reSee.it - Related Video Feed

Gilbert Doktorov is asked how the Iran war is reshaping dynamics in the East, especially for Russia and China, and what the broader implications are for global order. - On Russia’s stance and reaction: Doktorov notes a gap between the Kremlin’s official positions and what “chattering classes” discuss. He observes astonishingly limited reaction from President Putin and his close foreign-policy circle to dramatic developments that could redefine regional and global orders. He contrasts Putin’s cautious, “slow-war” approach with sharper criticisms from other Russian voices (e.g., Salaviyev and Alexander Dugin) who urge moving beyond a gradual strategy. There is a sense within some Russian circles that a more assertive stance may be required, yet official channels show restraint. - On Iran’s strategic position and alliances: He points out that Iran has withstood intense pressure and maintained the ability to threaten Gulf energy infrastructure and the Strait of Hormuz, thereby sustaining global leverage despite severe attacks. Iran has managed to survive and press the global energy market, calling into question how meaningful Iran’s inclusion in BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is in practice. He notes scant evidence of meaningful Russian or Chinese military or intelligence support to Iran in public accounts, and cites Israeli claims of Russian arms shipments being denied by Moscow. - On the West’s behavior and international law: The discussion highlights what is described as the United States’ “might makes right” posture and the dismissiveness toward traditional international-law norms, including UN Charter commitments. The panelists contrast American rhetoric about legality with its real-world actions, and discuss how Russia’s and China’s responses have been cautious or critical rather than conciliatory or confrontational. - On potential military cooperation and bloc dynamics: The conversation explores whether a deeper Russia-China-North Korea alignment could emerge in reaction to US and Israeli actions against Iran. Doktorov mentions that North Korea is viewed as a, “will and determination to act,” supplying munitions such as underwater drones and missiles to Iran, whereas Russia and China are characterized as more talk than action. He argues Moscow benefits from maintaining broad, non-aligned diplomacy, but acknowledges a shift in Russian thinking after recent events toward more decisive posture. - On Europe and the US-European split: The panel discusses the European Union’s fragility and its leaders’ inconsistent responses to the Iran crisis and to US pressure. They consider European solidarity rhetoric as a cover for avoiding hard choices, with examples including Belgian leadership suggesting normalization with Russia post-conflict. The discussion reflects concern that EU leaders may be forced to confront realignments as Gulf energy supplies and US LNG leverage reshape Europe’s energy security and political calculus. - On diplomacy and pathways forward: The speakers debate the prospects for diplomacy, including possible three-way or broader security arrangements, and whether Alaska or other meeting points could offer reprieve. They note a public split within Moscow’s foreign-policy establishment about how to proceed, with internal figures pushing for diplomacy and others advocating a stronger balance of power. There is explicit skepticism about the utility of negotiations with Donald Trump and the idea that the war could end on the battlefield rather than through diplomacy. - On the Ukraine war’s interconnection: The discussion emphasizes that the Iran crisis has global ramifications that feed back into Ukraine, noting that Russia’s current posture and Western responses influence the Ukraine conflict. Doktorov highlights that the depletion of US air defenses observed in the Israel-Iran context affects Ukraine, underscoring the interrelatedness of the two wars and their combined impact on global power dynamics. - Final takeaway: The dialogue reiterates that the Iran war has a global dimension with the two wars being intimately connected; the Iran conflict reshapes alliances, energy security, and strategic calculations across Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, while signaling a potential reconfiguration of Western alliances and multipolar governance.

Mario and Malcolm discuss the evolving drone warfare landscape and the strategic implications for the United States, Iran, Ukraine, and Gulf states. Malcolm argues that Iran’s drone arsenal represents a persistent, low-cost threat with an 88,000 Shahid drone inventory at the lowest cost, and mass production estimated at 7,000. He notes Iran has destroyed roughly $5,000,000,000 of technology, underscoring the waste associated with high-value defenses. He contends the conflict “is gonna come down to rifles and knives and drones,” and suggests the U.S. and its allies have limited tolerance for the level of death this entails. He emphasizes the learning curve for anti-Shahid drones, estimating 35 to 45 days to train someone to fly such drones, and notes that combat veterans and Ukrainian international legionnaires could assist with training in Ukraine, Abu Dhabi, and beyond. They discuss defense markets and training pipelines. Mario recalls speaking with a U.S.-based VC in Ukraine who might be tapped to bolster defense industry interests; Malcolm reiterates that Ukrainian-made, locally developed systems dominate, and that Western companies must avoid partnerships that involve theft of technology. He stresses that Ukrainians own the drone industry, and that the U.S. has historically relied on foreign-made drones for ISR rather than attack, contrasting Ukraine’s trajectory from reconnaissance to drones used for direct attack and artillery fusion. Malcolm criticizes the U.S. approach to drones, arguing that the U.S. military has not adapted to modern drone warfare and that Ukraine’s battlefield experiences demonstrate rapid adaptation and innovating countermeasures, such as drone drop kits and improvised aerial bombs. He explains the progression: drones used for surveillance evolved into attack platforms, counter-drone tactics, and drone-enabled artillery. He provides detailed examples: using DJI drones for reconnaissance early on, then using drone-based bombing, counter-jamming techniques, and fiber-optic lines to guide munitions. He notes Ukrainian Sea Baby Magura drones and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) that attacked Russian ships, and describes a dramatic incident where a Ukrainian drone disabled a Russian submarine tail by docking behind it and flooding it with explosive force. The conversation shifts to recent strikes on Gulf-based assets. Mario asks about Zelensky’s visits to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and why Gulf defense preparedness appeared slow. Malcolm suggests the U.S. misreads regional resilience and that Gulf states will adapt using homegrown drone capabilities, with examples such as Kuwait buying thousands of Ukrainian drones and the UAE potentially building domestic drone factories. He cautions against overreliance on “wonder weapons” and emphasizes practical measures like machine guns, shotguns, and ground-based defenses, noting that 50-caliber weapons and simple tactics can counter Shahid drones if properly deployed. He asserts that the Gulf states will need to supplement their arsenals with practical, scalable training and production rather than expensive foreign capabilities. Malcolm discusses the strategic logic behind any potential concessions with Iran. He argues that Iran has geography, topography, history, and manpower advantages, and that Donald Trump’s threats to bomb Iran’s infrastructure are unlikely to force concessions. He claims Iran would not negotiate under U.S. pressure and that the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) would remain a focal point of conflict. He contends that Trump’s approach risks escalating toward broader conflict, and that Iran could respond by leveraging the Houthis or other regional proxies to disrupt shipping and Gulf economies, potentially closing the Red Sea and Suez Canal if alignments shift. They touch on Russia’s role, noting Moscow’s financial and strategic interests in the region. Malcolm argues Putin benefits from the conflict and that Trump’s priorities are tied to accumulating frozen Russian assets and broader political maneuvering, sometimes at odds with the publicized goal of restraining Iran. He observes that Russia’s drones, weapons components, and intelligence could be flowing to Iran, influencing the Gulf theater. The discussion closes with a broader warning: the war’s consequences will be felt for years or generations, with energy prices, inflation, and global economic disruption, and only a realignment of strategy—embracing distributed defenses, domestic production, and adaptable tactics—will shape outcomes. They acknowledge the difficulty of predicting concessions, the complexity of Gulf politics, and the precarious balance between deterrence and escalation.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss the recent Russian strike aimed at Lvov, using Soreshnik (Arashnik) missiles, and what it signals about NATO, Western responses, and the trajectory of the war. - Initial facts and uncertainties about the strike: The Russians did not provide a clear description of what they did or where. Doktorov says it’s unclear whether at least one or six to nine missiles were fired, and whether the targets included the largest single gas storage facility in Ukraine. He notes that if a gas storage facility were hit, it would imply enormous destruction and heat Ukraine’s heating, but no confirmation has been given about the exact damage or targets. Reports indicate several missiles were released, but the exact number and impact remain uncertain. A Ukrainian gas storage target would have produced a large explosion if hit. - Context of the attack: The strike was not isolated; it occurred amid drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles hitting multiple cities, including Kyiv. Zelensky urged Ukrainians to stay indoors, suggesting the Russians intended a larger attack. Doktorov argues this demonstrates Russian confidence that their weapons cannot be stopped by existing air defenses. He contends the attack serves as a message to the West, downplaying the significance of Western “domes” or defenses. - Western and Ukrainian reactions: Ukraine’s foreign minister called for a United Nations Security Council meeting, signaling seriousness. Ukraine’s leadership framed the strike as a response to Western provocations and ongoing escalations. - Arashnik weapon system and balance of power: There is discussion about whether Arashnik missiles have multiple warheads or dummy warheads, and how many were launched. The conversation notes that Russia’s use of the weapon, and the surrounding firepower (drones, missiles), are part of a broader strategy to exert pressure on the region and test Western defenses. - Domestic Russian dynamics and deterrence: Doktorov suggests the strike reflects pressure from within Moscow by hardliners who want a stronger, more forceful stance. He contrasts Putin’s leadership with Khrushchev, arguing Khrushchev was decisive and provocative, while Putin has been more restrained but could be compelled to show force by hardline factions. The conversation links recent events (attack on Putin’s residence, the northern energy and military infrastructure strikes, and the broadened use of missiles) to a perceived revival of Russian deterrence. - Role of the United States and Trump: The discussion covers the U.S. role and ambiguities surrounding Trump, including speculation that Trump’s policies may be both deceptive and strategic. They reference reports about Trump’s possible green light for attacks on Russian tankers and the broader implications for NATO and European security. The Financial Times editorial is cited as considering incentives and pushback to manage Trump’s Greenland agenda, suggesting Europe’s limited leverage over Trump, who could push to dissolve or weaken NATO rather than sustain it. - European strategic responses and deterrence: The editors discuss possible European tactics to counter Trump (e.g., threatening to expel U.S. troops), while recognizing that many Europeans prefer to keep U.S. military presence. They debate whether Trump’s aims include breaking NATO or extracting concessions, and consider whether European states will push back or acquiesce to U.S. leadership. - Prospects for peace and endgame: The speakers debate whether negotiations remain possible or are now merely for optics. They discuss whether a direct war between Russia and NATO could emerge if Russia escalates further, especially with energy infrastructure and civilizational effects in Ukraine. They foresee a likely “frozen conflict” outcome, with Russia annexing territories east of the Dnieper and Odessa, leaving Ukraine landlocked and largely excluded from NATO and EU integration, while warning that Western military presence and support could trigger direct confrontation if Russia chooses to escalate. - Civilians and dislocation: They emphasize that as the war intensifies, civilian suffering will grow, with mass displacement and humanitarian crises likely, particularly if Kyiv and other cities become uninhabitable due to outages and destruction. - Overall tone: The discussion underscores deep uncertainty, strategic signaling, and the perception that both Western policies and Russian deterrence are shifting in ways that could escalate or reshape the conflict, with no clear, imminent path to a settlement.

Ray McGovern recounts a long, inside view of U.S.–Soviet/Russian arms control and how it shaped or hindered security over decades, tying personal experience to broader strategic lessons. - Continuity and historical perspective. McGovern notes that, after decades in the CIA, he has witnessed both continuity and change in U.S. strategy across eras and administrations. He emphasizes that serious arms control and verification work has often depended on skilled, principled diplomacy even amid bureaucratic friction and political constraints. - Early arms-control work and verification. As chief of the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch in the CIA during the SALT era, he helped support Kissinger and Nixon while recognizing that the Russians faced pressure from both arms racing and concerns about China’s progress. He recalls briefing the Moscow delegation and the importance of verification: “Trust but verify.” He describes witnessing the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiations and the process of uncovering Russian cheating (a radar at Krasnoyarsk later identified as ABM-related). The experience reinforced the value of independent verification mechanisms. - Personal anecdotes about diplomacy and decision-making. McGovern shares instances illustrating how diplomacy operated in practice: Kissinger touring Moscow covertly to broker deals; ambassador Beam's reaction in Helsinki; the sense that a president’s trusted aides could push forward arms-control progress even amid Senate resistance. He stresses the role of credible, informed analysis about the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, and the way that genuine engagement with Moscow helped reduce tensions at key moments (e.g., the late-1970s/early-1980s path toward detente and arms control). - Key treaties and turning points. He highlights several milestones: - ABM Treaty (1972): limiting ABM sites to two, then one, to preserve deterrence stability; verification challenges and the Russians’ willingness to negotiate under pressure. - Reykjavik and the late-1980s era: Reagan’s willingness to pursue arms-control breakthroughs; the shift that helped lead to meaningful reductions. - INF Treaty (1991/1992 onward) and its later withdrawal under Trump: the collapse of a pillar of strategic stability and its consequences for future arms control. - New START (2011): described as “really good” in limiting offensive missiles; its expiry topic is central to the current security calculation. Putin’s public suggestion to extend the treaty for another year, conditional on U.S. reciprocity, is noted; Trump’s stance is portrayed as uncertain or inconsistent. - The broader security architecture and indivisible security. McGovern stresses that “there is no security without mutual security” and points to the OSCE concept of indivisible security—no country should increase its security at the expense of others. He argues that NATO expansion and security dynamics in Europe have undermined mutual security and contributed to the current fragility in the security architecture. - Ukraine, NATO, and the stakes of perception. He contends that Moscow viewed NATO expansion and Ukraine’s trajectory as threats to its core security interests, contributing to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. He argues that Americans are often not educated about mutual security principles, which fuels misperceptions and escalatory dynamics. - Putin as a cautious actor and the risk of leadership reliability. McGovern describes Putin as a cautious statesman who aims to protect Russia’s core interests and avoid existential risk. He suggests Putin is calculating the reliability of U.S. leadership, especially under Trump, whose unpredictability complicates trust and predictability in negotiations. He notes Trump’s perceived narcissism and the possibility that Trump’s motivations in pursuing a peace process could be mixed with personal prestige or political gain. - Current and near-term outlook. The discussion touches on the likelihood of renewed arms-control leverage if U.S. and Russian leaders can agree on Ukraine-related constraints and verify compliance. It also notes that the broader trend—toward weaker, inconsistent adherence to treaties and a perceived decline in diplomacy—risks fueling a renewed arms race and greater instability. - Closing sentiment. McGovern underscores that genuine arms-control diplomacy, mutual restraint, and credible verification are essential for reducing the security dilemma that drives dangerous competition. He frames Putin as a potential hinge for stabilizing relations if U.S. leadership can articulate and sustain a credible, reciprocal security posture. Overall, the dialogue weaves historical memory with current geopolitics, stressing that lasting security rests on mutual restraint, verifiable agreements, and a shared understanding of indivisible security—even as political winds shift and alliances realign.

In this discussion, Zhang Shuay Shin and Speaker 1 analyze the evolving U.S.-Iran confrontation through the lens of global power dynamics, the petrodollar, and the shifting balance among major powers. - The war is framed as primarily about preserving the petrodollar. Speaker 1 argues the United States, burdened by enormous debt, seeks to maintain the dollar’s dominance by controlling energy trade through naval power and strategic choke points. The belief is that the U.S. can weaponize the dollar against rivals, as seen when it froze Russian assets and then moved to stabilize oil markets. BRICS and others are moving toward alternatives, including a gold corridor, challenging the petrodollar’s centrality. The aim is to keep Europe and East Asia dependent on U.S. energy, reinforcing American hegemony, even as historical hubris risks a global backlash turning growing powers against Washington. - The sequence of escalation over six weeks is outlined: after the American attack on Tehran and the Iranian move to close the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. eased sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil to maintain global stability, according to Treasury statements. Escalations targeted civilian infrastructure and strategic chokepoints, with discussions of striking GCC energy infrastructure and desalination plants. A U.S. threat to “bomb Iran back to the stone age” was countered by Iran proposing a ten-point framework—encompassing uranium enrichment rights, lifting sanctions, and security guarantees for Iran and its proxies. The Americans reportedly suggested the framework was workable, but negotiations in Islamabad stalled when U.S. officials did not engage seriously. - The broader objective is posited as not simply a tactical war but a strategic move to ensure U.S. imperial supremacy by shaping energy flows. Speaker 1 speculates Trump’s motive centers on keeping the petrodollar intact, potentially forcing China and other partners to buy energy with dollars. Iran’s willingness to negotiate in Islamabad is linked to pressure from China amid China’s economic strains, particularly as energy needs and Belt and Road investments create vulnerabilities for China if Middle East energy becomes unreliable. - The proposed naval blockade is discussed as difficult to implement directly against Iran due to ballistic missiles; instead, the plan may aim to choke off alternative routes like the Strait of Malacca, leveraging trusted regional partners and allies. Iran could respond via the Red Sea (Bab al-Mandab) or other leverage, including the Houthis, challenging Western control of energy corridors. The overarching aim would be to force a global energy reorientation toward North America, though it risks long-term hostility toward the United States. - The roles of great powers are analyzed: the U.S. strategy is described as exploiting Middle East disruption to preserve the petrodollar, with short-term gains but long-term risks of a broader alliance against U.S. hegemony. Europe and Asia are pressured to adapt, with China’s energy needs especially salient as sanctions tighten Middle East supply. Russia is identified as the principal challenger to U.S. maritime hegemony, while China remains economically entangled, facing strategic incentives to cooperate with the United States if required by economic pressures. - The dialogue considers NATO and Europe, arguing that the real contest is between globalists and nationalists in the United States, with Trump viewed as an agent of empire who may threaten the existing globalist framework. The speakers discuss whether this competition will redefine alliances, the future of NATO, and the possibility that a more Eurasian-led order could emerge if Western powers fail to maintain their maritime advantages. - Finally, Russia’s role is emphasized: Moscow is seen as the key counterweight capable of challenging American maritime dominance, with the war in Iran serving, in part, to counter Russian actions in Ukraine and to incentivize alignment with Russia, China, and Iran against U.S. leadership over the next two decades.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

Larry Johnson discusses with Glenn about the Iran conflict, focusing on narrative control, economic warfare, and the feasibility of different strategic options. Key points across the conversation: - The reality vs. narrative: Johnson argues that the current sea of propaganda makes it hard to unpack reality, especially the claim that the U.S. blockade can cripple Iran. He contends the blockade is impractical in multiple ways and that political theater surrounds ship seizures. - Blockade viability and limitations: - Iran’s oil trading: Iran loads oil and ships it within 75 miles of its coast; the U.S. Navy will not approach closer than about 200 miles. Iran can threaten ships with short-range missiles, cruise missiles, and drones if the U.S. comes closer. - Moving beyond Iranian waters: If Iran uses a convoy of 20 tankers 75–100 miles off its coast into the Indian Ocean, the U.S. lacks enough ships to stop and seize every vessel; seizing ships requires keeping ships tied to port, reducing impact. - Imports and border routes: Iran can bring in goods via routes into Bandar Abbas and Chabahar and through Pakistan; Pakistan reportedly has six different routes into Iran. This dilutes the blockade’s effectiveness and undermines the “total cut-off” narrative championed by supporters of economic warfare. - Statements from Trump and Iran’s response: Johnson notes Trump’s statements about Iran’s leadership being chaotic and the possibility of lifting the blockade as a potential setup for a different narrative. He emphasizes that Iran’s leadership, according to his sources, remains cohesive and prepared. - Iranian leadership and past experience: Johnson highlights that Iran’s top leaders (Pazeshkin, Oraci, Golubov, and IRGC figures) were shaped by combat and share a history of fighting a US-funded adversary. This background, he argues, makes them better prepared to handle current threats than some US figures. - U.S. domestic political dynamics: The discussion touches on U.S. politicalConstraints and the difficulty of selling any deal domestically, particularly given lobbying (APAC, etc.) and internal political risks for those who sign a controversial agreement. - Russian role and diplomacy: - Araki’s weekend actions: Araki starts in Pakistan with a hardline Iranian position (rejecting a U.S. return to talks unless the blockade ends and uranium enrichment remains within a treaty framework), then moves to Oman to coordinate Hormuz management, then to Russia for talks with Putin and Lavrov, and finally back to Pakistan to relay messages. - Putin’s support: Putin publicly backs Iran, signaling readiness to coordinate, with Russia providing security guarantees potentially akin to its North Korea approach. Russia also offers intelligence and technical assistance to Iran’s military and economy, signaling a broader strategic alignment against Western sanctions. - BRICS and sanctions: Russia and China are moving away from enforcing Western-style sanctions on Iran, signaling a pivot to economic integration (including currency diversification and gold). This shifts Iran’s position relative to Western pressure. - Economic and strategic implications: - Rare earth supply and missiles: Johnson notes that the U.S. cannot easily replenish precision missiles (Patriot, THAAD, Tomahawk) because critical rare earth minerals (like samarium, neodymium, dysprosium) are controlled by China, which withholds them as leverage. - Energy diplomacy and China: Iran’s oil shipments to China and the risk to Western interests in East Asia complicate U.S. aims. Johnson argues China can keep receiving oil via convoys, limiting U.S. ability to fully disrupt Iranian trade. - Strait of Hormuz and strategic leverage: Iran’s stance suggests it can pressure Gulf states and deter foreign bases if it secures a more favorable arrangement, potentially using Hormuz as leverage in global trade and currency arrangements. - Possible paths forward and timing: - The discussion questions how long the economic warfare can persist and what would cause either side to blink. Johnson suggests that if Iran’s economy doesn’t collapse in the anticipated three weeks, the U.S. will face a choice between declaring victory or pursuing a more protracted negotiation. - There is skepticism about a decisive, lasting American victory; Johnson emphasizes that there is no viable ground option, and air and maritime options face significant constraints. - Historical lessons and perspective: The hosts draw parallels to past U.S. conflicts and emphasize learning from history (e.g., not underestimating adversaries, recognizing costs of war) and suggest that current leadership may be underestimating Iran’s resolve and capability. The conversation concludes with reflections on the need for informed diplomacy and the value of historical insights from figures like ambassador Jack Matlock, acknowledging that strategic miscalculations have repeated patterns across eras.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

Stanislav and Speaker 0 discuss a rapidly evolving, multi-front crisis that they argue is in its early days but already sprawling across the region and the global energy order. Key military and strategic points - The conflict has expanded from warnings into a broader destruction of regional economic infrastructure, extending from Israel to Iran. Israel began by hitting southern oil fields; Iran responded with attacks on oil and gas facilities and US bases, and warned it would strike “everywhere” including US bases if attacked again. - Iran’s stated aim includes purging the US from the Persian Gulf by destroying American bases and making hosting US forces prohibitively expensive. This has been coupled with actions that blinded US radars and pressured Gulf Arab states to expel the Americans. - Israel attacked infrastructure and a nuclear power plant associated with Russia’s project; Israel’s destruction of oil infrastructure and oil fires contributed to a widespread environmental contamination event, with oil smoke and carcinogenic particulates dispersing over Central Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Northern India, and potentially further. - The war is generating cascading economic damage, including a potential long-term hit to energy supply chains. The speaker who has oil-industry experience (Speaker 1) explains that refinery expansions and LNG projects involve complex, lengthy supply chains and custom equipment; extensive damage means years, not months, to recover, with LNG output potentially 20%–30% lower for Europe, and cascading effects on fertilizer supplies and food production. - European energy and fertilizer dependencies are stressed: Russia supplies a large share of chemical fertilizer; Europe could face severe energy and food crises, while the US appears more flexible on sanctions and fertilizer sourcing. - On the military side, there is discussion of a possible ground invasion by US forces, including the 82nd Airborne (as part of the XVIII Airborne Corps) and Marines. The analysis emphasizes the daunting difficulty of any cross-border operation into Iran or even taking forward positions in the Strait of Hormuz or on nearby islands. The speaker argues that the 80th/82nd Airborne’s capabilities are limited (light infantry, no back-up armor), making large-scale incursions extremely costly and unlikely to achieve strategic objectives (e.g., seizing enriched uranium on Kare Island). The argument stresses that “mission impossible” scenarios would yield heavy casualties and limited gains, especially given Iran’s mountainous terrain, entrenched defense, and pervasive drone threat. - Kare Island (Hormuz Strait) is described as highly vulnerable to drone swarms. FPV drones, longer-range drones, and loitering munitions could intercept or complicate the deployment of troops, supply lines, and casualty evacuation. Even with air superiority, drones combined with coastal defenses could make an island seizure a “turkey shoot” for Iran unless ground troops can be rapidly reinforced and sustained against a rising drone threat. - The role of drones is emphasized: drones of various sizes, including small FPV systems and larger retranslated-signal drones, could operate from Iranian coastlines to disrupt coastlines such as Kare Island and other Hormuz approaches. The talk highlights how drones complicate casualty evacuation, medical triage, and resupply, and how air assets (helicopters, Ospreys) are vulnerable to drone attacks. Nuclear and regional deterrence questions - Enriched uranium: Iran reportedly has around 60% enrichment; 90% would be necessary for weapons, which could provide a deterrent or escalation leverage. The possibility of nuclear weapons remains a major concern in the discussion. - Fatwas and leadership: The new supreme leader in Iran could alter policy on nuclear weapons; there is debate about whether Iran would actually pursue a weapon given its political culture and regional risk. Regional and international dynamics - The role of Russia and China: The discussion suggests the US is being leveraged by adversaries through proxy relationships, with Russia and China potentially supporting Iran as a way to undermine US influence and the Western-led order. - Regime and leadership dynamics in the US: Speaker 1 predicts intense internal political pressure in the US, including potential civil unrest if casualties rise and if policies become unsustainable. There is skepticism about the willingness of US political leadership to sustain a protracted conflict or a ground invasion. Recent events and forward-facing notes - A ballistic missile strike on southern Israel and simultaneous missile salvos from Iran were reported during the interview; there were also reports of air-defense interceptions near Dubai. - The discussion closes with warnings about the potential for catastrophic outcomes, including a nuclear meltdown risk if nuclear facilities are struck in ways that disable cooling or power systems, and emphasizes the fragility of the current strategic balance as this crisis unfolds.

Larry Johnson outlines a sequence of escalations between Russia and the United States after December 28, beginning with a failed drone attack on Vladimir Putin’s official residence and followed by Russia’s retaliatory actions in Ukraine and at sea. He describes Russia as engaging in cautious escalation: the December 28 strike signaled a deliberate move tied to a broader pattern of attacks on Russian nuclear-related targets, and the subsequent seizure of a Russian-flag tanker by the United States scene, which Russia condemned as piracy. He notes the crew composition (two Russians, eight Georgians, 20 Ukrainians) and observes that the United States released the two Russians while charging the others in the US, arguing the episode demonstrates how Washington uses force and intimidation without clear accountability. The exchange emphasizes that Russia’s response has targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, rather than NATO facilities in Europe, as part of a warning to NATO about escalation risk. Russia reportedly cut 50% of Ukraine’s stored natural gas and attacked energy substations across multiple Ukrainian regions (Nyropetrov, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv), causing widespread disruptions to heating and plumbing in winter. Kyiv officials, including Klitschko, warned residents to leave high-rise buildings to prevent pipe bursts. Johnson frames this as measured signaling rather than indiscriminate aggression, suggesting it’s a warning to the West that Moscow can reach out and touch them if escalation continues, while still aiming to avoid a full-scale direct confrontation with NATO. He remarks that Russia’s targeting of facilities owned by the United States in Ukraine signals willingness to attack US-affiliated targets inside Ukraine. The discussion then shifts to the broader geopolitical significance: US actions, including piracy at sea and attacks on Russian ships, contribute to a perception in Moscow that international law is being abandoned by the United States, especially under Trump and his aides who publicly dismiss international treaties. Johnson asserts that, from a Russian analytic perspective, this undermines trust in written agreements and pushes Russia toward preparing for broader conflict, potentially with NATO, while acknowledging Russia’s restraint—limiting strikes to Ukraine to avoid misinterpretation as a direct war with NATO. He suggests Russia might consider flagging ships with Russian or Chinese flags and deploying specialized forces on ships to deter or respond to attempts to board, as a possible evolution of maritime risk. The two discuss the purpose of Washington’s stance: is it to force concessions, provoke a broader European response, or achieve escalation dominance? Johnson asserts that US policy appears aimed at coercing Russia and pressuring Western Europe, though he notes China and India now press Russia toward negotiation; however, the Lula-like convergence of US internal dynamics and Trump’s rhetoric makes negotiations appear dead ends to Moscow. Johnson references a broader view that the US under Trump has eroded norms of international law, arguing that a shift toward force and lawless behavior leaves Russia imagining a future with reduced Western unity and increased incentives to diversify alliances with East/ Eurasian powers. On the military horizon, Johnson anticipates Ukraine’s manpower problem versus Russia’s growing mobilization, with Russia expanding its ground force to potentially over 2 million to prepare for future conflict with NATO, not merely Ukraine. He predicts continued Ukrainian misfortune on the battlefield, with major cities such as Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, and Sumy potentially at risk of encirclement, and Kyiv facing the broader strategic impact of energy outages and urban shutdowns. He foresees possible explorations of a post-war order, including who controls weapons and governance in Ukraine; Russia might threaten US reconnaissance aircraft or vessels in denial of freedom of navigation, while NATO could become more disunited as some European leaders push for separate talks with Moscow. In sum, the interview frames the current phase as a dangerous, escalatory dynamic with potential for miscalculation, where the United States’ posture of force, the erosion of international norms, and Russia’s strategic patience converge toward a possible broader confrontation, or, at minimum, a hardening of positions and a reorientation toward Eastward-alignments.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson joins the program with host Glenn to discuss the escalating tensions around Iran, the U.S. leadership, and the broader geopolitical and economic implications. The conversation centers on what is driving recent White House actions, the potential paths forward, and the risks of cascading consequences. Key points and insights: - Trump’s countdown to strike Iran: Wilkerson interprets Trump’s 48-hour, then 5-, then 10-day countdowns on Iran’s energy facilities as an attempt to buy time rather than a clear plan for escalation. He suggests Trump is trying to stall and manage narratives while lacking a credible path out of the crisis. - Reasons Trump is escalating: Wilkerson argues Trump is “buying time to be buying time,” unable to articulate a feasible exit strategy. He posits that the main driver of the escalation is a realization by Trump that he’s deeply entangled, with Bibi Netanyahu as the principal ally who would abandon him in a crisis. - Global force posture and limits: The administration is assembling various special operations forces (e.g., 1st SOG, rangers from multiple locations) and delivery/ extraction capabilities, but Wilkerson believes a full invasion is not feasible and would risk impeachment. He notes the use of dispersed forces and high-end delivery systems akin to operations in Venezuela, stressing the operational and strategic implausibility of a large-scale invasion of Iran. - Iranian diplomacy and leadership: Wilkerson cites Iranian diplomacy as sidelined by U.S. actions. He highlights a UN emergency meeting where Iraqi officials criticized the U.S. and Israel for “two bullying nuclear weapons regimes” and condemned the “torpedoing of diplomacy,” pointing to the broader frustration with the international handling of the Palestinian-Israeli situation. He criticizes Witkoff and Kushner as ineffective in negotiating with Iran and notes a strong Iranian stance emphasizing an end to what they view as aggression. - Domestic political dynamics: Wilkerson criticizes both U.S. parties for their current leadership, accusing figures like Keane, Hagel, and Trump of mismanaging the crisis. He rails against the influence of evangelical and political figures who advocate Old Testament-style rhetoric in modern policy, arguing it contributes to destructive escalation. - Economic and global ripple effects: The war threatens the global economy, with consequences such as disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz impacting helium, urea, and broader trade. Wilkerson warns that the world could experience a global recession, potentially spiraling into a depression, due to shipping bottlenecks and energy-price shocks. - Strait of Hormuz and strategic chokepoints: A recurring theme is the vulnerability created by critical chokepoints. Wilkerson references his naval analysis of global straits and identifies Hormuz as a significant vulnerability, though not necessarily the most critical, with Bab el-Mandeb potentially more serious. - Israel’s situation and nuclear considerations: Discussion turns to Israel’s military situation in Gaza and Lebanon, Netanyahu’s political decisions, and the potential for Israel to face internal collapse or drastic shifts. Wilkerson raises the hypothetical that Iran could seek a nuclear deterrent if faced with existential threats and notes concerns about how the U.S. and Israel might respond to an Iranian nuclear capability. - Possible exit routes and diplomacy: When pressed for a pathway out, Wilkerson suggests a drastic but unlikely option: declare victory and leave, lifting sanctions and pressuring allies to do the same, including pressuring Europe to support rebuilding Iran. He emphasizes this as a potentially politically expedient exit for Trump, though he doubts it will happen. - Nuclear entanglements and further escalation: The conversation turns to the risk of nuclear exchange if Iran develops a deterrent and if Israel or the U.S. decide to escalate further. Wilkerson outlines a scenario in which limited U.S. forces strike Gulf targets, provoking Iranian retaliation that could escalate into a broader regional conflict with nuclear implications, given multiple nuclear powers’ capabilities. - Long-term outlook: Wilkerson references the broader implications for the global order, noting the dangers of imperial hubris post-Cold War, and warns that multiple dimensions—military, economic, and diplomatic—are converging toward a dangerous crossroads. He asserts that the current trajectory could threaten global stability and the viability of traditional alliance structures. In sum, Wilkerson presents a troubling synthesis: Trump’s incremental escalation appears aimed at time-buying without a credible exit; Iran’s leadership responds with strategic diplomacy and potential deterrence considerations; Israel faces internal and regional pressures; and the global economy and critical chokepoints amplify the risk that the conflict could spiral into a larger, harder-to-control crisis. He emphasizes the dangerous mix of leadership missteps, strategic miscalculations, and existential stakes that could reshuffle the regional and global order.

In this discussion, Speaker 0 interviews Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector and US Marine Corps intelligence officer, about the implications of a phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the broader geopolitics around Ukraine, Iran, and energy. - On the Trump-Putin call and diplomacy with the US: Ritter notes that Trump initiated the call, and Russia has kept a diplomatic channel open with the United States, despite tensions and distrust. Russia reportedly invited figures like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to continue diplomacy. He interprets Russia’s openness as a strategic move to maintain influence in decision-making, particularly with the US seeking Russian assistance on energy and conflict termination in Ukraine and Iran. - Russia’s behavior in response to Western strikes and its strategic calculus: Ritter argues Russia has deliberately avoided a rapid military overreaction to Western actions (e.g., UK strikes on Bryansk using Storm Shadow missiles and Flamingo systems) to prevent elevating Ukrainian nationalism or provoking a harsher Western stance. He suggests Russia can legally justify countermeasures against British facilities tied to Storm Shadow and Flamingo production, but chooses restraint to avoid elevating domestic political backlash and to exploit diplomatic openings. - Economic dimensions and sanctions: He contends Russia benefits from the lifting of oil sanctions, with Russia able to sell crude at much higher market prices, improving its budget and war finances without further escalation. This is framed as a strategic reward for keeping the diplomatic channel open and for not overreacting militarily. - The strategic objective in Ukraine and the West: Ritter states Russia aims to remove Ukrainian nationalism from Europe’s security equation and to establish Ukraine as a neutral party. He argues that Russian actions, including potential pressure on Ukraine and Western states, are designed to compel a settlement more favorable to Moscow, with less emphasis on Ukrainian terms. - The Iran context and US leverage: The conversation posits that Russia’s phone call with Trump could enable further discussions with Kushner and Witkoff on terms that reflect Russian objectives, given the US’s urgent need for Russian help on energy and geopolitical cover. Ritter suggests Moscow could pressure Iran to negotiate in a way that aligns with broader Russian goals and reduces US influence, including potentially linking Ukraine settlements to Iran’s termination or moderation. - Off-ramps and the Iranian war: In Iran, the sole off-ramp is one Iran accepts; the US and Israel no longer control the process. Ritter argues that US strategies (e.g., general Cain’s claims about missile successes) are misguided, with Iran reportedly evading decisive pressure and maintaining leverage. The path forward would involve Russia acting as mediator and engaging Iranian leadership more directly, while the US’s ability to impose a decisive settlement appears limited. - US military options and feasibility: Ritter points out the limits of US military options in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. He argues that large-scale ground involvement (e.g., 80,000 Marines to seize territories around Hormuz) is impractical given resource constraints, political risk, and logistical challenges. He criticizes the reliance on bombing campaigns with insufficient precision munitions and questions target selection and legality, highlighting a historical precedent where strategic air campaigns did not compel German surrender in World War II. - Broader geopolitical consequences and alliances: The discussion covers how a perceived US strategic defeat could reshape global alignments. Ritter foresees BRICS strengthening as the US loses credibility, with China advancing in Taiwan and the South China Sea, and Russia expanding influence in the Middle East. He suggests Iran could emerge as a regional power, while Israel’s nuclear program could come under renewed pressure. Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, grounded in a strategic framework with Iran, provides Moscow with diplomatic legitimacy to lecture Gulf states. - Lavrov’s stance and Gulf politics: The speakers address Lavrov’s public admonition of Gulf states for pressuring Iran and seeking Western support, arguing this reflects Russia’s adherence to its diplomatic framework and a legally grounded position. Russia’s recent strategic framework with Iran underpins its legitimacy to influence Gulf behavior. - Closing assessment: Ritter emphasizes that the war’s trajectory is being driven by Iranian resilience and US strategic miscalculations. He maintains that Russia’s role as mediator and its leverage over energy markets position Moscow to shape outcomes, while the United States appears increasingly constrained, resource-drained, and vulnerable to strategic defeats on multiple fronts. The result could be a reordering of global alliances and regional power dynamics, with Russia and Iran gaining greater influence and the US recalibrating its priorities accordingly.

In the conversation, Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, addresses multiple interwoven geopolitical issues, centering on Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader strategic rivalry with the United States and its allies. Syria and ISIS release - Marandi asserts that the Damascus regime, described as al-Qaeda/ISIS-aligned factions, would not tolerate Kurdish forces backed by the United States. He notes prior violence against Alawites, Christians, and Druze as context for the current disturbing images from Syria. - He argues the United States is not a reliable partner for its allies, pointing to past episodes such as Obama’s refusal to support Arbil when ISIS threatened the Kurdish government, and Soleimani’s rapid military response to save the city. - He states that ISIS prisoners have been released in Syria, implying that thousands of ISIS members are now free and could destabilize Syria and possibly Iraq. He emphasizes that both Jolani (an ISIS-linked figure) and the Kurdish groups in northeast Syria are allied to the United States, making it unclear who released the prisoners but suggesting that those actors are aligned with the U.S. - The broader implication is that the release increases instability in Syria and potentially across the region. Border security and spillover fears - The discussion turns to Iraq’s border with Syria, with Marandi weighing whether U.S.-backed jihadist forces might spill into Iraq or Lebanon. He suggests a likelihood that ISIS/Al-Qaeda remnants could be used to pressure Lebanon and Iraq to prevent closer Iranian influence. - He notes that Iran’s potential responses could include its missile and drone capabilities, should security worsen on a front involving its allies in Lebanon and Iraq; however, Iran currently refrains from large-scale involvement in Syria but would consider action if threats to Iran or its allies escalate. Regime change, fragmentation, and U.S.-Israel aims - The conversation shifts to Iran post-riots, with questions about U.S./Israel strategies for regime change. Marandi contends the plan is to destabilize and fragment Iran, not to establish a unified post-regime scenario. - He cites alleged Israeli and Western involvement in organizing riots as evidence of a broader conspiracy to create chaos and justify military action. He claims Mossad and other intelligence agencies were on the ground, and public statements from former CIA officials acknowledged Israeli involvement. - He describes the riot phase as highly organized, with foreign funding (including Bitcoin), online recruitment, and careful targeting of police and infrastructure. He portrays the protests as initially legitimate grievances that devolved into violent chaos fueled by external coordination, with widespread destruction and deaths, including the killing of police officers. - In contrast, he highlights large pro-government demonstrations, especially a national day of demonstrations that he says showed widespread popular support for the Islamic Republic and condemnation of rioters. He points to extensive media coverage highlighting peaceful protests, while arguing that the riot narrative dominated Western coverage. Internal Iranian dynamics and public opinion - Marandi emphasizes the fragmentation among Iranian opposition groups: MEK, monarchists, Takfiri remnants near the Pakistan border, and Kurdish separatists, all of whom he asserts lack credible popular support. - He argues that even if the regime were at risk, fragmentation would prevent any single faction from stabilizing the country post-regime change. He suggests this aligns with his view of broader Israeli aims to weaken and fragment Iran and neighboring states, as seen in Syria and Iraq. Military capability and deterrence - He asserts Iran’s substantial missile and drone capabilities and asserts that Iran could defend allies in Lebanon and Iraq if needed. He notes Iran’s long-term preparedness against U.S. threats, including underground bases and extensive drone/missile stocks. - He contends that if war occurred, it would have wide regional and global economic consequences, potentially destabilizing oil markets and prompting broader geopolitical upheaval. He argues that U.S. restraint may be influenced by the risk of a global economic meltdown. Russia, China, and Starlink - Regarding technological assistance for countering communications, he mentions rumors of Russian or Chinese involvement in aiding Iran's internet disruption and Starlink-related issues, acknowledging uncertainty but highlighting a growing trilateral closeness among Iran, Russia, and China in the face of U.S. pressure. media narratives and leadership - He criticizes Western media for portraying protests as peaceful, while Israeli claims and cyber/disinformation around the events are presented as demonstrations of foreign involvement. He maintains that internal Iranian unity—visible in large-scale demonstrations—contrasts with the portrayal of a fractured nation. - He closes by suggesting that while some European leaders may align with U.S. policies, the overall strategic outlook remains uncertain, with a warning that Trump’s approach could escalate tensions rather than yield stability.

Alastair Crook discusses with the host the evolving US strategy toward Iran, the credibility of Iran’s deterrence, the role of Israel and Gulf states, and what is known about Iran’s domestic unrest. - Trump’s strategy toward Iran has shifted. Initially, he sought a big, quick victory with minimal entanglement, including a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June and assistance from Israel to identify a gap to exploit. Crook says Trump hoped for a toppling of the Iranian leadership via a “Maduro-style” operation that could be quickly achieved with outside support. Over time, outcomes did not align with those hopes, and the plan became far more complicated. - The naval armada near Iran was intended as a pressure point but, from the Pentagon’s view, is more of a liability. The armada is loaded with Tomahawk missiles rather than air defense missiles; estimates suggest 300-350 Tomahawks among two destroyers and one carrier. Iran has countermeasures: anti-ship missiles along the coast, submarines (including mini-submarines) with anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. Drones threaten the fleet, and the air defense burden would be high if a drone swarm attacked. Hormuz could be shut by Iran in the event of war, a long-term strategic lever that Iran has signaled. - Iran’s deterrence has matured: any attack by Israel or the US could trigger full-scale war and Hormuz closure. Symbolic exchanges were proposed by intermediaries (an empty IRGC building and an attack on a US base), but Iran rejected such symbolic moves, insisting on a broader, sustained response if attacked. - Israel’s posture and constraints: Israel has told the US it does not view the nuclear issue as the sole determinant, but instead urges action to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile system and deter future threats. Netanyahu, meeting with Whitlock, indicated opposition to any nuclear deal if the US does not secure certain Israeli demands, warning that without Israeli endorsement, a US deal would fail. Israel insists on conditions that make a broader deal nonviable for the US. - The Arabs’ restraint: Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, do not want direct involvement in an attack on Iran, including airspace use or refueling. Several factors influence their position: fear of Iranian retaliation, concerns about broader regional instability, and shifts in regional alignments. Saudi Arabia has grown more anti-Israel, viewing Israel as destabilizing and expressing concerns about the region’s security order. There is also a fear that a major war could trigger an Arab Spring-like upheaval in Gulf monarchies. - Iran’s internal unrest: The insurrection in Iran involved trained insurgents (MEK operatives trained by the Americans in Armenia and Kurds trained in Northeastern Syria) and some Baluch participants. Corridors through Turkey and Kurdish groups facilitated their entry into Kermanshah Province. The strategy aimed at creating chaos to provoke a Western intervention, with reports that attackers were paid (roughly $5-$10) to inflame violence, burn buildings, attack ambulances, and kill. The Iranian government reports nearly 3,000 killed during the protests, with about 150 more unidentified; the majority of casualties were security forces due to exchange of fire. The narrative contrasts with outside accounts, noting the opposition did not lead to defections from key state institutions, and Israeli intelligence assessment reportedly concluded the unrest did not threaten the regime’s collapse. - Regional and great-power dynamics: Russia and China have signaled opposition to letting Iran be pressured by the United States, with discussions in Russia about offering a nuclear umbrella or naval support for Iran, though official policies are unclear.Originally planned joint exercises near Hormuz were paused; there are ongoing considerations of Chinese/Russian involvement that would complicate US options. A Chinese-Russian naval presence near Iran could limit US maneuvering. A recent drone shot down by the USS Lincoln reflects continued attempts at signaling and potential negotiation. - Overall assessment: Trump faces a dilemma between projecting strength and avoiding a costly escalation, with Israeli opposition complicating any potential US move. The US cannot easily sustain pressure without risking market turmoil and broad regional and great-power entanglements. The likely trajectory involves continued “negotiations about negotiations” rather than immediate, decisive action, while Iran’s deterrence and regional recalibrations constrain what any use of force might achieve.

George Peavy (former CIA Director for Russia Analysis, Director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute) discusses how the war in Iran intertwines with the Ukraine conflict and its broader strategic implications for Russia, NATO, and Europe. Key effects of the Iran war on Ukraine and the strategic balance - U.S. weapon availability for Ukraine is strained. The U.S. has supplied weapons to Ukraine via Europe, with Europeans purchasing American systems for transfer, but shortages persist, especially in air defense, which was already stressed by Russian missile, drone, and glide bomb attacks. - The Iran war exacerbates Ukraine’s air defense crisis, raising the risk of a longer battlefield disadvantage for Ukraine if the conflict continues, potentially pushing Ukraine toward seeking a negotiated settlement sooner. - The Iran war disrupts the strategy of squeezing Russia’s energy earnings to pressure Moscow into compromise. The international energy market faces a crisis, making it harder to keep Russian energy off the market. This undermines the leverage of Western sanctions and incentives meant to push Russia toward a favorable end to the war. - Short-term Russian economic strength is bolstered by higher oil prices due to the Iran conflict, enabling Moscow to sustain the war longer in the near term. - There is anticipation that European leaders, facing an energy crisis, are hoping for a political shift in the U.S. and a change in leadership (e.g., Trump’s political fortunes) to alter the peace process, potentially delaying hard compromises with Russia. European rationality and behavior - The European stance is described as largely irrational by Peavy, driven by wishful thinking and a fear that compromising on big geopolitical issues could undermine NATO enlargement, EU unity, and European security arrangements. The EU’s cohesion is seen as benefiting from a persistent threat perception of Russia, which keeps the U.S. presence in Europe and NATO intact. - Europeans are viewed as hoping to endure the next few months, believing U.S. political dynamics (especially Trump’s prospects) could shift in their favor, though this is described as a risky bet. Russia’s possible responses and strategic calculations - Moscow faces internal pressure to escalate, with some arguing the United States cannot be trusted and that a window of opportunity exists to seize gains while Washington and Europe are preoccupied with Iran and Ukraine. - Putin’s leadership is viewed as not yet fully committed to abandoning the possibility of detente with the U.S. and pursuing negotiations over European security. A normalization of U.S.-Russian relations would give Russia more strategic room, including balancing China. - A potential shift in Russia’s approach could occur if it believes an improved U.S.-Russian relationship is unlikely to happen, whether due to Trump’s weakness or misperceptions about U.S. willingness to normalize. In that case, Russia might push for a decisive military victory in Ukraine. NATO and transatlantic alliance dynamics - The Iran conflict has intensified strains within NATO, with the U.S. pressing allies to help secure chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, while European allies push back, highlighting diverging national interests and energy concerns. - Trump’s public framing suggests NATO may face pressure or re-evaluation; Europeans view Washington’s Iran policy as jeopardizing European security and energy stability, potentially undermining confidence in long-standing alliance arrangements. Window for peace - Peavy believes a diplomatic window remains but is closing, likely not extending beyond this summer. Ukraine’s battlefield incentives push toward securing gains now, while Russia seeks a deal that could coincide with a more favorable U.S. posture. The durability of a negotiated settlement depends on perceptions of U.S. commitment and the willingness of both sides to compromise as the political calendars shift. Impact of alleged Russian support to Iran - If Russia aided Iran with intelligence, it could complicate U.S. discussions about a Ukraine ceasefire, though Moscow would argue reciprocity given Western activity since 2022. The strategic impact depends on how opposition to a compromise in Washington and Europe frames and utilizes this issue to shape diplomacy.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn (Speaker 0) discuss the current state of the international system, its shifts since World War II, and the implications for U.S. foreign policy, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. - Structural changes since the Cold War: Mearsheimer argues fundamental changes are underway in the international system due to two forces: evolving structural dynamics and the rise and actions of Donald Trump. The Cold War produced a bipolar order with the United States shaping a Western security architecture (NATO, European Community) designed to wage the Cold War. After 1989–1991, the Western order expanded globally during the unipolar moment, with NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and globalization (including China joining the WTO). From 2017, the world has entered a multipolar era with three great powers, and East Asia becomes the United States’ most important region outside the Western Hemisphere, overtaking Europe and the Persian Gulf. - East Asia as a priority: The U.S. pivot to East Asia (explicitly discussed by Clinton and then pursued under Trump) reorients strategic priorities away from Europe in a multipolar world where China is a peer competitor. This shift redefines where the U.S. focuses its resources and attention. - Trump as a destabilizing factor: Trump’s presidency is described as sui generis—a one-man wrecking ball that amplified unilateralism and contempt for international law, institutions, and allies. After initial containment of China in his first term, Trump’s policies intensified a unilateral approach. The Iran war decision (February 28) is presented as a catastrophic misstep that worsened U.S. positions globally and risked destabilizing the region further. - Three major strands of American policy causing trouble: NATO expansion, the global war on terror, and the Iran war. NATO expanded eastward in the 1990s and 2000s, culminating in Ukraine’s entry in 2022, aggravating Russia and complicating U.S.–Russia relations and European security. The global war on terror led to Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts and other interventions (Libya), generating domestic fatigue and a populist backlash that helped propel Trump. The February 28 Iran invasion created a broader, more consequential set of regional and global ramifications, with China, Russia, and Europe pressuring limits on U.S. actions. - The Iran war: Mearsheimer stresses that Iran presents a more dangerous theater than Iraq because the stakes are higher globally, with potential for a worldwide depression and cascading economic impacts, particularly in Asia. He outlines three options for ending or de-escalating the Iran conflict: (1) maintain the status quo with ongoing blockades; (2) blockade plus bombing, which risks catastrophic economic damage and Iranian retaliation; (3) cut a deal with Iran, which would be politically difficult in Washington given Israeli influence and the desire to avoid conceding that Iran “wins.” He asserts that the blockade alone won’t force surrender, bombing would escalate risk and deplete U.S. military capacity, and the only viable path is a negotiated settlement, though domestic and allied opposition makes this hard. - Israel–Iran–U.S. dynamics: The relationship between the United States and Israel creates a “tag team” dynamic, with Israel viewing Iran as an existential threat. If Iran preserves its nuclear enrichment capability, it could push Israel toward considering nuclear options, which raises the possibility of catastrophic outcomes. Trump’s rhetoric has even hinted at extreme objectives against Iran, complicating efforts to reach a deal. Mearsheimer emphasizes the influential role of the Israeli lobby in U.S. policy and notes the broader risk of nuclear escalation in the region. - Ukraine and nuclear deterrence: The Ukraine war has surprised many by showing Ukraine’s ability to threaten Russian strategic forces with Western support, which underscores Karaganov’s point about Europeans underestimating the nuclear dimension of security and deterrence. Mearsheimer highlights that the current era features a complex web of regional and great-power interdependencies—Russia, China, Iran, and European security architectures are all interlinked, affecting and being affected by one another. - Conclusion and outlook: The discussion emphasizes that managing security competition, rather than relying solely on military solutions, is essential. The speakers warn that the contemporary shift toward multipolarity and the interwoven regional dynamics heighten the risk of escalation and miscalculation, making prudent diplomacy and restraint crucial to avoiding a broader catastrophe. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving lasting peace in the Middle East given domestic political constraints and the powerful influence of regional actors, but stress the necessity of recognizing the geopolitical realities of a world in which power is distributed more unevenly than in the Cold War.

The discussion centers on the cascading economic and geopolitical consequences of the unfolding West Asia conflict, with an emphasis on energy markets, food production, and the potential reconfiguration of global power relations. Key points and insights: - The Iran-related war is described as an “absolutely massive disruption” not only to oil but also to natural gas markets. Speaker 1 notes that gas is the main feedstock for nitrogen fertilizers, so disruptions could choke fertilizer production if Gulf shipments are blocked or LNG tankers are trapped, amplifying downstream effects across industries. - The fallout is unlikely to be immediate, but rather a protracted process. Authorities and markets may react with forecasts of various scenarios, yet the overall path is highly uncertain, given the scale of disruption and the exposure of Western food systems to energy costs and inputs. - Pre-war conditions already showed fragility in Western food supplies and agriculture. The speaker cites visible declines in produce variety and quality in France, including eggs shortages and reduced meat cuts, even before the current shock, tied to earlier policies and disruptions. - Historical price dynamics are invoked: oil prices have spiked from around $60 to just over $100 a barrel in a short period, suggesting that large-scale price moves tend to unfold over months to years. The speaker points to past predictions of extreme oil shortages (e.g., to $380–$500/barrel) as illustrative of potential but uncertain outcomes, including possible long-term shifts in energy markets and prices. - Gold as a barometer: gold prices surged in 2023 after a long period of stagnation, suggesting that the environment could produce substantial moves in safe-haven assets, with potential volatility up to very high levels (even speculative ranges like $5,000 to $10,000/oz or more discussed). - Structural vulnerabilities: over decades, redundancy has been removed from food and energy systems, making them more fragile. Large agribusinesses dominate, while smallholder farming has been eroded by policy incentives. If input costs surge (oil, gas, fertilizer), there may be insufficient production capacity to rebound quickly, risking famine-like conditions. - Policy paralysis and governance: the speaker laments that policymakers remain focused on Russia, Ukraine, and net-zero policies, failing to address immediate shocks. This could necessitate private resilience: stocking nonperishables, growing food, and strengthening neighborhood networks. - Broader systemic critique: the discussion expands beyond energy to global supply chains and the “neoliberal” model of outsourcing, just-in-time logistics, and dependence on a few critical minerals (e.g., gallium) concentrated in a single country (China). The argument is that absorption of shocks requires strategic autonomy and a rethinking of wealth extraction mechanisms in Western economies. - Conspiracy and risk framing: the speakers touch on the idea that ruling elites use wars and engineered shocks to suppress populations, citing medical, environmental, and demographic trends (e.g., concerns about toxins and vaccines, chronic disease trends, CBDCs, digital IDs, 15-minute cities). These points are presented as part of a larger pattern of deliberate disruption, though no definitive causality is asserted. - Multipolar transition: a core theme is that the Western-led liberal order is collapsing or in serious flux. The BRICS and Belt and Road frameworks, along with East–West energy and technology leadership (notably China in nuclear tech and batteries), are shaping a move toward multipolar integration. The speaker anticipates that Europe’s future may involve engagement with multipolar economies and a shift away from exclusive Western hegemony. - European trajectory: Europe is portrayed as unsustainable under current models, potentially sliding toward an austerity-driven, iron-curtain-like system if it cannot compete or recalibrate. The conversation envisions a gradual, possibly painful transition driven by democratic politics and public pressure, with a risk of civil unrest if elites resist reform. - NATO and European security: there is speculation about how the Middle East turmoil could draw Europe into broader conflict, especially if Russia leverages the situation to complicate European decisions. A cautious approach is suggested: Russia has shown a willingness to create friction without provoking Article 5, but could exploit Middle East tensions to pressure European governments while avoiding a full European war. - Outlook: the speakers foresee no easy return to the pre-war status quo. The path forward could involve a reordering of international trade, energy, and security architectures, with a possible pivot toward multipolar alliances and a greater emphasis on grassroots resilience and regional cooperation. Overall, the dialogue emphasizes the profound interconnectedness of energy, agriculture, finance, and geopolitics, arguing that the current crisis could catalyze a permanent reordering of the global system toward multipolarism, while underscoring the fragility of Western economic and political models in absorbing such shocks.

Rain McGovern argues that the current conflict with Iran is truly an existential war for Israel, with Iran likely to survive whatever comes next, while the U.S. “hopefully will” as well. Israel has “put all its eggs in this one basket,” influenced by Netanyahu and by what she describes as Washington’s handling through Marco Rubio, who she says is the funnel for intelligence to Donald Trump via the National Security Council. Rubio allegedly admitted that Israel attacked Iran to trap the U.S. into acting, fearing Iranian retaliation if Washington didn’t respond. McGovern contends the war was launched by Israel to preempt Iranian escalation, and notes that most Americans are unaware of this dynamic because it’s not in major news outlets. She recounts a Geneva mediation process in which Oman’s foreign minister acted as an honest broker between the U.S. and Iran. After a session in Geneva on February 26-27, the Oman mediator reported that Iran had backed off on enrichment demands and could allow inspectors, suggesting a near-deal. McGovern claims that Rubio and perhaps Kushner then pushed for an Israeli attack, undermining the talks and pushing the U.S. toward war. She emphasizes that the question on her daughter’s lips (and among many Americans) is why there was no plan for such a major action, while insisting the truth is that “we got in this war for Israel,” a point she says is not widely reported. McGovern connects this to a broader pattern in U.S.-Iran relations, arguing that the leadership in Tehran now has the upper hand, having demonstrated greater missile capabilities and a willingness to close the Strait of Hormuz, which has global economic consequences. She suggests Netanyahu could resort to extreme measures, including a nuclear option in extremis, to avoid defeat, drawing a parallel to the Samson option and noting Kennedy’s crisis-era caution about provoking a nuclear power. She argues that Kremlinology does not apply cleanly to Trump—public statements can diverge from private intent, making it hard to predict outcomes or the briefer’s assessments. The discussion shifts to the U.S. domestic and international implications. McGovern notes the Gulf states’ reliability as U.S. allies has weakened; Putin quickly signaled to Gulf leaders that the U.S. defense posture was unreliable, urging them to reassess their alignment. She cites Lavrov’s Bedouin line about not riding two camels at once, highlighting Russia’s role as a potential mediator and its desire to leverage the situation for its own benefit. She points to Russia’s backing of Iran and China’s ties, suggesting Moscow could press Washington to back off to minimize midterm political damage. A historical digression covers Iraq War intelligence failures. McGovern recalls the 2002-2003 run-up to Iraq, where Colin Powell claimed links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction—claims later shown by the Senate Intelligence Committee to be “unsubstantiated, contradicted, or nonexistent.” She cites Tom Finger’s 2003 assessment that Iran stopped pursuing a nuclear weapon in 2003, a finding reiterated by the intelligence community through 2007 and, as she asserts, up to Tulsi Gabbard’s March congressional testimony. She warns that Iran may continue advancing its capabilities, including hypersonic missiles, and predicts further pressure on global markets via Hormuz. Regarding regime change, McGovern contends it is now out of the question given the Iranian leadership’s resilience, the new supreme leader’s position after the deaths of family members, and Tehran’s insistence on not dealing with Trump. She suggests that Russia and China could try to broker a deal, requiring Iran to back away from confrontation and urging Washington to back off. The discussion ends with a reflection on civilian casualties and the propaganda around the Minab incident and U.S. claims about Iranian responsibility, including critique of Peter Hegseth and the broader narrative around civilian targets and U.S. strategic messaging. McGovern closes by urging accountability for civilian harm, citing the deaths of 168 young girls in Minab, and accusing Hegseth of deflecting blame. She reiterates the brutality and the moral concerns surrounding aggressive actions, warning of the implications for U.S. credibility and the global order.

The discussion centers on the alleged Iranian nuclear threat and the possibility of a U.S.-led or Israel-led military confrontation, with a mix of arguments about intelligence, strategy, and public appetite for war. - Recurrent warnings about Iran: The hosts note that for decades the U.S. government has warned Iran is on the brink of reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. They reference claims of “fresh intelligence” and “new evidence” of a renewed program, contrasting them with past warnings during the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. The tone suggests these claim cycles reappear with each new administration or set of negotiations. - Netanyahu and Iran timing: A compilation is shown of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stating over two decades that Iran has a nuclear program that could be imminent. One clip claims Iran could produce a weapon in a short time, with phrases like “weeks away,” “three to five years,” and even apocalyptic projections. The conversation then questions whether those warnings have come to fruition and whether media and public commentary have overstated the immediacy or impact of those claims. - Stuxnet and sanctions context: The moderator recalls that during the Bush era the U.S. launched Stuxnet against Iran’s centrifuges, and argues that Obama continued those efforts with sanctions; they portray sanctions as bipartisan pressure intended to justify claims about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. A guest mentions “demonic officials” and cites a book to underscore a harsh view of the two-term sanction era. - Diplomatic vs. military options: The panel describes the Biden administration sending negotiators to address the nuclear issue, while noting that “other options” exist. They discuss the tension between diplomacy and potential coercive measures, including the possibility of coalition or unilateral strikes. - Military balance and potential outcomes (Colonel Douglas MacGregor’s view): The guest emphasizes the complexity and risk of fighting Iran. He argues: - Iran is capable and not a “backward desert” opponent, with an arsenal including roughly 2,000 ballistic missiles and significant, varied air defenses. - Iranian forces could target U.S. bases and Israel, potentially inflicting substantial losses, though the duration and scale of any campaign are uncertain. - The aim would be to “disintegrate the state” and induce chaos rather than secure swift compliance; the scenario could produce high casualties among both sides, potentially thousands for Iran and substantial American losses, depending on scale and duration. - The long-term goal, he says, is to “make the region safe for Israel” and establish Israeli hegemony, noting the defensiveness and regional power dynamics in play, including rising concerns about Turkey as a threat. - Intelligence reliability and sources: A CIA veteran (John Kiriakou) challenges the immediacy and reliability of intelligence asserting that Iran reconstituted a nuclear program. He contends: - The Israelis and the U.S. have historically provided intelligence that may be biased toward aggressive action. - The CIA has produced intelligence estimates stating Iran did not have a nuclear weapons program; he questions whether boots-on-the-ground intelligence would confirm otherwise. - He emphasizes the risk that media outlets amplify “existential threat” narratives rooted in political calculations rather than verified evidence. - The domestic political-media dynamic: The discussion highlights perceived incentives for hawkish messaging from certain U.S. and Israeli actors, including prominent commentators who push the threat narrative. One commentator argues that the push for war serves particular political or financial interests, suggesting that public opinion in the U.S. is not aligned with an immediate military conflict. - Regional and alliance implications: The panel debates how a U.S.-led or Israeli-led strike would affect alliances, regional stability, and the global economy. They highlight: - The possibility that Iran could retaliate with volumes of missiles and unmanned systems, inflicting damage on Israel and regional targets. - The risk that a prolonged conflict could undermine NATO cohesion and Western diplomatic credibility in the Middle East and beyond. - Concerns about the effect on energy routes, particularly the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, and broader economic ramifications. - Operational and logistical strains: They discuss the practical challenges of sustained conflict, including: - Navy and air defenses, the need for replenishment of carrier groups, and the strain on logistics and maintenance after extended deployments. - The impact of political missteps and controversial statements (such as comments linked to public pro-war stances) on alliances and military readiness. - Speculation on timing and signals: The guests speculate about when or whether a conflict might occur, noting that political leaders may face pressure “between now and March” or around certain holidays, while acknowledging uncertainty and the potential for last-minute changes. - Ending note: The conversation closes with a recognition that the set of actors—intelligence, defense officials, media, and political leaders—are collectively influencing public perception and policy directions. The speakers emphasize contrasting views on Iran’s threat, the legitimacy and consequences of potential war, and the stakes for the United States, Israel, and global stability.

Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a full-throated warning to the United States and Israel against attacking Iran, saying any attack would be a grave mistake with devastating consequences. Russia also cautioned that threats of new military strikes on Iran are categorically unacceptable and criticized Washington for external interference in Tehran’s internal politics. Amid these tensions, Putin’s anger over Israel’s handling of Syria was referenced, with reports that Russia sent multiple large freight flights into Tehran in recent days. There was discussion about whether this could be connected to comments from President Trump that killings in the region might be winding down, with a reporter noting that the killing has “now stopped” and a follow-up remark that it is “winding down” despite uncertainty. The program suggested that pro‑Zionist accounts and MAGA influencers are circulating propaganda—fake death numbers from Iran and videos of protests—while questioning the reliability of such footage and calling out what was described as propaganda used to push for war in Iran. Claims were made that “the number of people killed is far higher than the 12,000” from Mark Levin’s reporting, and that Iranian body bags and mass casualties were being publicized by certain viewers, though not all claims could be independently verified due to a media blackout. Laura Loomer was cited showing footage of body bags claiming nearly 20,000 Iranians had been murdered for protesting for their freedom, while noting Mossad’s heavy involvement in Iran’s protests, including arming protesters with live firearms per Israel’s Channel 14. The discussion raised the possibility that Reuters and other sources were reporting imminent U.S. bombing of Iran within 24 hours, while also noting Trump’s pattern of weekend bombings when markets are closed. Anya Parampil of the Grey Zone, who had recently been in Iran, joined to discuss on-the-ground realities. She explained that the initial demonstrations in Iran began around rising inflation and economic hardship, worsened by sanctions that the United States has openly admitted using as a weapon. She noted that early protests were largely by pro-government or conservative segments, with the government making concessions and the president, Hassan Rouhani’s successor, acknowledging responsibility for policy decisions. Violent elements subsequently appeared, and a blackout on information has followed, with Internet cuts, complicating independent reporting. Parampil suggested outside support and covert interventions could be destabilizing the country and providing a pretext for international intervention, comparing the current situation to Syria in 2011. Parampil described the escalation from peaceful economic demonstrations to violent street actions involving armed extras, questions about who is killing whom, and the risk of a Syria-style CIA or covert foreign-backed civil conflict in Iran. She emphasized sovereignty and the Iranian people’s own trajectory, arguing that sanctions and external pressure complicate genuine domestic grievances and can undermine authentic movements. The discussion also touched on the nature of domestic sentiment: some protests were pro-government, driven by sovereignty and economic concerns, while others involved calls for reform. The participants urged skepticism about casualty figures, questioning sources funded by Western organizations and the reliability of reported death tolls amid the information blackout. They warned against rushed military action and suggested that the window of opportunity for U.S.-Israeli action might be closing, given the political clock in the United States and Israel. The program closed with notes that the Israeli media reported Mossad’s involvement and arming on the Iranian side, while U.S. reporting remained less transparent, and that the situation remained highly uncertain with conflicting narratives about who is directing violence and protests on the ground.

Russian president Vladimir Putin faces domestic criticism for not ending the war in Ukraine and is being pressed to act on Iran as well. On Russian talk shows, officials suggest Putin is dependent on his relationship with Donald Trump, which critics say stalls peace negotiations, raising questions about what Russia can do in Iran while entangled at home. Russia signals potential actions, such as stopping energy flow to those supporting the war, with Sergei Lavrov saying Russia will “do everything to create an atmosphere that will make this operation impossible” in cooperation with partners and in international forums. Putin also floated the idea of stopping energy flows to Europe, suggesting Europe could be drawn into the conflict since many NATO members are reluctant to be drawn in, though some like Italy and Spain reportedly oppose direct involvement. Iranian foreign minister comments: when asked whether Russia and China are helping Iran, the minister said they are supporting Iran politically and otherwise, and that military cooperation with Asia and Russia is not a secret. He did not give specifics on whether Iran is actively receiving military assistance in the current war, stating he would not disclose details of cooperation in the middle of the war. Discussion with guests focuses on the Ukraine and Iran theaters, the Russia-China-Iran triangle, and the potential for Russia to change its approach. Jim Jatris, a former State Department official, emphasizes that Putin’s view of Trump shapes Russia’s strategy, noting Russian engagement with two Americans described as “New York flim flam artists” around ceasefire discussions. Jatris argues the Russians may have been interested in a deal via Trump’s intermediaries but now see the negotiations as “treachery” and question whether there is any real chance to decapitate or leverage Kyiv, comparing this to Israeli and U.S. tactics against Iran and other groups. He suggests Moscow’s pressure points include whether Russia will shift its Ukrainian strategy and what happens if the U.S. declares a victory and withdraws, leaving Iran and Russia to decide whether to press their advantage or pause. Doug McGregor comments on Russian restraint, arguing Moscow has pressed for minimal terms since June 2024 and views Western capitals as cutthroat, making negotiation unlikely. He notes internal Russian debate among figures like Nabiulina and others about maintaining restraint and keeping negotiation channels open, while acknowledging that Russia might eventually decide to end the war by destroying the Kyiv regime, though it is unclear what they will do. The conversation also touches on the complexity of Russia-Iran-Israel relations and the potential for direct Russian involvement, including possible shadowing of Israeli submarines or deploying Russian personnel in Iran, while recognizing that Russia would likely avoid direct combat if possible. The overall tone considers how a pending Xi–Trump meeting in Beijing could be affected by the war’s progression, with speculation that the meeting may be canceled or postponed depending on developments.

In a discussion about the Iran confrontation and its wider implications, Glenn and John Mearsheimer analyze the sequence of events and underlying dynamics behind President Donald Trump’s statements and policy shifts. - Trump’s two Monday tweets frame the episode: an initial threat to “wipe Iran off the face of the earth” to force concession, followed by a reversal to announce a ceasefire based on Iran’s 10-point plan. Mersheimer emphasizes that this sequence reveals Trump’s desperation to end the war and to secure a ceasefire quickly, then to shift to negotiations with Iran’s plan as the basis. - The framework of the negotiations is contrasted with the US’s prior maximalist aims. The United States had demanded four core goals: regime change, Iran’s nuclear enrichment cessation, elimination of long-range missiles, and cessation of support for groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Mersheimer notes none of these have been realized, while Iran reportedly gains leverage through control of the Strait of Hormuz. - The Iranian 10-point plan is presented as a basis for negotiations that would, in effect, concede the big US demands. Trump’s evening tweet signaling acceptance of the 10-point plan is read as a defeat for the US position and a shift toward Iranian maximalism on its own terms. The claim is that the ceasefire, if it occurs, would involve concessions that Iran had already proposed. - The feasibility of a ceasefire is questioned. Iran’s open Strait of Hormuz depends on Israel halting attacks in Lebanon (on Hezbollah), which has not happened. Therefore, a true ceasefire is not in place, and the Israelis’ actions are seen as undermining any potential halt to hostilities. - The broader strategic picture is outlined. Iran’s leverage includes allied groups (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas) and the ability to close chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandab strait via the Houthis. The discussion notes Iran’s large missile/drone arsenal and potential to threaten American bases, though Mersheimer stresses that sanctions and the prolonged war have devastated Iran’s economy, which complicates assessments of its strength. - The role of external powers and economies is highlighted. Mersheimer argues that the global economy—especially oil and fertilizers—drives the push to end the conflict. He suggests China and Pakistan, with Russian input, pressured Iran to negotiate, given the global economic risks of a prolonged war. He also notes that the New York Times reported that all 13 US bases in the Gulf were damaged or destroyed, undermining U.S. presence there. - Domestic political concerns are discussed. Trump’s ability to declare victory while acknowledging defeat creates a political hazard. Vance is presented as a potentially capable negotiator who could press for a ceasefire, but there is concern about internal political blowback if he concedes too much. - Israel’s position is considered crucial. Netanyahu’s government is described as having promoted the war, and the war’s outcome is said to damage U.S.-Israel relations. There is speculation that Israel may consider drastic options, including nuclear consideration against Iran, given the perceived failure of conventional means. - The Ukraine war and its relation to the Iran conflict are explored. If Iran’s war ends or is perceived as winding down, European capacity and willingness to support Ukraine become central questions. The U.S. may shift blame to Europe for Ukraine’s defeat if Russia advances, while withholding weapons to Ukraine to avoid further strain on U.S. stockpiles. - The discussion on rationality in international relations emphasizes that states act rationally when their decisions align with a plausible theory of international politics and a sound decision-making process. Mersheimer argues Europe’s behavior toward the U.S. is not irrational, though he criticizes its liberal-theory basis (NATO expansion) as potentially misguided but not irrational. He contrasts this with Trump’s Iran attack in February 2029, which he deems irrational due to a lack of a plausible theory of victory. - The multipolar world dynamic is reinforced. The war’s outcomes are viewed as weakening U.S. ability to project power, diminishing transatlantic cohesion, and boosting Russia and China’s relative position. The loss of Gulf bases and diminished American influence are expected to push Europe toward greater strategic autonomy, with NATO potentially becoming less meaningful by 2029, depending on future leadership. - Final notes include concerns about the political risk for Vance as a negotiator, the likelihood of a difficult peace process, and the possibility that misperceptions and propaganda—analyzed through historical parallels like the Vietnam War and Walter Lippmann’s ideas—have locked leaders into an “evil enemy” narrative that complicates peacemaking. Overall, the conversation portrays Trump’s messaging as a sign of desperation to end a costly conflict, the ceasefire as a fragile construct dependent on Iranian terms, Iran’s expanding leverage in the region, the fragility of U.S.-Israel and transatlantic bonds, and a shifting global order moving toward multipolarity with lasting economic and strategic consequences.

Glenn and Stanislav Krapivnik discuss a string of escalating security and geopolitical crises with a focus on drone incidents, NATO-Russia tensions, and the broader international energy and security implications. - Baltic drone incidents: Glenn asks about an attack on a key Russian port in the Baltic Sea, noting drones entered from NATO territory through the Baltic States and may have circumvented Belarus. Stanislav explains that two drones hit targets in the Baltics—one at an Estonian power-plant chimney and another at a separate object in Latvia—and suggests dozens of drones may have flown through airspace, possibly from Ukraine via Poland and the Baltics or launched from the pre-Baltics. He argues this is not a one-off event and raises two possibilities: either NATO member states have incompetent security, or they are directly engaged, with the more likely conclusion that the pre-Baltic states are direct participants in the war. - Deterrence and red lines: The conversation notes that NATO has aimed to pressure Russia economically (targeting energy, shipping, and oil). Glenn asks how these actions affect sentiment and Kremlin incentives. Stanislav counters that Tallinn and other Baltic leadership have crossed red lines, citing past incidents (Estonia drone attack on Skowabur Air Base) and suggesting Estonian actions are part of a broader pattern of Russophobia. He argues that Estonia’s leadership and policies threaten deterrence calculations and calls for accountability, positing that deterrence must be reset against Estonia given the perceived egregious escalations. - Interconnected conflicts and the Iran-Russia axis: The speakers discuss Sergei Lavrov’s remarks about a potential third world war linked to Iran and Russia. Stanislav asserts that conflicts are becoming highly interconnected, with the West having fomented them through proxies and direct actions. He asserts that Western leaders, whom he characterizes as pursuing broad war aims, are willing to sacrifice lives for geopolitical objectives, and he highlights ongoing cross-border terrorism and sanctions on supply chains. He emphasizes that Russia has long been involved in Iran’s military upgrades and drones, noting that Russian components power Iranian drones. He also points to the potential for China to align with expanding conflict dynamics, suggesting that Russia has already embedded itself in supporting Iran and that a fall of Iran would threaten Russia’s regional borders, especially along the Kazakhstani frontier. - Energy, fertilizer, and economic shocks: Stanislav draws on his supply-chain experience to describe the cascading effects of war on energy and fertilizer. He explains the logistical challenges of large-scale industrial repair after missile strikes, including the long lead times for steel, valves, and large refinery components, and argues that Europe’s gas and steel supply are constrained. He notes Russia’s restriction on diesel exports and Qatar’s role in fertilizer, highlighting how Europe has become dependent on Russian and Qatari supplies and is now left vulnerable by policy choices. He foresees a multi-year disruption of energy, fertilizer, and food supplies, warning of price spikes and potential starvation in parts of Europe and beyond as planting seasons approach. He highlights that fertilizer production relies on natural gas and that gas-rich regions are facing supply limitations, which would prolong and intensify food insecurity and economic disruption. - Gulf energy states and strategic calculations: The discussion turns to the Gulf, describing Gulf states as corporate-like entities run by wealthy families. Stanislav speculates on the strategic calculations of states like Qatar and the UAE, including the possibility that political and economic incentives could shape decisions about involvement in broader regional conflict, arms supplies, or island and maritime control. He argues that damage to energy infrastructure, maritime chokepoints, and desalination plants could have devastating regional consequences, potentially forcing costly rebuilding campaigns over several years. - Military capability and future risks: Stanislav critiques U.S. military capability for large-scale ground campaigns, arguing that the U.S. is not a traditional land-power and that a sustained invasion of Iran would face enormous logistical and manpower challenges. He emphasizes the scale and difficulty of mobilizing, training, and sustaining a large force in conflict terrain, particularly in Iran’s mountainous, fortified landscape. He also discusses the domestic constraints of U.S. recruitment, obesity rates, and the challenges of sustaining a 21st-century volunteer force in a major war. - Final reflections on leadership and narrative: The conversation closes with a discussion of Trump-era war briefs, characterizing them as short, sensational videos focused on explosions rather than reality, and a broader critique of political leadership and messaging in wartime decision-making. Glenn and Stanislav note the risk that political leaders may oversell battlefield successes and struggle to withdraw from costly, escalating commitments. In sum, the discussion centers on cross-border drone activity and its implications for NATO-Russia dynamics, the widening economic and energy-security consequences of contemporary conflicts, the deepening Iran-Russia alignment, and the daunting logistical and strategic challenges of any potential military escalation in the Middle East, including Iran.

Glenn (Speaker 0) and John Mersheimer (Speaker 1) discuss the Iran war and its trajectory. Mersheimer asserts the war is not going well for the United States and that President Trump cannot find an off ramp because there is no plausible endgame or decisive victory against Iran. He notes that if Iran can turn the conflict into a protracted war of attrition, it has incentives and means to do so, including a strong bargaining position to demand sanctions relief or reparations. He argues the United States and Israel are not the sole drivers; Iran has a say, and there is no credible story about ending the war on American terms. Mersheimer cautions that even heavy bombardment or “today being the day of the heaviest bombardment” would not necessarily compel Iran to quit. He suggests Tehran will respond by escalating, potentially striking Gulf States and Israel with missiles and drones, given Iran’s capability with accurate drones and ballistic missiles in a target-rich environment. He emphasizes Iran’s incentive to avoid a settlement that yields no gains for Tehran while seeking concessions or relief from sanctions as time passes, increasing American pressure to settle. He warns that if international economic effects worsen, the United States may push for an end to the war, but that would constitute conceding to the Iranians rather than achieving victory. Glenn asks about escalation dominance, noting Iran’s potential vulnerability of Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. Mersheimer confirms Gulf desalination plants are a critical vulnerability (Riyadh’s desalination plant servicing 90% of Riyadh’s water; Kuwait 90%; Oman 76%; Saudi water about 70%; desalination is essential). He reiterates that Iran can target desalination alongside petroleum infrastructure to cripple Gulf States and that such actions would also affect Israel and the wider economy. He asserts Iran has the option to damage the Gulf States and thus impact the world economy, making escalation unlikely to yield a favorable US-Israeli outcome. The energy dimension is central: 20% of the world’s oil and gas comes from the Persian Gulf. The Straits of Hormuz are unlikely to be opened easily, and destroying Gulf States’ infrastructure would make that moot anyway. He explains that even if Hormuz were open, damaged Gulf States would not export oil, and American naval escorting would be impractical due to vulnerability. He observes that the Iranians’ options threaten the international economy, and the United States’ off ramp is not readily available. Mersheimer provides a historical perspective on air power: strategic bombing cannot win wars alone, as seen in World War II and later conflicts. He notes that the present campaign lacks boots on the ground, relying on air power, but history shows air power alone is insufficient to achieve regime change or decisive victory against formidable adversaries like Iran. He argues that the decapitation strategy, followed by escalation, is unlikely to succeed and that the literature on air wars and sanctions supports this. They discuss previous warnings within the administration: General James Mattis (General Keane) and the National Intelligence Council warned before the war that regime change and quick victory were unlikely. Mersheimer highlights that only 20% of Americans supported the war initially, with 80% skeptical or opposed. He attributes some of the current predicament to Trump and Netanyahu's insistence on a quick victory, arguing that Netanyahu has pushed for a regime-change approach that failed. The conversation turns to Russia and China. Mersheimer contends that Russia benefits from the war by diverting US resources and relations away from Europe and Ukraine, strengthening Russia’s own strategic position. He suggests Russia may be aiding Iran with intelligence and possibly with weapons or energy, as well as improving its image in Iran. He asserts that this war distracts the US from Ukraine, harming Ukrainian efforts and potentially strengthening Russia economically by boosting demand for Russian oil and gas if Gulf supply is constrained. Europe’s position is examined. Mersheimer claims the European Union’s support is largely rhetorical; Europe’s elites fear a US departure from Europe and want to preserve NATO. He argues Europe’s interests will be largely ignored in a US-dominated conflict, with Macron’s stance portrayed as exaggerated power. He suggests Europe is hurt by the war and that their leverage over the United States is limited unless they diversify away from exclusive dependence on the US. In closing, Glenn and John reflect on leadership and propaganda. Mersheimer reiterates that leaders lie in international politics, with democracies more prone to lying to their publics than autocracies, and notes that Trump’s statements—such as Iran possessing Tomahawk missiles or the nuclear capability being erased—are examples of implausible or untruthful claims. He emphasizes the rational strategic thinking of Iranian and Russian leaders, but critiques the American leadership’s strategic understanding. The discussion concludes with reflections on Europe’s potential hardball approach toward the United States, and the need for diversification in European strategy to counter American leverage. The interview ends with appreciation for the exchange and a shared wish that the subject were less depressing.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.