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Russia possesses strong ballistic missile and drone capabilities. Predictions in early 2022 suggested Russia would run out of missiles, but three years later, they are producing and deploying missiles that the United States cannot defend against. The recent strikes demonstrated Russia's ability to destroy Patriot missile batteries. Ukraine fired approximately 20 missiles within two minutes during the strikes, while Lockheed Martin only produces 550 of these missiles annually. Russia's ballistic missile and drone strategy is causing significant attrition of NATO weapons.

Speaker 0 says that Russia's strategy is to collapse morale within Ukraine and the will to fight. We've been in discussions with them about defensive weapons to be able to protect their grid, and ongoing technical conversations about the specific equipment they need, but ultimately, if that equipment is ultimately destroyed a week later after it's installed, that remains a problem, and that's been the history the last two or three years.

Germany has 12 Patriot systems and has already provided some to Poland. It is uncertain if Germany will relinquish all 12 batteries, and if those batteries factored into the 17 Patriot batteries being discussed. Spain is a potential source of Patriot batteries, but they have very few. It is questionable if Spain is willing to give up its Patriot capability, given production bottlenecks. There are questions about who gets Patriot replacements first, as other nations are buying them and the United States wants to divert them to Ukraine. The speaker believes there is wishful thinking without detailed negotiation, guarantees, and money. Questions remain about the source of funding and congressional authorization. The speaker suggests the arrangement is nonstandard and driven by political aspects related to Donald Trump's image rather than legitimate national security concerns.

Donald Trump started the war in Ukraine, not Joe Biden, and Russia is aware of this. Despite Trump's unpredictability, Russia will engage in diplomacy with the U.S. Trump's alleged leaked 2024 campaign statement, where he threatened to bomb Moscow if Putin moved into Kyiv, was never made, portraying Trump as a liar in the eyes of the Russians. Sanctions are not a credible threat because Russia doesn't care about them, and its major partners won't yield. Trump's claim of providing 17 weapon batteries to Ukraine is unrealistic, as countries like Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands cannot readily supply that many. Germany won't provide transit support until they receive replacements, and the U.S. is prioritizing Israel and replenishing its own stocks. Trump's proposition to Mark Rutte involves the Netherlands giving up its weapons to Ukraine and then buying them from the U.S. at no cost to America. Rutte should instead tell Trump to leave NATO because he is useless. This is not a serious proposal, but posturing to appease the Republican base who oppose aid to Ukraine.

There was no policy decision to stop sending weapons to Ukraine. A review of stockpiles caused a temporary pause of certain munitions. During the review, some shipping slowed down, but didn't stop. The review has occurred, and there's been no change to the posture of providing what is available. Ukraine needs Patriot batteries, which are available in multiple European countries, including Spain and Germany. Some countries that have ordered Patriot batteries and are about to receive them could defer shipment to Ukraine instead. These are defensive weapons that would help with missile attacks, but not drone attacks.

We have artillery, but is it sufficient? Ukrainian soldiers can't operate American tanks. Let's show the world that the United States is present. Translation: We have artillery, but is it enough? Ukrainian soldiers cannot operate American tanks. Let's show the world that the United States is here.

We will continue testing these systems, including in combat conditions, based on the security threats to Russia. We have a supply of these systems ready for deployment.

Is it possible to enforce a NATO ban on interference and close the skies to Russian aircraft? Two points: First, we're sending advanced anti-air missiles that outperform Stingers, capable of operating at night and effectively countering Russian aircraft. Second, I want to understand how Ukraine plans to address the challenge of not being able to fly, especially since a no-fly zone would apply to both sides. Given Russia's significant artillery and missile capabilities, one of Ukraine's few advantages is its ability to target these from the air.

Larry Johnson and the host discuss the rapid developments around Iran and the wider regional implications, challenging the narrative of visible damage and highlighting inconsistencies in Western reporting. Key points about Israel, Iran, and propaganda: - Johnson argues Israel’s situation may be worse than Tehran’s, noting that Iran seeks to destroy Israeli infrastructure while Israel aims to project resilience through propaganda, including social media controls. He cites a video on sonar21.com showing what he sees as the ineffectiveness of Israeli and US air defenses in Israel, with four missiles impacting Tel Aviv and across the horizon. - There are reports of significant pushback in Israel: divisions between police and military, shortages of food, inadequate shelters, and protests. Johnson says Western propaganda claiming Israel is unscathed is contradicted by these reports. - Johnson suggests Israel is attempting to broaden the conflict with Iran through false flag attacks (oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, and incidents in Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Cyprus) to draw NATO into a broader confrontation, but asserts Iran has been effective in debunking these false flags. Weapons, logistics, and supply constraints: - A major theme is American and allied weapon shortages and the sustainability of a prolonged campaign against Iran. Johnson and Speaker 1 discuss limits in Patriot and THAAD stocks, and the difficulty of sustaining Tomahawk production due to rare earth minerals controlled by China. - Patriot missiles: production data show a ramp-up from 2015-2020 (approximately 1,800 units total) to higher annual outputs since 2020 (about 550 per year, plus 620 in 2025). Ukraine reportedly exhausted its 974 Patriot missiles. - THAAD missiles are even less abundant (about 79 produced per year; each costs around $12-13 million), with a small overall stockpile. This implies a limited capacity to sustain long campaigns. - The discussion notes that the United States’ missile inventories are not as unlimited as sometimes claimed; logistics and manufacturing limits are real constraints, and resupply for long conflicts would be challenging. - The availability of Tomahawk missiles depends on rare earths from China, adding another constraint beyond factory capacity and labor. Ground force considerations and regional dynamics: - There is skepticism about any credible prospect of American boots on the ground in Iran. The Kurds, if mobilized, would face severe logistical and operational challenges in Iran’s rugged western border, making sustained insurgencies unlikely to impact Iranian politics. Early reports indicate Kurdish infiltrations were quickly repelled by Iranian forces. - Russia’s transfer of 28 attack helicopters to Iran is discussed as part of a broader assessment of Iranian military readiness. Iran has shot down several US air platforms (including multiple F-15s) in the past few days, reinforcing a perception of Iranian resilience. - Johnson notes that the West’s strategy to portray Iran as weak has backfired, strengthening internal Iranian unity and resolve, particularly after the February 28 and earlier June incidents. Regional and global reactions: - The war’s geographic expansion, including the submarine incident near Sri Lanka and broader Gulf security concerns, risks drawing in more regional actors and complicating alliances. - The Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar) rely heavily on US protection and expat labor, and there is growing concern about the United States’ ability to guarantee security. Johnson argues this could erode Western credibility and investment in the region. - The strait of Hormuz is pivotal; Iran’s potential control could disrupt global oil flows, with cascading economic effects. Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure may be shielded by alternative pipelines, but LNG exporters like Qatar would suffer significant downtime. - The broader strategic picture suggests a shift away from US-dominant security arrangements in the Gulf, with Turkey coordinating with Iran, and Gulf states re-evaluating security guarantees and economic dependence on the United States. Outlook and possible endings: - Johnson forecasts a prolonged attritional conflict, with the United States unlikely to break Iran’s defenses without a substantial and sustained shift in strategy. He argues that air power alone fails to achieve regime change and notes historical examples across Iraq, Serbia, and Vietnam where air campaigns did not produce the desired political outcomes. - He predicts an endgame in which Iran could leverage the Strait of Hormuz to negotiate terms that reduce sanctions in exchange for reopening traffic, but only if Washington concedes to major concessions (including ending military bases in Saudi Arabia and Qatar). - He warns this crisis could accelerate regional instability and potentially erode the United States’ credibility, with domestic political repercussions and potential shifts in both US and European political alignments. Final thoughts: - The discussion emphasizes the mismatch between optimistic Western narratives and the practical limits of militaries, economies, and logistics in sustaining a longer confrontation with Iran. - The speakers stress that a straightforward, decisive victory seems unlikely; instead, the conflict risks deepening regional instability, economic disruption, and lasting strategic realignments in the Middle East.

We're witnessing an unprecedented influx of weapons into Ukraine, but their final destinations remain largely unknown. Despite concerns about weapons potentially falling into the wrong hands, the priority is ensuring Ukrainian forces have what they need to fight. NATO countries are on high alert, balancing support for Ukraine with preventing a broader conflict with Russia. The war in Ukraine has tapped into deep emotions, drawing in foreign volunteers. However, the rise of paramilitary units raises concerns about governmental control on the battlefield. Logistical challenges, corruption, and bureaucracy hinder the delivery of supplies to the front lines. While the US and Europe are sending aid, there's debate on whether enough oversight exists to track where the weapons end up, both now and in the future, and whether a half-way approach to the war will be effective.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a series of escalating tensions and strategic assessments around Ukraine, NATO, Russia, and the United States. - Nightfall concept and implications: The British Ministry of Defence announced a new deep-strike ballistic missile for Ukraine, Nightfall, intended to carry a 200 kilogram warhead with a 500 kilometer range to strike Moscow. Scott Ritter says Nightfall is a joke: it is still developing, with a budget around £9,000,000, no production facility, no prototype built or tested, and a target of producing 10 missiles a month at about £800,000 each. He argues the idea is not a real weapon but an underfinanced concept, and that Russia will watch with interest while the plan remains insufficient to matter. - Britain’s strategic credibility and potential retaliation: Ritter contends that Britain could strike Moscow with such missiles only once before Russia responds decisively, potentially even with nuclear weapons. He asserts Russia resents Britain as a “failing power” and believes there is “great hatred” toward Britain among Russia’s political elite; he predicts Russia would not tolerate continued British escalation. - Western troop commitments and feasibility: The discussion also covers the idea of sending British troops to Ukraine. Ritter asserts that Britain cannot deploy 7,600 troops nor sustain them logistically or politically; he describes the British military as incapable of a rapid deployment and notes the overall size and combat-readiness of the British forces as insufficient for sustained operations. - The “keep Ukraine in the fight” plan: The speakers discuss the UK’s strategy to keep Ukraine in conflict as a political/propaganda effort, rather than a path to victory. Ritter calls much of Ukraine’s and Western rhetoric “the theater of the absurd” and says many actions by Ukraine are designed for propaganda rather than strategic success. He highlights drone strikes on Caspian oil rigs as demonstrative of “propaganda purposes.” He also notes that Russia’s response includes power and water outages across Ukraine and a strong retaliatory capability. - Arashnik and Russia’s nuclear posture: They discuss Russia’s Arashnik program, noting that initial launches were treated as test missiles, with a brigade deployed in Belarus and other units being prepared for fielding. Ritter asserts that Arashnik is now a permanent part of Russia’s strategic posture, and that Russia is deploying production-quality missiles, though exact production rates are uncertain. - Arms control and the European security architecture: Ritter claims there is a “total disconnect from reality” in Europe, asserting arms control is effectively dead. He argues Russia has advantages in intermediate and strategic nuclear forces, while U.S. forces are aging and expensive to modernize; he predicts a coming arms race with Russia holding an advantage. He is critical of attempts at extending New START and expresses belief that arms control is no longer feasible given the current political environment and U.S. leadership. - The Alaska “spirit” and U.S. foreign policy: The conversation discusses the 2024-25 era, with mentions of Donald Trump and the CIA’s role in anti-Russian operations. Ritter argues that U.S. actions, including cyber and drone activities against Russian targets (oil refineries and military assets), reflect a CIA-led strategy against Russia. He contends that Trump’s approach has shifted over time from tentative peace prospects to aggressive posturing, and that American leadership lacks trustworthiness in negotiations. - Intelligence and operational transparency: The dialogue touches on the May 2024 and June 2025 attacks on Russian deterrence assets (e.g., Engels base, and the Kerch Bridge operation). Ritter argues that the intelligence community (notably MI6 and the CIA) uses psychological operations to undermine Putin, but that Russia’s restraint and measured responses indicate limited willingness to escalate beyond a point. - Toward a broader European security collapse: Ritter foresees NATO’s dissolution or “death,” suggesting that the United States will pursue bilateral arrangements with European states as NATO weakens. He predicts Greenland and broader European security would become dominated by U.S. strategic interests, diminishing European autonomy. - On Trump’s transformation and democracy in the U.S.: The speakers debate Trump’s evolution, with Ritter arguing that Trump’s rhetoric and actions reveal a long-standing pattern of deceit and anti-democratic behavior, including alleged manipulation of elections and the undermining of international law. He depicts a grim view of the constitutional republic’s future, suggesting that Trump has consolidated power in ways that erode checks and balances. - Final reflections: The conversation closes with a weighing of whether peace can be achieved given deep mistrust, the CIA’s alleged influence in Ukraine, and the wider geopolitical shifts. Both acknowledge growing instability, the potential end of NATO as a cohesive alliance, and the possibility of a broader, more dangerous security environment if current trajectories persist.

Speaker 1 discusses a new anti-air missile being sent to Ukraine, which is better than a Stinger and effective at night. It is intended to help close the skies to Russian aircraft. Speaker 1 raises a question for Ukraine: Given Russia's overwhelming artillery and missiles, Ukraine's ability to counter them relies on air power. How would Ukraine manage if a no-fly zone, applicable to both sides, prevented them from flying?

Patriot missiles and batteries are being planned for Ukraine. A full complement of Patriots will be provided. Some are expected to arrive very soon, within days. Countries that already have Patriots will swap them out and replace them with new ones. Matt will coordinate with NATO. Boris Pistorius, the German defense minister, is visiting the secretary of defense, Pete Hackett, to discuss the Patriot situation. Norway is also involved. The deal is broader than just Patriots and includes missiles and ammunition.

Russia has relative freedom in Ukraine for drone and missile operations, with good intelligence coverage. Patriot batteries transferred to Ukraine are likely to be detected and destroyed by Russia before installation. Therefore, sending Patriot batteries to Ukraine is a waste of money. At best, it will extend the war by weeks, resulting in more Ukrainian and Russian deaths, but it will not change the outcome of the war.

Drones: A year ago, Ukraine had more drones, but now drone numbers are roughly at parity. Both sides launch a similar number of drones. Russia uses fiber optic drones more actively, which are immune to Western electronic warfare systems. These drones render jamming antennas useless. The army is actively using unmanned systems, including remotely controlled carts that can carry ammo, food, evacuate wounded soldiers, or carry explosives. Russia considers its approach to warfare as complex, dangerous, and highly professional.

A Patriot battery is not just a Patriot battery; there are old, less old, and new versions. Old Patriot batteries with old systems may have missiles that have undergone life extension programs and may not be suitable for continued operation. These older systems may not function or be designed for the high-speed maneuvering and target acquisition of modern Patriots. Therefore, providing old systems may be as good as providing nothing, making the number of Patriot systems a "fake number."

Europe must quickly increase support for Ukraine as artillery shells, air defense interceptors, and drone production capabilities dwindle. Europe could use proposals and potentially collateralize frozen Russian assets to act fast. The speaker is concerned about the cutoff of intelligence streams from the U.S. and pressure on allies like the UK not to use US intelligence for their own weapons. The primary purpose of US intelligence has been to help Ukrainians see Russian attacks coming and have advanced warning. Key weapon systems require U.S. satellite queuing and the military GPS system to hit targets. Without these, more Ukrainians will die, and Europe cannot replace this capability quickly.

Europe must quickly increase its support for Ukraine, especially as artillery, air defense, and drone production become more challenging. Europe could use proposals and potentially leverage frozen Russian assets to provide immediate assistance. The speaker is concerned about the cutoff of intelligence streams from the U.S. and pressure on allies not to use U.S. intelligence. U.S. intelligence has been vital for providing Ukrainians with advanced warning of Russian attacks. Additionally, certain weapon systems rely on U.S. satellite queuing and GPS for targeting. A prolonged pause in this support will result in more Ukrainian deaths, and Europe cannot rapidly replace this capability.

Speaker 0: In a few days, America is already running out of weapons against Iran, despite spending about $1,000,000,000,000 a year on defense. The administration is meeting with top defense contractors at the White House because strikes on Iran are diminishing US stockpiles, especially long-range munitions like Tomahawk missiles. Interceptor missiles are being exhausted by Iranian attacks. This is not getting wide play in the mainstream media; there is a blackout. CNN reported that Israel told them they are not allowed to show incoming rocket attacks. Speaker 1: One go up there. We're not showing you that because we're not gonna show. The Israeli government does not allow us or want us to show where that may have come up, that interceptor. Speaker 0: The most powerful military machine in history is not calling a meeting because it's winning too hard. It’s calling a meeting because the shelves are getting bare. Axios and The Wall Street Journal report that the reality contradicts slogans of unlimited munitions. War is fought with inventory and magazine depth, not slogans. The White House is seeking more supply as munitions run low. Speaker 0: The dirty little secret is that war isn’t fought with slogans; it’s fought with inventory. The Iran fight is the worst kind of war for stockpiles because it’s strike targets and defense of everything you own at the same time. A CIA station house in Riyadh was hit; Iran could strike a CIA station, and telemetry data may have come from China or Russia. Iran doesn’t need to beat the US head-to-head in aircraft carriers to bleed us dry. Speaker 0: Aircraft carriers are relics of the post-World War II era and are vulnerable to hypersonic weapons. France is sending a carrier; it’s not about carriers but about forcing us to burn high-end interceptors faster than we can replace them. It comes down to math: a $50,000 drone versus a $4,000,000 interceptor or a naval missile defense shot. We’re bleeding resources. Speaker 0: Tomahawks are expensive long-range munitions. The Pentagon plans to buy only 72 Tomahawks in fiscal year 2025 and 57 in fiscal year 2026, while operations have consumed hundreds. Each missile is around $1,300,000. Raytheon and others are ramping Tomahawk production from roughly 60 per year to eventually 1,000 per year. How long will that take? The defense supply chain is strained. Speaker 0: The entire defensive layer is under strain: Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors, costing about $4,000,000 each; Lockheed is moving to more than triple capacity, roughly from 600 per year to roughly 2,000 per year. Interceptors are expensive, and ramping production cannot fix the immediate shortfall. Speaker 0: Ukraine aid is enormous in dollar terms—State Department reporting puts military assistance since 2022 at over or close to $70,000,000,000, likely higher. Ukraine has been a grinding logistics war; Iran is turning into a high-end missile and air defense consumption war. Boots on the ground are being considered as necessary; air campaigns alone cannot achieve regime change. 155-millimeter shells production is around 40,150 rounds per month as of 2024–2025, but Ukraine’s consumption is far higher. Mineral shortages also constrain production, prompting the White House to convene the defense industry. Speaker 0: The war plan may be to destroy enough of Iran’s launch capability before magazines run shallow—a brutal last-call scenario. The US is fighting on two tracks: attack and defense, using Tomahawks, B-2 bombers, and 2,000-pound bombs, along with low-cost drones around $35,000 each. The message to Middle East allies is that the US cannot fully protect them as stocks thin. Putin and China are watching, waiting to see if the US can prevent a massive Russian advance or another major theater’s strain. The White House meeting with CEOs reads like a panic flare, not victory, as munitions are consumed faster than they can be replenished. The speaker notes the high death toll on Iran’s side and asks for more transparency on American casualties, while reiterating the commitment to anti-war principles.

Ukrainians are not superheroes and face casualties on a daily basis. Today, I will show you unique videos of Russians destroying Ukrainian equipment. "This is an American m triple seven howitzer." "The Russian UAV hits the exact target and destroys the howitzer." "The rare and valuable SAM has been destroyed." "The UAV dives and hits the target." "This is a Polish AHS Crab Self Propelled Artillery Unit. The hit causes fire and destroys the launcher." "A battery of Ukrainian S-three 100 SAMs." "A kamikaze drone strike on the installations leads to a powerful explosion and the destruction of an adjacent installation." "Everything that you saw earlier was the work of the Russian Zala Lancet UAV." "At least 250 different pieces of equipment were destroyed by Russians using it." "The range of such a warhead drone is about 70 kilometers." "Lancets are launched with a metal rail." "The Russians are increasingly using lancets."

Patriot missiles and batteries are being planned for Ukraine. A full complement with the batteries will be provided. Some are expected to arrive very soon, within days. Countries that have Patriots will swap over and be replaced with the ones they have. Matt will coordinate with NATO.

The counter offensive in Ukraine is progressing according to plan, but the availability and quality of weapons and ammunition are crucial for its success. However, the regained territory is still less than 1% of what was lost during the invasion. There is only about a month left before the cold winter sets in, forcing a pause until spring. Obtaining aid from Europe and Western countries is becoming increasingly difficult due to Russia's advantage in the protracted conflict. Lessons from the past were not learned, resulting in slow and unstable aid delivery. Ukraine believes that Russia's aggression could have been stopped earlier if their requests for weapons had been taken seriously instead of being asked to surrender to Putin's demands.

Europe must quickly increase its support for Ukraine as artillery shells, air defense interceptors, and drone production capabilities dwindle. Europe could use proposals and potentially collateralize frozen Russian assets to act fast. The speaker is concerned about the cutoff of intelligence streams from the U.S. and pressure on allies like the UK not to use US intelligence for their own weapons. The primary purpose of US intelligence has been to give Ukrainians advanced warning of Russian attacks. Key weapon systems require support from US satellite queuing and the military GPS system to hit their targets. Without this support, more Ukrainians will die, and Europe cannot replace this capability quickly.

I request that we provide more reliable anti-tank weapons, as previous deliveries have often failed, causing issues for our country. We have supplied over 4,000 anti-tank weapons, with more on the way. However, we are running low on our own stock. I communicate daily with Minister Reznikov about this. Currently, we face bureaucratic challenges; there are two supply routes into the country, but the Ukrainian general staff has opted to use only one, which has slowed down the delivery of supplies to your army that urgently needs them.

Europe must quickly increase its support for Ukraine as artillery shells, air defense interceptors, and drone production capabilities dwindle. Europe could use proposals and potentially collateralize frozen Russian assets to act fast. The speaker is concerned about the cutoff of intelligence streams from the U.S. and pressure on allies like the UK not to use US intelligence for their own weapons. The primary purpose of US intelligence has been to help Ukrainians see Russian attacks coming and have advanced warning. Key weapon systems require U.S. satellite queuing and the military GPS system to hit targets. Without these, more Ukrainians will die, and Europe cannot replace this capability quickly.