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The U.S. intelligence community has officially opened an investigation into more than 120 U.S. taxpayer-funded biological laboratories operating overseas, including 40 in Ukraine. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard says the probe aims to identify where the labs are located, what pathogens they contain, and what research is being conducted. Gabbard has previously accused officials of misleading the public about the existence and scope of U.S.-backed bio labs overseas, including claims tying the issue to the Biden administration and figures such as Anthony Fauci.
The discussion references claims made during the Biden administration by Victoria Nuland, who admitted bio labs are in Ukraine and funded by the United States but said they were only for defensive research, while dismissing accusations as Russian disinformation. Questions are raised about claims of Russian findings, including reported COVID vaccine samples in labs during Russia’s takeover of territory, and claims of AIDS research on Ukrainian military personnel.
Senator asks Ukraine-specific questions about chemical or biological weapons and whether there is doubt that any biological or chemical incident in Ukraine would be carried out by Russians. Ukraine is described as having biological research facilities, with concern that Russian troops may seek control of research materials, and statements that efforts are underway with Ukrainians to prevent research materials from falling into Russian hands. The exchange asserts that Russian propaganda blames Ukrainians for plots involving biological weapons and coordination with NATO, and that it is “classic Russian technique to blame on the other guy what they’re planning to do themselves.”
Doctor Merrill Nass, a biological warfare epidemiologist and author, says it is notable that the government acknowledges such facilities, including about 40 in Ukraine and over 100 elsewhere, and adds that many countries have studied biological weapons agents, treatments, and vaccines since at least World War II. Nass argues that the law prohibits developing biological weapons and references the Biological Weapons Convention, noting that the treaty has no enforcement mechanism, and that there is no way to send teams to investigate other countries’ labs. He suggests there have been roadblocks to obtaining details, and that labs outside the United States reduce oversight.
The conversation also discusses the idea of incentives and loopholes: Nass states that the U.S. has no legal control over private labs and that, in the U.S., it is possible to build high-containment laboratories and have scientists create whatever they like without a prohibition. Nass describes historical U.S. development and stockpiling of biological weapons agents, mentions evasion of antibiotics and vaccines, and argues that international restrictions do not prevent potential development efforts elsewhere.
Nass says that specific biological weapon use is not known to have occurred within the United States except that “the potential exception of COVID,” asserting the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine should never have been developed “the way it was developed for COVID” because it included “the most toxic, problematic parts” of the virus. He also recalls work as a consultant to the Cuban Ministry of Health in 1993 regarding illness attributed to cyanide poisoning, describes reports that the CIA sent African swine fever virus to Cuba through Panama to dissidents, and notes that Cuba reportedly had to kill half a million pigs due to that outbreak.
When asked whether researchers can be controlled and whether answers will emerge about roughly 120 labs, Nass says accountability and oversight are limited, citing a senate hearing where senators said the intelligence community is not under anyone’s control and is not accountable. He adds that if answers cannot be obtained in the U.S., they would not likely be obtained in other countries.
Nass argues that lab-produced viruses could be distinguished from naturally occurring ones by analyzing genomes, describing prior work on reconstructing an epidemic and claiming that attention to whether viral genomes are natural or unnatural will enable future differentiation. He notes that he believes the risk of severe consequences reduces the likelihood of use.
The segment ends with plans to bring Nass back as the investigation unfolds.