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Guy Mettin argues that Russophobia is rooted in religious and historical narratives that long predate modern geopolitics. He traces the irrational hostility toward Russia to deep-seated religious split dynamics, notably the Schism between Western Catholics and Eastern Orthodox in the eleventh century, and the way Catholic propaganda cast Byzantium’s Orthodox as schismatic, barbarian, and despotic. After Byzantium fell, Russia claimed the Orthodox heritage, which then fed a narrative of confrontation with Western Europe. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Western powers weaponized this narrative to justify anti-Russian sentiment as Russia rose as a European power after Peter the Great and Catherine II. A key example is the forged “testament of Peter the Great,” which France’s Louis XV, Napoleon, Britain after Vienna 1815, and later U.S. circles used to cast Russia as aiming to conquer the West, justifying preemptive actions and fear-driven policy. He notes the testament’s repeated misuse by Napoleon, the British, and even post-Vienna propaganda that shaped decades of Russophobia, including cartoons and cultural depictions like Bram Stoker’s Dracula as a symbol of Russian aristocracy. He emphasizes that this phobia has two functions: the belief that Western security depends on opposing Russia, and the idea that failure to act against Russia invites invasion. This dual function persists in contemporary discourse, where European calls for more weapons to deter Russia echo the old premise that what happens on Russia’s borders determines Europe’s fate. He asserts that Russia has not historically aggressed against Western Europe in the way Western narratives claim; rather, invasions often originated from the West (Teutonic knights, Mongols, Poland, Sweden, Napoleonic France, Germany, Britain). Russia’s own incursions into Europe have been responses to aggression by others, such as Napoleon’s invasion or Hitler’s World War II actions. The discussion turns to how the West constructs an ethical framework in which liberal democracy and human rights are presented as universal ideals, and any actions by Russia are interpreted through that lens. This leads to a paradox: when European powers sanction Russian academics or journalists in the name of defending freedom of expression, it appears inconsistent with the First Amendment protections observed in the United States, while Europe pursues sanctions that curb scholarly debate. He cites specific cases: sanctions against Swiss journalist Xavier Meurice and Jacques Bou, and mentions the sanctioning of other researchers; he also highlights Thierry Breton’s sanctioning by the United States as an example of perceived contradictions in Western policy. He contrasts the greater freedom of opinion in the U.S. with growing European censorship and the suppression of discourse on topics such as NATO expansion and U.S. involvement in Ukraine. Mettin discusses how Western journalists and NGOs may be influenced or embedded within foreign policy aims. He recalls Udo Ulfkotte’s critique of the “corrupted journalist” ecosystem—NATO/N Atlantis-linked influence, seminars, and conferences designed to mold media narratives. He recounts personal experiences in Sarajevo during the 1990s, where journalists were invited by NATO and the UN and later found the narrative they were fed to be constructed. He argues that funding sources, such as Open Society foundations, can bias investigative journalism, leading to a loss of independence, as observed in his experience with the Consortium of International Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) under Soros-Open Society money. The conversation shifts to the global dimension of Russophobia. He notes a growing anti-Russian sentiment is not shared elsewhere; in parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, there are relatively more favorable or nuanced attitudes toward Russia, which gives him optimism that the anti-Russian stance in Europe may eventually wane. He suggests broadening analysis to Ukraine and Eastern Europe—Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, Moldova—to understand how resentment toward Soviet-era rule persists and morphs into modern attitudes toward Russia, even as the Soviet past fades. Towards the end, he mentions Orban in Hungary as an example of a leader who can separate past anti-Russian sentiment from a rational present-day policy, arguing for a more principled approach. He closes with an endorsement of discussing these issues openly and hopes that the hate of Russia will eventually diminish. He invites listeners to read his book, Russophobia, and thanks the interviewer, Maxime, for the dialogue.

George Soros had begun to make a name for himself as a conscience-free economic hitman as early as World War II, collaborating with Nazis, which he described as “the best time of my life.” A subsequent exchange recalls that he went out with a protector who swore he was his adopted godson, and helped in the confiscation of property from the Jews. When asked if it was difficult, the respondent says, “Not at all. No problem,” and adds that even if he weren’t there, somebody else would be taking it away anyway, suggesting a market-driven rationale for the actions. The narrative then traces a mentorship under the Fabian Society’s Karl Popper at the Langdon School of Economics, where Soros acquired his idea of open societies as a cover for world government control. It also notes an Edmund de Rothschild–connected influence: George Karlweiss, chairman of the Rothschild Swiss-based bank Privy, endowed Soros with the financial resources to launch a new type of organization called a hedge fund. From that moment, the young speculator began to amass a fortune as a financial mercenary, released during the new age of deregulation and deployed to destroy the economies of any nation resisting a banker’s dictatorship through currency speculation. Using his ill-begotten resources, Soros was said to set up a network of private organizations to advance democracy-building around the world. In 1979, Soros’s Open Society Foundations came online and began to interface closely with the National Endowment for Democracy, which soon set up two offices in China in the 1980s. David Ignatius, the former head of the NED, admitted in 1991 that the organization was little more than a front for the CIA, noting that “a lot of what we do today was done covertly twenty five years ago by the CIA.” Throughout the 1980s, a new world order was staged, described by some as the end of history. In Hungary, Soros’ Open Society Foundations infused restructuring, privatization, and other market-driven reforms in 1988, leading to the emergence of a new oligarchical class beholden to Wall Street and contributing to election manipulation that ousted Ferdinand Marcos’s national leadership and installed Corazon Aquino in an early color revolution called the People Power Revolution. Russia warmly embraced Soros and the NED under Mikhail Gorbachev, who ensured the stage would be set for Russia’s submission to a new age of destruction called Perestroika. In the 1990s, the program was titled Operation Hammer by the Trilateral Commission’s George Bush Sr., a program of looting of former state enterprises under the watch of the IMF, taking the name “shock therapy.”

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the long-running effort to build civil society in the former Soviet Union, focusing on the Open Society Foundation’s role in Ukraine and the broader European reception of Vladimir Putin. Speaker 1 explains that the Cultural Initiative Foundation began in 1987 within the Soviet Union, and a branch was set up in Ukraine in 1990 two years before Ukraine’s independence. The foundation provided scholarships and supported civil society, and Speaker 1 asserts that the civil society’s maturity twenty-five years later is largely the work of the foundation. He notes that the foundation’s scholarships helped create a generation of leaders: those who were students twenty-five years ago became leaders later. Speaker 0 adds a personal observation that the new Ukrainian government and its leadership have been touched by Open Society and by Georgia, with many individuals personally benefiting from scholarships or having family members who did. The conversation then turns to the appeal of Ukraine as a model of open society, contrasted with broader European admiration for or susceptibility to Vladimir Putin. Speaker 0 points out that not all Europeans share the Ukrainian sympathy; she mentions that Hungary’s leader described Putin as a model, and cites Greece’s trips to Moscow and France’s Marielle Le Pen having close contacts with Putin. She asks how Speaker 1 explains Putin’s influence and appeal in Europe. Speaker 1 responds by situating the discussion in a political and historical context, noting his involvement in the collapse of the Soviet system. He describes himself as a political philanthropist and frames his perspective around the broader historical forces at play, implying that the appeal of Putin in some European circles is tied to these transformative historical currents. Key points: - The Cultural Initiative Foundation (established 1987 in the Soviet Union) and its Ukraine branch (1990) funded scholarships and civil-society work. - The foundation contributed to the maturation of civil society in Ukraine, with beneficiaries who became leaders two decades later. - Personal and institutional ties to Open Society and Georgia have touched Ukraine’s political leadership. - There is a notable divergence in Europe regarding Putin’s influence, with some leaders or groups appearing attracted to or engaging with Putin, while Ukraine’s open-society model is presented as a contrasting example. - Speaker 1 frames his view within a broader historical assessment of the collapse of the Soviet system, identifying as a political philanthropist.

I funded dissident activities and civil society groups in Eastern Europe and Poland during the revolutions of 1989. Similarly, I established a foundation in Ukraine before its independence from Russia, and it has been active ever since, playing a significant role in current events. We've also engaged in discussions with Ukrainian leadership on revitalizing agriculture and enhancing energy efficiency through new company partnerships. George Soros was present, and we collaborated on these initiatives.

George Soros's Open Society Foundations have been revealed to be actively trying to influence political processes in Europe and Russia through funding local advocacy groups, social media projects, and journalists. For example, they provided over $130,000 to EU Observer, which used professional news reporting to promote open society values during the European elections. Additionally, leaked documents show the organization's half a million dollar effort to find evidence of Russia's alleged influence in European politics, although they acknowledge the challenges of accusing Russia. Some critics argue that Soros aims to disrupt Europe and promote open borders, referring to his version of democracy as "Sorosocracy."

My initial efforts began in South Africa, followed by Eastern Europe after the Soviet Union collapsed. I focused on Hungary in 1984, Poland in 1987, and China in the same year, effectively building what I call the Soros Empire to replace the Soviet Empire. Currently, I'm most involved in Russia, which mirrors the situation during the Soviet Union's collapse. However, the context has changed; back then, the Soviet Union was declining while the European Union was thriving. Now, we see a resurgent Russia and a disintegrating European Union, which is a concerning development.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, George Soros stepped in to fill the power vacuum in Hungary, Poland, and China in the late 1980s. This marked the rise of what some call the Soros Empire, taking over where the Soviet Empire left off. How successful do you think Soros has been in his imperial ambitions?

George Soros discusses his work building civil society in the former Soviet Union, starting with the establishment of a foundation in Ukraine in 1990, two years before its independence, as an offshoot of the foundation in Russia, which began in 1987. He notes the foundation provided scholarships and supported civil society. He expresses that the maturity of civil society in Ukraine 25 years later is largely due to the foundation's work. The interviewer notes that many leaders in the new Ukrainian government have been touched by the Open Society, either personally receiving scholarships or having family members who did. Soros says it is quite an experience to see the impact of the foundation over 25 years, as former students have become leaders. The interviewer then asks Soros to explain Putin's influence in Europe, given that some European leaders view Putin as a role model. Soros responds that he can take a historical perspective, as he was very involved in the collapse of the Soviet system, which he considers his debut as a political philanthropist.

Open Society's Ukraine foundation was established in 1990 as an offshoot of the foundation in Russia, part of a Soviet-era cultural initiative started in 1987. It provided scholarships and supported civil society, and, twenty-five years later, its work contributed significantly to the maturity of civil society. The speaker notes that many in Ukraine's leadership have been touched by Open Society and Jordan, with people receiving scholarships themselves or through spouses. He reflects that the impact over a 25-year period is evident: those students became leaders. The conversation also notes wide European admiration for Putin in some quarters—Hungary's leader calling Putin a model, Greeks visiting Moscow, Le Pen in France with close contacts to Putin—and asks how to explain Putin's appeal in Europe. The reply emphasizes a historical perspective from someone involved in the collapse of the Soviet system, calling himself a political philanthropist.

I set up the foundation in Ukraine in 1990, which is two years before the independence of Ukraine, as an offshoot of the foundation in Russia. There was a “set up cultural initiative Initiative Foundation in in The Soviet Union set in 1987,” and we've built this branch in Ukraine in 1990. The foundation did, gave a lot of scholarships and supported civil society, and “The maturity of civil society twenty five years later is to a large extent, the work of the foundation.” “The twenty five years later, they were leaders.” Not all Europeans agree: “the leader of your own homeland, Hungary, has described Putin as a model as a role model” and “Marielle Le Pen having close contacts with Putin.” “I was very much involved in the collapse of the Soviet system. That was my debut as a what I call myself a political philanthropist.”

I established a foundation in Ukraine before its independence from Russia, and it's been active ever since, playing a significant role in current events. It's similar to my work funding dissident activity and civil society groups in Eastern Europe during the 1989 revolutions. In Ukraine, we've also collaborated with Ukrainian leaders on agricultural revitalization and energy efficiency improvements, partnering with various companies. I even worked alongside George Soros on some of these initiatives.

The discussion opens with a provocative line about not needing a CIA director this year because the National Endowment for Democracy is in place, followed by introductions of Carl Gershwin as founding co-president of the National Dialogue for Democracy and the plan to cover the topic at length. The speakers claim that democratic groups worldwide could be seen as subsidized by the CIA, noting that such subsidies were curtailed in the 1960s and that the Endowment was created to fund groups the CIA subsidized back then. They assert that, before grants are made, all grants are sent through the State Department to the CIA, and promise deeper exploration of “Ned CIA” material. They list prominent entities alongside the National Endowment for Democracy, including the Rockefeller Foundation, the Atlanta Council, Ellen White as an operative who prepared the way for political changes in the past two years, and efforts to take down the Soviet Union through internal coups in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. George Soros and the Open Society Foundation, as well as the Atlantic Council, are also named as funders or players in this network. The conversation identifies the Rockefeller Foundation as a major funder, calling it the “hellspawn of John D. Rockefeller and the octopus of Standard Oil,” and notes its funding of the Atlantic Council alongside the Pentagon and the State Department, claiming over $1,000,000 a year. A claim is made about the Rockefeller Foundation’s involvement beyond NATO’s civil society arm, including a reference to Google as the source for who runs the Rockefeller Foundation, and a mention that the foundation had an endowment around $6,000,000,000, making it the thirtieth largest foundation globally by endowment. The discussion briefly covers Raj Shah, described as having been appointed head of USAID by Barack Obama, previously at the Gates Foundation, and later running the Rockefeller Foundation, identifying him as the number one head of USAID. Speaker 2 shifts to criticizing Raj Shah and USAID, then highlights a partnership announcement between USAID and Mr. Beast’s philanthropic endeavors, noting Mr. Beast’s substantial net worth (estimates cited around $2.6 billion, with a referenced $5 billion company valuation). The speakers then pivot to analyzing Mr. Beast’s online influence, citing his enormous view counts across multiple channels and arguing that his content represents the most popular material on the Internet, capable of shaping hearts and minds and, therefore, serving as a finely tuned instrument of statecraft. The dialogue returns to ongoing coverage of Mr. Beast videos, including a live example of a Minecraft-based Hunger Games-style video with multi-minute view counts, and ends with a broad assertion that the Rockefeller Foundation has partnered with the CIA in a civil-society capacity and that Mr. Beast’s platform, with hundreds of millions of views, could function as a tool of statecraft, given its reach and influence.

Mike opens by noting cautious optimism about a peace agreement, while acknowledging widespread skepticism and asking why negotiations have stalled. He cites Rubio’s Vanity Fair quote: offers exist to stop the war on current lines, but Russia allegedly rejects them. He asks for thoughts on Putin’s intentions and whether the war aims extend beyond the Donbas into broader Ukrainian territory, given repeated peace deals rejected over territorial concessions. Jonathan responds that the conflict has never been primarily about territory for Putin. He argues the core threat is internal to Russia: Ukraine’s political and democratic developments since 2014 challenge Putin’s regime and business model, creating an intrinsic threat to his rule. He suggests Putin seeks to keep Ukraine weak as a buffer zone between Western democracy and Russia, framing democracy and Western reform as a catastrophe for Russians. He emphasizes that Ukraine’s progress since 2014—reducing oligarchic influence, fighting corruption, building civil society—constitutes the real threat, not NATO expansion. He adds that deterrence considerations, not territorial gains, dominate Russia’s calculus, making a permanent settlement difficult so long as Ukraine remains Western-leaning and democratic. Mark counters, insisting that a true NATO-Ukraine peace would align with American terms, while acknowledging publicly stated US/NATO roles as proxies. He asserts that Russia wants a permanent settlement that keeps Ukraine out of NATO and returns Ukraine to constitutional neutrality, arguing that the Kyiv regime’s repression of Russian-speaking East Ukraine makes concessions unacceptable. He claims that the US and Europe have used media and NGOs to influence Ukraine, but notes that before full-scale war, Ukrainian media was oligarch-influenced, and that since 2014 independent outlets have proliferated, challenging Zelensky’s government. He contends that US funding via USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy served to promote Western values, and that Russia views NGOs as foreign-influenced instruments rather than genuine civil society. Mike asks whether US and Western funding of NGOs represents a push to gain influence inside Ukraine, and whether this influences Russia’s calculations. Jonathan acknowledges NGO funding sometimes lacked a coherent strategic objective but aligns with traditional Western aims like freedom of navigation and press, while noting Russia’s suspicion of foreign influence. He argues that Ukraine now has a diverse media landscape, with ministers’ accountability increasing, and he states that Ukraine’s East Ukrainian population at times favors greater autonomy or varied allegiances, though not necessarily alignment with Russia, and cautions against overgeneralizing. Mark returns to the NGO funding debate, noting Russia’s use of government-backed NGOs is far less extensive than Western interference prior to 2014. He argues that civil society funded by a foreign government is not a genuine civil society. He attacks the West’s “freedom of navigation” narrative by pointing to recent US actions in the Caribbean and US actions in international waters, challenging the validity of Western claims about universal freedoms. He also accuses the Kyiv regime of suppressing opposition and bans on 21 political parties, while disputing the extent of Western influence in shaping Ukrainian politics. The conversation shifts to Russia’s broader strategic goals and the potential for a freezing of lines. Mark argues that freezing lines is impossible for Russia because it would leave Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia under a Kyiv regime deemed anti-Russian by Moscow. Jonathan emphasizes that the conflict could only end with a regime change in Kyiv, or a fundamental political transformation in Ukraine, suggesting that peace is unlikely while the Putin regime remains in power. He predicts that Russia seeks to erase perceived internal threats and shift Ukraine away from the West, whereas Mark asserts that Moscow’s aim is not limited to limited territorial gains but to neutralizing Ukraine politically. They discuss Western rearmament: Germany’s move toward conscription and Europe’s overall buildup, with concerns about domestic political forces (AFD, Le Pen, Meloni) possibly aligning with Kremlin narratives. Jonathan warns that European rearmament could be destabilized if friendly parties gain influence, while Mark argues that Europe’s rhetoric is not matched by decisive deterrence, prompting continued Russian pressure. Towards the end, Mike asks whether either side believes negotiations will lead to a real settlement. Mark says no; he believes the war will end on the battlefield with neither party accepting the other’s terms. Jonathan agrees that the conflict may endure for generations, with a possible hybrid warfare phase if direct conflict escalates, and he notes that China could benefit strategically if Europe becomes preoccupied or destabilized. In closing, Mike thanks the guests, who acknowledge the complexity and intractability of a definitive peace in the near term.

The discussion centers on why achieving a durable peace in Ukraine remains elusive, with participants insisting that every side seeks terms favorable to itself and that genuine compromise is seldom forthcoming. Putin’s true aims are debated. Jonathan argues that Putin’s primary concern is internal regime security rather than territory. He suggests that Ukraine’s shift toward Western political and democratic norms threatens Putin’s rule and his business model, making Ukraine a strategic buffer that could inspire similar Western reforms within Russia. He contends that the issue is not NATO expansion per se, but the regime’s fear of democratic influence emanating from Ukraine. Mark, by contrast, views the conflict as driven by a broader geopolitical contest, with Russia aiming to erase Kyiv’s Western alignment and to neutralize Ukraine as a political threat, a stance he says is explicitly stated by Russian representatives. He also emphasizes that for Russia, security guarantees and territorial concessions would be unacceptable if they leave anti‑Russian regimes in control of eastern Ukraine. The panelists repeatedly acknowledge that, in practice, peace negotiations are framed as a contest of terms. Rubio’s remark is cited to illustrate the perception that all parties want peace “on their terms,” and that Russia has repeatedly rejected deals that require concessions on its core objectives. A recurring theme is that Russia would prefer a permanent settlement that keeps Ukraine out of NATO and restores a neutral status for Ukraine, effectively precluding Kyiv’s future alignment with Western security structures. There is broad agreement that, on the battlefield, Russia has not achieved a straightforward, decisive victory and that the conflict is complex and protracted. Yet there is disagreement about whether Russia is “winning” or whether the front lines indicate a longer stalemate, with some arguing that Russia remains capable of imposing strategic costs and that the West has faced limits in providing advanced weapons or decisive deterrence. The discussion also touches on escalation risk, with some participants highlighting the risk of nuclear confrontation and the perception that Western powers, especially the United States, have been cautious in delivering the most potent capabilities to Kyiv. US and Western roles are examined in depth. Jonathan contends that the conflict has evolved into a US/NATO proxy dynamic, with the West providing support while avoiding a direct confrontation that could trigger a broader war. He argues that the Biden administration has pursued a cautious, incremental approach to armament and economic pressure to avoid escalation, while still trying to prevent a Ukrainian defeat. Mark challenges this, suggesting that Western policy has often been framed as preventing Ukraine’s collapse rather than decisively countering Russian goals, and he asserts that the U.S. has pursued objectives that do not aim for Moscow’s overthrow but instead for preserving a client state in Kyiv. The conversation also covers the Budapest Memorandum, the history of Western guarantees, and questions about whether Western promises would be reliable in a crisis. The role of NGOs, civil society, and media is debated. Jonathan explains that, prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian media was a mosaic with significant oligarchic influence, but that independent voices gained strength after 2014 and became more robust under pressure from government and oligarchs. He argues that Western funding for NGOs has aimed to promote democratic values and press freedom, though he concedes that some Western projects lacked a clear strategic objective. Mark counters by arguing that Russia also used civil society and NGOs as tools, though he asserts that Western leverage and funding were far more extensive and impactful. The debate includes a critique of US funding patterns and the potential for foreign influence shaping political outcomes. The participants discuss the possibility of freezing lines as a path to peace. They deem it unlikely: Mark says NATO presence near Russia’s borders remains unacceptable, and Jonathan notes that such a freeze would leave large Russian-leaning regions in Ukraine under a regime Moscow views as hostile. They acknowledge the political and military infeasibility of a durable ceasefire under the current conditions, given the entrenched positions and fortifications in Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. Looking ahead, the panelists foresee a long, possibly generational conflict unless there is a dramatic shift. Mark argues that the ultimate settlement would require regime change in Kyiv, while Jonathan suggests that both sides see no real path to a negotiated end under current terms, forecasting endurance of hostilities with periodic escalation and continued diplomacy as a façade that fails to yield a decisive peace. They anticipate Europe’s ongoing rearmament and potential domestic political shifts that could influence the trajectory of the conflict, with the broader global balance affected as countries reassess alliances and deterrence strategies.

I established a foundation in Ukraine prior to its independence from Russia, which has been active and influential in recent events. I appreciate criticism, but it should align with my views. During the upheaval, members of Congress, notably John McCain, visited Ukraine, showing support for those challenging their government. McCain's presence reassured the protesters in Maidan that they had backing from the United States. He emphasized that the struggle was about the future they desired and deserved for their country. What about the US ambassador?

I established a foundation in Ukraine before its independence from Russia, which has been active and influential in current events. While Putin will attempt to destabilize Ukraine, the majority of Ukrainians are committed to independence and aligning with the West. This struggle won't be easy, as Putin views a free Ukraine as a direct threat to his regime. Regarding accusations of anti-Semitism in Ukraine, it is indeed present, as anti-Semitism is historically rooted in this region.

During the 1989 revolutions, you funded dissident activities and civil society groups in Eastern Europe, including Poland and the Czech Republic; are you doing similar work in Ukraine? He replies that he set up a foundation in Ukraine before its independence from Russia, and that the foundation has functioned ever since and played an important part in events now. He says Ukraine can assert independence from Russia and move toward the West, though Putin will try to destabilize it; the large majority of Ukrainians are determined to be independent, and with freedom, free media, and a flourishing economy, his regime would be unsustainable. He is asked about antisemitism in Ukraine; he notes antisemitism is part of the DNA of that part of the world, and there is antisemitism.

George Soros explains that he set up a foundation in Ukraine before Ukraine became independent from Russia, and that the foundation has been functioning ever since and has played an important part in events now.

I outline the speaker’s central claims about George Soros, the CIA, and global political influence. The speaker contends that George Soros has been one of the CIA’s most valuable private assets for over forty years, acting as the civilian, deniable funding arm of American regime-change operations worldwide. Because of this, Soros is not only allowed in the United States but protected there, enabling him to operate with impunity, which the speaker says explains his arrogance and continued influence. The speaker traces a pattern of Soros-backed “color revolutions” starting with Serbia in 2000, refined in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and the Arab Spring in 2011. They assert that logos for USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the Open Society Foundations appear in all these cases, framing Soros as central to these movements. According to the speaker, the Arab Spring served as a trial run for Europe’s migrant crisis. They claim that in 2011 the CIA and Soros turned that playbook on Libya and Syria. Gaddafi allegedly warned in March 2011 that removing him would unleash millions to flood Europe from Africa; eight months later, Gaddafi was dead, Libya descended into chaos, and migrant waves began as predicted. By 2015–2016, the speaker asserts, battle-hardened jihadists and economic migrants were crossing the Mediterranean with iPhones, prepaid cards, and Twitter guides written in Arabic, described as the same social media mobilization tactics used in Kyiv and Tahrir Square. Wayne Madsen is cited as having called this pattern out in 2015, described by the speaker as a deliberate CIA social-engineering operation to fracture Europe from within, applying the same playbook to new targets. The speaker then asserts that the United States has been subject to this strategy from 2020 to the present, pointing to the summer riots of 2020 as an example. The claim continues that Soros’s Open Society Foundations donated at least $33,000,000 to groups that organized and sustained the 2020 riots, and that Soros-backed NGOs provided lawyers, maps, and logistics for the southern border caravans, as well as funding to influence police departments and district attorneys in major cities, effectively helping to elect them. The speaker argues that Soros is implementing the color-revolution playbook “on us now,” with the target being ordinary Americans rather than foreign nations. A historical reference is made to JFK, who allegedly spoke of splintering the CIA after the Bay of Pigs betrayal, a chance JFK did not realize, leaving the world the speaker claims the CIA built. The speaker notes that Hungary, a country of 9 million, has passed Stop Soros laws and expelled his operations, asking why the United States cannot do the same, and suggests finishing what JFK started.

Interviewer notes Soros funded dissident activities during the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe. Soros responds that he 'set up a foundation in Ukraine before Ukraine became independent of, Russia' and that 'the foundation has been, functioning ever since, and it played an important part in events now.' Asked whether Ukraine will assert independence from Russia and orient toward the West (not specifically NATO), he implies challenges ahead, stating 'No. Putin will try to destabilize, Ukraine.' He reiterates the foundation's ongoing role, saying 'the foundation has been, functioning ever since, and it played an important part in events now.' The discussion ties Soros's past funding of dissident activities to his ongoing Ukrainian foundation's role.

George Soros stated he set up a foundation in Ukraine before it became independent from Russia. According to Soros, the foundation has been functioning ever since and played an important part in current events. Soros believes Putin will try to destabilize Ukraine.

The speaker states that the foundation was functioning before Ukraine's independence from Russia. They claim Biden was deeply involved in Ukraine and had more patience than they did in trying to convert Poroshenko into a democratic leader.

We have been given an extraordinary blessing and our country needs people like George Soros who are fearless and willing to step up. George Soros is introduced by Hillary, who admires her greatly. He praises her speech on open society and her effectiveness in visiting Central Asia. Soros agrees with Hillary that there are people who now feel the need to get involved in electoral politics. He feels the same way and wants to become engaged in the electoral process in the US. In his foundations, he has supported those who believe in the idea of an open society.

The speaker believes his foundation's investments and efforts to promote an open society have been worthwhile and effective, despite difficulties and failures in individual programs, including issues in Russia. He expresses reservations about philanthropy, viewing charity as a corrupting activity, even within his own foundations. He believes charity corrupts recipients by fostering dependence rather than self-reliance or interdependence, turning them into objects of charity. It also corrupts the giver because people "suck up to him."

I established a foundation in Ukraine prior to its independence in 1990. Figures like George Soros were unfortunately everywhere in these events. This team consisting of people like Newland, Soros, and Biden, acted in favor of Hillary Clinton's interests and tried to prevent Mr. Trump from being elected. We can look at the Arab Spring in North African countries such as Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, as well as the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, and the Orange Revolution in 2004. The Revolution of Dignity in 2013 and 2014, all of this is related to his activities. He continued his operations in 2015 and 2016. Hunter Biden had deals in Ukraine, being on the board of directors of an oil and gas company in Ukraine. This explains the economic interests of the Biden family. Then there's the matter of supposed Russian election interference.