strait is more powerful than any nuclear weapon, noting that control is clearly in Iran’s hands, with additional mining of the southern portion forcing ships to sail right next to Iran’s total control. They criticize MAGA/Trump supporters for claiming Iran must open it immediately, saying, “you can say all the words you want, but Iran still controls the strait. And that means they control the backbone of the energy of planet earth, period.” Speaker 1 responds that Trump is desperate for a solution because the situation is humiliating the United States. They recount the U.S. posture since the Carter era, referencing the Carter Doctrine: to secure the energy-producing region in exchange for security guarantees, ensuring the Strait of Hormuz remains open. They remind that in 1987, during Operation Earnest Will, the U.S. Navy reflagged the Kuwaiti tanker fleet and escorted it through the Strait of Hormuz to protect it from Iraq and Iran. They say the Iranians watched and learned, and have since developed the capabilities to shut the strait down, and that the U.S. cannot keep it open—our navy, air force, and lack of sufficient ground power can’t do it. Therefore, Iran “own this. It is theirs, and they have declared it is ours.” Speaker 1 warns that if Iran continues to shut the strait, it will cause permanent damage, including permanent economic damage globally, with Europe facing an energy crisis it won’t recover from and Asia facing serious economic harm, including China. They note that China has intervened and pressured Iran to come to the table because a significant portion of China’s energy comes from the Middle East and from countries unable to ship oil due to the closure. They conclude that China told the Iranians they must sit down and talk with the Americans, and that Iran didn’t want to come to the table because they are “winning this war,” asserting, “they’re like, keep bombing us. We don’t care. You’re not destroying us. You’re not breaking our will. We’re destroying you. We’re humiliating you.” The Iranians, according to Speaker 1, were told by the Chinese to flow oil again and to begin talks, prompting Iran to sit down with the Americans.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Prof. Syed Muhammad Marandi of Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. The latest news is a U.S. peace proposal for Iran, with expectations of Iran’s response. The deal reportedly doesn’t address nuclear issues or the Strait of Hormuz. What can we make of this, and what wider negotiations are taking place? Marandi: Regarding the American proposal, we’ll have to wait to see the content, but Iran’s position is clear and unlikely to shift from its current priorities. First, a ceasefire and end to the fighting. The United States and the Israeli regime are currently violating the ceasefire, and until they end the slaughter in Lebanon and Gaza and the siege, there will be no possibility to move forward. After that, it will be the 10 Plan that Iran put forward and Trump accepted. Iran is not going to move away from that. If the Americans think over time this is just internal consumption, they are mistaken. It’s a major miscalculation akin to the miscalculation of launching the war. The Americans are now insisting that Iran respond within a time frame; Iran will respond when ready, possibly a day or two or three later, to avoid being intimidated. The American proposal, if true, likely violates Iran’s sovereignty and seeks something it could not gain on the battlefield. Iran would be flexible on issues but not on principles. On nuclear program, enrichment, sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, these won’t be given up. Iran is willing to do a deal, like in 2015, but not the Obama-era version; it would need an upgraded agreement that Iran envisions, not one Trump thinks is upgraded. Any deal, if it occurs, would have to be far more favorable than the 2015 agreement. The war participants gambled and lost; an attack could still occur. There’s a strong possibility of an imminent attack, and Iranian preparations reflect that outlook. No ships have left the Strait of Hormuz; Iran’s response to previous U.S. actions has been robust, while avoiding heavy escalation. The Strait of Hormuz has not been closed by Iran; it remains open for friendly states and those who have not joined the war against Iran. Glenn: It does seem the U.S. is returning to potential all-out war against Iran, though the U.S. may have limitations in what it can actually achieve. You mentioned Lebanon and Israel; has the push to address Lebanon’s siege dropped out of talks, or is it still on the table from the American side? Marandi: Iran’s stance is that there must be a regional ceasefire that includes Gaza; Lebanon is part of that regional ceasefire condition. Iran will not remove that from the table. Washington and Netanyahu demanded unconditional surrender at the war’s start, but after 39 days they accepted Iran’s 10-Plan as the basis for negotiations. Iran will not accept a shift in the American position, nor the continued slaughter of Palestinians and Lebanese as a precondition for talking. Glenn: What about disruption in Gulf cooperation with the U.S.? Saudi airspace was limited then reversed; are there splits in the U.S.-led alliance, or was that transient? Marandi: It’s unclear; the Iranians know U.S. airpower is concentrated in Qatar, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait. The Iranians are prepared for attack and believe the U.S. has not yet achieved its aims. Western reporting suggests Iran’s missiles and drones have advanced beyond what was seen in the 39-day war, with new underground-produced systems demonstrating greater capability. Glenn: On China, Xi Jinping and Iran recently met; how will that affect talks with the U.S. President and Xi’s approach? Marandi: China and Iran held a good meeting; China is impressed by Iran’s performance in the war, as are Russia and many others. China recognizes that the U.S. is targeting China, Russia, and Iran simultaneously. Iran’s relations with China are strong, but Iran won the war largely on its own—resilience, leadership, and the people’s support. The Strait of Hormuz is controlled by Iran, and the U.S. cannot overturn that within any negotiation framework. Glenn: If the U.S. returns to full-scale war, what red lines would Iran consider triggers for a broader conflict? Marandi: The likelihood is a major assault combined with terrorist incursions from northern Iraq and Pakistan-based groups, with ground actions against Iran. Iran believes it could counter and destroy critical infrastructure, including in Gulf states, which would escalate and likely devastate regional and global markets. Iran would retaliate against infrastructure targets, maintaining restraint toward civilians, but would not refrain from destroying critical assets if Iran’s infrastructure is attacked. If a new war begins, Iran expects a comprehensive defeat of the invading forces and non-cooperation with further aggression. Glenn: Thank you for the insights. We’ll likely speak again as this situation evolves. Marandi: Thank you, I appreciate it.

- The discussion begins with concern about the quality of Speaker 1’s internet connection for recorded YouTube work. Speaker 1 explains that their neighborhood has a monopolist limiting updates to local software/hardware, and says their own Starlink setup is going up, with 20+ or ~30 satellites already online and deploying quickly. Speaker 1 then jokes about sponsoring revolutions abroad, noting France and the UK should be ready. - The conversation shifts to international developments, focusing on the “Iran war” and later Ukraine/Russia, and then on Trump’s visit to China. - Speaker 1 describes alleged details from Trump’s China visit: Tajikistan’s president was visiting the same day, and during Trump’s arrival only part of the route’s flags were reportedly changed from Tajik to US flags. Speaker 1 frames this as a “soft insult.” - On Xi Jinping meeting Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin at airports/tarmacs, Speaker 1 says some claims are not true and emphasizes protocol and past examples: in prior meetings (Xi and Putin; Trump arriving previously), Xi reportedly met Putin at the tarmac, sat down with the top down, and drove into the city. Speaker 1 also says that in Trump’s last China arrival, Trump reportedly had Xi waiting. - Speaker 1 assesses the Xi–Trump meeting as unprepared compared with highly structured US-style or adversarial-country meetings. They describe how security teams, working diplomats, document preparation, possible joint statements, and agenda negotiation are typically handled before leaders meet. Speaker 1 compares this to earlier dynamics seen in Anchorage (with Trump allegedly seeking speed for a PR/picture moment). - The thread links the China visit to energy leverage involving Iran and Venezuela. Speaker 1 says Venezuela’s capacity is limited (around 800,000 barrels/day) and that significantly expanding it takes time and large investment. Speaker 1 argues US refining limitations matter: US refineries were set up for heavier sour crude (described as “viscous” and “sour” due to sulfur) and the US has not built a new refinery in over 30 years, citing bureaucracy and environmental laws as reasons companies left. - Speaker 1 elaborates on why the US cannot easily expand refining quickly, citing high insurance costs for factory work and related regulatory burdens, leading factories to move elsewhere. - Speaker 0 asks whether Trump intended a different sequence: Speaker 1 says the initial idea was to seek earlier wins and use Venezuela and Iran concessions to gain leverage, but the meeting reportedly came with Trump facing weaker leverage and needing help on Iran. - Taiwan discussions: Speaker 1 says reunification preferences exist among the Taiwanese opposition party that met Xi in China, with Taiwan described as the “Republic of China” and some groups categorized as seeking reconquest/reunification. Speaker 1 discusses why supplying Taiwan for conflict is difficult across open water and notes past US War College war-game conclusions that China would win if the US fleet intervened between China and Taiwan, while US strategy (as described) aims to make invasion costly rather than “winning.” - Proxy-war framing: Speaker 1 describes Ukraine and Iran/Yemen conflict patterns as proxy dynamics, referencing Marco Rubio’s admission that one war is a proxy war. - Iran supply/blockade claims: Speaker 1 says Iran is supplied via multiple routes—ports on the Caspian connected through Russian ports, and a rail line through Pakistan to China—plus other smaller export/storage options. Speaker 1 argues Iran’s weakness has historically included refining and diesel shortages, comparing it to the US importing refined product because it cannot refine enough to meet demand. - Venezuela capacity and US-advantaged/refinery/infrastructure problems are revisited, including discussion of reserves being held in gold in the US, social spending reductions of reinvestment, and US confiscation/export restrictions on equipment replacement, leading to worn-out infrastructure and the lack of “quick fixes.” - Straits of Hormuz and alleged “fee” idea: Speaker 0 cites a White House statement that China agreed to buy American oil to diversify from Hormuz and that Iran should not charge a fee for the Straits of Hormuz. Speaker 1 responds that Iran does not charge China fees (as stated by Speaker 1), then argues China’s commitments would only be clear if China confirms them, and compares this to past statements where purchases were claimed without matching agreements. - Speaker 1 argues sanctions can be moved/bypassed by the US government, not lifted by it, and says only US Congress can remove sanctions. Speaker 1 also claims the US continues buying sanctioned Russian products, while Europeans are criticized for accepting costly resell markups. - Speaker 1 also argues Hormuz isn’t treated as international waters in their view, and that Oman involvement matters, including claims about Oman not installing tollbooths and Iran striking ships—contrasted with the idea that a long-term/perpetual fee would open global choke-point “can of worms.” - Broader geopolitical framing: Speaker 1 says the “global system” is effectively gone, arguing the US helped build it and then killed it when it no longer served US interest, citing examples like the WTO and the strategic focus on controlling key choke points. Speaker 1 contrasts sea routes with Eurasia land connectivity and high-speed rail, linking this to belt-and-road connectivity. - Back to Iran: Speaker 0 asks whether China is pressuring Iran to concede or offering Trump political support with words. Speaker 1 says China prefers status quo and would prefer an end to war without weakening American stockpiles; Speaker 1 also says Iran’s ceasefire is not a full ceasefire and that both sides continue actions. - US military capacity and escalation: Speaker 1 argues that if Trump restarts the war, missile production is “null and void” at scale, and US manufacturing/industrial ramp-up would take years, citing the “missile production is null and void” point and the difficulty of rapid industry re-shoring due to state regulations. Speaker 1 discusses rare earths as a limiting factor in a different way—refining/processing capacity rather than shortage of elements—then argues chemical/electrolysis processing is expensive, energy intensive, and environmentally complex, often causing multi-year delays similar to refineries. - Soft-power indicators from Xi’s alleged absence and flag changes are used to explain Chinese behavior toward Trump, contrasted with prior high-level airport greetings and seating/handshake optics. Speaker 1 compares seating arrangements and perceived humiliation in European/Serbia contexts as a recurring pattern of power display. - Iran-war outcome speculation: Speaker 0 proposes a 50/50 scenario: continuation of conflict with Israeli strikes (and Iran mirroring strikes in the Gulf) versus Trump walking away. Speaker 1 says Israelis are driving outcomes and that APAC donors and money make turning away difficult, arguing Trump wants out but is constrained. Speaker 1 also says Iran and even Saudis/Kuwaitis reportedly would prefer US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. - US military withdrawal and logistics: Speaker 1 says the US fifth fleet has left, its forward headquarters is moving to Israel, and damage estimates/repair costs are discussed. Speaker 1 argues the US is drawn into a genocide-perception dynamic once bases/equipment and US involvement are present. - Historical Iraq/Kuwait/Persian Gulf narrative: Speaker 0 asks why the US wanted Saddam to invade Kuwait. Speaker 1 asserts the US wanted Iraq to enter the Persian Gulf and become positioned for broader US presence, describing US backing for conflicts involving Iran and chemical weapons channels, and claiming Kuwait engaged in slant drilling stealing Iraqi oil. Speaker 1 says the US/Soviet coalition dynamics allowed the Gulf buildup and entry point into the region. - Final escalation discussion and regional future: Speaker 0 asks whether Trump will walk away or get trapped into escalation for a “win.” Speaker 1 says Israel’s influence over the US is expected to decline, claims generational shifts among American Jews/Christians and anti-Israel demonstrations, and argues Iran and the Gulf could reshape into new blocks with improved Gulf-Iran relations if stability is prioritized. - The conversation ends with debate over perceived misconceptions about Iran’s treatment of minorities and religious/political representation, plus discussion contrasting Iran with Saudi Arabia in terms of women’s legal status and religious policing, followed by a plan to do a future live recording using appropriate software.

In the conversation, Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, addresses multiple interwoven geopolitical issues, centering on Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader strategic rivalry with the United States and its allies. Syria and ISIS release - Marandi asserts that the Damascus regime, described as al-Qaeda/ISIS-aligned factions, would not tolerate Kurdish forces backed by the United States. He notes prior violence against Alawites, Christians, and Druze as context for the current disturbing images from Syria. - He argues the United States is not a reliable partner for its allies, pointing to past episodes such as Obama’s refusal to support Arbil when ISIS threatened the Kurdish government, and Soleimani’s rapid military response to save the city. - He states that ISIS prisoners have been released in Syria, implying that thousands of ISIS members are now free and could destabilize Syria and possibly Iraq. He emphasizes that both Jolani (an ISIS-linked figure) and the Kurdish groups in northeast Syria are allied to the United States, making it unclear who released the prisoners but suggesting that those actors are aligned with the U.S. - The broader implication is that the release increases instability in Syria and potentially across the region. Border security and spillover fears - The discussion turns to Iraq’s border with Syria, with Marandi weighing whether U.S.-backed jihadist forces might spill into Iraq or Lebanon. He suggests a likelihood that ISIS/Al-Qaeda remnants could be used to pressure Lebanon and Iraq to prevent closer Iranian influence. - He notes that Iran’s potential responses could include its missile and drone capabilities, should security worsen on a front involving its allies in Lebanon and Iraq; however, Iran currently refrains from large-scale involvement in Syria but would consider action if threats to Iran or its allies escalate. Regime change, fragmentation, and U.S.-Israel aims - The conversation shifts to Iran post-riots, with questions about U.S./Israel strategies for regime change. Marandi contends the plan is to destabilize and fragment Iran, not to establish a unified post-regime scenario. - He cites alleged Israeli and Western involvement in organizing riots as evidence of a broader conspiracy to create chaos and justify military action. He claims Mossad and other intelligence agencies were on the ground, and public statements from former CIA officials acknowledged Israeli involvement. - He describes the riot phase as highly organized, with foreign funding (including Bitcoin), online recruitment, and careful targeting of police and infrastructure. He portrays the protests as initially legitimate grievances that devolved into violent chaos fueled by external coordination, with widespread destruction and deaths, including the killing of police officers. - In contrast, he highlights large pro-government demonstrations, especially a national day of demonstrations that he says showed widespread popular support for the Islamic Republic and condemnation of rioters. He points to extensive media coverage highlighting peaceful protests, while arguing that the riot narrative dominated Western coverage. Internal Iranian dynamics and public opinion - Marandi emphasizes the fragmentation among Iranian opposition groups: MEK, monarchists, Takfiri remnants near the Pakistan border, and Kurdish separatists, all of whom he asserts lack credible popular support. - He argues that even if the regime were at risk, fragmentation would prevent any single faction from stabilizing the country post-regime change. He suggests this aligns with his view of broader Israeli aims to weaken and fragment Iran and neighboring states, as seen in Syria and Iraq. Military capability and deterrence - He asserts Iran’s substantial missile and drone capabilities and asserts that Iran could defend allies in Lebanon and Iraq if needed. He notes Iran’s long-term preparedness against U.S. threats, including underground bases and extensive drone/missile stocks. - He contends that if war occurred, it would have wide regional and global economic consequences, potentially destabilizing oil markets and prompting broader geopolitical upheaval. He argues that U.S. restraint may be influenced by the risk of a global economic meltdown. Russia, China, and Starlink - Regarding technological assistance for countering communications, he mentions rumors of Russian or Chinese involvement in aiding Iran's internet disruption and Starlink-related issues, acknowledging uncertainty but highlighting a growing trilateral closeness among Iran, Russia, and China in the face of U.S. pressure. media narratives and leadership - He criticizes Western media for portraying protests as peaceful, while Israeli claims and cyber/disinformation around the events are presented as demonstrations of foreign involvement. He maintains that internal Iranian unity—visible in large-scale demonstrations—contrasts with the portrayal of a fractured nation. - He closes by suggesting that while some European leaders may align with U.S. policies, the overall strategic outlook remains uncertain, with a warning that Trump’s approach could escalate tensions rather than yield stability.

Wang Wen, professor and dean of the Changyang Institute of Financial Studies and the School of Global Leadership at Renmin University of China, discusses Beijing’s view on the Iran war and its broader implications for China and the international order. - China’s position on the Iran conflict: Beijing emphasizes a resolution through political negotiation and opposes unilateral military action not authorized by the UN. China calls for a ceasefire, an end to hostility, respect for sovereignty and development rights, and opposes the maximum pressure campaign and long-term sanctions. This stance reflects adherence to international law, multilateralism, and safeguarding global peace, while aligning with China’s strategic interests as a major energy importer and advocate of multilateral solutions. - Context of a shifting world order: The justifications for a multipolar world are growing. The U.S. and Germany are viewed as nearing the end of their post–Cold War order, with the world entering a multipolar era. Two features cited: the U.S. has largely lost the capacity to dominate globally and may retreat to regional influence, while emerging powers (China, Russia, India, Brazil, and others) rise and constrain U.S. ability to contain them. Iran is seen as part of this broader transition, with the possibility of greater regional and systemic shifts over the coming decade. - China’s cautious but steady approach: China maintains a low-profile stance and continues normal trade with all sides (including the U.S., Israel, and Iran) while urging ceasefires and political resolution. US sanctions targeting Chinese banks and Iran are deemed unreasonable threats; Beijing signals it will counter such measures if pressed. - Belt and Road and Middle East investments: China’s Middle East investments and the Belt and Road Initiative (BI) face disruption due to the war. Oil imports via the Strait of Hormuz (about 35% of China’s oil) and China’s broader energy security are affected. China’s approach emphasizes diversification: expanding overland corridors (e.g., North–South routes, Eurasian Railway Express, Trans-C-Cascadia paths, Central Asia Land Corridor) and increasing energy sourcing from non-Middle Eastern suppliers (Russia, Central Asia, Africa, South America) to reduce reliance on maritime routes. Investment in Iran (about $5 billion, with projects across the region) has slowed as the war continues, with evacuations and impeded progress, though China’s strategic emphasis on diversified transport and energy remains central. - Taiwan issue and potential conflict: Wang argues that if China intends to resolve Taiwan by force, the U.S. would have already lost the capacity to stop it; a peaceful resolution is increasingly likely. He states that any use of force would target independence rather than the general public in Taiwan, and reiterates China’s long-standing preference for peaceful unification. - US–China–Russia triangle: The conflict reshapes this triangle. The U.S. is constrained by Iran, becoming more erratic, and signaling toward China and Russia. Russia benefits from higher oil prices and the Ukraine situation, while China faces oil-import pressures and market volatility. Overall, the U.S. strategy appears less capable of containing both China and Russia; both Beijing and Moscow gain strategic leverage in this environment. - Risks and opportunities for China if the war continues: Energy security risks rise due to higher oil costs and potential disruption to Middle East trade, complicating BI projects and regional diplomacy. The situation increases the appeal of diversification of energy sources and transport corridors. However, China typically prefers peace and stability as the best path for growth. - The new book and strategic opportunity: Wang promotes his book, New Strategic Opportunity: China and the World toward 2035, arguing that the world’s turbulence highlights China’s peace, stability, and prosperity as valuable. He contends that no matter the adverse environment, China can seize new strategic opportunities by focusing on domestic development, reinforcing that the longer the U.S. seeks conflict, the more China upholds peace and rises. - Closing observations: The interviewer notes the broader perception of China’s growing influence and responsibility in shaping a responsible international system, with Wang affirming a peaceful, opportunity-driven path for China’s rise.

Speaker 0: This war was never about Iran. And once you see it, you can't unsee it. Everyone's focused on the missiles, the Strait Of Hormuz, the oil price, but nobody's asking the only question that matters. Who actually gets hurt when Iran's oil disappears? Not America. Not Europe. China. 80% of Iranian oil goes to Asia. China has been buying millions of barrels from Iran every single month under the table around sanctions through back channels. Iran is China's cheap energy lifeline, and Trump just cut it off. He bombed Karg Island, the one port that handles 90% of Iran's oil exports. He didn't hit it by accident. He hit it because that's the pipe that feeds Beijing. But here's what makes this genius. Before he even touched Iran, he captured Maduro, took Venezuela, secured the largest oil reserves on the planet for The US. So when Iran's oil disappears from the global market, America has the replacement. China doesn't. Think about what that means. China's energy costs just exploded. Their factories, their manufacturing, their entire economic engine runs on cheap oil, and the cheap oil just got cut off. While America is sitting on Venezuela on domestic production on the strongest energy position in decades, Iran didn't lose this war. Iran was never the target. Iran was the move you sacrifice to take the queen. This was never a war in The Middle East. This is an energy war against China, and most people won't understand that until it's already over. Wake up.

Syed Mohamed Marandi discusses the collapse of the Islamabad negotiations and the wider implications of the current U.S.-Iran confrontation. - On what happened in Islamabad: Iran participated despite low expectations, aiming to show willingness to resolve the crisis if Americans are reasonable and to ensure the world sees Iran’s efforts. The Iranians believed the United States lacked will to make progress. During talks there was some progress on various issues, but near the end the United States shifted to a hard line on the nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Vance claimed Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, a claim Marandi notes was contradicted by former counterintelligence official Joe Kent’s resignation letter. Netanyahu reportedly maintains direct influence, with Vance reporting to Netanyahu daily, which Iran views as undermining an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on control and “being the boss” is presented as a central obstacle to any deal. The ceasefire in Lebanon was touted as failing, with Netanyahu and Trump accused of conspiring to wreck it, and Iran’s actions after the ceasefire aligned with this view. The Iranian delegation flew back by land after the flight to Tehran was diverted, reflecting the perceived danger and the Washington Post piece calling for the murder of negotiators. Iran’s approach is framed as attempting to resolve the problem while signaling willingness to negotiate if U.S. policy becomes reasonable. - On the blockade and its consequences: The U.S. blockade on Iranian ports has just begun and will likely worsen the global economic crisis, pushing more countries to oppose the United States. China is angry as Washington dictates terms against oil and trade in the region. The blockade could be used to strangle China’s energy supplies, creating a double-edged impact by simultaneously worsening the global crisis and pressuring U.S. allies. Iran says it may respond by striking ships in the Red Sea and blocking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman if the blockade continues. Iran notes it has substantial financial resilience from oil sales at higher prices without middlemen, with about 100 million barrels left to sell after selling half of its declared oil stock, and it views energy shortages as likely to trigger broader economic disruption, including shortages of helium, LNG, and fertilizers. - On war readiness and possible outcomes: Iran anticipates a major assault and is preparing defenses and offensive capabilities. Iran argues negotiations were not taken seriously by the United States and believes the U.S. is buying time. Iran would view victories as having the United States back down, preserving Iran’s rights, and protecting its regional allies, with a long-term ceasefire. Iran contends it should control the Strait of Hormuz to prevent future aggression and seeks compensation for damages caused by the conflict, emphasizing sovereignty over Hormuz and peace for Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran states that if the U.S. and its regional proxies strike, Iran would respond by targeting energy and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. - On broader geopolitical shifts and regional dynamics: Marandi argues the current crisis accelerates a move toward a multipolar world, with the United States’ hegemonic position eroding. The UAE is portrayed as pushing for war, while other Gulf states are increasingly wary. He predicts a possible land invasion of Iran, but emphasizes Iran’s long-term preparedness and resilience. Weather and terrain are cited as factors likely to complicate a potential U.S. invasion, particularly in the hot summer conditions of the region. - On potential definitions of “victory”: Iran’s victory would involve U.S. backing down, Iran preserving its rights, a long-term ceasefire, and sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. A broader victory would see the end of supremacism in Palestine and the end of genocidal actions in Lebanon, with peace across the region as a key objective. The discussion ends with the notion that a shift toward an American focus on its republic, rather than empire, would benefit global stability.

- The discussion opens with trying to map a post-war world, considering both a quick end to the war and a prolonged one, with a focus on US–China relations, US allies, Iran, and the broader region. A participant notes a broader battle between a China–Russia–Iran alignment and the Western alliance, including financial systems. - A major regional shift is already underway: by 2000, the top banks were dominated by Japanese and European players; by 2025, China dominates the top four banks. The speaker argues that power is moving from Western banks to China, and that countries with US-dollar-denominated debt are converting debt into renminbi because it’s cheaper. - In the last week, Russia and China signaled to Iran a push to revisit the Gulf security architecture. Putin spoke to Iraq about Gulf security; Wang Yi did the same. The implied shift is toward a Gulf security framework less dependent on US protection. - The current Gulf security model is described as US bases guaranteeing protection from Iran, coupled with a demand that recipient states buy US Treasuries and military equipment. The speakers argue this model left Gulf states vulnerable and exposed as US defense systems failed to prevent Iranian attacks in the recent episode. - Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and to a lesser extent the UAE) are discussed as potentially moving away from the United States toward Russia and China. A Pakistani ISI general reportedly said Saudi and Qatari leaders are breaking from the US; one NBC report cited Trump canceling Project Freedom due to Saudi resistance to air operations from Prince Saud Air Base. The implication is a Persian Gulf broadly shifting into the Russian–Chinese sphere, potentially altering Gulf financial flows away from the US dollar toward gold and the yuan. - An opposing view, aired by another economist, suggests the US will strengthen its deterrence in the Gulf, with UAE as an indicator. The counterpoint argues that the Gulf countries previously supported Iran’s adversaries, including indirect funding for attacks on Iran, implying US deterrence remains necessary. - The conversation emphasizes the gulf’s deterrence history: Iran has largely avoided offensive military action in the Gulf against the region, while Gulf states have relied on US protection. The lack of a robust Chinese or Russian security guarantee in the region is highlighted as a real risk to Gulf security calculations. - There is a debate about whether US military power remains credible. One participant argues the US has not won a major war since World War II, with recent actions described as limited or draw outcomes; another contends that US protection remains essential despite past failures, given Iran’s capabilities and history. - Military-strategy discussions cover the feasibility of a ground invasion vs. airstrike-only approaches. The speakers outline logistical challenges (water, supply lines, mountainous terrain) and the scale of forces needed (potentially large, multi-month training and buildup) to degrade Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Arguments are made that holding the Strait of Hormuz would be difficult if Iran can still launch missiles and drones from interior positions. - The strategic importance of Gulf exports is quantified: Gulf oil about 32% of world supply; LNG around 20% (centered on Qatar and the Gulf), urea and sulfur for agriculture and industry (urea ~36%; sulfur for refining and semiconductors), and helium from Qatar at about 33%. Keeping the Gulf open is framed as essential to global energy, inflation, and agriculture. - A possible pathway to open the Hormuz is proposed: Iran could offer broad access to global markets except for countries allied with Israel or those that attacked Iran; Iran would leverage this to restart global flows, particularly to Asia. The idea is that a near-term crisis could force a negotiated settlement with Iran. - The timeline mentions a forthcoming peace negotiation in Beijing next week, with skepticism about it proceeding smoothly. If negotiations occur, Trump would not likely receive a warm reception due to recent sanctions and US actions against China; China has signaled resolve against US sanctions, instructing its companies not to acquiesce to pressure. - Overall, the dialogue frames the war as a potential catalyst for a broader realignment: power shifting toward China and Russia, a Gulf region hedging its security through new alliances, and the global economy recalibrating around yuan- and gold-based financial flows, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining a central strategic chokepoint.

Afshun Rutansi speaks with Professor Zhang Weiwei, director of the China Institute at Fudan University, who has translated for Chinese paramount leaders including Deng Xiaoping. Rutansi frames the discussion around Trump’s visit to China amid the Israel-Iran war context and events including officials meeting in Delhi and a reported Saudi initiative for a West Asian aggression pact with Iran ahead of Putin’s and Xi Jinping’s scheduled meeting in Beijing. Rutansi asks whether Chinese officials understand that Xi Jinping is meeting a U.S. president responsible for attacking one of China’s key energy trading partners. Zhang says many Chinese prefer Trump over Harris for being “slightly more honest,” and contrasts Trump’s “decent respect” for big powers such as Russia and China with perceived hypocrisy from Biden and Harris. He argues that China should manage damage through dialogue given U.S.-China as the two largest economies and military powers. Rutansi raises historical memory, arguing that the U.S. deliberately prevented China from buying grain during Mao’s famine and imposed a naval blockade of food. Zhang responds that, during the Cold War, although no “hot wars” occurred between the U.S. and Soviet Union, China faced the Korean War and the Vietnam War as direct military confrontation with the U.S., and that China remembers the U.S. drawing lessons from those conflicts and that China would fight back if “red lines” were crossed. On claims that Trump is “destroying China while smiling” and attacking China’s energy supplies, Zhang says operations tied to Venezuela and Iran are aimed at controlling oil China needs. He says Venezuela represents less than 3% of China’s total oil imports, so it “will not affect” China’s oil supply, while the Iran situation is “more serious” and is treated as a mistake from which China can benefit due to long-term energy planning pursued for about two decades. Zhang says China’s energy dependency on foreign supply is at maximum 15%, and outlines China’s current energy mix: about 52% from coal described as “processed green coal,” 20% from renewables, and the rest from traditional oil and gas, with roughly 70% of those fuels from foreign sources. He lists diversified oil supply routes including lines from Russia, Central Asia, and Myanmar, and highlights a railway connection between China and Iran as “hugely important for Iran.” Rutansi asks whether this railway was bombed as part of a U.S.-Israeli campaign; Zhang says the U.S. “really dare[s]” not to damage it overall and that on the whole it is still moving. Zhang links U.S. efforts to containment with previous trade and tech wars starting in 2018, saying they “failed completely,” and cites an ASPI report comparing critical high-tech technologies where he claims China beats the U.S. in 57 of 64. He argues China’s position is that the Strait of Hormuz should remain open and places responsibility for the crisis’s consequences on U.S. and Israeli military action, while also saying China has “strategic partner” relations with Iran and Gulf states and hopes for reconciliation between Iran and the Gulf States. In part two, Rutansi asks why China was not hosting or acting as intermediary in negotiations and whether China spoke through Pakistan. Zhang says China prefers “behind the scene, low key” approaches. Rutansi then addresses claims that China could use rare earths as leverage and asks why China exports rare earths to the U.S. Zhang says China has exercised stricter control over rare earth exports to the U.S. since the previous year, stating that for a one-year period there would be no rare earths for military purposes, and that China can exercise this control during negotiations. Rutansi asks whether China will reduce exposure to U.S. treasury markets; Zhang says China-U.S. trade relations are normal overall, but that Trump’s trade war led to a sharp drop, and describes China’s “socialist market economy” as driven by private and public enterprises. He rejects “moralistic perspective” as the main lens, stating that China follows international law and Chinese law, condemns aggression, and applies sanctions through the United Nations if necessary. Rutansi criticizes propaganda narratives and asks about the U.N. General Assembly president Annalina Beerbok calling Xi Jinping a dictator, asking whether that makes things difficult for China and the U.N. Zhang argues the issue lies in EU politics and what he calls low caliber of EU, U.S., and NATO leadership, and says he predicted that without political reform, worse leaders would be elected. On whether working classes in NATO countries will see through propaganda that China is the enemy, Zhang says opinion surveys show China’s impression improving gradually in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and in the West, especially among young people, attributing this in part to widespread use of Chinese hardware and software. He also explains that American and other foreign companies invested in China because of profits, and says the trade war and tech war drove high-tech firms to consolidate business interests in China; he mentions Apple, Tesla, Microsoft, and says Boeing has not been purchased in nine years while Boeing’s CEO is now in China.

Einar Tangin and Glenn discuss the forthcoming Xi Jinping–Donald Trump meeting and the broader strategic landscape shaping U.S.–China competition. - On the Trump–Xi meeting: Tangin expects very little substantive outcome. China’s strategy toward the United States is to keep engagement open rather than push Trump into a corner, despite Trump’s past actions and their consequences. He notes a narrow scope to be discussed in a California meeting, with Trump volunteers unprepared and pushing “the usual maximist stuff.” China is signaling that Taiwan will be a red line. Beyond that, the Chinese may accept limited concessions such as grain, gas, or oil purchases, but no sweeping arrangements. The overall takeaway: continued engagement, but not a game-changing breakthrough. - U.S. energy and global strategy: Tangin argues the United States uses energy as a tool of influence, aiming to control access and shape markets (the petrodollar legacy, strategic chokepoints). The Ukraine war has accelerated Europe’s decoupling from Russia and the U.S. seeks to expand similar dynamics in East Asia. He emphasizes that the energy game is dynamic: oil prices impact inflation, and long-term, demand destruction and a shift to alternatives (electricity, renewables) will reshape markets. He points to new energy tech and scale: batteries and storage (CATL’s battery capacity) enable large-scale decoupling from fossil fuels; China’s plans to deploy up to 50 nuclear plants at a time and to pursue commercially available fusion power could transform the energy landscape. The U.S. may face higher exploration costs and geopolitical risk in sustaining high oil output, while heavy reliance on fossil fuels could erode long-term economic viability. - Global consequences and who bears the pain: In the short term, countries without reserves (notably parts of the Global South, including India) will face fertilizer and diesel shortages during planting seasons, with potential 15–25% yield reductions and elevated inflation. Food security risks loom as energy costs ripple through fertilizer, transport, processing, and farming inputs. The analysis highlights fertilizer nitrogen production’s energy intensity and the cascading nature of energy in food supply chains. The discussion stresses that global south economies will be hit hardest early on, with food and fuel inflation compounding social and political pressure. - The Iran war and maritime strategy: The discussion connects the Persian Gulf crisis to broader blockades and maritime competition. A naval blockade approach risks escalation and confrontation with China, which has extensive trade links through ASEAN and other partners that would be harmed by disruption. Tangin notes that China cannot be easily forced into combat in Europe or the Middle East; any escalation involving tactical nuclear use would be dangerous. He suggests that Europe’s elites may push for confrontation against Russia, but the political climate and energy constraints could destabilize Western allies and push towards alternative alignments, particularly with China. - China’s strategic posture and alternative world order: Tangin emphasizes that China has a model that emphasizes no ideology between states, sovereignty, and mutual non-interference, echoing a Westphalian framework. He describes China’s global governance concept as a peer-to-peer, negotiation-centered approach, where disputes are settled at the table rather than through force. He frames China’s proposition as simple: “No more ideology between countries. Every country should be secure. Security should not depend on the insecurity of another country. Every country has the right to choose its own path of development.” This is presented as a peaceful, governance-based alternative to U.S.-led hegemony. - Europe’s strategic crossroads and the future: Europe faces existential economic strains, competitiveness challenges, and the temptation of isolationist or right-wing governance. The conversation predicts prolonged political volatility if energy prices and inflation persist, with potential swings between different leaderships. China’s strategy, in this vision, is to promote internal diversification and consumption-led growth while engaging with international partners on a governance framework that reduces the incentives for confrontation. - Concluding note: The speakers agree that Europe’s willingness to embrace China’s model, rather than clinging to a confrontational U.S.-led paradigm, could shape a more stable global order. They caution that the old order has ended, and creative destruction is underway, with China advocating a negotiated, governance-based path forward.

Speaker 0 introduces a myth that Trump waging war against Iran would close the Strait in a way that hurts China first, making Trump victorious, and asks for an answer to that perception. Speaker 1 argues that the perception isn't accurate, noting China has been building energy security for over twenty years. They travel to China frequently and see zero signs of energy scarcity; if there were any potential energy squeeze, it would be visible among the people and on social media, but it isn’t. He explains China’s energy composition is stable, and that even if Middle Eastern energy supplies were disrupted, China’s situation remains manageable. He states that China actually produces 30% of the crude oil it consumes domestically, so it does not import all its energy. Speaker 0 adds that people are often surprised by how much solar, wind, and hydropower China has, mentioning a special report noting that the aggregate annual terawatt-hours of output of China’s power grid is more than double the United States, and that this is growing rapidly. Speaker 1 confirms the rapid growth and attributes part of China’s diversification to the influence of Western financial practices, saying, “thanks to the Western banking cartel because they have been suppressing the price of silver to ridiculous low prices.” He claims China imports all the silver to manufacture solar panels, implying that by maintaining low silver prices, Western bankers have inadvertently helped China with energy diversification.

One speaker considers the possibility that China, India, or Pakistan might escort a ship through the Strait of Hormuz and worries about a potential direct confrontation between the United States and those countries. He notes there is no expected confrontation between Pakistan and India, highlighting an open line of communication, a good relationship, and that one of them is a mediator in negotiations. China, however, is described as a different case, with increasing parallels to what was seen between the United States and Russia in the early Cold War era. The other speaker expresses hope that the Chinese will not decide to confront the Americans over the Strait. He bluntly states that the Chinese are not friends with the United States anymore; while they have long-term economic partnership and linked economies, the current administration has been placing tariffs on China and threatening more tariffs. News reports are cited indicating that China will provide the HQ-9 air defense system, which is described as far superior to the Russian S-300, to Iran. He emphasizes these are defensive weapons, not offensive capabilities, and notes that the administration is likely to be distressed by this development. Despite the administration’s stance, the speaker asserts that providing defensive weapons to another country is something done routinely and acknowledges that this move could enhance Iran’s defensive posture. He mentions the possibility that the Chinese supply could even enable Iran to detect F-35 aircraft, though he notes uncertainty about this point. The situation is characterized as a game changer and described as a behind-the-scenes nuance that the average American might not fully understand, as well as perhaps the administration not fully grasping it. The speaker reiterates that the Chinese plan is to provide these defensive weapons to Iran, describing it as a soon-to-occur development.

Chas Freeman and Glenn discuss the broader geopolitical implications of the ongoing war with Iran, focusing on perspectives from China, Russia, and the United States, and then turning to regional dynamics involving Israel, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, and others. Freeman argues that China does not have a unified view on the Iran war. He notes that some in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army are pleased to see the United States seemingly disarmed by its own stalemate and by depleting weapons stockpiles, including the pivot away from stationing intermediate-range missiles in the Pacific. Geopolitical thinkers fear the war destabilizes a central region for global commerce and energy, with the Hormuz Strait now effectively impassable. He asserts that Azerbaijan has become a primary route for Asia-to-Europe transit, while Iran’s control of the strait and safe passage for Chinese tankers complicate sanctions regimes. China, he says, is also recalibrating its economy toward renewables and away from fossil fuels due to the war’s effects. Freeman highlights how Asia-Pacific dynamics are affected: Japan is highly dependent on oil and gas imports and is stressed; Taiwan faces limits due to its own energy constraints; South Korea is economically hurt by the strait closure; Southeast Asia suffers from reduced petroleum exports; and the war pushes China closer to Russia, with Russia’s planned Siberia gas project gaining traction as a diversified supply route away from maritime routes. He also mentions Brazil and South Africa increasing military cooperation, noting potential Brazilian-Japanese collaborations and rising defense spending in Japan, with implications for US influence and global supply chains. Freeman then discusses Russia, noting Trump’s call with Putin and the possibility that Russia is seeking to influence or assist in ending the war with Iran. He asserts Iran seeks to deter or destroy Israel and to decolonize West Asia, including removing American forces from the Gulf. He emphasizes that Russia and China do not want Iran subjugated and abstained on a Security Council resolution condemning Iran, aiming to avoid offending Gulf Arabs while not endorsing the war. The war has drawn Iran closer to Russia, with Iranian drones and technology transfers now in Russian use, and Russia increasing influence in Iran as Gulf reconstruction becomes necessary. Freeman also points out that Iran has demanded reparations and sanctions relief, and that sanctions have deeply distressed the Iranian population. He argues that Russia benefits from higher oil and gas prices and European energy dependence on Russian supply, while the conflict complicates Western weapon stockpiles and European defense needs. He contends Putin benefits from divisions within the US and diminished American global leadership, while the war is not advantageous for the United States overall. Freeman emphasizes a broader moral and strategic dimension, criticizing what he sees as a departure from international law and ethical norms, including the suspension of targeting guidelines and collateral-damage assessments in certain operations. He cites concerns about human rights and humanitarian law, warning that the erosion of a universal moral order could have long-term consequences for Western diplomacy. He invokes historical and religious ethical frameworks (Kant, Grotius, and others) to argue for a return to principled conduct in war and postwar reconciliation. The conversation turns to Israel, with Freeman suggesting that Netanyahu’s long-standing aim to reshape Israel’s security and borders faces a difficult reckoning as Iran becomes a tangible military threat. Freeman contends that Israel’s plan for regime change in Iran is failing, and he questions what Plan B might be if Israel cannot secure its strategic goals. He warns that Israel could contemplate extreme options, including nuclear considerations, if it feels existentially threatened, while noting the potential for Israel’s positions to undermine American public support for Israel and complicate US domestic civil liberties and freedom of inquiry. Glenn and Freeman close by acknowledging that the situation has created a shifting web of alliances and rivalries, with European willingness to appease Trump waning and broader questions about coexistence in the Middle East. They stress the need for a more sustainable approach to regional security and a reconsideration of diplomatic norms to avoid escalating toward broader conflict.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson discusses the US summit with China under Donald Trump, arguing that China “owned the summit” through choreography and by ensuring Taiwan was addressed as a first priority in every meeting. He describes Xi Jinping as standing firmly and approaching Trump with gestures and gestures alone, saying Trump “lost” because the real issues were not substantively addressed. Wilkerson links the meeting’s outcomes to economic and strategic signaling: China would resume buying US soybeans and make other gestures, and it might restrict exports of chemicals used in fertilizers; he also raises that farmers are facing fertilizer shortages and could face a disastrous season. On Iran, Wilkerson says the summit amounted to Trump and Xi making points while both were lying, and he focuses on the failure to engage the core issues. He claims the US did not accomplish much beyond expressing interest in opening the Strait of Hormuz, and he connects the Iran situation to broader strategic challenges, including Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, and related military considerations. He also argues that US efforts to pressure Iran were tied to US-China relations but that US statements about not seeking China’s help were performative and aimed at projecting hegemonic power. Wilkerson emphasizes that China’s position on Iran is conditional on issues like lifting the siege, permanent cessation of war, compensation for damages, removal of all illegal sanctions (primary and secondary), and respect for Iran’s sovereignty and rights. He says these points would still not satisfy Benjamin Netanyahu, who he portrays as accepting only a scenario that eliminates the current Iranian leadership and results in instability across the region. Wilkerson notes that the nuclear program was not treated as a key discussion point publicly, implying that any progress would likely require back-channel arrangements rather than open diplomacy. The conversation includes Wilkerson’s view that China is circumspect about an arms race involving nuclear weapons, especially given the lack of treaties and the increase in the number of nuclear-capable states. He also argues that US intelligence and the intelligence community do not believe Trump when Trump says China is not providing arms to Iran, and he describes a domestic escalation in response to alleged leaks, including efforts by Kash Patel to target whistleblowers and journalists. Wilkerson says US diplomats were minimal and that the trip functioned like a business trip, with Donald Trump himself as the lead figure. Speaker 0 questions whether the US overstated what China agreed to about Iran’s nuclear constraints. Wilkerson responds by broadening the analysis to global power shifts and the developing view in the West that recognizes China’s rise. He contrasts China’s framing—sustainability, development, innovation, cooperation—with what he describes as the US stance—sanctions and war, including “maniacally” by Iran. He claims the world sees the US as losing its way and turning toward a technocratic, global project that would use Chinese technology and rare earths, likening it to the kind of system associated with Elon Musk, and he warns of an “insidious” trajectory driven by elite technocrats rather than true diplomacy. He then discusses a wider domestic and geopolitical risk of breakdown, citing limits to removing Trump from office, describing impeachment as having failed historically, and portraying a worsening situation. Wilkerson alleges that mainstream media exposure of information is alarming Trump, and he cites the sending of Kash Patel as an example of escalating hostility toward journalists and whistleblowers. He argues this could leave the country vulnerable to outcomes including JD Vance or Marco Rubio, or even civil conflict. Wilkerson compares current potential US breakdown to the Roman Republic’s fall and Julius Caesar’s assassination, describing how civil wars followed until Octavius emerged and established stability (the Pax Augustus). He says the analogy suggests civil conflict is not impossible under present circumstances, without identifying any specific “Octavius” figure. He argues that sweeping international power changes and domestic polarization can lead societies to think in all-or-nothing terms, paralleling conditions that preceded historical upheavals like the Russian Revolution. The episode concludes with the idea that unsustainable paths will force some pullback or escalation, with Wilkerson expressing hope it does not become catastrophic.

China's influence over Iran is a major concern, as it supports the Iranian regime. This raises the question of whether we should confront China directly. The involvement of China is alarming, especially considering the credibility of whistleblowers from within the Chinese CCP. Nicole, representing the new federal state of China, an organization aiming to dismantle the CCP, joins the program to provide crucial information. The organization hopes that sharing this intel will aid the US, Israel, and other peace-loving nations in defeating the CCP.

Professor Zhang argues that geopolitics is a game where players maximize their self-interest, with predictions built on game theory rather than ideology. For 2026, the central event is Trump’s state visit to China in April, and the US–China relationship is identified as the key uncertain variable, while Russia–Ukraine is considered settled and Europe–NATO–Russia largely forecastable. Zhang outlines the grand strategy behind current tensions: Trump supposedly aims to force a grand bargain with China by leveraging the destabilization of the Middle East and Western Hemisphere to push China into continuing to buy US dollars. He contends that since Nixon’s 1971 decision to float the dollar, the US has relied on two pillars—the petrodollar system and opening China to American technology and markets. As the US then ran deficits and engaged in Middle East wars, China sought to internationalize the yuan and reduce dependence on the dollar via instruments like the Shanghai gold exchange. This, in his view, destabilizes the dollar, prompting Trump to push China to maintain dollar demand by destabilizing oil supply routes and minerals for China’s EV, AI, and other sectors. By invading Venezuela and potentially destabilizing Iran, Trump allegedly aims to force China to rely more on Western Hemisphere oil, silver, gold, lithium, copper, etc., and thus buy more US Treasuries to support the dollar. The discussion then shifts to possible bifurcations: if the United States truly wants China to use the dollar, it would create trust and a predictable, rules-based order; yet current actions—such as cutting China off from semiconductors or “crushing its tech industry”—could push China away, making it more independent and less dependent on the dollar. The Venezuelan case is cited as evidence that the aim is to obstruct China rather than claim oil directly; it would rather block rival powers than simply seize resources. The two powers are described as codependent: China imports about three-quarters of its oil, with roughly 50% from the Middle East and 20% from Russia; China would face a long and costly transition to replace Russian oil entirely, including pipelines. China also has tools to push back, such as triggering instability in silver markets (where China dominates) or other commodities used for manufacturing, a dynamic described as mutually assured economic destruction if either side overplays. When asked how the US could simultaneously pursue trust and coercion, Zhang asserts it cannot have both; the US is described as a global hegemon that should treat China as an equal, but instead presses to subordinate China. This creates a “ladder over an abyss” metaphor: both sides must climb together, or both fall; overt coercion could push China toward a different strategic alignment, possibly toward Russia or a diversified energy portfolio. Zhang emphasizes the role of hubris and racism in US policy, rather than pure ideology, and says the US dollar’s strength is also its vulnerability. Looking at US domestic dynamics, Zhang predicts a potential US economic crisis could magnify political instability. He identifies three US fragilities: (1) AI-driven GDP components that may not generate enduring profits, as data centers consume vast resources and job loss looms; (2) over-financialization, including a speculative silver market and leverage in commodities; and (3) cryptocurrency de-coupled from real utility, with quantum easing allowing continued money printing. He argues these weaknesses could precipitate a fiscal crisis and civil conflict if not contained, potentially catalyzing a broader crisis of state legitimacy. In Europe, Zhang foresees militarization and a misguided pro-war stance despite domestic discontent, predicting irrational policies and a possible collapse of NATO’s existing framework. He forecasts intensified Europe–Russia tensions, including a possible endgame around Odessa, with NATO likely to be overwhelmed militarily, leading to civil unrest and a “slow death” for European cohesion over five to ten years. He contends Europe’s strategic autonomy is eroding under multiculturalist policies and internal polarization, undermining willingness to fight. Regarding the United States’ global posture, Zhang argues Washington is moving toward transactional empire-building—exploiting its vassals when advantageous and abandoning them when not—while projecting power from the Western Hemisphere as a core strategy. He argues that this approach will erode Europe’s relevance and provoke global backlash. Finally, Zhang returns to Iran: Trump’s push for regime change there is linked to leveraging support from Israel and influential backers, such as Adelson and Elon Musk, with the likely aim of a ground invasion. Yet the plausibility of a successful invasion is questionable, given Iran’s size and power, and Trump’s emphasis on optics over sustained policy. The main unknown is China’s response; factions within China differ on dependence on Russia versus diversified oil sources, and the April meeting will shape whether a grand bargain reduces conflict or merely preserves the empire’s decline. To conclude, the April China meeting is pivotal, with four scheduled meetings in 2026; a China–US deal could stabilize some tensions, but the underlying imperial collapse is expected to persist, fueling wars and confrontations worldwide regardless of occasional bargains.