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The speaker states that the United States is conducting an operation with a clear goal: to eliminate the threat posed by Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and by Iran’s navy to naval assets. The speaker says the operation is focused on this objective and is progressing “quite successfully,” with the details of tactics and progress to be discussed by the Pentagon and the Department of War. Two reasons are given for acting now. First, the speaker asserts that if Iran came under attack by the United States, Israel, or another party, Iran would respond against the United States. According to the speaker, orders had been delegated down to field commanders, and within an hour of the initial attack on Iran’s leadership compound, the Iranian missile forces in the south and in the north were activated to launch. The speaker notes that those forces were “prepositioned.” Second, the speaker explains that the assessment was that if the United States stood and waited for Iran’s attack to come first, American casualties would be much higher. Therefore, the president made the decision to act preemptively. The speaker emphasizes that they knew there would be an Israeli action, and that action would precipitate an attack against American forces. The implication is that delaying a preemptive strike would result in greater casualties, potentially billions of dollars in losses, and more American lives at risk. The overarching message is that the preemptive operation aims to neutralize Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and navy threats before they are used in consolidation with anticipated Israeli actions and any Iranian counterattacks against U.S. forces. The speaker frames the decision as prudent and anticipatory, intended to prevent higher casualties and to maintain safety for American personnel and assets. The speaker stops short of detailing specific tactical methods, pointing listeners to the Pentagon and the Department of War for a deeper discussion of tactics and progress.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

The statements contend that the actions were carried out with no congressional authorization, placing them in direct violation of the Constitution, specifically Articles I and II, and that they breach international law and American law, with no concerns raised about these issues. The speaker suggests that this pattern represents a new perimeter being established by Donald Trump, portraying the current situation as lawless and characterized by an authoritarian figure in the person of Trump. It is argued that there are no remaining guardrails to constrain him, and the only limitations he follows are self-imposed, based on what might provoke a backlash or retaliation. In other words, he would only undertake operations that do not invite a response or “kickback.” According to the account, some operations have already been undertaken that did not carry potential pushback, but the Iran scenario is singled out as one of the larger cases. The contention is that, unlike previous actions, there is a solid chance that Iran could retaliate in ways the United States would prefer to avoid. There is further concern that if Iran does retaliate, the United States could be harmed back in ways that are undesirable or difficult to manage. This potential for meaningful retaliation is presented as a key reason why Trump may not have ordered certain operations up to this point. Overall, the speaker implies a shift toward more aggressive or expansive actions without the usual checks and balances, highlighting the absence of congressional authorization and the potential for significant consequences if opposing parties decide to respond forcefully. The Iran situation is emphasized as a critical turning point because of the greater likelihood of retaliation compared to previous actions, influencing Trump’s restraint or hesitation in approving further operations.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

Glenn discusses growing fears that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is approaching a “third world war,” citing weekend attacks on Moscow, claims of Western assistance to Ukraine, and attacks “coming from NATO territory” without permission from Baltic states and Finland. He notes Europe mass-producing or intending to mass-produce long-range strike weapons to strike deep inside Russia, and asks Professor John Mearsheimer how events may develop, what options Russia has, and what futures lie ahead. Mearsheimer says Ukrainians are escalating against the Russian homeland. Earlier in the war they relied mainly on missiles under limits from Europeans and Americans; now they have turned to drones and developed a significant drone force capable of striking into Russia. He argues drone damage is not enough to affect the war’s outcome meaningfully, but warns the danger is continued escalation: drone attacks rising over time, and later missiles being added, resulting in combined missile-and-drone attacks on Russia. He says the key question is what Russia will do in response. He reports that Sergei Karaganov argues Russia should strike European targets to send a signal that actions are unacceptable, starting with conventional weapons and then—if necessary—nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer says Karaganov claims that while the idea was previously a minority view, now most Russians Mearsheimer speaks to agree, arguing Russia is “fed up” and that escalating attacks on the Russian homeland are unacceptable. Glenn suggests further escalation may occur beyond retaliation, including more brutal attacks on Ukraine and conventional attacks against countries such as Germany or Estonia, and raises discussions about Ukraine possibly “liberating Moldova” from Transnistria, where thousands of Russian troops are present, as another escalation pathway. Mearsheimer frames the conflicts as lacking bargaining space—comparing them to the Iran conflict between Iran and the United States/Israel. He says both sides see the other as an existential threat, leaving no room for negotiation, and that desperation drives risky behavior. Regarding diplomacy, Glenn questions how diplomacy can fail repeatedly. Mearsheimer says there is “zero bargaining space” because Russia sees Ukraine and European positions as existential threats, while Europe and Ukraine increasingly view Russia’s success in Ukraine as an existential threat. He adds that the United States does not view Russia as an existential threat, implying Trump is willing to bargain, but Europeans and Ukrainians do not want to negotiate the deal Trump proposes. He says Trump may have “washed his hands” of a diplomatic settlement and believes the war must be settled on the battlefield. Glenn then asks whether the United States would join if Russia struck Estonia. Mearsheimer says Karaganov’s framework involves attacking NATO countries with conventional weapons, which in the past would almost guarantee U.S. involvement. He says it is unclear what Trump would do, but emphasizes that once escalation begins, nuclear weapons are in the background. He describes the escalation ladder as being “felt in the dark,” where nuclear use is a rung that everyone wants to avoid, giving nuclear threats “huge deterrent value.” Glenn returns to deterrence and escalation dynamics, suggesting NATO is overly confident Russia is deterred, while Russia waits and then takes bigger steps. Mearsheimer says even limited conventional missile strikes into NATO countries—killing hardly anyone—would be a huge step because they would strike NATO members. He also argues Russia is winning the war and that drones have slowed Russian territory gains, making progress incremental. He concludes that slow battlefield progress, no bargaining space, and rising homeland attacks make serious escalation likely, and that Russia may only need a major conventional step to trigger a “gigantic leap forward.” He further argues narrative incentives increase the risk: if the West believes Russians are losing momentum, Europeans and Ukrainians may increase attacks on Russian homeland. He says rebranding in the West could also shape decisions, including how people describe the Iran war’s objectives. Glenn pivots to Iran, saying it may be “hours away” or within 20–48 hours, and asks how it may develop. Mearsheimer says Iranian and American settlement proposals are “light years apart,” with no public evidence of behind-closed-doors concessions. He describes the sequence as a 40-day bombing campaign failing, followed by a ceasefire and a blockade strategy that also is not working; he says time is something Trump does not have because of economic consequences. He argues Trump’s choices appear to be restart bombing or cut a deal on Iran’s terms, and that returning to bombing would not cause Iranian surrender, while increasing incentives for Iran to escalate attacks across the Gulf, including threats to shut down the Red Sea and damage key infrastructure. When Glenn asks about strengthening the blockade by moving it (e.g., toward the Strait of Malacca), Mearsheimer says the location does not matter much; the blockade is not inflicting sufficient punishment to get Iran to surrender, and if the Strait of Hormuz is closed, economic damage worsens over time. He says Iran and Gulf countries are working on ways to beat the blockade, complicating any attempt to inflict punishment strong enough to force surrender. Glenn asks about the broader U.S. strategy amid multipolarity claims and the sense that diplomacy is failing. Mearsheimer says the U.S. is shifting the burden of Ukraine onto Europeans, is working to prevent crises or war in East Asia involving the U.S., and is deeply involved in fighting in the Middle East—specifically the Iran war. He concludes that the U.S. is unlikely to accept defeat in a war once involved, tying it to lessons from Vietnam: entering wars is easier than getting out, and the U.S. searches for ways to win even when defeat is recognized. He says there is reason to believe Trump may return to a massive bombing campaign driven by desperation, but that it still would not work. He adds that a “meltdown” may be overstated, drawing on historical comparison between Johnson in Vietnam and Trump’s potential political fate, while arguing Trump has “no good option.” Glenn asks about additional “cards” the U.S. could play through regional actors or proxies. Mearsheimer says no comparable proxy force exists to match what Ukraine represented, and argues that if the U.S. and Israel together could not defeat Iran, then other actors like the UAE by themselves are not positioned to take on Iran. In closing, Glenn notes fears of more escalation in both Ukraine and Iran and says the situation ahead may be “very troubling.” Mearsheimer agrees and calls the escalation ladder framing “very depressing,” ending with the theme that once conflicts begin, escalation and difficulty exiting are persistent.

Nations usually debate before going to war, but sometimes they have to be bombed into it, like in World War 2 when America was attacked at Pearl Harbor. This event opened Americans' eyes to the conflict and danger they faced. The majority of Americans are now determined to fight this battle. The terrorists want to destroy America, freedom, and its allies, with Israel being on the front line. Saddam Hussein is undoubtedly working towards developing nuclear weapons. Removing his regime would have positive effects on the region. Benjamin Netanyahu has even stated that the September 11th attacks were beneficial.

Nations, especially democracies, are hesitant to go to war but may need a wake-up call like Pearl Harbor or 9/11. The bombing of September 11th made Americans realize the danger they face and the need to act. The majority of Americans are now determined to confront this threat. Taking out Saddam Hussein's regime would have a positive impact on the region. Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that the September 11th attacks have had a positive effect.

Initiating a crisis to go to war with Iran is challenging. If compromise fails, starting a war through covert means may be best for US interests. Historical examples show wars began after specific incidents, not just sanctions. Increasing pressure on Iran, like mysterious submarine incidents, could be an option. Using covert actions against Iran could escalate if needed.

Democracies are reluctant to go to war and prefer to debate and argue. However, sometimes they need to be bombed into action, as seen in World War 2 when America was attacked at Pearl Harbor. This event opened Americans' eyes to the conflict and danger they faced. The majority of Americans are now determined to fight this battle. The September 11th attacks served as a wake-up call, urging Americans to use their power to act against terrorists who seek to destroy America and its allies. Saddam Hussein is unquestionably pursuing nuclear weapons, and removing his regime would have positive effects on the region. Benjamin Netanyahu has acknowledged the impact of the September 11th attacks.

Speaker 0 questions the rationale for the war, noting that “the intelligence did not suggest that an attack was imminent from Iran,” and asking, “What is left? Why are we at war with Iran?” He also remarks that “the nuclear program isn’t the reason” and that he never expected to hear Ted Cruz talking about nukes. Speaker 1 suggests the simplest explanation given, which has been backtracked, is that “Israel made us do it, that Bibi decided on this timeline, Netanyahu decided he wanted to attack, and he convinced Trump to join him by scaring Trump into believing that US assets in the region would be at risk, and so Trump was better off just joining Netanyahu.” He adds that this may not be the full explanation, but it’s a plausible one. He notes that “the nuclear program is not part of their targeting campaign,” and that “harder line leadership is taking hold,” with the Strait of Hormuz “still being shut down even as we get their navy.” He asks what remains as the explanation, suggesting it might be that Israel forced the United States’ hand and questions, “How weak does that make The United States look? How weak are we if our allies can force us into wars of choice that are bad for US national security interests?”

The speaker argues that the war in Iran and associated U.S. and Israeli actions are presented as a complex, intractable crisis, but in reality follow a simple pattern of a “controlled collapse” already underway. The collapse is said to be visible in everyday life, such as rising gas prices after the Strait of Hormuz being effectively closed and tensions around the conflict; the war is described as having caused thousands of deaths and sending energy markets into upheaval, with oil at a four-year high and inflation fears resurging as the Fed is expected to raise rates. Key events cited include the February 28 to March 1 strikes launched by the United States and Israel, the 48-hour ultimatum from President Trump demanding Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and the deployment of thousands of Marines to the Middle East. The speaker asserts Iran’s threat to respond by closing the Strait of Hormuz and targeting U.S. linked energy infrastructure and IT networks, including desalinization plants and data centers, stating that this represents not de-escalation but the architecture of a broader war. The narrative challenges conventional claims that Iran is degraded or cornered, noting that Iran has fired long-range missiles toward the U.S. base on Diego Garcia and conducted strikes near Israel’s Demona nuclear facilities, contradicting the idea that Iranian military capability has collapsed. The speaker argues that war messaging routinely declares the enemy weakened while the conflict expands, and asks why thousands of Marines are being deployed if victory is close and missiles are supposedly diminishing. The broader thesis is that this is part of a larger, premeditated shift toward centralized control. War and energy shocks are said to destabilize prices and justify intervention, with examples of strategic petroleum reserve releases and sanctions easing to calm markets. The speaker links this to a longer-running plan to install emergency governance and digital control systems: surveillance, mobility restrictions, and a move toward digital money, identity, and movement management. They point to developments such as China’s digital yuan expansion, Europe’s digital euro, and the push toward “15-minute cities,” arguing that these are precursors to a digitized, programmable money system. The speech asserts COVID-19 demonstrated how governments can impose sustained fear and centralized control, with digital gatekeeping and state-corporate coordination seen as a live test. It is argued that the “rollout” is not about a temporary crisis but a permanent, durable control grid, with airports adopting faster digital processing and biometric scanning, and the public gradually accepting reduced freedoms and increased dependence as a solution to emergencies. The speaker concludes that the conflict is not as complex as claimed; it is about control and the expansion of a surveillance, monetary, and movement-management system under the guise of crisis management, and invites audience feedback on this perspective.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn discuss the trajectory of the United States’ foreign policy under Donald Trump, focusing on the shift from an anticipated pivot to Asia and a reduction of “forever wars” to the current Iran confrontation and its global implications. - Initial optimism about Trump: Glenn notes a widespread belief that Trump could break with established narratives, recognize the post–Cold War power distribution, pivot to the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, end the “forever wars,” and move away from Europe and the Middle East. Mearsheimer agrees there was early optimism on Judging Freedom that Trump would reduce militarized policy and possibly shut down the Ukraine–Russia war, unlike other presidents. - Drift into Iran and the current quagmire: The conversation then centers on how Trump’s approach to Iran evolved. Mearsheimer argues Trump often vacillates between claims of victory and deep desperation, and he characterizes Trump’s current stance as demanding “unconditional surrender” from Iran, with a 15-point plan that looks like capitulation. He describes Trump as sometimes declaring a “great victory” and other times recognizing the need for an exit strategy but being unable to find one. - The escalation ladder and strategic danger: A core point is that the United States and its allies initially sought a quick, decisive victory using shock and awe to topple the regime, but the effort has become a protracted war in which Iran holds many cards. Iran can threaten the global economy and Gulf state stability, undermine oil infrastructure, and harm Israel. The lack of a credible exit ramp for Trump, combined with the risk of escalation, creates catastrophic potential for the world economy and energy security. - Economic and strategic leverage for Iran: The discussion emphasizes that Iran can disrupt global markets via the Strait of Hormuz, potentially shut down the Red Sea with Houthis participation, and target Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. The U.S. should maintain oil flow to avoid devastating economic consequences; sanctions on Iran and Russia were strategically relaxed to keep oil moving. The longer the war drags on, the more leverage Iran gains, especially as Trump’s options to harm Iran’s energy sector shrink due to the global economy’s needs. - Exit possibilities and the limits of escalation: Glenn asks how Trump might avoid the iceberg of economic catastrophe. Mearsheimer contends that a deal on Iran’s terms would entail acknowledging Iranian victory and a humiliating US defeat, which is politically challenging—especially given Israeli opposition and the lobby. The Iranians have incentive to string out negotiations, knowing they could extract concessions as time passes and as U.S. desperation grows. - Ground forces and military options: The possibility of a U.S. ground invasion is deemed impractical. Mearsheimer highlights that Desert Storm and the 2003 invasion involved hundreds of thousands of troops; proposed plans for “a few thousand” light infantry would be unable to secure strategic objectives or prevent Iranian counterattacks across the Gulf, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, with Iran capable of inflicting significant damage on bases and ships. The discussion stresses that even small-scale operations could provoke heavy Iranian defense and strategic backlash. - European and NATO dynamics: The Europeans are portrayed as reluctant to sign onto a risky campaign in support of U.S. objectives, and the episode warns that a broader economic crisis could alter European alignment. The potential breaching of NATO unity and the risk of diminished transatlantic trust are underscored, with Trump’s stance framed as blaming Europeans for strategic failures. - Israel and the lobby: The influence of the Israel lobby and its potential consequences if the war deteriorates are discussed. Mearsheimer notes the danger of rising antisemitism if the war goes catastrophically wrong and Israel’s role in pressuring continued conflict. He also observes that a future shift in U.S. strategy could, in extreme circumstances, diverge from traditional Israeli priorities if the global economy is at stake. - Deep state and decision-making: The final exchange centers on the role of expertise and institutions. Mearsheimer argues that Trump’s distrust of the deep state and reliance on a small circle (Kushner, Whitkoff, Lindsey Graham, media figures) deprived him of necessary strategic deliberation. He contends that a robust deep-state apparatus provides essential expertise for complex wars, offering a counterpoint to Trump’s preferred approach. He contends the deep state was not fully consulted, and that reliance on a limited network contributed to the strategic miscalculations. - Concluding tone: Both acknowledge the grave, uncertain state of affairs and the high risk of escalation and miscalculation. They express a desire for an optimistic resolution but emphasize that the current trajectory is precarious, with signs pointing toward a dangerous escalation that could have wide-ranging geopolitical and economic consequences. They close with a note of concern about the potential for rash actions and the importance of considering responsible exits and credible diplomatic channels.

The speaker believes it is difficult for a U.S. president to initiate war with Iran. If compromise with Iran is not possible, the traditional method of America entering wars would be best for U.S. interests. Drawing historical parallels, the speaker notes that Presidents Roosevelt, Wilson, Johnson, and Lincoln waited for events like Pearl Harbor, the Lusitania, the Gulf of Tonkin, and the attack on Fort Sumter to justify military action. If the Iranians do not compromise, it would be best if they started the war. The U.S. could increase pressure through covert means, such as causing Iranian submarines to sink, or escalating existing covert operations. The speaker is not advocating for these actions, but suggests that sanctions are not the only option.

In this video, the speaker claims that all wars in the US have been fake, referring to the manipulation and strategizing that leads to war. He highlights the Washington Institute For Near East Policy, a think tank with influential members like Henry Kissinger and Condoleezza Rice, who have served in various presidential administrations. The speaker emphasizes that American interests in the Middle East, rather than spreading democracy or freedom, drive these wars. He discusses historical examples of false flag events that led to wars, such as Pearl Harbor and the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The speaker concludes that if Iran doesn't compromise, someone else should initiate the war, following the pattern of previous conflicts.

The speaker opens by citing James Madison, who wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1789 that “the constitution supposes what the history of all governments demonstrates, that the executive branch of power is the most interested in war and most prone to it,” and notes that the constitution itself vests in the legislature the question of war (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11) while giving the president operational powers of war (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). Even if one claimed the 1973 War Powers Resolution supersedes the constitutional language, the speaker argues the president has not met its conditions: the president may only introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities under three circumstances—declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack on the United States—none of which exist today because Iran has not attacked the United States, Congress has not declared war, and Congress has not granted specific statutory authorization. Beyond this constitutional framing, the speaker asks why the United States would go to war with Iran and emphasizes that servicemembers deserve a clear mission. He questions how such a war would help American families with groceries, housing, or safety in schools and neighborhoods. He cautions against past interventions in the Middle East, arguing they have produced a debt of at least $8 trillion from wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan, and contends a sustained war with Iran will not stabilize the region but will radicalize new generations of terrorists and generate more refugees to Europe and the United States. The speaker argues Iran is not Venezuela, and that Ayatollah Khomeini was not a president but a religious leader in a region notorious for radical Islamists; he asserts that the United States and Israel turned him into a martyr, contributing to broader conflict and casualties, including six American families who have lost loved ones. He claims the administration cannot provide a straight answer for why the preemptive war was launched, noting contradictory statements about imminent Iranian strikes and the rationale of stopping a nuclear program. A candid answer, he says, came from the Secretary of State, who said Israel forced the United States to act, implying that Congress must decide war. If American lives are to be risked, that decision must be debated and voted on by representatives, and the debate should be arduous with a hard vote. He offers a theory that colleagues do not want to go on record due to a poor track record of meddling in the Middle East and a desire to avoid their names being associated with an unfavorable outcome. The speaker asserts Congress is not here to declare war today; the vote on the War Powers Resolution is to reassert that Congress must decide questions of war. Some say war is authorized by paying for it through the budget, but the speaker asserts that defining the mission for the troops is not included in the budget and has not been done. He thanks the men and women engaged in combat, prays for their safety, and states that the resolution is written for them—to ensure they know when they achieve their mission and can come home.

We seem to be heading to war with Iran, with little pushback from Republicans. War with Iran could mean Armageddon, with no appreciation for the implications for the US, Europe, and the Middle East. Twenty percent of the world's oil passes through the Straits of Hormuz, and Iran has missiles that can reach 1,200 miles with precision. If we bomb Iran, our bases in Iraq and Syria will be targeted. Hezbollah has a large operation in Mexico, and their agents could cause trouble here at home. If we attack Iran, Russia will not sit by quietly. Sanctions haven't stopped Iran's military development. Our military is at a weak point. If the US enters this conflict, it will be difficult for Russia and Turkey not to also come into this fight against us.

Zhang Shueqin is discussed as a predictor known for predicting Trump’s reelection, Vance as VP pick, and a US–Iran war. The conversation centers on why he predicted a US attack on Iran and how it might unfold. Key reasoning about Iran war - The strongest evidence, according to Zhang, is the January 2020 US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, who led Iranian proxies. He argues that killing an Iranian envoy to the region amounted to a declaration of war, and that if Trump had won reelection in 2020, he would have most certainly declared war on Iran. - In the war’s first month, the US focus was decapitation of Iranian leadership, aiming to force surrender and regime change. Iran proved resilient and creative, leading the US to shift to a phase of attrition, attempting to cripple Iran’s war-financing capacity and oil exports to China, and to control Hormuz. This included a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. - The war is expected to be slow and world-news-muted, with efforts to pressure Iran economically and diplomatically to force a settlement. There is no off-ramp seen for the US because consequences are vast for regional players. Actors and interests in the region - Regional players: UAE, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Kuwait, viewed as wanting Iran defeated and the war prolonged. Iran’s leadership wants relief from sanctions and to retain Hormuz as leverage. - The United States: aims to sustain the petrodollar system; fears that if Gulf states decouple from the dollar or shift currencies, the American economy could suffer. The US would prefer to press sanctions and blockade to compel cooperation and debt-financing from global actors. - Israel: sees the conflict as an opportunity for its Greater Israel project, hoping regional chaos would redraw borders after the conflict. - China: wants an end to the conflict to protect global trade and its energy interests, and to preserve balance in its relations with Iran, the GCC, and other players. China’s leverage includes pressure on Iran and economic guarantees that encourage a ceasefire, while seeking to minimize direct conflict with GCC states. - Russia and others: Russia is discussed as arming and supporting Iran in a broader economic/military contest with the US; geopolitics involve maritime skirmishes and energy strikes in a wider economic war. World War III framework and economic warfare - Zhang argues we are already in World War III, but the war is economic and strategic rather than traditional kinetic warfare. The main combatants are the US and Russia in the maritime and energy sphere, with China central to US debt-financing and global trade stability. - Economic warfare includes targeting oil refineries, shipping lanes, and export capabilities; the purpose is to force political settlements and shift global economic order. - The US strategy is described as creating global chaos while maintaining North American focus, exporting conflict to Europe and East Asia to defend empire interests, and using debt and weapons sales to manage global markets. China, the US, and future diplomacy - A Trump visit to Beijing is framed as potentially signaling a rapprochement, followed by cooperation in three areas: trade (China buying more Western Hemisphere LNG and resources), Taiwan status (reaffirming one China policy), and AI collaboration. The larger aim is described as turning China into an economic vassal to the US empire. - Europe is described as already largely vassalized by US policy, with the war in Ukraine illustrating this subordination; popular discontent is rising (e.g., in Germany with the AfD), but European leadership remains aligned with Washington’s agenda. Iranian and European responses - Iran, facing economic pressures and geopolitical isolation, initially led the war, but China’s mediation and pressure contributed to a ceasefire. There is a rift between Iran’s political leadership and its military leadership over how to proceed with the war. - Europeans could escalate involvement in a broader conflict, but the US strategy appears to rely on Europe fighting longer against Russia while the US profits through arms sales and financial mechanisms. European leadership, according to the discussion, remains cautious and influenced by external powers. Israel’s position and the broader arc - Israel is depicted as pursuing a death-cult, eschatological strategy that could unify Jews globally but increase regional instability. The greater aim is for Israel to benefit from regional chaos, while risking broader conflict. Future trajectories and civilizational decline - The discussion suggests that, in the short term, the US may appear to win economically, especially through debt-financed global demand for US energy and weapons, but in the mid- to long-term, imperial decline could lead to civil conflict within the US, driven by factional struggles between Wall Street financiers and tech oligarchs backing AI surveillance/state power. - The potential for a third Trump term is linked to deeper internal conflicts and the acceleration of violence or civil unrest, with religion offered by some as a potential stabilizing force in American society. - Three symptoms of imperial decline are privatization, financialization, and individualization; yet the speaker believes a Christian-nationalist revival could renew the republic. Closing stance - Across the discussion, the US empire is portrayed as pursuing an expansive, conflict-driven strategy to sustain power, while global players seek various economic and strategic outcomes. The overall forecast emphasizes ongoing, multi-front tensions with no easy peace, and a complex interplay among US, European, Middle Eastern, Russian, and Chinese interests.

Attacking a nation like Iran would quickly teach them to acquire nuclear weapons to prevent future attacks. Israel, North Korea, France, the United States, and Russia all obtained nuclear weapons for this reason. The speaker references the United States killing 250,000,000 people in two days in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, stating that it was not a high moral moment for America. The speaker suggests that attacking Iran could push them to develop nuclear weapons.

Syed Mohamed Marandi discusses the collapse of the Islamabad negotiations and the wider implications of the current U.S.-Iran confrontation. - On what happened in Islamabad: Iran participated despite low expectations, aiming to show willingness to resolve the crisis if Americans are reasonable and to ensure the world sees Iran’s efforts. The Iranians believed the United States lacked will to make progress. During talks there was some progress on various issues, but near the end the United States shifted to a hard line on the nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Vance claimed Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, a claim Marandi notes was contradicted by former counterintelligence official Joe Kent’s resignation letter. Netanyahu reportedly maintains direct influence, with Vance reporting to Netanyahu daily, which Iran views as undermining an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on control and “being the boss” is presented as a central obstacle to any deal. The ceasefire in Lebanon was touted as failing, with Netanyahu and Trump accused of conspiring to wreck it, and Iran’s actions after the ceasefire aligned with this view. The Iranian delegation flew back by land after the flight to Tehran was diverted, reflecting the perceived danger and the Washington Post piece calling for the murder of negotiators. Iran’s approach is framed as attempting to resolve the problem while signaling willingness to negotiate if U.S. policy becomes reasonable. - On the blockade and its consequences: The U.S. blockade on Iranian ports has just begun and will likely worsen the global economic crisis, pushing more countries to oppose the United States. China is angry as Washington dictates terms against oil and trade in the region. The blockade could be used to strangle China’s energy supplies, creating a double-edged impact by simultaneously worsening the global crisis and pressuring U.S. allies. Iran says it may respond by striking ships in the Red Sea and blocking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman if the blockade continues. Iran notes it has substantial financial resilience from oil sales at higher prices without middlemen, with about 100 million barrels left to sell after selling half of its declared oil stock, and it views energy shortages as likely to trigger broader economic disruption, including shortages of helium, LNG, and fertilizers. - On war readiness and possible outcomes: Iran anticipates a major assault and is preparing defenses and offensive capabilities. Iran argues negotiations were not taken seriously by the United States and believes the U.S. is buying time. Iran would view victories as having the United States back down, preserving Iran’s rights, and protecting its regional allies, with a long-term ceasefire. Iran contends it should control the Strait of Hormuz to prevent future aggression and seeks compensation for damages caused by the conflict, emphasizing sovereignty over Hormuz and peace for Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran states that if the U.S. and its regional proxies strike, Iran would respond by targeting energy and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. - On broader geopolitical shifts and regional dynamics: Marandi argues the current crisis accelerates a move toward a multipolar world, with the United States’ hegemonic position eroding. The UAE is portrayed as pushing for war, while other Gulf states are increasingly wary. He predicts a possible land invasion of Iran, but emphasizes Iran’s long-term preparedness and resilience. Weather and terrain are cited as factors likely to complicate a potential U.S. invasion, particularly in the hot summer conditions of the region. - On potential definitions of “victory”: Iran’s victory would involve U.S. backing down, Iran preserving its rights, a long-term ceasefire, and sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. A broader victory would see the end of supremacism in Palestine and the end of genocidal actions in Lebanon, with peace across the region as a key objective. The discussion ends with the notion that a shift toward an American focus on its republic, rather than empire, would benefit global stability.

- Trump has been presenting optimistic updates about negotiations with Iran, despite Iran denying them, and there is a belief that Monday morning actions are an attempt to manipulate markets, keep oil prices low, and keep the stock market high. - If a weekend land invasion of Iran occurs, many military experts suspect US troops would have to land or parachute in, which would change gold demand and pricing dynamics. - Speaker 1 explains that a true war outcome would require ground troops to take control of territory, not just air strikes or bombs. He notes Trump promised no troops on the ground, but argues that regime change would be impossible without occupying the country, leading to higher American casualties and families affected. - He warns that sending troops would mean they would have to stay in Iran, creating a prolonged conflict akin to Iraq or Afghanistan, with no clear exit strategy and ongoing political and strategic problems. - He suggests that Trump could alternatively declare victory and withdraw, claiming the destruction of Iran’s military capabilities (no navy, no air force, no nuclear program) as a complete victory and greatest military achievement. - The discussion then notes that the Strait of Hormuz was open before the war, implying strategic stakes and continued vulnerability. - Speaker 0 points out that Iran has pledged not to allow US occupation and would fight back, describing Iran as a country of 90 million with rugged terrain and highly motivated, religiously committed people who could be willing to die for their country. - They acknowledge the assumption that Iranians are uniformly supportive of a US liberation, labeling that notion as crazy. - They conclude that there could be even greater anti-American sentiment in Iran now than a month ago, recognizing that the population’s reaction to war may be hostile despite US actions.

Crisis initiation is tough, and it's hard to see how the U.S. president can get the U.S. to war with Iran. If compromise isn't coming, the traditional way America gets to war would be best for U.S. interests. To go to war, the U.S. has historically waited for an attack, such as Pearl Harbor, the Lusitania, the Gulf of Tonkin, the Maine, or Fort Sumter. If the Iranians aren't going to compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war. One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions, such as increasing pressure after the explosion on August 17. Iranian submarines periodically go down, and someday one of them might not come up. The U.S. is already using covert means against the Iranians and could get nastier.

The discussion centers on Iran’s response to the latest US peace terms and the broader trajectory of the conflict. Iran publicly rejected the terms, calling them “completely unrealistic” and signaling that they would not open the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the claim is made that the rumblings from US outlets and the president’s rhetoric suggested closeness to a deal, but those impressions are challenged as inconsistent with Iran’s stance. Project Freedom is said to have been shelved after Saudi Arabia reportedly refused to allow US forces to use its airspace and a key regional airbase, making the Trump administration’s stated option to advance that plan unworkable. The host asks where things stand on the escalation ladder. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats, describes the situation as a trap. He argues that the fundamental issues in play have not changed since the bombs began falling about seventy days ago. He praises the US military’s tactical performance—air, naval, and leadership-target strikes—but criticizes the strategy as fundamentally flawed. According to Pape, tactical successes do not yield meaningful strategic results, and Iran’s power is growing due to geography and cheap technologies like drones and mines. He notes that even after sinking Iran’s navy, the impact was negligible because Iran’s power persists and expands, especially given a Gulf-wide vulnerability to Hormuz. A critical development discussed is Iran’s action near the UAE, striking a pipeline that bypassed Hormuz and moved nearly 2,000,000 barrels of oil per day. This demonstrated Iran’s capacity to inflict damage despite a naval blockade, contributing to Gulf states’ reluctance to participate in or support US actions. The implication is that US punitive measures—hitting energy infrastructure or power grids—are unlikely to force Iran to kneel and may instead provoke greater retaliation. Pape warns that the escalation could drag on for months, with consequences such as rising gasoline prices in the US, potentially reaching about $6 in May or higher in some places like Chicago. The conversation turns to more immediate developments: fresh drone attacks around Kishem Island with Iran claiming air defenses intercepted the assaults; Iranian officials reportedly require compensation for damages and the withdrawal of all US forces from the Gulf as preconditions for ending the war. Pape reframes these attacks as part of Iran’s effort to keep the United States off balance and off leadership leverage, suggesting that Trump’s approach—driven by civilian leadership and charisma—misses the realities of great-power politics. He discusses the broader risk of increased Gulf infrastructure targeting if the US escalates, including the potential for higher gas prices and substantial infrastructure repair costs. The interview ends with reflections on the limits of punishment as a strategy, the enduring influence of Iran’s geopolitical position, and the likelihood that even if further force is used, it may not yield the desired strategic outcome. The speakers acknowledge the difficulty of predicting exact moves but emphasize the persistence of the escalation trap and the real-world consequences for energy markets and regional stability.

"Here's something you're never taught in school. Here in the good old US Of A, all of your wars have been fake." The video centers on the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an American think tank established in 1985, whose mission is "to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in The Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them." Its board includes Henry Kissinger, Richard Pearl, Condoleezza Rice, George Shultz, James Woolsey. The speaker notes: "crisis initiation is really tough, and it's very hard for me to see how The United States, president can get us to war with Iran." He adds: "The traditional way that America gets to war is what's best for US interests." He cites alleged false flags: "False flag." Pearl Harbor, Lusitania, Gulf Of Tonkin, Maine, Fort Sumter. "If the Iranians aren't gonna compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war." "This is how America goes to war." "One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions." "We could step up the pressure." "They're in the game of doing that to everybody." "We are in the game of using covert means against the Iranians." "We could get nastier with that." "you don't know when World War three is gonna break out, but when it does, you'll know why."

"The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This is an American think tank out of Washington DC. It was established in 1985, and it says the mission statement of the institute, quote, is to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in The Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them. Not about what's right and wrong over there. It's just whatever secures the American interests over in The Middle East, and we all know what those interests are. You've got Henry Kissinger, Richard Pearl, Condoleezza Rice, George Shultz, James Woolsey. It's a fun crowd. And it doesn't matter which president you think you're voting for. It's gonna change everything. People that have been part of this particular think tank have served senior positions in the administrations of every president this country has had since George h w Bush. Some of you may have seen this video, but again, considering the things that are going on right now, it's very it's more relevant now than it's ever been. So we're gonna go ahead and watch this, and I just wanna say upfront, you're gonna wanna have to make yourself resist the urge to punch your screen because you're gonna wanna punch this guy." "crisis initiation is really tough, and it's very hard for me to see how The United States, president can get us to war with Iran." "He just said that. You aren't hearing things he literally said. Crisis initiation's tough, and how's The United States president gonna get to war with Iran? Because wars don't just happen. They make the war." "The traditional way that America goes to war is what's best for the interests." "Some people might think that mister Roosevelt wanted to get us into World War two, as David mentioned. You may recall we had to wait for Pearl Harbor. False flag." "Some people might think that mister Wilson wanted to get us into World War one. You may recall he had to wait for the Lusitania episode. False flag." "Some people might think that mister Johnson wanted to send troops to Vietnam. You may recall he had to wait for the Gulf Of Tonkin episode. Total false flag." "We didn't go to war with Spain until the USS until the Maine exploded. Probably also a false flag." "May I point out that mister Lincoln did not feel he could call out the federal army until Fort Sumter was attacked, which is why he ordered the commander of Fort Sumter to do exactly that thing which the South Carolinians had said would cause an attack. Also a false flag." "Do you see a pattern here?" "So if in fact the Iranians aren't gonna compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war." "Period." "If the Iranians don't compromise, it would be best if someone started this war because that is how America goes to war." "One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions. I mentioned that explosion on August 17. We could step up the pressure." "We are in the game of using covert means against the Iranians. We we could get nastier with that." "This is how America goes to war. You don't know when World War three is gonna break out, but when it does, you'll know why."