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Russia possesses strong ballistic missile and drone capabilities. Predictions in early 2022 suggested Russia would run out of missiles, but three years later, they are producing and deploying missiles that the United States cannot defend against. The recent strikes demonstrated Russia's ability to destroy Patriot missile batteries. Ukraine fired approximately 20 missiles within two minutes during the strikes, while Lockheed Martin only produces 550 of these missiles annually. Russia's ballistic missile and drone strategy is causing significant attrition of NATO weapons.

Ted Postal, professor emeritus at MIT and expert on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, discusses the Arashnik/Oreshnik hypersonic system and what is known about its capabilities, limitations, and potential implications. Postal emphasizes that the weapon is a very powerful conventional system, not a nuclear one. He notes that it delivers munitions and, as of the evidence available, seems to inflict damage primarily through kinetic impact. While adding submunitions with high explosives could increase damage per submunition, this would not constitute a game changer unless nuclear weapons were mounted on top of the system. He also cautions that the fact the system can deliver nuclear weapons is not especially novel in the context of existing delivery options, and the main policy concern is the possibility of escalation to nuclear use in response to a conventional attack. Key characteristics he outlines: - The Oreshnik is a one-stage missile that appears to repurpose the first stage of an old SS-20 (Pioneer) intermediate-range missile. The SS-20 was a two-stage missile with three warheads; in the Oreshnik, six buses on the vehicle carry submunitions. - The payload consists of six buses, each carrying about six submunitions, for a total of around 36 submunitions. Each submunition weighs roughly 70–80 kilograms. - The submunitions are delivered from a high-velocity canister that is ejected and then uses a high-pressure gas propulsion system to push out six submunitions onto six separate targets. The vehicle remains oriented to maintain stability, preventing tumbling and ensuring precise deployment. - The submunitions travel at very high speeds (hypersonic) but do not reach hypersonic speed on impact with the ground due to atmospheric reentry dynamics. They hit the ground at approximately 150–200 kilometers per hour, not at Mach 10, because tumbling and aerodynamic drag reduce speed before impact. - Debris analysis suggests the submunitions are not penetrating deep underground; instead, their energy is converted into heat and a violent expansion near the surface, producing an explosion-like effect rather than deep penetration. - The trajectories are lofted, delivering the submunitions to the target area after a long flight time (Russia has claimed 15–17 minutes for submunitions to reach targets). This lofted path reduces the likelihood of interceptors successfully engaging the weapon. On the effects and targeting: - A single submunition’s energy disperses over a footprint rather than concentrating in a single crater. The weapon’s conventional damage is significant, especially when deployed as clusters against a structure or urban area, but it is not equivalent to a nuclear strike. - If six buses with six submunitions each were all directed at a single structure, the resulting destruction would be substantial, but the extent would depend on targeting accuracy and footprint, as well as how many submunitions actually strike the intended area. - Postal notes that a one-kiloton nucleus would create a clearly larger, more devastating area of destruction than the conventional cluster could achieve; meanwhile, a 150–200 kiloton nuclear warhead mounted on Oreshnik would be city-destroying, illustrating how dramatically different outcomes would be with a nuclear payload. Interception and defense: - Postal argues there is no reliable intercept option for this weapon. The high loft and deployment of multiple submunitions after release complicate interception: the submunitions depart the launcher and travel at several kilometers per second above the atmosphere; interceptors would have minutes to react at distances where they would struggle to reach the fast-moving submunitions. - He contrasts this with Iskander, noting that while intercepting Iskander is challenging, the Oreshnik presents a broader, more difficult defense problem due to its trajectory and submunition deployment. Strategic and political context: - The discussion touches on the broader strategic implications, including the psychological impact of a sky lit up by hypersonic activity and the potential for miscalculation leading to nuclear escalation. Postal warns against overestimating the weapon’s nuclear potential and cautions policymakers about proportional responses to conventional attacks. - He critiques public rhetoric and speculative defense concepts (e.g., extreme “golden dome” missile defense schemes) as impractical, arguing that current defenses are unlikely to deter or intercept hypersonic submunition deployments. - The dialogue also reflects on Western economic and political actions, such as sanctions, and suggests that some analyses of the effects on Russia’s economy and strategic posture may mischaracterize outcomes; Postal emphasizes that the weapon’s value lies in its conventional destructive capability and its ability to complicate defense planning, rather than in conventional deterrence or nuclear signaling. - The conversation closes with a stark warning: if thousands of these missiles were deployed, a significant strategic reshaping would follow, necessitating new considerations for air and missile defense, even as existing systems face fundamental limitations in countering hypersonic conventional weapons.

Ukrainian drone attacks are characterized by indiscriminate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure like airports, churches, and apartment buildings, with the primary goal of terrorizing the public. Conversely, Russia is precise in its targeting, focusing on Patriot missile batteries, factories, military installations, and airfields used for combat aircraft. Russia's strategy aims at the attrition of both Ukraine and, indirectly, NATO.

Mario and Malcolm discuss the evolving drone warfare landscape and the strategic implications for the United States, Iran, Ukraine, and Gulf states. Malcolm argues that Iran’s drone arsenal represents a persistent, low-cost threat with an 88,000 Shahid drone inventory at the lowest cost, and mass production estimated at 7,000. He notes Iran has destroyed roughly $5,000,000,000 of technology, underscoring the waste associated with high-value defenses. He contends the conflict “is gonna come down to rifles and knives and drones,” and suggests the U.S. and its allies have limited tolerance for the level of death this entails. He emphasizes the learning curve for anti-Shahid drones, estimating 35 to 45 days to train someone to fly such drones, and notes that combat veterans and Ukrainian international legionnaires could assist with training in Ukraine, Abu Dhabi, and beyond. They discuss defense markets and training pipelines. Mario recalls speaking with a U.S.-based VC in Ukraine who might be tapped to bolster defense industry interests; Malcolm reiterates that Ukrainian-made, locally developed systems dominate, and that Western companies must avoid partnerships that involve theft of technology. He stresses that Ukrainians own the drone industry, and that the U.S. has historically relied on foreign-made drones for ISR rather than attack, contrasting Ukraine’s trajectory from reconnaissance to drones used for direct attack and artillery fusion. Malcolm criticizes the U.S. approach to drones, arguing that the U.S. military has not adapted to modern drone warfare and that Ukraine’s battlefield experiences demonstrate rapid adaptation and innovating countermeasures, such as drone drop kits and improvised aerial bombs. He explains the progression: drones used for surveillance evolved into attack platforms, counter-drone tactics, and drone-enabled artillery. He provides detailed examples: using DJI drones for reconnaissance early on, then using drone-based bombing, counter-jamming techniques, and fiber-optic lines to guide munitions. He notes Ukrainian Sea Baby Magura drones and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) that attacked Russian ships, and describes a dramatic incident where a Ukrainian drone disabled a Russian submarine tail by docking behind it and flooding it with explosive force. The conversation shifts to recent strikes on Gulf-based assets. Mario asks about Zelensky’s visits to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and why Gulf defense preparedness appeared slow. Malcolm suggests the U.S. misreads regional resilience and that Gulf states will adapt using homegrown drone capabilities, with examples such as Kuwait buying thousands of Ukrainian drones and the UAE potentially building domestic drone factories. He cautions against overreliance on “wonder weapons” and emphasizes practical measures like machine guns, shotguns, and ground-based defenses, noting that 50-caliber weapons and simple tactics can counter Shahid drones if properly deployed. He asserts that the Gulf states will need to supplement their arsenals with practical, scalable training and production rather than expensive foreign capabilities. Malcolm discusses the strategic logic behind any potential concessions with Iran. He argues that Iran has geography, topography, history, and manpower advantages, and that Donald Trump’s threats to bomb Iran’s infrastructure are unlikely to force concessions. He claims Iran would not negotiate under U.S. pressure and that the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) would remain a focal point of conflict. He contends that Trump’s approach risks escalating toward broader conflict, and that Iran could respond by leveraging the Houthis or other regional proxies to disrupt shipping and Gulf economies, potentially closing the Red Sea and Suez Canal if alignments shift. They touch on Russia’s role, noting Moscow’s financial and strategic interests in the region. Malcolm argues Putin benefits from the conflict and that Trump’s priorities are tied to accumulating frozen Russian assets and broader political maneuvering, sometimes at odds with the publicized goal of restraining Iran. He observes that Russia’s drones, weapons components, and intelligence could be flowing to Iran, influencing the Gulf theater. The discussion closes with a broader warning: the war’s consequences will be felt for years or generations, with energy prices, inflation, and global economic disruption, and only a realignment of strategy—embracing distributed defenses, domestic production, and adaptable tactics—will shape outcomes. They acknowledge the difficulty of predicting concessions, the complexity of Gulf politics, and the precarious balance between deterrence and escalation.

All drones are produced by Changhome Factory, a Chinese military-controlled factory, with assembly lines in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and possibly other countries. The speaker highlights the importance of understanding Russia's involvement in the Ukraine war and the Middle East. They question whether China supplies weapons to Russia, but clarify that the CCP doesn't directly provide weapons since all their weapon technologies come from Russia. Russia has its own weapon manufacturers in China, making it unnecessary for the CCP to supply weapons. The speaker emphasizes that these are strategic games and mentions Miles Guo's whistleblowing about CCP sending Rocket Force troops to Russia for the Ukraine war.

Ukraine could complicate Russia's plans to deliver weapons if they could install up to 17 batteries without issue. However, it is not confirmed if there will be 17 batteries. The delivery timetable is unknown, as is whether nations will release them now. It's also uncertain if Ukraine has enough trained personnel to operate 17 batteries, despite having trained people for the batteries already provided.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the Ukraine war and related strategic developments, Colonel and the host cover several key topics, facts, and analyses. Skyfall/Burevznik nuclear-powered cruise missile - The Skyfall (Burevznik) is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable cruise missile. A test five years ago ended with five deaths and an explosion; a newer test reportedly flew 14 hours and 15,000 miles. Its characteristics include very long range, low-altitude flight to hug terrain, and high maneuverability, making detection and interception challenging. - The U.S. perspective is that it is not a silver bullet, but it represents an advanced capability: maneuvering over great distances, flying subsonically at very low altitude (within about 20 meters of the ground), and potentially approaching from unexpected directions. - Russia claims it cannot be shot down; the guest cautions that nothing is invulnerable until proven operational, but the missile adds a troubling dimension to deterrence and arms competition. - The broader significance is that it accentuates concern about nuclear weapons and underscores the desirability of nuclear arms reduction talks before START’s expiration. Nuclear arms talks and China’s potential role - The guest indicates Russia is pushing for nuclear arms reduction talks before START expires (February). China is conceptually willing to join, according to some Russian sources, but no authoritative statements from China are cited. Any willingness would depend on Western engagement to explore meaningful participation. Poseidon and other advanced weapons - Poseidon is described as a Russian nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicle (a "massive unmanned torpedo drone") intended as a strategic deterrent. Its exact status is uncertain; reports and videos circulate, but it remains largely experimental. - The discussion notes general concerns about U.S. safety from advanced weapons such as Poseidon and other long-range strike capabilities. Encirclement near Donbas: Pokrovsk and Kupiansk - Grasimov claimed 49 Ukrainian battalions are involved in Donbas, with about 31 allegedly encircled near Pokrovsk (for roughly 5,000 troops). Ukraine says supply lines are not cut and that encirclement is not complete. - The analysts explain that Russia has achieved notable progress in Kupiansk and Pokrovsk areas. Ukraine has mounted limited counterattacks in the north near Pokrovsk to disrupt a potential northern encirclement pivot at Rodinsky, but sustained pressure is difficult due to Ukraine’s manpower and logistics constraints. - The northern shoulder near Rodinsky is a focal point: if Russians move beyond Rodinsky, encirclement risk increases. Ukraine’s ability to keep tens of thousands of troops supplied and to hold the city is limited; Russia’s reserves enable more methodical advances. - The overarching view: Ukraine can slow Russian advances but cannot realistically stop or reverse the broader trajectory due to manpower, equipment, and ammunition imbalances. Russia’s advantage in resources makes a prolonged war of attrition unfavorable to Ukraine. Ukraine’s manpower, equipment, and ammunition - The central constraint for Ukraine is manpower. Even with missiles, drones, and air defense, without sufficient infantry to hold and seize territory and to provide reserves, Ukraine cannot win. - Russia’s industrial capacity and reserves enable it to sustain campaigns, whereas Ukraine’s supply and manpower constraints limit sustained operations. - The discussion notes Western missiles (Storm Shadow, Flamingo) and the pace of Tomahawk deliveries, with the implication that gaps in long-range standoff capability affect Ukraine’s offensive and defensive options. Mercenaries and potential foreign troop contributions - Reports of North Korean troops aiding Pokrovsk are discussed. The guest sees little likelihood of other countries sending troops, given the risk of provoking Russia. Mercenary recruitment by other countries is mentioned as a potential but unverified factor. Western sanctions and energy dynamics - The significant development of American sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil (two-thirds of Russia’s oil exports, roughly 4.4 million barrels per day) is analyzed. China’s state-owned majors and India are reducing seaborne imports but still engaging via pipelines or other mechanisms; the long-term impact on Russia’s revenue is likely substantial but may be offset through workarounds. - The guest emphasizes that history shows Russia tends to absorb economic pain and adapt, making it unlikely that sanctions alone will force strategic changes in Russia’s posture. Global Thunder and other security signals - The Global Thunder nuclear command exercise is mentioned, but the guest signals incomplete knowledge of this particular exercise’s details. Other security signals include drone activity near the Kremlin and assertions about Russia’s broader strategic planning, including potential NATO-related concerns and the Arctic buildup. NATO, European militaries, and relative capabilities - The discussion contrasts Europe’s growing modernization and ambition with actual combat experience. Europe’s strategic parity with Russia is viewed as plausible at a high level, but conventional capabilities lag Russia’s real-time battlefield experience and industrial scale. - The guest warns that perception of inevitable war between NATO and Russia could create self-fulfilling dynamics, urging cautious interpretation of escalatory signaling on both sides. Trump’s negotiation tactics and Ukraine peace prospects - The host questions Trump’s peace negotiation tactics: threats of Tomahawk missiles, meetings with Putin, and attempts to tailor a peace deal offering to freeze lines or concede Donbas. The guest describes Trump’s approach as transactional and inconsistent, with fluctuating positions that depend on the perceived personal and political gains. - The guest argues that Russia’s position has remained consistent since 2014-2022, centering on existential-security demands and denazification logic, including ensuring rights and language protections for ethnic Russians within the contested territories. A lasting peace would require a win-win vision that both sides can accept; transactional bargaining alone is unlikely to lead to a durable settlement. Venezuela and broader geopolitics - The discussion notes a Wagda-linked cargo flight to Venezuela amid sanctions evasion talk, with implications of mercenaries or military parts and a broader strategic alignment with Russia. The host and guest agree that U.S. regime-change impulses in Venezuela complicate international norms, risk escalation, and could inadvertently shift attention away from Ukraine. Overall, the conversation traces the evolving military balance in Ukraine, the emergence of new weapons systems and strategic deterrence concerns, the limits of Western capabilities and sanctions, and the complex interplay of diplomacy, negotiation tactics, and geopolitical aims shaping the conflict and potential resolutions.

The Iranian Shaheed 136 drone, rebranded as the Russian Juran-2, has slight upgrades. The Iranian version uses an inertial navigation system, while the Russian version uses GLONASS, a Russian alternative to GPS, which allows it to loiter but is vulnerable to jamming. Drones are transported by Tupolev Tu-22M bombers or Sukhoi Su-37 fighter jets, increasing their range from 1,000 km to 3,000 km, potentially reaching most of Europe. The Shaheed 136 is a low-budget cruise missile, costing $10,000-$40,000, and is launched from a truck container using rocket-assisted takeoff. The drone is 3.56 meters long, weighs 220 kg, and is powered by a 50-horsepower engine, sounding like a moped. It flies at low altitudes in swarms of five to ten to overwhelm air defenses. Limitations include GLONASS jamming. Countermeasures include weather balloons, Gepard anti-aircraft guns, and Soviet Zu-23 guns. Despite limitations, swarm tactics increase the chance of a successful strike.

This is not just a nuclear carrier or nuclear weapons carrier. This is a nuclear missile or nuclear submarine drone. Because it's in the water, it can carry a much larger payload than something flying through the air. So you've got two systems now operating with nuclear reactors in them. This is a whole new level of technology. The US created a nuclear missile once. It was nuclear powered. It was contamination in flight. Everything around was contaminated. They had to back off. They couldn't master the technology. But it was traceable too because of the radiation. It was leaking everywhere. These systems don't leak radiation. They're very effective. And what they are, first of all, just to understand, is they're second strike systems. So if The US, in this case, starts getting feisty and psychotic and tries to because The US, by the way, does have a policy of first strike, whether it's from space or whether it's missile bound or whether it's submarines out of coast. If The US thinks that they can decapitate the Russian leadership and somehow take out all the Russian missiles that are on tracked carriers, on rail carriers, on ships all over the place. But let's assume somehow they decide they can do this. You've got two issues here. One, you've got the Poseidon, which may already be in place or can be launched from a carrier and travel over three, four, five days to get in place and then explode and create a wave. I mean, if they could actually put a 100 megaton explosion, I mean, a city buster missile is one megaton. 10 megatons is something that you wipe out the entirety of something like the size of New York. If they could put a 100 megaton warhead as has been proposed, you'd be facing a 200 meter wave, a 150, 200 meter wave that would destroy most anything in its path. And that considering 80%, almost 80% of the American population lives on either of the East or the West Coast, the majority being on the East Coast, that's one of those vengeance weapons that would just destroy The US effectively as a country. Then you've got the Borovayashnik, which can fly for weeks, months maybe. Who knows nobody knows exactly how long it can actually fly. If tensions are growing very high, you put a five, six, 10 of those up in the air, and they're just doing circles and waiting for command. So the enemy knows that if they do a decapitating strike, they're gonna get wet. They're gonna get a surprise.

Ukrainians at the NATO Innovation Summit stated 30% of their casualties were from drone strikes. In the Kursk offensive, drones account for the majority, if not almost all, of Russian tank and vehicle losses. FPV drones are currently operated in a one v one fashion. In the next few years, drone warfare will evolve to one v many. Command and data links, essential for drone operation, are becoming more vital. Countermeasures exist to jam or deny these links. The goal is to make drones more autonomous, enabling one operator to control many drones simultaneously.

A drone carrying a significant amount of explosives approached the Olenegorsky Gorniak ship, causing it to be hit. The drone was reported to have carried nearly half a metric ton of explosives. According to a Ukrainian source, there may have been around 100 Russian soldiers or personnel on board at the time of the strike.

Russia has relative freedom in Ukraine for drone and missile operations, with good intelligence coverage. Patriot batteries transferred to Ukraine are likely to be detected and destroyed by Russia before installation. Therefore, sending Patriot batteries to Ukraine is a waste of money. At best, it will extend the war by weeks, resulting in more Ukrainian and Russian deaths, but it will not change the outcome of the war.

**Ukrainian Summary:** Легко вдосконалити безпілотну систему, адаптувати її та зациклити всі напрямки БПЛА. Тоді з'явиться щось більше, ніж просто БПЛА. Це потрібно проти "тушок", запусків балістичних ракет, авіабомб типу FAB-3000. Загалом, однією ЛВС можна битися дронами, бо вони точніші та маневреніші. **English Translation:** It is easy to improve an unmanned system, adapt it, and cycle all UAV directions. Then something more than just UAVs will appear. This is needed against "corpses", ballistic missile launches, and FAB-3000-type aerial bombs. In general, one LVS can fight with drones because they are more accurate and maneuverable.

Drones: A year ago, Ukraine had more drones, but now drone numbers are roughly at parity. Both sides launch a similar number of drones. Russia uses fiber optic drones more actively, which are immune to Western electronic warfare systems. These drones render jamming antennas useless. The army is actively using unmanned systems, including remotely controlled carts that can carry ammo, food, evacuate wounded soldiers, or carry explosives. Russia considers its approach to warfare as complex, dangerous, and highly professional.

A drone carrying a large amount of explosives hit the Olenegorsky Gorniak ship, causing significant damage. The drone approached the ship slowly, alarming the Russians. According to a Ukrainian source, the explosive payload weighed almost half a metric ton. It is believed that around 100 Russian soldiers or personnel were on board when the strike occurred.

Russia is quietly deploying a smart artillery shell that doesn't need GPS and is changing the game in Ukraine. The Krasnopal M2 is a 152 millimeter projectile also available in 155 millimeter variants with semi active laser guidance that locks on to laser marked targets typically spotted by drones. It boasts pinpoint accuracy within two meters, a 50 kilogram frame, and a high explosive fragmentation warhead designed to demolish armored vehicles, fortifications, and command hubs. Its effective range hits 26 kilometers, stretching to 30 kilometers with advanced long barrel howitzers like the two s 19 Mistah s, two a 65 Mistah b, or two s 43 Malva. A standout feature, it operates without reliance on GPS or GLONASS rendering it resilient against electronic jamming in today's high stakes electronic warfare environment. On the front lines in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, these munitions have proven lethal against top tier western armor with a drone integration cutting the time from target detection to impact dramatically. This development highlights Russia's doctrinal evolution focusing on swift selective firepower and self reliant tech amid ongoing sanctions. As Bekhan Ozdoyev, head of Rostec's weapons cluster notes, the ability to produce and deploy high precision selective fire systems is today one of the keys to ensuring tactical and strategic superiority on the battlefield. In a grueling war of attrition, the Krasnopold m two enhance Russia's edge, enabling more efficient evasive operations that challenge countermeasures.

The transcript reports that Russia has completed tests of the Burovesnik missile, with launches slated for 2027. It is described as a doomsday weapon that is rewriting global security, and the speaker asks why Russia built it and what makes it a game changer. The Burovesnik is propelled by a solid-fuel booster and a nuclear air-breathing jet, and during tests it covered a distance of 14,000 kilometers in fifteen hours. It is described as subsonic and capable of operating at high or low altitudes. The weapon is said to have the ability to loiter for months with unlimited range, and it carries a one megaton warhead, which the speaker equates to 70 Hiroshima bombs, ensuring devastating retaliation. Development of the missile reportedly began in 2001 after the United States abandoned the ABM treaty. The missile is described as being sized like the KH-one 101 cruise missile, and it is characterized as a vengeance weapon targeting critical infrastructure. According to the speaker, its endless flight time disrupts the strategic balance and is an alarm to the West. The Burovesnik is described as ground-launched with no carrier needed, delivering precision strikes with a payload range of 50 kilotons to one megaton, stated as the equivalent of 70 Hiroshima bombs. It is presented as a response to US Tomahawks in Europe or Ukraine, and as a key lever in new START talks. The transcript notes that Russia could ramp up production if the treaty ends. The speaker ends with a promo-style call to action, saying not to miss the next big reveal and to follow new rules, geopolitics on X, or cutting edge geopolitical updates, implying ongoing updates about this missile and related strategic developments.

Scott Ritter discusses the Iran talks, U.S. and Iranian positions, and the broader implications for U.S. foreign policy. - He states the talks aren’t over, describing them as a process. The United States came in crudely and with a stunt, while the Iranians were well prepared with technical papers and talking points. The talks remain ongoing, with both sides leaving technical teams behind after high-level visits; the ceasefire is two weeks and has not been terminated, so the process continues. - Ritter characterizes the situation as “the theater of the absurd” and warns it’s dangerous and could spin out of control. He criticizes Donald Trump’s approach as bluster and high-stakes posturing, saying the Iranians haven’t budged and that the U.S. has no clear objectives in the negotiations. He notes the president allegedly has “hard commitment” to Iran not producing a nuclear bomb, but asserts the fatwa against nuclear weapons remains in place and U.S. actions have undercut that position by killing the official who put the fatwa on the table. - He argues the easiest deal would be to sit down with the Iranians and “shut the door on any potential of Iran ever producing a nuclear weapon,” provided genuine experts were involved, but claims the U.S. isn’t there to make that deal. The aim, he says, is to project U.S. control and to frame Trump as the winner, irrespective of the actual outcomes. - Ritter contends Trump’s inner circle includes JD Vance, Marco Rubio, and others; he asserts Trump is using public appearances (e.g., an MMA event) to signal who is in charge and to replace others who opposed the war. He claims JD Vance did not support the war and is being sidelined or publicly discredited. He also criticizes Rubio as nominally in charge of foreign affairs but notes the State Department has been gutted, lacking a full team and interagency process. - He predicts the next two weeks will yield a deal that makes Trump the winner and Vance the loser, suggesting Rubio isn’t being promoted much and that Trump will throw everyone under the bus. He asserts there is no real change in U.S. capabilities, noting the stockpiles of missiles have not been rebuilt. - On NATO and the Ukraine war, Ritter argues drones are redefining warfare: the Ukrainian and Russian use of drones is changing battlefield dynamics, with drone operators becoming central to military effectiveness. He asserts NATO and the U.S. do not fully understand how to fight this war, and claims the conflict demonstrates the end of NATO and a broader “empire terminating event” linked to America’s failure in Iran. He stresses that drone dominance could break the battlefield’s traditional dynamics, leaving tanks and infantry less decisive. - He claims the Ukraine war’s drone innovation is the most significant development in warfare since dynamite, saying without drones you cannot prevail on the battlefield. - On Melania Trump and Epstein, Ritter declines to engage with the specifics of Melania’s personal involvement, but discusses Epstein as emblematic of America’s elite rot. He argues that Melania normalized relationships with Epstein and Maxine and that she will be seen as an enabler, whether or not criminal liability is established. He contends this politics of normalization reflects deeper decay in American power elites.

Ukrainians are not superheroes and face casualties on a daily basis. Today, I will show you unique videos of Russians destroying Ukrainian equipment. "This is an American m triple seven howitzer." "The Russian UAV hits the exact target and destroys the howitzer." "The rare and valuable SAM has been destroyed." "The UAV dives and hits the target." "This is a Polish AHS Crab Self Propelled Artillery Unit. The hit causes fire and destroys the launcher." "A battery of Ukrainian S-three 100 SAMs." "A kamikaze drone strike on the installations leads to a powerful explosion and the destruction of an adjacent installation." "Everything that you saw earlier was the work of the Russian Zala Lancet UAV." "At least 250 different pieces of equipment were destroyed by Russians using it." "The range of such a warhead drone is about 70 kilometers." "Lancets are launched with a metal rail." "The Russians are increasingly using lancets."

Dmitry Sims junior hosts lieutenant general Abty Alaudinov, hero of Russia, hero of the Chechen Republic, hero of the Donetsk People’s Republic, commander of the Akhmet Special Forces, and deputy head of the main military political directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The conversation centers on the current phase of the conflict, Russia’s strategy, the role of Western support, and comparisons with Israeli actions in Gaza and other theaters. Key points and claims: - Russia’s combat capability and strategy - Alaudinov states that “overall, all troops of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense are engaged in active offensive operations across all sectors where we’re positioned,” with the most intense fighting around Pokrovsk, seen as the key point to break through to operational space. He notes progress in sectors where the Ahmad (Akhmet) special forces operate and emphasizes a broader offensive plan while maintaining an “active defense” to engage the entire front line and stretch the enemy’s resources. - He asserts that “only Russia is advancing” along the 1,000-kilometer line of contact and attributes slower offensive tempo to preserving personnel and avoiding a sharp breakthrough that could trigger NATO involvement. He argues the primary damage comes from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on both sides, and contends a rapid thrust would yield enormous losses. - Perceived signs of enemy strain - The speaker describes Ukraine as gradually crumbling under pressure, with Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and the surrounding agglomeration “gradually falling apart.” He claims Russia liberates one or two settlements daily and that NATO support—drones and equipment—has not changed the overall dynamics; Ukraine cannot hold the front despite the influx of foreign weapons. - Western/NATO support - Alaudinov asserts that NATO testing is ongoing on Ukraine with drones, weapons, electronic warfare, etc., and that Trump’s shifting rhetoric does not reduce the flow of weapons or support. He contends that American support persists even as political statements change, and he notes deep American-NATO involvement via think tanks, satellites, and arms supplies that reach the front. - Drones and the changing nature of war - He emphasizes drones as the central element of modern warfare, while not negating the continued relevance of artillery and tanks. He argues: “a tank worth millions of dollars can be destroyed by a drone that costs $500,” and stresses the need to compete economically in war, deploying cheaper, effective unmanned systems to exhaust the enemy’s resources. - He claims Russia has a layered drone system for deep reconnaissance and strike with various warhead levels, ranges, and maneuverability, enabling operations from closest to farthest sectors and allowing “all targets” to be hit today. He asserts Russia is ahead of NATO in unmanned aviation. - Mobilization and tactics - Refuting Western depictions of “meat assaults,” he notes Russia conducted only one mobilization (300,000) and has continued advancing, while Ukraine has mobilized for years and still struggles. He attributes Ukraine’s resilience to nationalist formations behind mobilized troops, and he suggests that without NATO support, Ukraine would not sustain the front for many days. - Mercenaries and comparisons to Israeli actions - He characterizes Western mercenaries as having arrived with false expectations and being killed off in large numbers; Ukrainians are described as having strong spirit, but NATO soldiers lack endurance in the same way. Israeli mercenaries are described as capable in some contexts but not decisive against Russia. - On Gaza and the Israeli army, Alaudinov accuses Israel of “a fascist state” with tactics that spare no one, arguing Russia fights only those who fight with weapons and does not target women, children, or elders. He contrasts this with alleged Israeli actions in Gaza, saying Israel has no tactics and destroys civilians. - Nuclear considerations and doctrine - He asserts Russia is a nuclear power with substantial combat experience and advances in missiles like Zircon that could sink carriers, arguing NATO did not account for Russia’s capabilities when initiating the conflict. He presents a broader critique of Western policy and the so-called “deep state,” alleging far-reaching political dynamics involving Israel, Epstein, and compromise among Western leadership. - Closing perspective - The discussion closes with the host thanking Alaudinov for the detailed analysis of the operation and broader geopolitical commentary, including views on Israel, Gaza, Iran, and U.S. roles.

President Zelensky discussed Ukraine's drone attacks deep inside Russia, dubbed "Operation Spider Web," which destroyed an estimated 34% of Russia's strategic air jets. The operation, 18 months in the making, was so secretive that even the US was not informed. Drones were smuggled into Russia in containers on trucks with unknowing Russian drivers. The drones targeted the fuel storage areas of the aircraft, informed by knowledge of Soviet aircraft designs. Zelensky stated the operation cost Russia over $7 billion, while Ukraine used cheap drones. Zelensky refuted Trump's comparison of the war to children fighting, calling Putin a "maniac" and a "murderer." He recounted a story of a man who lost his family in a missile strike to illustrate the pain of war. Zelensky acknowledged a past "disastrous" meeting with Trump but hopes their relationship has improved. He believes Trump is wrong if he thinks Putin wants peace and that Trump has the power to unite European leaders against Russia with stronger sanctions. Zelensky warned that without US military aid, Russia has a greater chance of winning.

On presidential orders, US Central Command executed Operation Midnight Hammer, a strike against three Iranian nuclear facilities. The mission involved B-2 bombers launched from the US, with a portion acting as a decoy. The main strike package of seven B-2s executed in-flight refuelings and linked with escort aircraft. A US submarine launched over two dozen Tomahawk missiles at Esfahan. Deception tactics, including decoys and fourth and fifth-generation aircraft, were employed. The strike package was supported by multiple US commands. At 6:40 PM EST, the lead B-2 dropped two GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator weapons on Fordow, with a total of 14 dropped on two nuclear target areas. All three targets were struck between 6:40 PM and 7:05 PM EST. Initial battle damage assessments indicate severe damage and destruction. Over 125 US aircraft participated, and approximately 75 precision-guided weapons were used. Force protection measures were elevated in the region, and US forces are prepared for potential Iranian retaliation. The operation demonstrated the US military's global reach and capabilities.

На пусковой установке зенитно-ракетной системы С-350 Витязь, успешно демонстрируемой в зоне СВО. По большой пачке РСЗО HIMARS шло «порядка 12-16 целей»; комплекс «успешно справился, ни одной цели не достигло своей точки». Цель захвачена на дальности «порядка 90 километров», подпустив ближе, «устойчиво сопровождая была поражена на дальности порядка 70 километров». Ракета маневрирует параллельно цели. По нам применяется и АТАК МС и РСЗО HIMARS. Цели были успешно поражены. Это «один из новейших образцов вооружения Российской Федерации». Комплекс имеет зенитно-управляемые ракеты с головками самонаведения, «высокую мобильность, маневренность». Комплекс имеет автономную систему питания, ему «не обязательно привязываться к системам свэп». Разброс дивизиона повышает живучесть экипажей. С момента обнаружения до поражения цели — «от полутора до трех секунд», как при участии оператора, так и в автоматическом режиме. «Автоматический режим у данного комплекса работает идеально, не было совершено в данном режиме ни одного лишнего пуска ракеты и все цели были успешно поражены»。 At the launcher site of the S-350 Vityaz air defense system, successfully demonstrated in the zone of the SVO. For a large batch of HIMARS MLRS there were «about 12-16 targets»; the complex «successfully coped, not a single target reached its point». The target was captured at a distance of «about 90 kilometers» and, by approaching closer, was «consistently engaged at a distance of about 70 kilometers». The missile maneuvers parallel to the target. For us, ATAK MS and HIMARS MLRS were used. The targets were successfully destroyed. This is «one of the newest samples of weapons of the Russian Federation». The system is equipped with guided missiles with homing heads, «high mobility, maneuverability». The system has an autonomous power supply; it «does not have to be tied to SWEP systems». The division’s dispersion increases crew survivability. From detection to destruction — «from one and a half to three seconds», whether with operator involvement or in automatic mode. «Automatic mode of this complex works perfectly, there has not been a single extra rocket launch in this mode, and all targets were successfully destroyed».