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The conversation centers on a reported peace framework and the idea that Iran is “giving up all of their chips” and cards. The speaker says many people seem to believe the rumor that a peace deal is in play, and reacts by calling themselves an optimist while insisting the approach must be “realistic.” The speaker argues that any peace deal “won’t be acceptable to Israel,” and that the key requirement is taking steps to restrain Israel. They say that, if the U.S. looks at the Israelis “with clear eyes,” it could achieve a deal with Iran that does not include everything the U.S. wants—for example, the speaker says Iran will not “hill(s) in the deal about zero enrichment” and will not “hand us over all your enrichment.” The speaker’s main goal is ending the fighting, which they say is “definitely possible.” However, the speaker expresses skepticism that the U.S. has taken the first “hard step” of telling Israel it is “done taking offensive action without our permission.” They describe the war as “existential for the Israelis,” and argue the situation cannot assume Israel will not face conditions that could lead to continued attacks or another “terrorist attack.” The speaker says the U.S. cannot “take that off the table” or “rule it out,” and cannot allow others to dismiss considerations as “a conspiracy theory.” The speaker further claims the U.S. has had institutional difficulty being skeptical and “not trusting” regarding Israel, saying Israel “lied us, lied to us to get us into this war.” They argue the U.S. needs to “turn Matter” (stating “as a matter of fact”) and apply more verification, especially because Israel is described as an ally that has misled the U.S. Finally, the speaker says if Israelis believed the U.S. would extricate itself from the conflict, “there would be an element within Israel” seeking actions to prompt Americans to recommit to the conflict, reinforcing the need for not taking anything off the table and emphasizing verification.

Saeed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team, discusses the status and prospects of a potential Iran–United States memorandum of understanding (MOU) and broader regional implications. Marandi says optimism is warranted but argues the Israeli regime’s attack on Beirut will change calculations. He asserts the attack aimed “to prevent a deal from happening” and to ensure that Iran and the United States do not agree on an MOU. He characterizes Iranian reasoning as: if the United States is not serious, or cannot control events, or is “playing good cop, bad cop,” then Iran has no reason to negotiate. He claims there was “close to an agreement” previously, but that a final text had not been achieved, despite statements by Trump and mediators that it was finalized. He describes a sequence of events: negotiations were close to a deal two or three weeks earlier, then Americans attempted to impose new conditions that stopped talks. He says Israelis attacked Beirut after that, Iran retaliated, and the United States began attacking Iran. He states that on Wednesday a Qatari delegation was sent to Iran to indicate the United States withdrew those conditions, leading negotiations to return to normal. Marandi then says a United States attack that Wednesday night is believed to have been intended to “hide the fact” that the conditions were withdrawn, so that any later agreement would appear to come from strength. Marandi outlines terms he says are already “what you already know” from weeks of discussion: lifting/waiving sanctions on Iran’s energy exports; releasing Iranian assets through a particular mechanism; ending the Gaza conflict and forcing the Israeli regime to retreat; ending a siege; Iran promising not to develop nuclear weapons; and normalizing civilian trade through the Strait of Hormuz. He adds that Iran says it will continue to control the Strait, receive fees from shipping, and not allow ships belonging to Iran’s enemies to pass. He emphasizes an internal Iranian debate on implementation assurances. Critics argue the United States cheated Iran under Obama in the JCPOA by failing to honor obligations after Iran implemented its side, creating concern that the same one-sided outcome could recur. He notes questions being raised: whether the United States will actually release Iranian assets; whether the Israeli regime will stop killing in Lebanon or continue occupying Lebanon; and whether assurances are adequate. Marandi says the attack on Beirut has pushed that intense debate aside for now because Iranians are focusing on Lebanon. He argues Israeli actions increase unity within Iran by reinforcing sensitivity to Lebanon-related red lines. He also argues Netanyahu’s actions undermine Trump politically, making it appear the U.S. is subordinate to Israelis and angering ordinary Americans, while also worsening the economic and energy crisis. On the Strait of Hormuz, Marandi says there is no final text and agreement is not imminent because of the Beirut attack and unresolved issues, especially assurances about stolen assets and whether U.S. forces will pull back. He describes competing positions: negotiators say Iran will control the Strait and impose fees while allowing ordinary shipping to pass normally; critics say the deal does not include adequate guarantees and that reopening the Strait would make it difficult to close later if one side violates commitments. Asked about regional change, Marandi says implementation of a deal would be a turning point, including symbolically forcing the United States to accept defeat in cases where it is not Iranian “capitulation.” He adds that even without a deal, he believes the region is moving toward countries recognizing that the United States is not protecting them, and toward models like Iran–Oman and Iran–Iraq. Marandi also links Western rhetoric and escalation to Iranian attitudes, citing Trump’s tweeted language about an “ultimate alternative” if Iran does not sign, which he reads as a nuclear threat. He expects a likely limited war, at least because Iran would probably respond to the Israeli regime regarding Beirut and because the “genocide” in Lebanon is too severe for Iran to ignore. He says he does not know the decisions “from the inside,” but argues the key question is who calls the shots—Trump or Netanyahu—and that each scenario delays negotiations and worsens prospects for an agreement. He concludes that the Beirut attack will have set back the U.S.–Iranian deal and could further derail it, at least for a while, as the economic crisis worsens.

Ambassador Chas Freeman, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, discusses tensions in the Middle East, focusing on the Israel–U.S. relationship, a potential U.S.-Iran framework, and broader regional and global implications. Freeman says there is “a great deal of tension” between Netanyahu and Trump, asserting that Netanyahu “basically talked Trump into this war,” which “gone very badly” and appears to end without achieving stated objectives. He describes a potential Trump exit strategy: allowing Congress to vote to end the war and portraying it as a betrayal by Democrats and “apostate” Republicans. Freeman argues that any exit would leave Israel “high and dry” and would “invalidate the US partnership with Israel against Iran,” since “no future president is going to do what Donald Trump did.” He characterizes the current status as a “memorandum of understanding” that is “an agreement to negotiate,” not peace or an agreement itself. Freeman contrasts Trump’s earlier approach—going to war “with no negotiations” and using diplomacy as a cover—with current claims that diplomatic means must be exhausted first. He says figures including Mr. Widokoff and Mr. Kushner have been removed and that mediation is now being run by “professional diplomats and leaders from Pakistan and Qatar.” Freeman describes immediate Israeli reaction as subdued due to an election environment, while Israel’s critics in the U.S.—including Lindsey Graham and Ted Cruz—push for returning to war. He portrays Trump as politically cornered: pressured by Netanyahu and Israeli donors, facing rebellion from parts of the Republican base, and dealing with military concerns that there is “no real military option,” with the possibility that the military has sought written orders to avoid blame. On the alleged framework’s key issues, Freeman claims its essence is that the Strait of Hormuz will be open. He disputes that any deal would mean “no tolls,” saying Iran would not accept that and is demanding sanctions relief and release of frozen funds in the “tens of billions of dollars.” He argues Iran will not do anything without receiving something first due to a lack of confidence in the U.S., including the U.S. leaving the JCPOA and repudiating commitments in subsequent negotiations. Freeman argues Iran’s position implies “zugzwang,” where any U.S. actions lead to defeat, stating Iran will not release enriched uranium to third parties, not relinquish control of the Strait of Hormuz, and will not make compromises to appease the U.S. He adds that any deal would face sabotage risk: “If there actually is a deal, Israel is in a perfect position to sabotage it, and will do so,” including insistence on “a real, as opposed to a phony ceasefire in Lebanon.” Freeman broadens the discussion to Lebanon and Israel’s domestic and international standing. He says Israel’s aim in Lebanon remains “an effective annexation,” describing a buffer zone as turning southern Lebanon into “the equivalent of a Gaza.” He also says Hezbollah is using optical fiber-guided drones and that Israel is losing soldiers and equipment, while Lebanese government negotiations are a “sideshow” because Hezbollah has denounced them. He cites Israel’s overstretched forces, declining economy, fatigued reservists, internal divisions, and election pressures on Netanyahu. He also discusses reputational decline abroad, including claims about U.S. political views and European reaction to incidents involving a flotilla. Freeman states that Israel is “essentially a pariah internationally,” while the U.S. continues to back it. He says Israel has “never put forward a single peace proposal” in 78 years and claims this record of belligerence is “unmatched in human history.” He concludes that if the U.S. continues “write blank checks” with no conditions, Israel will not make strategic choices and the state will collapse as foreign support fades. On China, Freeman describes China’s approach as “masterly inactivity” and says China backs Pakistan’s mediation efforts while seeking peace and stability in the Persian Gulf for energy and for restoring UN Charter and international law principles. He claims China has not modified export controls to Iran and that China may be providing technical assistance affecting air defenses. Freeman states it is “ridiculous” to expect China to endorse American aggression against Iran. Freeman argues the war has shifted the strategic environment: Iran is not disarmed, may move toward nuclear capability, and may hold the Strait of Hormuz, improving its leverage. He says the GCC is split, citing Oman’s cooperation with Iran and participation by other Gulf states in discussions about post-war order. He also mentions Hajj as a factor reducing arguments for military action. Finally, Freeman discusses possible U.S. outcomes, comparing the current period to Vietnam but saying Vietnam’s context was different due to Cold War bipolarity. He argues foreign wars are unpopular in the U.S. and predicts reduced alliance strength, discredited international law, and a trend toward arms races and requests for reduced U.S. presence. He describes a turbulent transition toward new polycentric regional orders, with Europe facing questions about viability and international institutions needing replacement. He ends by saying there are “many, many questions, no answers,” and emphasizes that major historical change has been occurring, implying the present is not permanent.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

Professor Seyyed Muhammad Marandi and Glenn discussed the widening of the war and what Yemen’s entry means for the escalation, as well as how Iran interprets attacks on it and its own targeting. - Yemen’s entry into the war is described as very important. Marandi notes the United States previously waged war on Yemen last year and withdrew, which he says demonstrates Yemen’s significance. With the US engaged against Iran, its ability to focus on Yemen is reduced, giving Yemen more room to maneuver. Iraq’s resistance has been striking US targets and could go further; Yemen’s capabilities have likely grown, and its current targets are limited but could expand to striking Saudi oil facilities or entering the Arabian Peninsula, including potentially closing the Red Sea or striking Israeli and US assets. - He recalls past dynamics of the Yemen conflict, including the seven-yearSaudi-led campaign backed by much of the world, the blockade on Yemen that blocked medicine and food, and Yemen’s eventual leverage via strikes on Saudi oil and gas installations that contributed to a ceasefire. Today, Yemen could “easily take out Saudi oil installations and cut Saudi imports from the Red Sea completely,” and could blockade the Red Sea or strike Israelis or US assets in the Indian Ocean. He asserts Yemen has been developing capabilities swiftly, similar to Iran and Hezbollah, and argues the West consistently underestimates such actors. - The escalation ladder remains high, and if the US or Israel escalates, Iran’s side will escalate too. Global energy, fertilizer, and petrochemical shortages are increasing, intensifying international pressure on Trump and anger toward Israel and Netanyahu. Marandi believes Iran’s escalation dominance is present, although they have not yet demonstrated their maximum capabilities. - He references a book, Going to Tehran, as a contrast to US policy: if the US had chosen a different route a decade ago, the current critical situation might be different. Instead, he says policymakers listened to Zionist influence and a small oligarchy, leading to the current climate of possible catastrophe from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, Iraq, and Iran. - On the US-Israel coordination, Marandi suggests joint operation is likely, pointing to an Israeli strike on the South Pars gas installation as a test that led to Iranian retaliation, and argues President Trump’s stated deadlines to strike Iranian infrastructure were used to manage markets, notably oil prices. He asserts the pattern shows the US delaying or intensifying threats for market control, while Iran retaliates when threatened. - Ground forces and potential deployments: UAE signals strongest engagement among Gulf states, with islands claimed by the UAE that Iran took in 1971. Marandi argues that no Persian Gulf Arab regime is capable of fighting effectively; their role is to provide bases, airspace, and territorial access for the US. Iran, however, has prepared for potential ground operations for decades and believes it could counter any invasion with underground bases and a wide range of weapon systems that go beyond missiles and drones. He posits scenarios where Iraqi forces and Yemen could strike into Kuwait or Northern Saudi Arabia, complicating US options. - Regarding resilience, Marandi emphasizes Yemen’s and Iran’s enduring capacity to resist: Yemen “won the seven-year genocidal war” against the US-backed coalition and is now more prepared; Iran’s resilience is linked to its Islamic and Shia identity, symbols like martyrdom, and a population that remains mobilized despite leadership assassinations and external pressure. He cites public demonstrations in Tehran and widespread civilian backing, as well as ongoing strikes and bombings against Iranian targets, which he says continue to provoke Iranian retaliation rather than deter it. - In terms of outcomes and negotiations, Marandi says Iranian demands will have to be met, though the method is negotiable: reparations could be pursued from regional actors like the Emirates and Saudis rather than the US. Iran would require benefits for its regional allies (Hezbollah, Yemen, Palestinians, Iraqis). He warns that without concessions, further invasion remains a risk, implying that time is not on the side of the West because energy and petrochemical shortages will escalate. He also emphasizes that the real core issue is control over oil, LNG, petrochemicals, and fertilizer, and that the US would face severe economic and social disruption if those supplies are cut off. - The conversation ends with a note of hope that, despite the grim prospects, there is optimism for a better future, even if the days ahead look darker.

The Quincy Institute’s executive vice president Trita Parsi discusses the risk that the U.S. goes to war with Iran again and how the dynamics of the last round may shape a new one. He says the risk of war has significantly gone up, though it is unclear whether it is above 50%. He argues the Beijing meeting between Trump and Xi delivered very little to the American side, noting that the Chinese statement about wanting the Strait open is described as “vanilla” and not meaningful because it depends on definitions of “open” and Iran’s control versus traffic flow. Parsi contrasts U.S. desires to “regionalize” the mechanism with China’s arrangement to get its ships out. He links recent increases in hostile rhetoric to a pattern of failures: the blockade of the blockade failing after the blockade itself and war threats failing, suggesting the Trump administration is being pushed toward another escalatory move. He also says Iran is “almost counting on an attack” while negotiations remain far apart on key issues, and he describes U.S. inflexibility in meeting “maximum demands.” On nuclear and related Chinese positions, Parsi says China’s stance aligns with the NPT and that China and other P5 states seek to preserve privileged status as nuclear weapon states. He contrasts China never saying Iran should not enrich with a hypothetical supportive signal that would have been made by calling for no enrichment. Discussing what could differ in a second round, Parsi critiques how Trump handled Iran’s “10 plan”: Trump publicly claimed the ceasefire would be based on Iran’s 10 proposal, but once negotiations started, he pursued a different approach. He then outlines U.S. hawks’ pushes for attacking Iran’s power grids and oil installations and even potentially destroying the state. He says assassinations and limited actions have not led to regime collapse, and that what has not been done is going in with ground troops, taking an island, or going after energy infrastructure. Parsi argues that targeting energy assets would prompt Iranian counter-escalation against GCC oil infrastructure, shifting the crisis from a bottleneck to a production problem that would drive oil prices above $180–$200 for a long time and throw the global economy into recession or depression. He says Trump has threatened these actions but did not carry them out. He adds that Iran expects retaliation at a higher level than before, including targeting the UAE for its role during the war and its increasing strategic partnership with Israel. He claims Iranian targeting could include companies and industries connected to Trump, such as AI and data centers used by Palantir, potentially harming the UAE’s investment as an AI hub. He also says Iran may close the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, and explore targeting undersea fiber optic cables that handle 99% of internet traffic in GCC states. He compares potential impact to a “second” Strait of Hormuz, noting Iran’s existing reliance on internal networks due to Iran’s internet being cut off. When asked about Iraq, Parsi says he has not followed it as closely but notes revelations that Israelis may have set up air bases in Iraq with U.S. pressure, and that GCC states and Iraq territories were used in attacks against Iran, whether voluntarily, without full knowledge, or under coercion. He argues this fits a broader view of Iraq becoming weak and unable to resist U.S. demands. He says it is plausible that Iran could use Iraq as a theater for horizontal escalation, though he does not know if it is likely in the first or second round. He says the U.S. underestimated Iranian horizontal escalation and attributes part of the miscalculation to Israeli efforts to depict Iran as weaker than it is. Parsi further explains Trump’s worldview: he says Iran’s refusal to talk directly with Trump reinforced an American belief that Iran was weak and would not escalate. He argues that Trump expected the war not to last more than four days, though he was mistaken. On U.S. primacy and multipolarity, Parsi argues that the U.S. did not achieve a military or political win in Iran: the U.S. “lost it,” with Iran establishing escalation dominance and the U.S. begging for a ceasefire. He says global repercussions include fuel shortages and energy crises across Australia and countries in South Asia and East Asia dependent on Persian Gulf oil. He adds that if the U.S. cannot establish escalation dominance in the Persian Gulf and is not willing to pay the price to open the Strait of Hormuz, this undermines questions about U.S. ability to sustain primacy and hegemony. In diplomacy, he emphasizes that military options are limited and costly, because defending islands and taking control of the straits would require actions and troop presence the U.S. is not willing to sustain. He claims diplomatic options are more promising, arguing Trump may be in a better position than previous presidents because he is willing to put all sanctions on the table and lift primary sanctions, which he says are executive-order based and do not require Congress, unlike secondary sanctions imposed by Congress. Parsi says sanctions relief beyond the JCPOA matters, and notes that in Iran’s last proposal Iran became open to a “moratorium” framing of not enriching for 12 years, a “remarkable shift.” He says the talks are currently deadlocked over Iran’s 60% stockpile but that both sides have shown some flexibility on other points. He also says Iran needs sanctions relief even more after the war, citing $300,000,000,000 in damages. Addressing Iran’s trust and the Strait of Hormuz, Parsi says Iran is unlikely to give up control, arguing it can reopen and reclose the strait due to assets along its coastline. He discusses a GCC proposal for an “environmental management fee” that he describes as functioning as a toll. He says any such payment would not compare to the scale of investments Iran could attract if sanctions were lifted. Finally, Parsi argues that peace depends on shifting rhetoric from zero-sum, hegemonic messaging toward diplomacy-based expectations of mutual concessions. He says Trump’s counterproductive social media rhetoric can disrupt breakthroughs and raises Iranian questions about his discipline and trustworthiness, while also claiming Trump is uniquely capable of making statements that break political taboos, including saying he wants Iran to flourish.

Shamhani stated that Iran is willing to commit to never having nuclear weapons. In exchange for the immediate lifting of all sanctions, Iran would get rid of its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and only enrich to a level needed for civilian use. Iran would also allow inspectors to oversee these activities. Shamhani said Iran would accept that deal tonight. He is one of the few people in Iran authorized to speak about the sensitive negotiations. He also stated that better relations with the U.S. are possible.

Speaker 0: And so, I mean, it sounds to me like that that it's leaving Iran with this choice of either rolling over, literally given everything we want, the, you know, the the nuclear enrichment, the the missiles, the proxies, etcetera, And that would buy you a little time, but then leave you utterly powerless. And the next day Speaker 1: That's right. Speaker 0: Either Israel or anybody else can come in, you would literally be helpless. And and, I mean, so we're correct me if I'm wrong, but we're offering Iran the option of either lay down and die by death later or stand firm and maybe die shortly now, but at least this way, you're gonna have some missiles to shoot back. I mean, do you see it differently? Speaker 1: No. I think you're exactly right. And, basically, we're we're inviting them to to become Qaddafi. You remember Qaddafi basically gave us a nuclear program. They basically said, fine. You know, I saw what you did in Iraq. I don't wanna end up up like that. I'll meet your terms, and we'll come to an agreement. We'll all be out. And we said, great. Now that you're defenseless, let's destroy you. Stick a bayonet up your rear rear end and shoot you in the head. Now if you're if you're the Iranian leadership, do you wanna end up like that? Look. I've always said the Iranians basically have a choice. They could be North Korea or they can be Libya. Which would you rather be? Speaker 0: That's not a choice for anybody to have to make. Speaker 1: Yeah. But that's that's the position we're putting them in. And frankly, I'm a little surprised they haven't gone for a nuclear breakout up till now. Because if they if they're looking for real security, say, okay. Fine. None no more of this nonsense. We don't wanna be Libya. We're North Korea now. Back off. Yeah. That that would make that would make sense from their point of view, wouldn't it?

The day starts with the 10 Iranian plan being accepted by President Donald Trump as the basis for negotiation. JD Vance was headed to Islamabad to lead the American negotiating team, with former leaders persona non grata toward Iran. The speaker notes this contrasted with what happened the last time Iran negotiated with Kushner and Witkoff. Lebanon was in a ceasefire on paper, written by the prime minister of Pakistan, whose efforts were praised. If the 10-point plan was the basis for negotiation, this represented a major victory for the Islamic Republic, a point echoed in a Moscow conference addressed by the Iranian ambassador in those terms. But by sunset, the situation “appeared to have gone to hell in a handcart.” Just before going on air, Tehran’s air defenses were engaged with what were said to be American bombers, implying the ceasefire didn’t even last twelve hours. The Islamabad negotiation is now in grave doubt. In an RT interview, the question was asked whether Iran had really won as claimed. The response asserts that the greatest superpower cannot achieve its objectives and thus has lost; if the U.S. “definitely lost,” then Iran has won. Iran is described as a global south emerging country under sanctions for forty-seven years, surviving two nuclear superpowers (regional and global). The speaker contrasts Trump’s regime-change talk for Iran with Afghanistan’s experience, noting the U.S. spent a trillion dollars to remove the Taliban only for the Taliban to return to power as the U.S. withdrew. There is a claim of “replacing one Khamenei with a second Khamenei,” with the son being less moderate than the father, and referencing the dead father, mother, wife, and children from the initial American attack. The speaker recounts an attack on a 169-schoolgirl incident near Bandar Abbas, asking listeners to imagine daughters or granddaughters incinerated in an instant, and labels it a day of infamy akin to Pearl Harbor. Iran was allegedly negotiating with “the sneak attackers,” with thousands of Iranian civilians killed, mosques and churches destroyed, and even a synagogue destroyed; the speaker notes having filmed a synagogue outside of which there are “100 synagogues in Iran,” with Jews in Iran and a million Christians having an honored place in the Islamic Republic. The claim is that these acts occurred while the United States and Israel bombed, killed front-rank commanders, and destroyed the leader of the Iranian revolution, achieving nothing. The speaker contrasts Trump’s harsh rhetoric against Obama over the JCPOA with Trump’s support for a 10-point plan that supposedly is less restrictive than the JCPOA, including allowing Iran to charge a toll on every tanker through the Strait of Hormuz, potentially earning about a hundred billion dollars per year in perpetuity, and criticizing Obama for returning Iran’s own money. Trump is said to claim Lebanon was included in the ceasefire, but the plan and the prime minister of Pakistan say Lebanon is included; nonetheless, Israel launches a frenzy of violence on Lebanon, including bombing a funeral, with a death toll rising. The speech notes Israeli attacks on Beirut, and describes a seventy-two-hour bombardment and the Arab League’s response, with the UAE allegedly attacking two Iranian islands eight hours after the ceasefire, threatening a broader war between Iran and the UAE. The Strait of Hormuz is claimed closed again, despite Trump’s boast of unblocking it, and oil prices are cited at $144 per barrel, with implications for Russia, Europe, and Asia if prices surge. The speaker asks where this is heading and reflects that, while exultant in the morning, the evening leaves doubt about resolution. The commentary concludes that this is a global crisis bigger than past financial crashes, and introduces Professor Syed Muhammad Marandi as the guest to explain further after a break.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Larry Johnson, former CI analyst and writer at Sonar Twenty One. Where do things stand in the Iran war and the information war surrounding it? Larry: The Gulf is too wide for a negotiated settlement. Iran has positions of principle: sanctions lifted immediately and assets unfrozen; recognition that they control the Strait of Hormuz; attacks on Palestinians, Lebanon, and Hezbollah must stop. They won’t back off from enriching nuclear material within limits; they insist on being treated as a sovereign state and as a signatory to the NPT. The U.S. portrayal of Iran as a vicious terrorist state is, in his view, widely believed in the West, and Washington thinks continued pressure will force surrender. He argues the leadership in Iran is not as split as some claim; figures like Pozeskin and Arakchi and Golubov are IRGC-associated, contrary to “moderates” narratives. On the economy, the U.S. pretends Iran is blockaded, but Iran has opened land routes through Caspian Sea access, Pakistan (seven routes now into Iran), and connections to Russia; the largest deepwater port in Pakistan supports Iranian trade. China and Russia are quietly reshaping Gulf security dynamics. After Arakashi met Putin in Saint Petersburg, Putin spoke of the Gulf security architecture; Wang Yi echoed the theme with Oraqi. Project Freedom was ended after Saudis told the U.S. not to use their territory or base for it. A Pakistani ISI general told Glenn that Saudi Arabia and Qatar may cut ties with the U.S. militarily, or push the U.S. out of the region. If true, this aligns with China and Russia’s push to restructure the Gulf security framework, reducing U.S. military footprint. Iran’s ability to retaliate has so far been limited as China, Russia, and Pakistan counsel restraint. Glenn: The nonproliferation treaty is central here. Iran is a signatory and seeks its civilian nuclear program within limits; the U.S. demands no civilian program. The treaty’s articles and U.S. behavior are contentious, and the discussion underscores broader questions about security architecture in the region and whether Iran can be included in a new, inclusive security order. Larry: Regarding current fighting, it’s a tit-for-tat dynamic. Iran retains control of the Strait of Hormuz; U.S. ships are claimed to be active but in practice may avoid direct engagement in the gulf. Iran has supposedly neutralized several U.S. bases and radar systems; the Fifth Fleet HQ in Bahrain is reportedly out of action, and Al Udeid’s operations center may have shifted. The possibility of returning personnel remains doubtful, given the extent of damage and the host nations’ willingness to rebuild with China/Russia in the mix. The UAE’s stance stands out: they blocked flights supporting Project Freedom for a time, then re-opened under restrictions, signaling a shift toward diversifying security partners beyond the U.S. They face pressures related to strategic position and possible leverage by Iran. On oil and markets, Glenn notes that strategic reserves releases are perceived as signaling decisiveness but may fail to stabilize prices once reserves run dry. Larry explains that a supply shock, not just demand, drives price increases; with reserves exhausted, prices will rise unless demand collapses, which would be a sign of broader economic distress. He contends that Iran’s leverage is growing as Gulf states move away from U.S. protection and toward China/Russia, potentially seeking alternative security arrangements and currencies beyond the petrodollar. The war’s domestic branding in the U.S. is another theme. Trump declared victory after 60 days, then launched “Epic Fury,” later signaling “Project Freedom.” Larry suggests this is a rebranding to justify further U.S. intervention and to replenish defense-industrial stockpiles, rather than a substantive strategic settlement. The broader goal is to secure new round of allocations for weapons manufacturers, regardless of Iran’s position. Larry concludes that the move toward a more inclusive regional security architecture—recognizing security interests of opponents and reducing exclusive reliance on the U.S.—appears unlikely in current discourse, even as China and Russia push for such restructuring. Hormuz remains central to Iran’s strategic security, and without meaningful diplomacy, the region’s stability will continue to be threatened. Glenn signs off, thanking Larry for the discussion.

The US could regain trust by immediately removing sanctions on critical Iranian sectors like the medical sector, including chemotherapy drugs and diagnosis machines. Iran would likely request reconnection to the SWIFT payment system. After a deal is signed, there must be full sanctions relief, meaning all US sanctions must be removed. There can't be any more sanctions regimes. If the US reneges again, there have to be snapback clauses for Iranians to renew their nuclear activities. Iran will not give up its legitimate nuclear program, which is overseen by the IAEA and follows its rules. Nuclear nonproliferation is about weapons, not the use of nuclear energy for legitimate reasons.

The discussion centers on how an Iran war would affect global economies, and why energy-price dynamics may not be a sustainable path to stability. The professor says that even without a war, energy prices are expected to remain very high through the rest of the year due to existing delays. He argues the situation would worsen because a war is “breaking out very soon,” possibly by Sunday or Monday, with “no real negotiations” so any negotiation could not affect the military or peace situation. He describes conditions for preconditions to negotiations as impossible to meet. He says one requirement is that Iran be given back confiscated Iranian funds, including “many billions of dollars” intervened by the United States and references stablecoin. He states the United States cannot return any money because Congress has set positions including “Not one penny for Iran,” characterizing Iran as a terrorist country. He also says the United States has repeatedly reneged on prior commitments, giving an example that Trump annulled an Obama administration atomic weapons contract, so Iran would not concede without return in advance. According to the professor, market expectations are being driven by announcements and the belief that a peaceful negotiation might be reached, citing stocks and bonds rising and a perceived chance to profit when markets open Monday or Tuesday. He claims the announcements are aimed at creating that expectation rather than producing a durable settlement. He describes alleged U.S. messaging to Netanyahu about allowing attacks, and says the war secretary Hegseth spoke with Oman and Qatar. He states that if Oman did not agree not to join Iran in imposing tariffs (presented as Iran’s effort to obtain reparations for illegal attacks), the U.S. would “let Netanyahu kill you,” and that this reportedly ended negotiations. He predicts Iran is not ready and that the peak of the war will come as the build-up since Trump took office. He argues the conflict would create shortages of oil, fertilizer, sulfur, chemicals, and helium, plunging the world into a depression “worse than the nineteen thirties.” He cites ExxonMobil’s estimates of pushing oil prices to “over the hundred fifty, hundred sixty dollar a barrel range,” causing chemical industry shutdowns throughout Asia and the global South and Europe, blocking fertilizer exports, and reducing agricultural yields amid extreme-weather conditions. He says fertilizer blockades and agricultural disruption would drive food price increases and industry closures. He then describes an economic mechanism: chemical-industry closures reduce demand for oil, so oil prices might fall to “maybe a hundred twenty, a hundred thirty dollars a barrel,” but he expects “large scale defaults and bankruptcy.” He says debt leverage across economies would turn an industrial depression into a financial crisis because companies depend on lending and credit, and that collateralized debt obligations have created patterns resembling the 2008 bank crisis. He states central banks cannot “simply create more credit” because banks would avoid lending to prevent turning economies into a “Ponzi scheme.” He also argues U.S. negotiation demands are designed to prevent serious talks, describing Trump’s stated premise that nothing will happen until Iran transfers all atomic weapons as a “red herring” and likening it to a deal-breaker. He says sanctions aimed to starve Iran have not worked since they were first put in place in 1979, and that the U.S. intends to provoke Iran into a defensive response. The professor expands from economics to international law and institutions. He claims U.S. attacks would treat civilian activity as military, referencing alleged attacks on fishermen in other regions and arguing similar logic would apply in the Strait of Hormuz. He says the UN is a “casualty” because it has been unable to enforce its charter, blocked through U.S. veto power, and says the alternative would require “a new United Nations” independent of the United States, with China, Russia, and Iran as leading members. He proposes a broader strategy focused on control of the global oil trade, stating the U.S. aims to prevent other countries from using alternative supplies by destroying oil facilities and weaponizing the oil trade. He links this to actions involving Nord Stream, sanctions, and scenarios involving Venezuela and grain trade. He states Venezuela oil revenue is paid into a Florida bank account under Donald Trump’s direction and says the same approach is sought for Iran. He further claims the U.S. would aim to restrict alternative energy (wind and solar), portray it as rival to oil, and maintain dependence on U.S. LNG and oil exports. He concludes that chaos is used to lock in foreign dependency and that a U.S.-centered outcome would involve closed European industry, subsidies or market opening demands, and client political alignments. He predicts Europe would relocate industry outside Europe but not necessarily to the U.S., while still facing political revulsion and seeking an alternative system as the depression deepens. He also says future wars would be air wars with missiles, bombs, and drones rather than invasions.

The conversation centers on a newly discussed MOU involving Iran, Israel, the GCC, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and the downstream effects on markets, alliances, and investment. Regarding the MOU, Jeffrey Krigsmann says it is the same MOU that was meant to be signed Sunday but is now on Friday, and that not all parties have agreed publicly to its terms. He says Israelis and GCC members have been kept in the dark, raising questions about sustainability: if Israel launches attacks on Hezbollah immediately after signing, he argues, Iran’s actions regarding the straits could affect shipping operations. He notes that Maersk has already said it will not change plans because of it, and that how long the arrangement lasts matters for ship movement and whether ships can be brought back out. Krigsmann also says other parties were not consulted on the “logistics service fee,” described as tolls. He highlights a key point: when J.D. Vance was asked about $300 billion in who pays it, Vance indicated Gulf friends are paying it. He frames this as a large cost for some party to shoulder. If Gulf states are not paying, he says the U.S. would have to, and he connects that to the need for congressional involvement. He adds that Iranian reporting has already circulated the $300 billion figure and that parties are claiming victories even though nothing is broadly agreed. The discussion then shifts to details of what the MOU actually states: the host notes that leaks suggest Iran would manage shipping and reopen the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian management, but the fee is not clearly stated in the MOU details they have seen. Krigsmann says he has not seen the details yet. The host asks whether Iran will control the Strait of Hormuz, how significant that is for Iran and the global economy, and whether there could be a long-term deal integrating Iran into the global economy that investors are considering. Krigsmann says investors are not currently talking about it but argues it should be brought back into focus as the leverage Iran wanted from its nuclear program, describing that leverage as the most it has had since the revolution. On how the Gulf is hurt and how long recovery takes, Krigsmann says the region is a big victim, especially countries like Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and also Iraq. He says Saudi and the Emiratis are richer and can roll with impacts more easily, but countries such as Qatar derive a large share of GDP from oil and gas, and he says Qatar’s major LNG facilities have been permanently damaged. He argues that if Gulf states were paying war reparations, it would be an insult for countries severely hurt as bystanders. When asked whether security and stability perceptions in places like the UAE will return, the host suggests people forget quickly and references COVID. Krigsmann compares the dynamic to the Global Financial Crisis and says a key lesson is diversification—specifically diversification of energy supply. He says the Middle East will likely remain a dominant energy supplier but with alternative routes that cost more. He argues that a similar “new set of players” dynamic followed the 2008 crisis, and he expects a parallel shift on the energy side. He adds that the pain could become more asymmetric as shortages approach and restart takes time. The host broadens diversification beyond energy and mentions security and alliance structures. Krigsmann says countries will try to be self-sufficient and diversify friends, with Middle East alliances shifting and becoming transactional. He frames diversification across supply lines, defense, and finance as a response to the risk of being dependent on one entity. The conversation then turns to asset flows and market behavior. Krigsmann describes a rotation out of “new economy” tech into “old economy” commodities that he says ran through the ceasefire on April 8, with commodity names later giving back gains during a sell-off. He argues that capital has flowed into SpaceX/NASDAQ and tech, and because it is a “zero-sum game,” less capital going into energy and commodities means they fall. He also says retail investors destock physical commodities and sell equity exposure expecting cheaper prices tomorrow. He expresses concerns about how uncertainty and volatility affect markets, arguing that the “information content” of markets is reduced when rules shift. He cites regulatory changes in the U.S. and Europe as reasons markets may not function with the stable regulatory framework they previously relied on. He says oil companies are down and oil price down because uncertainty is too high to hold positions, making it too painful to hold long or short. He references volatility swinging sharply within months and states this pushes people out because holding positions has become too dangerous. On Asia, he says conditions calmed somewhat because it is before peak summer driving season and before heating/cooling ramps, but he says places like Japan and Korea face problems ahead. He estimates that oil shut-ins fell from about 12 million barrels per day to about 10 million due to leaks from the Gulf, and he says trapped ships decreased after ships were freed through the strait, though he says it is not a long-term solution. Strategically and economically, Krigsmann says the U.S. has not “actually had to feel it yet,” but that impacts will be evident in years. He contrasts the situation with 1991: he argues this is a different strategic world where globalization “blew” apart opposite to the Gulf War I context and describes a game-changing shift with polarization. He also argues that the “grand bargain” broken—sea-lane security by the U.S. Navy in exchange for dollar-based trade—means questions about strategic alliances and the link between oil, dollar, and navy. When asked about integrating Iran into the global economy, he says capital wants certainty and confidence that investments will not lose everything. He calls Iran “uninvestable right now,” comparing it to Venezuela where guarantees were offered and where investment viability depended on them. He says guarantees are what institutions like the World Bank and IMF were designed to support after World War II, and he asks who would provide guarantees for Iran. The host adds that Iran has looked for guarantees from multiple countries, but no one could guarantee U.S. promises, leaving the guarantor as the party that cannot guarantee. The discussion concludes with agreement that uncertainty is unprecedented and that hard assets may benefit, followed by closing remarks about the show and upcoming guests.

Speaker 0 notes that, “if you listen to our leaders, it seems like everything is fine,” with a war “barreling towards a close,” markets “exploding,” and Trump praising the stock market. He says Pam Bondi reminded us about why we can’t have the Epstein files because “the Dow is over 50,000.” He reports Trump said Israel and Lebanon have agreed to begin a ten day ceasefire, starting at 4 PM Eastern, and claims they “haven’t spoken in thirty four years” but now are at a ten day ceasefire, while Israel is carrying out “last minute terrorist attacks, blowing up civilian homes in Inatah, centuries old village in South Lebanon,” and “blowing up a school” in Marwan, South Lebanon. He also says Trump spoke an hour earlier that Iran and the United States are close to an agreement to end this war. He closes with a tongue-in-cheek jab about a “ten days to regroup” from Tony in the chat. Speaker 1 emphasizes the priority: “The big thing we have to do is we have to make sure that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon,” stating that Iran “agreed to that” and that Iran has agreed to give back the nuclear dust “way underground because of the attack we made with the b two bombers.” Tony Garrett in the chat is cited again confirming “ten days to regroup, restock, and reassess.” Speaker 0 then introduces Colonel Daniel Davis as host of Deep Dive, noting a bombshell from his sources and that despite positive rhetoric, military movement suggests otherwise. Speaker 2 asserts that, even without his sources, President Trump was asked if there’s no deal, “we’ll definitely do that,” and that Secretary Hagstads (Hagstad) briefing said, “we are locked and loaded and we are ready to get right back into this.” He says there has been “lots of ammunition and fuel and restocks” moved into the region during the ceasefire to be used, and cautions that “until an order is given, it doesn’t matter what you’ve prepared for,” but that “militarily, all the pieces are in place to restart this thing.” He concludes the pause is a pause to reload, not a true end to hostilities. Speaker 3 asks about ten days’ viability to replenish ammunition, and about a Wall Street Journal report that the Pentagon is pushing Ford and GM to shift factory capacity toward weapons production. Speaker 2 says such conversions are possible (World War II precedent) but would be expensive and time-consuming; more likely, the U.S. “can take them out of our stockpiles” and deplete them, possibly for months or years to replenish, with Iran possibly calculating they can outlast U.S. firepower. He notes the risk that a protracted war could outstrip American stockpiles, whereas Iran could endure longer. Speaker 0 shifts to gold and silver promotions, then returns to the strategic issue, describing that Mossad head’s claim that Iran war ends only with regime change, and Russian intelligence’s counterclaim that the ceasefire is a mask. He asks the chat if the ceasefire is real; Speaker 2 confirms it is real in a technical sense (no missiles fired) but calls it a pause to reload, not a negotiated settlement. Speaker 4 (Secretary of War remarks) says, “Iran can choose a prosperous future…we will maintain this blockade,” and “if Iran chooses poorly, then they will be a blockade and bombs dropping on infrastructure, power, and energy,” while Treasury is launching “Operation economic fury.” Speaker 2 responds that such measures are physically feasible but question their effectiveness in achieving supply and demand balance or restoring fertilizer, helium, and chip supply chains, arguing Iran will endure and that the war is militarily unwinnable. Speaker 2 reiterates concerns about escalating consequences in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, noting the USS Ford’s voyage around Africa to avoid the Houthis, and arguing continued aggression risks destroying global supply chains, with the war demanding a quick exit. Speaker 0 and Speaker 3 thank Colonel Davis and close.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and an award-winning author, discussed developments around the Iran war and the prospect of a near-term diplomatic breakthrough. Parsi addressed whether the Trump administration is attempting to expel him personally after his criticisms. He said it is not simply “the Trump administration,” but that there are elements inside and outside the government attempting to escalate pressure toward deportation. He referenced pro-Israeli social media influencers pushing for it, including an AI video depicting his deportation. He said a recent investigation claim in the Free Press was denied within hours by the State Department, which he described as unusual. Parsi argued this is part of a long-term pattern: for 25 years he said neocons and warmongers in Washington have tried to cancel, silence, discredit, and accuse him of being an Iranian agent, but that this is the first moment he has seen a more public push toward deportation. He also said other elements inside the administration pushed back, making the situation more complicated than a single unified effort. He then discussed how discourse around wars has deteriorated, not only in the United States but also internationally, describing it as driven by team-slogan logic rather than explanation and context. Parsi argued that wars of choice require eliminating nuance and context, which he said leads to attacks on those who explain alternative perspectives. He emphasized that moralism can become counterproductive by preventing discussion of opponents’ security concerns and undermining compromise and peace. Parsi connected this to earlier U.S. policy toward Iran, saying decision-makers misread Iran’s behavior by assuming Iran is weaker and fears war more than surrender. He said he tried to communicate that Iran would not surrender, that it fears surrender more than war, and that it likely would absorb pain if it viewed the threat as existential. He argued the fundamentals of the approach were erroneous and that the resulting negotiation dynamics differ from the terms originally imagined. He also described how intelligence and evidence can be ignored when groupthink and only listening to certain voices, such as Israelis, leads to miscalculation—especially regarding options like closing or disrupting the Strait of Hormuz and striking Gulf Cooperation Council states. On strategy and propaganda, Parsi contrasted earlier public rational debate with more coercive moral framing. He cited examples from Afghanistan and broader great-power practice of selling war as peace, including using women’s rights narratives and prominent collaborations between political and celebrity figures. He said this moral framing functions to block strategic discussion and prevents evaluation of whether interventions serve stated objectives. In shifting to the current Iran talks, Parsi responded to the claim that a peace deal could be signed within 24 hours. He said he believes it is “different,” describing it as the “39th time,” but closer than ever based on conversations with “folks on both sides.” He said the proposal is back in Iran’s court and that delays stem from the internal need for buy-in across Iran’s dispersed power structure, particularly under a new Supreme Leader whose authority is not fully established. He said hardline elements that would never agree are part of the challenge, but that signals suggest the majority has already agreed in substance. Parsi said the Iranian foreign minister, U.S. President Donald Trump’s retweet of the Iranian foreign minister, and Pakistan’s prime minister’s messaging all point to momentum—while emphasizing the process is still a memorandum of understanding and a “pit stop” toward a final deal, not an end to the war. He warned sabotage could occur, including through attacks elsewhere such as Lebanon, which he said could destabilize the diplomatic process even without direct action against either party. Regarding what is in the MOU, Parsi said Iran’s position is that it needs U.S. buy-in through an exchange affecting leverage. He said Iran views opening the Strait of Hormuz—described as major leverage, more than a 60% enriched uranium stockpile—as part of what is being given up, and it argues the U.S. blockade (he called it counterproductive to the U.S.) is being removed. He said Iran is asking for 12 billion upfront, with an additional 12 billion at the end tied to the MOU. He also said some funds were previously supposed to be released in connection with a prisoner exchange in August 2022, but that the deal was reneged after the Mahsa Amini protests began, meaning Iran does not want to renegotiate those promised first amounts. He said the U.S. side has avoided direct release for reasons including avoiding comparison to Obama-era actions, so others proposed a workaround where a third party provides equivalent funds initially, followed by accounting later. Parsi said Iran appears to be moving toward accepting an approach that ensures it receives the money even if it is not unfreezing directly by the U.S. He added that ambiguity about key terms—like “open” regarding the Strait of Hormuz—could allow both sides to interpret commitments domestically, but that too much vagueness could make the agreement like “Swiss cheese.” On the Strait of Hormuz, Parsi distinguished between the idea of reopening while it is not closed—potentially involving fees/tolls or administrative management rather than full restoration of prior arrangements—and he said legal disputes about whether it is international waters or Iranian/Omani waters shape how the language can be framed. He said he does not expect Iran to give up control entirely and instead expects a change from the pre-existing status quo. Finally, Parsi discussed regional security after Iran’s direct attack on Israel following Israel’s bombing of Lebanon, which he described as an attempt to establish extended deterrence, or “the new equation,” backed by large-scale Iranian capability rather than limited attacks attributed to the Houthis. He said Israel’s subsequent actions—striking Iran and later Southern Lebanon rather than Beirut—do not prove the equation is fully established, though it could increase the perceived cost of further escalation. He said that if an MOU is agreed, it is unlikely Iran would do so without a region-wide ceasefire, especially because restarting war in Lebanon could spill over into Iran. He argued Iran’s priorities include shrinking U.S. military presence in the region, diversified security arrangements for GCC states, and deeper economic and security rehabilitation for Iran—moving away from a decades-long U.S. organizing principle of containment and isolation.

Speaker 0 said Reuters is reporting that part of the deal includes $24 billion in sanctions relief to Iranians. They framed the arrangement as not a situation where “we win and you do what we say,” but instead as a question of how to open up the straits and what it would cost.

The transcript contrasts statements from the United States/White House side and Iranian officials about whether a deal is imminent. The United States side says a deal is “two days away,” while Iranian officials say that is “not true at all,” claiming there has been no discussion and that there was “no deal.” The speaker says there were “two deals.” The first followed a “thirty-nine day war.” This began with Trump saying “unconditional surrender, lay down your arms,” and ended with Trump accepting Iran’s “ten point proposal” as the framework for negotiations, which “didn’t go well for Trump.” After thirty-nine days, a ceasefire was agreed upon, including an element to end “the genocidal attacks on Lebanon.” Trump allegedly agreed to this, but the transcript claims Netanyahu “carpet-bombed the country in order to wreck the ceasefire,” and that instead of Trump forcing Netanyahu to abide by the ceasefire, he “sided with Netanyahu,” resulting in the ceasefire being wrecked. The speaker then says Trump imposed a “siege on Iranian ports,” described as “an act of war” and “another violation of the ceasefire.” The speaker attributes the failure to both Trump and Netanyahu. The second “agreement” is described as still being “floated.” The transcript says a general framework was agreed upon, but the details contain “gaps,” and there is “right now… no progress.” It outlines elements the speaker says were more or less agreed: - The US would lift sanctions on Iranian energy exports for the duration of the agreement (an MOU), while Iran would receive part of its assets “stolen over the years by the United States.” - The war in Lebanon would end, including “the genocide in Gaza” stopping. - The lifting of the siege on Iranian ports would be exchanged for Iran normalizing ship movement through the Strait of Hormuz. - Iran would declare it will “not pursue nuclear weapons,” which Iran has been saying it will not do for years. The transcript says the agreement was “close” but that “the details were never sorted out.” It further claims Trump repeatedly said he would not return Iranian assets, remove sanctions, or lift the siege. The speaker states that this “runs against written statements by his own negotiators,” and concludes that “the only person who’s the deal breaker is Trump,” suggesting he is pressured not to have the deal by Netanyahu and “the Zionist lobby.” It argues US interests favor “normalization of global trade” and energy flowing out of the Strait of Hormuz, while “Israeli regime interests” are described as continuing war and hostilities to “wreck the global economy and… the US economy,” with the transcript claiming Netanyahu and the “Zionists” have “the upper hand.”

The conversation focuses on developments around U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, the Israel–Lebanon war, and concerns that actions in the region could undermine or complicate a potential agreement. The discussion begins with a reported Israel–U.S. tension: the IDF was said to be abandoning plans to bomb Beirut after American pressure, driven by fears Iran might retaliate. The caller links this to U.S. opposition to Israeli plans to restart a large-scale war in Lebanon, particularly mass bombing campaigns in Shia-majority districts of Beirut, and to concerns Iran might walk away from peace talks. The Iranians are described as being “very serious” about negotiations, even while the war between Iran and Hezbollah continues, including strikes and counterfire between Hezbollah and Israel. Attention then shifts to U.S.-Iran clashes at sea: the Americans said they shot down two boats laying mines, while the Iranians shot down one drone and posted video showing targeting of another fighter jet that was not shot down. The Americans also shut down one surface-to-air missile site on the Iranian side. The caller asks how worried the participants are that negotiations could break down, noting that Donald Trump had been unusually quiet the same day—no posts and no media leaks—creating an impression of behind-the-scenes activity, though the conversation treats the silence as out of the ordinary. The conversation then broadens into patterns of escalation: the caller says Israel often intensifies actions in Lebanon when negotiations approach an end or a solution seems possible, accelerating operations while not heeding the United States, despite periodic Trump statements. The caller argues that U.S. forces are not at “optimal capability” after prolonged deployments at sea, and suggests that if military action is planned, it could be preferable sooner rather than later. The discussion also reflects concern about timing after the Hajj and the possibility that strikes could occur after major public milestones, potentially undermining trust in the U.S. if negotiations were treated as a “facade.” A central topic is Iran’s demands and lack of compromise. The conversation states Iran is firm on what it requires, including unfreezing assets, and that this posture could indicate diplomacy moving in the right direction. However, the caller also suggests Trump would face opposition from Israelis and neocons if a deal advances. The discussion includes detailed domestic U.S. politics around a potential agreement: Rubio reportedly said a deal was possible within days, with holdup tied to specific nuclear-language and sanctions language in the initial document. Meanwhile, Ted Cruz called the announced deal an “MOU” a disastrous mistake; Roger Wicker warned it would be null/useless; Pompeo criticized it; and additional senators and figures piled on criticism. The caller describes a shift when Trump said the deal would be expanded to include the Abraham Accords, leading to conflicting reactions from figures like Senator Lindsey Graham. The conversation claims other countries (Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi) said no, while Iran also said no and positions were not changing. The caller argues the Abraham Accords have not helped Gulf signatories in practice and have been linked to broader issues involving Palestinian rights. The conversation then introduces a harsh statement by Mustafa Kamane during the “hush season,” describing a new order in which U.S. influence shrinks and framing Israel’s actions as a religious confrontation between Islam and what he calls the “Zionist regime.” The speakers express concern that Iran’s messaging is becoming more radical and anti-U.S. compared with earlier positions. They also discuss a purported power struggle between Netanyahu and Trump, emphasizing that the next steps will reveal who is directing events. Several reports about Israel–Lebanon dynamics are cited: the foreign minister calls Iranian actions and ceasefire violations blameworthy; Iran accuses the U.S. of maritime piracy and claims the strikes show suspicion justified. On the military side, Israeli commanders reportedly say the situation in southern Lebanon is “more unbearable by the day,” with footage described of drones hitting Israeli troops and trucks. Israel is said to have moved toward more nighttime operations, while Hezbollah reportedly uses FPV drones with night vision. Additional reports claim Israel is procuring more anti-drone nets from Europe due to drone threats, and an Israeli official says Israel cannot accept the current reality in Lebanon without ability to respond, constrained by understandings and agreements with both the U.S. and the Lebanese government. The Lebanese government is described as refusing to negotiate unless bombing stops before talks. A particular focal report states senior Israeli officials say Israel does not want to be seen as deliberately sabotaging Trump’s potential agreement with Iran. It claims Israel rejects random building bombings in Beirut at this stage due to fears of harming the ongoing Iran negotiations, while maintaining freedom of action in southern Lebanon. The conversation interprets this as evidence that strikes in Beirut are restricted compared with activity in the south. The speakers also analyze the region’s broader security shift: they describe regional countries seeking security architectures that replace U.S. bases and may not include Israel, referencing institutionalizing control of Persian Gulf straits under a Gulf security system by a “Gulf Strait Authority.” They also mention “Isaac Accords” as a similar Israel-centric concept applied to Latin America and Central America, involving trade/technology cooperation and countering Iranian influence. Finally, the conversation includes concerns about escalation risks if Trump uses military force, including the possibility of catastrophic retaliation affecting energy infrastructure, undersea cables, and the wider Gulf economy. They discuss information warfare and social media influence, including a claim that social media accounts of Colonel Aguilar may have been wiped out simultaneously with upscaling across pro-Palestinian platforms. The closing return to geopolitics includes discussion of a “new world order” and multipolarity, the Saudi–U.S. civilian nuclear track, and related regional missile developments attributed to North Korea. The conversation ends with acknowledgment of a technical glitch earlier in the show and a preview of upcoming guest interviews.

Colonel Daniel Davis joins the discussion to address the idea of a forthcoming false flag attack aimed at provoking Iran into a broader war. The conversation threads through claims that key US and Israeli military hardware is in place, Russia has countermeasures ready, and that Israel and a US “deep state” war faction coordinated by the CIA are driving the move. There’s also the assertion that a US carrier strike group is in place for the operation, and that the New York Times reports Trump has received intelligence suggesting Iran’s position is weakening. The host questions the reliability of this intelligence flow, asking who is really transmitting such assessments and whether the CIA or others are shaping Trump’s view. Davis pushes back on the weakening Iran narrative, stating he has followed Iran for years and sees no evidence that Iran is weakening; to the contrary, he notes Iran used a forceful response to suppress a rebellion—an action that, in his view, suggests strength. He references outside voices, including Mossad and Pompeo’s New Year’s Eve tweets, to illustrate how Western narratives have portrayed the protests. He challenges the idea that the protests reveal Iran’s weakness, arguing that the regime’s security apparatus remained in control and that no IRGC defections or regime desertions appeared visible. He warns that if Trump is led to believe Iran is at its weakest point, a more aggressive push could backfire, potentially producing a strong repudiation. The discussion turns to what a “deal” with Iran might entail. The co-panelists note claims that Trump says they can make a deal, while Davis explains that reports indicate any deal would require Iran to remove enriched uranium, cap long-range missiles, change its regional proxy policies, and ban independent uranium enrichment—red lines Iran has repeatedly rejected. The implication is that such terms would, in practice, preclude a peaceful settlement and push toward a military strike. The debate then moves to the military buildup and international reactions. The host asks about possible actions in the next few days, given reports of an Israeli target date around January 30. Davis rejects the notion of a simple, quick conflict, arguing that some Trump administration insiders want a regime-change outcome, whereas he sees limited attainable objectives beyond bombing or destroying infrastructure. He emphasizes the risk of a miscalculation leading to American or Israeli casualties and the potential for a prolonged conflict. He warns there is zero upside to a strike on Iran and a high downside if Iran responds forcefully. Turning to regional dynamics, the panel discusses how Russia, China, and a new Saudi axis might respond. Davis suggests China and Russia would offer logistical support or dual-use equipment rather than direct military aid, preferring to watch the confrontation and preserve their own interests. He also speculates that Beijing and Moscow hope to avoid provoking a broader conflict that could erode their own alliances, while watching Western infighting. A brief, cautioned aside notes Pakistan’s stated red line response to any Israeli nuclear escalation, indicating a potential chain reaction in the region. The panelists acknowledge the risk of escalation but maintain that Israel, if pressured, might pursue a broader conflict with Iran, while noting the uncertainty of Iran’s exact response should a strike occur. The exchange ends with a consensus that the scenario described contains significant risk and complexity, with the overall sentiment that pursuing such a conflict could have catastrophic consequences. Note: Promotional content for ExpressVPN was removed from the summary.

- Speaker 0 recounts a conversation with vice president JD Vance, who called from his plane after returning from Washington. The discussion centered on the development—and what was described as an explosion—of negotiations, with the American side not willing to tolerate Iran’s alleged violation of the agreement by failing to open cross-border crossings and ceasefire commitments. The central issue for the United States, per JD Vance as relayed, is the removal of all enriched material and ensuring that there is no more enrichment in the coming years, potentially for decades. - Speaker 1 echoes and expands on this, asserting that the information confirms Joe Kent’s statements about Israel pushing the Trump administration to move the goalposts and demand harsher terms from Iran in order to prolong the war. They argue that Israel’s actions are driven by a need to prolong the conflict, implying it is not in the United States’ or Iran’s interest to continue the war, and suggesting that Israel’s interference undermines a potential settlement. - The speakers present Barak Ravid’s (the Israeli journalist) reporting as further corroboration, describing Netanyahu at a cabinet meeting as having discussed Vance’s call from the plane and reiterating the claim that the American side could not accept Iran’s alleged violations. The central issue remains removal of enriched material and preventing any future enrichment for decades, a shift they frame as a change from prior understandings. - The discussion references Joe Kent’s resignation letter, interpreting it as evidence of shifting goalposts imposed by Israel and reinforcing the claim that Iran’s enrichment levels were being framed as an existential threat requiring zero enrichment, a stance the speakers say Iran never agreed to. They argue that a deal could be reached about uranium enrichment levels and monitoring that would end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz if the United States subordinated Israeli demands to its own interests. - The speakers imply a pattern of influence where JD Vance’s statements and actions are contrasted with what they describe as pressure from Netanyahu and other Israeli figures to derail negotiations. They claim Jared Kushner publicly celebrated a Gaza-related policy outcome they view as aligning with long-standing plans that purportedly prioritize private Israeli interests over American policy, and they allege Kushner’s demeanor signals a lack of restraint despite negotiations failing to produce peace. - The speakers imply, without endorsing, that the ongoing actions and disclosures point toward a broader strategy by Western and allied actors to escalate toward a wider conflict, including World War III, with long-term aims of shaping global governance structures. They suggest that Western leaders are preparing for a major conventional war and acting without public consent or scrutiny, framing recent events as part of a deliberate trajectory toward broader confrontation. Note: Promotional content and advertising by Speaker 2 (yellowshrimpstore/alexandrapshore products) has been excluded from the summary.

Glenn Deason hosts former CIA analyst Larry Johnson to discuss current developments in the war against Iran, noting that earlier Trump-era bombing cycles were followed by claims that the sides were close to a deal, only for renewed war talk to follow. Johnson says the current situation appears different: Iran and the U.S. are moving toward a “shared understanding” and a stepped memorandum of understanding (MOU), shepherded by Pakistan, with Qatar also involved. Johnson describes the MOU as based on “14-point documents” Iran introduced on April 8, alongside a memorandum of understanding on how the process will work. He says the arrangement does not mean agreement on every issue yet, but that “an act of good faith” has occurred through reported asset releases by the United Arab Emirates, including reportedly $3 billion first and later a report of $20 billion total. Johnson lists Iran’s red line demands: unfreeze assets; lifting sanctions; recognition of Iran’s control or sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz; lifting the U.S. blockade; and a permanent ceasefire in Lebanon and Gaza, including calls for Israeli troops to withdraw from Lebanon and Gaza. He adds that Iran has not backed off those demands, leaving the question of timing. Deason says Iranian officials have indicated the MOU would be published in steps, with “first” step action tied to signing: once signed, all Iranian assets would be released and not frozen again, allowing movement to subsequent steps. He characterizes the asset release and sanctions unfreezing as a significant first move, which would also impose political and practical costs on the U.S. if it backtracks. Deason asks what else must be included. Johnson says sanctions lifting must include more than oil, with early gestures including lifting sanctions on oil. He argues the main stumbling block is Israel: Israel must leave Lebanon and Gaza. Johnson says Trump would have leverage through cutting off aid, but he doubts Trump would apply pressure as hard as possible. He says nuclear issues are “down the road,” and Israel’s complaints about ballistic missiles likely create friction because Iran is unlikely to allow ballistic missiles to be put on the agenda, treating them as a key strategic “ace in the hole” alongside Strait of Hormuz leverage. Johnson also discusses Hormuz operations, including a claim attributed to Iranian statements that charging for “services” is reserved because the Strait is treated as partly within national waters rather than international waters. The discussion then turns to ceasefire risks. Deason worries that Israel could disrupt any peace negotiation, citing the idea that Lebanon and Gaza could be used to veto terms at any time through massacres or provocations. Johnson says he has seen evidence suggesting Iran’s upgraded air defense system during recent U.S. strikes, including reports of Tomahawk missiles being taken down and Iranian systems engaging an aircraft. He adds that Iran’s retaliation reportedly focused on Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and that upgraded capabilities reflect assistance via China and Russia. Johnson also says he is not seeing “signature activities” suggesting additional U.S. airstrikes, and interprets that as consistent with genuine negotiations. Johnson argues negotiations appear linked to diplomacy and regional calculations. He characterizes the UAE as an “obnoxious relative” and says its participation likely reflects economic incentives and business needs, including reopening and returning some frozen assets. He adds that Qatar stayed engaged during attacks and helped align with Pakistan on a document, while Pakistan is also negotiating with Qatar and Saudi Arabia to reduce U.S. military entanglement and separate them from hosting U.S. personnel. He says the 14-point Iranian document includes a point about U.S. military withdrawal from around Iran. He notes Saudi and Qatar reluctance to allow U.S. bases and specifically not allowing Israel to overfly their territory, limiting Israel’s options. He frames the broader effort as part of constructing a post-Western-pressure economic and security order connected to BRICS and a new international economic order. On secrecy and potential sabotage, Deason asks whether secrecy is meant to prevent wrong expectations and sabotage from “all sides,” including U.S. actors, Israelis, and Iranian hawks. Johnson says on the U.S. side there is an effort to prevent a further firestorm, including social media attacks on Trump, calls from prominent U.S. figures, and warnings from oil executives about imminent fuel disruption and economic chaos. As to what might break first, Johnson says Israel would refuse to leave Lebanon while Trump would refuse to use leverage to force withdrawal, citing historical precedents where U.S. pressure led Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. He says Hezbollah would likely end attacks as part of the broader peace arrangement supporting Iran, but warns there are “pitfalls” and “booby traps” that could derail the process quickly. Johnson closes by arguing that U.S. military power has faced clear limits across other conflicts, and that weapons inventories and supply chains impose constraints. He says if the MOU process proceeds, it could boost prestige and reduce immediate risk in the Strait of Hormuz because opening it militarily would require Iran to guarantee no shooting while user fees continue, which would affect insurance and commercial confidence. He also warns that domestic and foreign Zionist pressures could push Trump to back out and return to war. Deason ends with “cautiously optimistic” framing, hopes that releasing Iranian funds could become sunk cost supporting continued compliance, and discusses possible impacts on China and Russia, with Johnson suggesting China would seek recovery given its BRICS exposure to Strait of Hormuz closure. The conversation concludes with Johnson’s final remark comparing “third time is the charm” to Trump’s repeated predicted “successes,” followed by off-topic remarks about “Russia Day” and the host’s continued commentary.

Speaker 0 contends that the world economy is severely damaged and worsening, blaming Israel’s influence, Trump’s policies, and BlackRock. They say Trump reversed the downturn but that his current behavior worsens the situation, describing him as a degenerate gambler who keeps betting with the people’s money. They warn that the global economy is being sunk by these decisions and that any recovery would be unlikely if he does not shut down the current course. Speaker 1 argues a simple plan: Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon and they won’t have one. They claim the president didn’t want to go that far, but there is no pressure from elsewhere. They assert victory will come, stating that militarily they have already achieved a complete victory in theory, with Iran’s navy effectively nullified and ships sunk by the U.S. They emphasize Iran’s strategy hinges on closing the Strait of Hormuz, not their blue-water navy. They note Iran has now made larger financial demands—a claim of $500,000,000,000 in reparations—describing these as part of a broader disaster. They accuse globalists and BlackRock of engineering the war to derail the Trump recovery, leading to inflation, fertilizer shortages, and a planetary downturn. They say there is no way to reverse this and warn that threats of further strikes against Iran could worsen the situation. They also accuse media and political figures of misrepresenting the war’s trajectory, and criticize those who supported the war for claiming to have been right. They suggest the debt situation is dire, with the national debt approaching or exceeding GDP in service, calling this a banana republic scenario. They describe a coming period of permanent austerity and a “great reset” via a central bank digital currency system, and contrast this with the supposed prior plan that could have rebuilt the economy. Speaker 2 adds that the United States holds all the cards if escalation occurs, but the goal is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and restore open access without mines in the water or tolls. They emphasize the aim to return to the previous open state of the strait. Throughout, Speaker 0 revisits earlier warnings about the start of the war, insisting Schmoyle (Schmoy/ Schmoyle) had warned this would derail the global recovery. They recall personal discussions with Tucker Carlson about Trump’s assessment of the war’s consequences, noting that Trump claimed “everything I do always turns out okay,” even as the analyst contends the consequences have been severe. They reiterate that the “globalist trap” and the Iran war were designed to undermine the U.S. and world economy, with the goal of bringing about a prolonged austerity and a global cashless system. They describe demonstrably worsening indicators—stocks, oil, and rates rising; inflation accelerating; fertilizer shortages; and a deepening recession—arguing these dynamics confirm the planned malaise. They reference headlines about inflation, the Iran confrontation, and potential sleeper cells, and they criticize the left, Democrats, neocons, and “MAGA knob polishers” for supporting the war. They reiterate that the globalists’ objective is to derail the U.S. and Western economies and to push toward a controlled, austerity-driven global order, while claiming the administration’s responses are failing to reverse the trend.

The discussion centers on the prospect of a renewed full-scale war in the Middle East, the motivations behind it, and the strategic implications for the United States, Israel, Iran, and regional partners. - Probability of renewed conflict: Speaker 1 argues that the chances of another US-Israeli assault are high and could be imminent. The war’s continuation is described as driven by Zionist policy, not by US national interests, and there is belief that “the forces surrounding Trump” are not rational. The capacity and readiness for a major operation are described as significant, with US equipment and ground-force preparations in Kuwait, the Emirates, and Bahrain, plus jets in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. - Iran’s stance and Hormuz: The conversation asserts that Iran did not intend to take control of the Strait of Hormuz; rather, that move came as a response to the war and hostile actions in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s side contends that the Strait should not be used as a foothold to wage war against Iran, and that its demand for secure passage is tied to preventing further attacks on Iranian infrastructure. The claim is that Netanyahu pushed for occupying the region and that the war’s origins relate to Zionism. - Netanyahu and policy: The speakers attribute the onset of the war to Netanyahu’s actions, arguing that his approach forced escalation and that the US reoriented its strategy in line with Netanyahu’s goals. The claim is made that the real policy of the US and Europe supports a scenario in which Israel could dominate the region, with the two-state solution presented as a long-standing facade. - Trump’s stance and rhetoric: The dialogue notes fluctuations in Trump’s rhetoric, including posts that reference military action against Iran. It is suggested that Trump wants to withdraw but is constrained by the gap between Iranian demands and what the US is willing to concede. There is a sense that Iran is not satisfied with limited concessions and that Tehran seeks broader sanctions relief plus a permanent adjustment to the Hormuz situation. - Negotiations and concessions: The speakers discuss the negotiations’ sticking points, particularly Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief. There is a view that Iran should retain control over the Strait of Hormuz permanently, rejecting any plan to relinquish control or limit enrichment in a way that would be perceived as a concession to Trump or the West. The suggestion is that while limits could be easy to manage through the IAEA, the control of Hormuz must not be offered as a temporary concession. - UAE and Gulf dynamics: The UAE is described as strategically vulnerable and heavily aligned with the US and Israel, creating a target profile for Iran. Iran’s attacks are framed not as personal but as strategic, aiming to impact the global economy by targeting the UAE as a hub. The UAE’s role in regional politics is portrayed as aggressive in its push toward conflict, although the possibility of reconciliation with Iran is acknowledged. - Alaster Crook and decision-making: An anecdote about Alastair Crook is used to illustrate a point about Western decision-making, suggesting that rational analysis often does not drive policy; emotional factors and perceptions influence choices in Washington and European capitals. - Human costs and damage: The discussion references the human and infrastructural toll, including the destruction seen in Gaza and Lebanon, and alleges the US and Israeli campaigns have caused widespread harm, including to schools and civilians. The speakers assert that the war has inflicted severe economic and humanitarian costs and warn of deeper global recession or depression if conflict deepens. - Specific incident and online safety concerns: The host reveals that Speaker 1 has a bounty on his head, stemming from a Twitter account fundraising for kidnapping him; the account was initially not removed, drawing attention to online threats associated with the conflict. - Nuclear diplomacy and a potential deal: When considering a hypothetical deal, Speaker 1 asserts that Hormuz control must be permanent and rejects a proposal for temporary limits or enrichment concessions in exchange for sanctions relief or assets unfrozen. He emphasizes that Iran believes its nuclear program is a sovereign right and should be handled through international mechanisms like the IAEA rather than through punitive terms tied to Hormuz control. He also reiterates that the nuclear issue has long been used as a pretext for broader policy aims. - Final takeaway: The conversation closes with a sense of caution about the likelihood of avoiding a renewed war, a recognition of the high stakes involved, and an insistence that Hormuz control be non-negotiable for Iran, while acknowledging the potential for reconciliation if Gulf states reevaluate alignment with Israel and the US.