TruthArchive.ai - Related Video Feed

Seyyed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiators, joins the discussion amid rising tensions around Iran. He notes that the Strait of Hormuz has been temporarily closed for Iran’s military exercises, describing it as unprecedented and potentially a warning, while the United States continues to accumulate assets in the region, including the USS Gerald Ford entering the Mediterranean. He observes that given the scale of U.S. assets, it will be hard to reverse the momentum, and wonders how Iran views the severity of the situation and what an off-ramp might look like. From the outset, Marandi says a major confrontation seems likely, though it’s unclear whether it would involve actual military aggression. He asserts that the Zionist regime, the Zionist lobby, and the so-called Epstein class in the West would do anything to aid the Israeli regime, citing the U.S. ambassador to Israel who said that if the regime takes the whole region, that would be acceptable. He argues that Iran, Hezbollah, and the resistance in Iraq are the principal forces resisting the “greater Israel project,” while other regional governments—Erdogan, the Emirates, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan—are part of the American empire and unlikely to prevent Israeli gains until it is too late. He states that Iran will not back down and that there is no scenario in which the Americans win a potential war. Marandi emphasizes that Iran has said it would shut down the Hormuz if attacked, and that this would not be a last-resort measure. He recalls that in the twelve-day war (presumably 2021-2022), the conflict mainly involved Iran and the Israeli regime, with the Americans carrying out a token strike and not destroying the global economy; Iran does not desire to cause global economic suffering. He argues that Iran has friends worldwide, and ordinary people in many countries desire peace and the ability to earn a living. He contends that Gulf monarchies hosting U.S. bases have contributed to planning against Iran, and that Iran and its allies would respond with strong measures. If attacked, Iran would do everything to protect itself and would hit hard to bring down the global economy; the war would be costly and devastating for the United States and its Western allies. Regarding U.S. strategy, Marandi says the American plan for surprise is central, and he doubts Washington can win without a full-scale ground invasion, which would be economically unfeasible for the United States. He argues that the on-the-ground resistance in Iraq and Yemen, and the potential instability of Gulf regimes, would tempt political upheaval in those states. He asserts that the longer the conflict lasts, the more irreversible the damage, with Iran’s drones and missiles capable of striking oil facilities, ports, and ships across the region, threatening Gulf and Caucasus oil flows. Marandi critiques Western media coverage, accusing it of fabricating or inflating numbers about Iranian casualties and portraying Iran as the aggressor. He points to demonstrations in Iran—millions in Tehran and across the country on February 11—versus Western reports that try to depict the opposite, and he argues that independent Western journalists who witnessed Iranian demonstrations were attacked and smeared for challenging the narrative. He says the media’s role is to lay groundwork for war, and that in his view the “Epstein class” in the West has exposed itself. On negotiations, Marandi says the United States publicly focuses on Iran’s regional allies and military capabilities, not on the nuclear deal, and that Iran will not discuss its regional policy. He notes Iran’s insistence on negotiating with the Americans directly (not in a multilateral format) and in Oman, while observing that the talks are often used as deception. He asserts that Iran restarted indirect talks to show that it is not the aggressor, and that Tehran remains prepared for war but not initiating it. He argues that Iran’s preparations have strengthened its capabilities since the twelve-day war, with more drones and missiles directed at the United States and its proxies, and that Iran’s underground bases and air defenses have advanced. Concluding, Marandi says the window for a U.S. decision is limited by the regime’s costs, and that Iran’s home-field advantage, the widespread unpopularity of Gulf monarchies, and the broader resistance in the region would shape the outcome. He believes a U.S. victory is impossible, describing a scenario where, after heavy destruction and economic collapse, Trump would be forced to retreat under the guise of victory, with the West blamed for the catastrophe. He asserts that Iran will defend itself and that the global economy would suffer far greater damage than Iran’s own infrastructure, with mass movements of people worldwide as a consequence. He closes by affirming his commitment to continue communicating despite the risks.

- Tucker Carlson released a video addressing the war with Iran, arguing he was among the few who warned Washington weeks before the conflict began and that President Trump did not heed that warning. The discussion notes Tucker’s appearance in Washington with Trump and mentions supporters like JD Vance and Tulsi Gabbard. - Carlson’s framework for analyzing a major war is introduced as four questions: 1) Why did this happen? 2) What was the point of it? 3) Where does it go from here? 4) How do we respond? - On why this war happened, the speakers assert a simple answer: this happened because Israel wanted it to happen. The conflict is characterized as Israel’s war, not primarily for U.S. national security objectives, and not about weapons of mass destruction. The argument is made that the decision to engage was driven by Israel, with Benjamin Netanyahu demanding U.S. military action and pressuring the U.S. through multiple White House visits. - The speakers contend that many generals warned against the war due to insufficient military capacity, but those warnings were reportedly ignored as officials lied about capability and duration of a potential conflict. They claim there was no credible plan for replacing Iran’s government after a potential topple, highlighting concerns about Iran’s size, diversity, and the risk of regional chaos. - The discussion suggests a history of manipulation and misinformation, citing a 2002 exchange where Netanyahu allegedly pushed for regime change in Iran and noting Dennis Kucinich’s account that Netanyahu said the Americans had to do it. They argue this war is the culmination of a long-term strategy backed by Netanyahu. - On what the point of the war would be for Israel, the speakers say the objective is regional hegemony. Israel seeks to determine regional outcomes with minimal constraints, aiming to decapitate Iran to allow broader actions in the Middle East, including potential expansionist goals. They argue Iran’s nuclear program was used as a pretext, though they contend Iran was not imminently close to a nuclear weapon. - The role of regional players is examined, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman—and their strategic importance as energy producers and regional influencers. The speakers claim Israel and the U.S. sought to weaken or destabilize these Gulf states to reduce their capacity to counter Israel’s regional dominance and to push the U.S. out of the Middle East. - It is asserted that Netanyahu’s strategy would involve reducing American involvement, thereby weakening U.S. credibility as a security partner in the region. The claim is that the Gulf states have been left more vulnerable, with missile threats and disrupted energy infrastructure, and that Israel’s actions are designed to force the U.S. to withdraw from the region. - The speakers argue that Europe stands to suffer as well, notably through potential refugee inflows and disruptions to LNG supplies from Qatar; Europe’s energy security and economy could be adversely affected. - The discussion notes alleged Israeli actions in the Gulf, including reports of Mossad activity and bombings in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, though it is presented as part of a broader narrative about destabilization and its costs. - The potential consequences outlined include cascading chaos in Iran, refugee crises in Europe, and a weakened United States as an ally in the Middle East. The speakers predict long-term strategic losses for Europe, the Gulf states, and the U.S. - The discussion concludes with a warning that, if Israel achieves its aims to decapitate Iran, the region could destabilize further, potentially triggering broader geopolitical shifts. A final reference is made to Naftali Bennett portraying Turkey as the new threat, illustrating ongoing great-power competition in the region. - The overall message emphasizes truthfulness in reporting, critiques of media narratives, and the view that Western audiences have been propagandized into seeing Middle East conflicts as moral battles rather than power dynamics between competing states.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined by professor Syed Mohammed Marandi, from Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back. Marandi: Hi, Glenn. Thank you. It shows how much I like your show because I went through a lot of trouble to get online. Glenn: I appreciate it. Regarding the riots in Iran, Tehran included, it seems every time there’s a buildup to regime change or invasion, the script follows a pattern: first destabilize with sanctions and an information war, then build on public grievances and instigate violent protests. You announce the intention to help locals in their aspirations for freedom, with rhetoric reduced to a binary: either you don’t care about the protesters or you support sanctions or intervention. After a coup or invasion, the US and its allies have a zero-sum geopolitical interest and power interest, not altruism. The result, from the Arab Spring onward, is that the country to be liberated is destroyed. Iranian protests are an internal issue, but once international, geopolitics intrudes. How do you assess the situation on the ground in Tehran, domestic grievances, and the geopolitical component? Marandi: Western media and think tanks periodically declare Iran on the verge of collapse, but the state has popular support and a strong constitutional adherence. Currency suddenly fell—perhaps 30–50% in a brief period—and was managed from abroad, with pressure from the US and Western allies on currency-exchange places. Peaceful protests in Tehran and other cities followed mainly by business people whose shops were threatened by rising prices; if the currency isn’t stabilized, they’d go out of business. Protests continued into day two, with larger crowds in some cities. Then infiltration occurred: small, well-disciplined groups began to riot. Over the past days, over 100 officers were murdered, some beheaded or burned alive, some police faces smashed. A nurse in a clinic was burned alive in the top floor; ambulances and fire engines were burned; a Red Crescent worker was killed. Western media claims “protesters” and ignores footage. Across the country today, demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic and the constitution were large—city by city like Isfahan, Tabriz, Ahvaz, Mashhad, Tehran. The crowd in Tehran was among the largest ever. Despite rioters, millions showed up in demonstrations across the country. The Iranian state’s media is outspent by a global Persian-language media empire in the West, with billions spent on online campaigns, bot armies, and networks. Yet millions demonstrated in support of the state. People can see the footage themselves. The internet was shut down to coordinate rioters across groups including ISIS-related elements, monarchists, and Kurdish groups. The rioters’ coordination collapsed when the internet went down. The regime’s supporters remain, and demonstrations in Tehran and across Iran show broad, diverse perspectives, all affirming support for the constitution and the state. Glenn: I’ve seen pro-government marches here as well; they’re huge, though not always covered in Europe. Marandi: There’s a narrative control to label the government illegitimate to topple it. The rhetoric claims Iranians are freedom-loving, yet those who claim to support them have bombs and blood. Pompeo’s tweet suggesting Mossad agents among protesters, and Mossad’s Persian-language statements, indicate foreign interference. The internet blackout aimed to prevent coordination among rioters; footage shows violent acts—two men burned in a mosque, a nurse burned in a clinic, ambulances and public buses destroyed. The “millions on the streets” claim is contradicted by the actuality of coordination via foreign paymasters. Glenn: Trump claimed Iran had fallen and would negotiate; is this about a new nuclear deal, stalled or about missiles and Iran’s regional support? What are Washington’s aims? Marandi: No one contacted him; his claim about the second-largest city falling is baseless. His ignorance shows inchoate knowledge of ground realities. Trump’s past statements about surrendering Iran suggest aims aligned with the Israeli regime’s goals: a broken West Asia and North Africa, fragmentation of states, and meddling across the region. Erdogan’s miscalculation—allying with Israel and Qatar—empowered Israeli policy at the expense of Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and Iran. The “woman, life, freedom” protests were initially fueled by Western narratives; BBC Persian and other outlets spread misinformation about Massa Amini, which was later corrected, but the cycle repeats. The West uses propaganda to push riots; Iran’s endurance of sanctions and propaganda demonstrates broad legitimacy for the Islamic Republic even amid external pressure. The demonstrations today show support for the state, the constitution, and Iran’s policies while denouncing the US, the Israeli regime, and their supporters. AOC’s stance and Trump’s stance reflect a uniparty tendency toward empire preservation. Glenn: Regarding potential war, Lindsey Graham floated strikes; how likely is war? Marandi: The currency manipulation aimed to justify instability for war. The CIA, Mossad, and others would seek to justify strikes, but Iran is prepared for war. If the US attacks, Iran may strike back; the population that stood with the state could unite in the face of aggression. Iran’s capabilities include underground drone and missile bases, short- to medium-range missiles, more easily moved than long-range missiles. Iran could devastate US installations if attacked. If war occurs, Iran could retaliate in the Persian Gulf and beyond, potentially impacting global economies. If the US begins, Iran could respond decisively, targeting American interests abroad and in the region. The Zionists allegedly favor war for their regional aims, regardless of Western consequences. Glenn: Professor Malandy, thank you for traveling and for the discussion. Marandi: Always a pleasure, Glenn.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

Speaker 0 discusses a strategic move focusing on Karg Island in the Northern Persian Gulf. He states that the island is offshore about 18 miles. He asserts that if that island were taken out, it would affect “80 to 9% of the petroleum usage that the Iranians have,” implying a substantial economic impact on Iran. The speaker contends that removing the island would essentially shut Iran off economically, preventing it from supporting China and also preventing it from supporting Russia. The argument presented suggests that such a disruption would have broad geopolitical consequences, weakening Iran’s ability to back allied actors. The speaker predicts that sooner or later, the opposing side would realize that this scenario constitutes “just a bad news thing,” implying that the economic impact would become evident and influential in international relations.

Glenn: Welcome back, with Janis Varoufakis, former Greek finance minister and founder of DM25. The world has grown more dangerous. He notes the war in Iran is asymmetric: the US is more powerful but Iran can shut down energy trade and view the conflict as existential, willing to shut down the global economy to avoid defeat. Glenn asks where the war is headed and whether there is an off-ramp. Yanis: The US has a history of asymmetric conflicts where it enters with confidence and exits with its wings clipped—Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria. Iran has faced stronger opposition than those cases, and despite striking Tel Aviv and Gulf bases, the US pain threshold seems lower than Iran’s. He points out the difference this time is a broader regional and global resistance and Iran’s capacity to respond through strategic actions like shutting Hormuz, making escalation costly for the US. Glenn: Economics show that industrial might, supply chains, and technological sovereignty matter, suggesting a shift away from free trade. He asks whether these lessons will redefine Western ideology and asks about the role of deindustrialization over the last decades. Yanıs: He says the shift began after Bretton Woods and the era of financialization and neoliberalism, with industrial capacity shipped out and the West leveraging finance and, later, big tech. He notes Margaret Thatcher’s role in deindustrialization and shipping capacity abroad, and he is surprised Trump fell into a war against Iran without a clear exit strategy. He argues Netanyahu’s influence pulled the US into a long war, framing it as a tactic to keep Israelis in fear and justify annexation moves in the West Bank, thus sustaining conflict. He also addresses the liberal-imperialist claim of liberating women, stating that women of Iran do not need bombs and that liberation would require defeating the powers that prevent peace and democracy, citing the 1953 coup and the suppression of the left in Iran after 1979. He emphasizes that the regime’s survival has involved neoliberal policies within Iran and that both reformists and conservatives in Iran ultimately align around survival and regional power, with the regime having benefited from long-term Western hostility and recent escalations. Glenn: Raises the point that the US miscalculated even the narrative—often incoherent, with statements about “liberating women” fluctuating between aims of freeing women and destroying Iran’s ability to rebuild. Yanīs: He challenges the idea that this war is about liberating women, and reiterates that the people of Iran face a stark choice between the current regime and a failed-state trajectory. He argues the regime's popularity is enough to sustain it, and that external pressures are not driving a straightforward democratic outcome. He notes that the real losers are ordinary people in the US, Iran, and globally, with rising food and energy prices, while the leaders of Iran may see gains in rallying around a common external threat. Glenn: Cites Trump’s tweets about higher oil prices and questions the populist credentials when the impact is on the average person. Yanīs: He discusses the changing nature of warfare, highlighting drone technology as a major shift. A drone economy makes cheap drones capable of challenging costly missiles, altering the political economy of war and enabling autonomous, AI-driven weapons. He notes that drone warfare, as seen in Ukraine and now Iran, could lead to a permanent-war dynamic where peace becomes a system error. He mentions how tech companies like Palantir train AI for civilian and military applications, including hospital management, illustrating the broader commercialization of war tech. Glenn: Reflects on how competition among NATO, Russia, and China could reshape power dynamics, particularly with autonomous weapons and the ability of adversaries to strike at vulnerabilities. Yanīs: He cautions about the risk of a broader great-power war and notes that drones, autonomy, and AI could enable rapid decision-making with less human oversight, expanding the lethality and reducing accountability. Glenn: Observes that Iran can absorb pain and still threaten Hormuz, while the US and Israel may be unable to declare a decisive victory without economic and political costs. He asks where US and Israel go from here. Yanīs: He argues Netanyahu seeks permanent war to justify expansion, while the Trump administration would like a quick victory. He underscores that a clear victory is hard to define when Hormuz remains contested, and that Trump’s options may be to declare a triumph or continue the conflict, depending on midterm politics. He emphasizes that the war’s outcomes are measured by the cost to ordinary people rather than leaders’ narratives. Glenn: Adds that the war’s casualties and economic effects will hit working people hardest, and notes Trump’s failure to align populism with real-world costs. Yanīs: Returns to the moral dimension, explaining that he has opposed illegal wars by the US and Israel in various contexts and that his duty is to call out both sides, stressing international law and stopping his own governments from dropping bombs on Iran as the top priority. Glenn: Agrees, adding that human rights should restrain war, not justify it, and warns against substituting humanitarian rhetoric for power plays. Yanīs: Concludes by recalling past anti-war activism and reiterates that solidarity should resist imperialism, not substitute it with bombings of other regimes. He emphasizes choosing international law and opposing the gang-like rule of Western governments. Glenn: Thanks Yanis; Yanis thanks him as well.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the unfolding Iran war three days in, arguing that the conflict has become a regional war with global economic and strategic reverberations. Key points and allegations: - Iran has targeted at least 27 bases and port facilities across the region, from Kirlik Airbase to Dubai, effectively regionalizing the war. Oil markets anticipate disruption; Europe’s open price rose about 20% on expectations of supply cuts, with a potential rise above $100 per barrel. - In the Gulf, inexpensive drones have breached what appear to be expensive air and missile defenses, affecting airstrips and airports. A large expatriate workforce in the UAE (about 4.6 million Indians and many Europeans and Americans) is stranded, highlighting economic disruption. Oil infrastructure damage is just beginning, with some Saudi refineries struck; more damage anticipated. - The war’s consequences extend beyond Iran and Israel, potentially affecting India, Northeast Asia, Turkey, and Europe. The conflict did not begin with a joint US-Israeli attack; it began with an Israeli attack, with Rubio (Secretary of State-like comment) indicating that Israel started it, which the US later joined due to perceived insufficient posture. - Reports indicate three F-15s were downed; casualties include American sailors and Marines, though the exact numbers are unclear. - The rhetoric from Secretary Hagel (likely Hagerty) and Trump about Iran as a state sponsor tied to Israel is criticized as incautious. MacGregor argues the focus should be on Pakistan and Syria (where remnants of ISIS/Al Qaeda reside), noting Pakistan’s long-standing role as an incubator of radical Islam. He views the war as primarily about Israel’s aim to destroy Iran to enable greater Israeli regional hegemony, with the US fully committed. - He predicts a long regional war and warns that logistics will be decisive: missiles are finite, and the US may exhaust its stock; many missiles used in Ukraine reduce available stock for Iran-related defense. He notes Hypersonic missiles and decoys complicate defense capabilities. - European involvement is uncertain; Britain’s rapid response is unclear, and the broader European willingness to intervene remains doubtful. China and Russia are viewed as potentially pivotal if they decide to intervene; India is suggested as a potential mediator, given cultural ties and BRICS interests. - The US’s strategic credibility and military power are questioned. MacGregor contends the US has shown unreliability, damaging its legitimacy and triggering broader regional and global realignments. He emphasizes that the world is moving toward a new order, with the end of Sykes-Picot-era maps and shifting alliances; Gulf monarchies may seek US withdrawal. - Iran’s resilience is stressed: even if the supreme leader was killed, unity of command remains, and Iran’s dispersed military network complicates US efforts. Iran’s survival could enhance its regional influence; the longer the conflict lasts, the weaker the US and Israel appear, and the stronger Iran, Turkey, and others may become. - The possibility of an escalation to nuclear warfare is raised: if Israel uses a tactical nuclear weapon to stop Iran’s missiles, Russia and China might intervene; this could force a broader confrontation. MacGregor doubts Israel’s ability to sustain a large front and warns this could lead to a strategic pivot by major powers. - On outcomes and endgames: Iran seeks US withdrawal from the region; the US’s presence is likely to be forced out as Gulf states demand it. The interview suggests a collapse of US influence and a reshaping of the Middle East, with Persia re-emerging stronger. Israel’s survival is uncertain; extended fronts and exhaustion are anticipated. - Trump’s role is described as constrained by Netanyahu: Trump is not a free agent, and there is little expectation of near-term strategic change in Washington. The potential for a negotiated end is deemed unlikely so long as Iran remains intact and steadfast. Overall, the conversation frames the conflict as a turning point: a regional war with profound economic and geopolitical ripple effects, signaling the decline of US military hegemony in the Middle East and the possible reconfiguration of global power blocs, with Iran poised to gain relative strength if the conflict persists.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

The speaker argues that Iran, despite being an energy-rich country, has squandered its potential by pursuing a radical ideology that diverts wealth away from its people. He states that millions of Iranians protested because their quality of life did not match what it could or should be, and he attributes this disconnect to the Iranian state’s priorities. The speaker contends that Iran is the number one state sponsor of terrorism because it takes the money it earns and invests it in tunnels, missiles, launchers, UAVs, and other militarized capabilities, and that those investments are being destroyed and degraded “in historic proportions.” He emphasizes that Iran may still possess some capability and will attempt to hold people at issue, signaling ongoing threats that require vigilance. In response, the speaker asserts that efforts to compel Iran are ongoing every single day. Regarding embassies and consulates, he notes that unlike previous administrations, the current approach is to double and triple down on ensuring the safety of personnel, regardless of which department—Whether Department of War or Department of State—cits involvement, the aim is to protect facilities and personnel. The maxim “the best defense is a good offense” is invoked to justify proactive measures, including targeting or pursuing those who would threaten diplomatic facilities. He asserts that there are numerous actors attempting to target U.S. diplomatic missions, and that the U.S. is not surprised by Iran’s indiscriminate targeting, asserting that such attempts are still occurring. The overall message is one of a persistent, aggressive stance against Iran’s destabilizing capabilities and an emphasis on protecting U.S. personnel and facilities abroad while continuing to degrade Iran’s ability to project power.

Professor Zhang returns to discuss the Iran war and geopolitics through historical patterns and game theory. He argues that Trump has failed to articulate a clear purpose or strategy for the war. Initially, the narrative centered on preventing Iran’s nuclear uranium enrichment, but the Oman foreign minister reportedly told observers that Iranians had already agreed to zero uranium enrichment even for civilian purposes, calling the nuclear weapon pretext into question. He notes that Rubio proposed preempting Israel’s anticipated attack, suggesting the U.S. acted to defend itself. After initial strikes, Iran bombarded U.S. bases in the GCC and closed the Strait of Hormuz, causing significant global economic disruption as oil prices rose toward around $120 a barrel. Iran’s aim, Zhang says, is to pressure global economies and the GCC to push Trump to end the war, while the United States and its allies pursue a destructive approach, including strikes on desalination and oil facilities, which he characterizes as civilian targets that would jeopardize civilians’ access to water and fuel. He cites a 170 schoolgirls’ deaths in a Tomahawk strike as an example of the civilian toll and argues the war’s conduct suggests a focus on destroying Iran rather than regime change. Glenn observes the narrative’s inconsistency and compares it with other wars, where a single organizing narrative typically emerges. Zhang expands the view: the war is a war of attrition for Iran, pressuring global energy supplies and GCC partners to influence Washington to end the conflict, whereas the United States and Israel pursue a path of destruction. He emphasizes Iran’s vulnerability of Gulf States, arguing their dependence on U.S. protection—despite their vulnerability when Hormuz closes and their desalination capacity is threatened. He explains that Gulf economies depend on oil revenue and import food and water; closing Hormuz and attacking desalination plants could collapse the GCC’s economic and physical stability. He contends that the Gulf’s petrodollar system ties the region to the U.S. economy, and destroying that link would threaten both American debt and the AI/flood of investment in the United States from Gulf capital. Zhang further argues that the war’s broader global impact could unsettle the current liberal international order. Iran seeks to push the U.S. out of the Middle East, gain control of Hormuz, and finance rebuilding domestically, while the U.S. and its allies resist recognizing the limits of empire. He asserts that the petrodollar system ties Gulf investments to the U.S. economy; if Gulf States stop funding American growth, an AI-driven financial bubble could burst, triggering a severe downturn reminiscent of a Great Depression. He counters a belief that the United States could gracefully withdraw from the region, labeling such thinking as wishful and attributing the U.S. position to imperial hubris. Glenn asks about the war’s potential global spread and how the conflict might draw in other powers, including Russia, China, Turkey, and Pakistan. Zhang contends there is likely no off-ramp; Israel intends to widen the conflict to achieve its Greater Israel project, while Iran would strike GCC targets more than Israel. He notes Turkey’s weakness and predicts possible broad regional engagement, with Pakistan obligated to defend Saudi Arabia and potentially becoming a participant due to mutual defense pacts. He suggests a multi-vector expansion: from Pakistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan to secure the Shatt al-Arab and Hormuz, leading to broader regional escalation and eventual intervention by Southeast Asian economies reliant on Hormuz oil. Discussing Russia, Zhang argues that Vladimir Putin has a grand strategy. He believes Putin is waiting for a U.S. ground invasion of Iran; once U.S. forces commit ground troops, Russia could exploit the distraction to advance objectives, notably Odessa, potentially triggering a European defense and a prolonged, draining conflict. This, he says, would exhaust Europe and push for a political realignment favorable to Russia, potentially replacing the current order with a new balance of power. Towards the end, Zhang forecasts three major post-war trends: deindustrialization due to energy scarcity, mercantilism with localized supply networks, and remilitarization as Pax Americana ends and Pax Judaica or similar regional orders emerge. He suggests Japan might lead East Asia in deindustrialization and remilitarization, while China remains tied to the old global order. He predicts a potential rapprochement between the United States and China but maintains the global order will not be saved. He also notes that Europe is in a dire condition, facing demographic and economic strain, refugee integration challenges, and political fragmentation, which undercuts Western liberal hegemonies. In closing, Zhang reiterates that his earlier prediction from two years prior—that the United States would invade Iran—has been fulfilled with shock, and he expresses sympathy with the unsettling realization of the unfolding dynamics.

Daniel Davis contends that Iran’s two primary objectives are to survive—politically and militarily—and to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed. Politically, Iran must maintain control of the IRGC, police, and regular army to endure assassination attempts and maintain regime viability. Militarily, Iran does not need to defeat the United States but must sustain missiles, drones, and attacks on regional assets to remain viable. Time benefits Iran: the longer the conflict lasts, the more it hurts the United States, especially given U.S. urgency to end the war and reopen Hormuz. Davis argues the United States has a more urgent timeline due to the economic impact of a closed Hormuz, with oil prices hovering around $100 and potential further price spikes if the Strait remains shut. Iran, however, can endure months of strikes while keeping Hormuz closed, placing pressure on the Trump administration. He notes that the U.S. has destroyed much of Iran’s surface forces and air force and much of launch infrastructure, but Iran retains missiles, submarines, speedboats, drones, and a dispersed set of launch sites, allowing continued viability. On the political front, Davis says Iran sees the Israeli-US effort as aimed at destroying the Iranian state, and that domestic opposition to the regime has rallied around the flag. He argues Trump faces significant political challenges at home, including allies unwilling to risk naval engagement and internal criticism amplified by figures like Joe Kent, who resigned as director of the National Counterterrorism Center and accused the Israeli lobby and media of orchestrating a misinformation campaign. Kent stated there was no imminent threat from Iran, arguing the war was not America-first. Davis asserts that Trump cannot count on broad allied support to open Hormuz; allies have refused to risk their ships or crews in a mission that could fail. He cites the lack of a coherent, feasible military plan to open the Strait and the risk of escalation, while noting domestic and Gulf-state economic pressures. In discussing potential military options, Davis questions the viability of a ground invasion of Iran. He estimates a ground campaign would require at least 500,000 to 1,000,000 troops and would face impassable terrain and fortified defenses, making a successful outcome unlikely. He argues a sustained air and naval campaign also fails to guarantee opening the Strait, given Iran’s dispersed defenses, underwater missiles, drones, submarines, and long-range artillery. He suggests the most feasible non-air/space option might involve attempts related to Yemen to keep Bab el-Mandeb open, but even that is uncertain and risky. Regarding weapons and logistics, Davis notes the current conflict uses different inventories than those used in Ukraine, with interceptors and air-defense assets not readily available to share, while JDAMs and other munitions are limited. He observes that munitions consumption is high and could strain stockpiles, complicating long-term operations. Finally, Davis discusses US-Israeli relations. He says there has been a public decline in support for Israel among some groups, and Joe Kent’s explicit critique of Israeli manipulation could complicate bipartisan support. He predicts that growing American casualties and economic costs from the war could lead to political pressure on Trump to adjust or disengage, potentially affecting U.S.-Israel coordination in a prolonged conflict.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and Speaker 2 discuss the evolving confrontation between the United States and Iran and its broader economic and strategic implications. Speaker 0 highlights three predictions: (1) Trump would win, (2) he would start a war with Iran, and (3) the US would lose that war, asking if these predictions are still valid. Speaker 1 characterizes the current phase as a war of attrition between the United States and Iran, noting that Iranians have been preparing for twenty years and now possess “a pretty good strategy of how to weaken and ultimately destroy the American empire.” He asserts that Iran is waging war against the global economy by striking Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and targeting critical energy infrastructure and waterways such as the Baghdad channel and the Hormuz Strait, and eventually water desalination plants, which are vital to Gulf nations. He emphasizes that the Gulf States are the linchpin of the American economy because they sell petrodollars, which are recycled into the American economy through investments, including in the stock market. He claims the American economy is sustained by AI investments in data centers, much of which come from the Gulf States. If the Gulf States cease oil sales and finance AI, he predicts the AI bubble in the United States would burst, collapsing the broader American economy, described as a financial “ponzi scheme.” Speaker 2 notes a concrete example: an Amazon data center was hit in the UAE. He also mentions the United States racing to complete its Iran mission before munitions run out. Speaker 1 expands on the military dynamic, arguing that the United States military is not designed for a twenty-first-century war. He attributes this to the post–World War II military-industrial complex, which was built for the Cold War and its goals of technological superiority. He explains that American military strategy relies on highly sophisticated, expensive technology—the air defense system—leading to an asymmetry in the current conflict: million-dollar missiles attempting to shoot down $50,000 drones. He suggests this gap is unsustainable in the long term and describes it as the puncturing of the aura of invincibility that has sustained American hegemony for the past twenty years.

The Strait of Hormuz is extremely important: about 20 to 25% of the world’s petroleum passes through it, roughly a third of the world’s fertilizer comes through the strait, and about 10 to 12% of the world’s aluminum also moves via this route. If the war continues and the strait becomes really closed (it isn’t completely closed right now), Iranian ships carrying oil go through the strait. The United States is permitting Iranian oil to enter the oil market for the same reason it removes sanctions on Russian oil: President Trump wants to ensure there is as much oil in the international market as possible so that oil prices stay down. So oil continues to come out of the Gulf, and most of it is Iranian oil. If the strait were shut off, there would be very significant effects on the international economy. Even if it isn’t shut, oil prices are expected to creep up, which would increase pressure on President Trump to try to open the strait. But there is no way to open the strait, and the fact that President Trump is asking for help in that mission shows that the mighty US Navy, the mightiest naval force on the planet, cannot open the strait by itself. This indicates the level of trouble we’re in. Moving forward, it looks like the Iranians have a very powerful hand to play.

The speaker reveals a surprising reason why America, the UK, and France support Israel. Contrary to popular belief, it's not about oil but rather the Suez Canal. Egypt currently owns the canal and earns $9 billion annually from it. The Americans, British, French, and Israelis want a share of this profit. To achieve this, they plan to build the Ben Gurion Canal by nuking a rocky area in the Middle East. This new canal would allow two ships to pass simultaneously, unlike the current Suez Canal. It would empty into the Mediterranean at the northern point of Gaza, resulting in the displacement of Palestinians to the south.

Speaker 0 expresses concern that Iran’s escalation leads to automatic draft registration and that many people voted against the Biden administration and Kamala Harris because of floated draft ideas for Russia. They reference a report on Liberty Report about this automatic involuntary draft registration. Speaker 1 describes the NDAA as a must-pass bill that often includes dangerous language. He says the bill will automatically register young men aged 18 to 26 for the draft and create a database, removing any choice about whether to register or not. He argues this presumes the government owns you and your body, equating it to slavery. He contends that if a war is unpopular or unconstitutional, people will still be forced to register. He notes a belief that the current war is obviously unconstitutional and asserts confidence in young Americans defending their country if attacked, though he questions whether an attack has occurred. Speaker 2 counters that the threat is not existential from Iran, but argues it comes from elsewhere, including issues at the southern border. He reframes the concern as domestic rather than a direct external threat from Iran. Speaker 3 agrees and adds that the U.S. lacks a sufficiently large army due to prior cuts and a focus on exotic weapons and a large surface fleet. He contends the army is too small to project power, and any ground invasion into the Middle East would face immediate, formidable opposition, including precision missiles and drones, making a conventional ground war implausible. He criticizes naval power’s utility in modern conflicts and suggests an invasion would be impractical. Speaker 2 asks for more detail about Karg Island, a strategic island off Iran’s coast, noting 90% of oil flows through Iran from that area. He mentions talk among Trump administration officials about capturing the island and asks how the U.S. could secure it. Speaker 3 explains that much of the oil from Karg Island goes to India, China, Japan, and South Korea; destroying or occupying the island would require moving ground forces and crossing water, which would be extremely dangerous. He warns that destroying oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf would lead Iran to target refineries, drilling rigs, and storage tanks, and notes that Gulf States heavily rely on desalination plants. He cautions that destroying these plants could cause mass death and devastate Gulf economies. He adds that the Israelis previously struck a desalination plant in Iran, which would amplify consequences for regional economies. Speaker 0 asks how the public should feel about the conflict, noting that the government started it on false pretenses and that the country’s leaders and military performance have been disappointing. They seek guidance on how to view the situation and how to respond. Speaker 1 expresses domestic concern about a potential false flag, citing FBI warnings that Iran may have launched attack drones off the West Coast, suggesting a false flag could be used to erode civil liberties. Speaker 2 agrees with the false-flag concern and notes that Israel has a history of false flags and mentions events in Azerbaijan and Turkey. He emphasizes the need for Americans to understand the consequences of U.S. actions for people in the region and to push the president and administration to stop inflammatory language. Speaker 3 clarifies that Iranian officials have instructed contacts in the Western Hemisphere not to harm the United States, arguing that causing harm would benefit Israel. He concedes that false-flag analysis is plausible but unlikely in the long run, and stresses the importance of public awareness of consequences and maintaining peaceful regional relations after the war ends.

Glenn (Speaker 0) and John Mersheimer (Speaker 1) discuss the Iran war and its trajectory. Mersheimer asserts the war is not going well for the United States and that President Trump cannot find an off ramp because there is no plausible endgame or decisive victory against Iran. He notes that if Iran can turn the conflict into a protracted war of attrition, it has incentives and means to do so, including a strong bargaining position to demand sanctions relief or reparations. He argues the United States and Israel are not the sole drivers; Iran has a say, and there is no credible story about ending the war on American terms. Mersheimer cautions that even heavy bombardment or “today being the day of the heaviest bombardment” would not necessarily compel Iran to quit. He suggests Tehran will respond by escalating, potentially striking Gulf States and Israel with missiles and drones, given Iran’s capability with accurate drones and ballistic missiles in a target-rich environment. He emphasizes Iran’s incentive to avoid a settlement that yields no gains for Tehran while seeking concessions or relief from sanctions as time passes, increasing American pressure to settle. He warns that if international economic effects worsen, the United States may push for an end to the war, but that would constitute conceding to the Iranians rather than achieving victory. Glenn asks about escalation dominance, noting Iran’s potential vulnerability of Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. Mersheimer confirms Gulf desalination plants are a critical vulnerability (Riyadh’s desalination plant servicing 90% of Riyadh’s water; Kuwait 90%; Oman 76%; Saudi water about 70%; desalination is essential). He reiterates that Iran can target desalination alongside petroleum infrastructure to cripple Gulf States and that such actions would also affect Israel and the wider economy. He asserts Iran has the option to damage the Gulf States and thus impact the world economy, making escalation unlikely to yield a favorable US-Israeli outcome. The energy dimension is central: 20% of the world’s oil and gas comes from the Persian Gulf. The Straits of Hormuz are unlikely to be opened easily, and destroying Gulf States’ infrastructure would make that moot anyway. He explains that even if Hormuz were open, damaged Gulf States would not export oil, and American naval escorting would be impractical due to vulnerability. He observes that the Iranians’ options threaten the international economy, and the United States’ off ramp is not readily available. Mersheimer provides a historical perspective on air power: strategic bombing cannot win wars alone, as seen in World War II and later conflicts. He notes that the present campaign lacks boots on the ground, relying on air power, but history shows air power alone is insufficient to achieve regime change or decisive victory against formidable adversaries like Iran. He argues that the decapitation strategy, followed by escalation, is unlikely to succeed and that the literature on air wars and sanctions supports this. They discuss previous warnings within the administration: General James Mattis (General Keane) and the National Intelligence Council warned before the war that regime change and quick victory were unlikely. Mersheimer highlights that only 20% of Americans supported the war initially, with 80% skeptical or opposed. He attributes some of the current predicament to Trump and Netanyahu's insistence on a quick victory, arguing that Netanyahu has pushed for a regime-change approach that failed. The conversation turns to Russia and China. Mersheimer contends that Russia benefits from the war by diverting US resources and relations away from Europe and Ukraine, strengthening Russia’s own strategic position. He suggests Russia may be aiding Iran with intelligence and possibly with weapons or energy, as well as improving its image in Iran. He asserts that this war distracts the US from Ukraine, harming Ukrainian efforts and potentially strengthening Russia economically by boosting demand for Russian oil and gas if Gulf supply is constrained. Europe’s position is examined. Mersheimer claims the European Union’s support is largely rhetorical; Europe’s elites fear a US departure from Europe and want to preserve NATO. He argues Europe’s interests will be largely ignored in a US-dominated conflict, with Macron’s stance portrayed as exaggerated power. He suggests Europe is hurt by the war and that their leverage over the United States is limited unless they diversify away from exclusive dependence on the US. In closing, Glenn and John reflect on leadership and propaganda. Mersheimer reiterates that leaders lie in international politics, with democracies more prone to lying to their publics than autocracies, and notes that Trump’s statements—such as Iran possessing Tomahawk missiles or the nuclear capability being erased—are examples of implausible or untruthful claims. He emphasizes the rational strategic thinking of Iranian and Russian leaders, but critiques the American leadership’s strategic understanding. The discussion concludes with reflections on Europe’s potential hardball approach toward the United States, and the need for diversification in European strategy to counter American leverage. The interview ends with appreciation for the exchange and a shared wish that the subject were less depressing.

Speaker 0 argues that “they’re making hundreds of billions of dollars a year more,” and that this funding emboldens them to give their proxies “weapons, money, and the vigor to attack the Jewish state,” which he says is unacceptable in the international community. He sets the stage for a connection between large flows of money and aggressive action by those proxies. Speaker 1 responds by asserting that “the only reason that Hamas attacked Israel, the only reason they’ll able to is because of increased Iranian funding,” and adds that Hamas is funded “in part” by Iran but that Hamas also receives funding from various other sources. He names possible funders such as Iran and Qatar and questions who funds Iran, suggesting multiple sponsors. Speaker 0 presses the point with a direct question, “Who funds Iran?” prompting Speaker 1 to identify Qatar as a potential funder. Speaker 0 repeats and confirms, expressing uncertainty about specifics by saying, “Buffans? Okay. Who from Hamasi? Of course they do. Right?” Speaker 1 continues with uncertainty, noting that “they were transferring a whole lot of money to the Gaza Strip” and references the Gaza funding issue as a major scandal associated with Netanyahu, described as “one of the big scandals that Netanyahu was involved in,” tied to letting that money pass through to the Gaza Strip, though he adds “I don’t know this is supervision.” In the dialogue’s core, Speaker 0 posits a logical implication: “If Iran gets more money, that’s good for Hamas. Right? You agree on that? Come on.” Speaker 1 responds with a cautious “Broadly speaking,” and Speaker 0 presses further, urging Speaker 1 to concede one point, addressing him by name, Steven. Overall, the exchange centers on the linkage between international funding, particularly Iranian and Gulf-state money, to Hamas and its activities, with attention to the claim that large monetary flows empower proxies to threaten Israel, and with references to past allegations about the transfer of funds to Gaza and the political fallout surrounding those funds.

Israel's massive money printing funds a military that outspends all others per resident. This money is used to buy technology and resources, but other countries holding Israeli shekels cannot easily use them. They cannot exchange them for dollars or gold, or use them to buy land in Israel. Iran is a target because it lacks a central bank and possesses the world's second-largest natural gas and crude oil reserves, and has recently achieved a milestone in rare earth element production. The speaker claims that due to money printing, GMOs, and variable interest rates, a million dollars from 1980 would be worth only 50 cents today. Artificially modified food and high compound interest rates further erode wealth.

In this discussion, Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, analyzes whether Donald Trump is seeking an off-ramp from the Iran war and what he might trade away to gain it. Glenn, the host, frames the conversation around the Strait of Hormuz as a potential barrier to an exit, given Trump’s recent tweet that the Strait is not America’s problem and that regional countries should handle it. Johnson emphasizes that Trump’s apparent objective is to declare victory, but he identifies several impediments and possible paths. Johnson contends that the United States has claimed a “100% victory,” asserting that “we've wiped out all of the Iranian army, the Iranian navy, the Iranian air force,” and asks rhetorically why more countries would be needed. He warns, however, that a victory would come with devastating worldwide consequences, including rising gas prices, shortages of fertilizer, and global distress from economic ripples. He notes that Iran began striking back within an hour of the attack on March 28, systematically targeting U.S. military installations, destroying radar systems, and forcing relocations of the Fifth Fleet’s Bahrain base and related assets. He describes the war as becoming a political burden for Trump, who also publicly boasted of military successes even as costs mount. Johnson links Trump’s rhetoric with Netanyahu, suggesting a coordination to present an exit pattern: claim success, then exit with a narrative that the objective was met, while implying Iran must accept a settlement. He asserts that Iran is not going to capitulate simply because the United States and Israel say so, and that Iran seeks a rock-solid guarantee that it will not be attacked again. He notes Russia’s involvement in mediation efforts and argues that Iran can endure a longer war than the United States, particularly as the 2024-2025 political cycle intensifies pressure on Trump. The discussion expands to strategic and economic dimensions. Johnson highlights the Kuwait-like vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, the potential for Iran to impose a separate corridor or “selective access” within Iranian waters, and the implications for the petrodollar system if Gulf states must pay Iran for safe passage. He argues that an Iranian victory could effectively expel the United States from the Middle East if the region no longer depends on American protection. He questions whether such a shift is feasible, given Iran’s capability and resolve and the West’s miscalculation of Iran’s endurance and strategy. They discuss the broader international-law questions and the West’s posture toward rules-based order. Glenn notes that the Netanyahu-Trump axis may be seeking an off ramp, while Johnson contends that Iran’s response is to demand a political settlement that would reverse U.S. presence and align with IAEA inspections or nonproliferation commitments—an outcome that Trump might try to package as a victory. Johnson stresses that Iran’s stance has shifted from “defeat Iran” to seeking outcomes like IAEA oversight and adherence to nonproliferation norms as conditions for strategic concessions. The conversation also critiques Washington’s military logistics and political optics. Johnson argues that boots-on-the-ground options in the Hormuz region are militarily impractical, given the geography (Normandy-scale landings in a cliff-lined, fortified zone) and Iran’s layered defense. He questions the plausibility of a successful river-to-sea offensive, given the risk to ships, drones, and supply lines, and points to potential escalatory cycles that could involve Russia and China more deeply. Towards the end, they touch on the idea of an exit built around a renewal of JCPOA-like constraints—without naming it as such—as a possible route for Trump to declare victory and withdraw. However, they remain skeptical about whether Iran would accept renewed constraints, given its current strategic posture and allies. The discussion closes with a candid recognition that, according to Johnson, there is a lack of a coherent, realizable strategy to end the conflict on favorable terms for Washington, and that Trump’s political vulnerability could further constrain any viable off-ramp.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Seyyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. There’s talk in the US of seizing Kharg Island, which would handle 80–90% of Iran’s oil shipments, effectively a nuclear option to shut down Iran’s economy. What would be Iran’s likely response if the US pursued this path? Marandi: It would be a major problem to access the island because the US would have to fly over Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf. Iran would retaliate if Iranian territory were occupied, taking the war toward a major escalation. The regimes hosting the island would have to pay a heavy price, far greater than now. For the United States, the island is well protected, with Iranian assets on the shore supporting the islanders, and it’s farther from the US Navy and closer to Iran’s shore. But more importantly, such an aggression would be futile: it would not change the Persian Gulf trade through Hormuz, which Iran has effectively controlled by requiring permission to pass. An invasion or occupation would lead to fierce combat and punishment of the regimes that enabled it—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar—desert-based states with oil and gas but little water. If the US succeeds in taking the island, Iran’s retaliation would involve destroying assets of the cooperating countries. Long-term, Hormuz could be effectively closed, with upstream infrastructure damaged and no oil or gas able to move, making a later reopening contingent on a peace agreement. The operation would be logistically, militarily, and economically disastrous for global markets. Glenn: There are reports Iran is mining Hormuz. Do you know anything about that operation? Marandi: Iran hasn’t mined Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, or the Indian Ocean. The Iranian navy capable of wartime actions is largely in underground tunnels and includes speedboats, surface-to-sea missiles, and a network of underground bases. Iran has not moved to mine the Gulf. It does not want escalation. Iran has always negotiated; US claims that Iran wanted nuclear weapons at the negotiating table are rejected by Iran, the fatwa, and IAEA history. If negotiations had failed, the US invasion would be unjustified. Doha and Qatar are prepared to restart gas facilities and allow oil to flow if peace returns. If the US escalates to destroy key infrastructure, Iran will retaliate, and Iran can hurt US assets and its proxies more than the US can hurt Iran, with long-term global energy consequences. Iran has been striking bases in the region and says it is prepared to continue until after the midterm elections. Glenn: The US energy secretary says the US Navy is studying options to escort tankers through Hormuz. What are the main challenges? Marandi: It would be virtually impossible. Iran’s navy is largely underground, with mines, surface-to-sea missiles, and drones capable of targeting Hormuz from Iran. If open war begins, Iran would retaliate against regimes hosting US bases. Even if Hormuz were opened temporarily, without oil, gas, tankers, or production, there would be no purpose, and energy prices would spike permanently. The US would likely be forced to accept Iran’s terms for peace to allow oil to flow. Glenn: Trump has spoken of further destruction if needed, but says he’s run out of targets. What do you expect from the American side? Marandi: The US is already targeting nonmilitary sites and civilian targets in Iran. They slaughter civilians, including families and children, with premeditation. They could intensify attacks on oil, gas, electricity infrastructure, which would invite Iran to retaliate. Iran’s society is united, with people on the streets despite the bombardments. If the US destroys infrastructure, Iran would respond, but Iran does not want escalation; it would be catastrophic for the global economy. The media in the West is controlled, and there is little outrage at threats to destroy Iran. Glenn: Israeli and American aims now—what’s at stake, and how end this? Marandi: Since the Gaza genocide and Lebanon escalation, Zionism is increasingly viewed as evil, and public opinion against Zionism is growing in the US. The destruction of Israel’s credibility is the greatest defeat, not battlefield losses. End this war now would be prudent; as Iran strikes back, global sympathy for Iran grows and the empire weakens. If Israel were to use a nuclear weapon, that would be catastrophic and could prompt broader proliferation. Glenn: Any chance Iran could retaliate against Britain or European states? Marandi: Europe and the US will have diminished presence in the region; bases would be forced to leave. He notes the possibility of false-flag attacks in the West and asserts Zionist manipulation as a risk, but emphasizes Iran’s determination to defend sovereignty and support for Palestinians and others. Glenn: Just a final note—Iran had three negotiations, not two, including the JCPOA. Thank you for joining. Marandi: Thank you.

The speaker argues that Iran is no longer the same as in the past, describing it as no longer a regional strong-arm. Israel is portrayed as stronger now than in the past, and the speaker states that they are working against Iran in many ways, with some actions to be revealed at a later stage. The claim is also made that Israel is much stronger, greater than it has been previously. The speaker notes a belief that they would reach to the kingdom and make it to the return of the messiah, but specifies that this will not happen next Thursday. They describe the life of nations as precarious and surrounded with threats, attributing survival and endurance to alliances forged for greater strength. The speaker emphasizes that, from one battle to another, Israel has become stronger than ever through the current operations.