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In 2018, the Dallas elections had irregularities, similar to what we're hearing now. Texas hired a cybersecurity group to investigate these irregularities, finding 10 different ways the Dominion equipment could be manipulated. Texas outlawed the use of Dominion, but it was still used. This group spent 2 years reverse engineering how to rig an election using Dominion. Meanwhile, another cybersecurity group, including hackers and other experts, mapped out the election manipulation plan. They approached DHS and CISA for a meeting, but they refused to attend. It's concerning how many people turned a blind eye to this issue. Lawyers involved may not understand the technology, but they should be held accountable.

A journalist contacts Homeland Security to inquire about troubling systems. The speaker is directed to submit a report on assista.gov or dhs.gov. When asked why they can't answer questions, the speaker explains that the number is only for government agencies. The journalist expresses concern about Ericsson's involvement with ISIS and the lawsuit filed by veterans. The speaker suggests reporting the issue to pincident.gov or ic3.gov. The journalist asks about the interconnection of systems and the role of the FBI. The speaker advises reporting to local FBI offices and mentions the importance of reporting to IC3 for analytics. The journalist mentions the patent sharing agreement between Ericsson and Huawei. The speaker suggests reporting to IC3 for international matters. The journalist expresses fear and asks about CISA's role in cybersecurity incidents. The speaker explains that CISA mainly focuses on government agencies and suggests visiting cisco.gov for more information. The journalist questions the taxpayer's role in supporting agencies that protect corporations. The speaker acknowledges the concern and the call ends.

A journalist contacts Homeland Security regarding Ericsson's involvement with ISIS. Homeland Security directs the journalist to report the issue to appropriate agencies and websites. The journalist questions the interconnectedness of emergency systems and cybersecurity. Homeland Security advises reporting to IC3 for analysis. The journalist expresses concern over media bias towards Ericsson. Homeland Security mentions a patent sharing agreement between Ericsson and Huawei. The journalist seeks clarity on CISA's role in individual cybersecurity. Homeland Security clarifies that CISA focuses on government agencies, not individuals. The journalist questions the taxpayer-funded support for corporations by government agencies. Homeland Security ends the call. Translation: A journalist contacts Homeland Security about Ericsson's ties to ISIS and is directed to report the issue to specific agencies. They discuss the interconnectedness of emergency systems and cybersecurity, media bias, and a patent sharing agreement between Ericsson and Huawei. The journalist questions CISA's role in individual cybersecurity and the taxpayer-funded support for corporations by government agencies. Homeland Security clarifies CISA's focus on government agencies, not individuals. The call ends.

At the Capitol, we witnessed the hacking of outdated election machines, which are used in many states. This raises concerns as only three companies control these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Researchers have discovered serious security flaws, including backdoors, in voting machines used by 43% of American voters. These companies refuse to answer questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the larger companies avoid answering any questions altogether. Additionally, five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the voting machine results. This undermines the notion of cybersecurity in our elections.

A Microsoft certified security expert provided evidence of a Dominion vote counting machine in a swing state with a wireless card connected to a thermostat's wireless network. The IP address traced back to a city in China, linked to a Chinese corporation involved in questionable dealings with American politicians. There is a thick binder of documented evidence showing foreign access and interference in the election, including public statements from the FBI and DHS warning about Iran's involvement. The evidence is undeniable, and those questioning it should argue with the FBI and DHS. The photographs and IPs provide conclusive proof of foreign interference in the voting systems.

While working, I found a piece of paper with passwords for election machines outside a polling location. I confirmed with someone that it contained login information for the poll books. I reported this incident, providing details about the credentials. They took my information and mentioned they would investigate to determine ownership. I inquired whether all judges shared the same passwords and expressed concern about the information being improperly handled. I emphasized the need for a thorough investigation, as this could raise voter concerns. The representative assured me they would escalate the issue to the appropriate local authorities. I highlighted the urgency, as the passwords could compromise three days of voting.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss government disinformation offices and transparency concerns. - CISA’s office of mis, dis, and malinformation (MDM) operated as a DHS unit focused on domestic threat actors, with archive details at cisa.gov/mdm. The office existed for two years, from 2021 to 2023, before being shut down and renamed after the foundation published a series of reports. - The disinformation governance board was formed around April 2022. The CISOs countering foreign influence task force, originally aimed at stopping Russian influence and repurposed to “stop Trump in the twenty twenty election,” changed its name to the office of mis, dis, and malinformation and shifted focus from foreign influence to 80% domestic, 20% foreign, one month before the twenty twenty election. - Speaker 1 argues that the information environment problems are largely domestic, suggesting an 80/20 focus on foreign vs domestic issues should be flipped. - A June 2022 Holly Senate committee link is highlighted, leading to a 31-page PDF that, as of now, represents the sum total of internal documents related to the office of mis, dis, and malinformation. The speaker questions why there is more transparency about the DHS MIS office from a whistleblower three years ago than in ten months of current executive power. - The speaker calls for comprehensive publication of internal files: every email, text, and correspondence from DHS MIS personnel, to be placed in a WikiLeaks/JFK-style publicly accessible database for forensic reconstruction of DHS actions during those years, to name and shame responsible individuals and prevent repetition. - The video also references George Soros state department cables published by WikiLeaks (from 2010), noting extensive transparency about the Open Society Foundations’ relationship with the state department fifteen years ago, compared to today. The claim is that Open Society Foundations’ activities through the state department, USAID, and the CIA were weaponized to influence domestic politics while remaining secret, with zero disclosures to this day. - Speaker questions why cooperative agreements from USAID with Open Society Foundation, Omidyar Network, or Gates Foundation have never been made public, nor quarterly or annual milestone reports, network details, or the actual scope of funded activities. USAID grant descriptions on usaspending.gov are often opaque or misleading compared to the true activities funded. - The speaker urges transparency across DHS, USAID, the State Department, CIA, ODNI, and related entities, asking for open files and for accountability. They stress the need to open these records now to inform the public and prevent recurrence, especially as mid-term political considerations loom.

We demonstrated how easily election machines can be hacked, raising concerns about the limited number of companies controlling voting technology. 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some states lack a paper trail to verify results. The lack of transparency in cybersecurity practices is alarming.

Last month, CISA disclosed that their systems were hacked due to vulnerabilities in Ivanti products. The compromised systems contained sensitive data on security assessments for government networks and chemical facilities. This breach poses a significant threat to national security, as hackers now have access to critical information. Despite warnings and patches, CISA failed to update their systems in time, leading to the compromise. The impact of this breach could extend to other government agencies and organizations, putting citizens and infrastructure at risk.

The speaker calls Homeland Security as a journalist seeking information about troubling systems. They are directed to submit an inquiry on the government website. The speaker expresses concern about Ericsson's involvement with ISIS and the lawsuit filed by veterans. They question why government officials are not taking action. Homeland Security provides resources to report the issue to the FBI and suggests contacting local news outlets. The conversation touches on the interconnection of systems and the role of different agencies. The speaker expresses frustration with the lack of support for individuals who experience cyberattacks. They discuss the patent sharing agreement between Ericsson and Huawei and mention reporting to the FBI. The speaker concludes by questioning the role of CISA and the taxpayer's support of agencies that protect corporations.

The office of the director of National Intelligence would have only participated in election security briefings with private companies like Twitter, YouTube, Microsoft, and state election officials. These meetings did not involve content moderation or the Biden laptop as Russian disinformation. Therefore, there was no authority or reason for anyone in the intelligence community to say otherwise.

The speaker states that, regarding election security, everyone must acknowledge egregious behavior and foreign influence, of which there is direct evidence. Other foreign partners also have evidence and were watching attacks on the election system on November 3rd. They are willing to provide that evidence directly to the president, and this evidence was received today. These foreign partners and allies are willing to help. The speaker concludes that foreign influence against election security and the SolarWinds system is dangerous, and more must be done.

Speaker 0 recounts discovering a secret SCIF on campus, a secure facility with files nobody knew existed. An employee walked by a door, inquiries were made, the room was entered, and individuals were found working there with secret files on controversial topics. Those files have been turned over to attorneys and the speaker is pursuing what happened. The speaker notes that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) knows every traveler entering the country and every good that comes in, and they assess and collect tariffs. They highlight that information about travelers during COVID was with national labs under the speaker’s jurisdiction, and that scientists at those labs participated with the Wuhan lab. The speaker claims these scientists traveled back and forth between each other and worked on those experiments, describing this as eye-opening. Addressing Elon and his team, the speaker says they were extremely helpful since the speaker’s arrival in office, assisting in identifying a troubling issue: some of the speaker’s own department employees had downloaded software on the speaker’s phone and laptop to spy on them and record meetings. The speaker states that this had happened to several politicians and notes that bringing in technology experts helped reveal this software; without examining laptops and phones, the activity would still be ongoing. The speaker emphasizes a need to continue partnering with technology companies and experts to bring them in for assistance, as government work—especially within the department under the speaker’s jurisdiction—has been neglected and lagging behind what it should be. The speaker recalls that in the first four months, they couldn’t even email a PowerPoint from Department of Homeland Security servers if it was longer than six pages, illustrating what they view as backwards thinking that hindered national security. The speaker reflects on the concept of a deep state, admitting that they previously believed it existed but didn’t realize how severe it was. They describe daily efforts to uncover individuals who do not love America and who work within the Department and across the federal government. The overall message conveys uncovering secrecy, internal surveillance concerns, cross-agency connections involving CBP and national labs, collaboration with tech experts, and a strong critique of past departmental conduct and systemic protection failures.

The speaker, a well-versed American patriot, has been aware of the sketchiness of the election systems for about 15 or 16 years. They have been working with a group of people who have uncovered some significant findings. In 2018, the Dallas election had irregularities, which prompted the Texas governor to form a panel to investigate. This panel hired a cybersecurity group to study the irregularities, specifically on Dominion Machines. Over the past two years, this group has reverse-engineered the process of stealing an election using this equipment. The speaker has been associated with them since August and has been actively supporting their efforts for the past 4 or 5 months.

The speaker discusses the establishment of an election integrity partnership (EIP) at the request of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). They mention an email from Graham Brookie of the Atlantic Council, confirming the setup of the partnership. The speaker also highlights the connection between the Atlantic Council and the National Endowment for Democracy, which is linked to the CIA. They point out the involvement of various organizations with ties to intelligence agencies, such as Stanford, UW, and Graphika. The speaker asserts that EIP was not a secret operation and was formed due to funding and legal limitations of CISA. They express personal satisfaction in discovering and sharing this information.

CISA lacked the capability and resources to address election disinformation. To bridge this gap, a project was quickly formed involving four institutions. The project collaborated with government partners like CISA DHS and local/state governments, civil society groups including NAACP, MITRE, Common Cause, and the Healthy Elections Project, and major platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, Reddit, and Nextdoor. Agreements for data access were made with some platforms, while analysts had to work individually with others.

A journalist contacts Homeland Security to inquire about troubling systems. The representative directs the journalist to submit a report on assista.gov or dhs.gov. The journalist expresses concern about Ericsson's involvement with ISIS and the lawsuit filed by veterans. The representative suggests reporting the issue to pincident.gov and ic3.gov. The journalist asks about the interconnection of emergency systems and the role of the FBI. The representative advises reporting to local FBI offices and mentions the importance of reporting to IC3 for analytics. The journalist mentions the patent sharing agreement between Ericsson and Huawei. The representative suggests reporting to IC3 for international matters. The journalist expresses fear and asks about CISA's role in cybersecurity incidents. The representative clarifies that CISA focuses on government agencies and suggests visiting cisco.gov for more information. The journalist questions the taxpayer's role in supporting agencies that protect corporations. The representative acknowledges the concern. The call ends.

A journalist contacts Homeland Security to inquire about troubling systems. The speaker is directed to submit an inquiry or report on the official government websites. When asked why they can't answer questions, the speaker explains that the number is only for government agencies. The journalist expresses concern about Ericsson's involvement with ISIS and the lawsuit filed by veterans. The speaker suggests reporting the issue to pincident.gov and Ic3.gov, which is handled by the FBI. The journalist asks about the interconnection of emergency systems and the role of NCSWIC. The speaker clarifies that they handle cybersecurity issues for government agencies, while local jurisdictions report incidents to the FBI. The journalist questions the effectiveness of reporting and mentions the patent sharing agreement between Ericsson and Huawei. The speaker advises contacting the local FBI for further details. The journalist expresses fear and asks about CISA's role in protecting individuals. The speaker explains that CISA primarily focuses on government agencies and corporations, not individual cases. The journalist comments on taxpayers funding agencies to protect corporations and third parties. The conversation ends abruptly.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

The speaker demonstrated how they were able to boot up the Electionware system on a non-conforming laptop, highlighting violations of security protocols. They revealed that default passwords for election machines are easily accessible online, posing a significant security risk. The speaker emphasized the urgent need for updating security measures and changing passwords to enhance election security. They also pointed out the lack of antivirus protection on crucial election machines, putting counties at risk. The speaker concluded by stressing the importance of immediate action to address these vulnerabilities.

The speaker discusses the intelligence community's efforts to share information with social media platforms to address inauthentic content. They clarify that the office of the director of National Intelligence would only participate in approved election security briefings with private companies like Twitter, YouTube, Microsoft, and state election officials. These briefings focus on discussing threats and have nothing to do with content moderation or the Biden laptop as Russian disinformation. The speaker mentions that there were weekly meetings between the FBI, DHS, and Twitter, but only one reference to their office. They hope that this reference was part of the approved process for election security briefings.

The speaker attended the voting village event, where common voting machines were tested. Surprisingly, major manufacturers like ES and S and Dominion did not provide the machines for testing, so organizers had to buy them on eBay. Hackers, who had never seen these machines before, easily accessed their inner workings. One machine, Dominion's image cast system, had its internals exposed. This is concerning because Georgia recently signed a $100 million contract with Dominion for the same hardware. The machines were found to have vulnerabilities, such as easily accessible admin passwords. Despite these issues, there seems to be little political will to address the security of voting machines. The speaker found the event and the lack of action on voting security alarming.

Our technology teams discovered a concerning issue with connected devices at a polling location. Despite the devices not supposed to have Wi-Fi, they were found to be communicating in real time, both receiving and sending data. This should never happen, and we have documented the incident. We cannot disclose the location, but we have confirmed it in multiple places. There are three types of machines involved: a scanner, a ballot marking device, and a polling pad. The communication is happening through the polling pad, which is used for checking everything. This access could potentially allow someone to manipulate and modify the data being exchanged in the system.

The cybersecurity and intelligence components within the Department of Homeland Security have been overly siloed. There has been insufficient communication and collaboration with other intelligence agencies. While there is some interaction with INA, more partnership is needed to enhance effectiveness.

Stanford researcher Renee DiResta and journalist Matt Taibbi discuss the revelation that Congress has access to people's emails through subpoena power. They also confirm that the Election Infrastructure Partnership (EIP) was a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operation from the beginning, as previously established. Twitter's Lisa Roman reveals that CISA received grants to build a web portal for reporting election-related misinformation. The committee report highlights gaps in legal authorities and coordination for addressing election misinformation. DiResta explains how DHS has taken on a role similar to a domestic CIA for information control. The federal government lacked preparedness and coordination in identifying and analyzing election misinformation, as the intelligence community and FBI have specific limitations.