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Russia possesses strong ballistic missile and drone capabilities. Predictions in early 2022 suggested Russia would run out of missiles, but three years later, they are producing and deploying missiles that the United States cannot defend against. The recent strikes demonstrated Russia's ability to destroy Patriot missile batteries. Ukraine fired approximately 20 missiles within two minutes during the strikes, while Lockheed Martin only produces 550 of these missiles annually. Russia's ballistic missile and drone strategy is causing significant attrition of NATO weapons.

We were given a stand with two Max7 machine guns, caliber 7.62. They have performed well, targeting Shakhids and drones. We used them effectively to cover areas and provide square coverage. The effective range is about 1.5-2 km, with a bullet flight distance of around 3800 meters.

We're at a point now where the Russian military has all of the advantages. They have mastered drone warfare. And I bring that up because that's the way the fighting's done now. The day of, you know, mass tank attacks and all this is over. You put a thousand tanks online and move them towards a drone equipped enemy, and you'll have a thousand smoking hulks. You can't do mass infantry attacks. You have to break your teams up into smaller teams. You have to break the battlefield up into smaller chunks. There's nothing that can be done. Nothing can be done to stop this. The advantage is 100% Russia, and we're looking at the Ukrainians on the verge of total collapse. This is why you're seeing 10 kilometers in a day here. Unpressured because the Ukrainians have nothing to plug the hole.

Ted Postal, professor emeritus at MIT and expert on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, discusses the Arashnik/Oreshnik hypersonic system and what is known about its capabilities, limitations, and potential implications. Postal emphasizes that the weapon is a very powerful conventional system, not a nuclear one. He notes that it delivers munitions and, as of the evidence available, seems to inflict damage primarily through kinetic impact. While adding submunitions with high explosives could increase damage per submunition, this would not constitute a game changer unless nuclear weapons were mounted on top of the system. He also cautions that the fact the system can deliver nuclear weapons is not especially novel in the context of existing delivery options, and the main policy concern is the possibility of escalation to nuclear use in response to a conventional attack. Key characteristics he outlines: - The Oreshnik is a one-stage missile that appears to repurpose the first stage of an old SS-20 (Pioneer) intermediate-range missile. The SS-20 was a two-stage missile with three warheads; in the Oreshnik, six buses on the vehicle carry submunitions. - The payload consists of six buses, each carrying about six submunitions, for a total of around 36 submunitions. Each submunition weighs roughly 70–80 kilograms. - The submunitions are delivered from a high-velocity canister that is ejected and then uses a high-pressure gas propulsion system to push out six submunitions onto six separate targets. The vehicle remains oriented to maintain stability, preventing tumbling and ensuring precise deployment. - The submunitions travel at very high speeds (hypersonic) but do not reach hypersonic speed on impact with the ground due to atmospheric reentry dynamics. They hit the ground at approximately 150–200 kilometers per hour, not at Mach 10, because tumbling and aerodynamic drag reduce speed before impact. - Debris analysis suggests the submunitions are not penetrating deep underground; instead, their energy is converted into heat and a violent expansion near the surface, producing an explosion-like effect rather than deep penetration. - The trajectories are lofted, delivering the submunitions to the target area after a long flight time (Russia has claimed 15–17 minutes for submunitions to reach targets). This lofted path reduces the likelihood of interceptors successfully engaging the weapon. On the effects and targeting: - A single submunition’s energy disperses over a footprint rather than concentrating in a single crater. The weapon’s conventional damage is significant, especially when deployed as clusters against a structure or urban area, but it is not equivalent to a nuclear strike. - If six buses with six submunitions each were all directed at a single structure, the resulting destruction would be substantial, but the extent would depend on targeting accuracy and footprint, as well as how many submunitions actually strike the intended area. - Postal notes that a one-kiloton nucleus would create a clearly larger, more devastating area of destruction than the conventional cluster could achieve; meanwhile, a 150–200 kiloton nuclear warhead mounted on Oreshnik would be city-destroying, illustrating how dramatically different outcomes would be with a nuclear payload. Interception and defense: - Postal argues there is no reliable intercept option for this weapon. The high loft and deployment of multiple submunitions after release complicate interception: the submunitions depart the launcher and travel at several kilometers per second above the atmosphere; interceptors would have minutes to react at distances where they would struggle to reach the fast-moving submunitions. - He contrasts this with Iskander, noting that while intercepting Iskander is challenging, the Oreshnik presents a broader, more difficult defense problem due to its trajectory and submunition deployment. Strategic and political context: - The discussion touches on the broader strategic implications, including the psychological impact of a sky lit up by hypersonic activity and the potential for miscalculation leading to nuclear escalation. Postal warns against overestimating the weapon’s nuclear potential and cautions policymakers about proportional responses to conventional attacks. - He critiques public rhetoric and speculative defense concepts (e.g., extreme “golden dome” missile defense schemes) as impractical, arguing that current defenses are unlikely to deter or intercept hypersonic submunition deployments. - The dialogue also reflects on Western economic and political actions, such as sanctions, and suggests that some analyses of the effects on Russia’s economy and strategic posture may mischaracterize outcomes; Postal emphasizes that the weapon’s value lies in its conventional destructive capability and its ability to complicate defense planning, rather than in conventional deterrence or nuclear signaling. - The conversation closes with a stark warning: if thousands of these missiles were deployed, a significant strategic reshaping would follow, necessitating new considerations for air and missile defense, even as existing systems face fundamental limitations in countering hypersonic conventional weapons.

Stanislav Krapivnik and the host discuss the current phase of the war in Ukraine, focusing on the southern front around Zaporizhzhia and the broader strategic implications. - On the southern front, the Russians are advancing along the Zaporizhzhia axis, with the last defensible Ukrainian positions in the area being Arakha (Orakhivka) and Zaporizhzhia city. Gulyaipol has fallen after Russians breached a fortified eastern line by exploiting open terrain and flanking from the east; the Ukrainians’ straight-line northern assaults into Gulyaipol are described as unsustainable under heavy drone and open-ground fire. Russian forces have moved along the river edge and toward a 15-kilometer radius from Zaporizhzhia City, entering suburban zones and pressing east to overhang Arakha from the north. Zaporizhzhia City itself is an open terrain area with a major bridge over the Nieper; the speaker asserts it would be hard to hold under drone and air superiority, and predicts a ruinous but ultimately unsustainable defense there. - The Russians have established a corridor along the river edge, with continued advances toward the eastern outskirts and suburbia north of Zaporizhzhia City. From there, a potential northward push could flank from the south toward Krivyi Rih and Nikolaev, creating a threat toward Odessa if a bridgehead across Kherson is rebuilt and maintained. The argument is that taking Nikolaev is a prerequisite to threatening Odessa and that control of Kherson remains a strategic hinge. - Ukraine’s attempts to retake territory are described as costly and often ineffective PR moves, including “suicidal” assaults on Gulyaipol where fighters up on exposed ground are eliminated by drone and artillery fire. The Russians are said to have flanked Ukrainian positions with new lines north of fortified areas, rolling up fortifications and leaving Ukrainian defenders with few exits. - In the north and center, fighting around Konstantinovka continues, with a southwest push into the area and Ukraine concentrating reserves to stop it. Kosytivka is described as about 65% surrounded, Mirnograd and Pokrovsk are said to be effectively finished, though small pockets hold out. In Sumy and Kharkiv directions, new incursions are occurring but are relatively small; the border is being “flattened” or straightened as Ukraine’s reserves are used. - Weather and terrain play a critical role. Mud, freezing and thaw cycles, fog, rain, and wind hamper heavy mechanized movement and drone operations. Western equipment struggles in mud due to narrow tracks, while Russian equipment with wider tracks traverses better but still encounters problems. Drones do not fly well in fog or rain, and heavy winds impede operations; Russia is leveraging fog to move infantry in close combat. - The broader war and geopolitics are discussed. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is a major target; European willingness to sustain support is framed as a bandage on a jugular wound, insufficient for a long-term victory. The host notes a perceived drift in European strategy, with French signals of compromise and American mediation and hints at how US priorities ( Greenland, Iceland, Iran, Cuba) could pull attention away from Ukraine. The Arashnik hypersonic system is described as capable of delivering a devastating plasma envelope and kinetic energy, with the potential to destroy bunkers and infrastructure anywhere in the world. - On the strategic horizon, there is skepticism about negotiations. The guest dismisses talk of a near-term deal and describes the last 10% of a push as the “bridge too far,” arguing that Russian gains in Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson are eroding Western leverage as they advance kilometer-by-kilometer. Zelensky is portrayed as a stationed beneficiary whose personal and backers’ financial interests may drive bargaining positions, with claims that he does not care about Ukrainians and is motivated by extraction from the conflict. - The guest contends that a gradual Russian advance, backed by logistics and local tactical wins, is more likely than a dramatic collapse, while insisting that a full-scale nuclear exchange between Russia and Europe remains unlikely unless the United States and NATO become deeply involved. The Arashnik discussion notes the potential for a limited exchange, but emphasizes Russia’s stated preference not to escalate, arguing Russia would not “want Europe” but would respond decisively if pushed. - The discussion also touches on global logistics and Western cohesion. A veteran anecdote about US military logistics in 2002 is used to illustrate how NATO’s naval and merchant fleets depend on non-Western partners for transport, underscoring European vulnerability in sustained conflict. Mercedes-Benz re-registering in Russia is noted as a sign of shifting economic realities, with wider implications for European-company strategy amid sanctions and isolation. - The program ends with a return to the practicalities of ongoing combat—daily casualties, the erosion of Ukrainian defensive lines, and the intensifying pressure on Ukrainian supply and morale—before signing off.

Mario and Malcolm discuss the evolving drone warfare landscape and the strategic implications for the United States, Iran, Ukraine, and Gulf states. Malcolm argues that Iran’s drone arsenal represents a persistent, low-cost threat with an 88,000 Shahid drone inventory at the lowest cost, and mass production estimated at 7,000. He notes Iran has destroyed roughly $5,000,000,000 of technology, underscoring the waste associated with high-value defenses. He contends the conflict “is gonna come down to rifles and knives and drones,” and suggests the U.S. and its allies have limited tolerance for the level of death this entails. He emphasizes the learning curve for anti-Shahid drones, estimating 35 to 45 days to train someone to fly such drones, and notes that combat veterans and Ukrainian international legionnaires could assist with training in Ukraine, Abu Dhabi, and beyond. They discuss defense markets and training pipelines. Mario recalls speaking with a U.S.-based VC in Ukraine who might be tapped to bolster defense industry interests; Malcolm reiterates that Ukrainian-made, locally developed systems dominate, and that Western companies must avoid partnerships that involve theft of technology. He stresses that Ukrainians own the drone industry, and that the U.S. has historically relied on foreign-made drones for ISR rather than attack, contrasting Ukraine’s trajectory from reconnaissance to drones used for direct attack and artillery fusion. Malcolm criticizes the U.S. approach to drones, arguing that the U.S. military has not adapted to modern drone warfare and that Ukraine’s battlefield experiences demonstrate rapid adaptation and innovating countermeasures, such as drone drop kits and improvised aerial bombs. He explains the progression: drones used for surveillance evolved into attack platforms, counter-drone tactics, and drone-enabled artillery. He provides detailed examples: using DJI drones for reconnaissance early on, then using drone-based bombing, counter-jamming techniques, and fiber-optic lines to guide munitions. He notes Ukrainian Sea Baby Magura drones and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) that attacked Russian ships, and describes a dramatic incident where a Ukrainian drone disabled a Russian submarine tail by docking behind it and flooding it with explosive force. The conversation shifts to recent strikes on Gulf-based assets. Mario asks about Zelensky’s visits to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and why Gulf defense preparedness appeared slow. Malcolm suggests the U.S. misreads regional resilience and that Gulf states will adapt using homegrown drone capabilities, with examples such as Kuwait buying thousands of Ukrainian drones and the UAE potentially building domestic drone factories. He cautions against overreliance on “wonder weapons” and emphasizes practical measures like machine guns, shotguns, and ground-based defenses, noting that 50-caliber weapons and simple tactics can counter Shahid drones if properly deployed. He asserts that the Gulf states will need to supplement their arsenals with practical, scalable training and production rather than expensive foreign capabilities. Malcolm discusses the strategic logic behind any potential concessions with Iran. He argues that Iran has geography, topography, history, and manpower advantages, and that Donald Trump’s threats to bomb Iran’s infrastructure are unlikely to force concessions. He claims Iran would not negotiate under U.S. pressure and that the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) would remain a focal point of conflict. He contends that Trump’s approach risks escalating toward broader conflict, and that Iran could respond by leveraging the Houthis or other regional proxies to disrupt shipping and Gulf economies, potentially closing the Red Sea and Suez Canal if alignments shift. They touch on Russia’s role, noting Moscow’s financial and strategic interests in the region. Malcolm argues Putin benefits from the conflict and that Trump’s priorities are tied to accumulating frozen Russian assets and broader political maneuvering, sometimes at odds with the publicized goal of restraining Iran. He observes that Russia’s drones, weapons components, and intelligence could be flowing to Iran, influencing the Gulf theater. The discussion closes with a broader warning: the war’s consequences will be felt for years or generations, with energy prices, inflation, and global economic disruption, and only a realignment of strategy—embracing distributed defenses, domestic production, and adaptable tactics—will shape outcomes. They acknowledge the difficulty of predicting concessions, the complexity of Gulf politics, and the precarious balance between deterrence and escalation.

Entering Red Square are the Russian aerospace force troops. Joining the parade are the S 400 Triumph anti aircraft missile systems of the 584 Guards Air Defense Missile Regiment of the Russian Aerospace Force commanded by Major Alexey Kryvorotko. The S 400 system enables Russia to maintain efficient air defense against all types of air and space threats, which has been confirmed during the special military operation.

Speaker 0: The discussion reports that Russia has covertly tested three new weapon systems over the past twenty-eight days, with two of them described as complete game changers. These tests are said to be causing nerves inside NATO, and none of these three have been made public by President Putin, who typically announces such developments. One system, however, is not being kept secret. Speaker 0: According to the report, Russian President Putin just rolled out their most advanced hypersonic missiles to date. These missiles are described as "no one can shoot down"—at least in the view of the speaker—unless future assessments prove otherwise. The specific system named is the Orenshik Oreshnik hypersonic missiles. They are set for combat duty by the end of the year, and they are characterized as capable of extremely high speeds and long-range strikes. The deployment of these missiles is framed as something NATO will be watching very closely. The report suggests that European leaders are exhibiting a willingness to engage in war-related actions, with two particularly troubling points highlighted: the idea that they want to be part of the conflict and the accompanying casualties. It is claimed that they want to participate in the death and destruction in the European Union and in The UK. Speaker 0: The report specifically notes German Chancellor Mertz saying that they are ready to draft young men to war if they cannot reach their volunteer numbers, effectively suggesting compulsory service to fight Russia. Speaker 0: It is also stated that the UK is telling its populace to prepare to sacrifice their sons and daughters, and the speaker emphasizes that "Sons and daughters, colleagues, veterans will all have a part to play, to build, to serve, and if necessary, to fight." The speaker adds that more families will know what sacrifice for our nation means. Speaker 1: The accompanying commentary underscores the need to explain the changing threat and the necessity of staying ahead of it, reinforcing the idea that sacrifice and readiness are central to national defense in the current context.

Ukrainian engineers designed drone launching systems disguised as wooden cabins on cargo trucks. These mobile containers concealed launch platforms, charging stations, and remote-controlled roofs. The design allowed vertical or angled launches, with signal shielding to avoid detection. Operatives moved the trucks into Russia, parking near airbases. Drones were preloaded and launched remotely, guided by live video feeds to targets within a few kilometers. Some drones carried high-explosive warheads. The operation hit at least five major airbases, damaging strategic bombers, including aircraft Russia no longer manufactures. Ukraine struck 34% of Russia's strategic bomber fleet. Targets included strategic nuclear bombers at Belaya Airbase in Siberia, Ivanovo Airbase near Moscow, Dyajalevo Airbase, and naval bases. Over 40 aircraft were reportedly hit. Some drones used fiber optic control systems, immune to jamming, but with limited range. A signal-enhancing drone can counter Russian electronic warfare. The drones are equipped with RPG warheads with piezoelectric triggers. The Tu-160 can release nuclear cruise missiles.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the Ukraine war and related strategic developments, Colonel and the host cover several key topics, facts, and analyses. Skyfall/Burevznik nuclear-powered cruise missile - The Skyfall (Burevznik) is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable cruise missile. A test five years ago ended with five deaths and an explosion; a newer test reportedly flew 14 hours and 15,000 miles. Its characteristics include very long range, low-altitude flight to hug terrain, and high maneuverability, making detection and interception challenging. - The U.S. perspective is that it is not a silver bullet, but it represents an advanced capability: maneuvering over great distances, flying subsonically at very low altitude (within about 20 meters of the ground), and potentially approaching from unexpected directions. - Russia claims it cannot be shot down; the guest cautions that nothing is invulnerable until proven operational, but the missile adds a troubling dimension to deterrence and arms competition. - The broader significance is that it accentuates concern about nuclear weapons and underscores the desirability of nuclear arms reduction talks before START’s expiration. Nuclear arms talks and China’s potential role - The guest indicates Russia is pushing for nuclear arms reduction talks before START expires (February). China is conceptually willing to join, according to some Russian sources, but no authoritative statements from China are cited. Any willingness would depend on Western engagement to explore meaningful participation. Poseidon and other advanced weapons - Poseidon is described as a Russian nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicle (a "massive unmanned torpedo drone") intended as a strategic deterrent. Its exact status is uncertain; reports and videos circulate, but it remains largely experimental. - The discussion notes general concerns about U.S. safety from advanced weapons such as Poseidon and other long-range strike capabilities. Encirclement near Donbas: Pokrovsk and Kupiansk - Grasimov claimed 49 Ukrainian battalions are involved in Donbas, with about 31 allegedly encircled near Pokrovsk (for roughly 5,000 troops). Ukraine says supply lines are not cut and that encirclement is not complete. - The analysts explain that Russia has achieved notable progress in Kupiansk and Pokrovsk areas. Ukraine has mounted limited counterattacks in the north near Pokrovsk to disrupt a potential northern encirclement pivot at Rodinsky, but sustained pressure is difficult due to Ukraine’s manpower and logistics constraints. - The northern shoulder near Rodinsky is a focal point: if Russians move beyond Rodinsky, encirclement risk increases. Ukraine’s ability to keep tens of thousands of troops supplied and to hold the city is limited; Russia’s reserves enable more methodical advances. - The overarching view: Ukraine can slow Russian advances but cannot realistically stop or reverse the broader trajectory due to manpower, equipment, and ammunition imbalances. Russia’s advantage in resources makes a prolonged war of attrition unfavorable to Ukraine. Ukraine’s manpower, equipment, and ammunition - The central constraint for Ukraine is manpower. Even with missiles, drones, and air defense, without sufficient infantry to hold and seize territory and to provide reserves, Ukraine cannot win. - Russia’s industrial capacity and reserves enable it to sustain campaigns, whereas Ukraine’s supply and manpower constraints limit sustained operations. - The discussion notes Western missiles (Storm Shadow, Flamingo) and the pace of Tomahawk deliveries, with the implication that gaps in long-range standoff capability affect Ukraine’s offensive and defensive options. Mercenaries and potential foreign troop contributions - Reports of North Korean troops aiding Pokrovsk are discussed. The guest sees little likelihood of other countries sending troops, given the risk of provoking Russia. Mercenary recruitment by other countries is mentioned as a potential but unverified factor. Western sanctions and energy dynamics - The significant development of American sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil (two-thirds of Russia’s oil exports, roughly 4.4 million barrels per day) is analyzed. China’s state-owned majors and India are reducing seaborne imports but still engaging via pipelines or other mechanisms; the long-term impact on Russia’s revenue is likely substantial but may be offset through workarounds. - The guest emphasizes that history shows Russia tends to absorb economic pain and adapt, making it unlikely that sanctions alone will force strategic changes in Russia’s posture. Global Thunder and other security signals - The Global Thunder nuclear command exercise is mentioned, but the guest signals incomplete knowledge of this particular exercise’s details. Other security signals include drone activity near the Kremlin and assertions about Russia’s broader strategic planning, including potential NATO-related concerns and the Arctic buildup. NATO, European militaries, and relative capabilities - The discussion contrasts Europe’s growing modernization and ambition with actual combat experience. Europe’s strategic parity with Russia is viewed as plausible at a high level, but conventional capabilities lag Russia’s real-time battlefield experience and industrial scale. - The guest warns that perception of inevitable war between NATO and Russia could create self-fulfilling dynamics, urging cautious interpretation of escalatory signaling on both sides. Trump’s negotiation tactics and Ukraine peace prospects - The host questions Trump’s peace negotiation tactics: threats of Tomahawk missiles, meetings with Putin, and attempts to tailor a peace deal offering to freeze lines or concede Donbas. The guest describes Trump’s approach as transactional and inconsistent, with fluctuating positions that depend on the perceived personal and political gains. - The guest argues that Russia’s position has remained consistent since 2014-2022, centering on existential-security demands and denazification logic, including ensuring rights and language protections for ethnic Russians within the contested territories. A lasting peace would require a win-win vision that both sides can accept; transactional bargaining alone is unlikely to lead to a durable settlement. Venezuela and broader geopolitics - The discussion notes a Wagda-linked cargo flight to Venezuela amid sanctions evasion talk, with implications of mercenaries or military parts and a broader strategic alignment with Russia. The host and guest agree that U.S. regime-change impulses in Venezuela complicate international norms, risk escalation, and could inadvertently shift attention away from Ukraine. Overall, the conversation traces the evolving military balance in Ukraine, the emergence of new weapons systems and strategic deterrence concerns, the limits of Western capabilities and sanctions, and the complex interplay of diplomacy, negotiation tactics, and geopolitical aims shaping the conflict and potential resolutions.

- The discussion centers on whether European actions against Russia amount to a NATO-wide escalation and could lead to direct confrontation with Russia outside Ukraine, given recent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure and civilian ships in the Black Sea, including a Russian oil tanker in the Mediterranean with reports of drones launched from Greece. Putin reportedly vowed retaliation, and the guests consider how European and U.S./NATO support for Ukraine factors into this dynamic. - Daniel Davis argues that a segment of the Western alliance wants a conflict with Russia, framing it as peace on their terms from a position of weakness. He says there is little consideration for Russia’s security requirements or a mutually acceptable peace, and that ignoring Russia’s security concerns has driven the current cycle of escalation. He notes that Western actions since 2021–2022 have ignored the Russian side and pursued war aims on Western terms, contributing to a deteriorating situation and increasing casualties on the Ukrainian side. - Davis contends that Russia has been reticent to respond to many provocations with significant actions outside Ukraine, implying that Moscow has avoided a full-scale escalation that could threaten NATO. He predicts that Putin will respond to Western strikes on Russian targets, possibly increasing pressure on Odessa and other civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, with a tit-for-tat pattern as Russia leverages its greater capacity to hit Western shipping and infrastructure. - He asserts that since 2023, the West’s approach has not reversed the battlefield dynamics; sanctions, intelligence inputs, and heavy weapon transfers have not pushed Russia out of Ukraine and have allowed NATO and European stockpiles to deplete while Russia continues to build up in key categories (missiles, air defense, logistics). He claims Europe’s commitment of large sums to Ukraine will further strain their economies and shorten their stockpiles, potentially weakening Western readiness for a wider conflict. - The guest stresses that Russia’s strategy appears to be “go slow” in Ukraine to maintain pressure without triggering a broader European or NATO intervention, while building up stockpiles to prepare for a possible expansion of war if needed. He notes that Russia has generated a stockpile advantage in missiles (including Oreshniks) and air defense that could be decisive in a broader conventional war. - The discussion covers Oreshnik missiles, with Davis explaining Russia’s aim to maximize production and use if needed, not merely deter. He argues that Western air defenses would be ineffective against such systems and that Russia’s broader stockpiling and production could outpace Western depletion. He suggests Russia’s buildup is intended to enable a decisive move if NATO or Western forces escalate, and that the West’s capacity to sustain prolonged high-tempo combat is limited. - Both speakers discuss Odessa as a likely target if Russia deems it necessary to retaliate against Western support for Ukraine, noting that recent strikes on bridges, trains, and energy facilities in the region indicate growing Russian intent to disrupt Ukraine’s rear and logistics in the event of a front-line escalation. They consider whether Russia could seize Odessa if Western concessions are not forthcoming, and whether European leaders would respond decisively if Russia moves against Ukrainian ports. - The hosts warn that Western rhetoric about a “just and lasting peace” may be misaligned with Russia’s goals and that the risk of a broader conflict—potentially involving nuclear considerations—exists if provocations continue. They caution that if the conflict widens, all sides—Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the United States—could suffer heavy losses, and express concern about the potential for miscalculation as new weapons systems and security arrangements come into play before the year ends.

The Orishnik missile is described as a state-of-the-art weapon system launched from a massive 12 by 12 truck platform. It is engineered with multiple stages that enable it to reach orbit in a few minutes. A defining capability highlighted is its ability to hit hypersonic speed; once it attains altitude, it transitions into a steep dive, accelerating to hypersonic velocities. During its descent, the missile’s fairing opens to reveal six highly sophisticated warheads. Each warhead is equipped with miniature thrusters at its base, allowing the warheads to maneuver dynamically even as they fall under gravity. This maneuverability enables changes in direction, which is asserted to make it almost impossible for a Patriot missile to hit its target. The description notes that these capabilities are demonstrated in the video ahead.

The Iranian Shaheed 136 drone, rebranded as the Russian Juran-2, has slight upgrades. The Iranian version uses an inertial navigation system, while the Russian version uses GLONASS, a Russian alternative to GPS, which allows it to loiter but is vulnerable to jamming. Drones are transported by Tupolev Tu-22M bombers or Sukhoi Su-37 fighter jets, increasing their range from 1,000 km to 3,000 km, potentially reaching most of Europe. The Shaheed 136 is a low-budget cruise missile, costing $10,000-$40,000, and is launched from a truck container using rocket-assisted takeoff. The drone is 3.56 meters long, weighs 220 kg, and is powered by a 50-horsepower engine, sounding like a moped. It flies at low altitudes in swarms of five to ten to overwhelm air defenses. Limitations include GLONASS jamming. Countermeasures include weather balloons, Gepard anti-aircraft guns, and Soviet Zu-23 guns. Despite limitations, swarm tactics increase the chance of a successful strike.

Ukrainians at the NATO Innovation Summit stated 30% of their casualties were from drone strikes. In the Kursk offensive, drones account for the majority, if not almost all, of Russian tank and vehicle losses. FPV drones are currently operated in a one v one fashion. In the next few years, drone warfare will evolve to one v many. Command and data links, essential for drone operation, are becoming more vital. Countermeasures exist to jam or deny these links. The goal is to make drones more autonomous, enabling one operator to control many drones simultaneously.

Speaker 0: The transcript portrays Putin issuing a chilling World War III threat with a flying Chernobyl-style nuclear weapon. The classified missile is rumored to reach Mach 15, change direction midair, and the Russians believe no one can shoot it down. They’ve already tested earlier versions on Ukraine. Even with high-tech missile defense systems, it cannot be stopped. Russia reportedly has hypersonic missiles that fly hundreds of feet above the ground, alongside ballistic missiles. The speaker asserts the Russians have it all, and that the US says Russia is ahead of us in hypersonic missiles. The Pentagon is described as keeping most powerful capabilities secret, with about two generations of weapons tucked away. The speaker claims Russia has almost a two-to-one nuclear superiority over the US, and that once war starts, nobody wins: even if 95% of missiles are shot down, they would still flatten every city and military base. A classified unnamed ballistic missile is shown dropping many dummy warheads as a demonstration. The narrative references alleged testing in Ukraine and notes a claim that a demonstration MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) was presented: a demonstration that Russia can penetrate defenses and deliver nuclear payloads, though no warheads were involved in that particular display. The speaker recalls Biden announcing long-range cruise missiles, and Putin responding by attacking a missile factory, with subsequent release of photos showing holes in the centers of buildings within the factory. Western media allegedly dismissed these as not powerful missiles, but the speaker counters that it was a MIRV demonstration, and Russia later confirmed the demonstration of capability to field nuclear payloads. The speaker also claims Trump is frustrated with NATO and the EU, accusing them of starting the war with Russia and not wanting it to end. It is stated that Trump decided, over a week prior, not to provide Tomahawks to Zelenskyy. In response, EU and NATO are said to be supplying comparable or more advanced weapons to Ukraine, which would escalate the conflict on the escalatory ladder. Putin is said to be amassing nuclear weapons and attack submarines, with references to maps in the Daily Mail illustrating Russia’s buildup in the Arctic Circle as preparations for war with NATO are described. A segment mentions footage of the Skyfall ballistic missile factory. Speaker 1: Closing outro promoting Infowars, urging followers to connect on X (Twitter) at real Alex Jones and at AJN Live, and to download the Alex Jones app, urging support against the “democrat deep state party” and declaring that they will never be silenced.

Speaker 1 discusses a new anti-air missile being sent to Ukraine, which is better than a Stinger and effective at night. It is intended to help close the skies to Russian aircraft. Speaker 1 raises a question for Ukraine: Given Russia's overwhelming artillery and missiles, Ukraine's ability to counter them relies on air power. How would Ukraine manage if a no-fly zone, applicable to both sides, prevented them from flying?

Russia has relative freedom in Ukraine for drone and missile operations, with good intelligence coverage. Patriot batteries transferred to Ukraine are likely to be detected and destroyed by Russia before installation. Therefore, sending Patriot batteries to Ukraine is a waste of money. At best, it will extend the war by weeks, resulting in more Ukrainian and Russian deaths, but it will not change the outcome of the war.

Drones: A year ago, Ukraine had more drones, but now drone numbers are roughly at parity. Both sides launch a similar number of drones. Russia uses fiber optic drones more actively, which are immune to Western electronic warfare systems. These drones render jamming antennas useless. The army is actively using unmanned systems, including remotely controlled carts that can carry ammo, food, evacuate wounded soldiers, or carry explosives. Russia considers its approach to warfare as complex, dangerous, and highly professional.

The transcript reports that Russia has completed tests of the Burovesnik missile, with launches slated for 2027. It is described as a doomsday weapon that is rewriting global security, and the speaker asks why Russia built it and what makes it a game changer. The Burovesnik is propelled by a solid-fuel booster and a nuclear air-breathing jet, and during tests it covered a distance of 14,000 kilometers in fifteen hours. It is described as subsonic and capable of operating at high or low altitudes. The weapon is said to have the ability to loiter for months with unlimited range, and it carries a one megaton warhead, which the speaker equates to 70 Hiroshima bombs, ensuring devastating retaliation. Development of the missile reportedly began in 2001 after the United States abandoned the ABM treaty. The missile is described as being sized like the KH-one 101 cruise missile, and it is characterized as a vengeance weapon targeting critical infrastructure. According to the speaker, its endless flight time disrupts the strategic balance and is an alarm to the West. The Burovesnik is described as ground-launched with no carrier needed, delivering precision strikes with a payload range of 50 kilotons to one megaton, stated as the equivalent of 70 Hiroshima bombs. It is presented as a response to US Tomahawks in Europe or Ukraine, and as a key lever in new START talks. The transcript notes that Russia could ramp up production if the treaty ends. The speaker ends with a promo-style call to action, saying not to miss the next big reveal and to follow new rules, geopolitics on X, or cutting edge geopolitical updates, implying ongoing updates about this missile and related strategic developments.

Ukrainians are not superheroes and face casualties on a daily basis. Today, I will show you unique videos of Russians destroying Ukrainian equipment. "This is an American m triple seven howitzer." "The Russian UAV hits the exact target and destroys the howitzer." "The rare and valuable SAM has been destroyed." "The UAV dives and hits the target." "This is a Polish AHS Crab Self Propelled Artillery Unit. The hit causes fire and destroys the launcher." "A battery of Ukrainian S-three 100 SAMs." "A kamikaze drone strike on the installations leads to a powerful explosion and the destruction of an adjacent installation." "Everything that you saw earlier was the work of the Russian Zala Lancet UAV." "At least 250 different pieces of equipment were destroyed by Russians using it." "The range of such a warhead drone is about 70 kilometers." "Lancets are launched with a metal rail." "The Russians are increasingly using lancets."

Dmitry Sims junior hosts lieutenant general Abty Alaudinov, hero of Russia, hero of the Chechen Republic, hero of the Donetsk People’s Republic, commander of the Akhmet Special Forces, and deputy head of the main military political directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The conversation centers on the current phase of the conflict, Russia’s strategy, the role of Western support, and comparisons with Israeli actions in Gaza and other theaters. Key points and claims: - Russia’s combat capability and strategy - Alaudinov states that “overall, all troops of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense are engaged in active offensive operations across all sectors where we’re positioned,” with the most intense fighting around Pokrovsk, seen as the key point to break through to operational space. He notes progress in sectors where the Ahmad (Akhmet) special forces operate and emphasizes a broader offensive plan while maintaining an “active defense” to engage the entire front line and stretch the enemy’s resources. - He asserts that “only Russia is advancing” along the 1,000-kilometer line of contact and attributes slower offensive tempo to preserving personnel and avoiding a sharp breakthrough that could trigger NATO involvement. He argues the primary damage comes from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on both sides, and contends a rapid thrust would yield enormous losses. - Perceived signs of enemy strain - The speaker describes Ukraine as gradually crumbling under pressure, with Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and the surrounding agglomeration “gradually falling apart.” He claims Russia liberates one or two settlements daily and that NATO support—drones and equipment—has not changed the overall dynamics; Ukraine cannot hold the front despite the influx of foreign weapons. - Western/NATO support - Alaudinov asserts that NATO testing is ongoing on Ukraine with drones, weapons, electronic warfare, etc., and that Trump’s shifting rhetoric does not reduce the flow of weapons or support. He contends that American support persists even as political statements change, and he notes deep American-NATO involvement via think tanks, satellites, and arms supplies that reach the front. - Drones and the changing nature of war - He emphasizes drones as the central element of modern warfare, while not negating the continued relevance of artillery and tanks. He argues: “a tank worth millions of dollars can be destroyed by a drone that costs $500,” and stresses the need to compete economically in war, deploying cheaper, effective unmanned systems to exhaust the enemy’s resources. - He claims Russia has a layered drone system for deep reconnaissance and strike with various warhead levels, ranges, and maneuverability, enabling operations from closest to farthest sectors and allowing “all targets” to be hit today. He asserts Russia is ahead of NATO in unmanned aviation. - Mobilization and tactics - Refuting Western depictions of “meat assaults,” he notes Russia conducted only one mobilization (300,000) and has continued advancing, while Ukraine has mobilized for years and still struggles. He attributes Ukraine’s resilience to nationalist formations behind mobilized troops, and he suggests that without NATO support, Ukraine would not sustain the front for many days. - Mercenaries and comparisons to Israeli actions - He characterizes Western mercenaries as having arrived with false expectations and being killed off in large numbers; Ukrainians are described as having strong spirit, but NATO soldiers lack endurance in the same way. Israeli mercenaries are described as capable in some contexts but not decisive against Russia. - On Gaza and the Israeli army, Alaudinov accuses Israel of “a fascist state” with tactics that spare no one, arguing Russia fights only those who fight with weapons and does not target women, children, or elders. He contrasts this with alleged Israeli actions in Gaza, saying Israel has no tactics and destroys civilians. - Nuclear considerations and doctrine - He asserts Russia is a nuclear power with substantial combat experience and advances in missiles like Zircon that could sink carriers, arguing NATO did not account for Russia’s capabilities when initiating the conflict. He presents a broader critique of Western policy and the so-called “deep state,” alleging far-reaching political dynamics involving Israel, Epstein, and compromise among Western leadership. - Closing perspective - The discussion closes with the host thanking Alaudinov for the detailed analysis of the operation and broader geopolitical commentary, including views on Israel, Gaza, Iran, and U.S. roles.

Mario and the Colonel discuss the latest developments in the Ukraine-Russia conflict and their implications for peace negotiations and the battlefield. - The hosts walk through conflicting claims about an alleged Ukrainian drone attack on Putin’s residence, timed with Zelenskyy’s meeting with Trump. Ukraine denied the claims; Russia asserted the opposite; a CIA report then said the drones targeted a Russian military base in the region and that this wasn’t the first time such a base had been targeted. The Colonel notes that all sides may be using disinformation, and no one can say with authority what happened. He emphasizes that what matters is how each side uses the information to bolster its position and public support, including Lavrov’s stated threat of retaliation. He argues the military reality on the ground continues to be unfavorable for Ukraine, and that Russia will use any incident to justify gains or concessions on its terms. - On negotiations, the 90–95% of an agreement reportedly already accepted is contrasted with two sticking points: security guarantees and territory. Zelenskyy is said to be nearing some form of security guarantee solution, but Donbas territorial concessions remain unresolved. The Colonel suggests evaluating who benefits from the alleged incident; if true, it could be used to sabotage peace talks. He notes competing narratives: Ukraine seeks to portray Russia as untrustworthy, while Russia portrays Ukraine as the aggressor and untrustworthy, both using the incident to justify their positions. He questions whether any side actually benefits, proposing that Russia might use the event domestically to rally support and push negotiations toward its terms. - The discussion moves to strategic weapons and timing. They note the Arashnik missiles in Belarus, described as nuclear-capable, with high speed and multiple warheads. The Colonel says Russia has signaled willingness to escalate but would likely reserve Arashniks for decisive moments or major escalations, possibly a clash with NATO, rather than using them routinely. He cites Putin’s statements about negotiating or taking actions by force and explains that Russia’s leadership appears to have reached a point where battlefield gains could be prioritized if diplomacy stalls. - On Ukraine’s ability to advance, the Colonel argues that Russia prioritizes territorial gains but is not constrained by time, with large manpower advantages and sustained firepower. He asserts Russia’s advance has accelerated over 2024–2025 and could continue, potentially enabling breakthroughs even if the Donbas remains a long-term objective. He contrasts this with potential Ukrainian vulnerabilities, including troop losses, desertions, and mobilization limits, suggesting Ukraine could face a collapse in the front line by spring or summer, though there is uncertainty about exact outcomes. - Regarding Ukraine’s effort to disrupt Russia’s economy by targeting the Black Sea fleet and shipping, the Colonel is skeptical that such actions would decisively affect Russia, given Russia’s diversification away from sea-based revenues and Ukraine’s parallel economic strains, including power shortages and refineries. He emphasizes that neither side’s economic measures have produced a decisive effect, and that Russia has prepared countermeasures. - Trump’s post claiming that “Putin’s attack bluster” shows Russia stands in the way of peace is discussed. The Colonel says Trump is echoing Western lines and that such rhetoric will not by itself alter the course of negotiations; an eventual settlement requires both sides to agree on terms, not slogans. - On possible Russian retaliation, the Colonel suggests targeted responses within Kyiv’s power sector or leadership and possibly infrastructure, but he cautions against predicting escalation, noting Russia’s risk-averse tendencies and potential to strike second- and third-tier Ukrainian leaders or critical infrastructure if deemed necessary for domestic purposes. - Looking ahead twelve months, the Colonel predicts continued war, potential major battlefield moves with accelerating territorial changes, and the possibility of a breakthrough or a sharp escalation. He warns that a purely defensive posture will not win and that the pace of Russian advances could lead to significant shifts by late 2026, with Donbas negotiations remaining unsettled. He concludes that the conflict is likely to continue, with hybrid warfare and broader Western responses shaping developments.

Die Ukraine darf nun mit gelieferten Waffen militärische Stellungen in Russland angreifen, was bisher kaum möglich war. Dies stellt einen entscheidenden qualitativen Unterschied in der Kriegsführung der Ukraine dar, Stichwort Long Range Fire. Russland greift rücksichtslos zivile Ziele an, was die Ukraine nicht tut. Ein Land, das sich nur im eigenen Territorium verteidigt, verteidigt sich nicht ausreichend. Daher findet die Verteidigung der Ukraine nun auch gegen militärische Infrastruktur auf russischem Staatsgebiet statt. **Translation:** Ukraine is now allowed to attack military positions in Russia with supplied weapons, which was previously hardly possible. This represents a decisive qualitative difference in Ukraine's warfare, keyword Long Range Fire. Russia ruthlessly attacks civilian targets, which Ukraine does not do. A country that only defends itself on its own territory does not defend itself sufficiently. Therefore, the defense of Ukraine is now also taking place against military infrastructure on Russian territory.

На пусковой установке зенитно-ракетной системы С-350 Витязь, успешно демонстрируемой в зоне СВО. По большой пачке РСЗО HIMARS шло «порядка 12-16 целей»; комплекс «успешно справился, ни одной цели не достигло своей точки». Цель захвачена на дальности «порядка 90 километров», подпустив ближе, «устойчиво сопровождая была поражена на дальности порядка 70 километров». Ракета маневрирует параллельно цели. По нам применяется и АТАК МС и РСЗО HIMARS. Цели были успешно поражены. Это «один из новейших образцов вооружения Российской Федерации». Комплекс имеет зенитно-управляемые ракеты с головками самонаведения, «высокую мобильность, маневренность». Комплекс имеет автономную систему питания, ему «не обязательно привязываться к системам свэп». Разброс дивизиона повышает живучесть экипажей. С момента обнаружения до поражения цели — «от полутора до трех секунд», как при участии оператора, так и в автоматическом режиме. «Автоматический режим у данного комплекса работает идеально, не было совершено в данном режиме ни одного лишнего пуска ракеты и все цели были успешно поражены»。 At the launcher site of the S-350 Vityaz air defense system, successfully demonstrated in the zone of the SVO. For a large batch of HIMARS MLRS there were «about 12-16 targets»; the complex «successfully coped, not a single target reached its point». The target was captured at a distance of «about 90 kilometers» and, by approaching closer, was «consistently engaged at a distance of about 70 kilometers». The missile maneuvers parallel to the target. For us, ATAK MS and HIMARS MLRS were used. The targets were successfully destroyed. This is «one of the newest samples of weapons of the Russian Federation». The system is equipped with guided missiles with homing heads, «high mobility, maneuverability». The system has an autonomous power supply; it «does not have to be tied to SWEP systems». The division’s dispersion increases crew survivability. From detection to destruction — «from one and a half to three seconds», whether with operator involvement or in automatic mode. «Automatic mode of this complex works perfectly, there has not been a single extra rocket launch in this mode, and all targets were successfully destroyed».