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The conversation centers on Iran, its 47-year regime, and how to think about protest, reform, and potential change from the perspective of an Iranian-American who has lived in the United States most of his life. The speakers discuss the severity of the regime, the nature of the opposition, and the calculus involved in any push for change. - Freedom and the cost of change: Freedom is described as nasty and the regime as “nasty.” The speakers assert that the regime, including the IRGC, is not likely to give up Iran in a peaceful way. They emphasize that protests and resistance have been ongoing, and that the regime has a track record of destroying opposition. They use the imagery of public executions and a ruthless approach to suppression, comparing the regime’s behavior to a brutal, game-of-thrones-like motto. - Personal history and perspective: The guest notes his life trajectory—born during the 1978 revolution, living through the Shah’s era briefly, and then the Khomeini years—giving him a long historical frame for evaluating leadership and revolution. He remarks that he has no moral authority to tell Iranians how to protest or whether to risk their families, acknowledging the severe personal stakes for those on the ground. He stresses the bravery and resilience of the Iranian people and explains the immense pressures that drive ordinary citizens to protest. - The strategic challenge of regime change: The guest asserts that the regime wants to stretch negotiations and extend days to avoid losing resources, implying a protracted endurance tactic. He insists that replacing or reforming the regime would be extremely difficult, given the depth of the regime’s networks and its long tenure. - Reza Pahlavi and leadership dynamics: The discussion revisits Reza Pahlavi, the former shah’s son, noting his recent high-profile activity, meetings in Washington, and televised statements. The guest acknowledges both praise and criticism of Reza Pahlavi, arguing that leadership in Iran would require clear, tough decisions and that those who criticize him must provide constructive counterarguments rather than ad hominem attacks. He discusses the complexity of leadership in exile and the challenges of returning to Iran to lead, including loyalty issues within the military and the risk of betrayal. - The US and foreign policy angle: The hosts debate what role the United States should play, including the consideration of strikes or sanctions. The guest uses a parable about a local offense (a killer in Miami) to illustrate how a country should commit to eliminating a threat without broad interference in other regions’ problems. He argues for public support of a targeted objective but cautions against broad, nation-building wars that could trigger larger conflicts. He also notes the influence of other actors, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, China, and European nations, on the Iran situation, suggesting a multi-layered and opaque calculus in any action. - The question of strikes and objectives: The speakers discuss whether strikes should aim to completely destroy the regime or merely pressure it, emphasizing that the intention behind any military action matters more than the action itself. They consider the risk of a dangerous power vacuum, comparing potential outcomes to Libya or Iraq, and discuss the possibility of negotiating with a different leadership that could concede to protesters’ demands while minimizing harm to the broader population. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving a favorable outcome without risking unintended consequences. - The role of sanctions and diplomacy: The sanctions are described as byproducts of the regime’s leadership and its lack of diplomacy, with the argument that sanctions affect the Iranian people more than the ruling elite. The dialogue touches on questions of accountability for the regime’s behavior and the broader regional dynamics, including public sentiment in Iran and international responses. - Mossad and external involvement: The guest asserts that Mossad and Israel are heavily involved in Iran’s internal dynamics and protests, given the existential stakes and the perception of threats against Iranian leadership. He contends that foreign intelligence communities are active in shaping events and information, including potential misdirection and propaganda. - The broader takeaway: The discussion ends by underscoring the need for multiple options and credible leadership in Iran, the difficulty of changing a deeply entrenched regime, and the reality that any transition would be complex, potentially dangerous, and require careful, strategic consideration of long-term impacts rather than quick, sweeping actions. The host reflects on the remarkable intensity and busyness of US politics and foreign policy under a dynamic administration, noting that such a convergence of domestic and international pressures makes this period historically singular.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined by professor Syed Mohammed Marandi, from Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back. Marandi: Hi, Glenn. Thank you. It shows how much I like your show because I went through a lot of trouble to get online. Glenn: I appreciate it. Regarding the riots in Iran, Tehran included, it seems every time there’s a buildup to regime change or invasion, the script follows a pattern: first destabilize with sanctions and an information war, then build on public grievances and instigate violent protests. You announce the intention to help locals in their aspirations for freedom, with rhetoric reduced to a binary: either you don’t care about the protesters or you support sanctions or intervention. After a coup or invasion, the US and its allies have a zero-sum geopolitical interest and power interest, not altruism. The result, from the Arab Spring onward, is that the country to be liberated is destroyed. Iranian protests are an internal issue, but once international, geopolitics intrudes. How do you assess the situation on the ground in Tehran, domestic grievances, and the geopolitical component? Marandi: Western media and think tanks periodically declare Iran on the verge of collapse, but the state has popular support and a strong constitutional adherence. Currency suddenly fell—perhaps 30–50% in a brief period—and was managed from abroad, with pressure from the US and Western allies on currency-exchange places. Peaceful protests in Tehran and other cities followed mainly by business people whose shops were threatened by rising prices; if the currency isn’t stabilized, they’d go out of business. Protests continued into day two, with larger crowds in some cities. Then infiltration occurred: small, well-disciplined groups began to riot. Over the past days, over 100 officers were murdered, some beheaded or burned alive, some police faces smashed. A nurse in a clinic was burned alive in the top floor; ambulances and fire engines were burned; a Red Crescent worker was killed. Western media claims “protesters” and ignores footage. Across the country today, demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic and the constitution were large—city by city like Isfahan, Tabriz, Ahvaz, Mashhad, Tehran. The crowd in Tehran was among the largest ever. Despite rioters, millions showed up in demonstrations across the country. The Iranian state’s media is outspent by a global Persian-language media empire in the West, with billions spent on online campaigns, bot armies, and networks. Yet millions demonstrated in support of the state. People can see the footage themselves. The internet was shut down to coordinate rioters across groups including ISIS-related elements, monarchists, and Kurdish groups. The rioters’ coordination collapsed when the internet went down. The regime’s supporters remain, and demonstrations in Tehran and across Iran show broad, diverse perspectives, all affirming support for the constitution and the state. Glenn: I’ve seen pro-government marches here as well; they’re huge, though not always covered in Europe. Marandi: There’s a narrative control to label the government illegitimate to topple it. The rhetoric claims Iranians are freedom-loving, yet those who claim to support them have bombs and blood. Pompeo’s tweet suggesting Mossad agents among protesters, and Mossad’s Persian-language statements, indicate foreign interference. The internet blackout aimed to prevent coordination among rioters; footage shows violent acts—two men burned in a mosque, a nurse burned in a clinic, ambulances and public buses destroyed. The “millions on the streets” claim is contradicted by the actuality of coordination via foreign paymasters. Glenn: Trump claimed Iran had fallen and would negotiate; is this about a new nuclear deal, stalled or about missiles and Iran’s regional support? What are Washington’s aims? Marandi: No one contacted him; his claim about the second-largest city falling is baseless. His ignorance shows inchoate knowledge of ground realities. Trump’s past statements about surrendering Iran suggest aims aligned with the Israeli regime’s goals: a broken West Asia and North Africa, fragmentation of states, and meddling across the region. Erdogan’s miscalculation—allying with Israel and Qatar—empowered Israeli policy at the expense of Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and Iran. The “woman, life, freedom” protests were initially fueled by Western narratives; BBC Persian and other outlets spread misinformation about Massa Amini, which was later corrected, but the cycle repeats. The West uses propaganda to push riots; Iran’s endurance of sanctions and propaganda demonstrates broad legitimacy for the Islamic Republic even amid external pressure. The demonstrations today show support for the state, the constitution, and Iran’s policies while denouncing the US, the Israeli regime, and their supporters. AOC’s stance and Trump’s stance reflect a uniparty tendency toward empire preservation. Glenn: Regarding potential war, Lindsey Graham floated strikes; how likely is war? Marandi: The currency manipulation aimed to justify instability for war. The CIA, Mossad, and others would seek to justify strikes, but Iran is prepared for war. If the US attacks, Iran may strike back; the population that stood with the state could unite in the face of aggression. Iran’s capabilities include underground drone and missile bases, short- to medium-range missiles, more easily moved than long-range missiles. Iran could devastate US installations if attacked. If war occurs, Iran could retaliate in the Persian Gulf and beyond, potentially impacting global economies. If the US begins, Iran could respond decisively, targeting American interests abroad and in the region. The Zionists allegedly favor war for their regional aims, regardless of Western consequences. Glenn: Professor Malandy, thank you for traveling and for the discussion. Marandi: Always a pleasure, Glenn.

The president of Haiti told the speaker he thought he was going to be killed or taken away, but the speaker dismissed it. The president, Aristide, was then deposed and flown to the Central African Republic on an unmarked CIA plane. The U.S. ambassador walked him to the plane in broad daylight. The speaker, an economic advisor and friend, called the New York Times reporter on the beat to cover the coup. The reporter said her editor was not interested.

The discussion opens by critiquing mainstream media narratives about Iran, contrasting them with “neocon run” outlets and highlighting one-sided portrayals. Condoleezza Rice is cited as arguing that Iran started the war forty-seven years ago, with the implication that the current actions are a finish. Speaker 1 (a guest) adds that Iran has been at war with the U.S. since 1979, noting the embassy hostage crisis, the killings of Marines in Lebanon, and Iranian-made roadside bombs in Iraq, suggesting longstanding Iranian hostility. Speaker 0 and others reference this framing as propagandistic, while noting Pentagon claims of US air power over Iran. Speaker 2 describes the view of US bombers flying over Tehran and the IRGC, with the assertion that Iran will be unable to respond while US and Israeli air power dominates. Talk then shifts to the possibility of US boots on the ground in Iran. Polymarket is cited, giving a 65% probability of US forces on the ground in Iran by December 31. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (spelled Ogracchi in the transcript) says he is waiting for a US ground invasion and claims Iran is prepared, while an NBC anchor appears surprised by the statement. A dialogue follows with a reporter asking an Iranian interviewee whether Iran is ready for a US invasion; the interviewee responds that Iran is ready and willing to confront US ground forces, insisting that Iran’s missiles and upgraded capabilities were demonstrated in prior conflicts. Colonel Douglas MacGregor appears to discuss the likelihood of US boots on the ground. He states zero probability of large-scale ground forces, noting the army’s reduced size since the 1990s and the Marines’ limited numbers. He argues a half-million troops would be needed for a meaningful ground campaign, with sustainment, drones, and missiles making a ground invasion impractical. He describes the challenge of moving forces through Israel, Syria, and into northern Iran, and asserts missiles and unmanned systems would deter such an operation. He also dismisses the idea that special operations could be the exception, noting concerns about extraction and the overall feasibility. Speaker 6 adds that Israel reportedly wants boots on the ground but lacks generals to lead such a mission, framing the move as potentially suicidal. The panel discusses perceived indicators of US military “success,” but MacGregor cautions that such signals—like a White House meeting with aerospace leaders and Israeli mobilizations—do not necessarily indicate a decisive victory. He argues that Iranian missiles and drones have inflicted damage on bases, radars, Patriot and THAAD batteries, and that Israel’s mobility and readiness are strained, with reservists mobilized but not guaranteed to show up. He emphasizes that Iran’s capabilities could prolong the conflict, and notes a broader geopolitical risk, including potential Russian and Chinese involvement. The conversation critiques Washington’s strategic planning, questioning whether the US or its allies had a systematic analysis of the likelihood of success in striking Iran, arguing that assumptions were evidence-free. MacGregor predicts a prolonged conflict, possibly extending for weeks, and warns against a broader regional collapse. He emphasizes that Iran’s strategy may be to endure and avoid a quick tactical defeat, while the US contemplates escalation or potential engagement with carrier groups. Regarding naval operations, there is debate about escorting ships through the Strait of Hormuz. The idea of US insurers covering shipping is discussed, with concerns about the risk to US taxpayers and the feasibility of naval escorts near Iran. MacGregor and the others argue that such an approach would be dangerous and unlikely to be pursued by naval leadership, pointing to the risk of being sunk and the logistical challenges of carrier air operations at long distances. Toward the end, the participants reflect on information integrity in wartime, noting that casualties and damage are often under- or mis-reported, and referencing Napoleon’s adage that the first casualty in war is the truth. The final segment promotes MacGregor’s Substack piece, MacGregor Warrior, and MacGregor TV, acknowledging shadow bans and encouraging listeners to seek out his material. The host and guests close with a candid acknowledgment of ongoing uncertainty and the prospect of a drawn-out conflict.

Scott Horton discusses the history of US involvement in Iran, starting with the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh and the reinstallation of the Shah. This action led to blowback, exemplified by the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nixon pressured the Shah to buy more US weapons, undermining his rule. The US initially tried working with Khomeini but later supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran, fearing the spread of Shiite fundamentalism. The US also supported the Mujahideen in Afghanistan to bait the Soviets into a costly war. The US gave Saddam Hussein the green light to invade Iran, fearing the influence of the Iranian revolution on Iraq's Shiite population. The US government facilitated Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iran. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US intervened to reinstall the Kuwaiti king, lying about Iraqi threats to Saudi Arabia. The US then betrayed the Shiite uprising in Iraq, fearing Iranian influence. The US supported Al Qaeda in conflicts like Bosnia and Kosovo, even as Al Qaeda attacked the US. Neoconservatives pushed for war with Iraq to benefit Israel, aiming to rebuild an oil pipeline to Haifa. The US then backed Al Qaeda-linked groups in Syria to weaken Iran and its ally, Assad. Obama took Al Qaeda's side in Libya. The US has been fighting a proxy war against Russia. The US has a pattern of supporting Bin Ladenite suicide bombers. Trump bombed Iranian nuclear facilities, calling the Ayatollah's bluff. The US continues to prioritize foreign interests over domestic needs.

Speaker 0 describes a dynamic of collaboration and tension around Iran, noting that the Israelis are “very American” and that they could have shouting matches in meetings over whose idea is best, but then go have lunch and remain amicable. He emphasizes that Israelis are good allies that the U.S. needs to protect, and asserts that CIA and Al Qaeda “worked closely together in Iraq. And Syria.” Speaker 1 adds that in Syria the aim was to overthrow Assad. Speaker 0 explains that there were times when covert action findings allowed meetings to talk to the “quote, unquote, enemies” to try to bring things down, as CIA officers. Speaker 1 observes that most of the world has a problem with Al Qaeda and ISIS (Daesh), but implies the CIA’s cooperation with ISIS and Al Qaeda lowers that problem. Speaker 0 argues that if the plan is for the U.S. to work with them, to work on a security agreement, which has been done with enemies before, the U.S. would have played that role side by side with diplomats and other involved countries, and he wouldn’t be surprised if that were happening; he calls it possibly hopeful. Speaker 1 notes that newspapers in the United States once celebrated Qasem Soleimani as a fighter with American troops against ISIS and Al Qaeda, and now that stance has changed. The speaker concludes with the reversal of priorities: “Now we have to go to Als ISIS and Al Qaeda to go back against Iran.”

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

John Bolton suggests regime change in Iran, but the U.S. has a history of interference there. In the 1940s and 50s, Britain and the Soviets deposed the Shah, and later the U.S. overthrew Prime Minister Mossadegh, who was seen as communist and hostile to American interests, despite being secular. The U.S. then reinstalled the Shah, an unpopular autocrat, making America unpopular in Iran. This led to the 1970s revolution, bringing Ayatollah Khomeini to power and creating an anti-American regime. Intervention made Iran an enemy. Regime change can lead to unforeseen consequences like civil war and refugee crises. The West should not interfere; Iran's problems today stem from past U.S. involvement.

US politicians accuse other nations of election meddling, but the CIA has a long history of interfering in foreign affairs through military coups. In one example, the CIA orchestrated the overthrow of Iran's prime minister for nationalizing the oil industry, leading to widespread violence and the installation of a US-friendly government. Declassified documents reveal the CIA's involvement in the coup, highlighting their use of propaganda and bribery. Despite claims of no longer meddling in elections, the CIA director openly admitted to continuing such actions for "very good reasons."

Scott Horton discusses the history of US-Iran relations, starting with the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh and the reinstallation of the Shah. This action led to blowback, exemplified by the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nixon pressured the Shah to buy US weapons, undermining his rule. The US initially tried working with Khomeini but then soured after the hostage crisis, triggered by the Shah's admission into the US for cancer treatment at Rockefeller's request. The Carter Doctrine declared the Persian Gulf an American lake. Brzezinski sought to bait the Soviets into Afghanistan, leading to the Carter Doctrine to deter Soviet expansion into Iran, though he later admitted the Soviet threat to Iran was overstated. The US supported Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, enabling his use of chemical weapons against Iranians. The US supported the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, leading to the rise of Al Qaeda. The US gave Saddam a green light to invade Kuwait, then intervened to protect Saudi Arabia. The Clinton administration adopted a dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran, further fueling Al Qaeda's animosity. Bin Laden cited US support for Israel and bases in Saudi Arabia as key grievances. The US supported Al Qaeda in Chechnya and Bosnia, even as they attacked the US. Neoconservatives, many with Trotskyist backgrounds, advocated for war with Iraq to benefit Israel, aiming to rebuild an oil pipeline to Haifa. The US supported Al Qaeda-linked groups in Libya and Syria, leading to the rise of ISIS. Obama took Al Qaeda's side in Libya and then moved Gaddafi's arms to Al Qaeda in Syria. The US has been fighting a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine.

Scott Horton discusses the history of US involvement in Iran, starting with the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh and the reinstallation of the Shah. This action led to blowback, exemplified by the 1979 Iranian revolution. Nixon pressured the Shah to buy US weapons, undermining his rule. The US initially tried working with Khomeini but later supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran, fearing the spread of Shiite revolution. The US supported Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war, even enabling his use of chemical weapons. Simultaneously, the US backed the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, leading to the rise of Al Qaeda. The US then intervened in Iraq after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, but later abandoned the Shiite uprising. Clinton's administration adopted a dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran, further fueling anti-American sentiment. The speaker claims the neoconservative movement pushed for war with Iraq to benefit Israel, aiming to rebuild an oil pipeline to Haifa. The US supported Al Qaeda-linked groups in Libya and Syria, leading to the rise of ISIS. The speaker concludes that US foreign policy has been driven by the interests of foreign powers rather than American interests, advocating for a retrenchment of American power and a focus on domestic issues.

The speaker asserts that the United States bears responsibility for Iran’s later radicalism, contending that the American government is the reason Iran became radical. The reasoning given is that Iran had a democratically elected leader, Mossadegh, whom the speaker claims the U.S. did not like because he wanted to nationalize the oil. The speaker notes that the British also disliked Mossadegh for the same reason, and references a historical moment—1953—described as the Iranian coup d'etat, stating that it was aided by intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom and the United States. Following this intervention, the speaker claims that the United States and its allies “put the shah back in,” describing the shah as physically sick and unpopular. This sequence, according to the speaker, established conditions that paved the way for a rise in and persistence of radical elements within Islam for many decades. The points are presented in a causal narrative: U.S. opposition to Mossadegh over oil nationalization contributed to intervention in Iran, which led to restoring the Shah; the Shah’s unpopularity and ill health, under this arrangement, helped create an environment that empowered radical Islamist forces for an extended period. Key claims highlighted include: - The American government is depicted as the root cause of Iran’s later radicalism. - Mossadegh’s push to nationalize oil made him a target of U.S. and British opposition. - The 1953 coup d'etat in Iran was aided by intelligence agencies from the UK and the United States. - The Shah was reinstalled after the coup and is characterized as physically ill and unpopular. - This sequence is said to have paved the way for the most radical elements of Islam for many decades. The speaker emphasizes the continuity of this historical arc as a justification for present-day views on Iran, linking early mid-20th-century foreign intervention to long-term Islamist radicalism. The narrative is presented as a straightforward cause-and-effect chain, with the 1953 coup and the Shah’s reinstatement identified as pivotal events leading to subsequent decades of radicalization.

Iran wants to take over Saudi Arabia by burning down the Saudi embassy. They claim the US created ISIS by supporting Mujahideen fighters against the Soviets in Afghanistan. A high-level asset allegedly became president in 2008 to destroy the US from within. The president defunded the military and allegedly funded ISIS through covert operations. An ISIS commander in Pakistan confessed to receiving funds routed through the US to recruit fighters for Syria. The US government has been criticized for indirectly funding terrorist organizations. President Obama requested funds to train Iraqi soldiers and Syrian rebels to fight ISIS.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of striking Iran to eliminate its nuclear program and the broader implications of regime change. - Speaker 0 acknowledges arguments that Israel has wanted to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, and that American involvement with B-52s and large bombs might be needed to finish the job. He notes the idea of a strike that proceeds quickly with minimal American casualties, under a Trump-era frame that Iran will not get a nuclear bomb. - He observes a shift among Washington’s neoconservative and Republican circles from opposing Iran’s nuclear capability to opposing Ayatollah rule itself, suggesting a subtle change in objectives while maintaining the theme of intervention. He concedes cautious support if Trump executes it prudently, but warns of a “switcheroo” toward regime change rather than purely disabling the nuclear program. - Speaker 0 criticizes the record of neocons on foreign policy (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the Arab Spring) and argues that the entire Middle East bears their failures. He emphasizes a potential regime-change drive and questions what would come after removing the Ayatollah, including possible US troop deployments and financial support for a new regime. - He highlights the size of Iran (about 92,000,000 people, two and a half times the size of Texas) and warns that regime change could trigger a bloody civil war and a large refugee crisis, possibly drawing tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths and destabilizing Europe. - Speaker 1 presents a more vocal stance: he would like to see the regime fall and leaves to the president the timing and method, insisting that if the nuclear program isn’t eliminated now, “we’ll all regret it” and urging to “be all in” to help Israel finish the job. - In cuts 3:43, Speaker 1 argues that removing the Ayatollah’s regime would be beneficial because staying in power would continue to threaten Israel, foment terrorism, and pursue a bomb; he characterizes the regime as aiming to destroy Jews and Sunni Islam, calling them “fanatical religious Nazis.” - Speaker 0 responds that such a forceful call for regime change is immature, shallow, and reckless, warning that certainty about outcomes in foreign interventions is impossible. He asserts that the first rule of foreign policy is humility, noting that prior interventions led to prolonged conflict and mass displacement. He cautions against beating the drums for regime change in another Middle Eastern country, especially the largest, and reiterates that the issue is not simply removing the nuclear program but opposing Western-led regime change. - The discussion frames a tension between supporting efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and resisting Western-led regime change, with a strong emphasis on potential humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. The speakers reference public opinion (citing 86% of Americans not wanting Iran to have a bomb) and critique interventions as historically destabilizing.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

Scott Horton discusses the history of US-Iran relations, starting with the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh and the reinstallation of the Shah. This action led to blowback, exemplified by the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nixon pressured the Shah to buy US weapons, undermining his rule. The US initially tried working with Ayatollah Khomeini, viewing him as reasonable. In 1979, David Rockefeller influenced Carter to allow the Shah into the US for cancer treatment, triggering the hostage crisis. Carter then announced the Carter Doctrine, asserting US dominance in the Persian Gulf. Brzezinski aimed to provoke Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, later feigning concern about Iran. The US supported Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, even enabling his use of chemical weapons. The US also backed the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, leading to the rise of Al Qaeda. The US then intervened in the Gulf War to reinstate the Kuwaiti King. Clinton adopted a dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran, further fueling anti-American sentiment. Bin Laden cited US support for Israel and military presence in Saudi Arabia as key grievances. The US supported Al Qaeda in Chechnya and the Balkans, even as they attacked US interests. The neoconservative movement pushed for war in Iraq, aiming to reshape the region to benefit Israel. The US invasion of Iraq empowered Shiite groups and Iran, contrary to neocon plans. The US then backed Sunni extremists in Syria to counter Iranian influence, leading to the rise of ISIS. Obama then sided with Al Qaeda in Libya. The US has a history of supporting various factions in the Middle East, often with unintended consequences. The US has been fighting a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. The US has a long history of interventionism, often driven by foreign interests rather than American interests. The US should normalize relations with Iran.

To the people of Iran, help is on the way. In a brief exchange, Speaker 1 questions whether a hat reading “Make Iran Great Again” was on Air Force One with President Trump over the weekend, asking, “Did you really have this hat on Air Force One with president Trump this weekend? The one that says am I reading that right? Does that say make Iran great again? Did you give that to the president?” Speaker 0 confirms, “I did.” He adds that Trump “is not Barack Obama. He’s not turning his back on the people of Iran who are demanding that their oppression end.” He then directs a warning toward the Ayatollah and “his thugs,” stating, “if you keep killing your people in defiance of president Trump, you’re gonna wake up dead.” The message concludes with the assertion that the regime “is on verge of falling.”

The Iranian revolution understands its aim is not simply national. It's about the expulsion of The United States from the region. There's no security for Iranians without this expulsion of imperialists from the region, which then it also necessitates the defeat of Zionism. And if you study each and every step of the way, the imperialists offered Hezbollah and Iran always an entry into the order if they abandoned and abdicated the Palestinian cause, if they abandoned this issue. But there's a reason why this is not. First, obviously solidarity with the Palestinians on a range of grounds, but also clearly the Iranian project around restoring sovereignty is not quite possible without the defeat of imperialism and Zionism.

The conversation centers on Iran’s current crisis and the likelihood, timing, and aims of potential U.S. and Israeli actions against Iran. The speakers discuss whether protests inside Iran are driving any attack plans or if those plans were made beforehand, and what the objectives might be if war occurs. Key points and claims, preserved as stated: - The Iranian regime is described as facing its worst crisis since 1979, with reports of thousands dead, and questions about whether the U.S. and possibly Israel will strike Iran, and what their objectives would be (regime change vs installing a new leader under the supreme leader). - The interviewer introduces Trita Parsi, noting his nuanced, non-dual position and his personal history of fleeing Iran around the revolution. - The analysts discuss whether a war plan against Iran existed before the protests; Speaker 1 (Parsi) argues the plan was made prior to the protests and that the protests did not cause the decision. He says the Israelis intended to provoke the U.S. into war, but the sequence shifted so the United States would lead with Israel in a supporting role. He notes Netanyahu’s unusual quiet and suggests a deliberate effort to present this as Trump’s war, not Israel’s, though he believes the plan originated in Washington in late December at the White House. - The protests are said to be organic and not instigated from abroad, with possible slight slowing of plans due to the protests. The rationale for striking Iran initially emphasized Israeli concerns about Iranian missile capabilities and their potential rebuilding of missiles and, ambiguously, nuclear ambitions; there was no credible media evidence presented to support new nuclear development claims, according to Speaker 1. - The justification for an attack is viewed as a pretext tied to “unfinished business,” with the broader aim of addressing Iran’s missile program and perceived threats, rather than the protests alone. The discussion notes that pro-Iran regime factions in the U.S. may find protests more persuasive among centrist Democrats, but less so among MAGA or core Trump supporters. - The origins of the protests are described as organic, driven by currency collapse and sanctions, which Speaker 1 connects to decades of sanctions and the economic crisis in Iran. He states sanctions were designed to produce desperation to create a window for outside intervention, though he emphasizes this does not mean the protests are purely externally driven. - The role of sanctions is elaborated: Pompeo’s “maximum pressure” statement is cited as intentional to create conditions for regime change, with Speaker 0 highlighting the destruction of Iran’s economy as a method to weaken the regime and empower opposition. Speaker 1 agrees the sanctions contributed to economic distress but stresses that the protests’ roots are broader than the economy alone. - The discussion considers whether the protests could be used to justify external action and whether a regional or global backlash could ensue, including refugee flows and regional instability affecting Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and GCC states. It’s noted that the U.S. and some regional actors would prefer to avoid a total collapse of Iran, while Israel would welcome greater upheaval if it constrains Iranian capabilities. - The question of a power vacuum inside Iran is addressed. Speaker 1 argues there is no obvious internal opposition strong enough to quickly replace the regime; MeK is excluded as a coalition partner in current Iran opposition movements. The Pahlavi (Reza Pallavi) faction is discussed as a possible figurehead outside Iran, with debate about his domestic support. The MEK is described as outside any coalition due to its history. - Pallavi’s potential role: Speaker 1 suggests Pallavi has gained closer ties with Israel and some pro-Israel circles in Washington, but emphasizes that domestic support inside Iran remains uncertain and difficult to gauge. Pallavi says he would seek a democratically elected leader if the regime falls; Speaker 1 cautions that words alone are insufficient without proven ability to secure loyalty from security forces and to persuade key societal sectors. - The Shah’s legacy and comparison: The Shah’s regime is described as highly repressive but comparatively more open socially and economically, though with a discredited political system. The current regime disperses power within a more complex system where the supreme leader is central but not incomparable to past autocrats. - The potential for separatism and regional spillover is discussed, including Kurdish separatism in western Iran. Speaker 1 clarifies that the Kurdish group is not part of the protests but a separate element taking advantage of the situation; the risk of civil war if the state collapses is acknowledged as a nightmare scenario. - The possibility of a Maduro-like approach (managed transition through elite elements) is considered. While channels of communication exist, Speaker 1 doubts the same dynamics as Venezuela; Iran lacks internal continuity in the security establishment, making a similar path unlikely. - Military retaliation dynamics are examined: Iran’s response to limited U.S. strikes could be symbolic or broader, including potential strikes on U.S. bases in the region. The possibility that Israel would push the United States to target Iran’s military capabilities rather than just decapitation is discussed, with notes about potential after-effects and regional reactions. - The 12-day war context and Iran’s current military capabilities: There is debate about whether Iran’s military could be a greater threat to U.S. bases than previously believed and about how easily Iranian missile launches could be located and neutralized. - The closing forecast: The likely trajectory depends on the next few days. A limited, negotiated strike could lead to negotiations and a transformed regime with lifted sanctions, perhaps avoiding a wholesale regime change; a more aggressive or decapitating approach could provoke substantial instability and regional repercussions. The conversation ends with a personal note of concern for Parsi’s family in Iran. - Final reflection: The interview ends with expressions of concern for family safety and a mutual appreciation for the discussion.

Speaker 0 discusses working with the Israelis, describing them as “very American” and noting that they could get into shouting matches during meetings over whose idea was best, followed by casual lunch and reconciliation. He emphasizes that Israel is a good ally that the U.S. needs to protect and support, and he asserts that CIA and Al Qaeda had worked closely together in Iraq and in Syria, and that there are times when covert action allowed meetings with the “quote unquote, enemies” to try to bring things down as CIA officers. Speaker 1 adds that most of the world has a problem with Al Qaeda and ISIS/Daesh, but there is less of a problem because the CIA worked with ISIS/Daesh and Al Qaeda. He suggests that if the CIA worked with them, it would be better to understand what they were doing, and if the plan is for the U.S. to work with them on a security agreement, which has been done with enemies before, then this has been done in concert with diplomats and other countries involved. He indicates he wouldn’t be surprised if that was happening and would call it possibly hopeful. Speaker 0 continues by noting that newspapers in the United States once celebrated Qasem Soleimani as a fighter with American troops against ISIS and Al Qaeda. He states that Soleimani “was, and now it's switched,” implying a shift in perception or policy. The overarching theme is the idea of collaboration or coordination with hostile or extremist groups in pursuit of broader strategic objectives, including countering Iran, and the possibility that such collaborations could be framed as necessary or hopeful within a complex web of alliances and covert actions. Speaker 0 ends by reiterating the shift in stance: “Now we have to go to al ISIS and Al Qaeda to go back against Iran.” This underscores a cyclical or ironic pivot in U.S. strategy, moving from partnering with certain adversaries against common threats to reengaging those same groups to counter another adversary. The dialogue presents a candid view of realpolitik, suggesting that relationships with seemingly incompatible actors and shifts in alliances occur as part of broader geopolitical objectives, with collaboration sometimes described as acceptable when it serves strategic goals, and public narratives sometimes contrasting with behind-the-scenes actions.

Speaker 0 describes the events as “a classic regime change color revolution destabilization operation.” He asserts that “the military strike was being prepared in advance,” and that “the violence that they carried out” was carried out by “agent provocateurs managed and inserted by US and Israeli intelligence,” with British intelligence also involved. He adds that “when it comes to Iran, The United States and Britain are hand in hand since the first coup in Iran, which was a US British operation.” He further claims that Iranians who supported the shah “fled to The US, to Europe, to Canada, where they've set themselves up,” and that “nearly all of whom are quite wealthy,” consisting of monarchists who have been “looked after very well by the US government.” He says the US regards them as a “fifth column that they can deploy during times like this.” The speaker extends the accusation to other conflicts, stating that the US keeps “Syrian fifth column, an Afghan, an Iraqi, a Libyan fifth column,” and that wherever there’s a war, “The US and the British, the Canadians, they keep them in residence, and they use them either to create the future political class that they'll then parachute in.” He describes this as part of “the neocolonial system.” He concedes that “it didn't work out, but it was ugly.” Regarding information warfare, he criticizes the mainstream media, politicians, and “these so called influencers,” describing their misinformation and propaganda campaign as “even uglier.” He emphasizes that “this is not the first go around,” claiming they have “been doing this perpetually for years,” with the aim of creating unrest and instability and momentum. He explains a sequence they allegedly seek: if they can obtain momentum, it is followed by “a military strike, and then a decapitation of the leadership, and then regime change, hopefully.” He concludes that “so it didn't work out.”