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Glenn: Welcome back with professor Richard Wolff to discuss economic fury, the economic weaponization of the US campaign against Iran. How do you assess this effort, given the mix of oil sanctions, open markets for oil, and port blockades? Wolff: I’ll be blunt: I don’t know how to answer cleanly because the statements keep flipping on/off and have become “herky jerky.” The steps are inconsistent, sometimes increasing supply of oil and pushing down prices, other times constraining it. It’s not clear which way any given move will go, and the sequence is hard to parse. He notes that Gulf states are pressing for dollar swaps—foreign central banks can access dollars via swaps rather than buying them on markets. These swaps have shifted from weekly to daily, signaling worry about dollar access. The Gulf states—UAE and others—allege they depend on dollar-denominated oil revenues to service debts incurred through investments abroad. If dollars tighten due to strait closures and sanctions, they may be forced to sell assets in the US, including Treasury securities, which would lower bond prices and raise interest rates, potentially triggering a US recession. They could also sell holdings in the American stock market, affecting prices. Wolff emphasizes this as a surface manifestation of a broader global liquidity and debt dilemma tied to the Persian Gulf and the dollar’s role in the world economy. Glenn: So essentially the petrodollar is being unraveled because if Gulf states price and sell oil in dollars, but if they’re not exporting and not receiving dollars, they can’t pay debts or roll them over. They might sell treasuries or assets to cover shortfalls. How far can the US hold this position? Wolff: I don’t have a crystal ball, but I think the likely scenario is a political and economic squeeze. Trump has lost parts of his base—issues like the Epstein file and the economy’s inflation and job market. He relies on a narrative of victory; his base may be shrinking, while the wealthier 10% who own stock might be more supportive as the stock market stays buoyant. If the Gulf states must exchange dollars for debt relief or to cover losses, the government may have to grant more dollar swaps to prevent a spike in interest rates and a stock sell-off. Steven Bannon has warned that war could cost Trump the election, so the administration may shore up swaps to protect markets. Wolff suggests this is a desperate regime trying to exit a bad position with minimal damage. Glenn: You describe a broader pattern: the petrodollar’s decline, and the US dollar’s dwindling centrality in global reserves. How does this fit into the larger arc of American empire and capitalism? Wolff: It fits as part of the decline of the American empire and the corresponding decline of American capitalism. BRICS, China’s rise, and the shift away from dollar-dominated trade illuminate a trend toward reduced dollar dominance. Sanctions in Ukraine exposed the limits of that model, and there’s growing acceptance of payments outside the dollar for oil. The United States remains influential, but the dollar’s dominance is waning, and there’s no clear strategy to reverse that trend. Manufacturing has moved to other countries, notably China, which maintains low inflation and large-scale production. The world is moving toward multipolar arrangements, and the dollar’s preeminence is no longer assured. Glenn: Given this trajectory, is there any viable way to salvage the petrodollar, or is it beyond rescue? Wolff: I don’t predict the future with certainty, but I view the larger context as a decline in American hegemony and an erosion of dollar dominance. The war in Iran, like the war in Ukraine, demonstrates the limits of sanctions and the unintended consequences of aggressive confrontation. The dollar’s global reserve role is shrinking, and other powers are willing to transact outside it. He emphasizes this as a systemic shift, not a temporary setback. Glenn: Any final thoughts on how history and memory shape current policy? Wolff: History often gets reframed to fit current aims. There’s a tendency to present “victories” regardless of outcome, especially in wartime rhetoric. The dialogue in Europe and the US reflects a mix of nostalgia for past dominance and struggle to adapt to a changing global order. The conversation ends with questions about how Europe and the US should reorient foreign policy toward a multipolar world, where old assumptions no longer hold.

The speaker said that economic pain from the US-Israeli war against Iran will reach the United States later than much of the rest of the world, with economists explaining the reasons. They pointed to India as one of the first countries to be hit hard, citing Prime Minister Modi’s recent trip to Israel and his long support for Netanyahu and the Israeli regime. Despite this political alignment, India suffered soon after the war began. The speaker attributed India’s early economic impact to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which they said was almost from day one of the war closed “to most countries” in the Persian Gulf that participated in the war alongside the United States. They said Indians experienced shortages of fuel and high prices, and noted that India remains largely poor even though it has high growth and a segment of society doing well. They said many Indians are in the agricultural sector, and that alongside rising fuel and LNG costs and shortages, fertilizers became very expensive, becoming a major issue. They said this kind of problem is increasingly affecting people worldwide. For the United States, they said the near-term impact is mostly inflation, but that when strategic reserves empty, shortages will emerge not only for oil and heavy oil but also for other goods in the US economy. They stated that it is believed that by the end of June the degree of the crisis will become more evident to ordinary Americans. They concluded that whether people are in Uganda, Argentina, India, or elsewhere, they are paying the price for the war. They added that the Israeli regime has already lost a lot of global public support, saying people increasingly dislike the regime, and that global economic problems being attributed to the war will worsen the situation for Americans and Israelis.

The discussion centers on the economic component of what the guests describe as a proxy war between NATO and Russia, with Professor Richard Wolff arguing that Western efforts to collapse Russia’s economy through unprecedented sanctions have not achieved their intended effects. The host notes claims that Russia is “a gas station masquerading as a country,” yet Russia has adapted, diversified, and grown even as European counterparts face serious economic trouble. Wolff frames the issue through class analysis rather than only inter-state chess maneuvers, asking why great powers do what they do and how domestic constraints and social pressures shape government strategy. He argues that Europe—not only Russia—has been a central driver, rooted in Europe’s history of capitalism and imperial expansion. He describes European colonial capitalism as sustaining capitalist growth until, by 1914, European powers had run out of territory, exemplified by the 1884 Berlin Conference carving up Africa. He then characterizes the period leading to World War I and the mutual destruction of colonizing empires (except the United States) as the outcome of this exhaustion. According to Wolff, the United States emerged as hegemon after World War II, not through colonial control like the Europeans, but by creating economic chains tied to political and military arrangements. He describes a division of labor in which Europe was told to focus on domestic repression of communist and socialist movements while the U.S. provided a defense umbrella, allowing Europeans to spend on social welfare. Wolff says this arrangement later became a crisis for Europe when the U.S. reduced the umbrella, forcing Europeans to pay for defense at the expense of welfare or by borrowing, deepening subordinate dependence. He further argues that Europe “never recovered” from the loss of empires and became tied to the U.S. to manage internal political and external risks. Wolff claims that Europe’s main hope to restore its historical position is an outcome resembling Zbigniew Brzezinski’s concept from the 1990s: a grand strategy to “destroy Russia” and dismember it into smaller states. In Wolff’s portrayal, this is not about communism’s presence but about dismantling Russia to enable an imperial-like recapture that Europe believes it cannot pursue otherwise against the U.S. or China. Wolff describes European escalation as “desperate,” tied to leaders’ need to sustain domestic support after perceived U.S. disrespect. He claims demonization of Russia and escalation function as a strategy to keep capitalists supported and to preserve a new imperial project. The host agrees that Europe has incentives to make itself relevant to the U.S., citing NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s claims about military “Keynesianism,” arms procurement benefits, and buying U.S. energy to demonstrate loyalty. Wolff extends the argument by emphasizing Europe’s economic vulnerability: he says Europe lacks the domestic economic foundation and industrial capacity to compete technologically and militarily with the U.S. and China. He points to layoffs and industrial restructuring, including Volkswagen layoffs, and argues that deindustrialization is underway. He adds examples from European daily life (such as BYD taxis in Paris) to illustrate how competitors’ products displace traditional European manufacturing. On military feasibility, Wolff states that before Russia’s invasion there was a major Ukrainian military buildup, but he argues it was insufficient against Russia. He claims China’s manufacturing base and Iran’s ability to obtain capabilities via routes involving Russia and China increase the challenge of any attempt by Europe to reverse the balance. He also cites spending asymmetries, stating that Europe cannot match U.S. military budgets (including the projected rise in the U.S. budget to $1.5 trillion by 2027), and that even borrowing would not close the gap. Regarding Russian economic resilience, Wolff argues Russia has accepted it will be a junior partner of China, describing the Chinese economy as four to five times larger. He claims Russia and China will work toward developing and “colonizing” Russian Asia to access resources, cities, forests, and land, emphasizing that Russia has the geographic “horizontal” expansion unlike the constraints of places like New York. He contrasts this with Europe’s perceived inability to recover and suggests Russia’s partnership structure supports growth under sanctions. The exchange concludes with the host asking whether Europe’s attempts to become relevant to a declining U.S. indicate an unfavorable future, and Wolff responding that he fears European “hysteria” reflects a lack of alternatives and an unwillingness to change society to adapt to a multipolar reality. He argues the absence of an inclusive security architecture and the maintenance of sovereign inequality keep Europe locked into escalation rather than compromise. In closing, Wolff adds a Marxist question about enterprise organization, arguing that capitalism’s profit-maximizing structure benefits a small number while democratic alternatives would prioritize wages and salaries. He presents this as potentially offering a way out of an economic and political dead end.

- Speaker 0 notes that the United States Postal Service is adding a fuel charge to every package due to fuel cost increases tied to Iran–Israel tensions and says fuel costs have jumped more than 30% since the war began. - Reuters/Financial Times mention: US inflation to surge to 4.2% on energy shock; OECD warnings. Fuel lines are long worldwide, with coverage of shortages in Slovenia, parts of Europe, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines; some countries have run out of petrol or declared a state of emergency. - Speaker 1 paraphrases Putin, saying the energy shock from the Iran war is devastating globally, harming global logistic and production chains and the fuel industry. He claims Europe will beg Russia for oil and gas, referencing a pipeline blown up by the United States. - Mike Adams (Speaker 2, Health Ranger) joins to discuss fuel and food shortages and global impacts. He asserts: energy is the primary driver of affordable food, transportation, and personal freedom; farming is hydrocarbon-intensive due to energy inputs for fertilizer and for planting/harvesting; the Strait of Hormuz constriction worsens scarcity. He argues the Strait was open before the war and that actions against Nord Stream pipelines and the Strait have created energy constraints, predicting severe economic and food shortages until Hormuz reopens. - Speaker 3 (a senator) is shown commenting on the war costs ($2,000,000,000 daily) and casualties; notes that policy decisions and actions have led to escalating prices and potential long-term impacts on Americans. - Speaker 4 and Speaker 2 discuss a pattern of energy lockdowns, global shortages, and potential government controls: universal basic income (UBI) tied to digital control via a CBDC, with quotas on food and energy consumption; off-ramps include off-grid solar power and EV adoption. They suggest this could lead to government-delivered food and fuel, and to a broader move toward centralized control. - The conversation covers the European angle: Putin and the diplomats say Europe may beg Russia for cheap energy as Nord Stream pipelines were disrupted; China–Russia energy deals and Mongolia–Northern China gas transmission are noted as supporting Chinese industry. - Speaker 4 observes European leadership as having pursued energy restrictions and nuclear shutdowns, calling it “energy suicide” and expressing sympathy for European people, while criticizing their leaders for energy policy. - Speaker 2 discusses the petrodollar system’s fragility, noting potential shifts as allies and non-allies trade outside the petrodollar; warns of inflationary effects on the U.S. and potential mass selling of U.S. Treasuries by indebted economies like Japan. - The discussion touches on broader implications: a potential shift toward AI and robotics replacing human labor, with energy scarcity viewed as a driver for social and economic controls; concerns about large-scale power disruptions and rationing, and the possibility of a 10-year horizon for significant changes in labor and energy policy. - In closing, Mike Adams emphasizes the need for viewers to be informed and distinguishes between differing levels of information sources, inviting continued engagement.

The discussion centers on how an Iran war would affect global economies, and why energy-price dynamics may not be a sustainable path to stability. The professor says that even without a war, energy prices are expected to remain very high through the rest of the year due to existing delays. He argues the situation would worsen because a war is “breaking out very soon,” possibly by Sunday or Monday, with “no real negotiations” so any negotiation could not affect the military or peace situation. He describes conditions for preconditions to negotiations as impossible to meet. He says one requirement is that Iran be given back confiscated Iranian funds, including “many billions of dollars” intervened by the United States and references stablecoin. He states the United States cannot return any money because Congress has set positions including “Not one penny for Iran,” characterizing Iran as a terrorist country. He also says the United States has repeatedly reneged on prior commitments, giving an example that Trump annulled an Obama administration atomic weapons contract, so Iran would not concede without return in advance. According to the professor, market expectations are being driven by announcements and the belief that a peaceful negotiation might be reached, citing stocks and bonds rising and a perceived chance to profit when markets open Monday or Tuesday. He claims the announcements are aimed at creating that expectation rather than producing a durable settlement. He describes alleged U.S. messaging to Netanyahu about allowing attacks, and says the war secretary Hegseth spoke with Oman and Qatar. He states that if Oman did not agree not to join Iran in imposing tariffs (presented as Iran’s effort to obtain reparations for illegal attacks), the U.S. would “let Netanyahu kill you,” and that this reportedly ended negotiations. He predicts Iran is not ready and that the peak of the war will come as the build-up since Trump took office. He argues the conflict would create shortages of oil, fertilizer, sulfur, chemicals, and helium, plunging the world into a depression “worse than the nineteen thirties.” He cites ExxonMobil’s estimates of pushing oil prices to “over the hundred fifty, hundred sixty dollar a barrel range,” causing chemical industry shutdowns throughout Asia and the global South and Europe, blocking fertilizer exports, and reducing agricultural yields amid extreme-weather conditions. He says fertilizer blockades and agricultural disruption would drive food price increases and industry closures. He then describes an economic mechanism: chemical-industry closures reduce demand for oil, so oil prices might fall to “maybe a hundred twenty, a hundred thirty dollars a barrel,” but he expects “large scale defaults and bankruptcy.” He says debt leverage across economies would turn an industrial depression into a financial crisis because companies depend on lending and credit, and that collateralized debt obligations have created patterns resembling the 2008 bank crisis. He states central banks cannot “simply create more credit” because banks would avoid lending to prevent turning economies into a “Ponzi scheme.” He also argues U.S. negotiation demands are designed to prevent serious talks, describing Trump’s stated premise that nothing will happen until Iran transfers all atomic weapons as a “red herring” and likening it to a deal-breaker. He says sanctions aimed to starve Iran have not worked since they were first put in place in 1979, and that the U.S. intends to provoke Iran into a defensive response. The professor expands from economics to international law and institutions. He claims U.S. attacks would treat civilian activity as military, referencing alleged attacks on fishermen in other regions and arguing similar logic would apply in the Strait of Hormuz. He says the UN is a “casualty” because it has been unable to enforce its charter, blocked through U.S. veto power, and says the alternative would require “a new United Nations” independent of the United States, with China, Russia, and Iran as leading members. He proposes a broader strategy focused on control of the global oil trade, stating the U.S. aims to prevent other countries from using alternative supplies by destroying oil facilities and weaponizing the oil trade. He links this to actions involving Nord Stream, sanctions, and scenarios involving Venezuela and grain trade. He states Venezuela oil revenue is paid into a Florida bank account under Donald Trump’s direction and says the same approach is sought for Iran. He further claims the U.S. would aim to restrict alternative energy (wind and solar), portray it as rival to oil, and maintain dependence on U.S. LNG and oil exports. He concludes that chaos is used to lock in foreign dependency and that a U.S.-centered outcome would involve closed European industry, subsidies or market opening demands, and client political alignments. He predicts Europe would relocate industry outside Europe but not necessarily to the U.S., while still facing political revulsion and seeking an alternative system as the depression deepens. He also says future wars would be air wars with missiles, bombs, and drones rather than invasions.

Steven Shork says energy markets are driven by the physical realities of supply disruptions and logistics rather than headline-driven narratives. He describes a market dislocation that began at the end of February, when events around the Strait of Hormuz caused immediate reactions in oil derivatives, including NYMEX WTI and ICE Brent, while the Atlantic Basin was still supplied and therefore saw more muted impact initially. He argues that the most acute panic showed up among Asian refiners, who buy crude oil, not among traders who mainly trade derivatives. Shork contrasts “political price” in the prompt futures markets—with large speculators potentially reacting to news and social media—with “real market” conditions reflected in physical freight and risk. He emphasizes that when uncertainty rises around passage through the Strait, tanker charter costs, insurance rates, bunker fuel, and other logistics costs rise, forcing sellers to price crude based on the higher cost of moving it. He says the Strait-linked disruption plus Europe’s reduced access to tanker transit (he cites about 70 vessels losing transit access) created supply disruption and price pressure, while sanctions relief for Russia (and strategic petroleum reserve releases in Europe and the United States) worked to reduce panic by improving supply availability. He also claims the market’s behavior is inconsistent with the physical magnitude of the disruption: he says the globe has effectively lost around a billion barrels of oil since the conflict began (noting some of that has been masked by weak seasonal demand early in the year). As demand moves toward summer peak in June, Shork highlights a “make-or-break” period. He describes shifting global trade patterns as the United States becomes the marginal producer, with vessels and cargo flow shifting toward the US Gulf Coast export markets (Houston and Corpus Christi) to access US barrels, along with stepped-up supply from other Western Hemisphere producers such as Guyana and Brazil. He says this does not replace the roughly 15 million barrels per day he says have gone missing, but it helps “mill” price pressure. A key claim is that “headline resolution” is not matched by “risk resolution.” Shork repeatedly argues: “Price is suspended, the risk isn’t.” He addresses reports that President Trump expects a deal with Iran within days, and he says the weakness in oil is “nonsensical” given the ongoing physical constraints and logistics bottlenecks. Shork also describes a bifurcated market: futures markets appear to assume a quick resolution, while physical dislocations (tankers and insurance) suggest normalization would be delayed, potentially until the end of the year. To explain what would convince him that resolution is becoming real, Shork focuses on two diagnostics: (1) spreads/differentials across benchmarks (such as Oman/Dubai vs. Brent) and (2) the forward curve shape. He says a healthy market tends to show backwardation, but when backwardation reflects not only convenience yield but also fear of supply cutoff, it creates large differentials—he cites roughly $20–$25 per barrel between near-term and later delivery months (he includes a comparison between next month and 2027). He says he wants to see regression toward a more normalized forward curve and reduced stress in logistics pricing, including tanker chartering costs and freight insurance costs. Shork argues that Iran’s approach is not fully about closing the Strait, but about leveraging choke-point economics through financial blockade mechanisms affecting insurance. He says insurance markets reacted immediately when the blockade began (he dates the war as February 27) and that ships are already being attacked. He describes a scenario where, even if ships can transit physically, insurance risk pricing still raises the all-in cost enough to “queer” the economics of shipping and keep barrels from being moved. When asked whether the “Hormuz” issue is the true core or whether it is about Iran’s nuclear program, Shork says he goes with the nuclear program. He connects Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability with the broader impact on global risk, including recognized links between Iran and regional armed groups, and he argues that Iran’s internal oil investment neglect and diversion of resources to the nuclear program and broader networks leave Iran unable to fully benefit from oil output. He says Iran and its choke-point position can lose leverage over time as the world adapts and finds alternatives. He cites infrastructure changes that he says reduce the importance of the Strait, including the UAE dropping out of OPEC and doubling pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait, and Saudi Arabia already increasing pipelines crossing the desert to Red Sea export facilities. Shork says this adaptation will encourage investment and supply growth across regions including Eastern Africa, West Africa, and South America (Guyana and Brazil), and also in the United States. Shork also discusses tanker-market signaling as a leading indicator for demand. He says the high daily cost of tankers translates into higher required selling prices for crude, and rising insurance and logistics costs amplify that. On reports about Iranian frozen funds, he says that if sanctions are lifted and Iran’s crude returns, futures could be supported via the supply-demand expectation channel. He provides a price reference from the NYMEX WTI spot market, saying prices had dipped to about $85.95 and later rose toward the high-$80s/near $90, with a rally occurring on headlines including an Apache helicopter being shot down and possible US reaction. In his view, however, underlying market signals and the behavior of key players (including the UAE’s actions) matter more than single headlines. He concludes that markets may be pricing wishful thinking around rapid resolution, while physical conditions and shipping/insurance constraints remain. He says it “doesn’t make sense” that so much risk has been taken only to return to February status quo, implying that even if headlines point to peace, the market’s assumptions may not match how long de-risking and normalization would take.

Speaker 0: The GCC allies are largely blockaded and not getting anything through; only UAE or Oman might be getting a few shipments due to being on the Gulf of Oman side. This is driving higher oil prices. We can’t simply bluff or "play a game of chicken" because it affects the entire world—Asia, Africa, Europe, and the United States. The shortage extends beyond oil to things like helium, and it’s impacting chip manufacturing and broader economic activity. These are medium-term issues already baked in and in short supply, so we’re facing real problems and a question of how long we can endure this. Speaker 1: As energy becomes more expensive—oil at $110, then $120, $130, $140, $150, rising until this crisis ends globally—the risk is a financial collapse worse than 2007–2008, potentially a depression in much of the world. Economists predict a serious recession, possibly a depression, and these dynamics are what Putin was trying to convey to Trump because Americans are perceived as potentially catastrophic. China is dependent on energy but is expanding nuclear power, has substantial coal, and is investing in renewables; China will survive this. Japan and Korea are on the edge; India is affected; Egypt is trying to feed 100,000,000 and facing famine; Turkey is involved. These states are being pushed toward war not just with Israel but with the United States, since without Israel none of this would be happening, and they know it. Russia, China, Egypt, Turkey, India, and possibly others may join a coalition to force the United States to stop. The speaker would prefer not to go there and believes President Trump should end the blockade, which was adopted because it was the only measure short of returning to war, but the blockade won’t work because the world won’t tolerate it. The president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has publicly said it’s time for Korea to defend itself. It’s been time for Korea to take control of its own armed forces for a long time, but the U.S. currently controls all their armed forces and Koreans have not liked that for at least twenty years. Now they want control of their own armed forces. The speaker expects the dissolution of the United States’ unofficial overseas imperial holdings, predicting the Koreans will expel the U.S., with Japan likely following. In the Pacific, trilateral efforts among Korea, the Philippines, and Japan are forming to cooperate with the U.S. in a future war with China—not in our lifetimes or on the planet, as no one wants war with China. Nobody wants war with China; China is increasingly seen as a safer place for cash and investments in the U.S. This shift began when the U.S. began telling Russians they would not allow them to access billions of rubles and may seize funds, possibly giving cash to Ukrainians. People are watching and asking whether they want to depend on the U.S. financial system or face interference with bank accounts. There are many bad developments right now, and the last thing the American people need is a war, certainly not one involving China, Russia, or any other powers along with Iran, yet that seems to the direction in which things are headed.

Mario asks Tom for an overall analysis of the current situation and where it is headed, citing rising instability around Iran and key shipping routes. He notes that, after Trump posted that Iran asked him to continue talks and that the parties had agreed, the ceasefire was declared over following U.S. bombing of Iran over two days (described as the heaviest since the ceasefire), with a third day of bombing attributed to “most likely Bahrain and Kuwait.” He adds that Iran retaliated against Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, and fired one strike at Qatar “looks like a warning strike.” According to Kepler data, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz/Homs area collapsed, with only 22 ships passing since yesterday—mostly on the Iranian side rather than the normal 40–50—while some military assets moved slightly out of the region. Tom says he takes a “third way,” arguing Iran has never been the real target of the broader war framework. He describes Ukraine, Lebanon, and Israel as not fully sovereign in his view, and frames Iran similarly—as connected to networks of larger powers. He argues Trump’s actions are part of a larger strategic picture targeting global trade “choke points,” including the Strait of Hormuz, and that escalation is a response pattern to “poking” major pressure points and triggering reactions. He links the current pattern to prior episodes he mentions involving Ukraine in 2022, and other Trump moves he says crossed “big red lines,” producing reactions. Tom explains his central connection: by pressuring oil flows out of Hormuz, Europe cannot afford energy (“the collateral on which the money moves”), making it difficult for Europe to keep resupplying Ukraine with personnel, logistics, and support. He adds details about a nearly failed German bond auction, where $6 billion (6 billion euros) in bonds were offered but only $3.9 billion sold, forcing pricing “at five basis points” over the prior issue. He claims oil prices and energy access matter for Europe’s ability to sustain the Ukraine war effort. He further argues that Trump and “emergent civilian leadership in Iran” are distinct from the IRGC in his framing, and that ceasefires and agreements repeatedly fail. He says he sees a cycle: when negotiators sign agreements that cross a red line, the IRGC forces a reaction, then the U.S. responds, assets are expended, and hostilities resume—until civilian leadership gains enough power to restrain the IRGC. He also says the recent three-day bombing campaign feels “very different,” implying escalation into “real siege warfare.” Mario asks about an Axios report stating that mediators believe recent Iranian attacks on commercial vessels were orchestrated by elements within Iran’s government opposed to the MOU and seeking to undermine it. Tom agrees he was on a similar track, adding that the larger aim is to “flip Iran out of the camp of the chaos regime” and constrain control of oil choke points that he says support leverage over Ukraine and China. Tom then argues the objective for Europe is not cheap energy but degradation of Europe’s ability to fund Ukraine: Europe needs energy and collateral for funding flows, yet Trump’s actions remove collateral. He also says Trump is constrained by domestic U.S. politics and that he cannot end supply “because he has a political problem at home” and must “play the game.” He argues Putin hedges because policy may change and says intelligence assets and conflict infrastructure must be destroyed to prevent restarting conflict later. As the discussion narrows, Tom says he does not believe Trump must control the Strait of Hormuz directly; instead, he wants an Iran “not a failed state,” with a more friendly government, and frames the desired end state as bringing Iran into the “community of nations.” He says the conflict is tied to institutions and “lines not crossed,” and envisions Gulf/Arab governments managing themselves through new regional frameworks similar to what he calls a “Gaza Board of Peace.” In the final question about scheduled talks in Switzerland next week amid reports of explosions in Iran (including a fire in Lorestan province at a refinery), Tom says he expects escalation to continue “for a few more months” in an “off on again” cycle, and advises watching the Iranian negotiators to see what they agree on and where differences emerge. He says permanent resolution is unlikely until after U.S. midterms, because Trump lacks “political stability” to build durable outcomes, and then legal processes move slower than political and market time.

Ashwin Rutansi introduces New Order, a global show tracing how India and its allies sit at the center of a transformation in world history. The program aims to explore partnerships, shifting alliances, and how structural changes ripple from global powers to streets, villages, markets, and boardrooms. The show promises to examine diplomatic architecture, networks of power, money flows, and levers of influence, presenting a fundamental reordering rather than mere turbulence. Zara Khan will join later to field viewer questions. Guest: John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago professor and coauthor of The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. The discussion opens with the recent incident of Iran firing missiles at an F-35 and what it implies given anticipated US and allied arms purchases. Mearsheimer notes that aircraft over adversary territory face real risks from surface-to-air missiles and air defenses, even if the US and Israel have degraded Iran’s defenses. He suggests this is a factor behind why the US and Israel refrain from flying over Iran. Geopolitical framing: Who benefits from the ongoing war (in Iran) at the time of the interview? Mearsheimer identifies two clear winners: Russia and China. Russia benefits from sanctions relief on oil and gas pushed by Trump-era policies, and the war diverts munitions away from Ukraine, aiding Russia in its position. China gains as US credibility in foreign policy deteriorates, increasing its influence in the Middle East and globally as nations worry about an unreliable US, with Europe showing signs of leaning toward China. India’s position is discussed as a potential loser in this new order. The discussion asserts that India’s relations with Israel and Iran, and its ties to both the US and the Gulf, place it in a precarious position. The possibility of a summit or peace conference is deemed unlikely to solve inflation, gas prices, fertilizer costs, or Indian food production challenges; the war is characterized as bad news for India, as reflected in Indian media. On US policy and the Israel lobby: Mearsheimer contends that the Israel lobby has significant influence over US foreign policy and that its role in dragging the United States into wars, including Iraq in 2003, was central. He notes with some irony that the lobby’s power is increasingly in the open, referencing Joe Kent’s statements and public figures like Tucker Carlson and Bernie Sanders endorsing similar criticisms. He points to Francesca Albanese, UN official on Palestinian territories, describing the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocidal, and notes the lobby’s efforts to undermine her career. Policy advice for the Global South, focusing on India: Mearsheimer argues that India should maintain distance from excessive US alignment to avoid heavy leverage over Indian policy. He suggests speaking up against US policy when it harms national interests but avoiding becoming overly dependent on the United States. He cites examples such as Indonesia where maintaining friendly ties with China while balancing US relations would be prudent. He warns that excessive closeness to the US invites sanctions and pain, whereas diversifying partnerships could reduce vulnerability. BRICS and multipolarity: The war could benefit BRICS and the Global South, with Russia and China gaining, while some BRICS members like India and possibly Indonesia could suffer. The conflict may prompt a strategic rethinking of US ties, encouraging greater independence from Washington. The discussion also touches on Europe’s economic strain and NATO’s perceived setback if Russia prevails in Ukraine, describing a “double whammy” for European leadership from the Gulf conflict alongside Ukraine. End of interview: The program teases future exploration of the Israel lobby’s influence and the potential for a broader discussion on the end of the Israel lobby era, followed by viewer questions. Zara Khan presents questions from the audience, including whether the broader humanity will gain a say on the world stage and how the Iran war might differ from Vietnam and Afghanistan, emphasizing asymmetrical warfare and the risk of ground involvement. The show signs off, inviting viewers to follow and watch future episodes.

Mario and the Professor discuss the scale and spread of the current oil and energy shock and its broad economic and geopolitical ripple effects. - Severity and scope: The Professor calls the crisis “pretty catastrophic,” possibly the biggest oil crisis experienced, potentially surpassing the 1970s shocks. He notes a gap between Washington rhetoric and underlying economic reality and emphasizes the war’s effects beyond oil, including fertilizer and helium, all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz or related chokepoints. - U.S. economic backdrop (before the war): The Professor provides a pre-war table: - U.S. GDP growth in 2024 was 2.3%, 2025 about the same after a dip in 2024 to 2.2%. - Jobs: 2024 added 2.2 million; 2025 added 185,000, with tariffs contributing to a manufacturing job loss of 108,000. - Productivity declined from 3% to 2.1% in 2025. - He argues the U.S. economy was already slowing and that the war exacerbates existing weaknesses rather than creating a boom. - Immediate physical and downstream effects: - The closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects more than oil: up to 20% of world oil, a third of fertilizer, and helium used in chip manufacturing (notably in Taiwan) pass through the strait. - The closure’s ripple effects include fertilizer shortages and higher prices (fertilizer up about 50%), and broader supply chain dislocations as related infrastructure and inventories (oil, fertilizers, helium) become depleted and must be rebuilt. - Relative impact by region: The U.S. is more insulated from physical shocks than many others, but financial markets (stocks and bonds) are hit, with higher interest rates and a rising 10- and 30-year bond yield. Europe and Asia face larger direct physical disruptions; India, Taiwan, and others bear notable hits due to fertilizer and helium supply constraints. - Global energy and political dynamics: - The U.S. remains a net importer of oil, though it is a net exporter of petroleum products; fertilizer reliance and pricing reflect broader global constraints. - The professor highlights the political costs: protectionism (tariffs), militarism (increased defense spending and involvement), and interventionism (policy actions). He notes polling is negative on these directions, suggesting policy headwinds for the administration. - The escalation and motivations for war: - A theory discussed is that the war was driven by a belief in decapitating Iran’s leadership to force regime change, a strategy the professor says many experts have warned against. He cites New York Times reporting that Mossad and Netanyahu supported decapitation, but that former Mossad leadership and U.S. intelligence warned it would not work; the escalation suggests a divergence between theory and outcome. - He acknowledges another view that controlling Hormuz could economically benefit the U.S., but ranks it as a lesser driver than regime-change objectives. - Possible outcomes and scenarios: - If the Houthis control the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and the Beber/Mendeb is blocked, the consequences would intensify; the professor describes a “freeway turned into a toll road” scenario in Hormuz and greater disruption in the Gulf, including potential attacks on desalination plants. - The economic signaling would likely worsen: downward revisions to growth, higher import prices, and increased financial market strain; a prolonged closure would intensify these effects. - The escalation ladder and endgame: - The professor warns that escalating with boots on the ground would favor Iran and could trigger widespread disruption of Gulf infrastructure, desalination, and regional stability. He suggests Russia would be a clear beneficiary in such a scenario. - He concludes with a stark warning: if Hormuz and the Beber/Mendeb remain closed, and desalination and critical infrastructure are attacked, the situation could resemble or exceed the scale of the 2008 financial crisis—“look like a birthday party” compared with what could unfold. - Overall takeaway: The crisis is multi-faceted, with immediate physical shortages (oil, fertilizer, helium) and cascading financial and political costs. The duration and depth depend on how long chokepoints stay closed and whether escalation occurs, with the potential for severe global economic and geopolitical consequences.

Larry Johnson and the host discuss the extraordinary and escalating tensions around Iran, the Middle East, and the United States’ role in the region. - The guests reference recent remarks by Donald Trump about Iran, noting Trump’s statement that Iran has until Tuesday to reach a deal or “I am blowing up everything,” with a quoted line describing Tuesday as “power plant day and bridge day all wrapped up in one in Iran,” followed by “open the fucking straight, you crazy bastards or you’ll be living in hell.” They describe this rhetoric as madness and suggest the rhetoric signals a potential for a severe U.S. action. - They contrast Trump’s stated plan with the capabilities and willingness of the U.S. military, arguing there are three distinct elements: what Trump wants to do, what the U.S. military can do, and what the U.S. military is willing to do. They discuss a hypothetical ground operation targeting Iran, including possible actions such as striking Natanz or a nuclear-related site, and potentially hitting a “underground missile factory” at Kesheveh, while acknowledging the risk and uncertainty of such plans. - The conversation details a Friday event in which a U.S. F-15 was shot down, and the implications for the broader operation: A-10 Warthog, F-16s, two Black Hawk helicopters (Pave Hawks), and two C-130s were reportedly lost, with speculation about additional losses. They discuss the Pentagon’s statements about casualties and the possibility that other aircraft losses were connected to a rescue attempt for a downed pilot. They estimate several U.S. airframes lost in the effort to recover one pilot and discuss the high costs and risks of attempting CSAR (combat search and rescue). - The speakers reflect on the status of U.S. combat leadership and the debates surrounding purges of senior officers. One guest emphasizes that the fired leaders (Hodney and Randy George) were not operational decision-makers for Iran and argues the purge appears political rather than war-related, describing it as part of a broader pattern of politicization of the senior ranks. - They discuss the Israeli war effort, noting significant strain from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and questions about Israel’s manpower and reserve mobilization. They mention reports that 300,000 reservists have been activated and talk of an additional 400,000 being considered. The discussion touches on claims that Israel is attacking Iranian negotiating participants and how the U.S. could be drawn into a broader conflict. They critique the Israeli military’s leadership structure, arguing that young officers with limited experience lead a reserve-based force, which they view as contributing to questionable battlefield performance. - The Iranian strategy is analyzed as aiming to break U.S. control in the Persian Gulf and to compel adversaries to negotiate by threatening or constraining energy flows. The guests detail Iran’s actions: targeting oil facilities and ports around Haifa and Tel Aviv, Damona (near the suspected nuclear sites), and claims of missiles hitting a major building in Haifa. They describe widespread civilian disruption in Israel (bomb shelters, subway tents) and emphasize the vulnerability of Israel given its manpower challenges and reliance on U.S. and Western support. - The broader strategic landscape is assessed: Iran’s goal to control the Gulf and oil, with potential consequences for global energy markets, shipping costs, and the international economy. They discuss how Iran’s actions may integrate with China and Russia, including potential shifts in currency use (yuan) for trade and new financial arrangements, such as Deutsche Bank offering Chinese bonds. - They discuss the economic and geopolitical ripple effects beyond the battlefield: rising U.S. fuel prices (gas increasing sharply in parts of the U.S., including Florida), potential airline disruptions, and the broader risk to European energy security as sanctions and alternative energy pathways come under stress. They note that Europe’s energy strategies and alliances may be forced to adapt, potentially shifting energy flows to China or Russia, and the possibility of Europe’s economy suffering from disrupted energy supplies. - Toward the end, the speakers acknowledge the difficulty of stopping escalation and the need for major powers to negotiate new terms for the post-unipolar order. They caution that reconciliations are unlikely in the near term, warning of the potential for a broader conflict if leaders do not find a path away from continued escalation. They close with a somewhat pessimistic view, acknowledging that even if the war ends soon, the economic ramifications will be long-lasting. They joke that, at minimum, they’ll have more material to discuss next week, given Trump’s actions.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

The speakers portray the United States as having shifted from an empire to a pirate state, with a transformation into what they call the petro gas dollar or LNG dollar. They claim the US has quietly carried out an armed robbery of the world’s oil and gas supply, hitting Russian tankers and refineries, crippling China’s oil supply, capturing major oil fields, and kidnapping or assassinating leaders, all while expanding its domination over global energy and finance. The analysis emphasizes that the US, now the world’s top producer and exporter of oil, gas, and LNG, operates with self-sufficiency but seeks to kill competition to maintain a monopoly. The claim is that the US used the Ukraine war as cover to eliminate rivals and then used the Iran war to finish off Qatar’s LNG position, forcing Europe to buy American LNG at ten times the price and turning Europe into a US energy client. As a result, European energy prices rise, euros lose value relative to the dollar, and BRICS and dedollarization efforts falter. A central strategic thread is the destruction of competing energy suppliers to create captive markets. The speakers allege that the US destroyed Nord Stream II and blew up pipelines, which not only hurt Russia but forced Europe to rely on American LNG. They argue that the US then redirected gas flows to the Gulf and Levant, sealing a role for Chevron and other US energy giants in these transactions. The Board of Peace is described as a front for a legal cover of Washington’s colonial plan, enabling energy seizures in Gaza, the Levantine Basin, and elsewhere, with Chevron’s activities framed as orchestrated groundwork for energy deals in the Levantine Basin, as well as in Venezuela and Lebanon. The narrative then claims the US intends to dominate China by cutting off its vital fuel sources, forcing China to buy American oil and gas, thereby preserving the dollar and hobbling BRICS and multipolarity. It details how the US targeted Venezuela’s oil, kidnapping Maduro and seizing oil, which previously supplied 80% of Venezuela’s oil exports to China, and how the US expanded its reach by threatening Cuba’s energy grid after Maduro’s removal. It asserts the US orchestrated a global oil blockade, with attacks on Russian energy hubs, ships, and refineries, to cripple Russia and China’s energy security, including attacks in the Caribbean, North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Baltic Sea. The speakers describe Iran as being cut off from Hormuz and subjected to an escalating cycle of strikes that disrupt its toll system and port infrastructure, while Russia’s exports are disrupted by attacks on export hubs and ships, creating a 40% reduction in Russia’s seaborne oil export capacity. They claim the US is using this chaos to drive up LNG and oil prices, forcing Europe and Asia to bid on US gas while shipping dominance remains with Washington. The financial logic is that dedollarization efforts fail because the US can force energy trade to be settled in dollars, while the US economy benefits from wartime pricing and export profits. The “maritime extortion network” is described as a system where the US can move LNG on ships, changing routes as needed, and a “protection racket” via the US Navy is proposed as a price for safe passage. The monroe doctrine is reframed as moving the planet’s energy corridor into the Western Hemisphere, with the Gulf of Mexico and Washington as the key nodes, rather than the Middle East. Finally, the speakers assert that Iran’s drones, missiles, and air defenses have degraded the US air force’s bases and radar arrays, while the USS Gerald R. Ford was compelled to relocate, reinforcing the claim that Iran’s actions are challenging US military dominance and undermining the myth of invincibility. The overarching claim is that the US empire is consolidating global energy control through piracy, sanctions, and strategic energy realignments, with Chevron playing a pivotal role in every facet of this strategy.

Syed Mohamed Marandi discusses the collapse of the Islamabad negotiations and the wider implications of the current U.S.-Iran confrontation. - On what happened in Islamabad: Iran participated despite low expectations, aiming to show willingness to resolve the crisis if Americans are reasonable and to ensure the world sees Iran’s efforts. The Iranians believed the United States lacked will to make progress. During talks there was some progress on various issues, but near the end the United States shifted to a hard line on the nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Vance claimed Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, a claim Marandi notes was contradicted by former counterintelligence official Joe Kent’s resignation letter. Netanyahu reportedly maintains direct influence, with Vance reporting to Netanyahu daily, which Iran views as undermining an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on control and “being the boss” is presented as a central obstacle to any deal. The ceasefire in Lebanon was touted as failing, with Netanyahu and Trump accused of conspiring to wreck it, and Iran’s actions after the ceasefire aligned with this view. The Iranian delegation flew back by land after the flight to Tehran was diverted, reflecting the perceived danger and the Washington Post piece calling for the murder of negotiators. Iran’s approach is framed as attempting to resolve the problem while signaling willingness to negotiate if U.S. policy becomes reasonable. - On the blockade and its consequences: The U.S. blockade on Iranian ports has just begun and will likely worsen the global economic crisis, pushing more countries to oppose the United States. China is angry as Washington dictates terms against oil and trade in the region. The blockade could be used to strangle China’s energy supplies, creating a double-edged impact by simultaneously worsening the global crisis and pressuring U.S. allies. Iran says it may respond by striking ships in the Red Sea and blocking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman if the blockade continues. Iran notes it has substantial financial resilience from oil sales at higher prices without middlemen, with about 100 million barrels left to sell after selling half of its declared oil stock, and it views energy shortages as likely to trigger broader economic disruption, including shortages of helium, LNG, and fertilizers. - On war readiness and possible outcomes: Iran anticipates a major assault and is preparing defenses and offensive capabilities. Iran argues negotiations were not taken seriously by the United States and believes the U.S. is buying time. Iran would view victories as having the United States back down, preserving Iran’s rights, and protecting its regional allies, with a long-term ceasefire. Iran contends it should control the Strait of Hormuz to prevent future aggression and seeks compensation for damages caused by the conflict, emphasizing sovereignty over Hormuz and peace for Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran states that if the U.S. and its regional proxies strike, Iran would respond by targeting energy and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. - On broader geopolitical shifts and regional dynamics: Marandi argues the current crisis accelerates a move toward a multipolar world, with the United States’ hegemonic position eroding. The UAE is portrayed as pushing for war, while other Gulf states are increasingly wary. He predicts a possible land invasion of Iran, but emphasizes Iran’s long-term preparedness and resilience. Weather and terrain are cited as factors likely to complicate a potential U.S. invasion, particularly in the hot summer conditions of the region. - On potential definitions of “victory”: Iran’s victory would involve U.S. backing down, Iran preserving its rights, a long-term ceasefire, and sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. A broader victory would see the end of supremacism in Palestine and the end of genocidal actions in Lebanon, with peace across the region as a key objective. The discussion ends with the notion that a shift toward an American focus on its republic, rather than empire, would benefit global stability.

Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and Speaker 2 discuss the evolving confrontation between the United States and Iran and its broader economic and strategic implications. Speaker 0 highlights three predictions: (1) Trump would win, (2) he would start a war with Iran, and (3) the US would lose that war, asking if these predictions are still valid. Speaker 1 characterizes the current phase as a war of attrition between the United States and Iran, noting that Iranians have been preparing for twenty years and now possess “a pretty good strategy of how to weaken and ultimately destroy the American empire.” He asserts that Iran is waging war against the global economy by striking Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and targeting critical energy infrastructure and waterways such as the Baghdad channel and the Hormuz Strait, and eventually water desalination plants, which are vital to Gulf nations. He emphasizes that the Gulf States are the linchpin of the American economy because they sell petrodollars, which are recycled into the American economy through investments, including in the stock market. He claims the American economy is sustained by AI investments in data centers, much of which come from the Gulf States. If the Gulf States cease oil sales and finance AI, he predicts the AI bubble in the United States would burst, collapsing the broader American economy, described as a financial “ponzi scheme.” Speaker 2 notes a concrete example: an Amazon data center was hit in the UAE. He also mentions the United States racing to complete its Iran mission before munitions run out. Speaker 1 expands on the military dynamic, arguing that the United States military is not designed for a twenty-first-century war. He attributes this to the post–World War II military-industrial complex, which was built for the Cold War and its goals of technological superiority. He explains that American military strategy relies on highly sophisticated, expensive technology—the air defense system—leading to an asymmetry in the current conflict: million-dollar missiles attempting to shoot down $50,000 drones. He suggests this gap is unsustainable in the long term and describes it as the puncturing of the aura of invincibility that has sustained American hegemony for the past twenty years.

Professor Michael Hudson and Glenn discuss how the war against Iran is reshaping the global economy and international order. Hudson contends this is World War III in the sense that energy, fertilizer, and oil exports are fundamental to the world economy, and the conflict targets these choke points. He notes a recent US stock market rally of about a thousand points, driven by hopes of reversibility, while insisting the war’s effects extend far beyond Iran and are irreversible. He asserts the US is waging a war to maintain control over the world oil economy by preventing any sovereignty that could export oil outside US influence. This includes sanctions on Iran and Russia, and earlier sanctions on Venezuela, with the aim of ensuring oil proceeds flow to US-controlled channels. He argues the US sought to control the Strait of Hormuz to decide who gets Gulf oil, but Trump’s advisers warned that attempting to seize Hormuz would leave troops as “sitting ducks,” yet the underlying goal remains “grab the oil.” He claims Iran’s objective is to guarantee security by removing all US bases in the Middle East and by relief of sanctions imposed by US allies; without that, Iran claims the world will not return to the previous order. Hudson emphasizes that the war disrupts key supply chains: oil, fertilizer, helium, sulfur, and related inputs. Although Iran allows oil exports via Hormuz for payments, it does not permit fertilizer exports, impacting the upcoming planting season. He forecasts the world entering the most serious depression since the 1930s due to these interruptions and the consequent financial ripples. On the financial system, Hudson explains that since the 2008 crisis, the US pursued zero or near-zero interest rates to rescue banks, enabling asset price inflation in real estate, stocks, and bonds. He describes a shift where non-bank lenders and private equity could borrow cheaply and buy up assets, creating a debt-led, Ponzi-like dynamic that depended on continued access to credit and rising asset prices. As long as rates stayed low, this system could keep rolling; now, with 10-year treasuries around 4.5 percent and 30-year mortgages above 5 percent, the cost of rolling over debt intensifies. The war-induced disruptions to energy and inputs threaten defaults and a feedback loop of debt collapse, catalyzing a depression. Regarding the broader international system, Hudson argues Europe is following sanctions on Russia at great economic cost, with Germany already experiencing GDP declines after energy sanctions in 2022. Europe’s shift away from Russian energy, the Ukraine-Hungary/gas dynamics, and the broader energy choke points threaten the cohesion of NATO and the EU. He predicts Europe may suffer consumer price increases and living standard cuts as deficits expand to subsidize heating and energy, leading to a reordering of alliances and economic blocs. He characterizes Asia–Russia–China as increasingly separate from Western systems, with a shift toward Asia as the growth center and Europe/US lagging. He asserts the West’s operational vocabulary frames the conflict as a clash of civilizations, but the underlying dynamic is a clash of classes, where the US seeks to subordinate others through energy and trade controls. Hudson argues the current trajectory signals not simply a decline but an abrupt systemic change: the end of the postwar Western-led order. He calls for rethinking international institutions and law, including a new framework to replace a discredited United Nations and to organize economic and military arrangements that protect sovereignty outside US-dominated systems. He highlights the need for energy and food self-sufficiency to resist weaponized foreign trade and to avoid being drawn into US-imposed economic chaos. In closing, Hudson points to Britain’s looming non-viability under deindustrialization and limited energy resources, illustrating how advanced economies may struggle to adapt to a new multipolar order.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some sort of action. They could say, oh, well, we gotta go respond to this to set the stage for our military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert action by the CIA to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective, get control of the oil. That's the number one priority. And I think it's being done with an eye looking forward, recognizing the potential risk. If conflict is renewed with Iran, prospect of the shutdown of Persian Gulf— Mario: Ukraine defeated Russia. Larry: Yeah. That was the plan. Russia's military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: Let’s talk Venezuela. What’s your initial reaction? When John Kuriaki suggested the best indicator is naval movements, and the buildup off Venezuela is significant. I’ve heard they have 14, twelve warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing? Is this Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the CIA’s Central America branch. They tried to provoke Noriega into action to justify invasion, which happened in December 1988. What’s different now is the base infrastructure. In Panama, Quarry Heights was full; Southern Command was there. Southern Command has moved to Miami. The weaponization of the idea of a “supported vs. supporting” commander is reversed here: Southern Command would be subordinate to Special Operations Command. SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war; they’re light infantry, raids, hostage rescue. So the question is: what will the ships actually do? Shells into Venezuela won’t defeat Venezuela. Ground forces would require mass, and Venezuela is three times the size of Vietnam with rugged terrain that favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, you’d stack body bags far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Mario: Do Venezuelans have the will to fight Maduro? Larry: Yes. It will rally insurgents from Brazil and Colombia. If we decapitate Maduro, there are loyalists with weapons; an insurgency could follow, and the US would be hard-pressed to pacify it. The State Department’s INL/INSCR reports on narcotics note Venezuela as a transit point for marijuana and some cocaine, with fentanyl less central than claimed by Trump. The 2018 emphasis on Trendy Aragua looked CIA-driven. Trump reportedly signed a covert action finding in 2018 to remove Maduro, leading to the Guaidó fiasco; that covert action included some public diplomacy via USAID. The objective now, as you asked, is oil control and curtailing Russia, China, and Iran’s influence, with an eye toward BRICS. Mario: Could there be a decapitation strike on Maduro, and would someone like Maria take over? Larry: A decapitation strike could spark insurgency; the US would not be able to pacify it. The broader agenda seems to include a strategy to seize oil and reduce regional influence by Russia and China. Venezuela’s role as a transit point and possible BRICS alignment complicates any straightforward regime-change scenario. Mario: Moving to general foreign policy under Trump. The national security strategy (NSS) for 2025 signals a shift, but you question how binding NSS papers are. What did you make of it, and how does it relate to Ukraine? You’ve noted Trump isn’t serious about peace in Ukraine on some occasions. Larry: The NSS is a set of guidelines, not a blueprint. Europe is being asked to step up, the US distancing itself from Europe, and the strategic relationship with Europe is damaged by the perception of long-term reliability and sanctions. The document highlights China as an economic rival rather than an enemy; it criticizes Europe’s defense spending and censorship, and it frames Russia as less of a direct threat than before, though the reality is nuanced. The US-EU relationship is strained, and the US wants Europe to shoulder more of the burden in Ukraine while maintaining strategic pressure. Mario: What about Ukraine? Zelensky’s negotiation posture, security guarantees, and the Moscow terms? Larry: Putin spoke on 06/14/2024 with five Russian demands: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk are permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw its forces from those republics; there must be an election in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president (the Russians argue Zelensky is illegitimate for not holding elections); they suggest a successor to Zelensky and elections within 90 days. Freezing lines in Donbas is not accepted by Russia; the Russians claim further territory may be annexed with referenda. If peace talks fail, Russia is likely to push to occupy Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Odessa, potentially Kyiv. Western support is insufficient to alter that trajectory, given Russia’s large artillery and drone production. The US and Europe cannot match Russia’s drone and shell output; even if they supply Tomahawks, escalation risks, including nuclear considerations, grow. Russia’s economy and war capacity remain robust, and the BRICS poles are strengthening as Western leverage wanes. Mario: What about sanctions strategy and Russia’s oil revenues? Larry: Oil remains a significant but not decisive portion of Russia’s GDP. The West’s sanctions are not enough to force collapse; Russia has endured the 1990s and remains resilient. BRICS cooperation and the shift to the Global South are changing the global order, with Russia and China deepening ties and reducing Western influence. The war in Ukraine has not produced a decisive Western victory, and the global south is moving away from Western-led sanctions, reshaping geopolitical alignments. Mario, it’s been a pleasure.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the escalating tensions over Iran and the possibility of drastic military action. He notes that President Trump says the deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz and negotiate a ceasefire is tomorrow, and that if they don’t, “the entire country will be taken out in one night,” raising questions about whether a nuclear weapon is at the ready. The discussion suggests that Trump’s line may be hyperbolic, with Speaker 1 positing that a nuclear weapon is unlikely and that conventional methods or power-grid disruption could be used to “take out the entire country” without permanently ending the war. He invokes George Kennan’s view on nuclear weapons and argues the goal is not to wage a nuclear exchange but to disrupt Iran’s energy infrastructure; he questions whether such measures would be permanent or decisive. The conversation shifts to censorship and satellite imagery. Speaker 2 reports that Planet Labs received a U.S. request to blackout images in and around Iran dating back to March 6, possibly earlier, with threats of sanctions if companies don’t comply. The panel discusses how to verify reality amid conflicting signals. The panel turns to a tactical assessment of potential actions around the Strait of Hormuz. Speaker 1 predicts Trump would pursue a coordinated air force and naval air strikes aimed at destroying petrochemical plants and energy infrastructure to deprive the government of power, though he doubts this would alter the strategic outcome given Iran’s continental capacity and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities. He explains Iran’s ability to use satellites and strike systems to counter, and notes Iran’s large force structure within the country. He warns that even if power is disrupted, Iran can respond and that the Gulf states would be affected due to a loss of energy and desalination capacity, potentially threatening regional stability and the Gulf’s populations. The discussion broadens to regional dynamics and Israel. Speaker 2 cites Trump’s remark about scrapping the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal to prioritize Israel, suggesting this shift contributed to the current conflict. Speaker 1 argues the global economy could enter a depression, highlighting how energy, plastics, fertilizer, and feedstock shortages would ripple through the Global South, Japan, Korea, and Europe as energy prices rise and supply chains falter. He asserts that oil is a global commodity and that a price rise worldwide is likely; he predicts a stock market crash and a long-term energy system rebuild. The hosts pivot to financial consequences and media appeals, with Speaker 0 promoting gold and silver investments through Lear Capital, citing Ed Dowd’s view on panic buying and shortages of fertilizer and energy, and predicting higher prices. The discussion notes a claim that about $42 billion has been spent on the conflict so far, with spending accelerating. On leadership and assessment of U.S. strategy, Speaker 1 raises concerns about President Trump’s current mental acuity and notes that some U.S. leaders are calling for a 60-day limit on hostilities without a formal declaration of war. He argues that Israel’s aims dominate the U.S. stance, complicating potential compromises with Iran and wider regional settlements. He asserts Israel seeks to expand its influence and dominance in the region, which undermines potential settlements and constrains U.S. options. In Israel, Speaker 1 explains that Hezbollah is not out of action and has launched rockets into Northern Israel; Israeli public unrest and evacuation patterns hint at severe internal strain. He contends that Israel relies heavily on U.S. support, which could be leveraged for broader regional aims, but may be unsustainable given regional opposition to Israel’s expansion. He suggests Arab populations and governing elites in the Gulf and Egypt grow discontent with Western-backed leadership. Finally, the panel probes the potential use of ground forces and the plausibility of a doomsday scenario, with Speaker 1 arguing that a large, sustained ground operation in the Gulf is unlikely to change the outcome without comprehensive disruption of Iranian strike systems and satellite networks. He emphasizes that a nuclear option would be catastrophic, and expresses concern about Israeli actions and regional reactions, including possible involvement by Russia, China, and other powers. Colonel MacGregor closes by pointing readers to his Substack for ongoing strategic analysis and reiterates the anticipated economic and geopolitical upheaval from the conflict.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, joins the program to discuss the dramatic developments in the war against Iran. The conversation centers on the strike on Karg Island, the strategic choke point for Iran’s oil exports, and the broader implications of escalating U.S. actions. - Karg Island and the oil threat: The host notes that Karg Island handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports and asks why Trump isn’t targeting this area. Johnson argues the attack on Karg Island makes little strategic sense and points out that Iran has five oil terminals; destroying one would not end Iran’s potential revenue. He emphasizes that the U.S. bombed the runway of the major airport on the island, which he says remains irrelevant to Iran’s overall capacity to generate revenue. He notes the runway damage would not support U.S. objectives for invading the island, given runway length constraints (6,000 feet measured vs. need for 3,500–3,700 feet for certain aircraft) and the limited air force in Iran. Johnson asserts that Iran has indicated it would retaliate against oil terminals and Gulf neighbors if oil resources or energy infrastructure are attacked. - Economic and strategic consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz: Johnson states that the action effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off 20% of the world’s oil supply, 25% of global LNG, and 35% of the world’s urea for fertilizer. He explains fertilizer’s criticality to global agriculture and notes that rising gas and diesel prices in the United States would impact consumer costs, given many Americans live paycheck to paycheck. He suggests the price hikes contribute to inflationary pressure and could trigger a global recession, especially since Persian Gulf countries are pivotal energy suppliers. He also points out that the U.S. cannot easily reopen Hormuz without unacceptable losses and that Iran has prepared for contingencies for thirty years, with robust defenses including tunnels and coastal fortifications. - Military feasibility and strategy: The discussion covers the impracticality of a U.S. ground invasion of Iran, given the size of Iran’s army and the modern battlefield’s drone and missile threats. Johnson notes the U.S. Army and Marine numbers, the logistical challenges of sustaining an amphibious or airborne assault, and the vulnerability of American ships and troops to drones and missiles. He highlights that a mass deployment would be highly costly and dangerous, with historical evidence showing air power alone cannot win wars. The hosts discuss limited U.S. options and the possible futility of attempts to seize or occupy Iran’s territory. - Internal U.S. decision-making and DC dynamics: The program mentions a split inside Washington between anti-war voices and those pressing toward Tehran, with leaks suggesting that top officials warned Trump about major obstacles and potential losses. Johnson cites a leak from the National Intelligence Council indicating regime change in Tehran is unlikely, even with significant U.S. effort. He asserts the Pentagon’s credibility has been questioned after disputed reports (e.g., the KC-135 shootdown) and notes that Trump’s advisors who counsel restraint are being sidelined. - Iranian retaliation and targets: The discussion covers Iran’s targeting of air defenses and critical infrastructure, including radars at embassies and bases in the region, and the destruction of five Saudi air refueling tankers, which Trump later dismissed as fake news. Johnson says Iran aims to degrade Israel economically and militarily, while carefully avoiding mass civilian casualties in some instances. He observes Iran’s restraint in striking desalination plants, which would have caused a humanitarian catastrophe, suggesting a deliberate choice to keep certain targets within bounds. - Global realignments and the role of Russia, China, and India: The conversation touches on broader geopolitical shifts. Johnson argues that Russia and China are offering alternatives to the dollar-dominated order, strengthening ties with Gulf states and BRICS members. He suggests Gulf allies may be considering decoupling from U.S. security guarantees, seeking to diversify away from the petrodollar system. The discussion includes India’s position, noting Modi’s visit to Israel and India’s balancing act amid U.S. pressure and Iran relations; Iran’s ultimatum to allow passage for flag vessels and its diplomacy toward India is highlighted as a measured approach, even as India’s stance has attracted scrutiny. - Israel, casualties, and the broader landscape: The speakers discuss Israeli casualties and infrastructure under sustained Iranian strikes, noting limited information from within Israel due to media constraints and possible censorship. Johnson presents a game-theory view: if Israel threatens a nuclear option, Iran might be compelled to develop a nuclear capability as a deterrent, altering calculations for both Israel and the United States. - Terrorism narrative and historical context: The speakers challenge the U.S. portrayal of Iran as the world’s top sponsor of terrorism, arguing that ISIS and the Taliban have caused far more deaths in recent years, and that Iran’s responses to threats have historically prioritized restraint. They emphasize Iran’s chemical weapons restraint during the Iran-Iraq war, contrasting it with U.S. and Iraqi actions in the 1980s. - Final reflections: The discussion emphasizes the cascade effects of the conflict, including potential impacts on Taiwan’s energy and semiconductor production, multiplied by China’s leverage, and Russia’s increasing global influence. Johnson warns that the war’s end will likely be achieved through shifting alignments and economic realignments rather than a conventional battlefield victory, with the goal of U.S. withdrawal from the region as part of any settlement. The conversation closes with mutual thanks and a reaffirmation of ongoing analysis of these evolving dynamics.