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The food supply is being shut down worldwide, with livestock being culled and farmlands bought up. Restrictions on water usage and backyard farming are increasing. The goal is to reduce carbon emissions, but it's destroying the ability to produce meat and fish. This is seen as a war against nature and humanity.

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

Nikolay Petro and Gwen were discussing the Munich Security Conference and the broader shift in global order. The core theme is the destruction or breakdown of the post–Cold War order as the world moves toward multipolarity, with the United States and Europe following diverging paths. - The transition to multipolarity is described as chaos and a vacuum of strategic thinking. From a European perspective, this is an unwanted transition into something unfamiliar, while the US debates a more pragmatic approach that may bypass traditional institutions to position itself favorably. The multipolar world would be more democratic, with more voices in actual discussion of each nation’s needs and contributions, in contrast to the hegemonic, rules-based order. - The concept of multipolarity presumes multiple poles of interest. Nations at the top of the old order feel uncomfortable; they had a lead dog (the United States) and knew where they were going. Now the lead dog may be wandering, and the rest are lost. There’s a push to engage voices from the global South, or the global majority, though the term “global South” is viewed as imprecise. - At Munich, Kaia Kallas and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Mertz) urged order to avoid chaos. Kallas favored restoring or preserving the structures of the past, arguing the European Union should reconnect with the US and dominate collectively as the political West. Mertz used aggressive language, saying Germany’s army must be the most powerful in Europe and that the war in Ukraine will end only when Russia is exhausted economically and militarily; he argued Europe imposed unheard-of losses on Russia. - In response, the US role in Munich was anticipated to feature Marco Rubio as the delegation head, signaling a security-focused agenda rather than deep internal European discourse. The discussion suggested the US may push a strategy of returning to or reshaping a hegemonic order, pressuring Europe to align with American priorities, and highlighting that the old order is over. - There is a perception of internal German political dynamics: the rise of the anti-establishment party (IFD) could challenge the current SPD/CSU coalition, potentially altering the German stance on Russia and Europe’s strategy toward Moscow. The possibility exists that internal German shifts could counter aggressive German policy toward Russia. - In Europe, there is a tension between those who want to sacrifice more national autonomy to please the US and those who advocate diversifying ties to avoid total dependence on Washington. In practice, EU policy has often mirrored US priorities, thereby delaying a truly autonomous European strategy. - The EU’s foreign policy structure remains weak due to political diversity among member states, the need for cooperation with national governments, and resistance to surrendering power to Brussels. There is no cohesive grand strategy within the EU, making it hard to present a unified vision in a multipolar world. The EU’s reliance on crisis-driven centralization contrasts with those internal contradictions. - Ukraine’s war exposed tensions in Europe’s cohesion. Initially, there was a rallying effect and unified front against Russia, aided by US support, aiming for a rapid Russian defeat. Now the EU’s rhetoric shifts toward seeking a ceasefire and preserving what remains of Ukraine, labeling victory in terms of saving Ukraine rather than expelling Russia. EU funding for Ukraine—about €90 billion over two years—may be insufficient, with Ukraine claiming higher needs. - The discussion suggested that European leadership’s view of Russia and Putin is unstable: some European circles believe Russia could collapse economically, while others see Russia’s leadership as capable of countermeasures. Reports of France reestablishing high-level political contacts with Russia were noted as part of this flux. - The conversation contrasted backward-looking US/EU visions with a forward-looking multipolar vision promoted by BRICS, especially Russia, which could be more promising due to its forward outlook. The EU, dominated by internal divisions, struggles to articulate an autonomous multipolar path, while the United States appears intent on reviving its dominant position and reshaping the international order, sometimes in ways that delay the shift to multipolarity. - Overall, the speakers highlighted a shared but backward-looking orientation between the EU and the US, versus a forward-looking, multipolar alternative; they also underscored the strategic vacuum, internal European divisions, and the continuing tug-of-war between attempting to restore past structures and embracing a new global arrangement.

As European economies decline, young people can't afford homes, and energy costs are much higher, leading to a declining standard of living and low birth rates, which is a sign of civilizational collapse. There's a lot of rage in Europe, and the Russia-Ukraine war serves as a relief valve for European leaders to blame Putin. The UK's response to fighting a new war against Russia is sad because Russia could easily defeat the UK. Turning the population's rage towards Russia distracts from domestic issues. Intelligence sources believe Ukrainians were behind the Nord Stream pipeline attack.

Ian Proud argues that while ending the war and accelerating Ukraine’s EU membership are important, there is a missing focus on the future relationship with Russia and a broader, Pan-European security framework. He notes that Europe is already experiencing economic decline as energy policy shifts away from cheap Russian energy toward more expensive sources, which he says contributes to factory closures and cost-of-living pressures. He warns that simply ending the war or admitting Ukraine into the EU could result in a hostile, “anti-Russia” posture within Europe, unless the long-term security architecture is reset. He emphasizes two key consequences of the Ukraine crisis since 2014: (1) Europe’s energy and economic policies are driving a decline, partly due to cutting off cheap energy from Russia; (2) focusing only on ending the war and integrating Ukraine into Europe risks creating a new, hostile dynamic with Russia if the relationship is not normalized. Without addressing the future Russia-Europe relationship, he suggests Europe could end up with a remilitarized Europe and higher defense spending, while postponing a durable settlement. Regarding peace negotiations, Proud argues for a treaty-based, comprehensive approach to pan-European security rather than only ceasefire promises. He contends that peace cannot be achieved by refusing to discuss Russia’s security concerns or by treating Ukraine’s EU accession as a standalone solution. He traces a long history of failed attempts at a broader European security architecture—from Helsinki Accords to the OSCE and the 2005 Common Space—showing that NATO expansion and Western reluctance to embrace a wider security framework undermined these efforts. He asserts that “the red line” on Ukraine’s status was drawn too late and that a durable peace requires a broader security settlement that includes Russia and the European Union, not just NATO. If advising Putin, Proud suggests pushing for a broader, treaty-based agreement on future pan-European security, rather than accepting merely tacit assurances or expanding NATO. He argues that Ukraine’s EU membership could become “NATO light,” potentially achieving the same military posture as a formal alliance but under EU institutions, thus reinforcing Moscow’s concerns. He calls for a comprehensive accord that reorganizes European security within a broader framework—reinstating indivisible security, sovereign equality, and an integrated approach to security that encompasses Russia, the EU, and potentially broader Eurasian arrangements. He warns that without such a deal, the conflict risks a prolonged stalemate and a dangerous re-escalation. Proud notes that the atmosphere around diplomacy is terribly toxic, with Western leaders and institutions increasingly sidelining Russia from formal talks. He criticizes the Munich Security Conference for excluding Russia from diplomacy and laments the overemphasis on military solutions and the symbolic, sometimes confrontational rhetoric by European leaders (for example, chancellor statements about arming Europe and projecting suffering onto Russia). He argues that Europe’s foreign policy today is driven by a single objective—defeating Russia—and that this approach has left Europe economically and strategically paralyzed. Towards the end, Proud cautions that post-war Europe will face a transition to a multipolar world, where the United States will shift priorities toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere. He questions Europe’s readiness to engage in a multipolar order and stresses the need for Europe to reestablish normal relations with Russia to avoid a new Berlin Wall-like division. He also critiques the perception of Ukraine’s resilience and Zelensky’s role, suggesting that Europe should develop its own foreign policy vision rather than being dominated by Kyiv’s stance. Overall, the dialogue centers on the necessity of a broad, treaty-based security framework for Europe that includes Russia and the EU, a genuine normalization of relations, and diplomacy that moves beyond ceasefires and symbolic gestures to a lasting peace architecture.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the Ukraine conflict as part of a broader geopolitical strategy attributed to a globalist elite. Speaker 1 contends that globalists in the White House, in Congress, and in European capitals want BlackRock to take over Ukraine to strip its resources and subjugate it to a globalist agenda, and they also aim to destroy Russia. The claim is that the war has never been about Ukraine itself, but about destroying Russia. According to Speaker 1, the people in charge failed to perform strategic analysis, underestimating Russia by treating it as if it were the post-Soviet state of 1992—weak and prostrate. The reference to John McCain’s description of Russia as “Spain with a gas station” is invoked to illustrate this hubris. The argument continues that Russians warned against NATO on their border and about the dangers of Western actions in Eastern Ukraine, but these concerns were ignored. Speaker 1 asserts that the outcome is a dangerous, ongoing war that could become regional or global, with a consequence that the White House is not fully grasping. He predicts a massive Russian offensive when ground conditions permit, foreseeing that much of what is currently identified as Ukraine—especially the Kyiv government—will be swept away. He claims the Kyiv government represents the interests of the globalist elite seeking resources to exploit, not the Ukrainian people. The discussion shifts to broader economic implications, including the potential loss of the petrodollar as Putin engages with Saudi Arabia and China. Speaker 1 frames the war as both military and financial, suggesting that BRICS could expand dramatically and move to a gold-backed currency, whether a single currency or a basket. He asserts that this shift threatens the current global financial system and that the globalists are desperate as a result. The speaker fears that once Ukraine’s fate becomes clear, there will be pressure to deploy US forces into Western Ukraine, with Polish and possibly Romanian troops, which would escalate into a full-scale war with Russia. According to Speaker 1, Putin has shown restraint and does not want a war with the West, but intervention in Western Ukraine could end in open conflict. Speaker 1 also argues that Putin has repeatedly warned against advancing the border toward Russia and transforming Ukraine into a hostile actor, framing what happens in Ukraine as an existential strategic interest to the United States. He contrasts this with a claim that Biden’s stance has prioritized regime change in Russia and the division of Russia to exploit it, while alleging that oligarchs like Kolomovsky, Soros, and others are part of this globalist project. The discussion concludes with criticisms of U.S. military recruitment practices, suggesting the Army and Marines are not prepared for such a conflict, including comments about recruitment of illegals encouraged by the administration.

Speaker 0: "Papa Gallo, parrot, stop repeating what everybody else is saying and think for yourself." "People have little minds. The masses follow." "My greatest concern is there's gonna be a false flag event that's gonna escalate this war." Speaker 1: "NATO can't keep going at this rate; not enough weapons to sustain Ukraine." "In a multipolar world, Russia, China, and India realize they need to cooperate because The US cannot be trusted." "They're gonna unite more." "When Biden put the sanctions on Russia, he said, quote, Putin's gonna pay the price." "We wrote in the Trends journal, no, they're not, that the people Russia has all of the technological, industrial, high-tech. They have they have all they need to be self sufficient." "All these companies pulling out of Russia, the Russian people are gonna take it over." "If we do, life on earth will be destroyed in twenty four hours."

Alex Kraner and Glenn discuss the geopolitical and economic fallout from Iran’s weekend strikes and the broader shifts in global risk, energy, and power blocs. - Oil and energy impact: Iran’s strikes targeted energy infrastructure, including Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia, and crude prices jumped about 10% with Friday’s close around $73.50 and current levels near $80 per barrel. Prices could push higher if Hormuz traffic is disrupted or closed, given that one in five barrels of crude exports pass through the Hormuz gates. The potential for further oil disruptions is acknowledged, with the possibility of triple-digit or higher prices depending on how the conflict evolves. - Market dynamics and energy dependence: The guest notes a hockey-stick pattern in uptrends across markets when driven by large asset holders waking up to energy exposure, referencing shadow banking as a driver of rapid moves. He points to vast assets under management (approximately $220 trillion) among pension funds, hedge funds, endowments, and insurers that could push energy markets higher if they reallocate toward oil futures and energy-related assets. He emphasizes that energy is essential for broad economic activity, and a curtailed oil economy would slow economies globally. - European vulnerabilities: Europe faces a fragile energy security position, already dealing with an energy crisis and decreased reliance on Russian hydrocarbons. Disruptions to LNG supplies from Qatar or other sources could further threaten Europe, complicating efforts by Ursula von der Leyen and Christine Lagarde to manage inflation and debt. The panel highlights potential increased debt concerns in Europe, with Lagarde signaling uncertainty and the possibility of higher interest rates, and warns of a possible future resembling Weimar-era debt dynamics or systemic stress in European bonds. - Global geopolitics and blocs: The discussion suggests a risk of the world fracturing into two blocs, with BRICS controlling more diverse energy supplies and the West potentially losing its energy dominance. The US pivot to Asia could be undone as the United States becomes more entangled in Middle East conflicts. The guests anticipate renewed US engagement with traditional alliances (France, Britain, Germany) and a possible retraction from attempts to pursue multipolar integration with Russia and China. The possibility of a broader two-block, cold-war-like order is raised, with energy as a central question. - Iran and US diplomacy optics: The negotiations reportedly had Iran willing to concede to American proposals when the leadership was assassinated, prompting questions about US policy and timing. The attack is described as damaging to public opinion and diplomacy, with potential impeachment momentum for Trump discussed in light of his handling of the Iran situation. The geopolitical optics are characterized as highly damaging to US credibility and to the prospects of reaching future deals with Iran and other actors. - Middle East dynamics and US security commitments: The strikes impact the US-Israel relationship and the US-Gulf states’ security posture. Pentagon statements reportedly indicated no signs that Iran planned to attack the US first, raising questions about the strategic calculus of the strikes and the broader risk to regional stability. The conversation notes persistent supply chain and defense material challenges—including concerns about weapon stockpiles and the sustainability of military deployments in the region. - Long-range grim projections: The discussion concludes with caution about the potential long arc of decline for Western economic and political influence if current trajectories persist, contrasted with the rise of Eastern blocs. There is warning about a possible long-term, multi-decade period of geopolitical and economic restructuring, with energy security and debt dynamics at the core of those shifts. - Closing reflections: The speakers acknowledge the unpredictability of markets and geopolitics, refraining from definitive forecasts but underscoring how energy, debt, and alliance realignments will likely shape the coming period.

Emmanuel Macron and his husband reportedly went into hiding in a Paris bunker as thousands of French farmers blocked the capital with tractors, prompting arrests and rising calls for Macron to resign. Professor Richard Werner notes the protests are significant and may influence EU decision-making beyond France. Werner explains that the French government appears to be wavering on the EU–Mercosur free trade deal (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Paraguay), which has been in the works for decades. The European Commission has binding authority, and under the new qualified majority voting system, France blocking it alone won’t stop the deal. Germany and Spain back the deal, while France’s opposition complicates approval, potentially delaying or revising the agreement if farmers’ pressure persists and media coverage sustains the public push. Farmers fear price declines from the Mercosur influx could undercut European agriculture. The current trigger allows governments to intervene if European prices fall by more than 8%; French farmers want this threshold lowered to 5%. They argue that European farming already operates with slim margins amid rising energy costs and EU-imposed burdens intensified in recent years. The discussion touches broader farm policy and nationalism in Europe: Dutch and German farmers faced herd culls and other policies, with Dutch and Danish protests cited. The Netherlands’ culling of herds and other measures are mentioned as part of a trend toward tightening control over farmland and food production, with alleged aims toward urban-planning shifts (15-minute cities) and reduced reliance on animal agriculture. The UK is also in the picture, with tractors in solidarity with French farmers. In the UK, inheritance taxes are framed as a tool to force privatized farmland back into state control, a tactic criticized as an expropriation policy. Oxford was among protest sites. Beyond agriculture, the conversation highlights Europe’s broader economic strain: Germany is in a third year of economic contraction—the longest since 1933—while other EU economies, including France and Austria, show weak indicators. Banking sector vulnerabilities are noted, with the ECB’s asset-bubble strategies in real estate contributing to potential instability. A new EU CO2 import tax system is described as highly complex (a 3,000-page framework with a 1,600-page registry), imposing substantial compliance costs on importers and potentially driving more firms out of business. Energy costs remain high, and climate-policy mandates are viewed as further straining the economy. The speakers critique leadership for focusing on external conflicts (Ukraine) rather than domestic economic revival, suggesting that ending the war could help economies recover. Viktor Orban’s Hungary is cited as a contrasting example, with border control policies claimed to reduce crime and pressures elsewhere. The exchange closes with a sense of urgency about Europe’s deteriorating situation, as leadership debates and domestic policy choices appear to align with worsening economic and social stress across the continent.

Jim Ferguson interviews Michael Young (Honeybadger 6), a former US Special Forces veteran, about global issues. Young is now in Bangkok, monitoring events like fires at facilities in Ireland. Starmer is criticized for calling protestors against illegal immigration in Northern Ireland racist. The "migrants" are predominantly military-age men, not asylum seekers. Young says this is an invasion, not a border crisis, and accurate language is crucial. He believes people have been "lulled to sleep" while this happens, and Ireland is being set up for genocide. The choices are to fight, flee, or become a slave. Some migrants arrive with UN handlers and receive immediate benefits without proper vetting, potentially including terrorists and criminals. Ireland's population has grown rapidly, with the increase mainly young men. Young references "Camp of the Saints" and "Weaponized Migration," arguing migration is being used as a weapon. He describes encountering fit, military-like individuals among migrants. Criminals are entering, leading to increased crime. The globalist agenda aims for a totalitarian government, not a recent development but a long-term plan involving central bankers. Groups like the Rothschilds, the Chinese Communist Party, and the World Economic Forum are involved, with figures like Gates and Soros having different goals but cooperating to destroy nation-states. The goal is to replace populations with divided groups that are easier to control. The US is a prime target. Soros aims to destroy the US by funding lawlessness. Globalists seek a one-world government and weaken nations by flooding them with migrants. Trudeau, Biden, and Harris are "clowns" and "condoms for the globalists," disposable and irrelevant. The jab pushers are also disposable. The globalists are pushing a depopulation agenda, aiming for a manageable population of 500 million. The conflict in Ukraine may be an attempt to provoke Russia into using nuclear weapons. Some Irish and Americans are considering moving to Russia. Globalists are trying to bankrupt farmers to control food supplies and engineer famine. Famine, war, and pandemics create human osmotic pressure, leading to migration. Globalists have been setting up conditions for famine, with rising food prices and reduced variety. Cutting off electricity could cause immediate famine. The globalists use the Hegelian dialectic, creating problems and then offering solutions. The migrants could be activated simultaneously in different countries to bring about a new world order. The invaders are the gunpowder, and the jabs are WMDs. The elite will discard the invaders after they have served their purpose. The game is rigged, and governments are captured. People owe them nothing. It's time to man up, build teams and communities, and reject cowards.

War is coming to the Arctic Circle, with Greenland seen as part of a broader clash for the world’s most important trade route. Russia and China have already laid claim to large portions; the United States now seeks in. The discussion notes the growing competition over the Arctic, Iran, and Europe as flashpoints. Trump is calling for a Pentagon budget increase from 1.0 trillion to 1.5 trillion for 2027. He tweeted that after negotiations, the military budget should be 1.5 trillion “in the very troubled and dangerous times,” and suggested capping CEO compensation in defense contracts at 5 million per year. Following the tweet, Lockheed Martin stock jumped, as did other defense contractors. Glenn Greenwald is cited, saying the Pentagon fails its audit for the seventh consecutive year and questions how hundreds of billions of dollars move around, then notes a preference to increase budgets from 850 billion to 1.0 trillion to 1.5 trillion. Tucker Carlson is quoted suggesting war is coming and that Trump may know something others do not. Speaker 1 frames the budget increase as the kind of funding a country anticipates a global or regional war would have, calling it a “war budget,” not a peacekeeping one, and suggests we’re moving toward a big war. Speaker 0 adds that a large-scale attack against Iran is likely before the end of the year, and questions what will happen in the Arctic Circle. The panel introduces Ben Freeman, author of The Trillion Dollar War Machine, who joins to discuss. Freeman’s point is that the president justifies a larger foreign war budget by pointing to money generated abroad, including oil resources in places like Venezuela. The panel agrees the implication is that the military is “paying for itself” through conquest, and a speaker notes this echoes imperial patterns. Another participant emphasizes that China’s military budget is about a third to a quarter of the U.S. budget, but China has triple the personnel, arguing that quantity does not necessarily equal capability and that the U.S. remains the strongest military force. There is a claim that the current budget primarily funds contractors, not service members, veterans, or families; defense contractors’ revenues largely come from U.S. government contracts, and this is reflected in stock surges when large budgets are announced. The discussion cites a statistic that about 54% of the defense budget goes to Pentagon contractors, and notes a contrast: one in four military families faces food insecurity despite the existing trillion-dollar budget. The panel argues that perpetual war is used to justify the size of the budget, not merely to address threats, but to keep the defense industry tidal-wanked into profits. They discuss whether diplomacy with Russia could be a more effective path, and acknowledge a shift in U.S. policy rhetoric compared to earlier promises to avoid endless wars. There is mention that the Senate voted to limit presidential actions in Venezuela; the president defends war powers as constitutional, while critics point to campaigns that promised restraint on war. Ben Freeman promotes his book, The Trillion Dollar War Machine, noting its availability in hardback, Kindle, and audiobooks, and the discussion ends with praise for the book and thanks to Freeman.

Speaker 0 notes a claim that “Russia joins EU providing energy resources.” The speaker then asserts, “Now, clearly, this clearly, this didn't happen,” indicating that the prior claim did not occur in reality. The statement continues by reminding that “Russia attacked Ukraine,” and emphasizes that “we all know that Ukraine was one of the major suppliers of grain.” The speaker proceeds to link these events to broader implications, saying that “when this abrupt climate change occurs, we know that there will be food shortages.” Finally, the speaker adds that such shortages “are worse for rare earth minerals.”

Vladimir Putin is attempting to weaponize energy, and the U.S. is currently responding with sanctions and support for Europe. However, in the short term, the focus should be on increasing fossil fuel production domestically. As long as the U.S. relies on fossil fuels, it remains vulnerable to global oil and gas price fluctuations, which are influenced by figures like Putin. Achieving true energy independence requires reducing dependence on Russian energy sources, ultimately diminishing their power and financial influence.

History is at a turning point, with global energy, food systems, and supply chains being greatly impacted. Governments play a crucial role in times of crisis, as challenges like climate change are interconnected and demand collaborative solutions.

Europeans were buying more Russian oil and gas than they were giving in aid to Ukraine, essentially funding both sides of the war. Germany will become totally dependent on Russian energy if it does not immediately change course. It's very sad that Germany makes massive oil and gas deals with Russia, paying billions of dollars a year to them. Many countries make pipeline deals with Russia, paying billions into their coffers while we're supposed to protect them against Russia. The former chancellor of Germany even heads the pipeline company supplying the gas. Germany will have almost 70% of their country controlled by Russia with natural gas. Germany is a captive of Russia because they get so much of their energy from them. They got rid of their coal plants and nuclear. NATO needs to address this.

Speaker 0 outlines that the United States is struggling to supply Ukraine with missiles, Israel with air defense systems, and other allies as well, including Taiwan which has paid the US for billions of military equipment that has not yet been delivered. All of these needs rely on rare earths and magnets, noting that China manufactures about 90–92% of the magnets. He asks what the impact would be on the US military, the US economy, and the European economy, as well as the rest of the world, with the expectation that the effects would primarily target the US. He emphasizes focusing on what would happen to the US if China proceeds with those restrictions. Speaker 1 responds that it would amount to a sudden stop in the production of equipment, machinery, devices, and gadgets. He stresses that rare earths are used universally in electronic production and are not easily separated into defense-related versus civilian uses. He compares rare earths to electricity in that sense. He notes that the phones and computers people use rely on rare earths, underscoring that the impact would be a global, broad economic disruption rather than a narrowly targeted strategy.

The EU is advocating funding Ukraine with frozen Russian assets, with EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen calling it the most effective way to sustain Ukraine and proposing a €140,000,000,000 reparations loan. The EU would lend to Ukraine and expect Russia to pay via seized assets once reparations are enforced. This follows Western action since the conflict began when the US and EU froze $300,000,000,000 in Russian reserves, originally anticipated to be returned in a peace deal. But that approach has evolved. In 2024, G7 leaders provided a $50,000,000,000 loan to Ukraine, to be repaid by interest from frozen assets. That loan is described as a first step, with the EU now aiming for the full principal amid growing Western fatigue over taxpayer funding. However, full confiscation carries the risk of triggering financial warfare. With serious Western consequences, Russia could retaliate by seizing $288,000,000,000 in Western assets in Russia, including securities and real estate. Russian courts have already taken hundreds of millions from JPMorgan and German banks. Even more, Russia might sue Euroclear, the Belgium-based holder of most frozen assets, which manages $40,000,000,000,000 globally, in courts such as Dubai or Hong Kong wind, potentially allowing Russia to seize Euroclear's worldwide assets, causing panic and destabilizing Western finance. Moscow has warned Belgium of liability. Beyond that, such moves would erode trust in the dollar and euro among emerging markets. China, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia oppose the plan. Fearing their reserves, alongside central banks, are shifting to gold, this opposition could hasten such a shift. Politically, the plan removes one of the incentives Russia has demanded for negotiations—recovering $300,000,000,000. Without that incentive, Moscow would push for total victory, while the EU's plan risks self-inflicted economic chaos and an extended conflict. Subscribe to New Rules Geopolitics to unlock cutting edge insights on global power plays.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

Speaker 0: China appears to be the only country pushing back against Trump’s tariff stance, with other countries—including neighboring ones and India—reaching deals with Trump. India, which initially showed resilience, moved toward China after the Shanghai summit and the tariffs. Recently, India and the US signed a deal to gradually reduce Russia oil exports to 50% of imports. This suggests China is the sole major power resisting the US in this round of measures. The discussion then shifts to a broader pattern: the US has overplayed its hand in its dollar dominance and control of the financial system via SWIFT. In the wake of sanctions on Russia after the Ukraine conflict—freezing assets and limiting access to SWIFT—many nations have begun moving away from the US dollar toward gold. The speaker sees China’s current move as accelerating other countries’ push toward self-reliance, particularly in rare earths. The US is investing in its own rare earth industry, while Europe seeks alternatives. There is mention of a US deal with Ukraine involving rare earths, and speculation that Greenland’s abundant rare earth reserves could be relevant to what Trump sought with Greenland. The long-term downside or repercussions for China from this move are noted. Speaker 1: The discussion distinguishes between the financial sanctions used after the Ukraine war and the current situation. While sanctions are not perfect substitutes for dollar assets like crypto or gold, they remain available, so US leverage is not as strong as China’s leverage in rare earths. The speaker agrees that in the long term, China’s move will push other countries to build processing capacity for rare earths. Although rare earths are not truly rare, the processing and concentration are. Countries will be motivated to develop processing facilities. Japan is innovating substitutes for rare earths, which may take time and will not provide immediate relief for the US.

Vladimir Putin is unlikely to negotiate. Additional sanctions on Russia are probable. The war in Ukraine could have been avoided with competent leadership, which was not present. The election was rigged, preventing that possibility.

There is no clear solution in Russia and Putin's departure seems necessary, but there are no prominent alternatives. Radical individuals are gaining attention, which is concerning. Regarding the Russian interference, some believe Russia was responsible, while others, like my son who works in the energy sector, think otherwise. Although some benefited from the situation, such as natural gas producers worldwide, the United States made the most profit. We have evidence to support this claim. As a result, our policy shifted towards exporting liquid natural gas overseas.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a cascade of developments around Ukraine, Russia, and Western policy. - Speaker 0 notes that Trump reportedly changed his stance on Tomahawk missiles, mentions a meeting with Zelensky where Zelensky supposedly urged acceptance of a Putin deal, and recalls that the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. Speaker 1 responds that Russia has 100% made clear there will be no freeze and that for the war to end, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory. He says Tomahawk missiles were never on the table, that this was a pressure ploy by Trump to push Russia, and that it could have led to a thermonuclear war, which Putin reminded the US about in their conversations. - According to Speaker 1, Ukrainians will die, Russians will advance, Ukrainian economy will be destroyed, and Ukrainian energy infrastructure will be annihilated, leading to the collapse of Ukraine as a nation. Speaker 0 sketches a timeline: initial plans for a Putin-Trump-Zelensky sequence, Putin’s call after Trump hinted at Tomahawks, then a Zelensky meeting where Zelensky allegedly pressed Trump to accept a Putin deal, after which Tomahawks were no longer on the table and the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. - Speaker 1 repeats: Tomahawks were never on the table; this was a pressure tactic. He explains the Russia-US exchange as frank, with Russia laying down the law; he asserts that the US would have faced a major escalation if Tomahawks had been supplied, because Tomahawks are nuclear-capable. He claims Ukraine would have been made a party to the conflict through US involvement. He adds that Russia will not accept a freeze because, constitutionally, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory, including Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk. - Speaker 0 asks why Tomahawks would matter, and Speaker 1 reiterates that Storm Shadow and Scout missiles are not nuclear capable, while Tomahawks would be, and contrasts this with Ukraine’s Flamingo drone, dismissing Flamingo as a propaganda tool. He describes Flamingo as a wooden drone designed to mimic a flock of birds and says it will be shot down and is not a serious threat; Ukraine’s drone capability is strong, with Ukrainians as the second-best fighters and drones in the world, while Russians are first in drone capability. - They discuss the trajectory of the war: Speaker 1 emphasizes that Russia’s advance is strategic, with drone warfare transforming the battlefield into piecemeal advances. He asserts Russia’s kill ratio of 36 Ukrainians to 1 Russian, and argues the West’s narrative of Russia suffering more is fantasy. He notes the West’s support for Ukraine drains Ukraine’s resources while Russia’s defense industry booms, and that Russia’s economy, energy, and sanctions resistance show resilience. - On economics, Speaker 1 claims the Russian economy is thriving; gas is cheap in Russia, Novosibirsk and Ekaterinburg are booming, and sanctions have not toppled Russia. He argues Europe’s sanctions are not beating Russia and that Russia’s ruble remains strong; he contrasts this with Western expectations of Russia’s collapse. - They discuss casualty figures and manpower. Speaker 0 asks for a definite casualty number; Speaker 1 cites Ukrainians dying daily (tens of thousands over time) and asserts Russians suffer hundreds daily on their worst day, noting Ukraine’s manpower shortages and Russia’s mobilization efforts: Russia conducted a one-time 300,000-mobilization; Ukraine has mobilized seven or eight times and relies on volunteers and external manpower, including Western units in some cases. He contends Russia’s total forces expanded to 1.5 million due to NATO expansion and ongoing operations. - On battlefield tactics, Speaker 1 explains Russia’s algorithm: three-man assault teams using drone support to seize bunkers held by larger Ukrainian forces, followed by reinforcement, all while drone warfare dominates. He asserts Ukraine’s drone capacity is strong, but Russia counters with its own drones and targeting of Ukrainian drone operators. - They debate why Russia would not freeze lines even if Ukraine yielded Donbas, Lugansk, and Donetsk. Speaker 1 insists those regions are Russian territory per referendum and constitutional absorption in September 2022, and argues that Ukraine cannot give up Donbas, which is Russia’s, and that a freeze would not be acceptable to Russia. He asserts that Moscow will not abandon these territories and that any idea of a freeze is a Western fantasy. - The discussion touches on the Minsk accords, the Istanbul talks, and the argument that Ukraine’s leadership initially pursued peace but later prepared for renewed conflict with NATO backing. Speaker 1 contends that Minsk was a sham agreed to buy time, and that Russia’s goal was to compel Ukraine to honor commitments to protect Russian speakers; Ukraine’s leadership is accused of pursuing war rather than peace after early negotiations. - They discuss Wagner and Prigozin’s role: Wagner provided a vehicle to surge capabilities into Lugansk and Donetsk; after September 2022 these troops were to be absorbed into the Russian military, but Prigozin continued operations in Bachmuth, recruited prisoners, and pressured for offensive allocations; this culminated in a confrontation with Shoigu and Gerasimov, and Wagner eventually faced disbandment pressure and a mobilization response. - In closing, Speaker 0 notes recent sanctions and Putin’s response condemning them as attempts to pressure Russia, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia seeks to end the war and rebuild relations with the US, but not under ongoing Ukraine conflict. He emphasizes that India and China will stand with Russia, citing strategic partnerships and the desire to maintain sovereign energy decisions, and predictsRussia will endure sanctions while seeking new buyers and alliances. - The exchange ends with Putin signaling that new sanctions will have costs for the EU, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia will adapt and maintain its strategic position, with China and India aligned with Russia rather than yielding to Western pressure.