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NATO and Russia debate over who is responsible for the Russian army being close to NATO's doorstep. NATO argues its expansion is defensive, while Russia sees it as a threat. Russia's actions in Ukraine are condemned, but NATO insists it is not a hostile move. The tension arises from NATO's eastward expansion, which Russia perceives as a threat. Both sides express concerns about security and territorial integrity.

In this conversation, Professor Glenn Diesen discusses his critical view of current Western and NATO policies, the treatment of contrarian analysis, and the evolving security dynamics in Europe, with a focus on Norway and the Nordic region. - On academic freedom and public discourse: Diesen explains that challenging the mainstream view is met with terms like “Putin Verster,” suggesting that understanding an opponent is seen as taking their side. He argues this suppresses discussion of security concerns and inhibits analysis on how to avoid or end conflicts. He notes that those who were right about Russia and NATO developments are often marginalized in the mainstream narrative. - Norway’s shift in security posture: In Norway, a move away from Cold War-era restraint toward greater alignment with the United States is described. Diesen notes that Norway previously avoided foreign bases on its soil, hosting limited Arctic activity and practicing deterrence without provoking the Soviet Union. He asserts this has changed, with Norway now granting access to American bases across the country, particularly in the Arctic, to confront Russia. He points out that Norway historically did not send weapons to countries at war, a policy that has shifted since the Ukraine conflict. - The Ukraine war and arms policy: Diesen contrasts the pre-2022 stance of “diplomacy first” with the current reality in which Norwegian leaders and parliament have largely supported arming Ukraine. He recounts his own attempt to run for parliament on a platform advocating diplomacy rather than weapon supplies, and he highlights that the current consensus—across almost all parties—favors weapons support, with perceived little room for alternative approaches. - Sweden and Finland in NATO and Nordic implications: The joining of Sweden and Finland to NATO is discussed as a response to fear of Russia after the Ukraine invasion. Diesen argues the public was initially hesitant in both countries, and argues that the narrative framing of Russia as an existential threat influenced rapid NATO accession once public opinion shifted. He suggests this shift was prepared in advance by Western powers, with media and political networks supporting pro-NATO positions. - Arctic geostrategy and regional stakes: The rapporteur explains that the Arctic and Baltic regions are central to Western containment of Russia. With Finland and Sweden in NATO and Norway militarized, the potential to block Russian access to key maritime corridors is emphasized. Diesen warns that expanding military leverage against Russia under a “more security through greater weapons” logic is flawed, predicting that Russia would respond forcefully if provoked. He stresses that the notion of Russia capitulating under increased pressure is unrealistic. - Denmark and Greenland scenarios: The discussion shifts to Denmark’s Greenland, noting President Trump’s interest in the territory. Diesen outlines possible US strategies: threaten force but favor negotiated settlements, offer financial incentives to Denmark to cede Greenland, or stage a sequence of steps (including a potential secession in Greenland) to facilitate absorption by the US. He suggests that the US might prefer a negotiated outcome over direct military action to avoid broad European backlash. - Europe’s strategic dependency and future: The European tendency to lean on the United States for security and economics is highlighted as a vulnerability. Diesen argues Europe has become heavily dependent—politically, economically, and militarily—and that this dependency limits Europe’s bargaining power in disputes over Greenland and other strategic issues. He proposes rethinking Europe’s security architecture towards inclusivity and dialogue with Russia, rather than a divides-based approach that feeds security competition. - A call for inclusive security architecture: Concluding, Diesen advocates reviving an inclusive European security framework based on indivisible security and open dialogue with Russia. He argues that NATO expansion and an exclusive security structure since the 1990s eroded the possibility of a cooperative European security order and that Europe should rethink its approach to reduce tensions and dependence on the United States. The interview ends with Diesen promoting his channel and noting translations into German, inviting further discussion on these themes.

In the short term, admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause significant concern in US-Russian relations. The speaker believes this move could provoke a strong reaction from Russia, although not necessarily a military one. They also mention the idea of Europe becoming "NATOized" like Finland. English Translation: Admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause concern in US-Russian relations, potentially leading to a strong reaction from Russia. The speaker also mentions the concept of Europe becoming "NATOized" like Finland.

The speaker discusses the hypothetical scenario of a revolution in Mexico and the potential consequences for the United States. They suggest that if a government hostile to the US were to come to power in Mexico, it might seek Russian military support along the US-Mexico border. The speaker questions whether the US would accept such a situation and highlights the need for a compromise. They propose that Ukraine should not become a NATO member in exchange for Russia withdrawing its forces.

- The conversation opens with a discussion of escalating dynamics in the Ukraine conflict as a new year begins, focusing on how the rules of war have shifted over the past four years, including the depth of NATO involvement and when actions cross into direct war. The speakers note that political leadership has largely been exempt from the war, but Russia has had opportunities to strike Ukrainian leaders that have been avoided, raising questions about future targets and the diplomatic path. - Speaker 1 argues that the political leadership has indeed been outside the war, and that voices inside Russia are growing more critical. They challenge the Western portrayal of Vladimir Putin as a dictator, suggesting Putin has restrained destruction that could hit the West, and asserting that the West and Zelenskyy have grown comfortable with exemptions. They warn that continued escalation could lead to a nuclear conflict with Europe at risk due to its geographic compactness, citing the potential fallout from attacks on American nuclear bases and the broader geopolitical consequences. - The discussion moves to the potential consequences of Western strikes on energy infrastructure and frontline energy targets, including refineries and civilian vessels. The speakers examine how Russia might respond if its assets are attacked at sea or in the Black Sea, and the possibility of Russia forcing Ukraine to lose access to the Black Sea through strategic military actions. The analysis includes a few provocative specifics: British and European actors allegedly orchestrating or enabling attacks, the role of third-country-flagged ships, and the idea that reflagging to Russian flags could be treated as an act of war by Russia. - The dialogue delves into the operational dynamics of the Mediterranean and Black Sea theatres, noting incidents such as sunflowers and other oil cargo damage, the Caspian transit company's facilities, and the implications for Turkish oil revenue and Western economies. The speakers argue that Western powers are drawing in broader international actors and that the war could expand beyond Ukraine, potentially dragging in NATO ships and submarines in a conflict at sea. They warn that if escalation continues, it could trigger a broader, more destructive war in Europe. - The conversation shifts to the likely trajectory of the battlefield, with Speaker 1 offering a grim assessment: the Donbas front and the Zaporozhye region are nearing collapse for Ukrainian forces, with Russian forces dominating missile and drone capabilities and outmaneuvering on three axes. The analysis suggests that within two to three months, upper-river-front areas, including the Zaporozhzhia and surrounding Donbas fronts, could be fully compromised, leaving only a few large urban pockets. The absence of civilian protection and the encirclement of cities would accelerate Ukrainian withdrawals and surrender, while Russia could enhance pressure on remaining fronts, including Donbas and Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnieper regions, as weather and terrain favor Russian movements. - The speakers discuss the impact of collapsing command posts and morale, likening the abandonment of Gudai Poia to a sign of impending broader collapse, with open terrain making Ukrainian forces vulnerable to rapid Russian breakthroughs. They suggest that strategic fortifications will be overwhelmed as the front line collapses and supply lines are severed, with a predicted sequence of encirclements and city sieges. - The US role is analyzed as both a negotiator and strategist, with the assertion that the United States has long led the proxy dimension of the conflict and continues to influence targeting and weapons delivery. The discussion questions the coherence of US policy under Trump versus Biden, arguing the conflict remains a US-led enterprise despite attempts to reframe or outsources it. The speakers describe the US as hedging its bets through ongoing military support, budgets, and intelligence cooperation, while insisting that Ukraine remains a core objective of US hegemony. - A critical examination of European Union leadership follows, with strong claims that the EU is increasingly tyrannical and undemocratic, sanctioning dissidents andSuppressing speech. The dialogue condemns the deplatforming of individuals and argues that the EU’s leadership has undermined diplomacy and negotiated peace, instead pushing toward a broader confrontation with Russia. The speakers suggest that several European countries and elites are pursuing escalating policies to maintain power, even at the risk of deepening European instability and economic collapse. - The conversation ends with reflections on broader historical patterns, invoking Kennan’s warnings about NATO expansion and the risk of Russian backlash, and noting the potential for the EU to fracture under pressure. The participants acknowledge the risk of a wider conflict that could redefine global power and economic structures, while expressing concern about censorship, deplatforming, and the erosion of diplomacy as barriers to resolving the crisis. They conclude with a cautious note to prepare for worst-case scenarios and hope for, but not rely on, better circumstances in the near term.

The speaker argues that the United States is shaping Ukrainian strategy to be aggressive toward Russia, asserting that Ukrainians are being encouraged to believe they will ultimately join the West because the United States will prevail over Putin and achieve its aims. The speaker notes that time is on the side of the U.S. and its allies, and that the Ukrainians, according to the speaker, are largely aligned with this perspective. The speaker claims that the Ukrainians are almost completely unwilling to compromise with the Russians and instead are pursuing a hard-line policy. Building on this assessment, the speaker states a consequence: if the Ukrainians continue to take a hard-line stance, the end result will be that their country is wrecked. The speaker contends that the policy and posture being encouraged effectively drive toward that outcome, implying that the approach is counterproductive for Ukraine’s welfare. From the speaker’s viewpoint, it would be more sensible for the United States and its partners to work toward creating a neutral Ukraine. The speaker asserts that achieving neutrality would be in the United States’ interest, as it would help bury the crisis quickly. The speaker also claims that it would be in Russia’s interest to resolve the crisis in this manner, implying mutual benefit from moving toward neutrality rather than escalation. Most importantly, the speaker emphasizes that it would be in Ukraine’s interest to bring the crisis to an end. The underlying claim is that ending the crisis through neutrality would align with Ukraine’s best interests, contrasting with the consequences of a prolonged hard-line policy and continued conflict. Throughout the statement, the speaker presents a contrast between a hard-line Ukrainian posture and the proposed alternative of neutrality, framing the latter as a quicker, more beneficial resolution for all parties involved. The overall argument centers on the idea that current encouragement of a tough posture leads to a wrecked Ukraine, while a shift toward neutrality would serve American, Russian, and Ukrainian interests by ending the crisis promptly.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss how the Iran war is shaping Russia’s strategic thinking, deterrence, diplomacy, and domestic political psychology. - The central impact in Russia is not economic bets on oil or gas, or European gas demand, but a shift in elite psychology in Moscow. Russians feel they have been jolted by a disaster scenario for their country, prompting a re-evaluation of strategy and leadership. This has driven a more acute public scrutiny of Putin and the feasibility of gradual, negotiated restraint versus decisive action. - A key theme is the perceived weakness or inconsistency of Western deterrence. Russians note that Trump's actions against Iran showed that American leadership can be unpredictable and capable of abrupt, decisive moves that undermine Russia’s sense of security. This has contributed to a loss of confidence in the long-standing belief that restraint and negotiation would preserve deterrence. - The discussion emphasizes a perceived “electric shock” in the Russian political class: doubts about the wisdom of a slow, nuanced approach, and concern that Washington might carry out decapitation-like or otherwise aggressive actions if Moscow does not appear capable of credible deterrence. The panel cites examples such as past American strikes and drone activity that highlighted vulnerabilities in Russia’s security posture and raised existential anxieties about Russia’s own durability. - Some interviewers and analysts describe a growing perception that Russia’s deterrence has been eroded by Western escalation, with NATO posture and Ukrainian military support intensifying pressure. There is fear that restraint by Moscow is interpreted as weakness, pushing Russia toward recalibrating its own posture to reassert deterrence, potentially through more aggressive or rapid actions. - The conversation notes internal Russian media dynamics and the shifting stance of influential figures. Salovyev’s and Lavrov’s recent critiques of negotiation, the discussion of Sergei Dabkov’s “spirit of Anchorage” remark, and other domestic debates reflect a broader realignment away from pacific, slow negotiations toward a more hardline posture. Alexander Dugin’s criticisms are mentioned as a sign of growing dissent about the current course. - The broader strategic environment includes concerns about Russia’s relations with China. Russian observers are disappointed that China’s support for Iran did not translate into the expected practical backing; Chinese aid and the efficacy of Chinese weapons are questioned after the Iran-Israel conflict began. This has undermined Russian confidence in China as a reliable partner in countering U.S. pressure. - The discussion highlights the possibility that Iran’s use of economic and political warfare—such as threatening Hormuz and impacting Gulf economies—could have major global consequences, increasing Europe’s energy insecurity and persisting higher prices, which could influence Western political dynamics and, in turn, Russia’s calculations. - There is speculation about whether Russia might seek to draw in Iran more deeply or exploit broader regional escalations. The interview notes that the Russians never concluded a mutual defense pact with Iran, viewing Iran’s reluctance as a factor that complicates Russian confidence in Tehran’s reliability. The possibility of Russia assisting Iran more robustly remains uncertain and is framed as a sensitive strategic option. - The interlocutors stress that the situation is developing into a high-stakes, all-or-nothing dynamic for major powers. Putin’s future decisions, Trump’s political fate, and the Western willingness to escalate further all feed into a fragile balance. The experts warn that escalating to large-scale action becomes a dangerous and destabilizing path for Russia, the United States, Iran, and regional players. - In closing, both speakers acknowledge the difficult, precarious trajectory ahead. The analyst emphasizes that if Russia does not bolster its deterrence and adapt its strategy, the domestic and international consequences could be severe; the host notes the dangerous incentives created by an all-or-nothing strategic environment and the potential for rapid, unintended escalations.

Russia will remain a dangerous opponent for a long time, and we must include Ukraine in NATO. The only way to have trusting relations with Moscow is through a decisive defeat and a reset in Russia, where the Russian population and politics abandon their deeply rooted imperial, aggressive, and colonial ideas.

Speaker: Discussing the future of Ukraine, Putin requested written plans from the Americans, but Biden refused to negotiate. This should have sparked concern in Germany, as a potential war would involve them. If conflict arises as the Americans warned, Germany will be drawn into the issue.

The speaker discusses the idea of Russia joining NATO and relates it to recently declassified documents. He reads a 1954 note from the Soviet government to NATO member countries, stating: "Relying on the unchanging principles of our peaceful foreign policy and striving to reduce tension in international relations, the Soviet government expresses readiness to consider jointly with interested governments the question of the USSR's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." He then presents the response to that proposal: “There is no need to underline the utterly unrealistic nature of such a proposal.” The speaker recalls an earlier moment, about a year prior, when, in response to the question about Russia possibly joining NATO, he said, “why not?” He notes that former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, while traveling in Europe, responded that this is not being discussed now. The core discussion is framed around understanding whether NATO is a military organization and whether Russia would be welcome there. The speaker suggests that NATO is indeed a military organization and questions whether Russia would be wanted there. He asserts that NATO “is moving toward our borders,” and he ascribes to this movement a purpose or inevitability that shapes Russia’s position on the issue. In summarizing the underlying basis of the Russian position, the speaker emphasizes the perception that NATO’s character as a military alliance and its movements toward Russia’s borders inform a strategic stance against expanding membership to include Russia. He contrasts the historical openness expressed in 1954 with the contemporary response that such a proposal is not realistic, and with current statements from Western officials indicating that Russia’s accession is not under consideration. The narrative ties together declassified archival material, a past provocative-appearing suggestion, and present-day geopolitical calculations about NATO’s reach and military posture near Russia.

Recent discussions in the UK and US suggest that Ukraine may be allowed to strike deep into Russian territory using Western long-range weapons. This marks a significant escalation, as Ukraine currently lacks the capability to effectively use these systems without NATO support. If NATO countries decide to proceed, it would mean direct involvement in the conflict, fundamentally altering its nature. The delivery of thousands of precision missiles to Ukraine raises concerns about potential Russian retaliation, which could lead to a broader conflict involving nuclear weapons. Putin has warned that such actions would be considered a declaration of war. The situation is precarious, with the risk of escalating tensions leading to catastrophic consequences, including nuclear warfare. The urgency of the moment calls for heightened awareness and preparation for potential global instability.

Larry Johnson outlines a sequence of escalations between Russia and the United States after December 28, beginning with a failed drone attack on Vladimir Putin’s official residence and followed by Russia’s retaliatory actions in Ukraine and at sea. He describes Russia as engaging in cautious escalation: the December 28 strike signaled a deliberate move tied to a broader pattern of attacks on Russian nuclear-related targets, and the subsequent seizure of a Russian-flag tanker by the United States scene, which Russia condemned as piracy. He notes the crew composition (two Russians, eight Georgians, 20 Ukrainians) and observes that the United States released the two Russians while charging the others in the US, arguing the episode demonstrates how Washington uses force and intimidation without clear accountability. The exchange emphasizes that Russia’s response has targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, rather than NATO facilities in Europe, as part of a warning to NATO about escalation risk. Russia reportedly cut 50% of Ukraine’s stored natural gas and attacked energy substations across multiple Ukrainian regions (Nyropetrov, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv), causing widespread disruptions to heating and plumbing in winter. Kyiv officials, including Klitschko, warned residents to leave high-rise buildings to prevent pipe bursts. Johnson frames this as measured signaling rather than indiscriminate aggression, suggesting it’s a warning to the West that Moscow can reach out and touch them if escalation continues, while still aiming to avoid a full-scale direct confrontation with NATO. He remarks that Russia’s targeting of facilities owned by the United States in Ukraine signals willingness to attack US-affiliated targets inside Ukraine. The discussion then shifts to the broader geopolitical significance: US actions, including piracy at sea and attacks on Russian ships, contribute to a perception in Moscow that international law is being abandoned by the United States, especially under Trump and his aides who publicly dismiss international treaties. Johnson asserts that, from a Russian analytic perspective, this undermines trust in written agreements and pushes Russia toward preparing for broader conflict, potentially with NATO, while acknowledging Russia’s restraint—limiting strikes to Ukraine to avoid misinterpretation as a direct war with NATO. He suggests Russia might consider flagging ships with Russian or Chinese flags and deploying specialized forces on ships to deter or respond to attempts to board, as a possible evolution of maritime risk. The two discuss the purpose of Washington’s stance: is it to force concessions, provoke a broader European response, or achieve escalation dominance? Johnson asserts that US policy appears aimed at coercing Russia and pressuring Western Europe, though he notes China and India now press Russia toward negotiation; however, the Lula-like convergence of US internal dynamics and Trump’s rhetoric makes negotiations appear dead ends to Moscow. Johnson references a broader view that the US under Trump has eroded norms of international law, arguing that a shift toward force and lawless behavior leaves Russia imagining a future with reduced Western unity and increased incentives to diversify alliances with East/ Eurasian powers. On the military horizon, Johnson anticipates Ukraine’s manpower problem versus Russia’s growing mobilization, with Russia expanding its ground force to potentially over 2 million to prepare for future conflict with NATO, not merely Ukraine. He predicts continued Ukrainian misfortune on the battlefield, with major cities such as Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, and Sumy potentially at risk of encirclement, and Kyiv facing the broader strategic impact of energy outages and urban shutdowns. He foresees possible explorations of a post-war order, including who controls weapons and governance in Ukraine; Russia might threaten US reconnaissance aircraft or vessels in denial of freedom of navigation, while NATO could become more disunited as some European leaders push for separate talks with Moscow. In sum, the interview frames the current phase as a dangerous, escalatory dynamic with potential for miscalculation, where the United States’ posture of force, the erosion of international norms, and Russia’s strategic patience converge toward a possible broader confrontation, or, at minimum, a hardening of positions and a reorientation toward Eastward-alignments.

There's debate over expanding NATO to Central European countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Russia is against further expansion, warning of a potential "cold peace." While the US hasn't set a date, the understanding is that expansion will happen eventually. The issue isn't *if*, but *when*. Germany primarily advocates for expansion within NATO. While keeping the option open, expansion should only proceed if there's a real threat. The focus should be on encouraging Russia to cooperate peacefully. It's also more important for Eastern European countries to join the European Union for economic benefits. Expanding NATO to protect borders that aren't currently threatened doesn't make sense. Creating a buffer zone in Central Europe could lead to renewed tensions between Russia and Germany. We should aim for friendly relations with Russia.

NATO's response to the use of Sarin gas in Syria raises questions about their actions if such an attack were to occur on European soil. Will they intervene or remain passive? And if they do intervene, how far are they willing to go? The possibility of a direct confrontation with Vladimir Putin looms.

Moving NATO forces, including American troops, closer to Russia's borders would escalate tensions and increase the risk of war. It is crucial to understand that Russia will not back down, as this is a matter of existential importance due to past events. It is not just Putin who holds power, but a political class with their own opinions. The majority of the public supports Russian policy, making it unlikely for Putin to compromise or retreat if faced with military confrontation.

What does "revisionist Russia" mean? It suggests a desire to return to the Soviet Union's former glory. Secretary Hagel mentioned Russia's army being on NATO's doorstep. Some argue this is due to NATO's eastward expansion, but that perspective isn't universally accepted. NATO's expansion is seen as beneficial, not a threat. While NATO is a defensive alliance, Russia's military movements, including actions in Ukraine, are viewed as aggressive. The expansion of NATO doesn't imply hostility; it's about security. The focus should be on Russia's actions that destabilize neighboring countries, rather than blaming NATO for its proximity to Russia.

If the Ukrainian military doesn't stop the Russian invasion, it won't be long before our NATO forces have to fight the Russian army crossing the border.

Finland and Sweden are being considered for NATO membership. The question is whether they meet the criteria and if they are democratic enough. The speaker previously predicted a "Finlandization of Europe," but now sees a potential "NATOization of Finland."

The speaker explains that the idea of Ukraine joining a Western military alliance is unacceptable to Russia. This goes back to 1990 when the Soviet Union collapsed and NATO agreed not to expand eastward. However, NATO did expand to East Germany and later to the borders of Russia under Clinton. The new Ukrainian government voted to join NATO, which the speaker sees as a serious strategic threat to Russia. The speaker argues that Russia's actions, such as taking Crimea, are reactions to this threat rather than acts of protection.

Admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause significant tension in US-Russian relations, potentially leading to a hostile reaction from Russia. This move could tip the balance and escalate the situation, despite the Baltic states' readiness for admission.

Admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause significant tension in US-Russian relations, potentially leading to a hostile reaction from Russia. This move could tip the balance and escalate the situation.

Many within the national security apparatus opposed NATO expansion, fearing it would provoke Russia. Even Cold War figures like George Kennan warned against antagonizing Russia, predicting a Russian reaction that would be used to justify further expansion. In 2008, current CIA Director Burns, then ambassador to Russia, sent a cable to Condoleezza Rice, titled "Nyet Means Nyet," relaying unanimous concerns from Russians across the political spectrum that Ukrainian entry into NATO was a red line. He warned of potential instability, violence, or even civil war. Despite this, NATO announced intentions to include Ukraine and Georgia, leading to the war in Georgia. The expansionist policy, driven by the same neocons who sought to remake the Middle East, has brought us closer to World War III and nuclear war.

If Ukraine's military doesn't halt the Russian invasion, it won't be long before our NATO forces have to fight on the border.

Если Украина вступит в НАТО, Россия может начать крупные военные операции против нее. Россия может пойти на прямую конфронтацию до вступления Украины в НАТО. Вступление в НАТО может привести к большой войне с Россией, а отказ от вступления - к поглощению Россией. В случае крупной войны с Россией и победы, Украина может вступить в НАТО.