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Ukraine has been a path of invasion into Russia. To avoid this, Gorbachev agreed to allow Germany to reunify under NATO, but only if NATO didn't expand eastward. Despite this agreement, NATO expanded, and the US withdrew from nuclear weapons treaties, placing missile systems near Moscow. In 2014, the US allegedly overthrew Ukraine's government, leading Russia to annex Crimea to protect its naval base. When the new Ukrainian government attacked ethnic Russians, Russia intervened to protect them. Zelenskyy was elected on a promise of peace by signing the Minsk Accords, but he refused to sign the agreement. Russia intervened, seeking negotiations to keep Ukraine out of NATO. A treaty was drafted, but allegedly, Joe Biden sent Boris Johnson to force Ukraine to abandon it. The result has been a catastrophic loss of life, with the world viewing the US as the aggressor.

The Ukraine war didn't begin with Putin's invasion; it's rooted in broken promises. In 1990, the US assured Gorbachev NATO wouldn't expand eastward, a pledge violated starting in 1994. NATO expansion, coupled with US actions like the 1999 bombing of Serbia and the 2002 withdrawal from the ABM treaty, fueled Russian insecurity. The US involvement in Ukrainian politics, including the 2014 coup, further escalated tensions. Putin's 2021 security proposal, seeking to prevent NATO expansion, was rejected. The US's "open door" policy for NATO enlargement, and its support for Ukraine's continued fight, directly contradicts the assurances made to Gorbachev, leading to the current conflict. This is not a simple case of Russian aggression, but a culmination of decades of broken promises and escalating tensions.

The narrative in the West claims that the invasion was unprovoked, which is false. This conflict was cultivated and encouraged by us, not initiated by Russia. From the start, Russia has sought to avoid confrontation. Putin has stated that if F-16s are deployed from Ukrainian bases, he will not allow attacks on NATO bases, indicating he does not desire conflict. The current stance outlined is not sustainable and cannot continue for much longer.

On February 24, the day of the invasion, neutral observers noted increased artillery fire from Ukraine into Donbas. Ukraine had amassed 110,000 troops at the border, indicating a potential invasion of Donbas. In response, Russia deployed around 130,000 troops to the area. However, Western media portrayed the situation differently, suggesting Russia's sudden intent to invade all of Ukraine. Many believed the U.S. was exaggerating the threat of invasion, viewing it as propaganda. This narrative may have set a trap for Putin, as the U.S. and its allies were prepared for an invasion that they had been predicting.

Russia invaded Ukraine with only 40,000 troops, indicating they did not aim to take over the entire country. Instead, they wanted to bring Ukraine to the negotiating table. In March 2022, Ukrainian President Zelensky and Russian President Putin agreed on a peace agreement based on the Minsk Accords. However, President Biden sent Boris Johnson to Ukraine to sabotage the agreement, leading to war. Since then, 350,000 Ukrainian children and 40-50,000 Russians have died. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin questioned the purpose of the war, while Biden stated it was for regime change in Russia. This conflict is essentially a proxy struggle between Russia and the United States, with the US committing $113 billion to Ukraine, far surpassing the budgets of other organizations.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discussed the trajectory of NATO and Western policy, focusing on Ukraine, Russia, and the broader shift in global power. MacGregor argued that NATO would not survive a Ukrainian crisis and that Russia would intervene, a view he had held publicly in January 2022 before the invasion. He traced his assessment to his extensive experience with NATO and the Warsaw Pact, noting three core conclusions from his career: the Warsaw Pact was unlikely to attack; NATO was a coalition of largely unprepared, limited-liability partners; and Germany was the only major power with the capability to fight effectively against the Soviets, while other Western militaries were fragmented and insufficiently integrated. MacGregor emphasized that Ukraine, being small and lacking the industrial base and manpower needed to outlast Russia, was not in a position to prevail. He highlighted Russia’s unity of command and language, contrasting it with the internal power dynamics and competing national agendas within NATO. He acknowledged that the Russian army at the start of the conflict was designed for territorial defense, not the mission it faced, and noted that it took about a year to build up into a force capable of sustained operations. He also criticized “wishful thinking” in Washington and European capitals about NATO and the European Union, describing a pervasive failure to acknowledge the realities on the ground. Discussion turned to European strategy and American politics. MacGregor argued that Europe has subscribed to an outdated notion of hegemonic peace delivered by NATO, while the United States has grown more powerful, pursuing interests beyond Europe. He attributed much of the Beltway’s stance to the money and power of think tanks and donors who benefit from ongoing confrontation with Russia, China, and Iran, and to a lack of a cohesive national strategy in the Trump administration. He criticized the Beltway for rewarding adherence to a fixed narrative rather than encouraging strategic recalibration, suggesting that President Trump’s instincts might favor ending costly engagements in Europe, though he criticized the administration for lacking a clear strategy and for being surrounded by insiders resistant to change. On Greenland and broader leverage, MacGregor argued that Trump’s approach reflected a view of Greenland as a near-term real estate decision within the security framework, while noting that the broader pivot to Asia had not materialized. He contended that Obama’s pivot to Asia implied a much larger, expensive expansion in Asia that did not materialize after the political will and funding did not align. He insisted there was no real strategy to manage the global balance of power, and asserted that Europe’s fragmentation would intensify unless larger political entities emerged to subsume the smaller nations. Turning to the Russia-Ukraine war, MacGregor warned against the optimism of a ceasefire as a lasting solution, arguing that Russia’s ultimate objective is a security architecture preventing future Ukrainian offensives and reducing threats to southern and northern Russia. He suggested possible outcomes for Odessa—either a forceful capture, or administration as a neutral, free port to prevent its use for military purposes—and stressed that Western negotiations were unlikely to yield productive terms under current conditions. He recalled historical lessons, such as the Brest-Litovsk negotiation in 1918, to illustrate that intractable conflicts could end only through decisive action. MacGregor concluded by arguing that Zelensky’s leadership and the Western push to escalate support for Ukraine contribute to a self-perpetuating conflict, while asserting that a stabilizing change would require a capable, decisive power to alter the current dynamic. He asserted that Trump, while sincere, is a prisoner of powerful domestic and foreign interests and could be unable to deliver a strategic reset without significant structural changes in Washington. He closed with a stark assessment: without decisive action, the conflict risks prolonging and deepening, and the West remains locked in a paralysis regarding Ukraine.

Putin initially sought to avoid war and aimed for a diplomatic solution before February 24, 2022. After the conflict began, he engaged in negotiations with Ukraine, focusing on NATO expansion and seeking a neutral Ukraine, without intentions to annex further territory aside from Crimea. However, the U.S. and U.K. influenced Zelensky to abandon negotiations, believing Ukraine and the West could win the war. Initially, this seemed plausible in 2022, but by 2023, the situation has shifted, indicating a challenging year for Ukraine and a potential advantage for Russia in the conflict.

Putin's intention in the war was to keep NATO, meaning the United States, off Russia's border. After the Soviet Union ended in 1991, the US decided to continue NATO's eastward expansion, formally deciding in 1994 to include Ukraine and Georgia. This expansion began in 1999 and continued in 2004, upsetting Russia. In 2008, the US pushed for NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, which border Russia. Russia protested, fearing the US would react similarly if Russia placed military bases near its borders. In 2014, the US actively worked to overthrow Yanukovych in Ukraine, and later, Ukraine refused to enforce the Minsk agreement, leading to conflict in the Donbas. Putin's initial war intention was to force Zelenskyy to negotiate neutrality, but Ukraine withdrew from near agreement due to US influence, leading to a proxy war with significant Ukrainian casualties.

Putin wants peace talks, but Zelensky refuses due to historical tensions. NATO's eastward expansion angers Russia, leading to conflict in Crimea. Zelensky, elected on promises of peace, faces pressure to abandon peace agreements. Russian troops enter Ukraine to push for negotiations, but Biden's interference leads to more casualties. The situation is dire, with Ukraine suffering heavy losses and international perception turning against the US.

Putin's intention in the war was to keep NATO, meaning the United States, off Russia's border. After the Soviet Union ended in 1991, NATO agreed not to move eastward, but the US later decided to enlarge NATO eastward to Ukraine and Georgia. Despite Russia's unhappiness, NATO enlargement continued. In 2008, the US pushed for NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, leading to protests from Russia. The US then installed missile systems in Poland and Romania. In 2014, the US actively worked to overthrow the Russia-leaning Yanukovych government in Ukraine. Later, Ukraine, supported by the US, refused to enforce the Minsk Two agreement, which would have given autonomy to Russian-speaking regions. In 2022, the US asserted its right to place missile systems anywhere, leading to the war. Putin's initial aim was to negotiate Ukraine's neutrality, but Ukraine withdrew from near-agreement due to US influence, furthering the proxy war.

The United States also wants to end this conflict. And before Putin launched his full invasion, we used every tool we could to try to prevent it. We used every tool diplomatically to prevent this war from starting. Did we really? Nope. The exact opposite is the case. The Russians were desperate to avoid a war. All you have to do is go back and look at the 12/17/2021 letter that Putin sent to both he and Stoltenberg, the head of NATO, and to president Biden, suggesting a deal and talking about getting together to figure out how to shut this conflict down and avoid a war. And we basically in fact, it was Tony Blinken who gave the Russians the high sign. We told them we're not interested, and we continued to push and push and push. And then when the Russians invaded on 02/24/2022, the Russians immediately thereafter sent a signal to the Ukrainians that they wanted to start peace negotiations. They wanted to end the war. This is right after they started it. Why? Because the Russians had no interest in a war. And, the peace negotiations were moving along quite well. There was no final agreement for sure, and one can never be certain that an agreement would have been worked out. But they were making major progress for sure, throughout March and early April. And lo and behold, The United States and the British basically tell the Ukrainians that they should walk away from the negotiations.

Defense industries have grown excessively due to tax funding, but this won't change the outcome of the conflict. Russia is likely to prevail, as Ukraine is in a difficult strategic position in the east. In December 2021, Putin attempted to prevent war by proposing peace talks with NATO, but these were dismissed. As Ukraine amassed troops near the Donbas, Putin felt compelled to act first. This was not a premeditated attack; unlike historical invasions, Russia entered with limited resources, lacking the typical three-to-one advantage for attackers.

Putin sent a treaty to NATO to stop enlargement, but war broke out in Ukraine. The conflict is not about NATO, but democracy and Putin's ambitions. Some compare Putin to Hitler. The root cause is Putin's desire for power. The situation is complex, with both sides at fault. Peace seems unlikely with Putin's actions.

Russia is holding on due to its size and army of a million. An army of 700,000 advancing on a million is slow. Putin wages war as a special military operation to avoid overheating Russian society, keeping it minimal. Russia spends 5-7% of its budget, a background mode of war with volunteers, not mobilization, while Ukraine is collapsing. If Russia drafted 2,000,000, strained the budget by 40%, Ukraine would be over in three months. They're not really fighting because they don't call up 1.5 million men. There is no real war because Medinsky feels sorry for everyone. They attack with fewer than Ukraine defends. War is a threefold superiority in breakthrough areas, 12-15 times concentration of forces, destruction to operational depth. They could create a threefold superiority of manpower and Putin may carry out another mobilization.

Defense industries are bloated with tax dollars. Russia is likely to prevail in the conflict with Ukraine. Putin tried to prevent war by proposing peace to NATO in December 2021, but they ignored him. When armed Ukrainians approached the border, Putin felt compelled to act first. The Russian attack was not preplanned and lacked the typical 3 to 1 advantage of an attacker.

Putin's recent actions can be better understood by the surprising response he received from the West, which initially stated its opposition to a military solution to the conflict. This, in my opinion, was a major mistake on the part of the West. It empowered Putin, who was uncertain and had good intentions, to a degree that he has not been able to come down from until today.

Putin's intention in the war wasn't to take over Ukraine, but to keep NATO, meaning the United States, off Russia's border. After the Soviet Union's end in 1991, an agreement stated NATO wouldn't move eastward, but the US decided to expand NATO eastward, formally deciding in 1994 to include Ukraine and Georgia. NATO enlargement began in 1999, upsetting Russia. By 2008, the US pushed for NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, which Russia protested, drawing a parallel to a hypothetical military base on the US border. In 2014, the US actively worked to overthrow Yanukovych. Putin's intention was to force Zelensky to negotiate neutrality, which initially occurred, but Ukraine withdrew from the agreement, reportedly due to US influence. The US aimed to isolate Russia by controlling the Black Sea, viewing it as a proxy war, while the consequences included significant Ukrainian casualties.

Russia has been invaded three times through Ukraine, and they don't want Ukraine to join NATO. Gorbachev agreed to German reunification under NATO with the promise that NATO wouldn't expand eastward. However, in 1997, plans were made to move NATO eastward, incorporating 15 countries and surrounding the Soviet Union. NATO expanded into 14 new nations and withdrew from nuclear weapons treaties with Russia, placing missile systems in Romania and Poland. The U.S. allegedly overthrew the Ukrainian government in 2014, installing a Western-sympathetic government. Russia then entered Crimea to protect its warm water port. The new Ukrainian government allegedly began killing ethnic Russians in Donbas and Lugans. The Minsk Accords, designed to keep NATO out of Ukraine, were refused by the Ukrainian parliament. Zelenskyy was elected in 2019 promising to sign the Accords, but allegedly pivoted due to threats from ultra-rightists and the U.S. Russia then intervened, aiming to negotiate. A treaty guaranteeing Ukraine wouldn't join NATO was allegedly signed, but Boris Johnson, allegedly under Joe Biden's direction, forced Zelenskyy to abandon it.

Putin initially tried to prevent the war and sought a diplomatic solution. He negotiated with Ukraine, focusing on Crimea. However, his main concern was NATO expansion into Ukraine. If Ukraine had remained neutral, the war might have been avoided. But the US and UK intervened, pressuring Ukraine to abandon negotiations. In 2022, it seemed possible for Ukraine and the West to win, but 2023 has been disastrous for Ukraine, and now it appears Russia will emerge victorious.

This conflict didn't begin recently; it started in 1990 with the promise that NATO wouldn't expand eastward if Germany reunified, a promise quickly broken starting in 1994 with plans to include Ukraine. Expansion began in 1999, and despite initial Russian complaints, Putin initially sought cooperation, even suggesting Russia join NATO. Key turning points included the US withdrawing from the anti-ballistic missile treaty in 2002, placing missile systems in Eastern Europe, and a US-backed regime change in Ukraine in 2014. Despite Putin's repeated requests to halt NATO expansion, the US refused, maintaining an "open door" policy. When Putin proposed a security agreement in December 2021 to prevent NATO enlargement, the White House rejected negotiations. After the military operation began, Zelensky was open to neutrality, but the US and Britain encouraged continued fighting, leading to significant casualties.

Putin claims he wants to negotiate the war, but Zelensky refuses. Historically, Ukraine has faced invasions, including from Hitler. After the Soviet Union's fall, Gorbachev allowed Germany to reunify under NATO, seeking a commitment not to expand NATO eastward. However, NATO expanded into 14 countries, and the U.S. withdrew from nuclear treaties. In 2014, the U.S. supported a government change in Ukraine, prompting Russia to annex Crimea. Zelensky, elected on a peace platform, was pressured not to sign the Minsk Accords. When Russia invaded with a small force, they sought negotiations, but U.S. intervention led to the treaty's collapse. The conflict has resulted in significant casualties, with Ukraine suffering heavily. The perception is that the U.S. appears as the aggressor in this situation.

The war is fundamentally about security for Russia, not territory. Since 1992, Russia has opposed NATO's presence in Ukraine due to historical invasions. Promises made during the Soviet Union's dissolution to not expand NATO eastward have been broken, leading to tensions. In 2014, the U.S. supported the overthrow of Ukraine's elected government, inviting NATO, which prompted Russian responses. Attempts at peace, like the Minsk Accords and later negotiations in 2022, were undermined by Western interference. The conflict has resulted in significant casualties, and the U.S. has spent substantial resources on it, which could be better used domestically. Trump aims to resolve the situation, preferring negotiation over conflict, while Russia's fears of being attacked through Ukraine have been validated by recent developments.

The war in Ukraine began in 2014, not 2021. NATO allies supported Ukraine with training and equipment, making their armed forces stronger by 2022. This support was crucial when Putin decided to attack.

Putin sent a treaty to NATO to stop enlargement, but NATO refused. The conflict isn't about NATO, but democracy in Ukraine. Some compare Putin to Hitler. The main issue is Putin's desire for influence. The war is not about NATO, but Putin's ambitions. It's a complex situation with no easy solution.