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Around 10 days after 9/11, I met with Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz at the Pentagon. A general called me in and informed me that we were going to war with Iraq. When I asked why, he didn't have a clear answer. There was no evidence connecting Saddam to Al Qaeda. It seemed like they didn't know what else to do, so they decided to go to war. A few weeks later, I asked if we were still going to war with Iraq, and he showed me a memo stating that we planned to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq and ending with Iran. The Middle East's oil resources have attracted great power involvement, and there has always been a belief that we could use force in the region.

Shortly after 9/11, a general told me about the decision to go to war with Iraq, even without evidence linking Saddam to Al Qaeda. The rationale seemed to be that military force was the go-to solution. Weeks later, I learned of a plan to "take out seven countries in five years," starting with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. I worked with every Israeli prime minister from Yitzhak Shamir forward. It would have been fantastic to own the Twin Towers. After 9/11, I was very lucky that Governor Spitzer helped me collect $4.5 billion in insurance money. There was a decision to pull the building and watch it collapse. Post 9/11, Iraq, Iran, and Libya were racing to develop nuclear weapons. Action was needed, and the first regime was the Taliban. The next step? Military action should happen first against Iraq.

In 1996, the Clean Break Report, commissioned by the Israeli government, outlined plans to secure Israel's borders by targeting Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Authors Douglas Faith, David Wormser, and Richard Perle proposed these actions. By 2000, all three authors were working for George W. Bush. After 9/11, the events unfolded as planned.

Shortly after 9/11, the speaker encountered Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz at the Pentagon. A general called him urgently, revealing that they had decided to go to war with Iraq. When asked why, the general admitted they didn't have any new evidence connecting Saddam to Al Qaeda. The decision was made because they didn't know what else to do about terrorism and believed their military could overthrow governments. Weeks later, the speaker asked if they were still going to war with Iraq, to which the general responded that it was even worse. He showed the speaker a classified memo outlining plans to attack seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq and ending with Iran. The speaker regrets not seeing the memo and asks for the general's name.

Recent events in Syria mark a culmination of a long-term strategy by Israel, particularly under Netanyahu, to reshape the Middle East. This effort began with the "Clean Break" strategy in 1996, aiming for a "Greater Israel" by destabilizing neighboring governments. The U.S. has been complicit in these actions, engaging in wars across multiple countries, including Iraq and Libya, under the guise of fighting terrorism. The narrative around Assad has shifted over the years, often driven by U.S. interests rather than genuine threats to national security. The ongoing conflicts serve the interests of the military-industrial complex and the Israel lobby, leading to instability rather than peace. Future U.S. foreign policy must prioritize diplomacy and accountability to avoid further escalation, particularly regarding Iran and Russia.

Shortly after 9/11, a general told the speaker that the decision had been made to go to war with Iraq, despite no connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda. The speaker later saw a memo outlining a plan to "take out 7 countries in 5 years," starting with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. Iran viewed the U.S. presence in Iraq as both a blessing and a threat and became deeply involved in Iraq, offering assistance to various groups. The U.S. has refused to talk with Iran and has allocated $75 million to promote regime change, possibly supporting terrorist groups inside Iran. The speaker believes confrontation with Iran is likely, but force should be a last resort. Regarding Seymour Hersh's report, the speaker finds it plausible that the Pentagon is planning a bombing attack on Iran and that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are covertly funding groups in the Middle East. The Saudis, distrustful of U.S. judgment, are taking matters into their own hands. An early U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could lead the Saudis to fund Al Qaeda-linked groups to fight the Shia, intensifying the threat of Sunni extremism.

The war was largely driven by a need to convince the American public of its necessity, using fear tactics. Surprisingly, it originated from Netanyahu's long-held belief that to eliminate Hamas and Hezbollah, the U.S. must topple their supporting governments in Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Netanyahu has been relentless in pushing for conflict with Iran, influencing U.S. involvement in ongoing wars. The narrative of democracy versus dictatorship is oversimplified and misleading, failing to capture the complexities of the situation.

After 9/11, a general informed me that the decision to go to war with Iraq was made without evidence linking Saddam to Al Qaeda. Later, a memo revealed plans to attack 7 countries in 5 years, starting with Iraq. Iran's involvement in Iraq is seen as a response to US presence. The possibility of a military confrontation with Iran is looming due to US actions. Saudi Arabia is funding Sunni groups to counter Iranian influence, potentially including groups with ties to Al Qaeda. The consequences of a premature US withdrawal from Iraq could lead to increased Sunni extremism, supported by Saudi Arabia, to combat Shia influence.

Regarding the war in Syria, the CIA was tasked by Obama to overthrow the Syrian government four years before Russia intervened. This operation, known as Timber Sycamore, barely received coverage in the New York Times. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was based on phony pretenses. Focus groups were conducted to determine how to sell the war to the American people, using fear as a tactic. This war originated from Netanyahu's theory since 1995 that toppling governments supporting Hamas and Hezbollah (Iraq, Syria, and Iran) was necessary. He has been trying to get the US to fight Iran. He has gotten the US into endless wars because of his power in US politics. Therefore, the narrative of democracy versus dictatorship is not sensible.

Mario: Daniel, after decades of diplomacy, the Middle East is now at war. Early on you suggested Hormuz and economic leverage; as the conflict evolved, US ground invasion talk, targeted Iranian leadership, and new developments—like JD Vance’s reaction to US intel and Israel striking energy infrastructure in Iran—have shaped concerns that Israel wields outsized influence. Broad question: how did we get here and why? Daniel: There’s a long history of American and Israeli influence in play. There is American agency and a geopolitical logic tying chokepoints like Hormuz to broader aims, such as reasserting US primacy vis-à-vis China. But this doesn’t fully explain how the last 10 yards into war were crossed. Netanyahu’s long effort to shape a strategic environment culminated when he found a president open to using American power in the region. Israel’s strategy appears to be to assert greater regional dominion by leveraging US military power and creating dependencies with Gulf states. Netanyahu reportedly offered the president an actionable plan, including on-the-ground assets, to decapitate Iran’s leadership and spark a broader upheaval, which helped push the White House toward a twelve-day war in June. Israel also presented a narrative of rapid US escalation to secure its aims, while the American interagency process—though deteriorated in recent years—had to interpret unusually aggressive, yet selective, Israeli intelligence and objectives. The result is a complex dynamic where US rhetoric and decisions are deeply entangled with Israeli designs for regional hegemony, an outcome that was not broadly anticipated by many regional partners. Mario: If the US administration had not fully understood Israel’s project, how did this come to pass? And how does Mossad factor in? Daniel: Israel has tremendous access to influence over an American administration through lobbying, media echo chambers, and political finance, which Netanyahu exploited to drive a course toward major confrontation with Iran. Before Trump’s term, Netanyahu was nervous about a president who could pivot against allies; he devised a strategy that culminated in Operation Midnight Hammer and subsequent US-Israeli collaboration, reinforced by the possibility of rapid decapitation of Iran’s leadership. There are reports (and debates) about Mossad presenting on-the-ground assets and the possibility of instigating a street revolution in Iran, which may not have been fully believed by Washington but was persuasive enough to shape policy. The question remains how much of Israeli intelligence makes it to Trump and his inner circle, especially given concerns about cognitive ability and decision-making in the White House at that time. Netanyahu’s aim, according to Daniel, was not simply to topple Iran but to maximize Israel’s regional leverage by using American power while reducing other regional peers’ influence. Mario: What about Gulf states and broader regional realignments? How did the Gulf respond, and what does this mean for their security calculus? Daniel: The Gulf states face a stark dilemma. They fear Iran's retaliatory capabilities but also distrust America’s consistency and question whether US support will be cost-effective. Iran’s strikes into the Gulf have forced Gulf capitals to reassess their reliance on US protection and Israel’s influence, particularly given Israel’s aggressive posture and expanded regional footprint—Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza—with potential implications for the Gulf’s own security and economic interests. Some Gulf actors worry about over-dependence on American security assurances while Israel intensifies operational reach. The GCC’s calculus is shifting: they confront a choice between continuing alignment with the US-Israel bloc or seeking more independent security arrangements. The possibility of a broader Gulf-Israel axis, or at least closer coordination, is tempered by concerns over long-term regional stability, public opinion, and the risk of escalation. Mario: How has this affected perceptions of Iran, Israel, and the broader regional order? Has the Gulf’s stance shifted? Daniel: The region’s balance has been unsettled. Iran’s actions have damaged Gulf trust in its neighbors’ security guarantees, while Israel’s aggressive posture and reliance on US power have complicated Gulf states’ calculations. Turkey’s role is pivotal as it balances concerns about Iran and Israel, while also watching how the region realigns. The possibility of a future where Iran’s power is weakened is weighed against the risk of destabilization and long-term security costs. Negotiations between the US, Iran, and regional actors—stoked by Turkish diplomacy and shifting Gulf positions—are ongoing, with Turkey signaling that diplomacy remains important, even as Gulf states reassess their security dependencies. Mario: What about Lebanon and Hezbollah, and the potential for broader spillover? Daniel: Lebanon faces severe consequences: displacement, civilian harm, and a domestic political paralysis that complicates relations with Israel. Hezbollah remains a factor, with ongoing tensions in Lebanon and the South. Israel’s goal of establishing security-control in Lebanon risks reigniting long-standing conflicts, while Lebanon’s government seeks a balance that could prevent further escalation, if possible. The broader picture is that Israel’s approach—driven by a perceived need to neutralize Iran and all potential threats—could provoke wider regional blowback, complicating already fragile domestic politics across the Levant. Mario: Final thoughts as the war unfolds? Daniel: Israel’s strategic ambitions appear to extend beyond countering Iran to shaping a broader order in which it remains the dominant regional power, aided by US military leverage. Gulf states face a difficult reorientation, reassessing longstanding alliances in light of perceptions of US reliability. The coming months will reveal whether regional actors can recalibrate toward diplomatic resolutions or wind up in a deeper, more protracted conflict. The question remains whether a political path could replace military escalation, and whether external powers can deter further aggression and stabilize the region without allowing a broader conflagration.

After 9/11, a general told me the decision to go to war with Iraq was made without evidence linking Saddam to Al Qaeda. Plans were revealed to take out 7 countries in 5 years, starting with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. Military operations began in Iraq and Syria. The situation in Syria was discussed, acknowledging the distressing images coming out of the country.

Shortly after 9/11, a Pentagon staffer says a colleague told him 'we're going to war with Iraq,' with no new evidence linking Saddam to Al Qaeda. A few weeks later, a memo 'describes how we're gonna take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan, and finishing off Iran.' Iran saw U.S. presence in Iraq as both a threat and a blessing; they were 'building up their own network of influence' and sometimes gave 'military assistance and training' to insurgents and militias. The administration allegedly sought to pay for regime change—'asking congress to appropriate $75,000,000' and 'supporting terrorist groups apparently who are infiltrating and blowing up things inside Iraq Iran.' Hersh notes a 'special planning group' to bomb Iran and Saudi funding of Sunni groups and the risk that a U.S. pull-out could empower Al Qaeda.

After 9/11, the speaker had a conversation with a general who informed him that the US had decided to go to war with Iraq, even though there was no evidence connecting Saddam Hussein to Al Qaeda. The speaker later learned about a memo outlining plans to attack seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq and ending with Iran. The speaker believes that Iran saw the US presence in Iraq as a threat and got involved to protect its interests. The speaker also discusses the possibility of the US planning a bombing attack on Iran and Saudi Arabia funding covert operations in the Middle East. The speaker warns against using force as a first resort and highlights the complexities of the situation in Iraq.

About 10 days after 9/11, the speaker met with Secretary Rumsfeld at the Pentagon. A general informed him that they had decided to go to war with Iraq, but when asked why, the general had no answer. There was no evidence linking Saddam to Al Qaeda, but they felt they had a strong military and could overthrow governments. Later, the speaker learned that there was a memo outlining plans to attack seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq and ending with Iran. The speaker asked if the memo was classified, and it was confirmed to be so.

Nations don't go to war easily, sometimes needing to be bombed into it, like Pearl Harbor in World War II and September 11. Removing Saddam's regime would have positive effects, as he used weapons of mass destruction and sought nuclear weapons. A year after September 11, the U.S. had the courage to win. The terrorists attacked and killed 3,000 citizens before the freedom agenda in the Middle East. The main reason for going into Iraq was the belief that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, which turned out to be false, and had nothing to do with 9/11. Some suggest the U.S. sometimes needs a catalyst for war, like Pearl Harbor or the Lusitania. Covert actions against Iran were mentioned, including intensifying pressure. Netanyahu reportedly said the September 11 attacks were good for Israel. Some left the military due to being lied to about weapons of mass destruction and ties to Al Qaeda. Instructions were given to shoot at anything that moved after IED explosions, desensitizing soldiers by dehumanizing Iraqis. There was a total disregard for human life. One individual apologized to an Iraqi man, finding it redemptive.

The speaker reveals a conversation with an officer who informed him about a memo from the secretary of defense's office. The memo outlined a plan to attack and destroy the governments of seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq and moving on to Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. This revelation shocked the speaker, as he realized that the purpose of the military was not to deter conflict but to start wars and change governments. He believes that a group of people, including Wolfowitz, Cheney, and Rumsfeld, orchestrated a policy coup to destabilize the Middle East and gain control. The speaker mentions a document from September 2000 that acknowledges the long process of transformation.

Around 10 days after 9/11, I met with Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz at the Pentagon. A general called me and informed me that we were going to war with Iraq, even though there was no evidence connecting Saddam to Al Qaeda. The decision was made because they didn't know what else to do about terrorism. A few weeks later, I asked if we were still going to war with Iraq, and I was told that the plan was even bigger. The Secretary of Defense had a memo outlining a strategy to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq and ending with Iran. The presence of oil in the Middle East has always attracted great power involvement, and there has been a belief that force can be used to intervene in the region.

After 9/11, I visited the Pentagon and spoke with a general who informed me that the decision had been made to go to war with Iraq, despite no evidence linking Saddam to Al Qaeda. The rationale seemed to be a lack of options in dealing with terrorism, leading to a military approach. A few weeks later, while we were bombing Afghanistan, the same general revealed a memo outlining plans to target seven countries over five years, starting with Iraq and including Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and ending with Iran. He mentioned the memo was classified and advised against viewing it.

After 9/11, General Wesley Clark, former head of NATO, visited the Pentagon and was shown a memo outlining a plan to attack seven countries in five years. The memo specified that the countries to be targeted were Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. According to the speaker, wars have been initiated in six of these seven countries, including Syria.

Shortly after 9/11, I visited the Pentagon and spoke with a general who informed me that a decision had been made to go to war with Iraq, despite no evidence linking Saddam to Al Qaeda. The rationale seemed to be a lack of options in dealing with terrorism, leading to a military approach. A few weeks later, while we were bombing Afghanistan, I asked if the plan to invade Iraq was still on. The general revealed that he had received a memo outlining a strategy to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq and followed by Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and ending with Iran.

Scott Horton introduces Joe Kent, formerly of the 75th Rangers and then the CIA’s Special Activities Division, who fought in the terror wars and later headed the Counterterrorism Center before resigning from the Trump administration over the war in Iran. Kent describes his background and why he came on the show, noting that he resigned over policy rather than personal animus, and emphasizes that his focus is on Iran policy and its intersection with Israeli interests. Kent asserts that the war with Iran was largely driven by the Israeli agenda and timeline. He points to statements from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the President, and the Speaker of the House claiming the attack was launched because they knew Israel would attack as well, arguing that this indicates Israel was driving U.S. policy and that the United States should not be bound to an Israeli timeline or to an outcome that serves Israeli objectives. He recounts his time at NCTC and in the White House, describing an ecosystem that included media figures, think tanks, and high-ranking Israeli officials, which he says influenced U.S. policy and reduced the president’s decision-making space, particularly concerning Iran’s red lines on enrichment. Kent explains his concern that the push for a hard line against Iran’s enrichment was an Israeli-led framing that equated any enrichment with a nuclear weapons program. He describes an alleged “Goldilocks methodology” by which Iran could enrich but not weaponize, a position the Israelis reportedly used to rally U.S. policymakers toward war. He argues that the Israelis wanted to remove any space for a negotiated deal and sought regime change, leveraging the U.S. military to accomplish that goal. He emphasizes that the war was not the first option and that a more pragmatic, slower approach could have yielded a deal if U.S. policymakers allowed it. In discussing the question of who was pressuring whom, Kent says the Israelis were trying to force a scenario where Iran’s red line would be seen as unacceptable, thereby pushing the United States toward war. He notes that Trump’s willingness to negotiate existed but was constrained by Israeli pressure and media echo chambers, and that the war’s timing undermined any potential for a peaceful settlement. He asserts that, if the president had space to negotiate, a deal might have been possible, but the Israelis’ push to force conflict narrowed that space. Kent also addresses the question of how the war affected American strategic interests, arguing that the United States should restrain Israel and align policy with broader American interests in the region, rather than facilitate regime change or allow broader chaos. He contends that an ongoing U.S.-Israel alignment over militarized actions in the Middle East risks destabilizing the region, jeopardizing energy security, and undermining U.S. partners in the Gulf and Europe. Regarding the Iraq war and Iran, Kent asserts that the Israeli lobby pressured for war in 2002-2003 and had broader influence in Syria and elsewhere, but he also acknowledges the complex mix of neoconservatives and various factions. He describes how, after the Iraq war, Iranian-backed Shiite militias and U.S. policy intersected with Iranian influence and regional dynamics, noting that many Iraqi Shias fought against Iran while others aligned with Tehran, and asserting that mishandling these dynamics contributed to instability. Kent discusses the handling of Iranian EFPs (explosively formed penetrators) and argues that Iran shaped many of the tactics, while local Iraqi groups adapted them. He emphasizes that the broader narrative around Iranian responsibility for attacks in Iraq should be tempered by on-the-ground complexities, including Iraqi dynamics and the role of other actors like Lebanese Hezbollah and al-Qaeda. The conversation turns to the question of whether there were Iranian assassination plots against President Trump, with Kent acknowledging a real threat after Soleimani’s killing but emphasizing that the most serious plan was not clearly linked to a large-scale operation; rather, one individual, Asif Mershand, was recruited by Iran and monitored by the FBI. Kent cautions that allegations of broader Iranian plots should be scrutinized, and he notes ongoing questions about linkage and DHS investigations. Throughout, Kent reiterates his core conclusion: the essential policy misstep was allowing Israeli leadership to drive U.S. policy on Iran, and a successful path forward would require restraining Israel and pursuing a negotiated deal with Iran under conditions that preserve American strategic interests, with a clear off-ramp and space for diplomacy. He endorses the notion that President Trump could secure a deal if given the political room to reset the dynamic with Israel and to recalibrate U.S. commitments in the region.

About ten days after 9/11, the speaker describes going through the Pentagon and seeing Secretary Rumsfeld. A general then pulls him aside and says they must talk briefly. The general says, “we’ve made the decision. We’re going to war with Iraq.” When the speaker asks, “Why?” the general replies, “I guess they don’t know what else to do.” The speaker asks if they found information connecting Saddam to Al Qaeda. The response is, “No. There’s nothing new that way.” The general explains they had “made the decision to go to war with Iraq,” and that it seems, as the speaker reflects, “we don’t know what to do about terrorists, but we got a good military and we can take down governments.” A few weeks later, the speaker returns to see the general amid bombing campaigns in Afghanistan and inquires again, “We still going to war with Iraq?” The answer is presented as worse than prior: the speaker says the general tells him, “I just got this down from upstairs, meeting the secretary of defense office today.” He describes a memo that outlines “how we're gonna take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and finishing off Iran.” The speaker asks if the memo is classified, and the general confirms, “yes, sir.” He adds, “Don’t show it to” (the transcript ends there). Key elements include the asserted decision to invade Iraq without evidence of a direct link to Al Qaeda, the perception that the administration chose military action because other options were unclear, and the claim of a broader plan to “take out seven countries in five years” beginning with Iraq and extending through Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran, with the memo described as classified. The account ties the Iraq invasion decision to a larger strategic agenda and emphasizes a chain of communication from the secretary of defense’s office to field-level comprehension, all within the context of ongoing Afghanistan bombing.

The speaker states the purpose of the military is to start wars and change governments, not deter conflict, and that the US will invade countries. An officer from the joint staff informed him the US was going to attack Iraq, but didn't know why, and that Saddam wasn't tied to 9/11. Later, the same officer showed the speaker a memo from the Secretary of Defense's office stating the US would attack and destroy the governments of seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. The speaker claims the country was taken over by people like Wolfowitz, Cheney, and Rumsfeld from the Project for a New American Century, who wanted to destabilize the Middle East and make it under US control. Their document, written before 9/11, acknowledged transformation would be a long process.

10 days after 9/11, a general informed me that we were going to war with Iraq. When I asked why, he didn't have a clear answer but mentioned that our military was capable of taking down governments. Weeks later, while we were bombing Afghanistan, I asked if we were still going to war with Iraq. To my surprise, he showed me a memo from the secretary of defense's office outlining a plan to take out 7 countries in 5 years. The countries listed were Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran.