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Speaker 1 stated they have not spoken about tariffs with the person in question, and suggests reading "The Art of the Deal." They believe the person is a negotiator who lays out tough terms, which sometimes works. Speaker 1 says we need to prioritize national security, resiliency, and diversified supply chains. They state tariffs are a tool that, if properly used, could help resolve these issues. Speaker 0 asks if tariffs are a legitimate negotiating tool, and Speaker 1 confirms they are.

The speakers discuss the importance of taking time to consult with other services. They mention that a separate meeting was unrelated to the referendum, and an official explicitly states that the report cannot be sent before the referendum, so it will be done afterwards. The speakers disagree on the interpretation of the sentence, with one saying it means they want to do it after the referendum because it can no longer be done well before, while the other argues it means they want to do it after the referendum if it cannot be done well before. They clarify that the time was needed to consult with other countries regarding their services and supervision. Translation: The speakers emphasize the need for time to consult with other services. They discuss a separate meeting that was not related to the referendum. An official states that the report cannot be sent before the referendum and will be done afterwards. They debate the interpretation of a sentence, with one saying it means doing it after the referendum because it can no longer be done well before, while the other argues it means doing it after the referendum if it cannot be done well before. They clarify that the time was needed to consult with other countries regarding their services and supervision.

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

Speaker 0 states that they are prepared to work with you, the United Kingdom, Europe in general, and the United States, but as equals and with a respectful attitude toward each other. They add that if they ultimately come to this arrangement, everyone will win from it.

The speaker thanks the Swiss government for hosting the trade meeting in Geneva. Talks were productive, and the location on Lake Geneva contributed to a positive process. An agreement was reached for a 90-day pause, with both sides agreeing to reduce reciprocal tariffs by 115%.

Vivek expresses his view on the importance of independence from China and the need for trade agreements with countries like Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, and Australia. He believes that bilateral trade agreements would be the best approach, as multilateral agreements come with baggage like climate change issues. He mentions the US Mexico Canada Agreement as an example of reentering a trade agreement on fairer terms. Rogan accuses Vivek of flip-flopping on his stance regarding the TPP, but Vivek clarifies that he is being more precise and emphasizes the importance of bilateral trade agreements in the context of declaring independence from China.

Today, the speaker openly states that the next step is Paris, and if Paris doesn't respond, then it's Brussels. They mention that regulations in Germany are different from here, and in Italy and Spain, they use products that are banned here. They express frustration with the constraints and controls they face regarding traceability. The speaker is determined and willing to face any consequences because they are fed up.

Speaker 0 notes that Trump used the Davos stage to demand Greenland back, warning allies to back off or face massive tariffs, calling Greenland “a piece of ice.” Speaker 1 says the goal is a piece of ice for world protection; the U.S. could have kept the land but chose not to, giving Greenland a choice to say yes and be appreciated or no and be remembered. Greenland is reportedly protesting in the streets, saying “hands off our country.” Speaker 0 adds that Trump has struck a deal framing a future agreement on Greenland and the Arctic, posted on Truth Social, stating that based on a productive meeting with the Secretary General of NATO, Marruta, a framework for a future deal with respect to Greenland and the Arctic has been formed, and that tariffs scheduled for February 1 will not be imposed. Speaker 2 challenges the claim, noting NATO doesn’t own Greenland, and questions whether Marruta can make such a deal. Speaker 0 continues the exchange, joking about not wanting a Met Gala, and suggests the post hints at the U.S. taking control of Canada as well because of Arctic interests. Canadian Prime Minister Carney responds by saying Canada will invoke Article 5 and support NATO to protect Denmark, with Denmark also unwilling to cede sovereignty following the framework. Speaker 2 adds that two people are deciding the fate of Greenland, and another participant begins to speak. Speaker 0 provides population context, saying about 57,000 people live in Greenland. Speaker 0 then mentions Putin’s response, quoting a brief remark that he’s “kinda behind this idea.” Speaker 2 notes Ravasi’s commentary and asks for a referendum, which Speaker 3 says would give Greenlanders a semblance of deciding for themselves, though it’s unclear how such a referendum would impact broader strategic interests. Speakers turn to Ralph Schulhammer, who is in Austria, to assess European reaction. Speaker 3 says Trump’s rhetoric in Davos was “very Trumpian” but contained carrots as well as sticks: he highlighted ancestry, support for a strong Europe, concerns about migration and energy policy, and suggested that Europe must strengthen itself to be a true partner; otherwise, the U.S. may retreat. The discussion acknowledges sentiment that Europe’s elites tend to frame issues as global rather than addressing national needs, with Speaker 3 arguing that policy-wise there can be shared interests, but communication strategy differed from Trump’s approach. The panel considers whether Greenland’s referendum would matter, noting that many peoples pursue autonomy but that Greenland’s outcome would not necessarily alter large strategic interests. They discuss historical precedents of land acquisitions and acknowledge the Greenland dispute sits at the intersection of Arctic strategic interests and great-power competition, including China and Russia’s activity in the region. Speaker 3 emphasizes that the future of Europe should be anchored in defending European territory and citizens, not only global agendas, and critiques the perception that Europe should always prioritize global issues over internal concerns. In closing, Speaker 0 references Macron’s overture to meet in Paris, noting Trump’s remark that Macron won’t be in power much longer. Ralph Schulhammer is thanked for his insights, with recognition of his Hammertime podcast.

The speaker confirms the USMCA is in place and considered a good deal for all countries. The speaker expresses dislike for the previous person they worked with on the deal, claiming she was terrible and tried to take advantage of the deal. This led to a bad relationship that was ended. A negotiation is coming up in the next year or so to adjust or terminate the USMCA.

The White House announced the deal with the UK because the deal was complete, contrary to claims. The president and prime minister spoke about the phenomenal deal, and discussions will continue. Trade deals involve an initial agreement, framework, and deal, followed by finalizing details. The numbers are determined, and market access will remain. The president is committed to a 10% baseline tariff, not just for the UK, but for all trade negotiations with other countries. The president is determined to continue with the 10% baseline tariff permanently, even after the deals are done.

The speaker wants to lead a transparent and comprehensive discussion about fixing the value chain and addressing a problem. They believe measures like the "most favored nation" approach are shortsighted and unsustainable, and won't achieve the desired result. The speaker emphasizes that the disagreement lies not in the "what," but in the "how" to achieve the goal.

Speaker 1 states that a deal with Canada is not being held up, but rather, there are different concepts being considered. Speaker 1 favors tariffs because they are simple, easy, and precise. Mark has a more complex, but also very good, idea. They are going to consider both concepts. Speaker 1 believes a deal is achievable if both parties agree.

The discussion centers on Venezuela and whether to engage with Nicolás Maduro. The dialogue notes that there has been consideration of talking to him, with uncertainty about the approach: “What Venezuela, sir? Are you planning to talk to Nicolas Maturo? I might talk to him. We'll see. But we're discussing that with their with the different steps.” The speakers acknowledge that Venezuela may be a topic of discussion and mention that “We might talk about Venezuela.” A key point raised is the United States’ designation of Maduro as the leader of a foreign terrorist organization. The exact assertion stated is: “The US this week did, of course, name him the leader of a foreign terrorist organization.” This designation is presented as a context for questioning the desirability of talking to him. In response to whether diplomacy with Maduro is prudent, there is a conditional stance expressed: “Why do you wanna talk to him if he's the leader? If we can save lives, if we can do things the easy way, that's fine.” This line frames the decision to engage in talks as potentially justified if it can save lives and if it can be accomplished through an easier route. The speakers also acknowledge flexibility in method: “And if we have to do it the hard way, that's fine too.” This phrase indicates willingness to pursue stronger or more challenging measures if necessary, depending on the outcomes or constraints involved in engaging with Maduro. Overall, the exchange highlights a tension between pursuing dialogue with Maduro and the U.S. designation of him as a leader of a foreign terrorist organization, balanced against the potential to save lives and the spectrum of possible approaches, from easy to hard. The conversation suggests that the decision to engage or not would be influenced by the prospect of saving lives and the practicality of the approach, given the current designation by the United States.

The European Commission's retaliatory tariffs are still on the table if a deal with President Trump cannot be made. Speaker 1 believes a deal can be made and offers to help. Their goal is to invite President Trump to Italy for an official visit and explore the possibility of a meeting with Europe, advocating for frank discussions to find mutually beneficial solutions. Speaker 1 believes that together, both sides are stronger and is committed to finding the best way to reinforce this strength on both sides of the Atlantic. Speaker 0 claims that making a deal with Europe will not be a problem because the U.S. has something that everyone wants.

The speaker notes that they are not the pen pal but the phone pal of Poroshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and now the speaker themselves. For the last four years, they have been on the phone two to three hours a week with those folks. There is an overwhelming instinct in Europe to say, before you guys became president, this was owned by Russia anyway. They ask, what difference does it make? Why are you making us engage in these sanctions? The speaker recalls last year, they were authorized to say they’d do the second tranche of a billion dollars, and he didn’t fire his chief prosecutor. Because the speaker has the confidence of the president, they were there. They said, “I’m not signing it. Until you fire him, we’re not signing it.” They clarified, “We’re not doing it.” Until you form a new government and you actually bring in someone who will move on this, they’re not playing. It’s not because they’re trying to play hardball, but because they know if they give an excuse to the EU, there are at least five countries right now that want to say, wooah, want out. What they are putting together now is a basic detailed road map of who goes first and who goes second. There are two pieces: one is the security guarantees that are to flow from Russia, and two, the political steps that Ukraine has to take. Some of the steps are very difficult to take. They’ve already done the energy piece, they’ve done some other things, but the point is that when you say the dumb boss is gonna have a special status and you’re gonna amend your constitution, it’s like saying, okay, you know, Texas and Wyoming—Texas is gonna have a special status that we don’t want because we want Mexico to have more influence in Texas. And we’re gonna pass that through the United States Congress. So there are some really tough stuff they’ve gotta do. They’re willing, and the speaker is convinced they will do it.

The European Commission's retaliatory tariffs are still on the table if a deal with President Trump cannot be made. Speaker 1 believes a deal can be made and aims to invite President Trump to Italy for an official visit, potentially organizing a meeting with Europe. The goal is to frankly discuss everyone's needs to find a mutually beneficial middle ground. Speaker 1 believes that together, both sides are stronger and is seeking the best way to reinforce both shores of the Atlantic. Speaker 0 claims that making a deal with Europe will not be a problem because the U.S. has something that everyone wants.

The speaker states that countries represented by the European Union will be told "that game is up." If they "get cute," they won't be able to sell cars into the United States anymore. The speaker claims that European unions and other countries gave drug companies a price, expecting America to pay the difference to cover a shortfall. The speaker says "that's what we did, but we're not doing it anymore."

The speaker states that countries represented by the European Union will be told "that game is up." If they "get cute," they won't be able to sell cars into the United States anymore. The speaker claims that European Union countries gave drug companies a price, expecting America to pay the difference to cover a shortfall. The speaker says "that's what we did, but we're not doing it anymore."

Speaker 0 states: "Can't charge a dollar. I would've used 1p, but we don't make the pennies anymore. We save money. Can't charge $1 to any country under IEPA. Not $1, I assume, to protect other countries." They assert this must have been done "to protect those other countries. Certainly not The United States Of America," which they say "they should be interested in protecting." They then claim: "That's what they're supposed to be protecting. But I am allowed to cut off any and all trade or business with that same country. In other words, I can destroy the trade." They further assert: "I can destroy the country. I'm even allowed to impose a foreign country destroying embargo. I can embargo. I can do anything I want, but I can't charge $1. Because that's not what it says, and that's not the way it even reads." The speaker emphasizes a broader power: "I can do anything I want to do to them, but I can't charge any money. So I'm allowed to destroy the country, but I can't charge them a little fee. I could give them a little $2.02 cent fee, but I cannot charge under any circumstances. I cannot charge them anything."

In this segment, the speaker argues against the idea that exiting the eurozone or the European Union would automatically sever access to the internal market, labeling such fears as fundamentally incorrect. The speaker references a position previously outlined in a Welt article from 2016, stating that every country within the EU should be allowed to leave the EU and automatically fall into the internal market, so that the free internal market continues to guarantee the fundamental freedoms between EU countries. The overarching objective presented is the creation of a European Economic Area, but the speaker rejects what is described as a “monstrous overbuild” currently practiced, characterized by tens of thousands of civil servants who are deemed unnecessary and overpaid, with a level of intrusion that is viewed as excessive. The speaker then shifts to a critique of the current leadership and policies, urging the removal of those in power within the EU framework, specifically naming Ursula von der Leyen and the policies associated with her tenure. The cited policy areas include a ban on combustion engines, CO2-related levies, heating laws, and building energy policy, among others. The demand is to “throw out” these people, as they are viewed as representative of an overreaching EU apparatus that the speaker does not support. The central message is that such a centralized and intrusive EU structure is unnecessary and undesirable. The text emphasizes the need for a free internal market among European nations, paired with the restoration of national sovereignty and secure borders. The speaker advocates for free exchange of goods and services among nations, suggesting that this approach would constitute real progress. The concluding sentiment reinforces a preference for smaller, less intrusive governance and a streamlined framework that prioritizes the free movement of goods and services within a European context, while maintaining secure borders and national autonomy. The overall call is for scrapping what is described as the EU apparatus, empowering nations to engage in open trade and cooperation without the perceived rigidity and overreach of the current EU system.

The discussion centers on how US officials handle diplomacy publicly and privately, particularly in relation to Ukraine. Speaker 0 notes that US officials talk about world issues because that's part of diplomatic work, and mentions that the secretary met with the opposition and stopped by a meeting with the foreign minister. He says it’s up to the people of Ukraine, including officials from both sides, to determine the path forward, but indicates that there should be no surprise that discussions about events on the ground are taking place. Speaker 1 counters that this is more than discussions, describing it as “two top US officials that are on the ground discussing a plan that they have to broker a future government and bringing officials from the UN to kind of seal the deal.” They suggest this signals that the US is “midwifing the process,” not merely offering suggestions, and imply private diplomacy is aiming to shape a post-conflict outcome with UN involvement. Speaker 0 acknowledges that private diplomatic conversations happen and involve deliberations about what involvement the UN can have and what engagement should occur on the ground. He says such discussions shouldn’t be surprising and that there is a range of options under consideration, including private interagency process discussions and what is conveyed publicly as US policy. Speaker 2 challenges this by arguing it’s not honest to claim there is no opinion and that the process is entirely up to the people of Ukraine. They point to Egypt as a counterexample, asserting that there is a public stance that differs from private discussions. Speaker 0 distinguishes between private conversations within the interagency process and what is publicly conveyed as US policy. He asserts a responsibility to convey the government’s position while also noting that a range of options are being discussed. Speaker 1 presses the distinction further, asking what happens behind closed doors when private deals are discussed versus publicly stating that the decision lies with Ukrainians. They emphasize the perceived difference between privately “cooking up a deal” and publicly acknowledging Ukrainian decision-making. Speaker 0 concludes by saying they would disagree with Speaker 1, arguing that they are overstating and overqualifying a few minutes of a privately recorded phone call.

If Russia invades Ukraine, Nord Stream 2 will be terminated, according to Speaker 0. Speaker 1 questions how this will be accomplished since Germany controls the project. Speaker 0 assures that they will find a way to make it happen.

Time will tell if Canada is for sale, despite claims to the contrary. The speaker believes that even seemingly impossible deals can become possible through friendly negotiation. The key is mutual benefit; Canada loves the speaker's country, and the speaker's country loves Canada. The speaker suggests that developments will unfold over time.

The speaker states they are in dialogue with the prime minister and believes he is happy with how they treated them with tariffs. The speaker addresses foreign leaders, urging them to terminate their tariffs, drop barriers, and stop manipulating currencies, which they claim is devastating. They request these leaders buy tens of billions of dollars of American goods. The speaker asserts tariffs protect the country from economic harm and will lead to unprecedented growth, adding that this growth has already started.

The speaker presented to the European Council different possibilities for free trade agreements. The most attractive option is cooperation between the EU and CPTPP (Asian countries), as both desire structured cooperation. This cooperation could be the beginning of redesigning the WTO, reforming it for the positive and avoiding past mistakes. The goal is to show the world that free trade with a large number of countries is possible on a rules-based foundation. Engaging in this project between the CPTPP and the EU is important because of its potential impact.