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Glenn and Professor John Mearsheimer discuss recent strikes in Ukraine, Western involvement, NATO’s role, and broader US grand strategy amid escalating pressures involving Russia, Ukraine, and Iran.
On the bombing of Kyiv, including claims by Kyiv’s mayor Vitali Klitschko that it was the worst bombing of Kyiv in the entire war, Mearsheimer says that the prevailing explanation for the massive attack is that it was a reprisal for Ukrainian drone attacks into Russia. He argues that while it could be interpreted as a “classic punishment campaign,” it actually targeted military-industrial or strategic targets rather than civilians. He notes that Kyiv Independent reported 20 Ukrainians killed and says the number is “not a large number” and does not indicate a punishment campaign designed to kill civilians. He adds that Russia has conducted massive strikes against military-industrial targets before and that he does not see the attack as fitting a direct response to Ukrainian drone attacks against Russia’s “heartland,” though he suggests Russia may frame it that way for domestic public relations purposes.
Glenn raises questions about NATO involvement, noting disputes about NATO participation and reporting about “two Russian pranksters” contacting an Estonian presidential advisor and obtaining coordinates relating to attacks on St. Petersburg. Mearsheimer responds by stressing that NATO is deeply involved and cites the G7 declaration issued after a June 17 meeting in France. He says the G7 countries stated they would accelerate support for Ukraine’s long-range bombing campaign into Russia and would ramp up economic pressure on Russia. He also says Western intelligence, drones, and drone development support have been provided to Ukraine, and that Western support likely includes helping plan drone offensives. He points out that Ukrainian drones have flown over the Baltic states without Russian reaction, but that Russia has said it will attack drone launch sites if drones are launched from Baltic territory—so he says Baltic states do not allow Ukraine to launch drones from their territory, though he believes Russia would retaliate if that changed.
Mearsheimer discusses proposals attributed to Sergei Karaganov about attacking Europe with conventional weapons first and then, if necessary, turning to nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer argues Russia is unlikely to take that “Karaganov road” right away because it believes it can parry drone attacks effectively in the short term and because battlefield conditions matter. He says Russia is moving slowly but steadily toward conquering all of Donbass, leaving little to conquer, and argues that these incentives reduce pressure to escalate into Europe or consider nuclear options immediately. He adds that if Western rhetoric were true that Russia is losing and suffering massive casualties, the Karaganov approach might seem more plausible, but he says that is not what is happening on the battlefield.
Glenn argues that Western leaders talk about bringing war to Russia and increasing “pain,” but that restraint has existed because Russia can absorb limited punishment without major impact. He warns that if the capacity to absorb punishment disappears, Russia may strike NATO states, raising the risk of major escalation. He then asks why Western elites are becoming more open about deep strikes inside Russia, including mentions such as a NATO-linked strategy reward for targeting Russian airfields, and whether this openness serves to normalize attacks, reduce fear of retaliation, or shift political incentives.
Mearsheimer replies that Western elites have convinced themselves that Putin is a “congenital aggressor,” and that Russia’s ambitions and inevitability of conflict narratives have become entrenched. He says these stories can fit elite motivations such as supporting defense spending and keeping Americans involved, but argues the belief may be driven more by unconscious self-persuasion than coordinated strategy. He describes a security dilemma spiral: if Europeans and Russians believe war is inevitable, each side prepares for the same war, and each side’s defensive actions look offensive to the other. He says he sees no way out of the spiral at present.
They then debate Western claims that Ukraine is winning. Glenn points to battlefield reports suggesting extreme casualty ratios—like 1 to 20 or 1 to 40 in Ukrainian-to-Russian dead—while also seeing Ukraine recapture territory. He says these accounts do not “add up,” citing perceived contradictions about rationality, deterrence assumptions, and political narratives. Mearsheimer focuses on casualty numbers and discusses a New York Times piece, saying it cited a CSIS study and reported around 450,000 Russians dead and between 125,000 and 150,000 Ukrainians dead, resulting in a “three to one” ratio. He says that ratio is “simply unbelievable” because the main battlefield killer is artillery, and that Russian artillery advantage is estimated at 5 to 1, 7 to 1, or even 10 to 1 across much of the war. He argues Ukraine has launched many offensives—citing Kursk and the June 4, 2023 offensive, plus earlier offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv—so the claim that Ukraine has mainly been defensive does not fit. He adds that he thinks Ukrainian losses are likely much higher, possibly around a million men killed in action, and says the New York Times numbers underpin decisions about escalating support for Ukraine.
Mearsheimer expands to explain “truth as first casualty,” saying propaganda turns casualty measurement into a success indicator. He compares to Vietnam, where body counts were treated as an indicator of winning despite internal knowledge of deep trouble, and says the process created a fantasy world. He argues that today’s Ukraine narrative is similarly sustained and that Western elites increasingly believe they are doing well, reinforced by perceived Russian setbacks and slow Russian progress. He says the only likely way to dispel the narrative is a Russian battlefield victory: if Russia rolls up Donbass, Zaporizhia, and Kherson and then moves further, it becomes harder to sustain the existing story.
Turning to Iran, Glenn asks how US success should be measured in a conflict without a ground war comparable to Ukraine or Vietnam. Mearsheimer says the US is not going to win the war but that two goals must be achieved. He defines goal one as opening the strait so oil flows, including Iranian oil, with payment in dollars and flooding the market. He defines goal two as achieving a nuclear deal, “some variant of the JCPOA,” because the nuclear issue is central while there will be no agreement on missiles or on supporting proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis, and no immediate regime change. He emphasizes that the Memorandum of Understanding structured negotiations so that first the Strait would be opened and shooting would end, and that bombing ended by April 8th after which the conflict shifted to blockade. He argues that while opening the strait is largely achieved, the nuclear issue remains unresolved alongside major economic issues advantageous to Iran: reparations (including a $300 billion fund), frozen assets (over $100 billion), lifting sanctions, and the “toll booth” issue. He says powerful incentives exist for the West to reach a nuclear deal because Iran has the capability to build a bomb and lack of a revised nuclear framework would increase the risk of Israeli nuclear use. He adds that the Iranians wanted the nuclear issue at the end of negotiations because keeping leverage for later mattered after the strait had opened, leaving leverage with the nuclear issue.
Finally, Glenn asks Mearsheimer to define US grand strategy now. Mearsheimer says earlier grand strategy during the Cold War focused on Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf as three key strategic regions outside the Western Hemisphere. He says in the multipolar world the principal threat is China, driving a pivot to Asia. He argues that under Trump, the Western Hemisphere is given high priority through social engineering and military engagement, despite no serious threats there at present. He says the US is also deeply involved in the Persian Gulf, with a major conflict with Iran, and reengaging in Ukraine as well as maintaining East Asia as a “pacing threat.” He concludes that the United States is not prioritizing and that this “militarized state” across multiple regions is not workable long term. He closes by adding two points: the debt problem and the weakness of the American manufacturing base. He argues the Ukraine war shows that in any prolonged war the US needs a large industrial base and depleted stocks can take a long time to replenish; therefore, planning for long wars—like a potential conflict in Asia—requires prioritization.