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These are examples of approved and failed ballots. The Voter Privacy Act prohibits inspectors from examining ballots to verify signatures. Many of the reviewed ballots have two different patterns of the letter "S" in the signature, even though some owners' names don't contain an "S." In total, 104,820 ballots were reviewed, with 20,232 having mismatched signatures.

The speaker noticed irregularities with the absentee ballots. The ballot numbers were in sequence, which is unusual for mailed-in ballots. The speaker also discovered that the envelopes lacked a date and the ballots were all from the same area. The signatures were similar, and there were no date stamps. Additionally, the ballots were not showing up in the system and had to be entered manually. When the speaker questioned these issues, they were met with resistance from the supervisor. Despite wanting to stay in the room, the speaker chose not to challenge further.

The speakers discussed issues with scanning envelopes due to jamming in the printer. They mentioned problems with the BlueCrest machine for signature verification. The request for scanned images of outer envelopes from November 2020 was not fulfilled. The discussion then shifted to obtaining signature exemplars and reference images for voters, which would require checking multiple databases for 860,000 voters. The process of finding signatures in the databases was explained in detail. The conversation also touched on absentee ballot application forms.

The speaker discusses the issue of inspecting ballots for signatures. They mention that the Voter Privacy Act prohibits inspectors from looking through a ballot to verify a signature. They also point out that many ballots have two different patterns of the letter "s" written for the signature, even though some of them don't even have an "s" in the voter's name. They state that out of the 104,820 ballots reviewed, 20,232 had mismatched signatures, which accounts for 20% of the total.

The transcript discusses several election-related issues in California. First, it highlights a controversy with the voting envelopes: in some counties, how a ballot is inserted into the envelope can reveal the voter's choice. Specifically, if a voter selects no, the hole aligns with the “no” vote, making the vote visible through a window in the envelope. The speakers suggest this could be used to see how someone voted, and question whether it could affect the outcome if a small percentage of ballots are read differently. Speaker 1 notes that voters wonder whether, after submission, someone might handle the ballot on the processing side, calling it a legitimate question to ask. Speaker 0 explains that the state says it does not know how many ballots are affected because counties print the envelopes, and acknowledges that Shasta, Tulare, and Sacramento have already admitted the mistake and told voters how to fix it. Speaker 2 proposes a solution: fold the envelope in the opposite direction to create a blank page so nothing on the ballot envelope is visible. The state GOP has released a video showing voters how to avoid the problem. The conversation then broadens to mention additional election issues. It is stated that the state spent nearly $300,000,000 mailing out the wrong redistricting map, which required a corrected mailer to be sent. There is also a warning that even ballots mailed on election day may not be counted due to slow mail service. Regarding the holes in the envelope, the explanation given is that the holes exist so blind voters can know where to sign the envelope by touching two areas and signing there, though the speakers question how blind voters would know which exact box to fill in on the document. The overall discussion centers on concerns about transparency and reliability in the voting process, including envelope design, the handling of ballots after submission, and the impact of mailing errors on the election.

A poll worker noticed that absentee ballot numbers were in sequence, which should not occur with mailed ballots. The worker noticed ballot numbers like 2232 next to 2233. The worker asked a supervisor about the envelopes lacking a specific date, showing only "November 0-2020," but was rebuked. The poll worker stated the sequential ballot numbers were all from the same area, Guarded Street in downtown Detroit, and the signatures looked alike. The envelopes had no date stamp and were missing the day of the month. The ballots were not in the system and were being entered manually, even though the details were not in the poll book.

The speaker discusses a violation regarding blank envelopes in the election. They state that according to the statute, blank envelopes cannot be cured and must have a signature by 7 pm on election day. However, they found 1,870 cured ballots without signatures. One example is a blank envelope without a signature or phone number, which was cured and verified after the statutory expiration. Another ballot was received on election day. When questioned, the speaker confirms that the metadata shows the envelopes were cured on November 8th, five days after the election. Another speaker points out that the statute allows for five working days, excluding weekends and holidays. They argue that the election was on Tuesday, so only three days should be counted.

The speaker discusses the process of verifying signatures on ballots and the issue of mismatched signatures. Under the previous administration, the curing process for signatures ended at 7 PM on election day, which caused problems in the recent election due to a large number of early ballots dropped off on election day. The language in the procedures manual regarding contacting voters about signature discrepancies is ambiguous and has been interpreted differently by various recorders' offices. The speaker also mentions concerns about partisanship and provides examples of comments and lawsuits related to the issue.

The speaker asks who determined the number of failed signatures in the 2020 election. Speaker 1 explains that their organization reviewed a quarter of the 1,900,000 envelopes from the election using 150 trained workers. They followed the guidelines in the secretary of state manual and analyzed each voter record individually. The statistics from the first 25% of the ballots were extrapolated to determine the final number, which is specific to Maricopa County. Speaker 0 acknowledges that Maricopa County alone had over 2 million ballots, with about 1.9 million of them being mail-in ballots. Speaker 1 confirms this and the conversation continues.

The speaker mentions the history of elections in Fulton County, Georgia. Another speaker brings up an interesting incident during a 99% audit on signatures. They found that many ballots did not have the required red initials, indicating approval. Once separated from the outer envelope, these ballots still had to be counted. This poses a problem as it undermines the accuracy of the audit. The speaker expresses concern about the lack of proper examination for dozens of ballots on Saturday. The conversation concludes with a thank you to Miss Fisher.

In the exchange, concerns are raised about mail-in ballots in Allegheny and Philadelphia counties and how they were counted. Speaker 0 notes that ballots were counted without observers, citing 682,770 ballots observed and asking about the 1,823,148 mailed-out ballots, contrasted with a final count showing 2,589,242 mail-in ballots. The core question is: what explains the roughly 700,000 mail-in ballots that “appeared from nowhere”? Speaker 1 responds that their cyber team uses white-hat hacking techniques to gather publicly available information from the secretary of state’s website, which has been updated as late as 11:16 this morning with provisional and mail-in ballots, though those numbers continue to change. He adds that the 2,500,000 figure is no longer on the website, and it has “just been taken off.” There is no annotation explaining why. Speaker 2 then describes an on-the-ground observation: a deputy sheriff, a senior law enforcement officer, was seen not being observed and walking in with baggies, with USBs being inserted into machines. The witness claims to have personally witnessed this 24 times, with additional witnesses including Democrat poll watchers. They were told by an attorney that every election leaves a couple of USB cards in the voting machines to be brought back by the warehouse manager, but this account is contradicted by law enforcement and other officials. The witness states that 47 USB cards are missing and “they’re nowhere to be found,” and that 32 to 30 cards uploaded were not present in the live vote update. The witness demanded timely live upload of vote results, which showed 50,000 votes; they assert those votes were for Vice President Biden, though they note that identifying who those votes were for should not matter to a computer scientist. Speaker 1 emphasizes that forensic evidence from the computers was not obtained: the procedure would involve turning off the computer, imaging the drive with BitLocker, under law enforcement observation, which would take about an hour for five machines. This forensic imaging was never performed, despite objections three weeks earlier. They later learned that virtually all chain-of-custody logs, yellow sheets, and forensic records in Delaware County were gone; a signing party attempted to recreate the logs with poll workers but was unsuccessful in recovering them all. The discussion concludes with a claim that there are 100,000 to 120,000 ballots, both mail-in and USB, in question, and that there is no remedy or “cure” within the local charter for certifying a presidential vote, leaving the speaker asserting that nobody could certify the vote in good conscience.

The speaker expresses frustration about a blank ballot that was not voted on. They mention being able to stop adjudication and scan and adjudicate all ballots, including the blank one. Misty asks if a ballot can be scanned more than once, and the speaker confirms that they have done it. They explain that they kept scanning the same batches of ballots. The speaker mentions that they have set the system to handle ambiguous marks and overvotes, but it should also handle blank ballots. They scan a blank ballot and accept it into the system, noting that the system does not know who touched the ballots during adjudication.

Signature verification is a process used to determine the legitimacy of a vote by comparing the voter's ballot envelope to the affidavit. In the 2020 election, 420,987 ballot envelopes failed signature verification, and the system was never fixed. As a result, the same issues persisted in the 2022 election, leaving the system vulnerable.

The speaker expresses frustration about a blank ballot that was not voted on. They mention being able to stop adjudication and scan and adjudicate all ballots, including the blank one. Misty asks if a ballot can be scanned multiple times, and the speaker confirms they have done so. They mention not receiving any more ballots until about 1. The speaker explains that the system is set to handle ambiguous marks and overvotes, but they want to see if it can handle blank ballots as well. They scan the blank ballot, accept it into the system, and mention that the system does not know who touched the ballots during adjudication.

On November 9th, there was a mysterious occurrence where 25,000 ballots went missing in the reported count. The next day, on November 10th, these ballots magically appeared, affecting the outcome of the race. This doesn't make sense and is completely wrong. The law exists to safeguard the integrity of the vote.

The speaker believes that the rejected ballots were placed in a separate box to be later counted at the headquarters. The rejection happened at the voting center due to invalid ballots that wouldn't match any tabulator's program. The question arises if Maricopa County was contacted to clarify their processes. It is mentioned that the rejected ballots would be sent to central tabulation to be duplicated onto readable ballots and inserted into the system. However, there is no way for voters to confirm if this process was actually carried out, which raises concerns.

- The discussion centers on ballot processing in Maricopa County, with several shipments arriving after the initial belief that counting was near completion. Speaker 0 notes that the Wednesday before the Friday they quit voting, and ten days before they quit tabulating, more truckloads of ballots came in, leading to the question: “how can you not know how many ballots are still out there?” - Speaker 1 asks for clarification: “They thought they were done.” The conversation confirms multiple times that those running the counting rooms believed they were almost done, or would be done, on Wednesday morning, then Thursday morning, then Friday morning, and the process extended into the next week. - Trucks bringing ballots arrived on the third, fourth, and fifth days, continuing throughout the last week. The last day mentioned is the tenth, with ballots still arriving. The company involved is Runback, described as doing high-speed scanning and printing of duplications and military ballots. There was no observer presence at Runback, and Speaker 0 indicates she had not been called to work there; she does not know exactly what Runback was doing (printing vs. scanning). - It is stated that all high-speed scanning occurs at Runback, and the ballots go to Runback. There is uncertainty about off-site scanning and whether Dominion equipment was involved. Speaker 0 clarifies: “They were duplications, the ballots that wouldn’t read through the tabulation machines. They were ballots that came in from military and overseas.” The number of additional sources for ballots beyond military/overseas is unknown, and Speaker 0 suggests this is a question for county employees to explain. - About the counting process: Speaker 0 confirms that the ballots went through tabulation machines and that adjudication work took place for those late arrivals. They observed the ballots being processed, but did not know the exact totals for certain days. - Daily volumes are described. Speaker 0 estimates: one day a shift might handle 90,000 ballots, and some days had similar volumes across three shifts; other days had fewer. There were days when as few as 15,000 ballots were processed. The “back door” arrivals are contrasted with the front door, with Speaker 0 noting that all back door ballots were received through back entries, not the front door. The remaining ballots in the latter part of the period continued to come in and be tabulated, with ongoing full-time shifts through the eighth, ninth, and tenth days. - The episode concludes with Speaker 1 seeking further explanation, and Speaker 0 indicating that some of the details were not fully known and that a county employee should clarify where the incoming ballots came from during the latter part of the period.

The speaker noticed irregularities with the ballot numbers and names on absentee and mailing ballots. The numbers were almost consecutive, and some envelopes lacked a date. When the speaker questioned this, they were met with resistance. The ballot numbers were all from the same area, with similar signatures and no date stamp. None of these details were entered into the system, and they were being manually entered. The speaker suspected something was amiss but didn't challenge further to avoid being kicked out.

Approximately 1,400,000 ballot packets have been sent out, with around 27,000 currently undergoing the curing process. Curing involves contacting voters when their signatures do not match. So far, about 15,000 of these have been successfully cured. There is a deadline of five calendar days after election day to cure as many ballots as possible.

During the election, there were damaged mail-in ballots that couldn't be read by scanners. The board decided to duplicate these ballots using pink highlighters. However, the highlighter couldn't be read by the scanners either, so all the duplicated ballots had to be fixed. The solution was to give workers stacks of blank mail-in ballots to individually fill in the correct ovals with a dark pen. This process went on for hours without observation until the observers confronted the deputy commissioner. Eventually, thousands of mail-in ballots were counted this way. This raises concerns about the integrity of the process.

The speaker asks if the person is aware that the outer envelope of a ballot must have the date, time, and signature of the town clerk. The person admits they were not aware. The speaker then asks if the person instructed their absentee ballot moderator about this rule, to which the person responds that they went over the manual but did not specifically mention the signature requirement. The speaker shows an example of an envelope without a signature and asks if it should have been counted. The person objects, but the speaker clarifies that they were in charge of counting the ballots. The person admits they did not discuss the signature requirement with the moderator. The speaker asks if the person's office ever checked for the clerk's signature on the envelopes, to which the person says it never came up in their training.

The speaker describes observing absentee/mail-in ballots and recording details from the ballots. They wrote down the ballot numbers and the last names of the person named on each ballot. The ballots appeared to be in sequence, which, according to the speaker, should not happen with mail-in ballots, since mail-in ballots come in at different times and numbers. The speaker recalls that when they noticed the numbers were almost next to each other—one in the middle, then another—they became suspicious. The speaker asked the supervisor about this, noting there was not even a date on the envelopes. The envelopes were marked November 2020, but there was no second number or other identifying date visible. When the speaker inquired about the date on a specific envelope, the response was hostile: the supervisors became angry and told them they were not letting them do their job and that the speaker was disturbing them. To avoid being kicked out, the speaker and the others in the room chose not to challenge the process further, since they did not want to be removed and there were only a few people present. The speaker also observed that the sequence of ballot numbers all originated from the same area—Guarded Street in Downtown Detroit. The ballots’ signatures looked alike, and none of the envelopes had dates stamped on them. The envelopes appeared to be missing a second or third date, or any date, and none of the ballots were appearing in the voting system. Additionally, the speaker notes that these ballots were being entered manually, and they asserted that none of these details would be present in the poll book or the system. The overall implication is that there was irregularity in the handling of these absentee ballots, with sequential numbers, indistinct dates, signatures resembling each other, and manual entry outside the expected process, raising concerns about whether the ballots were being processed consistent with standard procedures.

I was surprised to learn that there was no signature verification done for the ballots. I questioned how ballots without signatures were handled, and the response was they were just sent back out. This made me uncomfortable certifying the results.

In this video, the speaker discusses the analysis of ballot curing in Maricopa County. They compare the conservative case, where 11.29% of ballots should have been cured, to the county's curing rate of 1.31%. The speaker highlights that the number of ballots that should have been cured is far greater than what the county actually cured. They also mention that based on the extended study, a minimum of 4,965 ballots should have been thrown out due to signature mismatches, compared to the county's 587. The conclusion is that the county's signature verification process is flawed, contradicting their claim of having a rigorous process.

The speaker asks if the person is aware that the outer envelope of a ballot must have the date, time, and signature of the town clerk. The person admits they were not aware of this. The speaker then questions if the person instructed the absentee ballot moderator about this rule, to which the person says they did not. The speaker shows examples of envelopes with and without the clerk's signature, and asks if the one without should have been counted. The person agrees that it should not have been counted. The speaker asks if the person ever checked for the clerk's signature on envelopes, and the person says it never came up in their training.