reSee.it - Related Video Feed

Russia possesses strong ballistic missile and drone capabilities. Predictions in early 2022 suggested Russia would run out of missiles, but three years later, they are producing and deploying missiles that the United States cannot defend against. The recent strikes demonstrated Russia's ability to destroy Patriot missile batteries. Ukraine fired approximately 20 missiles within two minutes during the strikes, while Lockheed Martin only produces 550 of these missiles annually. Russia's ballistic missile and drone strategy is causing significant attrition of NATO weapons.

Ted Postal, professor emeritus at MIT and expert on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, discusses the Arashnik/Oreshnik hypersonic system and what is known about its capabilities, limitations, and potential implications. Postal emphasizes that the weapon is a very powerful conventional system, not a nuclear one. He notes that it delivers munitions and, as of the evidence available, seems to inflict damage primarily through kinetic impact. While adding submunitions with high explosives could increase damage per submunition, this would not constitute a game changer unless nuclear weapons were mounted on top of the system. He also cautions that the fact the system can deliver nuclear weapons is not especially novel in the context of existing delivery options, and the main policy concern is the possibility of escalation to nuclear use in response to a conventional attack. Key characteristics he outlines: - The Oreshnik is a one-stage missile that appears to repurpose the first stage of an old SS-20 (Pioneer) intermediate-range missile. The SS-20 was a two-stage missile with three warheads; in the Oreshnik, six buses on the vehicle carry submunitions. - The payload consists of six buses, each carrying about six submunitions, for a total of around 36 submunitions. Each submunition weighs roughly 70–80 kilograms. - The submunitions are delivered from a high-velocity canister that is ejected and then uses a high-pressure gas propulsion system to push out six submunitions onto six separate targets. The vehicle remains oriented to maintain stability, preventing tumbling and ensuring precise deployment. - The submunitions travel at very high speeds (hypersonic) but do not reach hypersonic speed on impact with the ground due to atmospheric reentry dynamics. They hit the ground at approximately 150–200 kilometers per hour, not at Mach 10, because tumbling and aerodynamic drag reduce speed before impact. - Debris analysis suggests the submunitions are not penetrating deep underground; instead, their energy is converted into heat and a violent expansion near the surface, producing an explosion-like effect rather than deep penetration. - The trajectories are lofted, delivering the submunitions to the target area after a long flight time (Russia has claimed 15–17 minutes for submunitions to reach targets). This lofted path reduces the likelihood of interceptors successfully engaging the weapon. On the effects and targeting: - A single submunition’s energy disperses over a footprint rather than concentrating in a single crater. The weapon’s conventional damage is significant, especially when deployed as clusters against a structure or urban area, but it is not equivalent to a nuclear strike. - If six buses with six submunitions each were all directed at a single structure, the resulting destruction would be substantial, but the extent would depend on targeting accuracy and footprint, as well as how many submunitions actually strike the intended area. - Postal notes that a one-kiloton nucleus would create a clearly larger, more devastating area of destruction than the conventional cluster could achieve; meanwhile, a 150–200 kiloton nuclear warhead mounted on Oreshnik would be city-destroying, illustrating how dramatically different outcomes would be with a nuclear payload. Interception and defense: - Postal argues there is no reliable intercept option for this weapon. The high loft and deployment of multiple submunitions after release complicate interception: the submunitions depart the launcher and travel at several kilometers per second above the atmosphere; interceptors would have minutes to react at distances where they would struggle to reach the fast-moving submunitions. - He contrasts this with Iskander, noting that while intercepting Iskander is challenging, the Oreshnik presents a broader, more difficult defense problem due to its trajectory and submunition deployment. Strategic and political context: - The discussion touches on the broader strategic implications, including the psychological impact of a sky lit up by hypersonic activity and the potential for miscalculation leading to nuclear escalation. Postal warns against overestimating the weapon’s nuclear potential and cautions policymakers about proportional responses to conventional attacks. - He critiques public rhetoric and speculative defense concepts (e.g., extreme “golden dome” missile defense schemes) as impractical, arguing that current defenses are unlikely to deter or intercept hypersonic submunition deployments. - The dialogue also reflects on Western economic and political actions, such as sanctions, and suggests that some analyses of the effects on Russia’s economy and strategic posture may mischaracterize outcomes; Postal emphasizes that the weapon’s value lies in its conventional destructive capability and its ability to complicate defense planning, rather than in conventional deterrence or nuclear signaling. - The conversation closes with a stark warning: if thousands of these missiles were deployed, a significant strategic reshaping would follow, necessitating new considerations for air and missile defense, even as existing systems face fundamental limitations in countering hypersonic conventional weapons.

Stanislav Krapivnik, a former US army officer from Donbas, returns to discuss the escalation of NATO-Russia proxy warfare, the role of drones, and potential strategic escalations. The conversation centers on how Europe is contributing to deep strikes in Russia, especially against energy installations, and the resulting danger of a broader conflict. Key points and claims, as presented: - Drones and deep strikes: The EU, through its defense alignment, aims to overwhelm Russian air defenses and threaten strategic assets, including nuclear-capable targets, by using long-range drones. The objective is to degrade Russian defensive systems and the production rate of missiles, potentially opening the path to strikes on radars, early warning systems, strategic assets like bombers, and even nuclear submarines in port. - Nuclear war risk: The interviewee asserts that by mid-to-late summer there could be a zone of possible nuclear war if ground warfare arises or escalates due to Western actions. He notes that Russia’s anti-aircraft and early warning capabilities are limited to manageable scopes, with occasional corridors allowing strikes in, and that Europe’s current strategy could push the conflict toward a nuclear dimension. - Deterrence and first strikes: The discussion contrasts U.S. first-strike doctrine with other nations’ second-strike assurances. The speaker argues that in a blinded Russia, the logic for targeted first strikes becomes stronger for the other side, while lamenting that Europe’s leadership might be pushing toward a nuclear exchange. He cites studies suggesting that as few as 47 key targets could collapse the U.S. in a nuclear context, highlighting the fragility of a high-tech economy under nuclear disruption. - European psyche and policy: There is criticism of what the speaker describes as a mass psychosis in Europe, where warnings about striking Russia’s early radar or deterrent systems are dismissed in favor of defending Ukraine. The rhetoric suggests deep political and media reinforcement of pro-Ukraine narratives, with limited space for risk discussion about nuclear consequences. - Energy installations and economy: While drone strikes have targeted oil facilities, the speaker notes that most damage has been to storage facilities rather than critical infrastructure like pipelines or refineries. Refineries are large, and damage to some vessels can take longer to repair. Russia’s production has not been significantly reduced, but the attacks are accelerating a shift of energy facilities eastward toward Asia, while Europe faces higher oil prices on the spot market and potential disruptions to gas routes like TurkStream and Caspian Pipeline Authority, with broader economic impact on Southeastern Europe and Turkey. - Russia’s response and drone modernization: The Russian military has reorganized its drone capabilities, forming dedicated drone battalions and establishing new schools to standardize and professionalize drone operations. The move encompasses reconnaissance, kamikaze, bombing, and supply drones, with adjustments after initial disorganization. Ukrainians reportedly helped inspire and provide drone countermeasures, and Russia’s modernization integrates drones with air defenses. - Zelensky and Victory Day threat: The possibility of Zelensky threatening to strike Moscow’s Victory Day parade is discussed. The guest suggests Zelensky would want to be at the head of such a move, while acknowledging the uncertainty of who controls decisions in Kyiv and the level of Western involvement. The parade’s downscaled format is noted, but the broader question remains whether such a strike could occur. The guest asserts that Russian deterrence may have been eroded, and Western actors might not take credible deterrence seriously until an incident occurs. - Africa and Mali: Russia’s activities in Africa, especially Mali, are described as significant. Mali’s leadership under Asimi Goata is navigating between Western and Russian influence. Russian forces, including elements from the former Wagner group now under the Russian defense ministry, are described as rebuilding Mali’s military and supporting a campaign by jihadist groups. The situation includes rapid, mobile “flying columns” that can cause chaos but lack staying power against organized defenses. Russian drones and aviation (including ME-20 aircraft) are reportedly effective, and Mali is moving toward energy and resource development, including three nuclear power plants proposed by Russia to Elektrify the country. France’s position is framed as colonial, with Mali’s uranium, gold, and other resources creating strategic interest. Burkina Faso’s involvement and regional dynamics involving Niger are cited as part of a broader, expanding conflict network across Africa. - Global frontlines and war risk: The guest argues that multiple frontlines are forming—Ukraine, the Persian Gulf, and Western Africa—and that they could merge into a single broader conflict if not stopped. He asserts that the West is driving this escalation, and he characterizes Western public sentiment as often indifferent to Ukrainian casualties, focusing instead on political or financial gains from the conflict. - Frontline realities: On the ground, Ukraine has tactical successes but limited staying power due to heavy casualties and supply problems. Russian forces are reportedly stronger in Donbas, Kherson, and Sumy, while Ukrainian forces face difficult conditions, including open fields and heavy artillery advantages for the Russians. Drone warfare has prompted reorganized Russian drone corps, with improved training and standardized units. The discussion ends with a warning that the conflict has global implications, with fronts expanding and risks of a broader, possibly world-scale war if not curtailed. The interviewee emphasizes that the West’s actions are fueling escalation and that African theaters, particularly Mali, are becoming an integral part of the wider confrontation.

Ukrainian drone attacks are characterized by indiscriminate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure like airports, churches, and apartment buildings, with the primary goal of terrorizing the public. Conversely, Russia is precise in its targeting, focusing on Patriot missile batteries, factories, military installations, and airfields used for combat aircraft. Russia's strategy aims at the attrition of both Ukraine and, indirectly, NATO.

Mario and Malcolm discuss the evolving drone warfare landscape and the strategic implications for the United States, Iran, Ukraine, and Gulf states. Malcolm argues that Iran’s drone arsenal represents a persistent, low-cost threat with an 88,000 Shahid drone inventory at the lowest cost, and mass production estimated at 7,000. He notes Iran has destroyed roughly $5,000,000,000 of technology, underscoring the waste associated with high-value defenses. He contends the conflict “is gonna come down to rifles and knives and drones,” and suggests the U.S. and its allies have limited tolerance for the level of death this entails. He emphasizes the learning curve for anti-Shahid drones, estimating 35 to 45 days to train someone to fly such drones, and notes that combat veterans and Ukrainian international legionnaires could assist with training in Ukraine, Abu Dhabi, and beyond. They discuss defense markets and training pipelines. Mario recalls speaking with a U.S.-based VC in Ukraine who might be tapped to bolster defense industry interests; Malcolm reiterates that Ukrainian-made, locally developed systems dominate, and that Western companies must avoid partnerships that involve theft of technology. He stresses that Ukrainians own the drone industry, and that the U.S. has historically relied on foreign-made drones for ISR rather than attack, contrasting Ukraine’s trajectory from reconnaissance to drones used for direct attack and artillery fusion. Malcolm criticizes the U.S. approach to drones, arguing that the U.S. military has not adapted to modern drone warfare and that Ukraine’s battlefield experiences demonstrate rapid adaptation and innovating countermeasures, such as drone drop kits and improvised aerial bombs. He explains the progression: drones used for surveillance evolved into attack platforms, counter-drone tactics, and drone-enabled artillery. He provides detailed examples: using DJI drones for reconnaissance early on, then using drone-based bombing, counter-jamming techniques, and fiber-optic lines to guide munitions. He notes Ukrainian Sea Baby Magura drones and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) that attacked Russian ships, and describes a dramatic incident where a Ukrainian drone disabled a Russian submarine tail by docking behind it and flooding it with explosive force. The conversation shifts to recent strikes on Gulf-based assets. Mario asks about Zelensky’s visits to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and why Gulf defense preparedness appeared slow. Malcolm suggests the U.S. misreads regional resilience and that Gulf states will adapt using homegrown drone capabilities, with examples such as Kuwait buying thousands of Ukrainian drones and the UAE potentially building domestic drone factories. He cautions against overreliance on “wonder weapons” and emphasizes practical measures like machine guns, shotguns, and ground-based defenses, noting that 50-caliber weapons and simple tactics can counter Shahid drones if properly deployed. He asserts that the Gulf states will need to supplement their arsenals with practical, scalable training and production rather than expensive foreign capabilities. Malcolm discusses the strategic logic behind any potential concessions with Iran. He argues that Iran has geography, topography, history, and manpower advantages, and that Donald Trump’s threats to bomb Iran’s infrastructure are unlikely to force concessions. He claims Iran would not negotiate under U.S. pressure and that the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) would remain a focal point of conflict. He contends that Trump’s approach risks escalating toward broader conflict, and that Iran could respond by leveraging the Houthis or other regional proxies to disrupt shipping and Gulf economies, potentially closing the Red Sea and Suez Canal if alignments shift. They touch on Russia’s role, noting Moscow’s financial and strategic interests in the region. Malcolm argues Putin benefits from the conflict and that Trump’s priorities are tied to accumulating frozen Russian assets and broader political maneuvering, sometimes at odds with the publicized goal of restraining Iran. He observes that Russia’s drones, weapons components, and intelligence could be flowing to Iran, influencing the Gulf theater. The discussion closes with a broader warning: the war’s consequences will be felt for years or generations, with energy prices, inflation, and global economic disruption, and only a realignment of strategy—embracing distributed defenses, domestic production, and adaptable tactics—will shape outcomes. They acknowledge the difficulty of predicting concessions, the complexity of Gulf politics, and the precarious balance between deterrence and escalation.

Glenn discusses growing fears that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is approaching a “third world war,” citing weekend attacks on Moscow, claims of Western assistance to Ukraine, and attacks “coming from NATO territory” without permission from Baltic states and Finland. He notes Europe mass-producing or intending to mass-produce long-range strike weapons to strike deep inside Russia, and asks Professor John Mearsheimer how events may develop, what options Russia has, and what futures lie ahead. Mearsheimer says Ukrainians are escalating against the Russian homeland. Earlier in the war they relied mainly on missiles under limits from Europeans and Americans; now they have turned to drones and developed a significant drone force capable of striking into Russia. He argues drone damage is not enough to affect the war’s outcome meaningfully, but warns the danger is continued escalation: drone attacks rising over time, and later missiles being added, resulting in combined missile-and-drone attacks on Russia. He says the key question is what Russia will do in response. He reports that Sergei Karaganov argues Russia should strike European targets to send a signal that actions are unacceptable, starting with conventional weapons and then—if necessary—nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer says Karaganov claims that while the idea was previously a minority view, now most Russians Mearsheimer speaks to agree, arguing Russia is “fed up” and that escalating attacks on the Russian homeland are unacceptable. Glenn suggests further escalation may occur beyond retaliation, including more brutal attacks on Ukraine and conventional attacks against countries such as Germany or Estonia, and raises discussions about Ukraine possibly “liberating Moldova” from Transnistria, where thousands of Russian troops are present, as another escalation pathway. Mearsheimer frames the conflicts as lacking bargaining space—comparing them to the Iran conflict between Iran and the United States/Israel. He says both sides see the other as an existential threat, leaving no room for negotiation, and that desperation drives risky behavior. Regarding diplomacy, Glenn questions how diplomacy can fail repeatedly. Mearsheimer says there is “zero bargaining space” because Russia sees Ukraine and European positions as existential threats, while Europe and Ukraine increasingly view Russia’s success in Ukraine as an existential threat. He adds that the United States does not view Russia as an existential threat, implying Trump is willing to bargain, but Europeans and Ukrainians do not want to negotiate the deal Trump proposes. He says Trump may have “washed his hands” of a diplomatic settlement and believes the war must be settled on the battlefield. Glenn then asks whether the United States would join if Russia struck Estonia. Mearsheimer says Karaganov’s framework involves attacking NATO countries with conventional weapons, which in the past would almost guarantee U.S. involvement. He says it is unclear what Trump would do, but emphasizes that once escalation begins, nuclear weapons are in the background. He describes the escalation ladder as being “felt in the dark,” where nuclear use is a rung that everyone wants to avoid, giving nuclear threats “huge deterrent value.” Glenn returns to deterrence and escalation dynamics, suggesting NATO is overly confident Russia is deterred, while Russia waits and then takes bigger steps. Mearsheimer says even limited conventional missile strikes into NATO countries—killing hardly anyone—would be a huge step because they would strike NATO members. He also argues Russia is winning the war and that drones have slowed Russian territory gains, making progress incremental. He concludes that slow battlefield progress, no bargaining space, and rising homeland attacks make serious escalation likely, and that Russia may only need a major conventional step to trigger a “gigantic leap forward.” He further argues narrative incentives increase the risk: if the West believes Russians are losing momentum, Europeans and Ukrainians may increase attacks on Russian homeland. He says rebranding in the West could also shape decisions, including how people describe the Iran war’s objectives. Glenn pivots to Iran, saying it may be “hours away” or within 20–48 hours, and asks how it may develop. Mearsheimer says Iranian and American settlement proposals are “light years apart,” with no public evidence of behind-closed-doors concessions. He describes the sequence as a 40-day bombing campaign failing, followed by a ceasefire and a blockade strategy that also is not working; he says time is something Trump does not have because of economic consequences. He argues Trump’s choices appear to be restart bombing or cut a deal on Iran’s terms, and that returning to bombing would not cause Iranian surrender, while increasing incentives for Iran to escalate attacks across the Gulf, including threats to shut down the Red Sea and damage key infrastructure. When Glenn asks about strengthening the blockade by moving it (e.g., toward the Strait of Malacca), Mearsheimer says the location does not matter much; the blockade is not inflicting sufficient punishment to get Iran to surrender, and if the Strait of Hormuz is closed, economic damage worsens over time. He says Iran and Gulf countries are working on ways to beat the blockade, complicating any attempt to inflict punishment strong enough to force surrender. Glenn asks about the broader U.S. strategy amid multipolarity claims and the sense that diplomacy is failing. Mearsheimer says the U.S. is shifting the burden of Ukraine onto Europeans, is working to prevent crises or war in East Asia involving the U.S., and is deeply involved in fighting in the Middle East—specifically the Iran war. He concludes that the U.S. is unlikely to accept defeat in a war once involved, tying it to lessons from Vietnam: entering wars is easier than getting out, and the U.S. searches for ways to win even when defeat is recognized. He says there is reason to believe Trump may return to a massive bombing campaign driven by desperation, but that it still would not work. He adds that a “meltdown” may be overstated, drawing on historical comparison between Johnson in Vietnam and Trump’s potential political fate, while arguing Trump has “no good option.” Glenn asks about additional “cards” the U.S. could play through regional actors or proxies. Mearsheimer says no comparable proxy force exists to match what Ukraine represented, and argues that if the U.S. and Israel together could not defeat Iran, then other actors like the UAE by themselves are not positioned to take on Iran. In closing, Glenn notes fears of more escalation in both Ukraine and Iran and says the situation ahead may be “very troubling.” Mearsheimer agrees and calls the escalation ladder framing “very depressing,” ending with the theme that once conflicts begin, escalation and difficulty exiting are persistent.

Stanislav Krapivnik said the war is changing, with a growing focus on logistics and infrastructure—bridges, energy sites, and even petrol stations—though he described sharp local variation in how fuel access is affected in Russia. He reported difficulty getting fuel outside major cities due to fewer logistics and partial shortages, with lines ranging from about 10 minutes to up to an hour depending on location. He said hoarding occurs by both individuals and companies, including an incident where two 20–21-year-old men were busted for allegedly buying 900 liters of E95 under the table to resell. He also described price spikes at some small “mom-and-pop” stations, and said the government’s response is unclear. He said Sberbank has a program to find fuel nearby, and that different areas use different methods such as volume caps, quotas, or queue systems, with restrictions on filling containers in some places. On military decisions and targeting, Krapivnik described intensified drone use and said he had observed that detectors only show distance and drone count, not friendly versus hostile. He described “Palantir drones” and a targeting logic where “the AI” selects military-type targets for the first 80% of the charge and then looks for anything moving for the last 20%. He said Russia adapted quickly by mounting machine guns on modified civilian vehicles (“Mad Max” cars) to escort trucks, often one per escort (sometimes two), to shoot down drones; he said civilians generally drive without such escort, creating different risk. Krapivnik claimed that drone attacks have killed civilians in places like the area between Gorlovka and Senovata, and he said open-air markets and buses have been hit, including alleged attacks on Belarusian buses. He argued Ukrainian attacks on gas stations are often targeting the refueling cars and people rather than the station itself, occurring “almost on a daily basis,” while Russia’s response includes dismantling gas stations in frontier territories and attacking gas stations at night. He described drones and fuel logistics in terms of Ukrainian portable drone launch sites: trucks carrying drone launchers that deploy near the line of contact, and Russia targeting fueling points where those launchers use regular gas stations. He described Russian attacks on such fueling points as occurring after closing stations overnight, accompanied by additional explosions and casualties. Regarding the situation in Kyiv, Krapivnik said the “party of war” is winning out, with hardliners gaining influence over those pushing for negotiations. He listed specific industrial and logistics targets struck in Kyiv, including companies producing cruise missile control components, drone-related products, sighting systems for armored vehicles, camera equipment, and logistics centers. He said defensive belts around major Ukrainian cities have expanded—barbed wire, dragon’s teeth, anti-tank ditches, minefields, and roads under block post control—and argued these defenses slow advances by drones, giving cities time to build defenses and creating delays for clearing obstacles under fire. He also addressed escalation concerns about Europe. He referenced Medvedev’s claim that Finland is on a nuclear targeting list after changing laws, and said Maria Zakharova claimed “Russian pranksters” exposed Estonian involvement in attacks on St. Petersburg, framing this as creating pressure for a harsher line. He asserted that the war could move toward either conventional or nuclear conflict, arguing there is “no in-between,” and compared Russia’s concerns to historical episodes such as Operation Barbarossa. He described reasons a defender might “absorb an attack” if capable of reversing it, and discussed legal arguments involving “Article 51” in relation to genocide-prevention claims he tied to Russia’s actions. Krapivnik argued Russia is unlikely to strike Poland, and he connected his view to what he said are threats and dynamics involving Ukrainian nationalists, Azov, and MiG-29 transfers, claiming Poland would have incentives to avoid escalation. He suggested that if Russia wanted to make an example in Europe, it might target manufacturing facilities involved in drone production, and he discussed Estonia as a possible focal point due to Russian-speaking populations and historical territorial framing. In the final segment, he shifted to technology, saying Russia launched its first photonic chip factory and that China launched one earlier. He claimed photonic chips use light rather than traditional etched silicon electronics, produce less heat, and offer greater capabilities. He said China plans to produce 12,000 photonic chips by the end of the year and that Russia’s efforts could yield chips “a thousand times faster” than NVIDIA (or “10 times faster” even if the claim is exaggerated), concluding this represents a major disruption to current AI-related expectations.

The Iranian Shaheed 136 drone, rebranded as the Russian Juran-2, has slight upgrades. The Iranian version uses an inertial navigation system, while the Russian version uses GLONASS, a Russian alternative to GPS, which allows it to loiter but is vulnerable to jamming. Drones are transported by Tupolev Tu-22M bombers or Sukhoi Su-37 fighter jets, increasing their range from 1,000 km to 3,000 km, potentially reaching most of Europe. The Shaheed 136 is a low-budget cruise missile, costing $10,000-$40,000, and is launched from a truck container using rocket-assisted takeoff. The drone is 3.56 meters long, weighs 220 kg, and is powered by a 50-horsepower engine, sounding like a moped. It flies at low altitudes in swarms of five to ten to overwhelm air defenses. Limitations include GLONASS jamming. Countermeasures include weather balloons, Gepard anti-aircraft guns, and Soviet Zu-23 guns. Despite limitations, swarm tactics increase the chance of a successful strike.

This is not just a nuclear carrier or nuclear weapons carrier. This is a nuclear missile or nuclear submarine drone. Because it's in the water, it can carry a much larger payload than something flying through the air. So you've got two systems now operating with nuclear reactors in them. This is a whole new level of technology. The US created a nuclear missile once. It was nuclear powered. It was contamination in flight. Everything around was contaminated. They had to back off. They couldn't master the technology. But it was traceable too because of the radiation. It was leaking everywhere. These systems don't leak radiation. They're very effective. And what they are, first of all, just to understand, is they're second strike systems. So if The US, in this case, starts getting feisty and psychotic and tries to because The US, by the way, does have a policy of first strike, whether it's from space or whether it's missile bound or whether it's submarines out of coast. If The US thinks that they can decapitate the Russian leadership and somehow take out all the Russian missiles that are on tracked carriers, on rail carriers, on ships all over the place. But let's assume somehow they decide they can do this. You've got two issues here. One, you've got the Poseidon, which may already be in place or can be launched from a carrier and travel over three, four, five days to get in place and then explode and create a wave. I mean, if they could actually put a 100 megaton explosion, I mean, a city buster missile is one megaton. 10 megatons is something that you wipe out the entirety of something like the size of New York. If they could put a 100 megaton warhead as has been proposed, you'd be facing a 200 meter wave, a 150, 200 meter wave that would destroy most anything in its path. And that considering 80%, almost 80% of the American population lives on either of the East or the West Coast, the majority being on the East Coast, that's one of those vengeance weapons that would just destroy The US effectively as a country. Then you've got the Borovayashnik, which can fly for weeks, months maybe. Who knows nobody knows exactly how long it can actually fly. If tensions are growing very high, you put a five, six, 10 of those up in the air, and they're just doing circles and waiting for command. So the enemy knows that if they do a decapitating strike, they're gonna get wet. They're gonna get a surprise.

Ukrainians at the NATO Innovation Summit stated 30% of their casualties were from drone strikes. In the Kursk offensive, drones account for the majority, if not almost all, of Russian tank and vehicle losses. FPV drones are currently operated in a one v one fashion. In the next few years, drone warfare will evolve to one v many. Command and data links, essential for drone operation, are becoming more vital. Countermeasures exist to jam or deny these links. The goal is to make drones more autonomous, enabling one operator to control many drones simultaneously.

A drone carrying a significant amount of explosives approached the Olenegorsky Gorniak ship, causing it to be hit. The drone was reported to have carried nearly half a metric ton of explosives. According to a Ukrainian source, there may have been around 100 Russian soldiers or personnel on board at the time of the strike.

Stanislav Kravtynik says he has returned to Donbass while living in Moscow. He describes trips to areas near Zaporozhye and Kherson, saying Ukrainians use drones at night to drop mines along roads, while civilian trucking and civilian cars make up most of the traffic being hit. He claims the pattern is designed to terrorize civilians, including targeting fuel trucks but mainly civilian transport. When asked about Russia’s escalation, Kravtynik argues that the Kremlin mood is “extremely militant,” saying Kiev and some European cities should be “a crater.” He asserts that daily civilian killings by Ukrainians are “nothing new” and claims Ukrainian drone warfare is “gamified”: Ukrainian drone operators receive points for destroying military equipment and personnel, and if no suitable targets are available they move down categories to civilian engineering, telecommunications, civilian trucking, civilian cars, and then civilians. He also claims most drones do not achieve kills, estimating only 15–20% produce results, with many drones shot down, stopped, or lost. He says targeting specific civilian locations includes reconning a school in Starobiesc with recon drones before attacks. He connects Russia’s restraint to changes in the escalation environment, referencing a dormitory incident in Lugansk and saying Russian conventional actions are used to “get the message across” rather than via nuclear escalation. Kravtynik criticizes targeting decisions that focus on “decision-making centers,” saying the military is a “tool” and that leadership replacement dynamics mean new officials would assume control. He also claims Ukrainian leadership is sustained by corruption and incentives tied to continuing the war, stating that as personnel are killed or “liquidated,” the remaining leadership would collapse. He argues it is unnecessary to target specific figures directly, since removing enough of the leadership apparatus would create broader collapse. Kravtynik says NATO countries are not neutral once they allow airspace or ground space for attacks or do not shoot down drones passing through their territory. He lists Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, and claims Latvia has enabled launching platforms for Ukrainian drones. He argues NATO bases should be made examples and suggests attacks on life-critical infrastructure in European cities as part of this approach. Turning to front-line developments, Kravtynik focuses on multiple sectors. In western Zaporizhzhia, he says Ukrainians have launched three counteroffensives, with earlier efforts around Gulyai Polia stopped quickly and an eastern push now encircled, with bridges blown and a pocket surrounded. He says Ukrainians break through faster because they do not “give a damn about losses,” using “suicide infantry” and storm infantry differently: younger, healthier personnel are assigned to storm infantry with training and equipment, while others become “suicide” assault waves or are used to hold sectors storm infantry cannot. He describes Kharkiv as an example, claiming attackers were sent across “two kilometers of open fields” with artillery killing the waves and that storm infantry could not be used effectively until targets were softened. He claims western Zaporizhzhia is at most a spoiling attack to delay a Russian offensive. He then discusses Ariokhov, describing movement from multiple directions, drone control over supply routes, and Russian forces closing rapidly toward Ariokhov, asserting Ukrainian defenses have collapsed. He describes Donetsk Republic as quieter, with concentrated fighting around Kostiantynivka, claiming roughly “70% in Russian hands,” a pocket of Ukrainians surrounded, and bridges blown so northern ridges cannot support each other. He claims Krasnystawka is near collapse and that Russian forces are within kilometers of Kramatorsk from the east. For the north (toward Slaviansk and Kupiansk), he describes siege dynamics around Krasnaya Mlyn, constant probing to wear out defenders, and says Ukrainians are running out of food and ammo. He also discusses logistics and a pocket up to the Serebrianka River, asserting Russian forces are cutting logistics lines and planning an offensive that could cut off a portion of Kharkiv Oblast. Regarding areas farther north and Belarus, Kravtynik claims Ukrainian drone activity over Belarus has been extensive and that Belarus would bear a cost-benefit if entering the war. He addresses reports that Zelensky has identified “500 targets” in Belarus and says the prospect of Belarus entering the fight would be escalation. He argues that European involvement is central to the survival strategy of the Zelensky regime and claims European leadership and populations are being pushed toward war while elites plan to exit when conditions become dangerous. Kravtynik concludes with a discussion of decision-making matrices, claiming staff systems weight options so that leadership believes it has choices while an intended course of action is selected. He says European leadership is influenced by “propaganda” and special interests, invoking examples such as BlackRock, and argues that even if some leaders slow the process, the EU continues moving toward war.

The conversation began with domestic politics on the U.S. right, focusing on claims that figures such as Tucker Carlson and Marjorie Taylor Greene are “walking away” from the Republican Party. Malcolm described a shift within conservative politics from older conservative movements associated with figures like William F. Buckley to later, more extremist influences. He argued that Trump’s “superpower” was communicating directly to “the lowest common denominator,” and compared Tucker Carlson’s role to earlier conservative media influence, describing Carlson as “intellectualizing” extremist ideologies. Malcolm portrayed Rush Limbaugh as a central force behind talk-radio conservatism, asserting that he never saw fault within his own party. He claimed this trajectory helped produce a new “neo-MAGA” that recognizes Trump’s influence as finite and expects the movement to end with Trump. He described MAGA as built on radicalism and threats toward enemies, while also claiming it functions in a way he equated to libertarianism. A major theme was ideological fragmentation and attempted succession after Trump. Malcolm said Marjorie Taylor Greene moved from QAnon beliefs about secret CIA operations and mass arrests/executions to “Super MAGA,” and then shifted to an “America First” platform, which Malcolm linked historically to the pre–World War II “America First” movement. He also argued that the conservative right has been pushed toward loyalty tests that prioritize loving Trump above family or religious commitments. Malcolm then pivoted to foreign policy and military spending. He criticized a pattern he associated with the U.S. defense establishment, invoking Dwight D. Eisenhower’s warning about the defense industrial establishment and describing how defense contractors profited through periods including World War II, the Vietnam War, and later post–Cold War military posture. He said budgets increased again after 9/11 and that systems and contracts continued to flow to defense contractors. He argued that various U.S. weapons programs—built for decades—remain in the inventory and are used in the context of contemporary wars, and claimed the U.S. spends on capabilities he said are unnecessary or misallocated. He also discussed what he described as a drone “swarm” threat allegedly observed by an F-15 pilot who saw “hundreds of Iranian drones” forming an aerial “minefield.” Malcolm compared the concept to drone-fireworks light-show patterns, arguing that placing explosives on many drones and dispersing them in staggered formations could create a hard-to-defeat mesh. He described loitering/hunter-killer dynamics in the swarm, explained why a wall of drones could cause “foreign object damage,” and said the relevant problem is detecting and neutralizing the system before it engages. He tied this to a broader critique of how quickly the U.S. can adapt and to the gap between experimental or contractor proposals and field-ready defensive solutions. Asked what Americans should do, Malcolm claimed U.S. intelligence and defense institutions are “gutted,” describing a loyalty-based purge linked to MAGA, which he said would prevent serious attention to such reports. He contrasted that with Ukrainian tactics, including intelligence debriefing and operational adaptation. He then described Ukrainian-style drone and cyber/kinetic tactics, including an example involving swarming drones used to strike targets in urban areas during crises. The conversation moved to Ukraine’s broader drone-centric battlefield transformation. Malcolm said drones have “completely supplanted artillery,” and he described changing tactical norms such as press badges becoming targets for drones. He characterized Russian drone operators as “human hunters” and referenced documentaries about Russian drone operator teams in Kherson, describing civilian casualties as part of the drone-operator training approach. He added that the Ukrainian priority includes hunting down drone operators. Kirill Budanov (head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, as discussed) was also discussed. Malcolm described Budanov as having “street cred” from earlier command roles and as a thinker who adapted tactics rapidly, with drone warfare treated as a distinct, scaled capability. Another participant discussed visiting Ukraine and the tight security around Budanov. Finally, the discussion returned to a “Sarajevo Safari” allegation. Malcolm described his own military experience as a designated marksman/reconnaissance sniper in the Ukrainian army and explained how civilians would not be allowed near weapon systems. He then connected to stories alleging wealthy foreigners paid to occupy Bosnian Serb sniper positions during the 1992–1996 siege of Sarajevo. The other participant summarized that late-2025 and 2026 attention included reports of wealthy foreigners allegedly paying large sums (with numbers cited such as 80,000–100,000 pounds/ euros in today’s money), that claims were popularized by a 2022 documentary, and that investigations were opened in multiple countries, though some allegations remained unproven and under investigation. Malcolm emphasized that, in his view, modern drone warfare would make such “tourism” impractical, and argued that money-driven participation does not provide protection from modern battlefield targeting.

Russia has relative freedom in Ukraine for drone and missile operations, with good intelligence coverage. Patriot batteries transferred to Ukraine are likely to be detected and destroyed by Russia before installation. Therefore, sending Patriot batteries to Ukraine is a waste of money. At best, it will extend the war by weeks, resulting in more Ukrainian and Russian deaths, but it will not change the outcome of the war.

**Ukrainian Summary:** Легко вдосконалити безпілотну систему, адаптувати її та зациклити всі напрямки БПЛА. Тоді з'явиться щось більше, ніж просто БПЛА. Це потрібно проти "тушок", запусків балістичних ракет, авіабомб типу FAB-3000. Загалом, однією ЛВС можна битися дронами, бо вони точніші та маневреніші. **English Translation:** It is easy to improve an unmanned system, adapt it, and cycle all UAV directions. Then something more than just UAVs will appear. This is needed against "corpses", ballistic missile launches, and FAB-3000-type aerial bombs. In general, one LVS can fight with drones because they are more accurate and maneuverable.

Drones: A year ago, Ukraine had more drones, but now drone numbers are roughly at parity. Both sides launch a similar number of drones. Russia uses fiber optic drones more actively, which are immune to Western electronic warfare systems. These drones render jamming antennas useless. The army is actively using unmanned systems, including remotely controlled carts that can carry ammo, food, evacuate wounded soldiers, or carry explosives. Russia considers its approach to warfare as complex, dangerous, and highly professional.

A drone carrying a large amount of explosives hit the Olenegorsky Gorniak ship, causing significant damage. The drone approached the ship slowly, alarming the Russians. According to a Ukrainian source, the explosive payload weighed almost half a metric ton. It is believed that around 100 Russian soldiers or personnel were on board when the strike occurred.

Russia is quietly deploying a smart artillery shell that doesn't need GPS and is changing the game in Ukraine. The Krasnopal M2 is a 152 millimeter projectile also available in 155 millimeter variants with semi active laser guidance that locks on to laser marked targets typically spotted by drones. It boasts pinpoint accuracy within two meters, a 50 kilogram frame, and a high explosive fragmentation warhead designed to demolish armored vehicles, fortifications, and command hubs. Its effective range hits 26 kilometers, stretching to 30 kilometers with advanced long barrel howitzers like the two s 19 Mistah s, two a 65 Mistah b, or two s 43 Malva. A standout feature, it operates without reliance on GPS or GLONASS rendering it resilient against electronic jamming in today's high stakes electronic warfare environment. On the front lines in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, these munitions have proven lethal against top tier western armor with a drone integration cutting the time from target detection to impact dramatically. This development highlights Russia's doctrinal evolution focusing on swift selective firepower and self reliant tech amid ongoing sanctions. As Bekhan Ozdoyev, head of Rostec's weapons cluster notes, the ability to produce and deploy high precision selective fire systems is today one of the keys to ensuring tactical and strategic superiority on the battlefield. In a grueling war of attrition, the Krasnopold m two enhance Russia's edge, enabling more efficient evasive operations that challenge countermeasures.

The transcript reports that Russia has completed tests of the Burovesnik missile, with launches slated for 2027. It is described as a doomsday weapon that is rewriting global security, and the speaker asks why Russia built it and what makes it a game changer. The Burovesnik is propelled by a solid-fuel booster and a nuclear air-breathing jet, and during tests it covered a distance of 14,000 kilometers in fifteen hours. It is described as subsonic and capable of operating at high or low altitudes. The weapon is said to have the ability to loiter for months with unlimited range, and it carries a one megaton warhead, which the speaker equates to 70 Hiroshima bombs, ensuring devastating retaliation. Development of the missile reportedly began in 2001 after the United States abandoned the ABM treaty. The missile is described as being sized like the KH-one 101 cruise missile, and it is characterized as a vengeance weapon targeting critical infrastructure. According to the speaker, its endless flight time disrupts the strategic balance and is an alarm to the West. The Burovesnik is described as ground-launched with no carrier needed, delivering precision strikes with a payload range of 50 kilotons to one megaton, stated as the equivalent of 70 Hiroshima bombs. It is presented as a response to US Tomahawks in Europe or Ukraine, and as a key lever in new START talks. The transcript notes that Russia could ramp up production if the treaty ends. The speaker ends with a promo-style call to action, saying not to miss the next big reveal and to follow new rules, geopolitics on X, or cutting edge geopolitical updates, implying ongoing updates about this missile and related strategic developments.

Ukrainians are not superheroes and face casualties on a daily basis. Today, I will show you unique videos of Russians destroying Ukrainian equipment. "This is an American m triple seven howitzer." "The Russian UAV hits the exact target and destroys the howitzer." "The rare and valuable SAM has been destroyed." "The UAV dives and hits the target." "This is a Polish AHS Crab Self Propelled Artillery Unit. The hit causes fire and destroys the launcher." "A battery of Ukrainian S-three 100 SAMs." "A kamikaze drone strike on the installations leads to a powerful explosion and the destruction of an adjacent installation." "Everything that you saw earlier was the work of the Russian Zala Lancet UAV." "At least 250 different pieces of equipment were destroyed by Russians using it." "The range of such a warhead drone is about 70 kilometers." "Lancets are launched with a metal rail." "The Russians are increasingly using lancets."

Dmitry Sims junior hosts lieutenant general Abty Alaudinov, hero of Russia, hero of the Chechen Republic, hero of the Donetsk People’s Republic, commander of the Akhmet Special Forces, and deputy head of the main military political directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The conversation centers on the current phase of the conflict, Russia’s strategy, the role of Western support, and comparisons with Israeli actions in Gaza and other theaters. Key points and claims: - Russia’s combat capability and strategy - Alaudinov states that “overall, all troops of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense are engaged in active offensive operations across all sectors where we’re positioned,” with the most intense fighting around Pokrovsk, seen as the key point to break through to operational space. He notes progress in sectors where the Ahmad (Akhmet) special forces operate and emphasizes a broader offensive plan while maintaining an “active defense” to engage the entire front line and stretch the enemy’s resources. - He asserts that “only Russia is advancing” along the 1,000-kilometer line of contact and attributes slower offensive tempo to preserving personnel and avoiding a sharp breakthrough that could trigger NATO involvement. He argues the primary damage comes from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on both sides, and contends a rapid thrust would yield enormous losses. - Perceived signs of enemy strain - The speaker describes Ukraine as gradually crumbling under pressure, with Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and the surrounding agglomeration “gradually falling apart.” He claims Russia liberates one or two settlements daily and that NATO support—drones and equipment—has not changed the overall dynamics; Ukraine cannot hold the front despite the influx of foreign weapons. - Western/NATO support - Alaudinov asserts that NATO testing is ongoing on Ukraine with drones, weapons, electronic warfare, etc., and that Trump’s shifting rhetoric does not reduce the flow of weapons or support. He contends that American support persists even as political statements change, and he notes deep American-NATO involvement via think tanks, satellites, and arms supplies that reach the front. - Drones and the changing nature of war - He emphasizes drones as the central element of modern warfare, while not negating the continued relevance of artillery and tanks. He argues: “a tank worth millions of dollars can be destroyed by a drone that costs $500,” and stresses the need to compete economically in war, deploying cheaper, effective unmanned systems to exhaust the enemy’s resources. - He claims Russia has a layered drone system for deep reconnaissance and strike with various warhead levels, ranges, and maneuverability, enabling operations from closest to farthest sectors and allowing “all targets” to be hit today. He asserts Russia is ahead of NATO in unmanned aviation. - Mobilization and tactics - Refuting Western depictions of “meat assaults,” he notes Russia conducted only one mobilization (300,000) and has continued advancing, while Ukraine has mobilized for years and still struggles. He attributes Ukraine’s resilience to nationalist formations behind mobilized troops, and he suggests that without NATO support, Ukraine would not sustain the front for many days. - Mercenaries and comparisons to Israeli actions - He characterizes Western mercenaries as having arrived with false expectations and being killed off in large numbers; Ukrainians are described as having strong spirit, but NATO soldiers lack endurance in the same way. Israeli mercenaries are described as capable in some contexts but not decisive against Russia. - On Gaza and the Israeli army, Alaudinov accuses Israel of “a fascist state” with tactics that spare no one, arguing Russia fights only those who fight with weapons and does not target women, children, or elders. He contrasts this with alleged Israeli actions in Gaza, saying Israel has no tactics and destroys civilians. - Nuclear considerations and doctrine - He asserts Russia is a nuclear power with substantial combat experience and advances in missiles like Zircon that could sink carriers, arguing NATO did not account for Russia’s capabilities when initiating the conflict. He presents a broader critique of Western policy and the so-called “deep state,” alleging far-reaching political dynamics involving Israel, Epstein, and compromise among Western leadership. - Closing perspective - The discussion closes with the host thanking Alaudinov for the detailed analysis of the operation and broader geopolitical commentary, including views on Israel, Gaza, Iran, and U.S. roles.

President Zelensky discussed Ukraine's drone attacks deep inside Russia, dubbed "Operation Spider Web," which destroyed an estimated 34% of Russia's strategic air jets. The operation, 18 months in the making, was so secretive that even the US was not informed. Drones were smuggled into Russia in containers on trucks with unknowing Russian drivers. The drones targeted the fuel storage areas of the aircraft, informed by knowledge of Soviet aircraft designs. Zelensky stated the operation cost Russia over $7 billion, while Ukraine used cheap drones. Zelensky refuted Trump's comparison of the war to children fighting, calling Putin a "maniac" and a "murderer." He recounted a story of a man who lost his family in a missile strike to illustrate the pain of war. Zelensky acknowledged a past "disastrous" meeting with Trump but hopes their relationship has improved. He believes Trump is wrong if he thinks Putin wants peace and that Trump has the power to unite European leaders against Russia with stronger sanctions. Zelensky warned that without US military aid, Russia has a greater chance of winning.

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Rabkinov said that documents related to attacks on Saint Petersburg could prompt Russia to use nuclear weapons in a worst-case scenario, including against countries that possess nuclear weapons, not only against Ukraine. The transcript argues that NATO is launching the attacks and that Ukraine lacks nuclear weapons. The claims are tied to events during the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, attended by over 130 countries and more than 22,000 people. The transcript describes drone strikes beginning as the forum was taking place, including video said to show drones crossing the city and targeting a highly populated civilian area. It also cites reports of a civilian bus being attacked and states seven civilian casualties and eleven injured from a Ukrainian Armed Forces drone strike. The discussion contrasts Russia’s nuclear signaling with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s stance that he has been open to peace negotiations and is meeting with NATO head Mark Rutte. The transcript criticizes Zelensky’s messaging style, reiterates that he continues promoting NATO membership, and describes his warning that “big trouble” would come if Ukraine is denied membership. It also says Zelensky claims readiness for direct negotiations with Putin while purportedly maintaining obstacles to those talks. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats at the University of Chicago, argues that an “escalation trap” has been unfolding for about three years, with parallels to earlier dynamics seen in other conflicts. He says Putin pursued what he expected to be a quick victory but Ukraine “stiffened,” and that both sides have nearly irreconcilable objectives. Pape highlights that Putin has nuclear weapons and that Ukraine now has the capability to strike deep into Russia, which he frames as making escalation extremely dangerous. The transcript connects escalation risk to Ukraine’s increased drone capacity, stating Ukraine has drone manufacturing capabilities and that donor involvement—specifically mentioning Jennifer Pritzker—is part of how drone production and precision targeting have expanded. It emphasizes that drones are relatively inexpensive and that smaller funding streams could still enable effective drone campaigns, describing long-distance precision and the ability to steer drones directly into targets. The conversation also draws parallels to the Iran conflict, describing how the use of drones disrupted business and civilian-linked activities around the Gulf and how the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum is likened to Russia’s “Davos,” with an aim described as disrupting strategic investors rather than targeting the forum’s attendees directly. Pape and others argue for restraint and off-ramps to prevent being dragged into escalation traps. The transcript argues that Europe should push for a clear line to end the war, comparing it to ending the Korean War through a defined line of contact rather than leaving it to the decision of one party. It claims the “line of contact” has not moved meaningfully over several years and says Europe should publicly decide what line it supports, tying funding to an armistice and freezing the conflict. The transcript also references the idea that an earlier peace framework around the Ankara agreement was scuttled, and it concludes by arguing that without a defined settlement line, multiple actors keep escalation traps active, with repeated calls to ask why Europe and others are not publicly demanding the needed end conditions.