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Charles (Speaker 0) and Mario (Speaker 1) discuss a wide range of intelligence topics, personal history, and contemporary covert operations, emphasizing experiences from the CIA and reflections on global security dynamics. Charles begins by outlining his background: growing up on a farm in Ohio, enlisting in the Navy as a law enforcement specialist at 17, studying East Asian languages and Mandarin, and eventually learning Persian. He joined the CIA in July 2001 as an operations officer, spending most of his career in the Middle East with stints in Europe and Asia, and leaving the CIA in 2019. Afterward, he worked at Tesla to set up an insider threat program and manage global information security investigations. He notes extensive experience with China, Russia, Israel, France, and South Korea, and emphasizes the prevalence of intellectual property theft and proprietary-systems concerns in the private sector, including the role of motivated individuals and cross-border actors seeking to commercialize advanced technology. The conversation turns to leadership targeting and decapitation concepts. Charles references how the Iraq War began with an attempted decapitation strike at Saddam, asking whether removing a center of gravity leadership could end a conflict decisively and whether that would be humane. He discusses Iran as a persistent factor across the region, arguing that Iran’s meddling contributed to problems in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and that without Iranian involvement, upheaval might be less intense, though turmoil remains possible. Mario expresses fascination with intelligence capabilities, particularly related to Iran, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Maduro, and asks about Charles’s CIA background and roles. Charles explains that his work involved recruiting individuals with access to foreign governments to commit espionage and provide secret information—“human operations.” He emphasizes the dramatic realism of espionage as two people engaging in a life-changing conversation, rather than high-action TV tropes. They discuss border crossings and the reality of intelligence work. Charles notes that the hardest border crossings were often returning to the United States, when travel appearances didn’t match and documents or identities could be scrutinized. He stresses the difference between romanticized espionage and the real tension of crossing borders with non-legitimate materials, relying on confidence, charisma, and interaction under stress. On private-sector and national-security crossover, Charles highlights the complexity of cyber threats and corporate espionage. He describes a Tesla case involving a Russian criminal organization attempting to install malware, with FBI involvement and the arrest of a Russian national. He explains that in cyber threats, the distinction between government-sponsored and private actors is often blurred, with organized crime sometimes acting as proxies for larger state agendas. He notes that entrepreneurial actors seek to accelerate development by acquiring others’ material, not building entire systems from scratch. He also comments on the blurry boundary between nation-states and private actors in tech espionage and the difficulty of attributing responsibility. The Mossad’s capabilities are analyzed in depth. Charles argues Mossad excels by focusing on high-impact targets within a narrow geopolitical scope (Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq) and by strong locational intelligence—understanding where leaders live, work, and their access points. He emphasizes Mossad’s willingness to act decisively, using surrogates and superior technology for surveillance. He mentions the head of Mossad and a quote from his book about ubiquitous surveillance through devices like phones and watches. He notes the “pager operation” against Hezbollah as a case study in supply-chain manipulation and the use of compromised intermediaries, and he cautions that modern operations involve cyber manipulation and near-constant information-flow considerations. Both discuss real-world operations, including the 2010 Dubai operation targeting a Hamas logistics figure, and general lessons about operational security, noting that some details cannot be disclosed publicly. They reflect on the “gentleman’s rules of the game,” acknowledging that lethal operations and leadership-targeting can be controversial and legally complex; they discuss how different regimes and leaders are perceived and targeted. The Maduro operation is revisited. Charles describes gathering information through satellites, drones (including covert, stealth, and micro-drones), and human intelligence; he stresses determining a target’s pattern of life, where a leader lives, sleeps, moves, whom they meet, and what they eat. He notes that insider sources and the right informants are critical, and he discusses the balance between opportunities created by regime instability and the risk of compromised sources. He emphasizes that in times of turmoil, there is opportunistic recruitment, as some individuals see few options other than cooperating with outside powers. Privacy is a recurring theme. Charles asserts that privacy is not dead but requires effort to protect. He compares privacy to fitness, arguing that modern technologies make it easy to be public, but steps can be taken to reduce attack surfaces, including privacy consulting, careful metadata handling, and secure, layered security (physical security and cyber measures). He uses anecdotes about Strava revealing location data and a submarine commander whose Strava activity was linked to his demise, illustrating how personal data can reveal sensitive information. Towards the end, Mario and Charles discuss strategic ambiguity and unpredictability in political leadership, including Trump’s posture and international signaling. They touch on the potential paths for Iran if regime change occurs, debating the likelihood and consequences of upheaval, the role of Western policy, and how regional dynamics might shift if the mullahs and IRGC structures are altered. The conversation ends with mutual appreciation for the complexity of global security issues and the rapid pace of geopolitical change.

The Mossad is very small. We're talking about an organization that has about 1,200 people, including secretaries and dry. To run a station in London you need doctors. You need drivers. You need cars. You need apartments. You need people who buy food, who sell food. You need people who vacate you tickets. So you open a station in London with five guys. Five. Sorry. That's the most sign for five. These five guys are the actual case officers. Then what you do is you get people to come from Israel, and they scout the country. They come up with a lot of names of the Jewish community in London. 70% turned them down, but nobody will ever turn them in. Before you know it, you've got 300, 400 people in London who are supporting the station. A banker opens the bank, and he takes it up because he knows two days from now, the money's gonna be back. You open a summer camp in Israel, and you fly people in, and you start teaching them that there’s a lot of antisemitism out there, and you have to protect yourself because everybody's an antisemite. There is no such thing as dual loyalty. This is a myth. Either you're loyal to your country or you're not. Never will Israel agree to have an Israeli support The US the way they expect people in the Jewish community to support Israel. There are more people in Israeli jail for supporting or helping US intelligence than you have Israelis in American jail. Now you have the same power that I was just telling you about in Tel Aviv, in San Francisco. Your people don't have that kind of power. This is a separate department that handles your work as a backup. That's called the soft cushion that you fall back on. San Francisco. Fine. We'll write you down that you're going to San Francisco. We have this cop and this cop and this cop and this cop, and we'll call this guy and this guy and this guy, and we'll get you out of there. Don't worry. Go do your thing.

We have an incredible array of possibilities of creating foreign companies that have no weight being traced back to Israel. Shell companies over shell companies who affect the supply chain to our favor. We create a pretend world. We are a global production company. We write the screenplay. We're the directors. We're the producers. We're the main actors. The world is our stage. This is Mossad's old office. Its motto from Proverbs twenty four six says in so many words, wage war through deception and trickery, kinda like the CIA smoke and mirrors, which is what this operation was all about.

"Israelis are not like anybody else. They killed a guy in a hotel room in Dubai, and then after they killed him, they were somehow able to lock the door from the inside of the hotel room. There's an underground" "My experience is universally negative. Universally negative. I've never had a positive encounter with Mossad." "The thing is, you know, the Israelis this was covered in the Washington Post, just a couple days after the twelve day war started." "And what the Israelis did is that they have a lot of Farsi speaking Jews in Israel. These are Iranians who are Jewish and who emigrated to Israel, and a lot of them work from Mossad and Shin Bet."

Discussion centers on subversion and thwarting plots against the state of Israel and, publicly, what they call the Mossad. It was hard to answer because 'you can't pick up the phone book.' 'There's no, Langley in, in Israel'—so they couldn't simply look up 'CIA or Mossad.' They asked, 'What shall we call it in English?' 'Mossad is institute,' but they wondered, 'when they write a letter to their friends in the CIA or the British intelligence, what do they call themselves?' It took a while, 'a matter of asking the prime minister's spokesman,' since officially 'the Mossad is under the prime minister's office.' He 'sort of wondered why you wanna know and all that,' so they explained, and he came up with 'the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service.' 'If it were to have initials, it would be ISIS. Just simple words like that.'

140 Israeli individuals have been arrested and detained this year in an organized intelligence gathering operation aimed at infiltrating government agencies. Most of them have served in the Israeli military and possess intelligence expertise, working for companies like Amdocs specializing in wiretapping. The Israeli embassy denies any involvement in spying. Behind the scenes, there is pandemonium at the FBI, DEA, and INS, with supervisors and management collecting information under pressure from top levels. Administrative reviews are underway to investigate the situation and understand how this information came to light, considering the explosive and political nature of the story.

In the discussion, Kevin Ship, a former CIA officer, describes how false flags allegedly unfold within a shadow government framework. He explains that operations are planned for months and that agencies always select a boogeyman—one person whose involvement makes it difficult to argue a larger conspiracy. If a single individual is framed as the perpetrator, he argues, investigators and the public cannot easily investigate conspiracies involving multiple actors. He cites examples like Tyler Robinson and references Charlie Kirk’s murder as cases where a lone “boogeyman” is presented despite conflicting evidence about the perpetrator’s capabilities or prior behavior. He suggests that after the act, the agency proclaims that “we got him” and downplays any broader conspiracy. The conversation turns to recent events in Australia around Bondi Beach, noting months of reports about paid actors making threats against Jewish institutions and the involvement of Mossad in the investigation, with Netanyahu publicly linking Iran as a suspect. Ship argues this demonstrates a laziness and arrogance in some operations and questions what Mossad’s role has to do with the Australian public or government, asserting that Mossad operates with no ethical boundaries and expands Israel’s power. He claims the CIA and Mossad are closely allied—“brothers and sisters”—sharing intelligence and functioning as “sister organizations,” with the CIA often involved in Mossad’s actions and Mossad sometimes targeting the CIA to steal information. The speakers discuss the appearance of individuals in multiple, unrelated events, sometimes posting self-incriminating or sensational content (e.g., a person claiming to have survived October 7 appearing in Sydney and at other events) as supporting evidence of staged incidents. They reference a pattern of same individuals appearing at different tragedies to push narratives. The conversation also touches on broader tensions between Western agencies and the media, with Ship noting a CIA program called the Media Liaison Office that propagandizes and influences U.S. news outlets, describing the “Mockingbird” media landscape as complicit in disseminating disinformation. Ship references 9/11 as a historical example, arguing that the official narrative relied on misleading artifacts (such as a passport found near the World Trade Center) and claiming that the 9/11 investigation was never legitimate. He notes that the CIA’s disinformation strategies are designed to fool the American public who mostly rely on televised news and lack critical thinking skills. He asserts that the media repeatedly broadcasts narratives that align with official accounts, including reports that anti-Semitism is rising in connection with attacks, framing the event as an assault on Israeli Jews tied to Iran. The speakers conclude that false flags remain effective tools, with Ship predicting more such events to influence public opinion and policy toward Iran, and they emphasize the need for critical thinking and independent media to counter these campaigns. They discuss the ongoing collaboration between intelligence agencies and mainstream media in shaping public perception, and they affirm that false flags are a persistent feature of the alleged shadow government operations.

The speaker discusses trying to uncover what the Mossad is called when dealing with other intelligence agencies. After asking the prime minister's spokesman, it was revealed that they refer to themselves as the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service, or ISIS for short. This name is used when communicating with agencies like the CIA or British intelligence.

The speaker discusses subversion and how to identify what they call the Mossad publicly. You can't pick up the phone book—"There's no, Langley in, in Israel that you can look up, you know, CIA or, in our case, the Mossad." They asked, "what shall we call it in English?" "Mossad is institute" translates the Hebrew words. When they write to friends in the CIA or British intelligence, "what do they call themselves?" It took a while. It was a matter of asking the prime minister spokesman, the best you could do because officially, the Mossad is under the prime minister's office. And I think he sort of wondered why he wanna know and all that, so we explained. He came up with "the Israeli secret intelligence Service." "If it were to have initials, it would be ISIS." "Just simple words like that." "Interestingly enough, kind of a British model."

Mossad agents are not permitted in CIA headquarters because every time they would come, they would give us gifts, and the gifts always had listening devices embedded in them. And we're like, you guys have to stop doing this. They're like, oh, we brought you a seal of the CIA. You should hang it in the director's office. It's all full of listening devices. So we're like, you guys can't come here anymore. So we had to rent a safe house, and we meet with the Israelis in this safe house. The Israelis are not our friends, period.

Subversion involves foiling plots against Israel, including political ones. A question arose about what to call the Mossad in English. Unlike the CIA, there’s no straightforward way to look it up. The term "Mossad" translates to "institute," but when communicating with agencies like the CIA or British intelligence, what do they refer to themselves as? After some inquiry, the prime minister's spokesman revealed that they call it the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service, which could be abbreviated as ISIS. This naming follows a model similar to that of British intelligence.

I was born in Canada, raised in Israel, served in the Israeli army, and later in the Mossad. Judaism is a religion and nation, not a race. Dual loyalty is a myth. Israel does not tolerate Israelis supporting the US. My books sold well, but my second book was not reviewed in North America due to accusations of anti-Semitism. Labeling individuals as anti-Semites is a tactic I used in the Mossad, which I now regret as a Jew. Translation: I was born in Canada, raised in Israel, served in the Israeli army, and later in the Mossad. Judaism is a religion and nation, not a race. Dual loyalty is a myth. Israel does not tolerate Israelis supporting the US. My books sold well, but my second book was not reviewed in North America due to accusations of anti-Semitism. Labeling individuals as anti-Semites is a tactic I used in the Mossad, which I now regret as a Jew.

The speaker discusses the challenge of identifying the Mossad in Israel. They sought to determine what the Mossad calls itself when dealing with other intelligence agencies. After consulting with the prime minister's spokesman, it was revealed that the Mossad is known as the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service (ISIS) in English. This simple and straightforward name is used when communicating with foreign counterparts.

Discussion centers on how to publicly refer to Mossad. There’s no directory like Langley in Israel, and the question arises: what do they call it in English? Mossad is institute. When they write to friends in the CIA or British intelligence, what do they call themselves? It took a while; it was a matter of asking the prime minister spokesman. Officially, the Mossad is under the prime minister's office, and he wondered why they wanted to know, so we explained. He came up with the Israeli secret intelligence Service. I mean, if it were to have initials, it would be ISIS. Just simple words like that. Interestingly enough, kind of a British model.

I never met anyone at the CIA who was pro-Israel because they make it so hard to like them. I knew a couple who were both CIA officers. When they went to Israel on rotation, the station decided to declare them to Mossad. Shortly after, they came home from a party to find all their furniture rearranged. Months later, after another party, all the toilets in their house had been filled with feces. At the end of their two-year tour, the ambassador threw them a going away party. When they got home, they found that someone had cut off their dog's tail. These people were moderately supportive of Israel, but they came home with only bitterness and hatred toward Israelis because of the constant harassment.

The Israel On Campus Coalition (ICC) coordinates efforts against BDS, employing around 100-120 professionals across organizations like APAC, Hillel, and Stand With Us. The ICC adopts a clandestine approach on campuses, prioritizing anonymity. Tactics include investigating and publicizing negative information about pro-Palestine activists through secure, anonymous channels to disrupt their activities. Canary Mission is cited as a highly effective example of this, monitoring Students for Justice in Palestine and their allies, with a budget that has grown from $3,000 to potentially $2 million. The goal is to ensure that today's radicals are not tomorrow's employees. Adam Milstein, who funds pro-Israel organizations and sits on the boards of APAC, ICC, and Stand With Us, is a central figure. He collaborates with Sheldon Adelson, who provides funding to expand the Israeli American Council.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss distrust of Israelis and Mossad in the CIA. "You didn't trust them? Not as far as I could throw them." "It was cultural. We don't allow the Israelis into CIA headquarters because they would always come with gifts, and the gifts had always listening devices packed inside them." They x-ray gifts; "'No more. So And was'” and they ban Israelis from campus. Asked about bugs, the reply is "'100%.'" The distrust toward Mossad is "'100%.'" A CIA officer recalls a couple assigned to Jerusalem; "'they were absolutely lovely people. They were declared to the Israelis.'" At a Christmas party, "'they go to a Christmas party at the ambassador's residence. And when they get back to the house, people had taken shits in all their toilets and left it unflushed.'" "'If they do this to the people they call their allies, imagine what they're doing to Palestinians.'"

"The Mossad is very small. We're talking about an organization that has about 1,200 people, including secretaries and dry." "Five guys are the actual case officers." "Cannot have a station in Damascus because they have no embassies there." "70% turned them down, but nobody will ever turn them in." "You need a car, you need a safe house, you need a doctor, you need tickets, you need transportation, you need $300,000 in an hour, 12:00 at night." "There are more people in Israeli jail for supporting or helping US intelligence than you have Israelis in American jail." "There is no such thing as dual loyalty. This is a myth." "A separate department that handles your work as a backup... the soft cushion that you fall back on." "Your people don't have that kind of power."

Sivan's brother, Paul, was an Israeli intelligence officer in counterterrorism. He failed a polygraph test after refusing to take it for 10 weeks. Some of the men's names were already known to American counterintelligence. Paul admitted serving in an Israeli army anti-terrorist unit. In FBI reports, a mistake or intentional clue was left unwhited out. Paul mentioned being selected by the Jewish agency to attend something for employees working outside Israel. The Jewish agency's board of governors includes Berthyn Wertheimer, an Israeli billionaire who loaned money to the police commissioner involved in covering up events prior to 9/11. The Mossad, like the CIA, funds off-the-book operations through drug trafficking and uses the mafia for distribution. They also spy on America's DEA through Israeli art students.

The speaker lays out a narrative in which Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, is intricately connected to the CIA and to a longtime insider, James Angleton. The claim is that Mossad and Angleton formed an alliance “forever,” with Angleton described as “the mole” who was aligned with Mossad. In 1960, Angleton was the head of the CIA’s Directorate of Foreign Intelligence, and he is depicted as the person who was always searching for a Russian mole. The speaker asserts that Angleton was effectively the Russian mole because of his close friendship with Mossad, to the extent that he would share information with Mossad and Mossad would not relay it to Russia. The narrative then moves to 1963, referencing David Ben-Gurion, the Israeli prime minister, arguing that Israel decided to kill John F. Kennedy. The speaker quotes Ben-Gurion as saying that Kennedy’s threats of inspections of “demonic” (interpreted as a mispronunciation or coded term for dangerous issues) were unacceptable, and that Ben-Gurion said, “It’s none of his frigging business. I don’t wanna hear anymore from Kennedy. You kill him.” According to the speaker, Ben-Gurion issued this order to Mossad and then resigned so he could not be held responsible for it. The implication is that Mossad then went to Angleton, implying that the Kennedy assassination was not a CIA job, but was “greased by the CIA” because Angleton had his connections at Mossad. From there, the speaker claims that Corsican sharpshooters were hired by Mossad for the Kennedy assassination as part of a larger operation at Dealey Plaza, including the escape. The speaker asserts that public suspicion has misattributed the blame to the mob, Lyndon Johnson, or Castro, but maintains that it was Israel that carried it out. The stated motive is tied to Israel’s desire to avoid further inspections related to their nuclear program. The speaker claims this is connected to Israel’s nuclear and biological capabilities and asserts that plutonium was stolen from the United States to support their program. In summary, the speaker contends that the Kennedy assassination was orchestrated not by the CIA alone, but through a coordinated effort involving Mossad, James Angleton, and David Ben-Gurion, with Israel acting to prevent scrutiny of its nuclear activities by eliminating Kennedy, aided by Corsican shooters and a CIA-Mossad alliance.

The speaker states they did not trust Israelis, "not as far as I could throw them," and that the CIA doesn't allow Israelis into headquarters because they would bring gifts containing listening devices. According to the speaker, 100% of the gifts from Israelis had bugs in them, even at a safe house in Virginia. The speaker claims that 100% of their colleagues didn't trust Mossad. In contrast, the speaker trusted the British the most because their national interests are closely aligned.

"The Mossad is very small. We're talking about an organization that has about 1,200 people, including secretaries and dry" "In order to have a station in London, what do you need? You need doctors. You need drivers. You need cars. You need apartments." "So you open a station in London with five guys. Five. Sorry. That's the most sign for five. These five guys are the actual case officers." "70% turned them down, but nobody will ever turn them in." "There are more people in Israeli jail for supporting or helping US intelligence than you have Israelis in American jail." "Now you have the same power that I was just telling you about in Tel Aviv, in San Francisco. Your people don't have that kind of power."

Clayton (Speaker 0) asks how false flags materialize and how the shadow government carries out clandestine attacks, citing Bondi Beach in Australia and Brown University, and notes observations like Google searches in Israel before a shooting. He asks Kevin Ship, who spent seventeen years in the CIA, how long these operations are planned. Kevin Ship (Speaker 1) responds that false flag operations are planned for months. He argues that the CIA plans these operations by always choosing a boogeyman, ideally one person, so there can’t be a broader conspiracy discussed. The boogeyman is hit with chemicals or directed energy to derail the mind, then the agency proclaims “we got him” and that there is no conspiracy. He points to Charlie Kirk’s murder as an example, saying, “There is the boogeyman. He did it. We got him. No conspiracy, nothing to see here.” He notes the pattern of a single boogeyman with no prior indication of criminal tendency. Clayton notes that in Australia, months before the attack there were reports of paid actors making threats against Jewish institutions, with Mossad now assisting the investigation and Iran being blamed, suggesting the boogeyman is Iran to push toward war. He asks why Mossad would be involved in this Australian case. Kevin replies that the more arrogant the operators become, the more stupid the disinformation appears. He questions Mossad’s involvement in Australia and asks what Mossad has to do with the Australian government and people. He claims Mossad has no ethics and will do anything to expand Israel’s power, stating Mossad is “whatever it takes.” He describes a frenemies relationship between Mossad and CIA, as they are “joined at the hip” and share intelligence at a high level, though Mossad may sometimes target the CIA to steal information. Clayton shows an individual who claims to have been in Israel on October 7, then appears in Sydney with bloodied selfies, claiming survival of October 7, and asks if this mirrors other false flag patterns where the same people appear at different events. Kevin agrees, citing examples like the same person appearing at completely unrelated events, suggesting manipulation. Clayton asks if false flags still work and if more are coming. Kevin says that the CIA studies how to manipulate Americans through media and disinformation, referencing the “media liaison office” as a division within the CIA that propagandizes and influences U.S. news media. He cites the 9/11 passport claim as an example of disinformation that was repeated to shape public perception, noting that many people accept it despite implausibility. Clayton asks if the CIA studies how to manipulate media budgets and public thinking; Kevin confirms there is a program to control thinking and propagate propaganda with complicit news outlets. They discuss mainstream media’s role in pushing narratives like antisemitism and the role of Mockingbird media. Kevin reiterates that false flags are still effective and that more of them are expected, making their work harder to debunk.

Speaker 0 discusses working with the Israelis, describing them as “very American” and noting that they could get into shouting matches during meetings over whose idea was best, followed by casual lunch and reconciliation. He emphasizes that Israel is a good ally that the U.S. needs to protect and support, and he asserts that CIA and Al Qaeda had worked closely together in Iraq and in Syria, and that there are times when covert action allowed meetings with the “quote unquote, enemies” to try to bring things down as CIA officers. Speaker 1 adds that most of the world has a problem with Al Qaeda and ISIS/Daesh, but there is less of a problem because the CIA worked with ISIS/Daesh and Al Qaeda. He suggests that if the CIA worked with them, it would be better to understand what they were doing, and if the plan is for the U.S. to work with them on a security agreement, which has been done with enemies before, then this has been done in concert with diplomats and other countries involved. He indicates he wouldn’t be surprised if that was happening and would call it possibly hopeful. Speaker 0 continues by noting that newspapers in the United States once celebrated Qasem Soleimani as a fighter with American troops against ISIS and Al Qaeda. He states that Soleimani “was, and now it's switched,” implying a shift in perception or policy. The overarching theme is the idea of collaboration or coordination with hostile or extremist groups in pursuit of broader strategic objectives, including countering Iran, and the possibility that such collaborations could be framed as necessary or hopeful within a complex web of alliances and covert actions. Speaker 0 ends by reiterating the shift in stance: “Now we have to go to al ISIS and Al Qaeda to go back against Iran.” This underscores a cyclical or ironic pivot in U.S. strategy, moving from partnering with certain adversaries against common threats to reengaging those same groups to counter another adversary. The dialogue presents a candid view of realpolitik, suggesting that relationships with seemingly incompatible actors and shifts in alliances occur as part of broader geopolitical objectives, with collaboration sometimes described as acceptable when it serves strategic goals, and public narratives sometimes contrasting with behind-the-scenes actions.