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Checklist for summary approach: - Identify the central claim: Putin allegedly sent a draft treaty demanding no further NATO enlargement and invaded Ukraine to prevent NATO expansion. - Distinguish competing framings: is the war about NATO, democracy in Ukraine, or Russia’s sphere of influence? - Note repeated assertions that the issue is not about NATO, and capture variations of that claim. - Include claims about democracy in Ukraine used to justify actions (parties, books/music, elections). - Include the view that NATO is a fictitious adversary and that the conflict centers on strategic aims. - Record references to Russia expanding influence and the West challenging Russian interests. - Include emotional/epithet language (evil, sick, Hitler analogies) and any direct quotes that illustrate intensity. - Mention concluding remarks or sign-off elements (guests, transitions to next segment). Summary: Speaker 0 states that Putin actually sent a draft treaty asking NATO to sign a promise never to enlarge, as a precondition for not invading Ukraine, and that this pledge was refused, prompting Russia to go to war to prevent NATO across its borders. This line frames the invasion as linked to NATO enlargement, a claim that is repeatedly asserted by the same speaker. Across the discussion, however, multiple participants insist the matter is fundamentally not about NATO enlargement, repeatedly saying, “This is not about NATO,” and “not about NATO expansion.” One speaker counters that it was never about NATO and emphasizes a distinction between NATO expansionism and other motives. Amid the debate, another perspective emerges: it is about democratic expansion. One voice argues the war is about defending democracy, describing Ukraine as banning political parties, restricting books and music, and not holding elections, thereby presenting democracy as the rationale for current actions. In contrast, other participants challenge this framing, suggesting the war also concerns Russia’s ambitions to expand its sphere of influence, noting that the West’s direct challenge to Russian interests could have been avoided if not for Western actions. A recurrent claim is that NATO is a fictitious imaginary adversary used to justify Russian policy, with one speaker asserting that NATO is not the real trigger but a construct around Russia’s aims. Another speaker concedes that Russia desires a sphere of influence over Ukraine, and that the two explanations—NATO implications and sphere-of-influence goals—are not mutually exclusive; the West’s responses may have made conflict more likely. The discussion also includes emotionally charged comparisons to Hitler, with references to Hitler invading Poland and to Putin being described as evil or sick, and to the idea of not negotiating with a madman as a parallel to historical figures like Hitler. The segment closes with a reference to Senator Lindsey Graham, thanking him before transitioning to the next portion.

Glenn (Speaker 0) argues that the idea Russia started the war merely for territory is nonsense and that NATO’s involvement is not genuinely helping Ukraine; he says “This is NATO’s war. Nothing we’re doing is actually helping Ukraine. They’re an instrument. They’re a tool.” He contends the conflict began as a failure to build a common European security architecture, and that Russian demands are high, making a peace settlement unlikely. He defines victory in a war of attrition as exhausting the adversary first, suggesting Russia would prefer a neutral Ukraine without NATO, and that if Ukraine remains in NATO orbit, Russia would rather take Odessa. He asserts that NATO expansion revived Cold War logic and that Ukraine’s neutrality was the original Russian objective. He argues that Ukraine’s current war losses and economic strain indicate Russia’s advantage, and claims NATO support has not truly helped Ukraine, noting that in his view NATO and Western actions have been a driver of the conflict, including claims about Istanbul, Minsk, and the 2014 coup. Jonathan (Speaker 1) pushes back on several points. He says the war is not solely about territory and disputes Glenn’s claim that NATO’s role is responsible for the conflict. He emphasizes that if this were simply about NATO, NATO could have destroyed Russia by arming Ukraine more aggressively, yet “they could have done it so much more, effectively,” implying NATO has not fully acted. He sees both sides as losing in a prolonged attritional battle and notes that neither side has achieved decisive victory due to limits on production, economies, and allied support. He argues the conflict is about more than territory and rejects the idea that NATO guarantees Ukraine’s security; he questions whether NATO would credibly defend an attacked ally in Europe. He says the Maidan movement in 2014 was organic and not fully orchestrated by the US, though he concedes US influence existed. He disputes Glenn’s claims about Western NGOs and American orchestration, and he highlights that many Ukrainians initially favored non-NATO paths, with polls showing limited appetite for NATO membership before 2014. He also contends that Ukraine’s future lies beyond mere territorial concessions, pointing to the EU’s role and the broader security order, and he warns that negotiations with a “mafia cabal” running Moscow are unlikely to yield lasting peace, arguing that Putin’s governance frames negotiations as instrumental and potentially destabilizing. Speaker 2 (moderator) asks for reactions to ongoing developments, including Trump and Kushner’s involvement, Putin’s aides’ statements about known positions and lack of progress, and questions about what Russia truly seeks: Donbas control or preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. The participants discuss definitions of “winning” in a war of attrition, the role and credibility of NATO guarantees, and the strategic importance of neutrality versus alliance membership. They debate whether Russia values a neutral Ukraine with security guarantees or insists on broader concessions, and whether Ukraine could ever be secure without a credible deterrent. Glenn asserts that there was never credible deterrence in Ukraine prior to 2014, while Jonathan argues that NATO’s efficacy and unity are questionable, with concerns about member states’ commitments and the real level of Western support. On NATO and security guarantees, Glenn maintains that true security for Ukraine would come from a non-NATO arrangement that prevents Ukraine from becoming a future proxy battleground, suggesting limited, carefully designed guarantees could be acceptable, but that any path toward NATO-like intrusion would be unacceptable. Jonathan says NATO is not delivering credible security and emphasizes that EU membership and security arrangements also factor into Russia’s calculations, with the European Union potentially offering security commitments if Ukraine joined, though that possibility remains contentious for Moscow. They discuss the costs of war, civilian impact, and the global economic ripple effects, including potential impacts on food prices and shipping routes if Russia responds to Ukrainian actions against its maritime traffic. Towards the end, they forecast no immediate peace and emphasize unpredictability due to Western political shifts, central bank asset issues, and external actors like China, North Korea, and Trump’s stance. Glenn predicts Ukraine’s military unraveling and a weakening economy, while Jonathan stresses that a peace deal remains unlikely under current leadership, with outcomes dependent on Western resolve and external support. The conversation closes with a sense that the next months will be dangerous and uncertain, with the broader international order potentially shifting as the conflict persists.

Stanislav Krapivnik and the host discuss the current phase of the war in Ukraine, focusing on the southern front around Zaporizhzhia and the broader strategic implications. - On the southern front, the Russians are advancing along the Zaporizhzhia axis, with the last defensible Ukrainian positions in the area being Arakha (Orakhivka) and Zaporizhzhia city. Gulyaipol has fallen after Russians breached a fortified eastern line by exploiting open terrain and flanking from the east; the Ukrainians’ straight-line northern assaults into Gulyaipol are described as unsustainable under heavy drone and open-ground fire. Russian forces have moved along the river edge and toward a 15-kilometer radius from Zaporizhzhia City, entering suburban zones and pressing east to overhang Arakha from the north. Zaporizhzhia City itself is an open terrain area with a major bridge over the Nieper; the speaker asserts it would be hard to hold under drone and air superiority, and predicts a ruinous but ultimately unsustainable defense there. - The Russians have established a corridor along the river edge, with continued advances toward the eastern outskirts and suburbia north of Zaporizhzhia City. From there, a potential northward push could flank from the south toward Krivyi Rih and Nikolaev, creating a threat toward Odessa if a bridgehead across Kherson is rebuilt and maintained. The argument is that taking Nikolaev is a prerequisite to threatening Odessa and that control of Kherson remains a strategic hinge. - Ukraine’s attempts to retake territory are described as costly and often ineffective PR moves, including “suicidal” assaults on Gulyaipol where fighters up on exposed ground are eliminated by drone and artillery fire. The Russians are said to have flanked Ukrainian positions with new lines north of fortified areas, rolling up fortifications and leaving Ukrainian defenders with few exits. - In the north and center, fighting around Konstantinovka continues, with a southwest push into the area and Ukraine concentrating reserves to stop it. Kosytivka is described as about 65% surrounded, Mirnograd and Pokrovsk are said to be effectively finished, though small pockets hold out. In Sumy and Kharkiv directions, new incursions are occurring but are relatively small; the border is being “flattened” or straightened as Ukraine’s reserves are used. - Weather and terrain play a critical role. Mud, freezing and thaw cycles, fog, rain, and wind hamper heavy mechanized movement and drone operations. Western equipment struggles in mud due to narrow tracks, while Russian equipment with wider tracks traverses better but still encounters problems. Drones do not fly well in fog or rain, and heavy winds impede operations; Russia is leveraging fog to move infantry in close combat. - The broader war and geopolitics are discussed. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is a major target; European willingness to sustain support is framed as a bandage on a jugular wound, insufficient for a long-term victory. The host notes a perceived drift in European strategy, with French signals of compromise and American mediation and hints at how US priorities ( Greenland, Iceland, Iran, Cuba) could pull attention away from Ukraine. The Arashnik hypersonic system is described as capable of delivering a devastating plasma envelope and kinetic energy, with the potential to destroy bunkers and infrastructure anywhere in the world. - On the strategic horizon, there is skepticism about negotiations. The guest dismisses talk of a near-term deal and describes the last 10% of a push as the “bridge too far,” arguing that Russian gains in Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson are eroding Western leverage as they advance kilometer-by-kilometer. Zelensky is portrayed as a stationed beneficiary whose personal and backers’ financial interests may drive bargaining positions, with claims that he does not care about Ukrainians and is motivated by extraction from the conflict. - The guest contends that a gradual Russian advance, backed by logistics and local tactical wins, is more likely than a dramatic collapse, while insisting that a full-scale nuclear exchange between Russia and Europe remains unlikely unless the United States and NATO become deeply involved. The Arashnik discussion notes the potential for a limited exchange, but emphasizes Russia’s stated preference not to escalate, arguing Russia would not “want Europe” but would respond decisively if pushed. - The discussion also touches on global logistics and Western cohesion. A veteran anecdote about US military logistics in 2002 is used to illustrate how NATO’s naval and merchant fleets depend on non-Western partners for transport, underscoring European vulnerability in sustained conflict. Mercedes-Benz re-registering in Russia is noted as a sign of shifting economic realities, with wider implications for European-company strategy amid sanctions and isolation. - The program ends with a return to the practicalities of ongoing combat—daily casualties, the erosion of Ukrainian defensive lines, and the intensifying pressure on Ukrainian supply and morale—before signing off.

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss the recent Russian strike aimed at Lvov, using Soreshnik (Arashnik) missiles, and what it signals about NATO, Western responses, and the trajectory of the war. - Initial facts and uncertainties about the strike: The Russians did not provide a clear description of what they did or where. Doktorov says it’s unclear whether at least one or six to nine missiles were fired, and whether the targets included the largest single gas storage facility in Ukraine. He notes that if a gas storage facility were hit, it would imply enormous destruction and heat Ukraine’s heating, but no confirmation has been given about the exact damage or targets. Reports indicate several missiles were released, but the exact number and impact remain uncertain. A Ukrainian gas storage target would have produced a large explosion if hit. - Context of the attack: The strike was not isolated; it occurred amid drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles hitting multiple cities, including Kyiv. Zelensky urged Ukrainians to stay indoors, suggesting the Russians intended a larger attack. Doktorov argues this demonstrates Russian confidence that their weapons cannot be stopped by existing air defenses. He contends the attack serves as a message to the West, downplaying the significance of Western “domes” or defenses. - Western and Ukrainian reactions: Ukraine’s foreign minister called for a United Nations Security Council meeting, signaling seriousness. Ukraine’s leadership framed the strike as a response to Western provocations and ongoing escalations. - Arashnik weapon system and balance of power: There is discussion about whether Arashnik missiles have multiple warheads or dummy warheads, and how many were launched. The conversation notes that Russia’s use of the weapon, and the surrounding firepower (drones, missiles), are part of a broader strategy to exert pressure on the region and test Western defenses. - Domestic Russian dynamics and deterrence: Doktorov suggests the strike reflects pressure from within Moscow by hardliners who want a stronger, more forceful stance. He contrasts Putin’s leadership with Khrushchev, arguing Khrushchev was decisive and provocative, while Putin has been more restrained but could be compelled to show force by hardline factions. The conversation links recent events (attack on Putin’s residence, the northern energy and military infrastructure strikes, and the broadened use of missiles) to a perceived revival of Russian deterrence. - Role of the United States and Trump: The discussion covers the U.S. role and ambiguities surrounding Trump, including speculation that Trump’s policies may be both deceptive and strategic. They reference reports about Trump’s possible green light for attacks on Russian tankers and the broader implications for NATO and European security. The Financial Times editorial is cited as considering incentives and pushback to manage Trump’s Greenland agenda, suggesting Europe’s limited leverage over Trump, who could push to dissolve or weaken NATO rather than sustain it. - European strategic responses and deterrence: The editors discuss possible European tactics to counter Trump (e.g., threatening to expel U.S. troops), while recognizing that many Europeans prefer to keep U.S. military presence. They debate whether Trump’s aims include breaking NATO or extracting concessions, and consider whether European states will push back or acquiesce to U.S. leadership. - Prospects for peace and endgame: The speakers debate whether negotiations remain possible or are now merely for optics. They discuss whether a direct war between Russia and NATO could emerge if Russia escalates further, especially with energy infrastructure and civilizational effects in Ukraine. They foresee a likely “frozen conflict” outcome, with Russia annexing territories east of the Dnieper and Odessa, leaving Ukraine landlocked and largely excluded from NATO and EU integration, while warning that Western military presence and support could trigger direct confrontation if Russia chooses to escalate. - Civilians and dislocation: They emphasize that as the war intensifies, civilian suffering will grow, with mass displacement and humanitarian crises likely, particularly if Kyiv and other cities become uninhabitable due to outages and destruction. - Overall tone: The discussion underscores deep uncertainty, strategic signaling, and the perception that both Western policies and Russian deterrence are shifting in ways that could escalate or reshape the conflict, with no clear, imminent path to a settlement.

The West is leading Ukraine down a path to destruction by encouraging them to play tough with Russia, with the expectation that the West will defeat Putin. This encourages Ukraine to be unwilling to compromise with Russia, which will wreck the country. A better policy would be to neutralize Ukraine, build up its economy, and remove it from the competition between Russia and NATO. Creating a neutral Ukraine would be in the interest of the West, Russia, and most importantly, Ukraine.

Putin initially sought to avoid war and aimed for a diplomatic solution before February 24, 2022. After the conflict began, he engaged in negotiations with Ukraine, focusing on NATO expansion and seeking a neutral Ukraine, without intentions to annex further territory aside from Crimea. However, the U.S. and U.K. influenced Zelensky to abandon negotiations, believing Ukraine and the West could win the war. Initially, this seemed plausible in 2022, but by 2023, the situation has shifted, indicating a challenging year for Ukraine and a potential advantage for Russia in the conflict.

Checklist: - Identify core claims: war in Ukraine not about NATO; Putin’s draft treaty; democracy vs. other motives; sphere of influence; West’s actions. - Remove repetition and filler; keep unique points. - Preserve key phrases and claims from the transcript where feasible. - Include notable comparisons (Hitler) and the Lindsey Graham reference. - Produce a concise, neutral summary within 378–473 words. Several speakers insist the war in Ukraine is not about NATO enlargement. Speaker 0 notes that President Putin sent a draft treaty to NATO promising no further enlargement as a precondition for not invading Ukraine; we rejected that, and he went to war to prevent NATO from closing near his borders. A flashback reinforces the point: “This is fundamentally not about NATO expansion,” with repeated lines such as “It’s not about NATO,” “Nothing to do with NATO,” and “NATO is not the reason.” Others push an alternative framing: the conflict is about democratic expansion rather than NATO. “This is not about NATO expansion,” one speaker repeats, followed by, “This is about democratic expansion” and “Ukraine is banning political parties… Ukraine restricts books and music… Ukraine won’t hold elections. It’s about democracy.” Still others insist the war has nothing to do with NATO, reiterating statements like “It has nothing to do with NATO” and “Nothing to do with NATO expansion,” while acknowledging that “security purposes” are claimed by some. A thread develops that Russia seeks a sphere of influence over Ukraine, and that the West’s challenges to Russian interests may have contributed to the conflict. “Hang on. I mean, the two are not mutually exclusive. Obviously, Russia has wished for a sphere of influence over Ukraine. But if the West had not challenged Russian interests so directly, I think that there there was a chance to avoid this war.” Putin’s demand for a binding pledge never to enlarge NATO is contrasted with the claim that the invasion is driven by broader ambitions. Moral condemnations appear: “The reason why Putin invaded Ukraine is because of his evil,” with references to “evil” and Putin’s goal to rebuild a Soviet empire, echoed by a comparison to Hitler. “Hitler… He’s a Hitler,” and “We’re back when the Nazis invaded Poland,” are invoked to describe Putin as a new Hitler, a butcher “trying to kill people everywhere in the world, just not Ukraine, Syria.” The discussion closes with thanks to Senator Lindsey Graham and a transition to the next segment: “Alright. Straight ahead.”

In a wide-ranging discussion about the Ukraine war and related strategic developments, Colonel and the host cover several key topics, facts, and analyses. Skyfall/Burevznik nuclear-powered cruise missile - The Skyfall (Burevznik) is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable cruise missile. A test five years ago ended with five deaths and an explosion; a newer test reportedly flew 14 hours and 15,000 miles. Its characteristics include very long range, low-altitude flight to hug terrain, and high maneuverability, making detection and interception challenging. - The U.S. perspective is that it is not a silver bullet, but it represents an advanced capability: maneuvering over great distances, flying subsonically at very low altitude (within about 20 meters of the ground), and potentially approaching from unexpected directions. - Russia claims it cannot be shot down; the guest cautions that nothing is invulnerable until proven operational, but the missile adds a troubling dimension to deterrence and arms competition. - The broader significance is that it accentuates concern about nuclear weapons and underscores the desirability of nuclear arms reduction talks before START’s expiration. Nuclear arms talks and China’s potential role - The guest indicates Russia is pushing for nuclear arms reduction talks before START expires (February). China is conceptually willing to join, according to some Russian sources, but no authoritative statements from China are cited. Any willingness would depend on Western engagement to explore meaningful participation. Poseidon and other advanced weapons - Poseidon is described as a Russian nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicle (a "massive unmanned torpedo drone") intended as a strategic deterrent. Its exact status is uncertain; reports and videos circulate, but it remains largely experimental. - The discussion notes general concerns about U.S. safety from advanced weapons such as Poseidon and other long-range strike capabilities. Encirclement near Donbas: Pokrovsk and Kupiansk - Grasimov claimed 49 Ukrainian battalions are involved in Donbas, with about 31 allegedly encircled near Pokrovsk (for roughly 5,000 troops). Ukraine says supply lines are not cut and that encirclement is not complete. - The analysts explain that Russia has achieved notable progress in Kupiansk and Pokrovsk areas. Ukraine has mounted limited counterattacks in the north near Pokrovsk to disrupt a potential northern encirclement pivot at Rodinsky, but sustained pressure is difficult due to Ukraine’s manpower and logistics constraints. - The northern shoulder near Rodinsky is a focal point: if Russians move beyond Rodinsky, encirclement risk increases. Ukraine’s ability to keep tens of thousands of troops supplied and to hold the city is limited; Russia’s reserves enable more methodical advances. - The overarching view: Ukraine can slow Russian advances but cannot realistically stop or reverse the broader trajectory due to manpower, equipment, and ammunition imbalances. Russia’s advantage in resources makes a prolonged war of attrition unfavorable to Ukraine. Ukraine’s manpower, equipment, and ammunition - The central constraint for Ukraine is manpower. Even with missiles, drones, and air defense, without sufficient infantry to hold and seize territory and to provide reserves, Ukraine cannot win. - Russia’s industrial capacity and reserves enable it to sustain campaigns, whereas Ukraine’s supply and manpower constraints limit sustained operations. - The discussion notes Western missiles (Storm Shadow, Flamingo) and the pace of Tomahawk deliveries, with the implication that gaps in long-range standoff capability affect Ukraine’s offensive and defensive options. Mercenaries and potential foreign troop contributions - Reports of North Korean troops aiding Pokrovsk are discussed. The guest sees little likelihood of other countries sending troops, given the risk of provoking Russia. Mercenary recruitment by other countries is mentioned as a potential but unverified factor. Western sanctions and energy dynamics - The significant development of American sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil (two-thirds of Russia’s oil exports, roughly 4.4 million barrels per day) is analyzed. China’s state-owned majors and India are reducing seaborne imports but still engaging via pipelines or other mechanisms; the long-term impact on Russia’s revenue is likely substantial but may be offset through workarounds. - The guest emphasizes that history shows Russia tends to absorb economic pain and adapt, making it unlikely that sanctions alone will force strategic changes in Russia’s posture. Global Thunder and other security signals - The Global Thunder nuclear command exercise is mentioned, but the guest signals incomplete knowledge of this particular exercise’s details. Other security signals include drone activity near the Kremlin and assertions about Russia’s broader strategic planning, including potential NATO-related concerns and the Arctic buildup. NATO, European militaries, and relative capabilities - The discussion contrasts Europe’s growing modernization and ambition with actual combat experience. Europe’s strategic parity with Russia is viewed as plausible at a high level, but conventional capabilities lag Russia’s real-time battlefield experience and industrial scale. - The guest warns that perception of inevitable war between NATO and Russia could create self-fulfilling dynamics, urging cautious interpretation of escalatory signaling on both sides. Trump’s negotiation tactics and Ukraine peace prospects - The host questions Trump’s peace negotiation tactics: threats of Tomahawk missiles, meetings with Putin, and attempts to tailor a peace deal offering to freeze lines or concede Donbas. The guest describes Trump’s approach as transactional and inconsistent, with fluctuating positions that depend on the perceived personal and political gains. - The guest argues that Russia’s position has remained consistent since 2014-2022, centering on existential-security demands and denazification logic, including ensuring rights and language protections for ethnic Russians within the contested territories. A lasting peace would require a win-win vision that both sides can accept; transactional bargaining alone is unlikely to lead to a durable settlement. Venezuela and broader geopolitics - The discussion notes a Wagda-linked cargo flight to Venezuela amid sanctions evasion talk, with implications of mercenaries or military parts and a broader strategic alignment with Russia. The host and guest agree that U.S. regime-change impulses in Venezuela complicate international norms, risk escalation, and could inadvertently shift attention away from Ukraine. Overall, the conversation traces the evolving military balance in Ukraine, the emergence of new weapons systems and strategic deterrence concerns, the limits of Western capabilities and sanctions, and the complex interplay of diplomacy, negotiation tactics, and geopolitical aims shaping the conflict and potential resolutions.

- The discussion centers on whether European actions against Russia amount to a NATO-wide escalation and could lead to direct confrontation with Russia outside Ukraine, given recent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure and civilian ships in the Black Sea, including a Russian oil tanker in the Mediterranean with reports of drones launched from Greece. Putin reportedly vowed retaliation, and the guests consider how European and U.S./NATO support for Ukraine factors into this dynamic. - Daniel Davis argues that a segment of the Western alliance wants a conflict with Russia, framing it as peace on their terms from a position of weakness. He says there is little consideration for Russia’s security requirements or a mutually acceptable peace, and that ignoring Russia’s security concerns has driven the current cycle of escalation. He notes that Western actions since 2021–2022 have ignored the Russian side and pursued war aims on Western terms, contributing to a deteriorating situation and increasing casualties on the Ukrainian side. - Davis contends that Russia has been reticent to respond to many provocations with significant actions outside Ukraine, implying that Moscow has avoided a full-scale escalation that could threaten NATO. He predicts that Putin will respond to Western strikes on Russian targets, possibly increasing pressure on Odessa and other civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, with a tit-for-tat pattern as Russia leverages its greater capacity to hit Western shipping and infrastructure. - He asserts that since 2023, the West’s approach has not reversed the battlefield dynamics; sanctions, intelligence inputs, and heavy weapon transfers have not pushed Russia out of Ukraine and have allowed NATO and European stockpiles to deplete while Russia continues to build up in key categories (missiles, air defense, logistics). He claims Europe’s commitment of large sums to Ukraine will further strain their economies and shorten their stockpiles, potentially weakening Western readiness for a wider conflict. - The guest stresses that Russia’s strategy appears to be “go slow” in Ukraine to maintain pressure without triggering a broader European or NATO intervention, while building up stockpiles to prepare for a possible expansion of war if needed. He notes that Russia has generated a stockpile advantage in missiles (including Oreshniks) and air defense that could be decisive in a broader conventional war. - The discussion covers Oreshnik missiles, with Davis explaining Russia’s aim to maximize production and use if needed, not merely deter. He argues that Western air defenses would be ineffective against such systems and that Russia’s broader stockpiling and production could outpace Western depletion. He suggests Russia’s buildup is intended to enable a decisive move if NATO or Western forces escalate, and that the West’s capacity to sustain prolonged high-tempo combat is limited. - Both speakers discuss Odessa as a likely target if Russia deems it necessary to retaliate against Western support for Ukraine, noting that recent strikes on bridges, trains, and energy facilities in the region indicate growing Russian intent to disrupt Ukraine’s rear and logistics in the event of a front-line escalation. They consider whether Russia could seize Odessa if Western concessions are not forthcoming, and whether European leaders would respond decisively if Russia moves against Ukrainian ports. - The hosts warn that Western rhetoric about a “just and lasting peace” may be misaligned with Russia’s goals and that the risk of a broader conflict—potentially involving nuclear considerations—exists if provocations continue. They caution that if the conflict widens, all sides—Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the United States—could suffer heavy losses, and express concern about the potential for miscalculation as new weapons systems and security arrangements come into play before the year ends.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a series of escalating tensions and strategic assessments around Ukraine, NATO, Russia, and the United States. - Nightfall concept and implications: The British Ministry of Defence announced a new deep-strike ballistic missile for Ukraine, Nightfall, intended to carry a 200 kilogram warhead with a 500 kilometer range to strike Moscow. Scott Ritter says Nightfall is a joke: it is still developing, with a budget around £9,000,000, no production facility, no prototype built or tested, and a target of producing 10 missiles a month at about £800,000 each. He argues the idea is not a real weapon but an underfinanced concept, and that Russia will watch with interest while the plan remains insufficient to matter. - Britain’s strategic credibility and potential retaliation: Ritter contends that Britain could strike Moscow with such missiles only once before Russia responds decisively, potentially even with nuclear weapons. He asserts Russia resents Britain as a “failing power” and believes there is “great hatred” toward Britain among Russia’s political elite; he predicts Russia would not tolerate continued British escalation. - Western troop commitments and feasibility: The discussion also covers the idea of sending British troops to Ukraine. Ritter asserts that Britain cannot deploy 7,600 troops nor sustain them logistically or politically; he describes the British military as incapable of a rapid deployment and notes the overall size and combat-readiness of the British forces as insufficient for sustained operations. - The “keep Ukraine in the fight” plan: The speakers discuss the UK’s strategy to keep Ukraine in conflict as a political/propaganda effort, rather than a path to victory. Ritter calls much of Ukraine’s and Western rhetoric “the theater of the absurd” and says many actions by Ukraine are designed for propaganda rather than strategic success. He highlights drone strikes on Caspian oil rigs as demonstrative of “propaganda purposes.” He also notes that Russia’s response includes power and water outages across Ukraine and a strong retaliatory capability. - Arashnik and Russia’s nuclear posture: They discuss Russia’s Arashnik program, noting that initial launches were treated as test missiles, with a brigade deployed in Belarus and other units being prepared for fielding. Ritter asserts that Arashnik is now a permanent part of Russia’s strategic posture, and that Russia is deploying production-quality missiles, though exact production rates are uncertain. - Arms control and the European security architecture: Ritter claims there is a “total disconnect from reality” in Europe, asserting arms control is effectively dead. He argues Russia has advantages in intermediate and strategic nuclear forces, while U.S. forces are aging and expensive to modernize; he predicts a coming arms race with Russia holding an advantage. He is critical of attempts at extending New START and expresses belief that arms control is no longer feasible given the current political environment and U.S. leadership. - The Alaska “spirit” and U.S. foreign policy: The conversation discusses the 2024-25 era, with mentions of Donald Trump and the CIA’s role in anti-Russian operations. Ritter argues that U.S. actions, including cyber and drone activities against Russian targets (oil refineries and military assets), reflect a CIA-led strategy against Russia. He contends that Trump’s approach has shifted over time from tentative peace prospects to aggressive posturing, and that American leadership lacks trustworthiness in negotiations. - Intelligence and operational transparency: The dialogue touches on the May 2024 and June 2025 attacks on Russian deterrence assets (e.g., Engels base, and the Kerch Bridge operation). Ritter argues that the intelligence community (notably MI6 and the CIA) uses psychological operations to undermine Putin, but that Russia’s restraint and measured responses indicate limited willingness to escalate beyond a point. - Toward a broader European security collapse: Ritter foresees NATO’s dissolution or “death,” suggesting that the United States will pursue bilateral arrangements with European states as NATO weakens. He predicts Greenland and broader European security would become dominated by U.S. strategic interests, diminishing European autonomy. - On Trump’s transformation and democracy in the U.S.: The speakers debate Trump’s evolution, with Ritter arguing that Trump’s rhetoric and actions reveal a long-standing pattern of deceit and anti-democratic behavior, including alleged manipulation of elections and the undermining of international law. He depicts a grim view of the constitutional republic’s future, suggesting that Trump has consolidated power in ways that erode checks and balances. - Final reflections: The conversation closes with a weighing of whether peace can be achieved given deep mistrust, the CIA’s alleged influence in Ukraine, and the wider geopolitical shifts. Both acknowledge growing instability, the potential end of NATO as a cohesive alliance, and the possibility of a broader, more dangerous security environment if current trajectories persist.

The West is leading Ukraine down a path to destruction by encouraging them to play tough with Russia, with the expectation that the West will defeat Putin. This encourages Ukraine to be unwilling to compromise with Russia, which will wreck the country. A better policy would be to neutralize Ukraine, build up its economy, and remove it from the competition between Russia and NATO. Creating a neutral Ukraine would be in the interest of the West, Russia, and most importantly, Ukraine.

Mike opens by noting cautious optimism about a peace agreement, while acknowledging widespread skepticism and asking why negotiations have stalled. He cites Rubio’s Vanity Fair quote: offers exist to stop the war on current lines, but Russia allegedly rejects them. He asks for thoughts on Putin’s intentions and whether the war aims extend beyond the Donbas into broader Ukrainian territory, given repeated peace deals rejected over territorial concessions. Jonathan responds that the conflict has never been primarily about territory for Putin. He argues the core threat is internal to Russia: Ukraine’s political and democratic developments since 2014 challenge Putin’s regime and business model, creating an intrinsic threat to his rule. He suggests Putin seeks to keep Ukraine weak as a buffer zone between Western democracy and Russia, framing democracy and Western reform as a catastrophe for Russians. He emphasizes that Ukraine’s progress since 2014—reducing oligarchic influence, fighting corruption, building civil society—constitutes the real threat, not NATO expansion. He adds that deterrence considerations, not territorial gains, dominate Russia’s calculus, making a permanent settlement difficult so long as Ukraine remains Western-leaning and democratic. Mark counters, insisting that a true NATO-Ukraine peace would align with American terms, while acknowledging publicly stated US/NATO roles as proxies. He asserts that Russia wants a permanent settlement that keeps Ukraine out of NATO and returns Ukraine to constitutional neutrality, arguing that the Kyiv regime’s repression of Russian-speaking East Ukraine makes concessions unacceptable. He claims that the US and Europe have used media and NGOs to influence Ukraine, but notes that before full-scale war, Ukrainian media was oligarch-influenced, and that since 2014 independent outlets have proliferated, challenging Zelensky’s government. He contends that US funding via USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy served to promote Western values, and that Russia views NGOs as foreign-influenced instruments rather than genuine civil society. Mike asks whether US and Western funding of NGOs represents a push to gain influence inside Ukraine, and whether this influences Russia’s calculations. Jonathan acknowledges NGO funding sometimes lacked a coherent strategic objective but aligns with traditional Western aims like freedom of navigation and press, while noting Russia’s suspicion of foreign influence. He argues that Ukraine now has a diverse media landscape, with ministers’ accountability increasing, and he states that Ukraine’s East Ukrainian population at times favors greater autonomy or varied allegiances, though not necessarily alignment with Russia, and cautions against overgeneralizing. Mark returns to the NGO funding debate, noting Russia’s use of government-backed NGOs is far less extensive than Western interference prior to 2014. He argues that civil society funded by a foreign government is not a genuine civil society. He attacks the West’s “freedom of navigation” narrative by pointing to recent US actions in the Caribbean and US actions in international waters, challenging the validity of Western claims about universal freedoms. He also accuses the Kyiv regime of suppressing opposition and bans on 21 political parties, while disputing the extent of Western influence in shaping Ukrainian politics. The conversation shifts to Russia’s broader strategic goals and the potential for a freezing of lines. Mark argues that freezing lines is impossible for Russia because it would leave Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia under a Kyiv regime deemed anti-Russian by Moscow. Jonathan emphasizes that the conflict could only end with a regime change in Kyiv, or a fundamental political transformation in Ukraine, suggesting that peace is unlikely while the Putin regime remains in power. He predicts that Russia seeks to erase perceived internal threats and shift Ukraine away from the West, whereas Mark asserts that Moscow’s aim is not limited to limited territorial gains but to neutralizing Ukraine politically. They discuss Western rearmament: Germany’s move toward conscription and Europe’s overall buildup, with concerns about domestic political forces (AFD, Le Pen, Meloni) possibly aligning with Kremlin narratives. Jonathan warns that European rearmament could be destabilized if friendly parties gain influence, while Mark argues that Europe’s rhetoric is not matched by decisive deterrence, prompting continued Russian pressure. Towards the end, Mike asks whether either side believes negotiations will lead to a real settlement. Mark says no; he believes the war will end on the battlefield with neither party accepting the other’s terms. Jonathan agrees that the conflict may endure for generations, with a possible hybrid warfare phase if direct conflict escalates, and he notes that China could benefit strategically if Europe becomes preoccupied or destabilized. In closing, Mike thanks the guests, who acknowledge the complexity and intractability of a definitive peace in the near term.

Jeffrey Sachs and the host discuss the four-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and reference the 12-year anniversary of the NATO-backed coup in Ukraine. They frame the conflict as humanitarian and strategic disaster, arguing it risks Europe and potentially nuclear escalation. They question why the war persists given high stakes. Sachs argues the war started from Western delusions in the 1990s that the US could bring Russia into a US-led world and reduce Russia to a secondary power or even fragment it. He cites Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1990s predictions of a divided Russia as evidence of “triumphalism” and says when Russia resisted Western demands after 2014 and 2022, those resistances were used by Western politicians to justify prolonging the conflict. He condemns Boris Johnson for saying Ukraine could not sign a peace with Russia without threatening Western hegemony, calling the situation “millions of lives” lost over a game of Western dominance. He characterizes European leaders as complicit, noting resistance to NATO enlargement in Europe but eventual acquiescence, and criticizes German leadership (Merkel, Scholz, and Scholz’s successor, Mertz/Merz?—context suggests Olaf Scholz and then Olaf Scholz and Friedrich Merz) for lack of truthful or constructive intervention. He emphasizes that the push for NATO enlargement and the Maidan coup signaled a failure by Europe to prevent war, with specific reference to the 2008 Bucharest Summit (NATO enlargement), the 2014 Maidan coup and the 2015 Minsk agreements, which Sachs claims Germany and France did not enforce. He asserts Merkel initially resisted but capitulated on enlargement, and that Minsk II was treated as a holding period to build Ukraine’s strength for war, a point he attributes to Merkel’s later statements. He argues Germany bears high responsibility as the largest EU member and a central actor in these decisions. Sachs then discusses what could have prevented the war, arguing that Germany should have counseled peace with Putin and engaged directly with the goal of avoiding escalation. He asserts that Merkel, Merkel’s successors, and the German leadership failed to prevent the conflict, calling for German initiative to seek peace. The conversation shifts to the possibility of negotiated settlement. The host notes Russia views NATO expansion and Ukraine’s invasion as existential threats, while Ukraine sees an existential threat from the invasion. The host asks what settlements might look like and what role the US and Europe should play. Sachs reiterates Germany as the key actor and calls for direct diplomacy between Germany and Russia to explore peace, suggesting a need for a political settlement and a reconsideration of Ukraine’s status. Sachs expands the discussion to global order. He references Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard, describing how Russia’s shift toward Eurasia and China challenged Western assumptions. He argues the West’s sanctions failed to keep Russia aligned with Europe, pushing Russia toward China and India, and turning the world toward multipolarity. He characterizes the US as a declining hegemon and Europe as demoralized and divided, with BRICS and other regions seeking prosperity through partnerships with China, India, and Russia. He argues that Europe should move away from Russophobia and toward collective security. The hosts touch on Joe Biden’s 1997 Atlantic Council remarks and Joseph Chamberlain’s imperial rhetoric as examples of misjudgments about global power dynamics. Sachs concludes by underscoring the need for a more realistic approach to the world order to avoid further conflict, and the host agrees to continue the discussion in the future.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss the evolving, multi-layered negotiations surrounding the Ukraine war, stressing that talks involve more than Ukraine and Russia, extending to US-Russia dynamics and broader European and global interests. - They note that trilateral talks among Ukraine, Russia, and the US have begun, with the first phase completed. The conversation emphasizes that the US-Russia dimension is crucial because the conflict is viewed as a proxy war between NATO and Russia, and that “the US toppled the government in Ukraine” with intelligence support, military planning, weapons, and targets coordinated through backchannels. The implication is that any durable settlement would require some deal between the US and Russia to de-escalate the proxy confrontation. - On US-Russia relations, Speaker 1 identifies several dimensions: renewal or non-renewal of New START, and the functioning of embassies, as negative signs, but points to positive changes elsewhere. He highlights Kislyov’s Sunday night program remarks, noting Russia’s proposal to contribute $1,000,000,000 to become a permanent board member using frozen US assets (total US assets frozen around $5 billion in equivalent value). He mentions that Trump was asked about using frozen assets and reportedly declined, but the implication is that Moscow views this as a potential lever. Kislyov also notes that the additional $4,000,000,000 in frozen assets would be allocated to reconstruction in Palestine, and that Russia’s participation on the board would influence regional diplomacy, including with Palestinians and Israelis. - The discussion suggests that the absence of official diplomacy (e.g., embassies) does not necessarily indicate a lack of progress, arguing that backchannels between Putin and Trump are functioning well. The speakers discuss the broader context of Russia’s strategic posture, including alleged advancements in space-based and other new military capabilities that are not fully captured by New START, and the sense from Moscow that the US is preparing a space-based missile system that would enable first strikes, a point the Russians emphasize in public discourse. - On Ukraine, Zelensky’s stance is described as uncompromising: Ukraine will not cede territory and will demand security guarantees, which could undermine a neutral status. The dialogue suggests Zelensky is using a posture of firmness to buy time for negotiations, with Ukrainian leadership potentially exchanging assurances for a broader settlement that could include regime change and financial support for reconstruction. - The potential for compromise is discussed in terms of strategic timing and leverage. The Russians’ primary interest is regime change, and there could be an understanding with Trump about a democratic replacement in Ukraine, possibly replacing Zelensky with a pro-Russian administration under conditions tied to substantial monetary reparations for reconstruction. The timing and mechanism, including potential referenda or buyouts, are considered critical elements that could determine the settlement’s architecture. - The European role is analyzed as increasingly fraught. Europe’s diplomatic engagement has been limited, but Moscow is open to leveraging European assets in a peace process. Lavrov’s stated position that talks with Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission leadership are unlikely, and the broader fragmentation within Europe (France, Germany, Finland, the EU leadership) are highlighted as complicating factors. There is speculation about European figures who could bridge talks, such as Finland’s Stubb, though there is skepticism about Kalas’s leadership within the EU. - The speakers speculate that Davos and Trump’s stance have reshaped European perceptions of US leadership, with European elites increasingly questioning the reliability of US-backed security guarantees. The conversation closes with an expectation that the year 2025 will be dominated by Trump as a central variable in resolving global issues, and that Moscow remains optimistic about achieving a settlement with Washington while signaling a tougher stance toward Ukraine if needed. Overall, the discussion portrays a complex, interwoven set of negotiations across US-Russia, Ukraine-Russia, and European dynamics, with backchannels, asset controls, potential regime-change considerations, and timing as key levers for reaching any settlement.

Richard Sakwa, a professor of politics at the University of Kent, discusses the Ukraine war, diplomacy, and the deeper roots of the conflict across four to five interlinked levels, emphasizing how shifting narratives and power dynamics shape the path to peace. - Current phase and diplomacy: Sakwa notes that Europe is shifting from a war-framed narrative (unprovoked invasion, good-versus-evil) toward recognizing mutual security concerns and engaging in diplomacy. He cites the evolving European appetite for diplomacy, referencing past proposals (Kirill Dmitriev–Steve Witkoff peace framework) and recent 20-point peace plan, which Moscow finds unacceptable in full. He highlights that Washington and European capitals are now planning to engage Moscow more substantively, with the battlefield still central for months, before durable diplomacy can take hold. He frames this as a liminal moment where deeper root causes must be addressed if negotiations are to succeed. - Four to five layers of roots: Sakwa articulates a multi-layered framework to understand the war’s origins. 1) Internal Ukrainian layer: He contrasts two visions of Ukrainian statehood since 1991. The monist vision posits a primordial Ukrainian nationalism that can shed Russian (and Polish-Lithuanian) colonial legacies to reveal an inherent Ukrainian state. The alternative “Russo-Ukrainian” vision (the book and concept he has developed) portrays Ukraine as pluralistic, tolerant, multilingual, and multi-confessional. Moscow’s demand for denazification and protection of linguistic and cultural rights sits within this frame, illustrating a core domestic-divide issue in Ukraine. 2) Russo-Ukrainian interstate/intercultural layer: Sakwa emphasizes a mimetic dynamic (citing Rene Girard) where proximity and shared space between Russia and Ukraine fuel intense conflict, rooted in their shared East Slavic, Orthodox-leaning civilizational space and long entwined history. This layer explains why hostility persisted for decades and why nationalist tendencies in Ukraine resist rapprochement with Russia. 3) Intra-European layer: He argues we must go back to 1945 and beyond to understand postwar arrangements. The post-1990s “Atlanticist” settlement—NATO and EU leadership shaping Europe—marginalized Russia, fueling security dilemmas and NATO enlargement. He suggests that the Cold War’s end did not produce a pan-European continental unity; instead, European powers reinforced a Western-centered security order that contributed to the current conflict. 4) United States–Russia superpower layer: He describes a deteriorating US-led framework where attempts to manage Europe and Russia were compromised by changing US policies and leadership (including Trump’s unpredictable positioning). The envisaged peace by “above” (grand bargains among great powers) has faltered, revealing a weakened Western-led order and fragile strategic coherence. 5) Civilizational and new security architecture layer (potential fifth): He mentions a broader civilizational struggle narrative (Russia versus Western liberal order) and the possibility of shifting toward a post-Western Russia that remains European in identity. He also notes discussions about building parallel institutions (BRICS, SCO) as alternatives to Bretton Woods and a more plural security order, including the idea of a pan-European, post-American European security framework. - Civilizational and identity dynamics: The dialogue highlights decolonial tendencies in Ukraine, cautioning that portraying Russia as an imperial relic risks domestic and international instability (purging culture, language, media, and political parties). Solzhenitsyn’s observation about Russians and Ukrainians being both brotherly and destabilizing is invoked to illustrate the double-edged sword of deep cultural ties. Sakwa argues for a nation-building Ukraine that is distinct from Russia while not being anti-Russian, to avoid inflaming internal and regional security tensions. - European strategic trajectory and a post-American Europe: The conversation critiques ongoing European war-centering and NATO expansion, warning that a divided Europe risks becoming dependent on the US and vulnerable to external powers, including China. Sakwa advocates a pan-continental vision—potentially a North Eurasian confederation—rooted in UN Charter norms and multilateral cooperation, rather than renewed bloc confrontation. He fears the United Nations system itself is deteriorating under great-power politics, as seen in US withdrawals and the politicization of international bodies. - Outlook and optimism: Both speakers acknowledge a subdued optimism about small openings for diplomacy but remain broadly pessimistic about rapid resolution. Sakwa emphasizes the need for new ideas and a reimagined security architecture, warning that the current trajectory risks prolonging conflict and deepening divisions. In closing, Sakwa stresses that diplomacy is on the agenda but remains uncertain in its effectiveness, with a wary prognosis for a quick end to the war. The discussion underscores that resolving Ukraine’s crisis requires addressing deep-rooted structural issues across Ukrainian internal politics, Russo-Ukrainian relations, European security order, US–Russia dynamics, and broader civilizational narratives, while pursuing a cooperative, rules-based international framework.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some action, so we could say we had to respond to set the stage for a military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert CIA action to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective is to get control of the oil. That's the number one priority, with an eye toward the risk of a renewed Iran conflict and the prospect of shutdown of the Persian Gulf, and the need to have an alternative supplier. Ukraine defeating Russia was the plan, and Russia’s military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: What’s your initial reaction to Venezuela? I talked to John Kuriaki who said to read naval movements to gauge what the military plans. The buildup on the coast of Venezuela is significant. They’ve got 14, 12 warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing or this is a Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the Central America branch, and the CIA’s analytical thrust was to provoke Noriega into taking action to justify a response and invasion. That happened in 1988. But that time there were US bases in Panama; Quarry Heights was full. Southern Command was there. Now Southern Command has moved to Miami, just near Southcom. Another issue: within the military, the concept of supported and supporting commands means the special operations command (SOCOM) would normally be the supporting commander, but here Southern Command would be subordinate to SOCOM, which is problematic because SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war. Delta Force, SEAL Team Six, and others are light infantry for raids, not mass warfare. So launching shells or sending ground forces won’t solve Venezuela; terrain is rugged and favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, body bags would likely exceed those from Iraq and Afghanistan. Venezuelans will fight, and insurgents from Brazil and Colombia could join. Decapitation strikes against Maduro could provoke an insurgency that the US would struggle to pacify. Mario: Could we see a decapitation strike like Israel against Hezbollah and Iran? Larry: Decapitating Maduro would still leave loyalists and other actors with weapons; an insurgency could erupt, and the US would be unable to pacify it. The real objective here is unclear. The State Department’s INL/INSCR programs have long documented Venezuela as a transit point for drugs; Trump claimed fentanyl is the issue, but most cocaine also goes to Europe. The 2018 Trump era mentioned the Trendy Aragua as a pretext to justify covert actions; I believe Trump signed a finding authorizing a CIA operation to remove Maduro, leading to Guaidó, but that failed. The broader agenda appears to be regaining oil influence and countering Russia, China, and Iran’s influence in Venezuela. Mario: Elaborate the agenda and strategy behind these strikes on boats out of Venezuela and Trump’s public acknowledgement of a CIA covert operation. What’s the strategy and intention? Larry: The objective is to restore oil control in Venezuela and reduce adversary influence. Maduro once aligned with the CIA, and Chavez/Maduro have maintained cordial relations with Moscow and Beijing. The US aims to curtail BRICS and reduce Venezuelan ties to Russia, China, and Iran, potentially moving Venezuela away from the dollar-based system. The theory that this is a message to Putin circulates, but if that were the aim, it’s a poor strategy given the broader geopolitical dynamics in Syria, Iran, and the Palestinian-Israeli arena. The US previously overpromised in the Red Sea and failed to secure freedom of navigation, signaling limited military capacity for large-scale campaigns. The objective of any Venezuela action must be concrete, otherwise it risks entanglement in an insurgency. Mario: Turning to general foreign policy under Trump. What about the national security strategy? Europe’s criticisms, and Trump’s approach to Ukraine—Witkoff and Kushner meeting Putin? Larry: The 2025 national security strategy signals change, but these documents are not blueprints; they’re guidelines. Europe is being asked to step up, while the US distances itself, arguing Europe’s resources and industrial capacity have diminished while Russia and China shift. Europe’s censorship and defense spending are under scrutiny. The US–UK intelligence relationship still lingers, but overall the West’s ability to project force is questioned. Russia and China’s relationship is deep and mutually reinforcing; the Rand Corporation’s earlier ideas that Ukraine would defeat Russia to force Moscow to join the West have not materialized. Ukraine’s fight has forced Russia to mobilize and shift front lines; casualty counts are contested, but Russia’s front has expanded with a larger force and higher attrition. Mario: What about Ukraine negotiations and Putin’s terms? Larry: Putin’s terms (as stated on 06/14/2024) are: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw forces from those territories before negotiations begin. An election must be held in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president, potentially replacing Zelenskyy, and Russia would then talk to Ukraine. Russia’s stance treats these territories as non-negotiable; freezing lines is not acceptable to Russia. If negotiations fail, Russia is likely to maintain control over large parts of Donbas and southern Ukraine, potentially extending into Kharkiv and Odessa. Western military support is insufficient in scale to match Russia’s production; Russia’s oil revenue remains a significant portion of GDP, and the global south is pivoting toward BRICS, with Modi’s meeting signaling stronger ties with Russia and China. The strategic trend is a shift away from Western dominance toward a multipolar order. Mario: Larry, appreciate your time. Larry: Pleasure as always, Mario.

Putin initially tried to prevent the war and sought a diplomatic solution. He negotiated with Ukraine, focusing on Crimea. However, his main concern was NATO expansion into Ukraine. If Ukraine had remained neutral, the war might have been avoided. But the US and UK intervened, pressuring Ukraine to abandon negotiations. In 2022, it seemed possible for Ukraine and the West to win, but 2023 has been disastrous for Ukraine, and now it appears Russia will emerge victorious.

The discussion centers on the Ukraine peace process, with Trump reportedly optimistic after his envoy discussed ceasefire conditions in Moscow and a call with Putin expected. A key point is that Russia seeks recognition of the war's fundamental causes, including Ukraine's neutrality, territorial settlements, and security arrangements. Publicly, Ukraine continues to demand NATO membership and full territorial recovery, which are not conducive to peace. The US may be shifting, suggesting NATO will not enlarge, territorial concessions are needed, and security arrangements won't involve the US. However, Ukraine's agreement on these points is uncertain. European leaders' bellicosity is contrasted with potential behind-the-scenes diplomacy. NATO expansion is viewed as a core issue, with Crimea unlikely to return to Ukraine. The failure of the Istanbul process in April 2022, allegedly blocked by the West, worsened Ukraine's territorial situation. Security arrangements should involve the UN Security Council, including Russia and China. Some European leaders privately acknowledge NATO enlargement to Ukraine is unlikely, despite public statements, which is seen as dangerous lying. The purpose and future of NATO are also questioned, given its original purpose has expired.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some sort of action. They could say, oh, well, we gotta go respond to this to set the stage for our military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert action by the CIA to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective, get control of the oil. That's the number one priority. And I think it's being done with an eye looking forward, recognizing the potential risk. If conflict is renewed with Iran, prospect of the shutdown of Persian Gulf— Mario: Ukraine defeated Russia. Larry: Yeah. That was the plan. Russia's military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: Let’s talk Venezuela. What’s your initial reaction? When John Kuriaki suggested the best indicator is naval movements, and the buildup off Venezuela is significant. I’ve heard they have 14, twelve warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing? Is this Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the CIA’s Central America branch. They tried to provoke Noriega into action to justify invasion, which happened in December 1988. What’s different now is the base infrastructure. In Panama, Quarry Heights was full; Southern Command was there. Southern Command has moved to Miami. The weaponization of the idea of a “supported vs. supporting” commander is reversed here: Southern Command would be subordinate to Special Operations Command. SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war; they’re light infantry, raids, hostage rescue. So the question is: what will the ships actually do? Shells into Venezuela won’t defeat Venezuela. Ground forces would require mass, and Venezuela is three times the size of Vietnam with rugged terrain that favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, you’d stack body bags far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Mario: Do Venezuelans have the will to fight Maduro? Larry: Yes. It will rally insurgents from Brazil and Colombia. If we decapitate Maduro, there are loyalists with weapons; an insurgency could follow, and the US would be hard-pressed to pacify it. The State Department’s INL/INSCR reports on narcotics note Venezuela as a transit point for marijuana and some cocaine, with fentanyl less central than claimed by Trump. The 2018 emphasis on Trendy Aragua looked CIA-driven. Trump reportedly signed a covert action finding in 2018 to remove Maduro, leading to the Guaidó fiasco; that covert action included some public diplomacy via USAID. The objective now, as you asked, is oil control and curtailing Russia, China, and Iran’s influence, with an eye toward BRICS. Mario: Could there be a decapitation strike on Maduro, and would someone like Maria take over? Larry: A decapitation strike could spark insurgency; the US would not be able to pacify it. The broader agenda seems to include a strategy to seize oil and reduce regional influence by Russia and China. Venezuela’s role as a transit point and possible BRICS alignment complicates any straightforward regime-change scenario. Mario: Moving to general foreign policy under Trump. The national security strategy (NSS) for 2025 signals a shift, but you question how binding NSS papers are. What did you make of it, and how does it relate to Ukraine? You’ve noted Trump isn’t serious about peace in Ukraine on some occasions. Larry: The NSS is a set of guidelines, not a blueprint. Europe is being asked to step up, the US distancing itself from Europe, and the strategic relationship with Europe is damaged by the perception of long-term reliability and sanctions. The document highlights China as an economic rival rather than an enemy; it criticizes Europe’s defense spending and censorship, and it frames Russia as less of a direct threat than before, though the reality is nuanced. The US-EU relationship is strained, and the US wants Europe to shoulder more of the burden in Ukraine while maintaining strategic pressure. Mario: What about Ukraine? Zelensky’s negotiation posture, security guarantees, and the Moscow terms? Larry: Putin spoke on 06/14/2024 with five Russian demands: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk are permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw its forces from those republics; there must be an election in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president (the Russians argue Zelensky is illegitimate for not holding elections); they suggest a successor to Zelensky and elections within 90 days. Freezing lines in Donbas is not accepted by Russia; the Russians claim further territory may be annexed with referenda. If peace talks fail, Russia is likely to push to occupy Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Odessa, potentially Kyiv. Western support is insufficient to alter that trajectory, given Russia’s large artillery and drone production. The US and Europe cannot match Russia’s drone and shell output; even if they supply Tomahawks, escalation risks, including nuclear considerations, grow. Russia’s economy and war capacity remain robust, and the BRICS poles are strengthening as Western leverage wanes. Mario: What about sanctions strategy and Russia’s oil revenues? Larry: Oil remains a significant but not decisive portion of Russia’s GDP. The West’s sanctions are not enough to force collapse; Russia has endured the 1990s and remains resilient. BRICS cooperation and the shift to the Global South are changing the global order, with Russia and China deepening ties and reducing Western influence. The war in Ukraine has not produced a decisive Western victory, and the global south is moving away from Western-led sanctions, reshaping geopolitical alignments. Mario, it’s been a pleasure.

Ray McGovern, a former CIA officer who chaired the National Intelligence Estimate and prepared daily briefs for the president, discusses the newly released US national security strategy and its implications for the war in Ukraine, as well as broader US-Russia and US-Europe dynamics. - McGovern notes a dramatic shift in the national security strategy’s emphasis. He observes it prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, with Russia treated as part of Europe. He contrasts this with past eras, recalling Paul Wolfowitz’s post–Gulf War doctrine, which asserted US primacy and the ability to act that Russia could not stop, and he emphasizes the stark difference between that era and the current document. - He recounts a historical anecdote from 1991–1992: Wolfowitz’s belief that the US could win where others could not, followed by a warning to General Wesley Clark that Russia would challenge US primacy as times changed. He points to subsequent US actions in Iraq (2003) and Syria (2015) as evidence of a shift in capability to project power, and he argues that in 2022 Russia halted US plans by preventing NATO expansion into Ukraine. - McGovern interprets the current strategy as signaling a recalibration: the US may be acknowledging a changing balance of power, with a focus on deterring Russia and stabilizing relations with Moscow, while recognizing that Europe is central to strategic calculations. He stresses that Russia’s core principle, in its view, is to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and he underscores that the strategy doc frames core interests as seeking strategic stability with Russia and a negotiated modus vivendi, though he notes these appear as a “castaway” in the Europe section. - He discusses ongoing high-level discussions in Berlin involving Witkoff (Wittkop) and Jared Kushner, and Zelenskyy’s positions on NATO membership and security assurances. He recalls past European reactions, including Rubio’s role in watering down European talking points and US–Russian negotiations, suggesting a pattern of European concessions followed by US–Russian engagement that sidelines European voices. - McGovern argues that Russia has “won the war” on the battlefield and that Moscow’s tactic is gradual, minimizing Ukrainian casualties while consolidating control over parts of Donetsk and other territorial objectives. He asserts Putin’s priority is to maintain a workable relationship with the United States, with Ukraine as a secondary concern. He also notes Trump’s stated interest in improving US-Russia relations, including a willingness to consider extending New START, and he highlights that Moscow would react to whether Trump commits to the treaty’s limits for another year, which would influence Moscow’s strategic calculations. - The discussion covers the internal US debate over how to handle Ukraine and whether to pursue negotiations with Russia. McGovern argues that the reality of Russia’s position and Ukraine’s losses complicate any simple “win” scenario for Ukraine, and he suggests that a negotiated settlement might eventually emerge if a durable US–Russia relationship can be pursued, given Russia’s advances on the battlefield and its leverage in European security. - They discuss John Mearsheimer’s realist perspective, arguing that Western expansion toward Ukraine contributed to the conflict, and that voices emphasizing NATO enlargement as the sole cause are contested. McGovern mentions Obama’s warnings not to give Ukraine illusions of prevailing against Russia and to avoid escalation, and he contrasts this with Stoltenberg’s statements about Russia’s preconditions for peace. - They also critique EU moves to seize Russian assets to fund Ukraine, suggesting that European leaders may be acting to preserve political power rather than align with the public’s long-term interests, and question whether such measures will endure or provoke wider political backlash. - In closing, McGovern reiterates that Russia has the upper hand for now, with the war’s outcome dependent on political decisions in Washington and Moscow, particularly whether Trump can extend New START, and whether European and US policymakers can sustain a realistic approach to security guarantees and the balance of power in Europe. The conversation ends with a cautious note about the potential for a settlement but ongoing uncertainties about the strategic environment and transatlantic politics.

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.

Checklist for summary approach: - Extract the core thesis and the primary motivation attributed to the actions described. - Preserve key verbatim phrases from the speakers where they express the main claims (noting repeated lines about NATO). - Consolidate related points into cohesive statements, avoiding repetition. - Retain the contrasting frames (NATO-centric vs. democracy/territorial influence) and the Hitler comparisons as presented. - Exclude evaluative judgments; reproduce claims as stated and keep the sequence of major assertions. - Translate only if needed; here, keep English original. Summary: The transcript centers on a recurring assertion that the Ukraine war is not about NATO enlargement. One speaker notes that Putin “actually sent a draft treaty that he wanted NATO to sign to promise no more NATO enlargement,” which was rejected, and that “he went to war to prevent NATO, more NATO close to his borders.” Across multiple voices, the refrain is stated many times: “This war in Ukraine … is not about NATO,” “It’s not about NATO expansion,” “NATO is not the reason,” and “NATO is just as a fictitious imaginary adversary for mister Putin and for Russia.” The discussion elevates alternative explanations: the war is framed as about “democratic expansion” and, more broadly, about Russia’s effort to expand its sphere of influence. One speaker argues, “This is not about NATO expansion. This is about democratic expansion,” while another insists, “This is about him trying to expand his sphere of influence.” A contrasting account acknowledges that “the two are not mutually exclusive,” noting that Russia has long desired influence over Ukraine and suggesting that Western challenges to Russian interests may have contributed to the war’s outbreak. Support for the democratic framing includes claims about Ukraine: “Ukraine bans religious organizations,” “Ukraine is banning political parties,” and “Ukraine restricts books and music,” followed by the statement, “It’s about democracy. Ukraine won’t hold elections.” A separate thread emphasizes that the security objective cited by Russia is not credible, with repeated insistence that “NATO is not the reason,” and “NATO is not really about NATO.” The dialogue then shifts to moral judgments about Putin, with assertions such as “The reason why Putin invaded Ukraine is because of his evil,” and “Putin wants to rebuild Soviet empire of evil,” alongside comparisons to Adolf Hitler: “People are comparing him to Hitler,” “Hitler… invaded Poland,” “This is exactly the same, what Hitler was doing to Jews,” and “Putin is reminiscent of Hitler,” including “new Hitler.” A caller describes Putin as a “butcher,” and an exchange ends with a nod to Senator Lindsey Graham before transitioning.