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Supporting Ukraine is crucial for us because they are fighting a war that we are not involved in. It is important to engage in dialogue with our American colleagues and friends as they share the same interest. Supporting Ukraine is a cost-effective measure to ensure that Russia, under its current regime, does not pose a threat to the NATO alliance. This support must be sustained to safeguard our collective security.

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

Ian Proud argues that while ending the war and accelerating Ukraine’s EU membership are important, there is a missing focus on the future relationship with Russia and a broader, Pan-European security framework. He notes that Europe is already experiencing economic decline as energy policy shifts away from cheap Russian energy toward more expensive sources, which he says contributes to factory closures and cost-of-living pressures. He warns that simply ending the war or admitting Ukraine into the EU could result in a hostile, “anti-Russia” posture within Europe, unless the long-term security architecture is reset. He emphasizes two key consequences of the Ukraine crisis since 2014: (1) Europe’s energy and economic policies are driving a decline, partly due to cutting off cheap energy from Russia; (2) focusing only on ending the war and integrating Ukraine into Europe risks creating a new, hostile dynamic with Russia if the relationship is not normalized. Without addressing the future Russia-Europe relationship, he suggests Europe could end up with a remilitarized Europe and higher defense spending, while postponing a durable settlement. Regarding peace negotiations, Proud argues for a treaty-based, comprehensive approach to pan-European security rather than only ceasefire promises. He contends that peace cannot be achieved by refusing to discuss Russia’s security concerns or by treating Ukraine’s EU accession as a standalone solution. He traces a long history of failed attempts at a broader European security architecture—from Helsinki Accords to the OSCE and the 2005 Common Space—showing that NATO expansion and Western reluctance to embrace a wider security framework undermined these efforts. He asserts that “the red line” on Ukraine’s status was drawn too late and that a durable peace requires a broader security settlement that includes Russia and the European Union, not just NATO. If advising Putin, Proud suggests pushing for a broader, treaty-based agreement on future pan-European security, rather than accepting merely tacit assurances or expanding NATO. He argues that Ukraine’s EU membership could become “NATO light,” potentially achieving the same military posture as a formal alliance but under EU institutions, thus reinforcing Moscow’s concerns. He calls for a comprehensive accord that reorganizes European security within a broader framework—reinstating indivisible security, sovereign equality, and an integrated approach to security that encompasses Russia, the EU, and potentially broader Eurasian arrangements. He warns that without such a deal, the conflict risks a prolonged stalemate and a dangerous re-escalation. Proud notes that the atmosphere around diplomacy is terribly toxic, with Western leaders and institutions increasingly sidelining Russia from formal talks. He criticizes the Munich Security Conference for excluding Russia from diplomacy and laments the overemphasis on military solutions and the symbolic, sometimes confrontational rhetoric by European leaders (for example, chancellor statements about arming Europe and projecting suffering onto Russia). He argues that Europe’s foreign policy today is driven by a single objective—defeating Russia—and that this approach has left Europe economically and strategically paralyzed. Towards the end, Proud cautions that post-war Europe will face a transition to a multipolar world, where the United States will shift priorities toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere. He questions Europe’s readiness to engage in a multipolar order and stresses the need for Europe to reestablish normal relations with Russia to avoid a new Berlin Wall-like division. He also critiques the perception of Ukraine’s resilience and Zelensky’s role, suggesting that Europe should develop its own foreign policy vision rather than being dominated by Kyiv’s stance. Overall, the dialogue centers on the necessity of a broad, treaty-based security framework for Europe that includes Russia and the EU, a genuine normalization of relations, and diplomacy that moves beyond ceasefires and symbolic gestures to a lasting peace architecture.

Thank God negotiations have begun; Europe should have been involved all along. The war will end if the United States stops providing arms and financing, as this conflict stems from American arrogance over the last 30 years. The U.S. destabilized nuclear arms control in 2002 and backed a violent coup in Ukraine in 2014, ignoring the UN Security Council. Europe needs a grown-up foreign policy, not childish, propaganda-based diplomacy. It should act as a united front, like the original 13 American colonies, and negotiate with Russia, China, and the U.S. under a framework of multilateralism. Europe needs its own defense, separate from NATO, to address its security concerns and foster stable relationships, promoting a global rule of law.

In the past two weeks, we've probably had more progress in ending this war than we have in the past three and a half years. And I think the fact that we're around this table today is is very much symbolic in the sense that it's team Europe and team United States helping Ukraine. And the progress that we're looking out of this meeting is about the security guarantees.

The speaker states that the concept of a neutral Ukraine is no longer relevant. They believe that Ukraine should become a member of NATO to ensure its security.

I believe Ukraine needs support in the form of weapons and fighter pilots to win the war. We should provide F-16s and training for pilots. I want Ukraine to join NATO by 2024. We should issue an invitation and provide more weapons in December to help them fight in 2025. American-made weapons are being used effectively by the Ukrainians, benefiting both countries.

The West is leading Ukraine down a path to destruction by encouraging them to play tough with Russia, with the expectation that the West will defeat Putin. This encourages Ukraine to be unwilling to compromise with Russia, which will wreck the country. A better policy would be to neutralize Ukraine, build up its economy, and remove it from the competition between Russia and NATO. Creating a neutral Ukraine would be in the interest of the West, Russia, and most importantly, Ukraine.

Russia will remain a dangerous opponent for a long time, and we must include Ukraine in NATO. The only way to have trusting relations with Moscow is through a decisive defeat and a reset in Russia, where the Russian population and politics abandon their deeply rooted imperial, aggressive, and colonial ideas.

Presidents Putin, Zelensky, and Biden should prioritize peace for Ukraine by agreeing to its neutrality. This means Ukraine would not join NATO or form military alliances with Russia, addressing security concerns for both the US and NATO, as well as Russia. By ensuring there are no Russian or NATO troops on each other's borders, the Ukrainian people can live in peace.

When it comes to supporting Ukraine, we need to provide them with the weapons and training they need to win. Retired F-16 pilots are welcome to join the fight. I want Ukraine to be invited to join NATO in 2024. American weapons are being used effectively, and we hope to provide more support in the future.

I would like to discuss our collaboration with you and President Zelensky's team. We aim to have a diplomat engage with you regularly in the coming days or weeks. If a peace deal is reached that satisfies Ukraine, Britain is ready to explore all options to support you, including a presence in Ukraine. Currently, we have troops in Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania, and we’ve maintained a training team in Ukraine since 2015. We are open to considering various options moving forward.

We must not abandon Ukraine or allow NATO to weaken. It goes against our national interests and the promises we've made. We need Congress to pass funding for NATO as soon as possible.

The Alaska Summit reinforced my belief that while difficult pieces within reach, I believe that in a very significant step, President Putin agreed that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine, and this is one of the key points that we need to consider. We're going to be considering that at the table, also, like who will do what, essentially. I'm optimistic that collectively we can reach an agreement.

The West is leading Ukraine down a path to destruction by encouraging them to play tough with Russia, with the expectation that the West will defeat Putin. This encourages Ukraine to be unwilling to compromise with Russia, which will wreck the country. A better policy would be to neutralize Ukraine, build up its economy, and remove it from the competition between Russia and NATO. Creating a neutral Ukraine would be in the interest of the West, Russia, and most importantly, Ukraine.

Supporting Ukraine is crucial for us because they are fighting a war that we are not involved in. It is important to engage in dialogue with our American colleagues and friends as they share the same interest. Supporting Ukraine is a cost-effective measure to ensure that Russia, under its current regime, does not pose a threat to the NATO alliance. This support must be continued to safeguard our interests.

We are strengthening our political relationship with the NATO Ukraine Council, working together to make decisions. Ukraine will become a member of NATO, it's just a matter of time. NATO will support Ukraine for security reasons as we prepare for that day.

General Harald Kuyat discusses the origins, dynamics, and potential endgame of the Ukraine war, emphasizing that the conflict is the product of long-term political developments beginning after the Cold War rather than a single moment. He points to early post-Cold War efforts to integrate Russia into a more stable European security order, noting Bush’s Mainz speech in May 1989, which aimed to reassure Soviet security interests and propose confidence-building measures such as open skies and CSCE expansion. As NATO expanded in the 1990s, Russia sought a buffer zone to manage crises near former Warsaw Pact states and the Baltic region, a concept reflected in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The crucial mistake, in his view, was suspending this mechanism, a move that has contributed to today’s tensions. Kuyat highlights turning points in the 2000s: the ABM Treaty’s termination in 2001, the INF Treaty’s withdrawal, and the Open Skies Treaty’s departure; the 2008 Bucharest summit, where Ukraine and Georgia were pressured for NATO membership, a move that foreshadowed later crises. He notes warnings about red lines and Crimea’s annexation followed those developments. He contends that the war could have been avoided or ended earlier if 2021-2022 draft treaties and Istanbul negotiations had been pursued seriously, and argues that Europeans bore responsibility for not advancing peace proposals during those moments. Regarding current U.S. policy, Kuyat asserts that he believes former President Trump’s effort to end the fighting is sincere, aiming to end killings and seek peace for historical recognition. He says Europeans failed to end the war with their own proposals over the past four years, and that military victory over Russia was never feasible. He stresses that the goal must be to end the conflict and suffering as early as possible, not to secure a decisive military victory. He recalls that negotiations could have progressed if Europe had embraced negotiations instead of prolonging the conflict. On the prospects for peace, Kuyat discusses concessions and security guarantees, including Ukraine’s neutrality and the possible deployment of NATO-country troops in a manner framed as reassurance rather than combat troops. He notes that both sides must be willing to make concessions and that negotiations must begin soon to avoid a military decision by Russia. He recalls a 2023/2024 proposal for negotiated peace with a small group, which he believes deserves consideration, and emphasizes that a lasting settlement would require mutual security guarantees and a mechanism for enforcement. Regarding Russia’s objectives, Kuyat states that Russia seeks to avoid NATO proximity to its borders and maintain a buffer zone; it views Donetsk and Luhansk as regions with Russian-speaking populations and as independent states should they be recognized, potentially under UN trusteeship. He suggests Russia might accept recognizing these regions as independent rather than reincorporating them into Ukraine, while Ukraine would withdraw from parts of Donetsk, and Russia would maintain access to its land corridor to Crimea. He notes that a peace settlement would require both sides to concede and that the European approach should also offer security guarantees for Russia and acknowledge Russia’s interests. He acknowledges that Russia’s goal includes a regime change objective, which complicates negotiations, and stresses that any durable peace must involve direct talks, possibly with American mentorship, and must include a long-term security framework. On European strategy, Kuyat argues Europe should strengthen its own security, reduce overreliance on the United States, and build a balanced, Europe-centered NATO pillar while maintaining the indivisibility of allied security. He warns against a perpetual European commitment to Ukraine’s reconstruction beyond what the United States is willing to support, and urges Europe to act more confidently for its own security interests. He also warns that without timely negotiations, the conflict could spread beyond four regions and threaten critical Black Sea access, potentially tying Ukraine’s fate to broader regional security concerns. In conclusion, Kuyat reiterates the need for an eventual peace order that includes direct talks with Russia, robust UN monitoring for any demilitarized zones, and a framework that ensures long-term normalization of Russia–Ukraine relations, while Europe strengthens its own security posture within a renewed European security order.

How can the UK further support us during this challenging time? We are focused on enhancing our anti-air capabilities and ensuring they arrive swiftly. We are exploring a defensive alliance with a nuclear power, and it would be beneficial if the UK could be that partner. The establishment of official British training centers in our country would be a great step forward. We are eager to support your negotiations, especially since President Zelensky values the UK's involvement, given past experiences like the Minsk agreement, which lacked UK and US participation. A security alliance is definitely a topic worth discussing in these negotiations.

To achieve a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine, it is important to provide more weapons and credible military support. This will increase the chances of success for diplomats working towards a peaceful end.

The Alaska summit reinforced my belief that “president Putin agreed that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine,” a key point to consider. “I'm optimistic that, collectively, we can reach an agreement that would deter any future aggression against Ukraine,” though I also note, “I actually think there won't be. I think that's even over overrated, largely overrated.” European nations are gonna take a lot of the burden; “we're gonna help them, and we're gonna make it very secure.” We also need to discuss “the possible exchanges of territory taken into consideration the current line of contact.” That means “the war zone, the war lines that are pretty obvious, very sad, actually, to look at them.” The next step: “a trilateral meeting, and that will be worked out.” “I have a feeling you and president Putin are gonna work something out.” Ultimately, Zelensky and the Ukrainian people, with Putin, must decide. “I'll set up a meeting with President Putin.” “All of us would obviously prefer an immediate ceasefire … maybe something like that could happen.” “As of this moment, it's not happening.” “I believe a peace agreement … is very attainable,” and “The next step would be for a trilateral meeting, and that will be worked out.”

So we spent a lot of time talking about NATO. First, I do wanna remind people that Ukraine and the NATO alliance have built a strong partnership. Ukraine is the only non NATO nation supporting every NATO mission. In Afghanistan and Iraq, Ukrainian troops are helping to support young democracies. In Kosovo, Ukrainians are help keep the peace. Ukraine now seeks to deepen its cooperation with the NATO alliance through a membership action plan. Your nation has made a bold decision, and The United States strongly supports your request. In Bucharest this week, I will continue to make America's position clear. We support MAP for Ukraine and Georgia. Helping Ukraine move toward NATO membership is in the interest of every member in the alliance and will help advance security and freedom in this region and around the world.

Ukraine has a strong partnership with NATO, supporting every NATO mission and helping in various peacekeeping efforts. They now seek to deepen their cooperation through a membership action plan, which the United States strongly supports. The US will make its position clear in Bucharest, advocating for MAP for Ukraine and Georgia. This move is in the interest of all alliance members and will enhance security and freedom in the region and globally.

I believe we should support Ukraine by providing weapons and training for their pilots. We need to issue an invitation for Ukraine to join NATO in 2024. A military-centric supplemental in December will provide more American-made weapons to aid Ukraine in their fight for freedom. This support will help Ukraine in 2025.

Aiding Ukraine is the most cost-effective way for the US to enhance its security as the Ukrainians are the ones fighting and dying. The US and Europe provide them with weapons to resist Putin. Having been to Kyiv twice, it is clear that Ukraine is a European country with a strong desire to align with the West. It would be astonishing if the US were to abandon Ukraine at this crucial time.