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Europe should have been negotiating with Russia, but now that Trump is, some are in an uproar. If the US stops sending arms and funding, the war will end. This all stems from American arrogance, going back decades to the US declaring itself the sole superpower and expanding NATO eastward, ignoring Russian concerns. The US participated in a violent coup in Ukraine in 2014, further escalating tensions. Europe needs a grown-up foreign policy, not one based on hate speech or Russophobia, but real diplomacy. NATO should have been disbanded in 1991. The US sees this as a game, but for Russia, it's about core national security.

Glenn (Speaker 0) argues that the idea Russia started the war merely for territory is nonsense and that NATO’s involvement is not genuinely helping Ukraine; he says “This is NATO’s war. Nothing we’re doing is actually helping Ukraine. They’re an instrument. They’re a tool.” He contends the conflict began as a failure to build a common European security architecture, and that Russian demands are high, making a peace settlement unlikely. He defines victory in a war of attrition as exhausting the adversary first, suggesting Russia would prefer a neutral Ukraine without NATO, and that if Ukraine remains in NATO orbit, Russia would rather take Odessa. He asserts that NATO expansion revived Cold War logic and that Ukraine’s neutrality was the original Russian objective. He argues that Ukraine’s current war losses and economic strain indicate Russia’s advantage, and claims NATO support has not truly helped Ukraine, noting that in his view NATO and Western actions have been a driver of the conflict, including claims about Istanbul, Minsk, and the 2014 coup. Jonathan (Speaker 1) pushes back on several points. He says the war is not solely about territory and disputes Glenn’s claim that NATO’s role is responsible for the conflict. He emphasizes that if this were simply about NATO, NATO could have destroyed Russia by arming Ukraine more aggressively, yet “they could have done it so much more, effectively,” implying NATO has not fully acted. He sees both sides as losing in a prolonged attritional battle and notes that neither side has achieved decisive victory due to limits on production, economies, and allied support. He argues the conflict is about more than territory and rejects the idea that NATO guarantees Ukraine’s security; he questions whether NATO would credibly defend an attacked ally in Europe. He says the Maidan movement in 2014 was organic and not fully orchestrated by the US, though he concedes US influence existed. He disputes Glenn’s claims about Western NGOs and American orchestration, and he highlights that many Ukrainians initially favored non-NATO paths, with polls showing limited appetite for NATO membership before 2014. He also contends that Ukraine’s future lies beyond mere territorial concessions, pointing to the EU’s role and the broader security order, and he warns that negotiations with a “mafia cabal” running Moscow are unlikely to yield lasting peace, arguing that Putin’s governance frames negotiations as instrumental and potentially destabilizing. Speaker 2 (moderator) asks for reactions to ongoing developments, including Trump and Kushner’s involvement, Putin’s aides’ statements about known positions and lack of progress, and questions about what Russia truly seeks: Donbas control or preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. The participants discuss definitions of “winning” in a war of attrition, the role and credibility of NATO guarantees, and the strategic importance of neutrality versus alliance membership. They debate whether Russia values a neutral Ukraine with security guarantees or insists on broader concessions, and whether Ukraine could ever be secure without a credible deterrent. Glenn asserts that there was never credible deterrence in Ukraine prior to 2014, while Jonathan argues that NATO’s efficacy and unity are questionable, with concerns about member states’ commitments and the real level of Western support. On NATO and security guarantees, Glenn maintains that true security for Ukraine would come from a non-NATO arrangement that prevents Ukraine from becoming a future proxy battleground, suggesting limited, carefully designed guarantees could be acceptable, but that any path toward NATO-like intrusion would be unacceptable. Jonathan says NATO is not delivering credible security and emphasizes that EU membership and security arrangements also factor into Russia’s calculations, with the European Union potentially offering security commitments if Ukraine joined, though that possibility remains contentious for Moscow. They discuss the costs of war, civilian impact, and the global economic ripple effects, including potential impacts on food prices and shipping routes if Russia responds to Ukrainian actions against its maritime traffic. Towards the end, they forecast no immediate peace and emphasize unpredictability due to Western political shifts, central bank asset issues, and external actors like China, North Korea, and Trump’s stance. Glenn predicts Ukraine’s military unraveling and a weakening economy, while Jonathan stresses that a peace deal remains unlikely under current leadership, with outcomes dependent on Western resolve and external support. The conversation closes with a sense that the next months will be dangerous and uncertain, with the broader international order potentially shifting as the conflict persists.

Rick Sanchez and Glenn discuss how western and Russian media frame the Ukraine war, the state of journalism, and prospects for ending the conflict. Rick Sanchez explains that in the United States, the media operates with Pentagon and State Department correspondents who are fed lines to read on air, often about “new documents proving that such and such a bad person” and then follow with praise for allies. He says many correspondents are good people but their job is to articulate the narrative dictated by those institutions, leaving little room for his pushback or for challenging the official line. He notes he was on CNN with a big show and tried to question those narratives, but was pushed off the air or fired when he did. He contrasts his experience in the U.S. with his current environment, where he has more editorial freedom, and argues that in the United States, leadership rarely covers the other side—Putin, Xi, Modi—beyond brief comebacks on comedy shows, while in Russia he can access ministers and officials and report what they say more directly. He recounts Putin’s remarks last night, noting Putin said “The US media has become in many ways what we used to do back during the Soviet era,” that they block and interfere, and that “Russia has the best intercontinental weapon in the world today, and it's called truth.” Rick emphasizes the difference in how truth and free speech are treated, pointing out RT’s 20-year anniversary of free speech in Moscow and contrasting that with U.S. media practices. Glenn asks about how the narrative has flipped over time, referencing early Davos moments with Trump and the Chinese delegation, and later Russia’s perspective in Moscow. They discuss accountability gaps in Europe and the U.S.—the lack of accountability for events like the Biden laptop story, the Afghan bounties, the Nord Stream controversy, and the claimed Ukrainian drone deals—arguing that the press often avoids tough questions and veers toward pro-Russian framing by labeling inconvenient facts as Kremlin talking points. Rick argues that the censorship culture makes it seem like presenting the Russian perspective legitimizes it, yet he insists that understanding opposing viewpoints is essential to address the conflict. Rick claims that after Joe Biden’s administration made it illegal for him to practice journalism in the U.S. (tied to Russian connections with penalties for noncompliance), he found greater editorial freedom in Russia. He asserts that in the U.S., Putin or Xi speeches are rarely covered in full, whereas in Russia, officials publicly present their evidence—such as Boris Johnson allegedly paying bribes to Zelensky’s government to prevent a peace deal in April 2022—and provide data, timelines, and formal declarations, like a stated MI6 operation against Russia’s pipelines and a separate incident involving the destruction of a Russian aircraft fleet. They discuss the Ukraine conflict as a proxy battle primarily between the United States and Russia, with Trump positioned as a potential mediator who could push for rapprochement with Russia, potentially lifting sanctions to move toward peace. Rick explains his view that Europe’s insistence on continued confrontation with Russia is a sticking point and that the war’s end would require a shift toward diplomacy and a reduction of war propaganda at home. He cites a Guardian article detailing financial incentives to prolong the war and emphasizes that Russia’s strategy—advancing while minimizing civilian casualties and flanking cities—deserves more attention in Western reporting. They touch on Trump’s stance, suggesting that his administration might seek to end the war by reestablishing relations with Russia, and stress that some discussions could extend beyond Ukraine, potentially involving Odessa and broader regional settlements. They note Merkel’s recent critical commentary about Poland and Baltic states and acknowledge shifts in Western media narratives as war dynamics evolve. The conversation closes with hopes for reduced propaganda, renewed diplomacy, and the possibility that Hungary could host a productive meeting between leaders to move toward peace.

Russia's winning. They are winning decisively across the entire battlefront. If you get your information from The Economist, The Financial Times, The New York Times, Washington Post, you are reading undiluted propaganda. Trump's legacy, MAGA, the one big beautiful bill, terrorists, that legacy is in danger of being destroyed by Trump's failure to get out of the war in Ukraine. Show me a winning army in the history of the world that agreed to an unconditional ceasefire. It doesn't happen. If Putin's depending on high priced oil revenue to finance the war, the way to stop the war is to get the price of oil down to $30.40 bucks. Not with sanctions. Let Russia pump as much.

Jiang Shuichin argues that rapid shifts in international power generally become highly disruptive and destabilizing, often coinciding with major world-order changes after major wars or state collapses. He says the Iran war could have wider ramifications beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the region, potentially dragging the broader world into escalating conflict. He explains that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has long been a major driver of the global economy by selling oil cheaply in US dollars and recycling revenue into the US economy. If GCC states were removed from the global economy, he says it would have “tremendous consequences.” He claims that within “a month or two” the world could run out of strategic fuel reserves, grounding airplanes. He also links the conflict to global food supply, stating that the Tigray War provides one third of the world’s fertilizer, and that during the global growing season widespread famine could occur within “five months” or “six months,” especially in Africa. On the Middle East’s reorientation, he argues that Iran can control the Strait of Hormuz de facto, collect tolls, and de facto use it to reconstruct its economy, industrialize, and build stronger trade relations with China and Russia. He says the US imposed a naval blockade to embargo Iranian oil exports to China, but that enforcement is difficult due to the Indian Ocean’s scale and US resource limitations. He asserts that the UAE is “most desperate for war” after losing control of trade through the region’s shipping and finance hub. He adds that Saudi Arabia faces long-term threat dynamics because Iranian influence and proxies affect both Hormuz/Straight security and the Red Sea. He claims Israel wants the war to continue to advance the “Greater Israel” project and warns it has discussed attacking Turkey and Egypt next. He frames the region as a “powder keg,” arguing it is hard for the status quo to persist and predicting possible future breakout regional hostilities, including possible US airstrikes against Tehran and possible Israeli false-flag escalation modeled on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. He suggests the status quo could last “the next three to five months,” arguing Trump would avoid being seen as a loser and might pursue a tentative agreement before shifting attention elsewhere. He presents Cuba as a potential “next global flash point,” arguing the US embargo blocks Cuba from accessing fuel, food, and water, and that Raúl Castro could be indicted, recalling a prior pattern involving Maduro and special forces. He says Russia is heavily invested in Cuba and that both Russia and China are trying to support it. He predicts the Middle East conflict could expand to other flashpoints worldwide, including the possibility of tensions involving North Korea and South Korea, and he claims the war in Europe will also escalate. In discussing Russia’s Ukraine war trajectory, he references an attack on a student dormitory in Luhansk that reportedly killed at least six students and says Putin promised swift retaliation, framing this as potential movement from a “special military operation” toward declaring war and switching to “total war.” He then argues that European elites are trapped in a self-reinforcing fantasy that Ukraine is winning, describing domestic and institutional dynamics that prevent acknowledgment of losses and sustain continued war support. Regarding China’s and Russia’s roles, he says Iranian Foreign Minister Araki visited both Russia and China and claims Putin told him Russia is supportive of the Iranian people and views the US and Israel as aggressors. He says if Iran faces difficulties, Russia would reinforce Iran through the Caspian Sea and describes Russia’s response to GCC complaints about Iran. He contrasts China’s approach as neutral and mediation-focused, arguing China seeks peace and ceasefire so the world can return to global trade and that China refuses a clear stance. He also claims China might sign an agreement with the US to buy more LNG to compensate for lost Middle East LNG, especially Qatar. He describes negotiations between the US and Iran as having “three sticking points.” The uranium issue, he says, could allow compromise through allowing international inspectors while keeping uranium. The Strait of Hormuz control, he says, is core to Iranian security and not something Iran would give up. The third sticking point is Lebanon and the requirement that any peace treaty with the US also applies to Lebanon, including Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He argues that Israel’s offensive in Lebanon makes lasting peace unlikely and suggests any settlement with Iran would be tentative and could resume within “at most six months.” He argues the US cannot retreat from the Iran war because US financing needs depend on the world continuing to buy US Treasuries and because continuous bombardment is limited by depleted munitions stocks after earlier sustained airstrikes. He states that to “fight this war effectively” the US would need ground troops, which he says would require a national draft and also a chain of events to justify the invasion, including a need for “justification” to rally Americans and create broader economic chaos that would make the invasion acceptable. On Israel’s “Greater Israel” project, he argues that Lebanon is part of the project and that even if the US and Iran reach tentative terms, Israel’s long-term objective would continue, preventing permanent peace. He also claims the Zionist lobby has significant political sway in the US and cites campaign spending aimed at defeating a Republican congressman to warn others. He further argues that conflict models in Europe and Asia are tied to a broader US grand strategy: shifting global conflict to sustain debt and delay economic constraints. He says the US would aim to retreat geographically while still financing and arming partners to prolong wars. For East Asia, he claims the US might allow Japan and South Korea to handle more while American forces and allied structures support containment dynamics. Finally, he argues that Taiwan’s status quo is not sustainable and points to a “grand bargain” after Trump’s China visit. He says Western reporting frames the visit as unproductive, while Chinese media and experts view it as a breakthrough that could end the trade war. He claims the bargain could involve US access to China’s financial market and China opposing Taiwan independence, with the US pausing or blocking a weapons shipment to Taiwan and considering onshoring semiconductors. He states he expects Taiwan to be a future flashpoint only near-term at minimum and argues the next major flashpoint could be North Korea rather than Taiwan. He closes by describing a Western “legitimacy crisis,” attributing it to demographic crisis, financialization, and moral decay, and arguing it will lead to a decline of Western society. He also argues immigration debates are framed as purely pro-immigrant versus racist, while culture and cultural cohesion are not addressed.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Russia and the U.S. are politically aligned, confronting "brown heirs of Hitler's Germany" in Europe. The speaker suggests the U.S. send an official representative to Moscow's Victory Day parade, and proposes that if Europe continues to "humiliate" Trump, he should either bless Russia's "special military operation" or pressure Europe to unblock $100 billion of frozen Russian assets as an initial settlement. The speaker suggests using part of the money to purchase Boeing airliners. They also propose restoring direct flights between Moscow and Washington, and returning seized Russian diplomatic property. The speaker claims Zelenskyy opposes Trump's administration and that Ursula von der Leyen is the "new leader of militarism in Europe," hatching plans to rearm Europe. The speaker references Maria Zakharova's statement that Germany providing long-range missiles to Ukraine would be direct participation in the war. The speaker believes Trump will be blamed if the Ukrainian direction is unsuccessful and must be tough in implementing his goals. The speaker believes Trump is saving Ukraine, referencing a closed session of the Verkhovna Rada where the head of Ukrainian intelligence said Ukraine faces serious threats if there is no negotiation process by the summer. Trump stated that the U.S. will no longer provide military support to Ukraine.

Ashton Rutanski hosts Going Underground from a region tensioned by ongoing missiles and drone attacks and the wider aftermath of what he describes as the Trump-era wars in the Middle East. He notes that Xi Jinping canceled and rescheduled a meeting with Trump in Beijing, shortly after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met Wang Yi, with China and Russia blocking UN Security Council efforts to condemn Iran's actions in the Strait of Hormuz and China directing its companies to ignore Washington’s oil sanctions on Tehran. Rutanski frames the current sanctions as part of a long tradition of U.S. sanctions and cites figures from The Lancet Health Journal on deaths linked to those sanctions. He then introduces Paul Craig Roberts, former US assistant secretary of the treasury for economic policy under Reagan and former associate editor of the Wall Street Journal. Roberts argues that if Iran had prevailed in the Gaza conflict, the outcome could have reshaped world events, claiming Iran could have “pummeled the American bases and Israel into a surrender” if not for a ceasefire. He says the ceasefire was a mistake that prevented solidifying a victory and criticizes negotiations as ineffective against hegemonic powers like the United States and Israel, which he characterizes as pursuing greater Israel and broader regional hegemony. He suggests that negotiating with such powers is pointless when their aim is existential, and he contends that Iranian taktics were good but the strategic plan was flawed. Rutanski asks about media and political rhetoric, including allegations that Japan’s Financial Times (as a stand-in for Western media) reports Iran warning the U.S. not to enter the Hormuz Strait and to launch drones at the UAE. Roberts reiterates his view that negotiations with hegemonic powers are futile when those powers deny others’ right to exist, and stresses that the broader issue is the Zionist agenda of Greater Israel. He asserts that Arab and Muslim states have never confronted this agenda and argues that Iran should use its position to raise the Greater Israel issue as a matter of diplomacy and regional sovereignty, rather than focusing solely on uranium enrichment or coastal control. The discussion turns to Neoconservatism and American policy history. Roberts recalls the Iran-Contra affair as an early neoconservative moment, and cites Norman Podhoretz’s call for “the elimination of seven countries in five years” (Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon). He contends that U.S. policy has long aimed to reshape the Middle East in support of Greater Israel, with ongoing Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Western support for Israel. Regarding Trump, Roberts dismisses Trump’s statements as nonsensical and references an official U.S. State Department document claiming that the United States attacked Iran “at the request of Israel.” He criticizes mainstream journalism and suggests much reporting has become aligned with official narratives, while noting that Iran’s strategic posture should be to confront the Zionist agenda rather than to engage in other points of negotiation. The conversation touches on Vladimir Putin and Ukraine, arguing that Putin’s long-running war has widened and become increasingly dangerous; Roberts criticizes Putin for not seizing opportunities and notes that the broader regional conflict is expanding into NATO airspace, which could destabilize regimes in the region. The program closes with Roberts emphasizing the need for the Muslim world to frame its negotiations around the Greater Israel issue and for internal Israeli politics to reflect on the Zionist agenda, then signs off with condolences for those affected by NATO-era wars and invites viewers to continue watching on Going Underground.

The conversation centers on a view that the United States has failed in its proxy conflicts with Russia and Iran and that power is shifting to a multipolar world led by non-Western states. Stanislav Krapivnik argues that Russia’s pivot away from the West undercuts Western unity and that Europe is increasingly exposed as the West’s policies erode, with Russia becoming a leading anti-Western force for years to come. He frames the shift as not just multipolar but anti-Western in direction, noting that Russia’s stance has turned against the West and that the West’s “genocidal” actions and moral claims have damaged its legitimacy. He also asserts that the West’s actions have helped bring to power leadership in both Russia and Iran who are less amenable to Western influence. He highlights Trump’s regime-change actions as reflecting realignments away from West-facing regimes and notes the long-running Iranian threat as a consequence of Western policy. Key points covered include: - The shift from a Western-centered world order to a multipolar order led by non-Western powers, with Russia and Iran resisting U.S. and European influence. - Russia’s movement away from Western integration toward an anti-Western bloc, and the idea that the West’s moral posture has deteriorated, with calls that Europe’s rulers have failed to uphold moral standards while supporting aggressive actions. - Iran’s history of being pro-Western but ultimately rejecting Western dominance after regime-change attempts and pro-West leadership were removed; the discussion notes that Iran has demonstrated resilience by countering Western pressure and has weakened American influence in the region by striking American targets and allied interests. - Ukraine as a proxy conflict, with NATO involvement, and the view that Western leaders are pushing Ukraine into escalating confrontations with Russia. The speaker cites evidence that NATO and U.S. forces are deeply involved, including drone and missile strikes attributed to American planning or directive, and suggests that Europe’s leadership is moving toward broader war, despite public appeals for limited engagement. - The role of Turkey and the Baltic states: Turkey’s shifting position and its anger over Ukrainian actions; the Baltic states’ treatment of Russian minorities and the geopolitical risk of escalation if Estonia’s airspace is used for drone strikes against Russia, seen as potentially triggering a larger European conflict. - The argument that Europe’s security architecture is collapsing under its own hubris and dependence on the United States, with accusations that European populations are being molded toward war, militarization, and possibly even mobilization and conscription in several states (Germany, Poland, etc.). - The claim that deterrence must be reasserted; the speaker argues for making an example of Estonia as a warning to deter further cross-border aggression and to prevent a larger war, asserting that Europe’s leaders are too eager to escalate, risking a broader confrontation with Russia. - The broader cultural and historical analysis of Europe’s relation to Russia, including Peter the Great’s attempts to connect with Western Europe and Russia’s long-standing pendulum between East and West, with the speaker asserting that today Russia views itself as separate from Europe, forming a distinct civilization and political orientation. - The potential for a larger war in the near term if European leadership does not adopt a more prudent approach; the speaker warns that Orban’s political fate could accelerate conflict, and emphasizes that Europe must acknowledge deterrence realities or face nuclear risks. - The closing remarks echo Easter greetings, with the speaker returning to the grim prognosis of European demographic and political trajectories, highlighting a view that Western policy has empowered elites while threatening mass casualties and societal upheaval in Europe.

The transcript claims Russia and Ukraine are preparing for the “end game” after what it describes as a major escalation, saying Russia has stopped negotiating while European and Western leaders are “playing with fire.” It provides context about an attack on the Sterbolesk College in which Ukraine is said to have launched multiple drone strikes that killed 21 college girls and wounded 42 people. The transcript asserts that, according to the speaker’s sources, there were “no military assets” at the college. It says Ukraine stated a drone went off course, and then argues that the targeting was intentional. It adds that Ukrainian drone operators are described as being awarded points and incentives for civilian deaths, with an “extra equipment” and “medals” system after monthly data handovers. The transcript further claims remaining Russian college professors who survived are “added to Ukraine’s kill list,” referencing the Myravaetz website. It also alleges coordination of drone targeting using satellite coordinates and says the CIA and the UK are involved in targeting and telemetry data for attacks on civilian infrastructure. On the Russian side, the transcript describes an overnight response on Kyiv, featuring, for the first time, “Orichin” missiles, and includes reactions to missiles striking nearby locations. It claims Russia warned foreign citizens to leave, calling it the “last straw,” and said it would conduct “systematic strikes” on targets across Kyiv. It quotes a Russian Ministry of Defense statement that foreign nationals and diplomatic missions should leave as soon as possible, and says the EU responded that it would not leave. The transcript includes remarks attributed to Dmitry Medvedev criticizing the EU’s decision to maintain diplomatic presence. It then claims that a larger buildup is underway and says forces and special forces from Germany, France, the UK, and the United States—including the CIA—have been building up inside Ukraine. It argues Russia might take Odessa and claims this would cut off Ukraine from the ocean, asserting that taking Odessa would effectively prevent Ukraine from remaining viable. It claims Putin has been patient and aims to prevent civilian casualties, and states that civilian casualty numbers on the Ukrainian side were “incredibly low” compared with attacks on Russian civilians. It also describes alleged pressure within Russia for a more aggressive approach, framed as coming from anger over civilian deaths. The transcript then shifts to alleged threats involving the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum (June 3–6), stating Russia is treating them seriously and expects possible attacks during the event. It asserts Russia plans to “bring pain to everyday infrastructure across Ukraine,” and, if that does not produce surrender, to encircle Kyiv again. It includes an RT-referenced claim that “annihilation” of terrorist infrastructure will begin, including in Europe. Later, it quotes an NBC interview with President Zelensky claiming soldiers are rationing ammunition and lacking weapons to advance, with territorial losses if American aid does not arrive. It then claims President Trump posted a meme about alleged waste and corruption involving Ukrainian steel shipped to Poland for export to the U.S. to avoid “Section 232” tariffs and anti-dumping duties. The transcript ends by arguing Russia was not “pushed back” at Kyiv, stating Russia “left” as part of a pullback and aims for a settlement.

Speaker 0: The transcript portrays Putin issuing a chilling World War III threat with a flying Chernobyl-style nuclear weapon. The classified missile is rumored to reach Mach 15, change direction midair, and the Russians believe no one can shoot it down. They’ve already tested earlier versions on Ukraine. Even with high-tech missile defense systems, it cannot be stopped. Russia reportedly has hypersonic missiles that fly hundreds of feet above the ground, alongside ballistic missiles. The speaker asserts the Russians have it all, and that the US says Russia is ahead of us in hypersonic missiles. The Pentagon is described as keeping most powerful capabilities secret, with about two generations of weapons tucked away. The speaker claims Russia has almost a two-to-one nuclear superiority over the US, and that once war starts, nobody wins: even if 95% of missiles are shot down, they would still flatten every city and military base. A classified unnamed ballistic missile is shown dropping many dummy warheads as a demonstration. The narrative references alleged testing in Ukraine and notes a claim that a demonstration MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) was presented: a demonstration that Russia can penetrate defenses and deliver nuclear payloads, though no warheads were involved in that particular display. The speaker recalls Biden announcing long-range cruise missiles, and Putin responding by attacking a missile factory, with subsequent release of photos showing holes in the centers of buildings within the factory. Western media allegedly dismissed these as not powerful missiles, but the speaker counters that it was a MIRV demonstration, and Russia later confirmed the demonstration of capability to field nuclear payloads. The speaker also claims Trump is frustrated with NATO and the EU, accusing them of starting the war with Russia and not wanting it to end. It is stated that Trump decided, over a week prior, not to provide Tomahawks to Zelenskyy. In response, EU and NATO are said to be supplying comparable or more advanced weapons to Ukraine, which would escalate the conflict on the escalatory ladder. Putin is said to be amassing nuclear weapons and attack submarines, with references to maps in the Daily Mail illustrating Russia’s buildup in the Arctic Circle as preparations for war with NATO are described. A segment mentions footage of the Skyfall ballistic missile factory. Speaker 1: Closing outro promoting Infowars, urging followers to connect on X (Twitter) at real Alex Jones and at AJN Live, and to download the Alex Jones app, urging support against the “democrat deep state party” and declaring that they will never be silenced.

Russia and the U.S. are politically aligned, contrasting with Europe, which is seen as continuing the work of the Third Reich. The speaker suggests the U.S. send an official representative to Moscow's Victory Day parade. If Europe humiliates Trump, he should allow Russia to continue its special military operation or pressure Europe to unblock Russian assets, using $100 billion to buy Boeing airliners. The speaker proposes restoring direct flights between Moscow and Washington and returning seized Russian diplomatic property. Zelenskyy opposes Trump's administration and relies on the EU, while Ursula von der Leyen is the new leader of militarism in Europe. Germany is risking conflict with Russia by considering supplying long-range missiles to Ukraine. The speaker questions the seriousness of U.S. threats to withdraw from Ukraine negotiations, noting upcoming midterm elections. Trump needs to be tough to resolve the conflict and has tools to influence Europe and Zelenskyy. Trump is saving Ukraine, as indicated by Ukrainian intelligence, and negotiations are in Ukraine's interest. Trump stated the U.S. will no longer provide military support to Ukraine.

In a wide-ranging interview, Professor Sergei Karaganov, a prominent Russian foreign policy scholar, provides his perspective on the current security crisis, Russia’s strategic posture, and possible futures for Europe and the world. On the trajectory of the conflict and world order - Karaganov argues that the conflict signifies a broader systemic shift, describing it as a “fourth world war” that began in Ukraine with American efforts to undermine Russia and European participation, spreading now to the Middle East and South Asia. - He frames the wider struggle as a gradual replacement of a unipolar Western order with multipolar dynamics, warning that diplomacy has been insufficient and that the European elites are leading their states toward a major war. - He emphasizes the need to prevent horizontal escalation and to stop the war in Europe, extending concerns to destabilization across a vast swath of the globe. On NATO, Ukraine, and escalation - He notes unprecedented Western support for actions on Russian soil, including missile attacks and political backing for operations on territory Russia considers vital, including aspects of its nuclear triad and early warning systems. - He criticizes Western decision-makers for misjudging the scope of the conflict, arguing that the war is not only about Ukraine but about a broader confrontation with the Old West. Russia’s strategic aims and deterrence - A central theme is the need to “win” this war to halt the bloodletting in Ukraine and to prevent further escalation and casualties on both sides. - He calls for escalating to deter and punish Western elites, arguing for a reevaluation and expansion of Russia’s nuclear doctrine to threaten European elites and bunkers with limited, targeted nuclear strikes if necessary. - He advocates shifting from a doctrine that assumes no victories in nuclear war to one in which “there will be victories” and where Russia would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against European adversaries if deterrence fails. - He also suggests delegating some command authority for European theater to a dedicated commander who could authorize such actions, including nuclear use, if necessary. On arms control, diplomacy, and prospects for peace - Karaganov argues for moving away from arms-control constraints as part of a broader strategic realignment and emphasizes the need to deter and potentially punish adversaries with credible force. - He dismisses the “Spirit of Alaska” as a trap and warns that peace would only be possible if European elites are removed or replaced, implying that diplomacy would be possible only after such changes. - He maintains that a truce could be possible, but not a peace, unless European elites are replaced by more restrained governance and a rethink of Western strategic posture. - He asserts that Minsk was a mistake and criticizes attempts to extend deterrence to European allies, labeling such proposals as disastrous for Russia and European stability. On Europe, modernization, and Russia’s future - He contends that Europe has historically been a source of conflict and that Europe must be kept at a distance; Europe should not determine Russia’s future course. - He rejects European integration as Russia’s path, arguing that Europe remains valuable culturally but cannot dictate Russia’s strategic choices. - He positions Russia as inherently Eurasian, with external cultural roots in the Byzantine, Muslim, and Buddhist worlds, and deems Europe as a historical phase that should be left behind for Russia’s future development. On diplomacy and concrete steps - He notes that diplomacy could still have a chance, but the endgame would involve the elimination of the Kyiv regime, restoration of Russian-controlled lands in the south and east of Ukraine, and breaking the will of European elites to pursue aggression. - He reiterates a preference for avoiding a direct European invasion and expresses a desire to avoid a full-scale nuclear exchange, while insisting that Russia must be prepared to act decisively if Western adversaries continue their aggression.

Europe needs war to prevent citizens from revolting due to negative interest rates that are strip-mining pension funds and banks. After Ukraine allegedly tried to assassinate Putin, any leader would retaliate, despite media narratives. If he were Putin, he would not sign a peace deal, as Europe is gearing up for war, with reports of citizens being drafted, even a 60-year-old in Germany. The Vienna peace conference is now about preparing for war. The Ukrainian recovery conference guaranteed billions for Ukraine's repair, with Europe providing funds for both weapons and recovery. The speaker no longer supports Trump for giving Putin fifty days, claiming the war was initiated by Victoria Nuland and John McCain, who supported overthrowing the Ukrainian government and picking the interim government that started the civil war. Zelensky refuses to have elections because he would lose and is allegedly sending people with Down syndrome to the front lines.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss the evolving, multi-layered negotiations surrounding the Ukraine war, stressing that talks involve more than Ukraine and Russia, extending to US-Russia dynamics and broader European and global interests. - They note that trilateral talks among Ukraine, Russia, and the US have begun, with the first phase completed. The conversation emphasizes that the US-Russia dimension is crucial because the conflict is viewed as a proxy war between NATO and Russia, and that “the US toppled the government in Ukraine” with intelligence support, military planning, weapons, and targets coordinated through backchannels. The implication is that any durable settlement would require some deal between the US and Russia to de-escalate the proxy confrontation. - On US-Russia relations, Speaker 1 identifies several dimensions: renewal or non-renewal of New START, and the functioning of embassies, as negative signs, but points to positive changes elsewhere. He highlights Kislyov’s Sunday night program remarks, noting Russia’s proposal to contribute $1,000,000,000 to become a permanent board member using frozen US assets (total US assets frozen around $5 billion in equivalent value). He mentions that Trump was asked about using frozen assets and reportedly declined, but the implication is that Moscow views this as a potential lever. Kislyov also notes that the additional $4,000,000,000 in frozen assets would be allocated to reconstruction in Palestine, and that Russia’s participation on the board would influence regional diplomacy, including with Palestinians and Israelis. - The discussion suggests that the absence of official diplomacy (e.g., embassies) does not necessarily indicate a lack of progress, arguing that backchannels between Putin and Trump are functioning well. The speakers discuss the broader context of Russia’s strategic posture, including alleged advancements in space-based and other new military capabilities that are not fully captured by New START, and the sense from Moscow that the US is preparing a space-based missile system that would enable first strikes, a point the Russians emphasize in public discourse. - On Ukraine, Zelensky’s stance is described as uncompromising: Ukraine will not cede territory and will demand security guarantees, which could undermine a neutral status. The dialogue suggests Zelensky is using a posture of firmness to buy time for negotiations, with Ukrainian leadership potentially exchanging assurances for a broader settlement that could include regime change and financial support for reconstruction. - The potential for compromise is discussed in terms of strategic timing and leverage. The Russians’ primary interest is regime change, and there could be an understanding with Trump about a democratic replacement in Ukraine, possibly replacing Zelensky with a pro-Russian administration under conditions tied to substantial monetary reparations for reconstruction. The timing and mechanism, including potential referenda or buyouts, are considered critical elements that could determine the settlement’s architecture. - The European role is analyzed as increasingly fraught. Europe’s diplomatic engagement has been limited, but Moscow is open to leveraging European assets in a peace process. Lavrov’s stated position that talks with Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission leadership are unlikely, and the broader fragmentation within Europe (France, Germany, Finland, the EU leadership) are highlighted as complicating factors. There is speculation about European figures who could bridge talks, such as Finland’s Stubb, though there is skepticism about Kalas’s leadership within the EU. - The speakers speculate that Davos and Trump’s stance have reshaped European perceptions of US leadership, with European elites increasingly questioning the reliability of US-backed security guarantees. The conversation closes with an expectation that the year 2025 will be dominated by Trump as a central variable in resolving global issues, and that Moscow remains optimistic about achieving a settlement with Washington while signaling a tougher stance toward Ukraine if needed. Overall, the discussion portrays a complex, interwoven set of negotiations across US-Russia, Ukraine-Russia, and European dynamics, with backchannels, asset controls, potential regime-change considerations, and timing as key levers for reaching any settlement.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

Afshin Ratanji introduces a new season of Going Underground amid war in West Asia, describing millions of displaced people and ongoing conflicts involving the United States, Iran, and UK-US-EU backed Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Palestine. He says the show is broadcasting from a UAE where OPEC is “de facto compromised,” and references participation in the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum in Russia, noting about 20,000 attendees from 100 countries despite NATO attacks on Saint Petersburg. He claims represented countries include the UAE, Saudi Arabia, China, Iran, and the United States “for the first time in nearly a decade,” and asserts that NATO-aligned media will not highlight Moscow’s role against the Nazis. Ratanji argues that Russia is benefiting from war-related disruptions tied to Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, stating that higher prices result from commodities being “plugged up in the Gulf.” He links Russia’s export windfalls to strong demand and says Russia produces key stranded commodities, listing oil, fertilizers (while claiming Russia held back fertilizer export), helium, and aluminum. He also points to a stronger ruble and claims it helps anchor inflation and inflation expectations in Russia, while grumbling in Moscow is said to reflect a fiscal deficit increase due to fewer rubles per dollar earned. He asks Professor Steve Hanke of Johns Hopkins University about the “Strait remains closed equals Russia remains…” claim and about differences between physical and paper oil prices. Hanke explains that the physical market refers to commodities delivered today or within a week, while the paper market refers to commodities delivered later, creating a timing difference. He says spot/near-month prices in the physical market are much higher than prices for delivery in two to four months. He attributes the futures dislocation to oil being “bottled up” and not delivered, leading to international demand exceeding current supply, with inventories being run down. He predicts inventories will reach very low critical levels by the end of July or early August, after which “the price will zoom up again,” and he says buyers of futures for August delivery today would profit if August prices rise when delivery arrives. When Ratanji asks about on-the-ground correlations versus WTI/Brent indicators, Hanke says shortages in specific markets drive physical prices higher when ships arrive and unload, and that “you have to think physical” for physical commodities. Ratanji then challenges European leaders regarding proposed price controls on milk, bread, and eggs. Hanke responds that the first step is to remove sanctions on Russia, arguing sanctions never work and backfire with unintended negative consequences. He claims Germany has been “hollowed out” and says European energy prices are highest in Germany, contrasting this with a scenario where Germany imports Russian oil and gas. Hanke also says projected growth for Germany in 2026 is almost identical to Russia’s, both around “half a percent per year.” Hanke argues that pressure should be applied to wind down the war against Iran and open the Strait, claiming the United States and Israel shut the Strait down and miscalculated, while Iran can control it. He says the Strait will likely remain closed and functionally inoperable for quite some time, and describes an “Ali strategy” analogy, saying Iran has absorbed “pound-pounding” and made a “knockout blow” through control of the Strait. He further ties commodity price damage to affordability crises and predicts revisions down for global forecasts, stating the Strait remaining closed is his baseline and that increased sanctions on Russia will slow down both Russia and Europe via blowback. He adds that perceptions shift in the global south and BRICS: the United States’ scores are said to have fallen to “minus eleven,” while China’s are said to be “plus seven.” He says the United States’ centrality to the world capital market prevents a complete pivot away from it, but that a marginal pivot is occurring. In response to Ratanji’s question about NATO nations’ “boomerang policies” and militarism, Hanke says since COVID there has been movement toward protectionism, interventionism, and militarism. He argues militarism is a “waste of money,” stating that producing drones destroys rather than builds or enhances human capital, and he asks whether militarism has ever done anything positive for an economy.

Russia is consistently portrayed as acting against American interests, particularly with its alliance with China and its invasion of Ukraine. This action, while wrong, was driven by Russia's concern over Ukraine potentially joining NATO and becoming a satellite of the United States with American weapons. The speaker argues that Ukraine's government isn't fully sovereign, alleging it was installed by a CIA coup. They highlight that during peace talks in Istanbul, a potential agreement was disrupted by the US, leading to further devastation and loss of life in Ukraine. The speaker questions why the U.S. is at war with Russia.

Russian president Vladimir Putin faces domestic criticism for not ending the war in Ukraine and is being pressed to act on Iran as well. On Russian talk shows, officials suggest Putin is dependent on his relationship with Donald Trump, which critics say stalls peace negotiations, raising questions about what Russia can do in Iran while entangled at home. Russia signals potential actions, such as stopping energy flow to those supporting the war, with Sergei Lavrov saying Russia will “do everything to create an atmosphere that will make this operation impossible” in cooperation with partners and in international forums. Putin also floated the idea of stopping energy flows to Europe, suggesting Europe could be drawn into the conflict since many NATO members are reluctant to be drawn in, though some like Italy and Spain reportedly oppose direct involvement. Iranian foreign minister comments: when asked whether Russia and China are helping Iran, the minister said they are supporting Iran politically and otherwise, and that military cooperation with Asia and Russia is not a secret. He did not give specifics on whether Iran is actively receiving military assistance in the current war, stating he would not disclose details of cooperation in the middle of the war. Discussion with guests focuses on the Ukraine and Iran theaters, the Russia-China-Iran triangle, and the potential for Russia to change its approach. Jim Jatris, a former State Department official, emphasizes that Putin’s view of Trump shapes Russia’s strategy, noting Russian engagement with two Americans described as “New York flim flam artists” around ceasefire discussions. Jatris argues the Russians may have been interested in a deal via Trump’s intermediaries but now see the negotiations as “treachery” and question whether there is any real chance to decapitate or leverage Kyiv, comparing this to Israeli and U.S. tactics against Iran and other groups. He suggests Moscow’s pressure points include whether Russia will shift its Ukrainian strategy and what happens if the U.S. declares a victory and withdraws, leaving Iran and Russia to decide whether to press their advantage or pause. Doug McGregor comments on Russian restraint, arguing Moscow has pressed for minimal terms since June 2024 and views Western capitals as cutthroat, making negotiation unlikely. He notes internal Russian debate among figures like Nabiulina and others about maintaining restraint and keeping negotiation channels open, while acknowledging that Russia might eventually decide to end the war by destroying the Kyiv regime, though it is unclear what they will do. The conversation also touches on the complexity of Russia-Iran-Israel relations and the potential for direct Russian involvement, including possible shadowing of Israeli submarines or deploying Russian personnel in Iran, while recognizing that Russia would likely avoid direct combat if possible. The overall tone considers how a pending Xi–Trump meeting in Beijing could be affected by the war’s progression, with speculation that the meeting may be canceled or postponed depending on developments.

Ray McGovern, a former CIA officer who chaired the National Intelligence Estimate and prepared daily briefs for the president, discusses the newly released US national security strategy and its implications for the war in Ukraine, as well as broader US-Russia and US-Europe dynamics. - McGovern notes a dramatic shift in the national security strategy’s emphasis. He observes it prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, with Russia treated as part of Europe. He contrasts this with past eras, recalling Paul Wolfowitz’s post–Gulf War doctrine, which asserted US primacy and the ability to act that Russia could not stop, and he emphasizes the stark difference between that era and the current document. - He recounts a historical anecdote from 1991–1992: Wolfowitz’s belief that the US could win where others could not, followed by a warning to General Wesley Clark that Russia would challenge US primacy as times changed. He points to subsequent US actions in Iraq (2003) and Syria (2015) as evidence of a shift in capability to project power, and he argues that in 2022 Russia halted US plans by preventing NATO expansion into Ukraine. - McGovern interprets the current strategy as signaling a recalibration: the US may be acknowledging a changing balance of power, with a focus on deterring Russia and stabilizing relations with Moscow, while recognizing that Europe is central to strategic calculations. He stresses that Russia’s core principle, in its view, is to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and he underscores that the strategy doc frames core interests as seeking strategic stability with Russia and a negotiated modus vivendi, though he notes these appear as a “castaway” in the Europe section. - He discusses ongoing high-level discussions in Berlin involving Witkoff (Wittkop) and Jared Kushner, and Zelenskyy’s positions on NATO membership and security assurances. He recalls past European reactions, including Rubio’s role in watering down European talking points and US–Russian negotiations, suggesting a pattern of European concessions followed by US–Russian engagement that sidelines European voices. - McGovern argues that Russia has “won the war” on the battlefield and that Moscow’s tactic is gradual, minimizing Ukrainian casualties while consolidating control over parts of Donetsk and other territorial objectives. He asserts Putin’s priority is to maintain a workable relationship with the United States, with Ukraine as a secondary concern. He also notes Trump’s stated interest in improving US-Russia relations, including a willingness to consider extending New START, and he highlights that Moscow would react to whether Trump commits to the treaty’s limits for another year, which would influence Moscow’s strategic calculations. - The discussion covers the internal US debate over how to handle Ukraine and whether to pursue negotiations with Russia. McGovern argues that the reality of Russia’s position and Ukraine’s losses complicate any simple “win” scenario for Ukraine, and he suggests that a negotiated settlement might eventually emerge if a durable US–Russia relationship can be pursued, given Russia’s advances on the battlefield and its leverage in European security. - They discuss John Mearsheimer’s realist perspective, arguing that Western expansion toward Ukraine contributed to the conflict, and that voices emphasizing NATO enlargement as the sole cause are contested. McGovern mentions Obama’s warnings not to give Ukraine illusions of prevailing against Russia and to avoid escalation, and he contrasts this with Stoltenberg’s statements about Russia’s preconditions for peace. - They also critique EU moves to seize Russian assets to fund Ukraine, suggesting that European leaders may be acting to preserve political power rather than align with the public’s long-term interests, and question whether such measures will endure or provoke wider political backlash. - In closing, McGovern reiterates that Russia has the upper hand for now, with the war’s outcome dependent on political decisions in Washington and Moscow, particularly whether Trump can extend New START, and whether European and US policymakers can sustain a realistic approach to security guarantees and the balance of power in Europe. The conversation ends with a cautious note about the potential for a settlement but ongoing uncertainties about the strategic environment and transatlantic politics.

The interview is delayed and then resumes, with discussion shifting to major international developments. On Iran-related negotiations scheduled for Saturday, July 11, Speaker 4 says the Pakistanis believe talks will resume by then, but multiple parties (Iranians, the U.S., Israel) can still disrupt events before that date. Speaker 4 says the first thing to check is whether the parties meet; if they meet, the MOU remains viable. He lists unresolved issues including failure of the United States to fulfill Article 1, efforts to control Iran’s duties under Article 5, Iran not relenting, and the issue of unfreezing assets. Speaker 1 adds that total relief of all sanctions is also still on the table, and raises the ongoing Lebanon issue. On maritime activity near the Strait of Hormuz, Speaker 1 cites a UKMTO statement claiming the southern route is open again for all traffic, with a corridor expanded for day or night travel if ships keep AIS on, radar on, and lights on. The threat level is described as substantial due to mine danger areas and concern about naval forces hailing ships over VHF. Speaker 4 says he is monitoring ship tracking and describes container ships and other cargo vessels returning, with most traffic going through Iranian channels and only one or two via Omani channels. The conversation then turns to a Netanyahu–Trump meeting during the NATO summit context. Speaker 1 relays an Axios report quoting a senior Trump official: Netanyahu made promises about the Iran war that didn’t come to pass, showing trust is broken, and the report’s leak is framed as significant. Speaker 4 references criticism of Netanyahu coming through reports attributed to Barak Ravid. Both discuss that any public warmth may mask deeper concerns, and they emphasize that what matters is what happens afterward. Speaker 1 worries about U.S. decisions that could greenlight Israel in Lebanon and undermine negotiations with Iran due to Israel’s violations of ceasefire and MOU language that Speaker 1 says is tied to Lebanon. Speaker 1 describes conversations with people from Lebanon (Laith Malouf of Free Palestine TV, and Sharmeen Narwani of The Cradle) and explains his focus on what the Lebanese government is thinking. He argues the Lebanese government’s actions contradict the MOU Iran made with the U.S. regarding Lebanon and references leaked clauses that he says require the Lebanese army to disarm Hezbollah across all Lebanon, which he says could trigger civil war. Speaker 4 replies that the deal represented only a portion of Lebanon’s population, with the rest split among Sunni and Shia Muslims and the Druze. Speaker 1 also relays an Axios item saying Netanyahu urged Trump to reign in Erdogan over increasingly anti-Israel rhetoric, and asked Trump to avoid approving weapon sales that would help Turkey modernize its air force. Discussion includes claims of mutual hostile rhetoric and disagreements between Israel and Turkey, as well as debate over whether economic escalation like oil pressure should occur. A clip of Trump’s comments is discussed, describing threats to attack Iran’s infrastructure and promises about enriched uranium. Speaker 1 then reads Iran’s response, attributed to Muhammad Bagheri, criticizing the threats and urging respect, with a statement that the Iranian people are “strangers to the language of threats” and warning of response “in another language.” Speaker 4 says the language was prohibited in the MOU and frames it as a violation, while Speaker 1 counters that violations may not be expected to be perfect in an MOU context. The transcript then focuses heavily on the scale of Ali Khamenei’s funeral as reported by Al Jazeera and other estimates: Speaker 1 cites projections of 14 to 20 million across Iraq and Iran over the entire period, and gives specific city estimates: Iran 15 million, Qom 2 to 4 million, Iraq 3 to 5 million, and Mashhad 7 to 10 million, with combined attendance projected around 30 to 40 million. Speaker 4 responds that the size indicates Sayyed Ali Mohammed’s unpopularity. Speaker 1 describes a viral post and a quote broadcast on Iranian national television from a person who says they were previously against the government, engaged in protests, and now begs forgiveness, portraying a shift in sentiment after the war. Speaker 4 compares the funeral’s impact to the U.S. unity shift after December 7, 1941, and says it will affect Iranian culture for the next 50 years. Speaker 1 agrees, adding that even critics may mourn and respect due to the defense of the country and the war’s narrative. Israel/Iran-related moral and protest comparisons appear next, including discussion of alleged violence by Israeli police and prisons versus claims about Iranian guards. The conversation then reports a new maritime incident: Speaker 1 says an unknown projectile hit a Qatari-owned LNG tanker, Al-Raqayat, on the port side near the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz, causing fire with no casualties or environmental impact reported. Authorities advise vessels transit with caution, report suspicious activity to UKMTO, and Speaker 1 frames the incident as showing escalation risk despite ongoing negotiations. On Ukraine, Speaker 1 relays comments attributed to Russian spokesperson Peskov calling it “a war,” and Zelensky’s statements about nuclear weapons as a form of security and vulnerability if lacking them. Speaker 1 connects this to reports that Ukraine may consider obtaining a nuclear capability and mentions a large Russian attack allegedly with drones intercepted but few or no missiles intercepted. Trump’s remarks are also discussed, including a claim that a 90-minute call with Putin and efforts by Trump could bring talks to an end, and that NATO summit discussions may help. Speaker 4 responds by shifting to arguments about escalation and retaliation patterns, then provides a long historical breakdown of Russia’s shifts in tactics and force posture: from early invasion framed as special military operation, to mobilizations, shifting operational focus (e.g., Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Pokrovsk), the Kursk invasion, and later expansion across multiple regions. Speaker 4 claims Kyiv has been struck repeatedly and discusses air defense failures, and he asserts Russia has reserves while Ukraine does not. The transcript then returns to military, economic, and political pressures. Zelensky’s Financial Times quote is read: once attacks reach “1,000 flying towards Moscow” Putin will “feel it personally,” and farther from Moscow means closer to ending the war. Speaker 4 counters with skepticism about Ukraine’s ability to match Russia’s scale of attacks, and discusses glide bombs and claimed casualty impacts. Speaker 1 asks about pressure from energy infrastructure strikes and oil market impacts, while Speaker 4 says Russia exports increase, premiums are obtained, and the broader oil-market impact is limited. Additional regional updates include Lebanon: the Lebanese president denies reports of meeting Netanyahu and says he would immediately leave if in the same room while Israeli attacks and violations continue. Speaker 1 also cites a Lebanese government preliminary report placing direct damage from the war between $3 billion and $4 billion, excluding indirect economic losses of $16 billion, and Speaker 4 responds by calling the deaths “priceless.” Yemen is described as a major development: Speaker 1 says Saudi imposed a blockade preventing Iranian airplanes from going to Yemen for the first time in 11 years, and Iran breached it with an Iranian Mahan air flight to Sana’a transporting injured people and a high-level delegation. The conversation frames this as strategically favorable for Iran, with proxy-war consequences and ongoing clashes linked to Houthi activity and Saudi-backed forces. Speaker 4 adds that Yemen heating up could affect Saudi exits through Bab el-Mandab and change logistics depending on where oil is being sold. On Gaza, Speaker 1 discusses claims that Hamas government bodies resigned or were dissolved and describes other circulating reports (from Emirati outlets) saying these were false and that Hamas instead renovated an emergency committee into an interim committee led by Abdul Hadi al-Aqra (as stated). Speaker 4 accepts this alternative framing as more credible, and Speaker 1 says Hamas aims to expand political control in Gaza and the West Bank. Speaker 1 adds news that an International Security Force presence (described as Trump’s “peace” border force) may bring 20,000 personnel mostly from Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, and Albania, while Gaza continues to be bombed. The episode ends with discussion of negotiation prospects: Speaker 1 argues Trump needs a political win after the Iran war and is more optimistic about Ukraine negotiations, while Speaker 4 says Europe may push confrontation with Russia and risks of escalation at sea. Both agree that the conflict’s end may happen while Trump is still president, but not on Trump’s terms, and they conclude after exchanging commentary on future tracking tools and other unrelated remarks.

Alexander McCurse and Glenn discuss whether Vladimir Putin has changed his approach in the war. McCurse says the new posture is a “new Putin” marked by an end to diplomacy-focused messaging and a shift to victory-oriented rhetoric, including talk of “liberating Donbass and Novorossiya.” He describes Putin as also calling for a long buffer zone as punishment for Ukraine’s actions in Kursk, with Russian forces getting close to Kharkov and Sumy and potentially tempting moves toward Ukraine’s second-largest city. McCurse links the shift to a key moment in December, when there was a drone attack on Putin’s residence in Valdai. He says many in Russia, possibly including Putin, believed it was an assassination attempt, reinforced by a Zelensky comment before the attack. He argues that a subsequent weeks-long period of Putin speaking less about Ukraine reflected internal debate in Russia about what to do. He then says Western escalation—more drone and missile attacks and a narrative that the initiative shifted to Ukraine—contributed to that debate ending. McCurse claims Putin emerged from it with a harder line focused on victory and internal stabilization, and says the “mood” across Russian society has darkened with no further interest in diplomacy. Glenn asks how European rhetoric and Trump’s stance factor in. McCurse says he attended a conference in Pskov and met people in Moscow, including factory workers, and found an overwhelming consensus about the war as a Russia-versus-West conflict. He says European talk about being on the brink of war communicated to Russia and influenced Putin. McCurse points to Putin’s claim that Europeans (and thus the West) are preparing for war, while Russia must prepare to defend itself, arguing that Russian drone attacks make this feel like “they are attacking it already.” Glenn questions whether restraint from Moscow is about avoiding nuclear war or about buying time. McCurse agrees it could be both, but emphasizes that Russians increasingly perceive they face a West that has lost fear of war and discusses war constantly. He adds that he believes Russians have concluded war may be coming and time should be used to prepare, and he cites Professor Karaganov’s argument that fear of war must be restored in the West. McCurse says he now sees more of this view being taken seriously by elites and advisers. McCurse adds specific claims about Putin’s latest interview: he dismisses diplomatic initiatives from the West as “tricks,” and for the first time says there was no actual deal or agreement reached in Anchorage with the Americans. McCurse argues that if Anchorage produced no real agreement, then concessions made there do not apply anymore, reinforcing his view of a strongly hardened posture. The discussion then turns to whether Russia can end the war or whether it could become permanent. Glenn argues that NATO and European support for Ukraine mean Russia may not be able to end the conflict simply by achieving territorial goals, referencing European actions around 2014, Minsk, and the idea that NATO built a large Ukrainian proxy force. McCurse responds that the Moscow debate has shifted from whether negotiation is possible to whether deterrence with the West can be restored through victory in Ukraine versus needing actions beyond victory to restore fear in the West. He says Russians are close to achieving initial territorial objectives in Donbass and possibly other regions, but that doubts in Moscow about reaching a negotiated settlement could lead Russia to push further west. On “dirty war,” McCurse says he is uncomfortable with the prospect but claims Russian admission of assassinating a Ukrainian military intelligence official. He argues that if tit-for-tat killings begin, it could extend beyond intelligence officials to political-system figures and potentially spread to Europe, given Russia’s resources and capabilities. Glenn describes how European narratives avoid confronting inconsistencies, including claims about battlefield movement and casualty ratios. McCurse replies that people become angry when factual contradictions are raised and states that, in his view, the Russians are advancing toward places like Kramatorsk and Slavyansk and threatening Sumy and Kharkiv. He describes recurring optimism narratives as wishful thinking and says the “war of attrition” is heading toward outcomes more disastrous for Ukraine. Glenn also raises the impact of attacks on Russia’s infrastructure, particularly in Crimea, and whether this increases pressure for extreme responses. McCurse says Crimea is a significant problem but that Russia has the resources and ingenuity to overcome challenges. He argues the key issue is not inflicting pain but whether it can achieve Russia abandoning objectives, adding that constant poking of a nuclear power is dangerous and that assuming Russian restraint indefinitely is not affordable. Finally, they discuss Europe’s political environment and debate suppression. McCurse says internal debate is closed down, and when escalation concerns are raised they are treated as “Putin talking points.” He claims European opposition is constrained because challenging policy is labeled pro-Russian. He adds that in the UK, leadership rotation continues with the same Russia policy, and argues policy change is unlikely. He also asserts that at least one prime minister who came into government saying the Russia policy was unsustainable would not remain prime minister long if trying to change it.