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Ashton Rifenski opens Going Underground from the UAE, referencing Antonio Gramsci and the idea of hegemony, and frames the day as one where the UN Security Council discusses maritime security in the context of what he describes as calls by Donald Trump that have “destroyed” that security, highlighting the Strait of Hormuz as half Iranian and half Omani owned and the broader global impact on prices for fuel, medicine, and food. He notes a visit by a “vassal state king” to Trump and contrasts it with the anticipated visit of Trump to the country with the largest economy by PPP powered by Iranian and Russian energy, suggesting that when Trump meets Xi Jinping, the U.S. life expectancy gap with Shanghai will be evident. Victor Gao, vice president of the Center for China and Globalization, joins from Beijing. Rifenski asks about a Financial Times headline claiming Tehran deployed a Chinese satellite to target U.S. bases in the Middle East and about U.S. claims that foreign entities, principally based in China, are engaged in deliberate industrial-scale campaigns, questioning whether China is supplying weapons to Iran. Gao responds by challenging the Financial Times’ premise, asserting that the UK paper is “owned by Japanese interests” and that China provides commercial satellite services openly available for international cooperation. He contends that China can engage in “commercial normal satellite services with any country,” including Iran, and says targeting versus weapons are distinct issues. He reiterates China’s position that it does not supply weapons to any country at war, and notes that China calls for an immediate end to the war and supports the UN Charter and international law, mentioning that the UN Secretary-General described the war as an aggression by the United States and Israel against Iran. Rifenski presses Gao on why China wouldn’t supply arms to Iran despite Iran’s energy ties with China. Gao emphasizes Iran’s capability to defend its sovereignty and notes no specific requests have been made by Iran for Chinese military aid, asserting China’s opposition to any allegation of arming Iran. He adds that Iran has demonstrated drones, missiles, and long-range capabilities, and states that China supports ending the war rather than escalating it. The discussion then shifts to whether China should have hosted negotiations between the U.S. and Iran. Gao notes Trump’s recent acknowledgment of China’s role in nudging Iran and the U.S. toward talks, highlighting Beijing’s diplomatic outreach via Wang Yi to over 20 foreign ministers to de-escalate. He mentions Pakistan as an intermediary and argues that China has sought a positive role, possibly facilitating or supplementing Pakistan’s efforts, while acknowledging uncertainty over Israel’s willingness to support a peace deal. Gao insists China’s commitment is to end the war and achieve peace. Rifenski and Gao discuss the broader implications of U.S.-China relations, the perception that the war is a test of U.S. strength, and the notion that China views a war with the United States as unwinnable for the U.S. He asserts that China aims to avoid headlined confrontations and prefers behind-the-scenes diplomacy, contrasting China’s approach with Western narratives. Gao argues that the global economy would suffer from U.S. aggression and asserts that the so-called Pax Americana is ending, accelerated by Trump’s policies. He notes China’s decreasing holdings of U.S. Treasuries and suggests the yuan’s growing role in international trade, predicting yuan settlement could rise from about 2.5-3% to 25-30% in the long term as more oil trades settle in renminbi. The interview closes with Gao offering advice to GCC countries, stressing that China’s involvement has historically led to peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia, while U.S. and Israeli involvement has led to hostility. He urges Middle Eastern actors to engage with China as a defender of free trade and peace, and to consider cooperation with China after the war to foster long-term regional stability.

Mister Miles Guo revealed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has expanded its military presence in South America and small countries near Australia. The CCP used tactics like selling advanced and affordable drones to these countries, establishing drone bases, and using blackmail and bribery to gain influence. They also parked cargo ships near the Bahamas and Cuba, filled with military devices. The CCP built a massive underground embassy in the Bahamas and established military bases in these countries, including missile systems and satellite launch bases. Meanwhile, Speaker 1 expressed concerns about the Biden administration's China-focused policies, including the potential stacking of the Supreme Court, abandonment of energy independence, and China's influence on the White House.

Einar Tangen, senior fellow at the TAIHE Institute and CIGI, discusses China’s shifting international diplomacy, including recent high-profile meetings involving Xi Jinping. He argues Beijing has studied Donald Trump closely after Trump’s first election, finding that his behavior is transactional and that China needs a “formula” for handling him. He says China has decided to be “somewhat firm” because attempts to be nice to Trump can lead to mocking and personal affronts, citing examples such as Zelensky. He also emphasizes that China must manage not only Trump but also the rest of the world’s repeated question—“What is China going to do?”—and he argues China is not seeking a toe-to-toe military confrontation with the United States because it would risk war, including nuclear war, and would drain resources from society. Tangen describes how China frames the issue through “red lines” and a claim that there is a path to dealing with Trump, alongside messaging such as security for all countries not dependent on others’ insecurity, each country’s right to development, and respect for sovereignty. He further argues China believes an appropriate endpoint for dealing with the current global system is outlasting it and leading by example through action rather than relying on messaging. He then turns to the question of how the United States arrived at Trump, arguing Trump is a symptom of a system dedicated to “anti-democratic democracy,” rather than an instigator that changed everything by himself. He traces what he calls structural changes back to the Powell Doctrine of the 1970s, which he says outlined that the American public cannot be trusted and that businesses should become aggressive in taking control of media and courts, fighting consumer protection, labor laws, and universities. He connects these developments to corporate influence in politics, arguing it increased money in elections and allowed corporations to back candidates with “as much money as they want.” He then links this to foreign policy shifts, including a “Clean Break Doctrine” associated with Richard Pearl, which he says emphasizes that Israel should dominate or decimate rather than pursue diplomacy. Tangen adds a third element through what he describes as Eldridge Colby’s 2021 strategy, “Strategy for Denial,” claiming it proposes denying China access to trade routes by controlling choke points (such as major canals and straits) and denying access to energy by intercepting or preventing distribution of what China produces. He presents these as a “blueprint” connecting domestic political control, exported logic into foreign policy, and foreign plus economic policy together. He also argues that changes in corporate leadership—from longstanding business families to “hired help” professionals—removed local community ties and oriented companies around profit-and-loss spreadsheets focused on maximizing shareholder value and bonuses, which he says helped shift aims and objectives. He describes this broader environment as producing a “world where there’s no empathy,” where civilian and prisoner killings are justified by cause, and where he claims “no heroes” exist because the approach relies on dehumanization and absence of empathy. To illustrate China’s approach and the global South perspective, he cites Belt and Road Initiative investment exceeding $1.3 trillion since around 2015, and discusses what he calls “dead trap diplomacy” claims about Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port. He says Hambantota port expanded cargo handling by 175%, requiring tens of millions of dollars in further expansion due to insufficient capacity, and argues there is typically a ramp-up period before profitability in ports. He connects this to his view that China expects skepticism but responds through continued performance rather than persuasion, noting that China “has given up” on quickly convincing critics and instead tries to convince “by action.” Tangen also argues that addressing U.S.-Israel-Iran escalation cannot be handled by China alone and requires overwhelming international coordination. He proposes that if countries do not trade with parties pursuing escalation, “all three of your economies will literally collapse,” describing this as peer pressure in an interconnected world. He further says the United Nations is “useless” due to veto power and argues a broader governance initiative may be needed. He describes the current global environment as containing “more than 80 conflicts,” with a crisis affecting a large share of energy and food through downstream impacts. He argues maximalist positions persist because there is no trust and parties feel the other side will not concede. He says that without an endgame, leaders rely on hate and refusal to talk, which he says increases the likelihood of war. In discussing media and political dynamics in the West, Tangen and the other speaker argue that rationality is being condemned and that opponents are treated as inherently evil—casting diplomacy as appeasement and making it difficult to restart negotiations. They also discuss censorship, harassment, intimidation, cancellations, and sanctions directed at academics and media figures who argue for adjustment to new realities. He describes discourse as shifting toward personalized accusations and lists examples of delegitimization through claims such as “apologist,” “propaganda,” or extremist labels. Tangen emphasizes that security competition shapes the debate: recognizing an opponent’s security concerns is treated as taking their side, which he argues prevents resolution. He says historical patterns—Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya—are associated with narratives that conflict would end rapidly with prosperity, concluding instead with “a trail of tears.” He argues there is no endgame when parties refuse to talk on moral grounds, and he hopes economics and trade can help reopen pathways toward negotiation, referencing the idea that after long periods of war, states often shift when they become economically constrained. The conversation ends with Tangen and Einar Tangen agreeing to stop there, with Tangen thanking him and expressing hope for continued rational debate about where the world is heading.

Jiang Shuichin argues that rapid shifts in international power generally become highly disruptive and destabilizing, often coinciding with major world-order changes after major wars or state collapses. He says the Iran war could have wider ramifications beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the region, potentially dragging the broader world into escalating conflict. He explains that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has long been a major driver of the global economy by selling oil cheaply in US dollars and recycling revenue into the US economy. If GCC states were removed from the global economy, he says it would have “tremendous consequences.” He claims that within “a month or two” the world could run out of strategic fuel reserves, grounding airplanes. He also links the conflict to global food supply, stating that the Tigray War provides one third of the world’s fertilizer, and that during the global growing season widespread famine could occur within “five months” or “six months,” especially in Africa. On the Middle East’s reorientation, he argues that Iran can control the Strait of Hormuz de facto, collect tolls, and de facto use it to reconstruct its economy, industrialize, and build stronger trade relations with China and Russia. He says the US imposed a naval blockade to embargo Iranian oil exports to China, but that enforcement is difficult due to the Indian Ocean’s scale and US resource limitations. He asserts that the UAE is “most desperate for war” after losing control of trade through the region’s shipping and finance hub. He adds that Saudi Arabia faces long-term threat dynamics because Iranian influence and proxies affect both Hormuz/Straight security and the Red Sea. He claims Israel wants the war to continue to advance the “Greater Israel” project and warns it has discussed attacking Turkey and Egypt next. He frames the region as a “powder keg,” arguing it is hard for the status quo to persist and predicting possible future breakout regional hostilities, including possible US airstrikes against Tehran and possible Israeli false-flag escalation modeled on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. He suggests the status quo could last “the next three to five months,” arguing Trump would avoid being seen as a loser and might pursue a tentative agreement before shifting attention elsewhere. He presents Cuba as a potential “next global flash point,” arguing the US embargo blocks Cuba from accessing fuel, food, and water, and that Raúl Castro could be indicted, recalling a prior pattern involving Maduro and special forces. He says Russia is heavily invested in Cuba and that both Russia and China are trying to support it. He predicts the Middle East conflict could expand to other flashpoints worldwide, including the possibility of tensions involving North Korea and South Korea, and he claims the war in Europe will also escalate. In discussing Russia’s Ukraine war trajectory, he references an attack on a student dormitory in Luhansk that reportedly killed at least six students and says Putin promised swift retaliation, framing this as potential movement from a “special military operation” toward declaring war and switching to “total war.” He then argues that European elites are trapped in a self-reinforcing fantasy that Ukraine is winning, describing domestic and institutional dynamics that prevent acknowledgment of losses and sustain continued war support. Regarding China’s and Russia’s roles, he says Iranian Foreign Minister Araki visited both Russia and China and claims Putin told him Russia is supportive of the Iranian people and views the US and Israel as aggressors. He says if Iran faces difficulties, Russia would reinforce Iran through the Caspian Sea and describes Russia’s response to GCC complaints about Iran. He contrasts China’s approach as neutral and mediation-focused, arguing China seeks peace and ceasefire so the world can return to global trade and that China refuses a clear stance. He also claims China might sign an agreement with the US to buy more LNG to compensate for lost Middle East LNG, especially Qatar. He describes negotiations between the US and Iran as having “three sticking points.” The uranium issue, he says, could allow compromise through allowing international inspectors while keeping uranium. The Strait of Hormuz control, he says, is core to Iranian security and not something Iran would give up. The third sticking point is Lebanon and the requirement that any peace treaty with the US also applies to Lebanon, including Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He argues that Israel’s offensive in Lebanon makes lasting peace unlikely and suggests any settlement with Iran would be tentative and could resume within “at most six months.” He argues the US cannot retreat from the Iran war because US financing needs depend on the world continuing to buy US Treasuries and because continuous bombardment is limited by depleted munitions stocks after earlier sustained airstrikes. He states that to “fight this war effectively” the US would need ground troops, which he says would require a national draft and also a chain of events to justify the invasion, including a need for “justification” to rally Americans and create broader economic chaos that would make the invasion acceptable. On Israel’s “Greater Israel” project, he argues that Lebanon is part of the project and that even if the US and Iran reach tentative terms, Israel’s long-term objective would continue, preventing permanent peace. He also claims the Zionist lobby has significant political sway in the US and cites campaign spending aimed at defeating a Republican congressman to warn others. He further argues that conflict models in Europe and Asia are tied to a broader US grand strategy: shifting global conflict to sustain debt and delay economic constraints. He says the US would aim to retreat geographically while still financing and arming partners to prolong wars. For East Asia, he claims the US might allow Japan and South Korea to handle more while American forces and allied structures support containment dynamics. Finally, he argues that Taiwan’s status quo is not sustainable and points to a “grand bargain” after Trump’s China visit. He says Western reporting frames the visit as unproductive, while Chinese media and experts view it as a breakthrough that could end the trade war. He claims the bargain could involve US access to China’s financial market and China opposing Taiwan independence, with the US pausing or blocking a weapons shipment to Taiwan and considering onshoring semiconductors. He states he expects Taiwan to be a future flashpoint only near-term at minimum and argues the next major flashpoint could be North Korea rather than Taiwan. He closes by describing a Western “legitimacy crisis,” attributing it to demographic crisis, financialization, and moral decay, and arguing it will lead to a decline of Western society. He also argues immigration debates are framed as purely pro-immigrant versus racist, while culture and cultural cohesion are not addressed.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

China uses other countries like Russia, Iran, and Hamas for its own benefit, without any real loyalty or friendship. Similarly, these countries rely on China for economic aid and military defense when they face isolation and sanctions from the US and its allies. This transactional relationship presents an opportunity for the US to intervene and disrupt these alliances. There is no honor among thieves, and when China, Iran, Russia, North Korea, Hamas, and Hezbollah are all considered, they can be described as thieves or even violent extremists.

Glenn opened by noting the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing and recalling Nixon’s 1972 visit as a historic opening, asking Chas Freeman for an assessment of why Trump is going, what’s on the agenda, and what to expect. Chas Freeman replied that Trump’s trip seems driven more by ego and the desire to feel honored in public pomp, rather than any clear strategic preparation. He contrasted the current visit with Nixon’s, which occurred amid a perceived Soviet expansion threat that made China a “protected state.” Nixon’s approach aimed to bind China to the West against a common threat, leveraging China’s sovereignty to counter Japanese expansion and Soviet influence. Freeman said the current moment lacks evidence of serious preparation or sherpa-style groundwork; there is a hurried, last-minute negotiation underway in South Korea between China’s trade negotiator and U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s administration. He suggested Trump is accompanied by senior American business figures seeking deals—likely Boeing sales, soybean trade, AI topics—and noted the China-U.S. contrast in AI strategies: the U.S. pursues general intelligence with heavy investment, while China applies AI to practical projects with open software. Freeman argued that beyond trade and tech issues, the broader context is muddled, with no obvious shared interests that would compel China to act concretely to help the U.S. in the Gulf or Hormuz, despite China’s interest in free trade and openness. He projected the question of how this meeting might affect West Asia: the war’s outcome signals a post-Iraq-Iran era emerging not favorable to the West, and he anticipated China’s strategic calculus would be to avoid being drawn into U.S. missteps while advancing its own interests in energy corridors and regional stability. Glenn speculated about wanting a grand power compromise (with Putin included) and suggested more is needed on Iran. He referenced Robert Kagan’s “The Jungle Grows Back,” noting that the West’s disregard for international law now clashes with a rising Sino-Russian-Iran axis. Freeman agreed with Kagan’s assessment of the war as a strategic debacle for the U.S., arguing that Iran’s retention of the Strait of Hormuz is likely and that international law is endangered in sea-navigational terms. He described a broader shift: Gulf Arabs may diversify away from the U.S., leaning toward Sino-Russian partnerships, and sea-power norms could be devalued. He emphasized that the conflict reduces the likelihood of a favorable new status quo and could push proliferation in the region; Iran may have or soon develop a nuclear capability, while others might follow. The war’s main strategic consequence, Freeman asserted, is a move toward a Sino-Russian axis and a transformed balance of power in the Middle East, with diversification away from U.S. security guarantees. Glenn added that the Nixon move was strategic, while Trump’s engagement seems tactical, and Freeman underscored the broader transformation in West Asia. They discussed the rule-of-law crisis in the West, the difference between “rule of law” and “rule by law,” and how domestic and international norms influence each other. Freeman argued that China has become a defender of the UN Charter and international law, in contrast to perceived Western unilateralism, and that the “jungle” is reconstituting a new order under Westphalian principles with many middle powers maneuvering. They debated whether China would want Iran to succeed to push the U.S. out of the region, and Freeman reiterated that the Chinese aim aligns with Westphalian sovereignty and peaceful coexistence, not ideological missionary diplomacy. They concluded that the Trump-Xi meeting could yield either a cautious pause or a dangerous misstep, given Trump’s temperament and Xi’s steadiness, and Freeman voiced cautious relief that nothing catastrophic occurs, while Glenn expressed a wish for a constructive outcome that could open space for rethinking Western hegemonic strategies.

- The speaker asserts that the United States is not just containing China but is attempting a rollback of Chinese economic growth, arguing that military power is largely a function of economic power. - They claim, “The United States… is a ruthless great power,” and that Americans are tough despite liberal rhetoric used to cover up ruthless behavior. - The speaker recounts a late-1980s/early-1990s warning to China: if China continues to grow economically, there will be a fierce security competition, and China would be shocked by how ruthless the United States is. - They state that China did not believe the warning at the time because the United States was treating China very well. - The speaker explains the underlying mechanism: “the structure’s gonna change, and when we go from unipolarity to multipolarity, and you’re a peer competitor, we’re gonna think about you very differently than we think about you now.” - They claim that this structural shift is exactly what is happening, with China moving toward being a peer competitor and the United States now treating China differently as a result.

Trump is officially three in o with China. Here's what nobody's talking about. China had a heavy investment in Iran. Trump neutered them. China had a heavy investment in Gaza. Trump secured a regional firewall. China straightforwardly controlled Venezuela for two decades. Trump's moving in and China's blinking for a third time. And that's why everyone is asking the wrong questions when it comes to Venezuela. The cover story is this: Trump's military buildup toward Venezuela is about countering narcoterrorism and targeting drug cartels like Trend Agua, which are tied to the president Nicolas Maduro's regime. But analysts go a step further and they still miss the mark when they say, well, this is really about regime change. It's neither of these things. I mean, yes, we've got a drug problem, but it's actually ties to a much bigger issue. Trump's Venezuela offensive is much bigger. It's his proxy war against China, and he's the only president in history who was actually fighting China where it hurts. As of this week, Trump has positioned over 10,000 US troops and eight warships in the region. We have helicopters and Reaper drones taking out narco boats. We have F-35s, and Venezuela has scrambled their jets. And this week, Trump has authorized the CIA to carry out lethal operations in Venezuela. We'll dive into that one a little deeper in the next segment. All this to ostensibly go after drug boats and fight narco terrorism. Yet everyone is taking this at face value. Listen. Why not have the coast guard stop them, which it is empowered by law to do? So Trump answers question as asked. Because we've been doing that for thirty years, and it has been totally ineffective. Even the ostensibly right-leaning National Review gets it wrong by musing that this is all about regime change. Here's why this whole Venezuela offensive is really about China, and this is a shadow war against Beijing. The first in history that looks like it will actually work. You see, attacking Maduro is attacking Xi Jinping. To think that Maduro is some independent agent is naive and foolish. Why is Venezuela basically China? Well, follow the money, the oil money. Again, remember what I said yesterday about why China is likely the biggest force behind the Gaza war in promoting Palestine and Hamas protests around the globe? Remember, it's about taking advantage of bad leadership that sits over cheap oil and cheap resources. China sweeps in, buys out the leadership, gets free gas, essentially. Venezuela is the poster boy of this predatory China oil game. Beijing is Venezuela's largest creditor by far. Venezuela has over 60,000,000,000 in debt to Beijing since 02/2007. It pays Beijing back in, you guessed it, oil. Venezuela is economically paralyzed by sanctions. The only country supporting Venezuela meaningfully is Beijing because they're the primary buyers. This forces Venezuela to sell their oil for next to nothing, meaning they'll forever be indebted to Beijing. That's the whole game. That's the way China plays. In May 2025, at the China CELAC Forum, Beijing gave Venezuela an additional billion dollars in new oil investments, solidifying Venezuela's position as the front lines of The US China shadow war. But China's interests in Venezuela go far beyond cheap oil and economics. Chinese companies are neck deep in modernizing Venezuela's ports and telecom infrastructures. And in all things related to Chinese companies, you're a fool to think the Chinese Communist Party does anything without making it a dual military civilian use project. I'll say it again. China does not allow its companies to operate in the world unless it could also be used for their national security purposes. So don't be fooled when Trump is using all this force and manpower and CIA expertise in Venezuela. This is Trump taking the war to China. He's doing what no other president before him was even remotely capable of accomplishing. Trump is declaring war on China's most valuable assets, Iran, Venezuela, Gaza. What do these tin pot dictatorships have in common? They'd be nothing without the Chinese Communist Party. And China would be nothing in the geopolitical stage without them. And now Trump is taking them, Iran, Gaza, and now Venezuela. Three strikes, and you're out, Xi.

Wang Wen, professor and dean of the Changyang Institute of Financial Studies and the School of Global Leadership at Renmin University of China, discusses Beijing’s view on the Iran war and its broader implications for China and the international order. - China’s position on the Iran conflict: Beijing emphasizes a resolution through political negotiation and opposes unilateral military action not authorized by the UN. China calls for a ceasefire, an end to hostility, respect for sovereignty and development rights, and opposes the maximum pressure campaign and long-term sanctions. This stance reflects adherence to international law, multilateralism, and safeguarding global peace, while aligning with China’s strategic interests as a major energy importer and advocate of multilateral solutions. - Context of a shifting world order: The justifications for a multipolar world are growing. The U.S. and Germany are viewed as nearing the end of their post–Cold War order, with the world entering a multipolar era. Two features cited: the U.S. has largely lost the capacity to dominate globally and may retreat to regional influence, while emerging powers (China, Russia, India, Brazil, and others) rise and constrain U.S. ability to contain them. Iran is seen as part of this broader transition, with the possibility of greater regional and systemic shifts over the coming decade. - China’s cautious but steady approach: China maintains a low-profile stance and continues normal trade with all sides (including the U.S., Israel, and Iran) while urging ceasefires and political resolution. US sanctions targeting Chinese banks and Iran are deemed unreasonable threats; Beijing signals it will counter such measures if pressed. - Belt and Road and Middle East investments: China’s Middle East investments and the Belt and Road Initiative (BI) face disruption due to the war. Oil imports via the Strait of Hormuz (about 35% of China’s oil) and China’s broader energy security are affected. China’s approach emphasizes diversification: expanding overland corridors (e.g., North–South routes, Eurasian Railway Express, Trans-C-Cascadia paths, Central Asia Land Corridor) and increasing energy sourcing from non-Middle Eastern suppliers (Russia, Central Asia, Africa, South America) to reduce reliance on maritime routes. Investment in Iran (about $5 billion, with projects across the region) has slowed as the war continues, with evacuations and impeded progress, though China’s strategic emphasis on diversified transport and energy remains central. - Taiwan issue and potential conflict: Wang argues that if China intends to resolve Taiwan by force, the U.S. would have already lost the capacity to stop it; a peaceful resolution is increasingly likely. He states that any use of force would target independence rather than the general public in Taiwan, and reiterates China’s long-standing preference for peaceful unification. - US–China–Russia triangle: The conflict reshapes this triangle. The U.S. is constrained by Iran, becoming more erratic, and signaling toward China and Russia. Russia benefits from higher oil prices and the Ukraine situation, while China faces oil-import pressures and market volatility. Overall, the U.S. strategy appears less capable of containing both China and Russia; both Beijing and Moscow gain strategic leverage in this environment. - Risks and opportunities for China if the war continues: Energy security risks rise due to higher oil costs and potential disruption to Middle East trade, complicating BI projects and regional diplomacy. The situation increases the appeal of diversification of energy sources and transport corridors. However, China typically prefers peace and stability as the best path for growth. - The new book and strategic opportunity: Wang promotes his book, New Strategic Opportunity: China and the World toward 2035, arguing that the world’s turbulence highlights China’s peace, stability, and prosperity as valuable. He contends that no matter the adverse environment, China can seize new strategic opportunities by focusing on domestic development, reinforcing that the longer the U.S. seeks conflict, the more China upholds peace and rises. - Closing observations: The interviewer notes the broader perception of China’s growing influence and responsibility in shaping a responsible international system, with Wang affirming a peaceful, opportunity-driven path for China’s rise.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson discusses the Iran conflict in depth, emphasizing that its outcome depends on multiple interconnected variables. He expands on a prior list of factors, adding his own: the actions of Russia and China, shortages of vital munitions, the resilience of the Iranian people, on-the-ground actors and energy facilities, the status of the Bab al-Mandab strait and the Strait of Hormuz, and the American public’s reaction to the war. He asserts that the conflict’s nature is central to understanding how events unfold. Wilkerson recounts his long experience in the U.S. military and in planning for war, noting his involvement in past U.S. positions toward Iran, including support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and later naval engagements in the Strait of Hormuz. He highlights a historical episode in which a U.S. Aegis cruiser fired missiles at an Iranian passenger airliner, a move he identifies as decisive in prompting Iran to accept a UN resolution and end the conflict. He argues that the current conflict is fundamentally misunderstood by U.S. policymakers, who he says fail to grasp the nature of a war against a "3,000 years old" and 90 million-strong people who would defend themselves violently, and who are willing to sacrifice to resist what they view as an imperial confrontation. Wilkerson criticizes public statements from U.S. officials—specifically Marco Rubio, Pete Hagseth, Donald Trump, and others in the administration—for lacking a coherent understanding of the conflict’s nature. He contends that Netanyahu’s objective is chaos in the region, extending beyond Iran to a broad Lavant corridor, and he adds that Turkey is watching closely, concerned about Israeli arming of Kurdish groups and the potential for battlefield shifts that could involve Turkey indirectly. He argues Turkey has already moved from being a bystander to a participant, given intelligence networks on the ground and potential strategic alignments. On the Kurdish issue, Wilkerson discusses U.S. considerations of arming Kurdish groups, noting that such moves would strain U.S. relations with Turkey and destabilize regional dynamics across Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. He recalls past U.S. actions—like support for Kurdish groups in Iraq after Operation Provide Comfort—and cautions that arming Kurds in multiple countries could provoke serious geopolitical fallout, including undermining Turkish cooperation and complicating Iran’s internal security. The conversation also delves into broader strategic implications. Wilkerson suggests a multipolar world is emerging, with China and Russia potentially benefiting from American overreach and regional chaos. He cites the Chinese decision to promote the renminbi as the world’s transactional reserve currency as indicative of China’s willingness to confront U.S. dominance, while acknowledging that China would avoid direct military engagement in a major war if possible. He warns that a nuclear-armed Israel alongside the United States attacking Iran presents a dangerous paradox, given Iran’s JCPOA-era transparency and nonproliferation commitments, contrasted with Israel’s undisclosed nuclear arsenal. Addressing U.S. military capacity, Wilkerson argues that the United States lacks sufficient munitions and will struggle to sustain an extended ground campaign in Iran. He contends that ground forces would face immense challenges, given Iran’s terrain, population, and the potential for civilian casualties. He also questions the credibility and consistency of U.S. political leadership, contrasting promises to restore the strategic oil reserve with failures to fund it, and he notes the potential consequences for allied countries like South Korea, which might reconsider its alliance given Washington’s willingness to reallocate defense assets. Wilkerson points to the broader humanitarian and strategic costs of the conflict, arguing that the war has already triggered civilian harm and that the narrative around supporting protesters and stopping missiles has evolved into a broader destabilization strategy. He emphasizes the risk that a limited victory could prompt renewed aggression elsewhere, and he suggests that the geopolitical chessboard in the region—Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Black Sea—could be poised for further turbulence if Western powers miscalculate. In sum, Wilkerson warns that the Iran conflict could escalate beyond a regional skirmish into a global confrontation, driven by misperceptions, overlapping national interests, and the strategic ambitions of major actors, including Israel, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and China.

George (Speaker 0) discusses an earlier conversation with Professor Glenn Deason asserting that the “ultimate aim” of Western trouble is China, and argues that China’s growing economic strength—described with examples like large-scale commerce in Shanghai—makes Western leaders treat China as an existential threat. He asks Sean Ryan where he stands on the possibility of a coming war with China, referencing developments in the Philippines, Japan, and Australia. Sean Ryan (Speaker 1) says China does not have to be an enemy of the Western world, but argues Western leaders have turned that relationship into a self-fulfilling prophecy. He says the Americans and Western Europeans have framed China as an existential threat over the last 10 years, increasing the risk that tension escalates beyond trade and tech conflicts into a hot war, “maybe in the South China Sea” involving the Philippines. He says he is “not particularly worried about Taiwan.” Ryan responds to remarks attributed to Mark Rutte, the NATO secretary general, claiming Rutte portrays China as the biggest threat to NATO and as Russia’s “puppet master,” forcing Russia to bomb NATO countries. Ryan calls that “preposterous talk,” adding that China is trying to improve economic relations with Germany, Italy, the UK, and other parts of Europe. He claims China accounts for about 30% of the world’s manufacturing and wants to export Chinese-made products into Europe, with companies such as Huawei and Xiaomi opening factories in Europe. He argues there may be “no pulling back” if Washington and Europe do not take a more pragmatic stance. George highlights a paradox involving leaders who, despite seeking strategic partnerships with China, also treat China as a threat, citing Keir Starmer’s experience in Shanghai and prior airport grilling by police. Ryan agrees and says Europe and India should get closer to China. He argues the United States poses a greater existential threat to Europe, pointing to Trump’s actions and rhetoric including Greenland. Ryan claims Germany’s biggest market is China and cites BASF investing about $7 billion in China, along with Mercedes, BMW, and Volkswagen selling most in China. He argues business leaders see politicians’ criticism of China as irrational because China drives major global GDP growth, estimating that China’s 2026 GDP growth alone is larger than Thailand and Vietnam combined. Ryan then addresses Australia, saying it depends on Chinese trade yet participates in an anti-China political posture. He claims China is Australia’s largest trade partner, buying iron ore, and that Chinese students are going to Australia; he notes that Chinese student numbers in the U.S. dropped about 20% in 2024 and suggests Australia benefits. He contrasts this with Australian politicians pushing alignment with the Quad, NATO, and the Western “curtain” to contain China. He says relations improved under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong compared with Scott Morrison, whom he describes as denigrating Chinese values. He argues ideological bigotry toward China exists in Australia and Europe, attributing it to discomfort with a powerful non-“predominantly white” nation rising. George notes that Japan is not improving and argues Japanese policy is shaped by the U.S., citing the U.S. dropping atomic bombs and referencing post–World War II tribunal accounts of atrocities committed by Japanese imperial and colonial forces in Asia. Ryan replies by claiming Japan is remilitarizing faster than China, with Japan set to double military spending over five years and China over ten. He also claims Germany made amends after WWII while Japan has not made proper apologies and rewrites history in school books. He describes an example involving a former classmate sent by the Japanese military to Harvard who allegedly said enslaved women were paid and “weren’t raped,” and says the individual later gained senior military authority overseeing China-Japan relations. George shifts to the Philippines as a “third front,” describing his earlier struggle against the Marcos dictatorship, and says Marcos is back, Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base are open, and the Philippines is being prepared for war. Ryan says he is “very scared” about the Philippines under Bongbong Marcos, describing deteriorating relations with China after being warm under President Duarte. Ryan claims Bongbong reopened Clark base, pushed the U.S. to invest more in Philippine military installations, and takes a stringent line against China. He argues China views Taiwan as cousins or brothers and wants peaceful reunification, but expects China to respond strongly to the Philippines, including “huge economic sanctions,” such as not buying Filipino fruit and potentially banning Chinese tour groups, referencing similar actions against Japan. He also says he worries about an accident between a Chinese fishing vessel and the Philippine Coast Guard that could ignite escalating conflict. Ryan frames China’s stance as unlikely to involve action against Taiwan and less likely against Japan due to Japan’s military and economic strength, but more likely to make “an example” of the Philippines to create pressure in the South China Sea. He concludes by saying Bongbong is a “tool of the United States” intended to create a proxy war that “bog[s] China down” like Russia was bogged down in Ukraine. George asks for a scorecard for the 105-year anniversary of the CPC. Ryan says the CPC has “got a nine and a half.” He argues China is better for low- and middle-income people, saying the government takes care of these groups, and he credits Xi Jinping with reining in capitalist excesses like those associated with Jack Ma and Alibaba, with wealth transferred toward education and healthcare improvements. He compares access to healthcare and specialist appointments, contrasting China’s quicker access with what he describes as delays in the United States. He ends with personal comments about safety in China, and George signs off with thanks to Sean Ryan and mentions The Split.

Ashwin Rutansi introduces New Order, a global show tracing how India and its allies sit at the center of a transformation in world history. The program aims to explore partnerships, shifting alliances, and how structural changes ripple from global powers to streets, villages, markets, and boardrooms. The show promises to examine diplomatic architecture, networks of power, money flows, and levers of influence, presenting a fundamental reordering rather than mere turbulence. Zara Khan will join later to field viewer questions. Guest: John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago professor and coauthor of The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. The discussion opens with the recent incident of Iran firing missiles at an F-35 and what it implies given anticipated US and allied arms purchases. Mearsheimer notes that aircraft over adversary territory face real risks from surface-to-air missiles and air defenses, even if the US and Israel have degraded Iran’s defenses. He suggests this is a factor behind why the US and Israel refrain from flying over Iran. Geopolitical framing: Who benefits from the ongoing war (in Iran) at the time of the interview? Mearsheimer identifies two clear winners: Russia and China. Russia benefits from sanctions relief on oil and gas pushed by Trump-era policies, and the war diverts munitions away from Ukraine, aiding Russia in its position. China gains as US credibility in foreign policy deteriorates, increasing its influence in the Middle East and globally as nations worry about an unreliable US, with Europe showing signs of leaning toward China. India’s position is discussed as a potential loser in this new order. The discussion asserts that India’s relations with Israel and Iran, and its ties to both the US and the Gulf, place it in a precarious position. The possibility of a summit or peace conference is deemed unlikely to solve inflation, gas prices, fertilizer costs, or Indian food production challenges; the war is characterized as bad news for India, as reflected in Indian media. On US policy and the Israel lobby: Mearsheimer contends that the Israel lobby has significant influence over US foreign policy and that its role in dragging the United States into wars, including Iraq in 2003, was central. He notes with some irony that the lobby’s power is increasingly in the open, referencing Joe Kent’s statements and public figures like Tucker Carlson and Bernie Sanders endorsing similar criticisms. He points to Francesca Albanese, UN official on Palestinian territories, describing the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocidal, and notes the lobby’s efforts to undermine her career. Policy advice for the Global South, focusing on India: Mearsheimer argues that India should maintain distance from excessive US alignment to avoid heavy leverage over Indian policy. He suggests speaking up against US policy when it harms national interests but avoiding becoming overly dependent on the United States. He cites examples such as Indonesia where maintaining friendly ties with China while balancing US relations would be prudent. He warns that excessive closeness to the US invites sanctions and pain, whereas diversifying partnerships could reduce vulnerability. BRICS and multipolarity: The war could benefit BRICS and the Global South, with Russia and China gaining, while some BRICS members like India and possibly Indonesia could suffer. The conflict may prompt a strategic rethinking of US ties, encouraging greater independence from Washington. The discussion also touches on Europe’s economic strain and NATO’s perceived setback if Russia prevails in Ukraine, describing a “double whammy” for European leadership from the Gulf conflict alongside Ukraine. End of interview: The program teases future exploration of the Israel lobby’s influence and the potential for a broader discussion on the end of the Israel lobby era, followed by viewer questions. Zara Khan presents questions from the audience, including whether the broader humanity will gain a say on the world stage and how the Iran war might differ from Vietnam and Afghanistan, emphasizing asymmetrical warfare and the risk of ground involvement. The show signs off, inviting viewers to follow and watch future episodes.

There was a debate over a line of reasoning: A, b, and c. Therefore, we had to do d, and that that's not true. It is, there there was a low lower level trade person who was slightly unhinged here in August. I think his name is Lee Quangong. And, it was threatening, saying that China would unleash chaos on the global system if The US went ahead with our docking fees for Chinese ships. And, this is clearly something that they were planning all along. I think that things can deescalate, that we don't want to have to escalate. We have things that are, more powerful than the the rare earth export controls that the Chinese want to put on. And, sir, to be clear, this is China versus the world. It's not a US China problem. Good news is that this is IMF week. A lot of my counterpart or all my counterparts are here. We're gonna be speaking with our European allies, with Australia, with Canada, with India, and the Asian democracies, And we're going to have a fulsome group, response to this because bureaucrats in China cannot manage the supply chain or the manufacturing process for the rest of the

Zhang Shueqin is discussed as a predictor known for predicting Trump’s reelection, Vance as VP pick, and a US–Iran war. The conversation centers on why he predicted a US attack on Iran and how it might unfold. Key reasoning about Iran war - The strongest evidence, according to Zhang, is the January 2020 US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, who led Iranian proxies. He argues that killing an Iranian envoy to the region amounted to a declaration of war, and that if Trump had won reelection in 2020, he would have most certainly declared war on Iran. - In the war’s first month, the US focus was decapitation of Iranian leadership, aiming to force surrender and regime change. Iran proved resilient and creative, leading the US to shift to a phase of attrition, attempting to cripple Iran’s war-financing capacity and oil exports to China, and to control Hormuz. This included a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. - The war is expected to be slow and world-news-muted, with efforts to pressure Iran economically and diplomatically to force a settlement. There is no off-ramp seen for the US because consequences are vast for regional players. Actors and interests in the region - Regional players: UAE, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Kuwait, viewed as wanting Iran defeated and the war prolonged. Iran’s leadership wants relief from sanctions and to retain Hormuz as leverage. - The United States: aims to sustain the petrodollar system; fears that if Gulf states decouple from the dollar or shift currencies, the American economy could suffer. The US would prefer to press sanctions and blockade to compel cooperation and debt-financing from global actors. - Israel: sees the conflict as an opportunity for its Greater Israel project, hoping regional chaos would redraw borders after the conflict. - China: wants an end to the conflict to protect global trade and its energy interests, and to preserve balance in its relations with Iran, the GCC, and other players. China’s leverage includes pressure on Iran and economic guarantees that encourage a ceasefire, while seeking to minimize direct conflict with GCC states. - Russia and others: Russia is discussed as arming and supporting Iran in a broader economic/military contest with the US; geopolitics involve maritime skirmishes and energy strikes in a wider economic war. World War III framework and economic warfare - Zhang argues we are already in World War III, but the war is economic and strategic rather than traditional kinetic warfare. The main combatants are the US and Russia in the maritime and energy sphere, with China central to US debt-financing and global trade stability. - Economic warfare includes targeting oil refineries, shipping lanes, and export capabilities; the purpose is to force political settlements and shift global economic order. - The US strategy is described as creating global chaos while maintaining North American focus, exporting conflict to Europe and East Asia to defend empire interests, and using debt and weapons sales to manage global markets. China, the US, and future diplomacy - A Trump visit to Beijing is framed as potentially signaling a rapprochement, followed by cooperation in three areas: trade (China buying more Western Hemisphere LNG and resources), Taiwan status (reaffirming one China policy), and AI collaboration. The larger aim is described as turning China into an economic vassal to the US empire. - Europe is described as already largely vassalized by US policy, with the war in Ukraine illustrating this subordination; popular discontent is rising (e.g., in Germany with the AfD), but European leadership remains aligned with Washington’s agenda. Iranian and European responses - Iran, facing economic pressures and geopolitical isolation, initially led the war, but China’s mediation and pressure contributed to a ceasefire. There is a rift between Iran’s political leadership and its military leadership over how to proceed with the war. - Europeans could escalate involvement in a broader conflict, but the US strategy appears to rely on Europe fighting longer against Russia while the US profits through arms sales and financial mechanisms. European leadership, according to the discussion, remains cautious and influenced by external powers. Israel’s position and the broader arc - Israel is depicted as pursuing a death-cult, eschatological strategy that could unify Jews globally but increase regional instability. The greater aim is for Israel to benefit from regional chaos, while risking broader conflict. Future trajectories and civilizational decline - The discussion suggests that, in the short term, the US may appear to win economically, especially through debt-financed global demand for US energy and weapons, but in the mid- to long-term, imperial decline could lead to civil conflict within the US, driven by factional struggles between Wall Street financiers and tech oligarchs backing AI surveillance/state power. - The potential for a third Trump term is linked to deeper internal conflicts and the acceleration of violence or civil unrest, with religion offered by some as a potential stabilizing force in American society. - Three symptoms of imperial decline are privatization, financialization, and individualization; yet the speaker believes a Christian-nationalist revival could renew the republic. Closing stance - Across the discussion, the US empire is portrayed as pursuing an expansive, conflict-driven strategy to sustain power, while global players seek various economic and strategic outcomes. The overall forecast emphasizes ongoing, multi-front tensions with no easy peace, and a complex interplay among US, European, Middle Eastern, Russian, and Chinese interests.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss the future of the West, NATO, Europe, and the international economic system. - The central dynamic, according to Wolff, is the rise of China and the West’s unpreparedness. He argues that the West, after a long era of Cold War dominance, is encountering a China that grows two to three times faster than the United States, with no sign of slowing. China’s ascent has transformed global power relations and exposed that prior strategies to stop or slow China have failed. - The United States, having defeated various historical rivals, pursued a unipolar, neoliberal globalization project after the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of that era left the U.S. with a sense of “manifest destiny” to shape the world order. But now time is on China’s side, and the short-term fix for the U.S. is to extract value from its allies rather than invest in long-run geopolitics. Wolff contends the U.S. is engaging in a transactional, extractive approach toward Europe and other partners, pressuring them to concede significant economic and strategic concessions. - Europe is seen by Wolff as increasingly subordinated to U.S. interests, with its leadership willing to accept terrible trade terms and militarization demands to maintain alignment with Washington. He cites the possibility of Europe accepting LNG imports and investments to the U.S. economy at the expense of its own social welfare, suggesting that Europe’s social protections could be jeopardized by this “divorce settlement” with the United States. - Russia’s role is reinterpreted: while U.S. and European actors have pursued expanding NATO and a Western-led security architecture, Russia’s move toward Greater Eurasia and its pivot to the East, particularly under Putin, complicates Western plans. Wolff argues that the West’s emphasis on demonizing Russia as the unifying threat ignores the broader strategic competition with China and risks pushing Europe toward greater autonomy or alignment with Russia and China. - The rise of BRICS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are framed as major competitive challenges to Western economic primacy. The West’s failure to integrate and adapt to these shifts is seen as a strategic misstep, especially given Russia’s earlier openness to a pan-European security framework that was rejected in favor of a U.S.-led order. - Within the United States, there is a debate about the proper response to these shifts. One faction desires aggressive actions, including potential wars (e.g., Iran) to deter adversaries, while another emphasizes the dangers of escalation in a nuclear age. Wolff notes that Vietnam and Afghanistan illustrate the limits of muscular interventions, and he points to domestic economic discontent—rising inequality, labor unrest, and a growing desire for systemic change—as factors that could press the United States to rethink its approach to global leadership. - Economically, Wolff challenges the dichotomy of public versus private dominance. He highlights China’s pragmatic hybrid model—roughly 50/50 private and state enterprise, with openness to foreign participation yet strong state direction. He argues that the fixation on choosing between private-market and public-control models is misguided and that outcomes matter more than orthodox ideological labels. - Looking ahead, Wolff is optimistic that Western economies could reframe development by learning from China’s approach, embracing a more integrated strategy that blends public and private efforts, and reducing ideological rigidity. He suggests Europe could reposition itself by deepening ties with China and leveraging its own market size to negotiate from a position of strength, potentially even joining or aligning with BRICS in some form. - For Europe, a potential path to resilience would involve shifting away from a mindset of subordination to the United States, pursuing energy diversification (including engaging with Russia for cheaper energy), and forming broader partnerships with China to balance relations with the United States and Russia. This would require political renewal in Europe and a willingness to depart from a “World War II–reboot” mentality toward a more pragmatic, multipolar strategy. - In closing, Wolff stresses that the West’s current trajectory is not inevitable. He envisions a Europe capable of redefining its alliances, reconsidering economic models, and seeking a more autonomous, multipolar future that reduces dependency on U.S. leadership. He ends with a provocative suggestion: Europe might consider a realignment toward Russia and China as a way to reshape global power balances, rather than defaulting to a perpetual U.S.-led order.

Afshun Rutansi speaks with Professor Zhang Weiwei, director of the China Institute at Fudan University, who has translated for Chinese paramount leaders including Deng Xiaoping. Rutansi frames the discussion around Trump’s visit to China amid the Israel-Iran war context and events including officials meeting in Delhi and a reported Saudi initiative for a West Asian aggression pact with Iran ahead of Putin’s and Xi Jinping’s scheduled meeting in Beijing. Rutansi asks whether Chinese officials understand that Xi Jinping is meeting a U.S. president responsible for attacking one of China’s key energy trading partners. Zhang says many Chinese prefer Trump over Harris for being “slightly more honest,” and contrasts Trump’s “decent respect” for big powers such as Russia and China with perceived hypocrisy from Biden and Harris. He argues that China should manage damage through dialogue given U.S.-China as the two largest economies and military powers. Rutansi raises historical memory, arguing that the U.S. deliberately prevented China from buying grain during Mao’s famine and imposed a naval blockade of food. Zhang responds that, during the Cold War, although no “hot wars” occurred between the U.S. and Soviet Union, China faced the Korean War and the Vietnam War as direct military confrontation with the U.S., and that China remembers the U.S. drawing lessons from those conflicts and that China would fight back if “red lines” were crossed. On claims that Trump is “destroying China while smiling” and attacking China’s energy supplies, Zhang says operations tied to Venezuela and Iran are aimed at controlling oil China needs. He says Venezuela represents less than 3% of China’s total oil imports, so it “will not affect” China’s oil supply, while the Iran situation is “more serious” and is treated as a mistake from which China can benefit due to long-term energy planning pursued for about two decades. Zhang says China’s energy dependency on foreign supply is at maximum 15%, and outlines China’s current energy mix: about 52% from coal described as “processed green coal,” 20% from renewables, and the rest from traditional oil and gas, with roughly 70% of those fuels from foreign sources. He lists diversified oil supply routes including lines from Russia, Central Asia, and Myanmar, and highlights a railway connection between China and Iran as “hugely important for Iran.” Rutansi asks whether this railway was bombed as part of a U.S.-Israeli campaign; Zhang says the U.S. “really dare[s]” not to damage it overall and that on the whole it is still moving. Zhang links U.S. efforts to containment with previous trade and tech wars starting in 2018, saying they “failed completely,” and cites an ASPI report comparing critical high-tech technologies where he claims China beats the U.S. in 57 of 64. He argues China’s position is that the Strait of Hormuz should remain open and places responsibility for the crisis’s consequences on U.S. and Israeli military action, while also saying China has “strategic partner” relations with Iran and Gulf states and hopes for reconciliation between Iran and the Gulf States. In part two, Rutansi asks why China was not hosting or acting as intermediary in negotiations and whether China spoke through Pakistan. Zhang says China prefers “behind the scene, low key” approaches. Rutansi then addresses claims that China could use rare earths as leverage and asks why China exports rare earths to the U.S. Zhang says China has exercised stricter control over rare earth exports to the U.S. since the previous year, stating that for a one-year period there would be no rare earths for military purposes, and that China can exercise this control during negotiations. Rutansi asks whether China will reduce exposure to U.S. treasury markets; Zhang says China-U.S. trade relations are normal overall, but that Trump’s trade war led to a sharp drop, and describes China’s “socialist market economy” as driven by private and public enterprises. He rejects “moralistic perspective” as the main lens, stating that China follows international law and Chinese law, condemns aggression, and applies sanctions through the United Nations if necessary. Rutansi criticizes propaganda narratives and asks about the U.N. General Assembly president Annalina Beerbok calling Xi Jinping a dictator, asking whether that makes things difficult for China and the U.N. Zhang argues the issue lies in EU politics and what he calls low caliber of EU, U.S., and NATO leadership, and says he predicted that without political reform, worse leaders would be elected. On whether working classes in NATO countries will see through propaganda that China is the enemy, Zhang says opinion surveys show China’s impression improving gradually in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and in the West, especially among young people, attributing this in part to widespread use of Chinese hardware and software. He also explains that American and other foreign companies invested in China because of profits, and says the trade war and tech war drove high-tech firms to consolidate business interests in China; he mentions Apple, Tesla, Microsoft, and says Boeing has not been purchased in nine years while Boeing’s CEO is now in China.

Einar Tangin and Glenn discuss the forthcoming Xi Jinping–Donald Trump meeting and the broader strategic landscape shaping U.S.–China competition. - On the Trump–Xi meeting: Tangin expects very little substantive outcome. China’s strategy toward the United States is to keep engagement open rather than push Trump into a corner, despite Trump’s past actions and their consequences. He notes a narrow scope to be discussed in a California meeting, with Trump volunteers unprepared and pushing “the usual maximist stuff.” China is signaling that Taiwan will be a red line. Beyond that, the Chinese may accept limited concessions such as grain, gas, or oil purchases, but no sweeping arrangements. The overall takeaway: continued engagement, but not a game-changing breakthrough. - U.S. energy and global strategy: Tangin argues the United States uses energy as a tool of influence, aiming to control access and shape markets (the petrodollar legacy, strategic chokepoints). The Ukraine war has accelerated Europe’s decoupling from Russia and the U.S. seeks to expand similar dynamics in East Asia. He emphasizes that the energy game is dynamic: oil prices impact inflation, and long-term, demand destruction and a shift to alternatives (electricity, renewables) will reshape markets. He points to new energy tech and scale: batteries and storage (CATL’s battery capacity) enable large-scale decoupling from fossil fuels; China’s plans to deploy up to 50 nuclear plants at a time and to pursue commercially available fusion power could transform the energy landscape. The U.S. may face higher exploration costs and geopolitical risk in sustaining high oil output, while heavy reliance on fossil fuels could erode long-term economic viability. - Global consequences and who bears the pain: In the short term, countries without reserves (notably parts of the Global South, including India) will face fertilizer and diesel shortages during planting seasons, with potential 15–25% yield reductions and elevated inflation. Food security risks loom as energy costs ripple through fertilizer, transport, processing, and farming inputs. The analysis highlights fertilizer nitrogen production’s energy intensity and the cascading nature of energy in food supply chains. The discussion stresses that global south economies will be hit hardest early on, with food and fuel inflation compounding social and political pressure. - The Iran war and maritime strategy: The discussion connects the Persian Gulf crisis to broader blockades and maritime competition. A naval blockade approach risks escalation and confrontation with China, which has extensive trade links through ASEAN and other partners that would be harmed by disruption. Tangin notes that China cannot be easily forced into combat in Europe or the Middle East; any escalation involving tactical nuclear use would be dangerous. He suggests that Europe’s elites may push for confrontation against Russia, but the political climate and energy constraints could destabilize Western allies and push towards alternative alignments, particularly with China. - China’s strategic posture and alternative world order: Tangin emphasizes that China has a model that emphasizes no ideology between states, sovereignty, and mutual non-interference, echoing a Westphalian framework. He describes China’s global governance concept as a peer-to-peer, negotiation-centered approach, where disputes are settled at the table rather than through force. He frames China’s proposition as simple: “No more ideology between countries. Every country should be secure. Security should not depend on the insecurity of another country. Every country has the right to choose its own path of development.” This is presented as a peaceful, governance-based alternative to U.S.-led hegemony. - Europe’s strategic crossroads and the future: Europe faces existential economic strains, competitiveness challenges, and the temptation of isolationist or right-wing governance. The conversation predicts prolonged political volatility if energy prices and inflation persist, with potential swings between different leaderships. China’s strategy, in this vision, is to promote internal diversification and consumption-led growth while engaging with international partners on a governance framework that reduces the incentives for confrontation. - Concluding note: The speakers agree that Europe’s willingness to embrace China’s model, rather than clinging to a confrontational U.S.-led paradigm, could shape a more stable global order. They caution that the old order has ended, and creative destruction is underway, with China advocating a negotiated, governance-based path forward.

One speaker considers the possibility that China, India, or Pakistan might escort a ship through the Strait of Hormuz and worries about a potential direct confrontation between the United States and those countries. He notes there is no expected confrontation between Pakistan and India, highlighting an open line of communication, a good relationship, and that one of them is a mediator in negotiations. China, however, is described as a different case, with increasing parallels to what was seen between the United States and Russia in the early Cold War era. The other speaker expresses hope that the Chinese will not decide to confront the Americans over the Strait. He bluntly states that the Chinese are not friends with the United States anymore; while they have long-term economic partnership and linked economies, the current administration has been placing tariffs on China and threatening more tariffs. News reports are cited indicating that China will provide the HQ-9 air defense system, which is described as far superior to the Russian S-300, to Iran. He emphasizes these are defensive weapons, not offensive capabilities, and notes that the administration is likely to be distressed by this development. Despite the administration’s stance, the speaker asserts that providing defensive weapons to another country is something done routinely and acknowledges that this move could enhance Iran’s defensive posture. He mentions the possibility that the Chinese supply could even enable Iran to detect F-35 aircraft, though he notes uncertainty about this point. The situation is characterized as a game changer and described as a behind-the-scenes nuance that the average American might not fully understand, as well as perhaps the administration not fully grasping it. The speaker reiterates that the Chinese plan is to provide these defensive weapons to Iran, describing it as a soon-to-occur development.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson discusses the US summit with China under Donald Trump, arguing that China “owned the summit” through choreography and by ensuring Taiwan was addressed as a first priority in every meeting. He describes Xi Jinping as standing firmly and approaching Trump with gestures and gestures alone, saying Trump “lost” because the real issues were not substantively addressed. Wilkerson links the meeting’s outcomes to economic and strategic signaling: China would resume buying US soybeans and make other gestures, and it might restrict exports of chemicals used in fertilizers; he also raises that farmers are facing fertilizer shortages and could face a disastrous season. On Iran, Wilkerson says the summit amounted to Trump and Xi making points while both were lying, and he focuses on the failure to engage the core issues. He claims the US did not accomplish much beyond expressing interest in opening the Strait of Hormuz, and he connects the Iran situation to broader strategic challenges, including Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, and related military considerations. He also argues that US efforts to pressure Iran were tied to US-China relations but that US statements about not seeking China’s help were performative and aimed at projecting hegemonic power. Wilkerson emphasizes that China’s position on Iran is conditional on issues like lifting the siege, permanent cessation of war, compensation for damages, removal of all illegal sanctions (primary and secondary), and respect for Iran’s sovereignty and rights. He says these points would still not satisfy Benjamin Netanyahu, who he portrays as accepting only a scenario that eliminates the current Iranian leadership and results in instability across the region. Wilkerson notes that the nuclear program was not treated as a key discussion point publicly, implying that any progress would likely require back-channel arrangements rather than open diplomacy. The conversation includes Wilkerson’s view that China is circumspect about an arms race involving nuclear weapons, especially given the lack of treaties and the increase in the number of nuclear-capable states. He also argues that US intelligence and the intelligence community do not believe Trump when Trump says China is not providing arms to Iran, and he describes a domestic escalation in response to alleged leaks, including efforts by Kash Patel to target whistleblowers and journalists. Wilkerson says US diplomats were minimal and that the trip functioned like a business trip, with Donald Trump himself as the lead figure. Speaker 0 questions whether the US overstated what China agreed to about Iran’s nuclear constraints. Wilkerson responds by broadening the analysis to global power shifts and the developing view in the West that recognizes China’s rise. He contrasts China’s framing—sustainability, development, innovation, cooperation—with what he describes as the US stance—sanctions and war, including “maniacally” by Iran. He claims the world sees the US as losing its way and turning toward a technocratic, global project that would use Chinese technology and rare earths, likening it to the kind of system associated with Elon Musk, and he warns of an “insidious” trajectory driven by elite technocrats rather than true diplomacy. He then discusses a wider domestic and geopolitical risk of breakdown, citing limits to removing Trump from office, describing impeachment as having failed historically, and portraying a worsening situation. Wilkerson alleges that mainstream media exposure of information is alarming Trump, and he cites the sending of Kash Patel as an example of escalating hostility toward journalists and whistleblowers. He argues this could leave the country vulnerable to outcomes including JD Vance or Marco Rubio, or even civil conflict. Wilkerson compares current potential US breakdown to the Roman Republic’s fall and Julius Caesar’s assassination, describing how civil wars followed until Octavius emerged and established stability (the Pax Augustus). He says the analogy suggests civil conflict is not impossible under present circumstances, without identifying any specific “Octavius” figure. He argues that sweeping international power changes and domestic polarization can lead societies to think in all-or-nothing terms, paralleling conditions that preceded historical upheavals like the Russian Revolution. The episode concludes with the idea that unsustainable paths will force some pullback or escalation, with Wilkerson expressing hope it does not become catastrophic.

China's support for Iran and Iran's support for Hamas are concerning in the broader geopolitical context. China and Iran have a 25-year weapons deal, making them firm partners. Recently, China and Russia blocked any response to a terror attack in Israel, which undermines relationships between the US and Gulf Arab States. The administration's dealings with China have negatively impacted the American economy. The Chinese Communist Party sees the attacks in Israel as advantageous for their geostrategic goals and their plans regarding Taiwan.

Brian Berletic discusses connections between the US “economic war against China” and wars/proxy conflicts involving Russia and Iran, arguing that the US seeks primacy rather than balance of power and uses diplomacy to build pretexts for additional war and to shape geopolitics. He says US policymakers do not expect China to pressure Iran or to pressure Russia, because China has reasons to avoid helping isolate itself, and he frames US actions as deliberate attempts to keep adversaries from becoming independent centers of power. He argues the US aims to weaken Russia, Iran, and China by creating wedges and subordination through client regimes and proxies. He claims Europe, Israel, Persian Gulf states, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are treated as extensions of US foreign policy rather than independent balancing powers. He also contrasts what he describes as US strategic framing—portraying America as reasonable while treating opponents as “evil”—with the claimed reality of proxy war, including in Europe and Iran. When asked about the goal of restoring primacy, Berletic says the US tries to pursue multiple forms of dominance—military, financial, trade-route control, and technological dominance—while acknowledging it is becoming less realistic as China surpasses the US plus its proxies. He says US strategy, as he describes it, shifts to wrecking multiple theaters and trade systems rather than direct head-to-head conflict, including efforts to disrupt energy exports and contested waterways. He cites US-created crises in the Middle East and describes US pressure on Indonesia near the Strait of Malacca, attempts to gain military access to that chokepoint, and blockading tactics affecting Russian energy exports and other routes. He claims the US has reorganized the Marine Corps into an anti-shipping force “specifically” for interdicting shipping, with preparation starting before the Trump administration. He argues that these actions aim to increase leverage over Asian states through energy dependence on US LNG exports, and to coerce regional countries away from balancing China. He compares this to how he says the US subordinated Europe via energy dependence, including by disrupting Russia–Europe energy flows over years. Addressing the US strategy’s “double blockade” concept and chokepoints, Berletic argues it is not about shutting everything down instantly. He claims the US does not need to seize every ship; he says ships often turn back and/or are disabled or seized, and he points to examples of US warplanes disabling ships. He argues this creates deterrence and manages economic damage rather than causing total collapse at once, with the goal of controlled destabilization and increased dependency that can be used to disrupt what China is doing in the region. On the Russia–China dynamic, he says Russia is a large energy producer and shares a direct border with China, leaving fewer “middle countries” through which disruption can be mediated compared with routes like Russia–Europe gas via Ukraine. He argues that because Russia and China together can attract other states into a broader gravitational pull, the US strategy carries risks but fits a longstanding pattern of maritime corridor control and chokepoint strategies. Berletic expands on what he describes as long-running pressure against Belt and Road corridors: he claims US-backed militants attack Belt and Road infrastructure in Myanmar and that the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is attacked by US-backed terrorists. He also describes attacks in Afghanistan against the Afghan government and Chinese investments, framing this as a long-term “global dirty war” against China and its partners. When discussing Iran and Russia, he says Iran and Russia could strike deals with the US but are instead aiming to prevent a return to the prior status quo of sanctions/perpetual threats and NATO’s incremental expansion. He frames their posture as insisting adversaries must be included in the security architecture. He then compares the current era to a “new great game,” arguing it extends beyond Eurasia and now involves technology and rapid integration of advanced capabilities into deterrence for states such as Iran. He characterizes US behavior as either dividing adversaries or weakening them to prevent coordination. He says the US does not want friends among Iran or Russia because it wants them to be subordinated or weakened; otherwise, he claims they would work together with China. Finally, regarding Taiwan, he says the US “keeps” the one-China policy rhetorically but undermines it in practice through laws, troop presence, and military cooperation with Taiwan alongside regional partners, framing US support as preventing any meaningful back-off. He says US diplomacy functions as cover, including in relation to Russia/Ukraine and Iran, and describes US strategy as a multi-domain approach that already functions as economic and proxy war against China while escalating across Russia, Iran, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific military integration. He concludes by warning that US policy will likely continue escalating and that China’s ability to build faster than the US can disrupt and destroy is central to whether open conflict can be deterred.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.