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I am concerned about the upcoming election because this voting machine, used in 18 states, can be easily accessed by anyone. I will demonstrate how it can be done in less than 2 minutes without any tools. By opening the machine, removing the card reader and unplugging it, then picking the lock with a ballpoint pen, I gain admin access. I encounter a few error messages, but by clicking Cancel and okay, I bypass them and gain full admin control.

Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and Speaker 2 discuss Dominion’s access to election systems during the 2020 election period in Georgia, with Gwinnett County cited as a specific example. The dialogue confirms that the questioning period was during the 2020 election, and the focus is on whether Dominion remotely accessed election systems and whether such access occurred in Georgia. Speaker 2 asks if there is any indication of nonelection personnel remotely accessing a Dominion system. Speaker 3 responds that they have reviewed a series of emails produced by Dominion in which they’re discussing remoting into Gwinnett County, Georgia. Speaker 1 then notes that Speaker 0 had mentioned Dominion remote collection or connection to election systems but lacks evidence that it occurred in Georgia. Speaker 0 asserts that there was one county and that they have seen many Dominion emails, requiring translation from Serbian to English to verify technical questions and translations. Speaker 1 asks specifically: “So it's your testimony that there is evidence of dominion remotely accessing Georgia election equipment?” Speaker 0 answers: “Yes, on the one county. It was included with stuff that I was researching and reading through considering Colorado. Michigan was also involved and there were other ones.” Speaker 2 inquires about Dominion’s ability to remotely connect to these election systems and whether they could do so without detection. Speaker 0 responds: “Yes.” Speaker 2 then asks if the interviewee is aware of any instances in which that has occurred, and Speaker 0 confirms: “One would be the Denver, Colorado server was granted or requested to grant Belgrave, Only Belgrade. Did search. There is a Belgrade Montana.” The speaker questions why Montana would need to connect to a Colorado file transfer server as part of the election system, noting there are other components and things done in the background concerning the database and the configuration of the database server that still do not have an engineering change order. Speaker 0 explains that in operational environments, things sometimes break and need fixing, leading to the submission of a change request or, in this case, an engineering change order that is retroactive. The goal is to record the process to ensure change management and integrity of the system. If changes are not recorded, it leads to a bad situation, according to Speaker 0.

A Microsoft certified security expert provided evidence of a Dominion vote counting machine in a swing state with a wireless card connected to a thermostat's wireless network. The IP address traced back to a city in China, linked to a Chinese corporation involved in questionable dealings with American politicians. There is a thick binder of documented evidence showing foreign access and interference in the election, including public statements from the FBI and DHS warning about Iran's involvement. The evidence is undeniable, and those questioning it should argue with the FBI and DHS. The photographs and IPs provide conclusive proof of foreign interference in the voting systems.

While working, I found a piece of paper with passwords for election machines outside a polling location. I confirmed with someone that it contained login information for the poll books. I reported this incident, providing details about the credentials. They took my information and mentioned they would investigate to determine ownership. I inquired whether all judges shared the same passwords and expressed concern about the information being improperly handled. I emphasized the need for a thorough investigation, as this could raise voter concerns. The representative assured me they would escalate the issue to the appropriate local authorities. I highlighted the urgency, as the passwords could compromise three days of voting.

I was invited to investigate the Mesa County server to compare the before and after images. I wanted to test the system's security, so I used a backdoor utility called SQL Server Management Studio, which is not certified software and should not be on a voting machine. I quickly accessed the presidential election results in Mesa County, showing Biden with 31,000 votes and Trump with 56,000 votes. I will explain later how easily I could manipulate the election results if I wanted to.

County technical employees reported independently that the vote counts recorded by machines and stored on USB drives changed overnight after polls closed. Votes seemed to appear and disappear during this time. When we sought to verify the integrity of these voting machines, we were only permitted a superficial visual inspection of the USB drives and denied a forensic examination.

Voting systems are designed to be closed systems without internet connectivity or external devices. Dominion, the company mentioned, does not have any remote access to the equipment or machines. No one has access to the information on the machines remotely.

Speaker 0: The election was stolen. A graph shows people who worked for ES&S, Hart, Dominion Voting Systems, ClearBallot, and Smartmatic, recycling through companies. People who worked at Dominion Voting Systems are entering the political sphere and taking over election offices; one county in Texas, after hiring someone who worked for Dominion, went blue for the first time. The speaker walks through information: Dominion using “Serbian technology with Chinese characteristics.” Huawei Bank is involved; there’s no public board saying Bank of China funds anything, but research on Roaming Networks—a relatively unknown Serbian company until 2013—shows it signed a value-added contract with Huawei Bank. Huawei is “the Bank of China.” Roaming Networks built ICT infrastructure and data centers in Serbia, with owner Nenad Kovac identified as the enterprise partner. Some Roaming Networks information may come off their site after this presentation. Dominion Voting Systems has a corporate office in Serbia; a screenshot of the office and a developer on their site is noted. A Serbian legislative leader said, “I know Dominion Voting Systems back in November. They have an office here.” Dominion started rapidly removing Serbian coders from their site/LinkedIn. Code is built in Serbia for a system used in the United States, using infrastructure funded by China, not just China but the Bank of China. A slide discusses Dominion’s enterprise partnership with Huawei, added to the restricted list on 05/16/2019. Roaming Networks references show Dominion Voting Systems using a pure flash storage solution in Dominion’s data center. A photo of Sacramento shows Dominion hardware coming from China, with a bill of lading from a Chinese supplier to Dominion’s McKinney, Texas office. Testing and approval of Dominion hardware show similarities with Smartmatic; the same hardware with different branding. They claim a “tail” behind the scenes—evidence of connections among ES&S, Hart, Dominion, ClearBallot, Smartmatic, with people cycling through these companies. People who once worked at Dominion are now entering election offices; in Texas, a county that hired a former Dominion employee “went blue” by accident with ES&S involved. The speaker calls out Gina Griswold for commenting on Tina Peters and Mesa, and Matt Crane’s role as Arapahoe County clerk and recorder, now head of the County Clerks Association; Crane’s wife previously worked for Dominion and Sequoia Voting Systems. The speaker asserts a public breach of trust requires an audit; if there’s nothing to hide, audits should restore trust. They argue, whether Dominion is the bad actor or not, removal of logs, altering code, and a “trusted build” are problematic, and emphasize the need for audits and investigations to restore trust in elections. Speaker 1: Indicators: a senior Dominion vice president’s name appears on patents; a software engineer involved in the Wayne County, Michigan tabulation center is connected to the software. Coincidences accumulate, suggesting there is a preponderance of evidence with affidavits across the country. The speaker asks which computer produced certain files analyzed yesterday; whether it came from the central count or precincts. Speaker 0: Answers with a non-answer, noting they imaged the main EMS and the tabulation system; servers in the county coordinate precinct information and house audit reports, cast vote reports, error reports, adjudication reports, and access logs. Thumb drives can contaminate the county and state systems if connected to a machine; it’s not unique to Dominion or voting systems but a general risk. They emphasize avoiding white noise and focusing on facts: Dominion is in Serbia; Huawei Bank funds the enterprise partnership and Serbia-based data centers; code is written in Serbia; imaging shows fingerprints of this. They call for audits, note deviations in Georgia (ballots appearing identical in different batches, a shredder truck before January 20 in Georgia, and a leaky arena water claim later proven to be a leaky toilet), and point to media silence. They argue against accepting the gold standard claim and highlight perceived connections to Soros-funded groups. They stress deviations in state and county behavior, urge audits, and compare the election system to a serial killer—unacceptable to let foreign systems run it. Speaker 2: Adds that with 100 indicators, a pattern emerges; reiterates the need to examine which files came from which computer, and questions the integrity of the central count. Speaker 3: Notes the risk of a non-internet-connected thumb drive introducing malware; emphasizes auditing all machines for that reason.

Voting systems are designed as closed systems without any Internet connectivity or external access. They are not meant to connect to the outside world in any way. Is there any remote access to the information on the equipment or within the machines? No, there is no remote access. Does anyone have access, to the best of your knowledge? No, no one has access.

In this video, the speakers discuss the risks associated with modems in voting machines. They highlight concerns about hacking and the potential for cheating in future elections. ES&S, a voting machine manufacturer, claims that their modems are separated from the public internet by firewalls. However, last summer, ES&S voting systems were found online in some precincts across 11 states. Cellular modems are commonly used to transmit election results, but this introduces vulnerabilities. Intruders can intercept data between the cell tower and voting machines, allowing them to alter votes and software. Despite claims that voting machines are not connected to the internet, many new machines have wireless modems for faster result uploads, raising concerns about their security during elections.

While on the oversight committee in the senate, Dominion was investigated. The president of Dominion and his software maker testified. Questions focused on whether Dominion machines had internet access. The president of Dominion said no, but this was a lie. The investigation was published, recorded, and should be online.

Clark County Technical employees independently found votes appearing and disappearing at night. They were only allowed a visual inspection of a USB drive, not a forensic examination.

Election machines are not connected to the Internet. Certification processes, beginning at the federal level, mandate that election systems operate in a closed, air-gapped system with no Internet connection.

Dominion can remotely connect to election systems without detection. This has occurred in instances such as the Denver, Colorado server, which was requested to grant access to Belgrade. It is unclear why Belgrade, possibly Belgrade, Montana, would need to connect to a Colorado file transfer server for an election system. There were also background activities concerning the database and its configuration that lack an engineering change order.

The transcript presents a broad, multi-voiced warning about the vulnerability of U.S. voting systems and the ease with which they can be hacked, hacked-stopping demonstrations, and the security gaps that remain even as elections continue. Key points and claims: - Virginia stopped using touch screen voting because it is “so vulnerable,” and multiple speakers argue that all voting machines must be examined to prevent hacking and attacks. Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and others emphasize systemic vulnerability across states. - Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering, with examples that even hackers with limited knowledge can breach machines in minutes (Speaker 2, Speaker 3). - In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas allegedly deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another (Speaker 4). - The largest voting machine vendors are accused of cybersecurity violations, including directing that remote access software be installed, which would make machines attractive to fraudsters and hackers (Speaker 5). - Across the country, voting machines are described as easily hackable, with contention that three companies control many systems and that individual machines pose significant risk (Speaker 2, Speaker 6). - Many states use antiquated machines vulnerable to hacking, with demonstrations showing how easily workers could hack electronic voting machines (Speakers 7, 2). - A substantial portion of American voters use machines researchers say have serious security flaws, including backdoors (Speaker 5). Some states reportedly have no paper trail or only partial paper records (Speaker 5, various). - Aging systems are noted as failing due to use of unsupported software such as Windows XP/2000, increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks (Speaker 9). An observed concern is that 40 states use machines at least a decade old (Speaker 9). - Specific past intrusions are cited: Illinois and Arizona in 2016 had election websites hacked, with malware installed and sensitive voter information downloaded (Speaker 4). - There is debate about whether votes were changed in the 2016 election; one speaker notes that experts say you cannot claim—without forensic analysis—that votes were not changed (Speaker 17, 18). - The existence of paper records is contested: some jurisdictions lack verifiable paper trails, undermining the ability to prove results are legitimate (Speaker 5, 9). - Some devices rely on cellular modems to transmit results after elections, creating additional avenues for interception and manipulation; vendors acknowledge modems but vary in how they frame Internet connectivity (Speakers 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The debate covers whether cellular transmissions truly isolate from the Internet or provide a backdoor, with demonstrations showing that modems can be connected to Internet networks and could be exploited. - The “programming” phase of elections—where memory cards are prepared with candidates and contests—can be a vector for spread of rogue software if an attacker compromises the election management system (Speaker 11, Speaker 10). - A scenario is outlined in which an attacker identifies weak swing states, probes them, hacks the election management system or outside vendors, spreads malicious code to machines, and alters a portion of votes; the assumption is that many jurisdictions will not rigorously use paper records to verify computer results (Speaker 10). - A Virginia governor’s anecdote is shared: after a hack demonstrated off-site by experts, all machines were decertified and replaced with paper ballots (Speaker 16). Overall impression: the discussion paints a picture of pervasive vulnerability, aging and diverse systems, reliance on modems and networked components, potential for targeted manipulation in close elections, and the need for upgrades and robust forensic capabilities, while noting contested claims about the extent of past interference.

Speaker 0 asserts that there was direct access to the Antrim County election management system (EMS). They claim that on November 5, an anonymous user logged on to the EMS remotely with escalated privileges and made changes to the database while attempting to retabulate the election. This, they say, constitutes a significant development, proving that the machines were remotely accessed and that access was by an anonymous user with elevated system privileges. Speaker 0 also discusses ballots, referring to black boxes on the side of the ballot, noting that there are 59 such black boxes. They state that forensic images show that in Antrim County, blocks 15, 18, 28, 41, and 44 were intentionally modified. The modification involved altering the height, width, and shape of those blocks with the intention of generating errors. They describe the consequence of such modifications: by modding these specific blocks, they were able to cause rejections for Republican ballots. Specifically, they claim that if a ballot voted for Donald Trump and was fed into the machine, that ballot was rejected at a rate 20% higher than for Joe Biden ballots.

Modems in voting machines are vulnerable to hacking as they are network connections. ES and S claims that their modems are separated from the public internet by firewalls. However, once a hacker gains access through the modem, they can manipulate the voting machine software to cheat in future elections. Some jurisdictions use cellular modems or the internet to upload election results, introducing additional vulnerabilities. Voting machines with embedded modems transmit vote totals to the county elections office via cellular networks, which pass through routers and switches used for regular internet traffic. An intruder can intercept data between the cell tower and the voting machine, altering votes and software. Despite claims that voting machines are not connected to the internet, many have 4G wireless modems for faster result uploads, raising concerns about their security during elections.

Cybersecurity experts discovered that voting machines, which are not meant to be connected to the internet, were found online. ES and S, the largest manufacturer of voting machines, revealed that some jurisdictions in Florida use modems to transmit unofficial results to the election office. However, concerns arise regarding the accuracy and security of these systems. Experts warn that hackers could manipulate the software in voting machines through the modems, potentially affecting future elections. Despite these findings, some of the systems remain online. It is widely agreed that modems in voting machines pose a significant vulnerability.

Speaker 0 notes that there were at least more than two of your direct employees and one indirect at the TCF center, up to nine, though no names are provided to avoid threats; they request clarification on each person’s responsibilities and roles during the process. Speaker 1 states backups were created by Tina Peters, Mesa County, Colorado county clerk. They are receiving information across the country that Dominion reps were going in under the guise of trusted build maintenance and wiping records. Under one dash 12 dash 69, those records by law have to be preserved. They caution not to blame staff, explaining a knee-jerk reaction by Dominion in Michigan to convince clerk staff they must have done something wrong. When discussing county liability, they emphasize listening to Mr. Lindbergh’s expert opinion. Speaker 0 asks about Ethernet access for adjudicators and tabulators in the TCF Center. Speaker 2 responds that the devices are not connected to the Internet; they are designed to be completely standalone and connected locally in a local area network separate from the Internet. Speaker 3 explains the vehicle for transmission from the ICP is a cellular modem, which can be configured in a VPN; Chicago and Cook County work with Verizon to secure that network, implying the same capabilities are available elsewhere. They note that multiple wireless chipsets/modems are supported, depending on jurisdiction preferences and network compatibility. Speaker 4 adds that some jurisdictions use a 3G modem (GSM) but can support multiple modem varieties, including latest 4G/5G standards. They confirm applicability across different networks (Verizon, AT&T, Sprint). They mention transmitting from the ICP in Mongolia, indicating no network limitations. In Puerto Rico, three vendors are used (Claro, AT&T, and T-Mobile) due to incomplete island coverage. Speaker 0 asks again about Ethernet setup to join the LAN. Speaker 5 paraphrases a claim that Dominion could fix the problem, implying Dominion can communicate with the device. Speaker 6 explains, by analogy to Apple remote support, that permission was given to take over the device to reprogram it from Adams Park to SSO 2 A and B at West Balding Drive Elementary. Speaker 7 shares observations from the TCF Center on the third and fourth, noting irregularities on election day. Randy Bishop, who owns radio stations and is IT-savvy, showed him high-speed scanners and tabulators with Ethernet lines running out of the tabulators, all bundled together and connected to routers and a main computer, which he says are connected to the Internet and that such connectivity is illegal and should not happen because it opens them to hacking. Speaker 2 reiterates that the computers in the local area network are connected via an RJ45 connector.

During my time in the Senate's oversight committee, we examined Dominion. The proceedings were recorded and are available online. The president of Dominion and his software engineer testified, primarily addressing whether their machines had Internet access. The president claimed there was no Internet access, which I believe was false.

Voting systems are designed as closed systems without internet connectivity or external connections. Dominion does not have remote access to information or the machines themselves. No one has access to the machines to the best of the speaker's knowledge.

Voting systems are designed as closed systems without internet connectivity or external connections. Dominion does not have remote access to information or the machines themselves. No one has access to the machines to the best of the speaker's knowledge.

Our technology teams discovered a concerning issue with connected devices at a polling location. Despite the devices not supposed to have Wi-Fi, they were found to be communicating in real time, both receiving and sending data. This should never happen, and we have documented the incident. We cannot disclose the location, but we have confirmed it in multiple places. There are three types of machines involved: a scanner, a ballot marking device, and a polling pad. The communication is happening through the polling pad, which is used for checking everything. This access could potentially allow someone to manipulate and modify the data being exchanged in the system.

According to the testimony, Dominion equipment is generally not connected to the internet, but there is evidence of a connection in Gwinnett County, Georgia, during the 2020 election. Non-election personnel have remotely accessed a Dominion system. Dominion emails discuss remotely accessing Gwinnett County, Georgia. There is evidence of Dominion remotely accessing Georgia election equipment in one county, along with involvement in Colorado and Michigan. Dominion can remotely connect to election systems without detection, and this has occurred. The Denver, Colorado server granted access to Belgrade, with questions raised about why Belgrade, Montana, would need to connect to a Colorado file transfer server. Changes to the database server lack an engineering change order, which is important for change management and system integrity.

The speaker asserts that there was direct access to the Antrim County election management system (EMS). According to the forensic images, on November 5 an anonymous user logged on to the EMS remotely with escalated privileges and made changes to the database while attempting to retabulate the election. This is presented as a major development indicating remote access to the machines, and specifically remote access by an anonymous user with elevated privileges. Additionally, the speaker describes intentional modifications to ballot components. Ballots have black boxes along the side, with boxes 59 in total. The forensic images allegedly show that blocks 15, 18, 28, 41, and 44 were intentionally modified, altering their height and width to generate errors. The claimed consequence of these modifications is that errors were produced which led to ballot rejections. Specifically, ballots in which a voter chose Donald Trump and then fed the ballot into the machine were rejected at a rate 20% higher than ballots for Joe Biden.