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The conversation centers on Iran, its 47-year regime, and how to think about protest, reform, and potential change from the perspective of an Iranian-American who has lived in the United States most of his life. The speakers discuss the severity of the regime, the nature of the opposition, and the calculus involved in any push for change. - Freedom and the cost of change: Freedom is described as nasty and the regime as “nasty.” The speakers assert that the regime, including the IRGC, is not likely to give up Iran in a peaceful way. They emphasize that protests and resistance have been ongoing, and that the regime has a track record of destroying opposition. They use the imagery of public executions and a ruthless approach to suppression, comparing the regime’s behavior to a brutal, game-of-thrones-like motto. - Personal history and perspective: The guest notes his life trajectory—born during the 1978 revolution, living through the Shah’s era briefly, and then the Khomeini years—giving him a long historical frame for evaluating leadership and revolution. He remarks that he has no moral authority to tell Iranians how to protest or whether to risk their families, acknowledging the severe personal stakes for those on the ground. He stresses the bravery and resilience of the Iranian people and explains the immense pressures that drive ordinary citizens to protest. - The strategic challenge of regime change: The guest asserts that the regime wants to stretch negotiations and extend days to avoid losing resources, implying a protracted endurance tactic. He insists that replacing or reforming the regime would be extremely difficult, given the depth of the regime’s networks and its long tenure. - Reza Pahlavi and leadership dynamics: The discussion revisits Reza Pahlavi, the former shah’s son, noting his recent high-profile activity, meetings in Washington, and televised statements. The guest acknowledges both praise and criticism of Reza Pahlavi, arguing that leadership in Iran would require clear, tough decisions and that those who criticize him must provide constructive counterarguments rather than ad hominem attacks. He discusses the complexity of leadership in exile and the challenges of returning to Iran to lead, including loyalty issues within the military and the risk of betrayal. - The US and foreign policy angle: The hosts debate what role the United States should play, including the consideration of strikes or sanctions. The guest uses a parable about a local offense (a killer in Miami) to illustrate how a country should commit to eliminating a threat without broad interference in other regions’ problems. He argues for public support of a targeted objective but cautions against broad, nation-building wars that could trigger larger conflicts. He also notes the influence of other actors, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, China, and European nations, on the Iran situation, suggesting a multi-layered and opaque calculus in any action. - The question of strikes and objectives: The speakers discuss whether strikes should aim to completely destroy the regime or merely pressure it, emphasizing that the intention behind any military action matters more than the action itself. They consider the risk of a dangerous power vacuum, comparing potential outcomes to Libya or Iraq, and discuss the possibility of negotiating with a different leadership that could concede to protesters’ demands while minimizing harm to the broader population. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving a favorable outcome without risking unintended consequences. - The role of sanctions and diplomacy: The sanctions are described as byproducts of the regime’s leadership and its lack of diplomacy, with the argument that sanctions affect the Iranian people more than the ruling elite. The dialogue touches on questions of accountability for the regime’s behavior and the broader regional dynamics, including public sentiment in Iran and international responses. - Mossad and external involvement: The guest asserts that Mossad and Israel are heavily involved in Iran’s internal dynamics and protests, given the existential stakes and the perception of threats against Iranian leadership. He contends that foreign intelligence communities are active in shaping events and information, including potential misdirection and propaganda. - The broader takeaway: The discussion ends by underscoring the need for multiple options and credible leadership in Iran, the difficulty of changing a deeply entrenched regime, and the reality that any transition would be complex, potentially dangerous, and require careful, strategic consideration of long-term impacts rather than quick, sweeping actions. The host reflects on the remarkable intensity and busyness of US politics and foreign policy under a dynamic administration, noting that such a convergence of domestic and international pressures makes this period historically singular.

The transcript describes footage of Ayatollah Khomeini on a plane returning to Iran from Paris, with an interview by Peter Jennings. Jennings asks how Khomeini feels about his triumphant return. Khomeini reflects, noting the question about whether the French are their friends. The discussion then questions why the Ayatollah would be sent back to Iran to inherit a deadly anti-American revolution if that wasn’t America’s intention, and answers that this is what America wanted. It is stated that the CIA and the State Department advised Jimmy Carter that “we know this guy. Khomeini, he’s not so bad. He was part of a Shiite group that we helped to agitate against Mohammed Mosaddegh back in ’53. We can work with him.” The transcript ends with a claim that a State Department official, William Sullivan, compared Khomeini to Mahatma Gandhi.

The discussion opens by critiquing mainstream media narratives about Iran, contrasting them with “neocon run” outlets and highlighting one-sided portrayals. Condoleezza Rice is cited as arguing that Iran started the war forty-seven years ago, with the implication that the current actions are a finish. Speaker 1 (a guest) adds that Iran has been at war with the U.S. since 1979, noting the embassy hostage crisis, the killings of Marines in Lebanon, and Iranian-made roadside bombs in Iraq, suggesting longstanding Iranian hostility. Speaker 0 and others reference this framing as propagandistic, while noting Pentagon claims of US air power over Iran. Speaker 2 describes the view of US bombers flying over Tehran and the IRGC, with the assertion that Iran will be unable to respond while US and Israeli air power dominates. Talk then shifts to the possibility of US boots on the ground in Iran. Polymarket is cited, giving a 65% probability of US forces on the ground in Iran by December 31. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (spelled Ogracchi in the transcript) says he is waiting for a US ground invasion and claims Iran is prepared, while an NBC anchor appears surprised by the statement. A dialogue follows with a reporter asking an Iranian interviewee whether Iran is ready for a US invasion; the interviewee responds that Iran is ready and willing to confront US ground forces, insisting that Iran’s missiles and upgraded capabilities were demonstrated in prior conflicts. Colonel Douglas MacGregor appears to discuss the likelihood of US boots on the ground. He states zero probability of large-scale ground forces, noting the army’s reduced size since the 1990s and the Marines’ limited numbers. He argues a half-million troops would be needed for a meaningful ground campaign, with sustainment, drones, and missiles making a ground invasion impractical. He describes the challenge of moving forces through Israel, Syria, and into northern Iran, and asserts missiles and unmanned systems would deter such an operation. He also dismisses the idea that special operations could be the exception, noting concerns about extraction and the overall feasibility. Speaker 6 adds that Israel reportedly wants boots on the ground but lacks generals to lead such a mission, framing the move as potentially suicidal. The panel discusses perceived indicators of US military “success,” but MacGregor cautions that such signals—like a White House meeting with aerospace leaders and Israeli mobilizations—do not necessarily indicate a decisive victory. He argues that Iranian missiles and drones have inflicted damage on bases, radars, Patriot and THAAD batteries, and that Israel’s mobility and readiness are strained, with reservists mobilized but not guaranteed to show up. He emphasizes that Iran’s capabilities could prolong the conflict, and notes a broader geopolitical risk, including potential Russian and Chinese involvement. The conversation critiques Washington’s strategic planning, questioning whether the US or its allies had a systematic analysis of the likelihood of success in striking Iran, arguing that assumptions were evidence-free. MacGregor predicts a prolonged conflict, possibly extending for weeks, and warns against a broader regional collapse. He emphasizes that Iran’s strategy may be to endure and avoid a quick tactical defeat, while the US contemplates escalation or potential engagement with carrier groups. Regarding naval operations, there is debate about escorting ships through the Strait of Hormuz. The idea of US insurers covering shipping is discussed, with concerns about the risk to US taxpayers and the feasibility of naval escorts near Iran. MacGregor and the others argue that such an approach would be dangerous and unlikely to be pursued by naval leadership, pointing to the risk of being sunk and the logistical challenges of carrier air operations at long distances. Toward the end, the participants reflect on information integrity in wartime, noting that casualties and damage are often under- or mis-reported, and referencing Napoleon’s adage that the first casualty in war is the truth. The final segment promotes MacGregor’s Substack piece, MacGregor Warrior, and MacGregor TV, acknowledging shadow bans and encouraging listeners to seek out his material. The host and guests close with a candid acknowledgment of ongoing uncertainty and the prospect of a drawn-out conflict.

Scott Horton discusses the history of US involvement in Iran, starting with the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh and the reinstallation of the Shah. This action led to blowback, exemplified by the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nixon pressured the Shah to buy more US weapons, undermining his rule. The US initially tried working with Khomeini but later supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran, fearing the spread of Shiite fundamentalism. The US also supported the Mujahideen in Afghanistan to bait the Soviets into a costly war. The US gave Saddam Hussein the green light to invade Iran, fearing the influence of the Iranian revolution on Iraq's Shiite population. The US government facilitated Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iran. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US intervened to reinstall the Kuwaiti king, lying about Iraqi threats to Saudi Arabia. The US then betrayed the Shiite uprising in Iraq, fearing Iranian influence. The US supported Al Qaeda in conflicts like Bosnia and Kosovo, even as Al Qaeda attacked the US. Neoconservatives pushed for war with Iraq to benefit Israel, aiming to rebuild an oil pipeline to Haifa. The US then backed Al Qaeda-linked groups in Syria to weaken Iran and its ally, Assad. Obama took Al Qaeda's side in Libya. The US has been fighting a proxy war against Russia. The US has a pattern of supporting Bin Ladenite suicide bombers. Trump bombed Iranian nuclear facilities, calling the Ayatollah's bluff. The US continues to prioritize foreign interests over domestic needs.

Israel encouraged and started Hamas to counteract Yasser Arafat. The speaker claims this served Israel's purpose at the time. The U.S. imposes its system on the world, such as invading Iraq to teach people how to be Democrats. The U.S. encouraged Palestinians to have a free election, and they elected Hamas. The speaker asserts the U.S. indirectly and directly, through Israel, helped establish Hamas. After Hamas became dominant through the election, the U.S. then had to kill them. The speaker concludes this does not make sense.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

John Bolton suggests regime change in Iran, but the U.S. has a history of interference there. In the 1940s and 50s, Britain and the Soviets deposed the Shah, and later the U.S. overthrew Prime Minister Mossadegh, who was seen as communist and hostile to American interests, despite being secular. The U.S. then reinstalled the Shah, an unpopular autocrat, making America unpopular in Iran. This led to the 1970s revolution, bringing Ayatollah Khomeini to power and creating an anti-American regime. Intervention made Iran an enemy. Regime change can lead to unforeseen consequences like civil war and refugee crises. The West should not interfere; Iran's problems today stem from past U.S. involvement.

US politicians accuse other nations of election meddling, but the CIA has a long history of interfering in foreign affairs through military coups. In one example, the CIA orchestrated the overthrow of Iran's prime minister for nationalizing the oil industry, leading to widespread violence and the installation of a US-friendly government. Declassified documents reveal the CIA's involvement in the coup, highlighting their use of propaganda and bribery. Despite claims of no longer meddling in elections, the CIA director openly admitted to continuing such actions for "very good reasons."

Scott Horton discusses the history of US-Iran relations, starting with the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh and the reinstallation of the Shah. This action led to blowback, exemplified by the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nixon pressured the Shah to buy US weapons, undermining his rule. The US initially tried working with Khomeini but then soured after the hostage crisis, triggered by the Shah's admission into the US for cancer treatment at Rockefeller's request. The Carter Doctrine declared the Persian Gulf an American lake. Brzezinski sought to bait the Soviets into Afghanistan, leading to the Carter Doctrine to deter Soviet expansion into Iran, though he later admitted the Soviet threat to Iran was overstated. The US supported Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, enabling his use of chemical weapons against Iranians. The US supported the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, leading to the rise of Al Qaeda. The US gave Saddam a green light to invade Kuwait, then intervened to protect Saudi Arabia. The Clinton administration adopted a dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran, further fueling Al Qaeda's animosity. Bin Laden cited US support for Israel and bases in Saudi Arabia as key grievances. The US supported Al Qaeda in Chechnya and Bosnia, even as they attacked the US. Neoconservatives, many with Trotskyist backgrounds, advocated for war with Iraq to benefit Israel, aiming to rebuild an oil pipeline to Haifa. The US supported Al Qaeda-linked groups in Libya and Syria, leading to the rise of ISIS. Obama took Al Qaeda's side in Libya and then moved Gaddafi's arms to Al Qaeda in Syria. The US has been fighting a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine.

Scott Horton discusses the history of US involvement in Iran, starting with the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh and the reinstallation of the Shah. This action led to blowback, exemplified by the 1979 Iranian revolution. Nixon pressured the Shah to buy US weapons, undermining his rule. The US initially tried working with Khomeini but later supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran, fearing the spread of Shiite revolution. The US supported Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war, even enabling his use of chemical weapons. Simultaneously, the US backed the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, leading to the rise of Al Qaeda. The US then intervened in Iraq after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, but later abandoned the Shiite uprising. Clinton's administration adopted a dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran, further fueling anti-American sentiment. The speaker claims the neoconservative movement pushed for war with Iraq to benefit Israel, aiming to rebuild an oil pipeline to Haifa. The US supported Al Qaeda-linked groups in Libya and Syria, leading to the rise of ISIS. The speaker concludes that US foreign policy has been driven by the interests of foreign powers rather than American interests, advocating for a retrenchment of American power and a focus on domestic issues.

The speaker opens by citing James Madison, who wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1789 that “the constitution supposes what the history of all governments demonstrates, that the executive branch of power is the most interested in war and most prone to it,” and notes that the constitution itself vests in the legislature the question of war (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11) while giving the president operational powers of war (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). Even if one claimed the 1973 War Powers Resolution supersedes the constitutional language, the speaker argues the president has not met its conditions: the president may only introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities under three circumstances—declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack on the United States—none of which exist today because Iran has not attacked the United States, Congress has not declared war, and Congress has not granted specific statutory authorization. Beyond this constitutional framing, the speaker asks why the United States would go to war with Iran and emphasizes that servicemembers deserve a clear mission. He questions how such a war would help American families with groceries, housing, or safety in schools and neighborhoods. He cautions against past interventions in the Middle East, arguing they have produced a debt of at least $8 trillion from wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan, and contends a sustained war with Iran will not stabilize the region but will radicalize new generations of terrorists and generate more refugees to Europe and the United States. The speaker argues Iran is not Venezuela, and that Ayatollah Khomeini was not a president but a religious leader in a region notorious for radical Islamists; he asserts that the United States and Israel turned him into a martyr, contributing to broader conflict and casualties, including six American families who have lost loved ones. He claims the administration cannot provide a straight answer for why the preemptive war was launched, noting contradictory statements about imminent Iranian strikes and the rationale of stopping a nuclear program. A candid answer, he says, came from the Secretary of State, who said Israel forced the United States to act, implying that Congress must decide war. If American lives are to be risked, that decision must be debated and voted on by representatives, and the debate should be arduous with a hard vote. He offers a theory that colleagues do not want to go on record due to a poor track record of meddling in the Middle East and a desire to avoid their names being associated with an unfavorable outcome. The speaker asserts Congress is not here to declare war today; the vote on the War Powers Resolution is to reassert that Congress must decide questions of war. Some say war is authorized by paying for it through the budget, but the speaker asserts that defining the mission for the troops is not included in the budget and has not been done. He thanks the men and women engaged in combat, prays for their safety, and states that the resolution is written for them—to ensure they know when they achieve their mission and can come home.

Israel encouraged and started Hamas to counteract Yasser Arafat. The speaker claims this served Israel's purpose at the time. The U.S. imposes its system on the world, such as invading Iraq to teach people how to be Democrats. The U.S. encouraged Palestinians to have a free election, and they elected Hamas. The speaker claims the U.S. indirectly and directly through Israel helped establish Hamas. Because Hamas became dominant after the election, the U.S. then had to kill them. The speaker concludes that this does not make sense.

Iran wants to take over Saudi Arabia by burning down the Saudi embassy. They claim the US created ISIS by supporting Mujahideen fighters against the Soviets in Afghanistan. A high-level asset allegedly became president in 2008 to destroy the US from within. The president defunded the military and allegedly funded ISIS through covert operations. An ISIS commander in Pakistan confessed to receiving funds routed through the US to recruit fighters for Syria. The US government has been criticized for indirectly funding terrorist organizations. President Obama requested funds to train Iraqi soldiers and Syrian rebels to fight ISIS.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of striking Iran to eliminate its nuclear program and the broader implications of regime change. - Speaker 0 acknowledges arguments that Israel has wanted to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, and that American involvement with B-52s and large bombs might be needed to finish the job. He notes the idea of a strike that proceeds quickly with minimal American casualties, under a Trump-era frame that Iran will not get a nuclear bomb. - He observes a shift among Washington’s neoconservative and Republican circles from opposing Iran’s nuclear capability to opposing Ayatollah rule itself, suggesting a subtle change in objectives while maintaining the theme of intervention. He concedes cautious support if Trump executes it prudently, but warns of a “switcheroo” toward regime change rather than purely disabling the nuclear program. - Speaker 0 criticizes the record of neocons on foreign policy (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the Arab Spring) and argues that the entire Middle East bears their failures. He emphasizes a potential regime-change drive and questions what would come after removing the Ayatollah, including possible US troop deployments and financial support for a new regime. - He highlights the size of Iran (about 92,000,000 people, two and a half times the size of Texas) and warns that regime change could trigger a bloody civil war and a large refugee crisis, possibly drawing tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths and destabilizing Europe. - Speaker 1 presents a more vocal stance: he would like to see the regime fall and leaves to the president the timing and method, insisting that if the nuclear program isn’t eliminated now, “we’ll all regret it” and urging to “be all in” to help Israel finish the job. - In cuts 3:43, Speaker 1 argues that removing the Ayatollah’s regime would be beneficial because staying in power would continue to threaten Israel, foment terrorism, and pursue a bomb; he characterizes the regime as aiming to destroy Jews and Sunni Islam, calling them “fanatical religious Nazis.” - Speaker 0 responds that such a forceful call for regime change is immature, shallow, and reckless, warning that certainty about outcomes in foreign interventions is impossible. He asserts that the first rule of foreign policy is humility, noting that prior interventions led to prolonged conflict and mass displacement. He cautions against beating the drums for regime change in another Middle Eastern country, especially the largest, and reiterates that the issue is not simply removing the nuclear program but opposing Western-led regime change. - The discussion frames a tension between supporting efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and resisting Western-led regime change, with a strong emphasis on potential humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. The speakers reference public opinion (citing 86% of Americans not wanting Iran to have a bomb) and critique interventions as historically destabilizing.

Speaker 0 asks how to weed out Muslims in a country that despises you and means you harm without vilifying or persecuting those who are fine and part of the social fabric. Speaker 1 responds by highlighting that Arab states have taken a strong stance against the Muslim Brotherhood and asks why the West hasn’t. The Muslim Brotherhood has been banned in Egypt and in many Gulf states (not Qatar), and there is a reason: they know how dangerous this organization is, that it doesn’t represent peace-loving Muslims who simply want to practice their religion and not impose a perverted version of jihad. Speaker 1 asserts that the Muslim Brotherhood is not pro-Muslim; it is an organization providing cover for terrorism that disproportionately impacts Muslims, especially in the Arab world. He emphasizes that the biggest victims of terrorism are the people of the Middle East, the majority of whom are Muslims, and urges people to educate themselves about what’s really happening on this front before it’s too late. Speaker 0 then asks why Europe is failing and has massively open borders, taking people from regimes where terrorism is life-threatening. Speaker 1 answers with a single word: subversion. He claims this is most evident in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, stating that the way the war and the conflict are presented in international media is not an accurate reflection of what’s happening on the ground. He believes many Palestinians would share that sentiment. He contends that what’s happening in Gaza is not how it’s reported, because narratives are shaped to present a certain story, a process he attributes to Al Jazeera. He questions who runs Al Jazeera and asserts it is state-run by Qatar, and says they have been a chief sponsor of a “laundered ideology” presenting Palestinian victimhood even if some stories are fabricated. He claims Al Jazeera has falsified stories during the Gaza war. Speaker 1 concludes that when people push back against Islamism, they’re accused of conspiracy or exaggeration, but the speaker argues that there is a conspiracy to undermine the West. He acknowledges that it may seem crazy to say so, but asserts that such a conspiracy is exactly what is happening. He identifies this as the fundamental ideology of Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Shia side, and says this is something that must be spoken out against to educate the general public.

Scott Horton discusses the history of US-Iran relations, starting with the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh and the reinstallation of the Shah. This action led to blowback, exemplified by the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nixon pressured the Shah to buy US weapons, undermining his rule. The US initially tried working with Ayatollah Khomeini, viewing him as reasonable. In 1979, David Rockefeller influenced Carter to allow the Shah into the US for cancer treatment, triggering the hostage crisis. Carter then announced the Carter Doctrine, asserting US dominance in the Persian Gulf. Brzezinski aimed to provoke Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, later feigning concern about Iran. The US supported Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, even enabling his use of chemical weapons. The US also backed the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, leading to the rise of Al Qaeda. The US then intervened in the Gulf War to reinstate the Kuwaiti King. Clinton adopted a dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran, further fueling anti-American sentiment. Bin Laden cited US support for Israel and military presence in Saudi Arabia as key grievances. The US supported Al Qaeda in Chechnya and the Balkans, even as they attacked US interests. The neoconservative movement pushed for war in Iraq, aiming to reshape the region to benefit Israel. The US invasion of Iraq empowered Shiite groups and Iran, contrary to neocon plans. The US then backed Sunni extremists in Syria to counter Iranian influence, leading to the rise of ISIS. Obama then sided with Al Qaeda in Libya. The US has a history of supporting various factions in the Middle East, often with unintended consequences. The US has been fighting a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. The US has a long history of interventionism, often driven by foreign interests rather than American interests. The US should normalize relations with Iran.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

The speaker argues that there has been an “unbelievable success in by, degrading Iran,” moving Iran from a first-rate power to a second- or third-rate power. Iran is described as “throwing their weight all over the place” and “exporting terrorism,” not only across the Middle East but also to Venezuela, where they are “in cahoots with the Maduro regime.” The claim extends to Iran exporting terrorism to America and to the American hemisphere, and to Hamas and Iran’s proxies attempting to get their guys into the United States. The speaker asserts that Hamas and Iran’s proxies are a threat not only to the United States but to Israel and to “all America’s allies in The Middle East,” and to America itself.

In 1951, the Iranian parliament, led by Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, nationalized the oil industry, ending four decades of British control via the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Mosaddegh's initiative was supported by his nationalist party and religious groups led by Ayatollah Khashani. Three factors contributed to the nationalization: national convergence, a strong bond between the nation, religious groups, and the nationalist party, and rivalries among major powers. Following nationalization, the US and Britain imposed sanctions on Iran, leading to a coup against Mosaddegh in 1953. Experts believe the nationalization was a primary cause of the Anglo-American coup, which resulted in a US-backed monarchy under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, later overthrown in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The CIA has since confirmed Washington's role in the coup. The US gained a share of Iran's oil wealth after the coup, as previously, only Britain benefited. Iran was the first Middle Eastern country to nationalize its oil industry, marking a key moment in both Iranian anti-colonialism and Middle Eastern political development.

- The discussion centers on Iran amid weekend protests and a push by some Western figures for regime change, with emphasis on misinformation and “rage bait” clips online. The hosts claim much of the trending content is old, mislabeled, from other countries, or edited to look new. - It is alleged that Iran is deliberately conducting a nationwide digital blackout to close off information from inside the country and to hinder outside eyes. Reportedly, Iran is not only shutting down ordinary Internet traffic but also attempting to disrupt satellite connections (Starlink, Iridium, Inmarsat, Thuria). The claim is that foreign partners are aiding Iran in this blackout, with China and Russia specifically named as helping jam communications, including satellite phones and Internet links. SkyFreight flights are said to bring jamming equipment into Iran. The satellite and Internet disruptions are described as part of an unusually sophisticated communications clampdown. - Starlink and other satellite services are reportedly being jammed beyond basic GPS interference, with references to Starlink, Iridium, GlobalSat, Inmarsat, and Thuria. China is singled out as a key player in the jamming equipment. There are also mentions of health risks within the radius of the jamming equipment. - On casualty figures, Iranian media is cited as reporting 500 killed and 300 injured, but the hosts’ sources disagree with both the Iranian and Western figures. The hosts’ sources claim 2,150 dead, 480 injured, and 620 missing across 11 cities in Iran as of yesterday. - The broadcast introduces Doctor Miriam Asusli (online persona: Syrian Girl) who had just returned from Iran. She describes normal conditions on the ground during her visit, including using the metro, observing advanced infrastructure, and seeing women in higher educational attainment with some freedom in dress. She challenges the notion of widespread protests and asserts that the situation in Iran did not resemble the media’s depiction; she suggests Iran’s protests are about opening the economy and breaking Western influence, extending broader claims about global liberal order, Western-backed “color revolutions,” and control of oil and markets. - The guest asserts that the protests are connected to broader geopolitical aims, including Israeli and American efforts to change regimes, and argues that sanctions in Syria and Iran are designed to create instability. She alleges Western-backed groups and foreign entities push for regime change and profit from it, including claims about the CIA and Mossad’s involvement in supporting rebels in the region, and suggests that the regime change narrative serves Western interests. - There is a discussion about sanctions and their impact, with claims that sanctions cause starvation and destabilization to push for external influence or regime change. The guest mentions the idea of Iran pursuing peaceful nuclear power as a potential stabilizing factor, while also expressing controversial views about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as a balance against Israel’s alleged nuclear capabilities. - The conversation connects the current events to broader regional dynamics, including Syria and Iraq, and asserts that Western powers seek to exploit Iran’s turmoil for strategic gains. The hosts acknowledge that there are multiple narratives and say that their sources in the Middle East indicate preparations for conflict by the end of the month, with specific timing debates around late January (the thirtieth or thirty-first). - The program closes with the hosts noting parallel reporting from Israeli sources about potential conflict timing and thanking the guest for on-the-ground insights, expressing a desire for peace.

The speaker argues that whenever a country defends its own people, the United States asks, “Who owns the resources?” and if the answer isn’t The US, a coup follows. The claim is that over 80 foreign governments have been overthrown or destabilized by the United States, and that most of them weren’t dictatorships, but democratically elected governments that threatened US corporate profits. The described playbook involves the CIA funding opposition groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda, planting stories in the media, bribing generals, arming rebels, or collapsing a country’s economy, with the coup replacing the leader with a pro-US dictatorship. The overarching assertion is that this is not about democracy but about power and control. Key historical examples cited include: - Iran in 1953: Mosaddegh attempted to nationalize oil; the CIA launched Operation Ajax, orchestrated protests, paid off politicians, and installed the Shah, resulting in twenty-five years of dictatorship and torture under US protection. - Guatemala in 1954: President Arbenz redistributed land from the United Fruit Company, a US corporation; the CIA branded him a communist, conducted a coup, and Guatemala descended into a civil war with over 200,000 deaths. - Chile in 1973: Allende was overthrown in a US-backed military coup, and Pinochet’s regime tortured and killed thousands after Allende’s attempts to nationalize copper. - Congo in 1961: Lumumba sought African control of African resources; the CIA helped orchestrate his assassination and installed a brutal dictator who was supported for decades. The speaker adds that there are “dozens of others” beyond these cases, including Haiti, Iraq, Libya, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Bolivia, and beyond, arguing that the motive is not fighting tyranny but profits and control. When a country attempts to exit the system or nationalize resources to reduce inequality, they threaten profits and the idea that another world is possible, so the CIA sabotages such efforts to prevent successful example-making, such as Libya. The conclusion is that many nations don’t trust the United States because “we’ve been the villains throughout most of our history.” The speaker invites readers to comment to receive a “forbidden reading list” of books and documentaries that “they never wanted you to find.”

The conversation centers on Iran’s current crisis and the likelihood, timing, and aims of potential U.S. and Israeli actions against Iran. The speakers discuss whether protests inside Iran are driving any attack plans or if those plans were made beforehand, and what the objectives might be if war occurs. Key points and claims, preserved as stated: - The Iranian regime is described as facing its worst crisis since 1979, with reports of thousands dead, and questions about whether the U.S. and possibly Israel will strike Iran, and what their objectives would be (regime change vs installing a new leader under the supreme leader). - The interviewer introduces Trita Parsi, noting his nuanced, non-dual position and his personal history of fleeing Iran around the revolution. - The analysts discuss whether a war plan against Iran existed before the protests; Speaker 1 (Parsi) argues the plan was made prior to the protests and that the protests did not cause the decision. He says the Israelis intended to provoke the U.S. into war, but the sequence shifted so the United States would lead with Israel in a supporting role. He notes Netanyahu’s unusual quiet and suggests a deliberate effort to present this as Trump’s war, not Israel’s, though he believes the plan originated in Washington in late December at the White House. - The protests are said to be organic and not instigated from abroad, with possible slight slowing of plans due to the protests. The rationale for striking Iran initially emphasized Israeli concerns about Iranian missile capabilities and their potential rebuilding of missiles and, ambiguously, nuclear ambitions; there was no credible media evidence presented to support new nuclear development claims, according to Speaker 1. - The justification for an attack is viewed as a pretext tied to “unfinished business,” with the broader aim of addressing Iran’s missile program and perceived threats, rather than the protests alone. The discussion notes that pro-Iran regime factions in the U.S. may find protests more persuasive among centrist Democrats, but less so among MAGA or core Trump supporters. - The origins of the protests are described as organic, driven by currency collapse and sanctions, which Speaker 1 connects to decades of sanctions and the economic crisis in Iran. He states sanctions were designed to produce desperation to create a window for outside intervention, though he emphasizes this does not mean the protests are purely externally driven. - The role of sanctions is elaborated: Pompeo’s “maximum pressure” statement is cited as intentional to create conditions for regime change, with Speaker 0 highlighting the destruction of Iran’s economy as a method to weaken the regime and empower opposition. Speaker 1 agrees the sanctions contributed to economic distress but stresses that the protests’ roots are broader than the economy alone. - The discussion considers whether the protests could be used to justify external action and whether a regional or global backlash could ensue, including refugee flows and regional instability affecting Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and GCC states. It’s noted that the U.S. and some regional actors would prefer to avoid a total collapse of Iran, while Israel would welcome greater upheaval if it constrains Iranian capabilities. - The question of a power vacuum inside Iran is addressed. Speaker 1 argues there is no obvious internal opposition strong enough to quickly replace the regime; MeK is excluded as a coalition partner in current Iran opposition movements. The Pahlavi (Reza Pallavi) faction is discussed as a possible figurehead outside Iran, with debate about his domestic support. The MEK is described as outside any coalition due to its history. - Pallavi’s potential role: Speaker 1 suggests Pallavi has gained closer ties with Israel and some pro-Israel circles in Washington, but emphasizes that domestic support inside Iran remains uncertain and difficult to gauge. Pallavi says he would seek a democratically elected leader if the regime falls; Speaker 1 cautions that words alone are insufficient without proven ability to secure loyalty from security forces and to persuade key societal sectors. - The Shah’s legacy and comparison: The Shah’s regime is described as highly repressive but comparatively more open socially and economically, though with a discredited political system. The current regime disperses power within a more complex system where the supreme leader is central but not incomparable to past autocrats. - The potential for separatism and regional spillover is discussed, including Kurdish separatism in western Iran. Speaker 1 clarifies that the Kurdish group is not part of the protests but a separate element taking advantage of the situation; the risk of civil war if the state collapses is acknowledged as a nightmare scenario. - The possibility of a Maduro-like approach (managed transition through elite elements) is considered. While channels of communication exist, Speaker 1 doubts the same dynamics as Venezuela; Iran lacks internal continuity in the security establishment, making a similar path unlikely. - Military retaliation dynamics are examined: Iran’s response to limited U.S. strikes could be symbolic or broader, including potential strikes on U.S. bases in the region. The possibility that Israel would push the United States to target Iran’s military capabilities rather than just decapitation is discussed, with notes about potential after-effects and regional reactions. - The 12-day war context and Iran’s current military capabilities: There is debate about whether Iran’s military could be a greater threat to U.S. bases than previously believed and about how easily Iranian missile launches could be located and neutralized. - The closing forecast: The likely trajectory depends on the next few days. A limited, negotiated strike could lead to negotiations and a transformed regime with lifted sanctions, perhaps avoiding a wholesale regime change; a more aggressive or decapitating approach could provoke substantial instability and regional repercussions. The conversation ends with a personal note of concern for Parsi’s family in Iran. - Final reflection: The interview ends with expressions of concern for family safety and a mutual appreciation for the discussion.

Speaker 0 describes the events as “a classic regime change color revolution destabilization operation.” He asserts that “the military strike was being prepared in advance,” and that “the violence that they carried out” was carried out by “agent provocateurs managed and inserted by US and Israeli intelligence,” with British intelligence also involved. He adds that “when it comes to Iran, The United States and Britain are hand in hand since the first coup in Iran, which was a US British operation.” He further claims that Iranians who supported the shah “fled to The US, to Europe, to Canada, where they've set themselves up,” and that “nearly all of whom are quite wealthy,” consisting of monarchists who have been “looked after very well by the US government.” He says the US regards them as a “fifth column that they can deploy during times like this.” The speaker extends the accusation to other conflicts, stating that the US keeps “Syrian fifth column, an Afghan, an Iraqi, a Libyan fifth column,” and that wherever there’s a war, “The US and the British, the Canadians, they keep them in residence, and they use them either to create the future political class that they'll then parachute in.” He describes this as part of “the neocolonial system.” He concedes that “it didn't work out, but it was ugly.” Regarding information warfare, he criticizes the mainstream media, politicians, and “these so called influencers,” describing their misinformation and propaganda campaign as “even uglier.” He emphasizes that “this is not the first go around,” claiming they have “been doing this perpetually for years,” with the aim of creating unrest and instability and momentum. He explains a sequence they allegedly seek: if they can obtain momentum, it is followed by “a military strike, and then a decapitation of the leadership, and then regime change, hopefully.” He concludes that “so it didn't work out.”