reSee.it Video Transcript AI Summary
Ted Postal, professor emeritus at MIT and expert on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, discusses the Arashnik/Oreshnik hypersonic system and what is known about its capabilities, limitations, and potential implications.
Postal emphasizes that the weapon is a very powerful conventional system, not a nuclear one. He notes that it delivers munitions and, as of the evidence available, seems to inflict damage primarily through kinetic impact. While adding submunitions with high explosives could increase damage per submunition, this would not constitute a game changer unless nuclear weapons were mounted on top of the system. He also cautions that the fact the system can deliver nuclear weapons is not especially novel in the context of existing delivery options, and the main policy concern is the possibility of escalation to nuclear use in response to a conventional attack.
Key characteristics he outlines:
- The Oreshnik is a one-stage missile that appears to repurpose the first stage of an old SS-20 (Pioneer) intermediate-range missile. The SS-20 was a two-stage missile with three warheads; in the Oreshnik, six buses on the vehicle carry submunitions.
- The payload consists of six buses, each carrying about six submunitions, for a total of around 36 submunitions. Each submunition weighs roughly 70–80 kilograms.
- The submunitions are delivered from a high-velocity canister that is ejected and then uses a high-pressure gas propulsion system to push out six submunitions onto six separate targets. The vehicle remains oriented to maintain stability, preventing tumbling and ensuring precise deployment.
- The submunitions travel at very high speeds (hypersonic) but do not reach hypersonic speed on impact with the ground due to atmospheric reentry dynamics. They hit the ground at approximately 150–200 kilometers per hour, not at Mach 10, because tumbling and aerodynamic drag reduce speed before impact.
- Debris analysis suggests the submunitions are not penetrating deep underground; instead, their energy is converted into heat and a violent expansion near the surface, producing an explosion-like effect rather than deep penetration.
- The trajectories are lofted, delivering the submunitions to the target area after a long flight time (Russia has claimed 15–17 minutes for submunitions to reach targets). This lofted path reduces the likelihood of interceptors successfully engaging the weapon.
On the effects and targeting:
- A single submunition’s energy disperses over a footprint rather than concentrating in a single crater. The weapon’s conventional damage is significant, especially when deployed as clusters against a structure or urban area, but it is not equivalent to a nuclear strike.
- If six buses with six submunitions each were all directed at a single structure, the resulting destruction would be substantial, but the extent would depend on targeting accuracy and footprint, as well as how many submunitions actually strike the intended area.
- Postal notes that a one-kiloton nucleus would create a clearly larger, more devastating area of destruction than the conventional cluster could achieve; meanwhile, a 150–200 kiloton nuclear warhead mounted on Oreshnik would be city-destroying, illustrating how dramatically different outcomes would be with a nuclear payload.
Interception and defense:
- Postal argues there is no reliable intercept option for this weapon. The high loft and deployment of multiple submunitions after release complicate interception: the submunitions depart the launcher and travel at several kilometers per second above the atmosphere; interceptors would have minutes to react at distances where they would struggle to reach the fast-moving submunitions.
- He contrasts this with Iskander, noting that while intercepting Iskander is challenging, the Oreshnik presents a broader, more difficult defense problem due to its trajectory and submunition deployment.
Strategic and political context:
- The discussion touches on the broader strategic implications, including the psychological impact of a sky lit up by hypersonic activity and the potential for miscalculation leading to nuclear escalation. Postal warns against overestimating the weapon’s nuclear potential and cautions policymakers about proportional responses to conventional attacks.
- He critiques public rhetoric and speculative defense concepts (e.g., extreme “golden dome” missile defense schemes) as impractical, arguing that current defenses are unlikely to deter or intercept hypersonic submunition deployments.
- The dialogue also reflects on Western economic and political actions, such as sanctions, and suggests that some analyses of the effects on Russia’s economy and strategic posture may mischaracterize outcomes; Postal emphasizes that the weapon’s value lies in its conventional destructive capability and its ability to complicate defense planning, rather than in conventional deterrence or nuclear signaling.
- The conversation closes with a stark warning: if thousands of these missiles were deployed, a significant strategic reshaping would follow, necessitating new considerations for air and missile defense, even as existing systems face fundamental limitations in countering hypersonic conventional weapons.