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The speaker discusses the spread of bird flu and the potential for mass culling of poultry. They mention the development of bird flu vaccines and the possibility of human-to-human transmission. The conversation also touches on the lack of human trials for vaccines and the FDA's approval process based on preclinical data. The focus is on the need for vaccination, particularly for farm workers.

The speaker, who has been on the farm for three and a half months, aims to connect Canadian and South African farmers to discuss how South Africa avoided culling ostriches despite similar policies and past outbreaks. South Africa now exempts ostriches from culling, unlike Canada, where they're treated as poultry. The speaker believes culling all ostriches won't stop avian flu in chickens and is present to protect the birds. The speaker claims the RCMP are monitoring the farm, and they fear the Canadian Security establishment wants to remove the camp and media coverage to avoid scrutiny of the CFIA's stamping out policy. They state the birds haven't been tested, so there's no proof of infection. The speaker mentions Robert Kennedy has voiced his opposition to the culling. Transporting the birds to the US might offer protection, but the Canadian government and CFIA would likely oppose it. The speaker questions why the CFIA can move supposedly contaminated culled birds to a municipal dump, but not allow testing to prove infection. The speaker asserts the farmer would voluntarily cull infected birds.

In 2024, the H5N1 bird flu virus jumped from wild birds to cows, shocking virus experts. The virus has since spread rapidly through US dairy herds and poultry flocks, infecting other mammals, including 70 Americans, one of whom died. Some experts claim the Biden administration was slow to respond, while the Trump administration laid off over 100 scientists. The virus spreads easily via milking equipment, and workers have also become infected. Experts fear the virus's pandemic potential, especially given its high mortality rate in past outbreaks. Testing was slow to start, and some states still test infrequently. A new strain in cattle has led to more severe disease in some people. The virus has spread to foxes, goats, pigs, rats, cats, and raccoons. Antibody tests on dairy workers revealed a 7% infection rate, suggesting many cases go undetected. Experts are concerned that the virus could evolve into a pandemic strain. A bird flu vaccine exists but isn't FDA-licensed, and the Trump administration paused funding for Moderna's vaccine. The USDA's milk testing program has helped slow the spread, but distrust of science and vaccines hinders prevention efforts. Some scientists claim the CDC influenza division has been decimated and that a communications ban has been put on federal workers.

The call aims to unite four public health agencies to discuss the current situation regarding HPAI, particularly H5N1, and to share lessons learned about surveillance and epidemiology. CFIA presented their enhanced poultry surveillance plans, including efforts related to cattle and milk. The UK Health Security Agency shared insights from their asymptomatic human surveillance pilot. Don Sheppard emphasized the need for developing an assay for H5N1 to prepare for potential positive test results. He highlighted the challenges in determining the appropriate populations and techniques for serosurveillance, including the lack of serum samples from humans or cattle with H5N1. Ongoing discussions and work are focused on protocol development to ensure readiness for any developments in the situation.

Jessica Hopkins from Public Health Ontario asked about plans for active surveillance in humans if there is a positive test for milk. The response mentioned developing enhanced surveillance protocols for farms, including baseline testing on pigs and birds. However, challenges were noted in implementing this plan due to sensitivities around farm access and testing migrant workers.

There's been people asking about the eggs. So the family has no idea. So these birds probably are laying eggs. What are what is the CFIA doing with the eggs? And unfortunately, the family does not know. They got no way to track this stuff. These guys come in here and and just take over the place. Don't let anybody know what they're doing. They put up all these walls of secrecy to ensure that nobody can see what's going on, and then they wonder why everybody's freaking out. It'd be easy enough for the CFIA to make a statement. It'd be easy enough for the police to make a statement. It'd be easy enough for anybody that knows anything about this to make a statement, but they wanna keep all the public in the in the dark.

The Biden administration should prioritize two key actions regarding bird flu. First, they need to increase testing availability, especially rapid home tests for farm workers and their families, to ensure we are aware of the virus's presence. Second, there is an existing vaccine for H5N1 that has not yet been authorized by the FDA. The administration should expedite this process to distribute the vaccine to farm workers and vulnerable populations. The urgency is heightened by uncertainty about future actions from the Trump administration, which could affect testing and vaccine authorization. Bird flu has a high mortality rate, particularly in vulnerable groups, making it crucial to prevent its spread and mutations.

Concerns about agricultural health issues are not widely recognized among the general population in Canada, particularly in Quebec. While agricultural stakeholders are aware, public interest remains low. However, a potential discovery of positive milk samples could rapidly change this perception, similar to trends seen in the U.S. Coordination between agricultural and health authorities is essential, and establishing a formal national table for communication is suggested. There is a need for a proactive communication strategy, especially in regions like British Columbia, where past outbreaks have heightened awareness. Discussions should also address unpasteurized products and the implications for animal health, including potential risks to pets. Overall, the focus should be on preparedness and collaboration across agencies.

Jessica Hopkins from Public Health Ontario asked about plans for active surveillance in humans if there is a positive test for milk. The response mentioned ongoing work on enhanced surveillance protocols to be implemented on farms with positive cases. Challenges include logistical issues and sensitivities around testing on farms, such as dealing with undocumented or migrant workers.

In 2024, the H5N1 bird flu virus jumped from wild birds to cows, shocking virus experts. The virus has since spread rapidly through US dairy herds and poultry, infecting other mammals, including 70 Americans, one of whom died. Some experts claim the Biden administration was slow to respond, while the Trump administration laid off scientists. The virus spreads easily and lingers on milking equipment, infecting workers. Experts fear the virus's pandemic potential, citing its high mortality rate in past outbreaks. Testing was slow to start, and some states still test infrequently. A new strain in cattle has led to more severe disease in some people. The virus has spread to foxes, goats, pigs, rats, cats, and raccoons. Some studies suggest many human cases go undetected. Experts worry that the virus could evolve into a pandemic strain. A bird flu vaccine exists but is not FDA-licensed, and the Trump administration paused funding for Moderna's vaccine. The USDA's milk testing program has helped slow the spread, but distrust of science and vaccines hinders prevention efforts.

The call brought together public health agencies to discuss HPAI H5N1 surveillance and research. CFIA presented enhanced poultry surveillance plans, while the UK Health Security Agency shared their asymptomatic human surveillance pilot. Don Sheppard from PHAC emphasized the need for developing an assay for H5N1 testing. Discussions revolved around the extent of surveillance, target populations, and assay validation challenges due to limited serum samples. Protocol development is underway to prepare for potential positive test results.

The data hasn't been shared because the virus wasn't isolated. Live animal samples testing positive don't provide useful information. It seems the source of the virus is not what we initially believed.

The data hasn't been shared because the virus wasn't isolated. Testing live animal samples doesn't provide useful information if they only show positive results. I don't believe the virus originated from what we initially thought.

About half of the workers on the farm are not US-born, and the operation runs 24 hours a day to be profitable. Year-round labor is essential for milk production. Despite supporting Governor Kristine Noem and former President Trump, there's concern about the impact of potential mass roundups of undocumented workers. If such actions were taken, food production could halt within two days, leading to empty shelves. The farmer believes that officials understand the consequences of these policies and expresses trust that they won't follow through with drastic measures.

I am Don Shepherd, VP of Infectious Diseases and Vaccination Programs. We are discussing testing for H5N1. There are questions about which populations to test, what methods to use, and whether to use molecular or serosurveillance techniques. There are challenges in validating assays due to limited serum samples. In the US, testing on dairy and beef cattle has been negative. Plans include testing asymptomatic cows and commercial milk samples. Wastewater testing is considered, but distinguishing between avian and bovine strains is difficult. We need to be prepared for positive results before deciding on implementation.

Someone states they are passionate after 34 years of caring for animals that live to 75 and have names. They ask that "Connor," "Ethan," and "Lulu" not be shot. They acknowledge there's a policy in place, but argue it's time for a change, suggesting a report indicating every bird looks healthy. Another person responds that going against the entire industry is not their decision, and that changing to a non-eradication approach requires a national conversation with the CFIA and the Canadian government. When asked how long it would take for an ostrich to die from sickness, the response is hours to days, depending on the disease. Someone counters that there have been no avian flu deaths on the farm in eight days. Another person states that the challenge is control versus eradication, because one diagnosis puts the entire population at risk, mandating destruction.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the war in agriculture, focusing on what they allege is horrendous treatment by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) of Universal Ostrich Farms. They recount a live farm feed from the previous night in which Katie, a friend of Speaker 0, appears distraught as she pleads with the CFIA to stop killing her birds. They claim that hundreds of bullets were fired at the birds, according to eyewitnesses, and estimate that perhaps 100 birds remain. They assert that the CFIA has been culling the herd already and had foreknowledge of a Supreme Court ruling, implying the CFIA acted to eliminate birds without accountability. The speakers state that the RCMP stood by and did nothing, including when the farm formally filed charges. They describe alleged collusion among CFIA, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the government, accusing them of harassment, lassoing, chasing, and injecting the birds for five weeks. The speakers argue that the birds must be tested to prove the CFIA acted for political reasons rather than for health, science, public protection, wildlife protection, or disease prevention. They echo Joe Warmington of the Toronto Sun in insisting on testing the birds and determining how many remain to prevent a cover-up. They emphasize that the cover-up cannot start now and reject any expectation that it will. They describe Katie as distraught, weeping, and appealing for mercy while watching her ostriches be shot throughout the night, characterizing Canada’s CFIA as analogous to the NKVD, Stalin’s secret police, in contrast to other historical comparisons used in the discussion. The discussion includes live audio elements and commentary about sound from the kill area, with uncertainty about why shots sound distant or off to the left. They reference a prior night’s events and plan to provide more footage and details about the shootings. They state their position that the CFIA’s actions are political and not health-related, and they insist on continued testing and transparency regarding the number of birds remaining. The conversation frames the events as part of a broader “war on agriculture,” asserting that the cover-up and lack of accountability are central concerns. Katie’s interview from the prior day is described as distressing, with the host noting the emotional toll of the situation on her.

We should be testing every cow weekly using pool PCR to detect asymptomatic infections. America's innovation allows for breakthroughs like pool testing dairy workers. Undetected cases in humans exist because we only track symptomatic individuals, leading to the spread of the virus. Switching to definitive laboratory testing is crucial to identify asymptomatic or mild cases that go unnoticed.

Vet was not allowed to take blood, and let's go into the reason why. So the vet said that they said it doesn't matter if all of these animals remember this. If every one of these animals test negative, they're still to die. And the reason being is because of that international trade policy between the World Animal Health Organization and the World Health Organization, which takes the directives of the United Nations. Good morning, Tina. And then the the minute anybody that any animal has a positive test on a property for HPAI, avian influenza, all animals are to be destroyed to protect our

The call brought together public health agencies to discuss the HPAI H5N1 trajectory, focusing on enhanced surveillance and scientific efforts. CFIA presented enhanced poultry surveillance plans, while the UK Health Security Agency discussed their asymptomatic human surveillance pilot. PHAC emphasized the need to develop an assay for H5N1 testing. Technical questions remain about assay validation and population testing techniques. Work is ongoing to address these challenges and ensure preparedness for potential positive cases.

In Quebec, the concern about H5N1 avian influenza is not high among the general population, but authorities are vigilant. There is a call for coordination between agricultural and health agencies at the national level in Canada. Funding is being allocated to address knowledge gaps, and there is a focus on pandemic preparedness. It is suggested to expand surveillance efforts to include goat and sheep milk testing. Communication strategies and preparedness for potential positive cases in Canada are emphasized. In British Columbia, there is interest due to past avian influenza outbreaks in poultry. Vigilance is urged, especially regarding raw milk products and potential risks to pets.

There's a noticeable gap in how we handle messaging about pets, including farm cats. It's important to consider this aspect. On a positive note, we successfully shut down mink farms in British Columbia, although Ontario still has them. Recently, the mink farm operators launched a lawsuit against us, which was dismissed just yesterday.

We need to consider messaging about farm cats as pets. On a positive note, mink farms in BC were shut down, while Ontario still has them. A lawsuit against us was recently dismissed.

The speakers describe an eerily devastated site with extensive property damage and a semi-dismantled kill pen in the background, suggesting blood, carnage, and possible biohazard concerns. They note that the perpetrators “drove all around it and left,” then disappeared, leaving behind an impression of what happened. Speaker 1 observes enormous bales—much larger than typical hay bales—stacked on the property, describing them as about a foot to four feet high. They remark that birds are landing inside the area and pecking at whatever is there. They reference video from the day with dead ostriches still present, noting flocks of birds arriving, implying concern about the bird flu. The speakers recount that “they drove all around in the killing fields” and “kicking up hay as they left,” describing the act as tearing down their operations and leaving in a dismissive manner after terrorizing the family for a long period and slaughtering many birds. They mention “a thousand rounds” fired by marksmen that night, and state that this had “nothing to do with avian flu,” asserting that those shots were unrelated to the flu. Speaker 0 points to a pickup they saw stuck and seized in the area, with windows left open, illustrating the chaos and mess left behind. They emphasize the long duration of distress endured: “eleven months of hell, over six weeks or something like that of having this occupied land,” with RCMP provoking people and CFIA marksmen shooting, followed by the aftermath. Speaker 1 echoes the mess, suggesting it would have been easier to stack the birds or manage them differently, rather than creating the visible wreckage. They reiterate the claim that if the situation is labeled a biohazard, wild birds are currently seen around the area. They observe birds flying over the site, including a duck, indicating ongoing wildlife presence. Both speakers conclude by questioning the process: with an anonymous tip or accusation triggering CFIA involvement, suspicion alone seems to trigger actions that lead to destruction of holdings. They assert that CFIA will come in, destroy everything, and leave scorched earth, killing all animals, presenting this as the outcome. They end with the statement that this is Canada, folks.