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The president of Haiti told the speaker he thought he was going to be killed or taken away, but the speaker dismissed it. The president, Aristide, was then deposed and flown to the Central African Republic on an unmarked CIA plane. The U.S. ambassador walked him to the plane in broad daylight. The speaker, an economic advisor and friend, called the New York Times reporter on the beat to cover the coup. The reporter said her editor was not interested.

Scott Horton discusses the history of US involvement in Iran, starting with the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh and the reinstallation of the Shah. This action led to blowback, exemplified by the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nixon pressured the Shah to buy more US weapons, undermining his rule. The US initially tried working with Khomeini but later supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran, fearing the spread of Shiite fundamentalism. The US also supported the Mujahideen in Afghanistan to bait the Soviets into a costly war. The US gave Saddam Hussein the green light to invade Iran, fearing the influence of the Iranian revolution on Iraq's Shiite population. The US government facilitated Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iran. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US intervened to reinstall the Kuwaiti king, lying about Iraqi threats to Saudi Arabia. The US then betrayed the Shiite uprising in Iraq, fearing Iranian influence. The US supported Al Qaeda in conflicts like Bosnia and Kosovo, even as Al Qaeda attacked the US. Neoconservatives pushed for war with Iraq to benefit Israel, aiming to rebuild an oil pipeline to Haifa. The US then backed Al Qaeda-linked groups in Syria to weaken Iran and its ally, Assad. Obama took Al Qaeda's side in Libya. The US has been fighting a proxy war against Russia. The US has a pattern of supporting Bin Ladenite suicide bombers. Trump bombed Iranian nuclear facilities, calling the Ayatollah's bluff. The US continues to prioritize foreign interests over domestic needs.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

John Bolton suggests regime change in Iran, but the U.S. has a history of interference there. In the 1940s and 50s, Britain and the Soviets deposed the Shah, and later the U.S. overthrew Prime Minister Mossadegh, who was seen as communist and hostile to American interests, despite being secular. The U.S. then reinstalled the Shah, an unpopular autocrat, making America unpopular in Iran. This led to the 1970s revolution, bringing Ayatollah Khomeini to power and creating an anti-American regime. Intervention made Iran an enemy. Regime change can lead to unforeseen consequences like civil war and refugee crises. The West should not interfere; Iran's problems today stem from past U.S. involvement.

US politicians accuse other nations of election meddling, but the CIA has a long history of interfering in foreign affairs through military coups. In one example, the CIA orchestrated the overthrow of Iran's prime minister for nationalizing the oil industry, leading to widespread violence and the installation of a US-friendly government. Declassified documents reveal the CIA's involvement in the coup, highlighting their use of propaganda and bribery. Despite claims of no longer meddling in elections, the CIA director openly admitted to continuing such actions for "very good reasons."

The discussion focuses on a proposed $300 billion figure for rebuilding Iran, compared to the earlier $1.8 billion mentioned in the agreement. The speaker argues that, regardless of where one might challenge specific points, the central issue is that Iran could not have developed a nuclear weapon without the U.S. knowing it. The speaker distinguishes the amounts: the money in the agreement was about $1.78 billion, while the figure of $300 billion is what is being talked about giving Iranians. The $1.78 billion is described as Iranian money, not American money. It allegedly comes from a weapons-related deal from the 1970s, when the Shah was still in power: the Shah did not receive the weapons, but Iran paid for them. When a new administration took over, the parties went to court, and they won—specifically on the interest that would accumulate each day that payment was not made. The speaker adds that, to protect American taxpayers, President Obama decided it was better to place the $1.8 billion at stake to gain credibility needed to carry out other actions that constrained Iran’s behavior. The transcript also highlights a point “a lot of people aren’t aware of” regarding Ayatollah Khomeini. It says Khomeini supported the negotiations and backed efforts to reach an agreement. Opponents who argued against negotiation—saying that if Khomeini negotiated with the “great Satan” he would regret it—are described as having been contradicted by Khomeini, who stated they would pursue a structure that could work for both Iran and the other side. The speaker says Khomeini faced internal political backlash for taking this position, including references to removing him.

The conversation discusses how the Dulles brothers—John Foster Dulles (head of the Department of State) and Alan Dulles (head of the CIA)—moved into the two highest unelected positions in the United States after returning from Nazi Germany and Switzerland. The speaker argues that from that point on, the State Department became a “tentacle” of an international banking cartel and that related global public-private partnerships continued until the USAID–DOJ partnership “was the first blow.” The speaker links current events to “Dulles brothers regime change operations” initiated in 1953, specifically Operation Ajax in Iran. They describe it as a playbook that has “played out till this day” and claim it was turned on America rather than serving “we the people” of the United States or any country. They characterize CIA work as part of a broader global intelligence effort involving MI6 and 5Is, and possibly Mossad, which they say protects the international banking system while producing an “endless war for profit machine.” They then outline a structure for the regime change operations: USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy were used to create chaos on the ground in Iran through uprisings and riots, after which the regime change was pushed. The speaker adds a specific connection to business interests, saying Sullivan and Cromwell—the law firm of John Foster Dulles—represented BP Oil, and claiming Operation Ajax was about BP Oil rather than the situation in Iran presented to the public. The speaker then compares this to Guatemala, stating that Sullivan and Cromwell’s client was United Fruit, and that Alan Dulles was on the board of United Fruit. They claim Guatemala involved preventing changes to farming rules desired by Guatemala while opposing those changes by United Fruit. The speaker asserts there have been about 90 regime change operations to date, culminating—according to them—in a regime change playbook applied to the United States after Donald Trump won in 2016, and they say the United States remains in that “color revolution” to the present.

Scott Horton discusses the history of US involvement in Iran, starting with the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh and the reinstallation of the Shah. This action led to blowback, exemplified by the 1979 Iranian revolution. Nixon pressured the Shah to buy US weapons, undermining his rule. The US initially tried working with Khomeini but later supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran, fearing the spread of Shiite revolution. The US supported Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war, even enabling his use of chemical weapons. Simultaneously, the US backed the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, leading to the rise of Al Qaeda. The US then intervened in Iraq after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, but later abandoned the Shiite uprising. Clinton's administration adopted a dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran, further fueling anti-American sentiment. The speaker claims the neoconservative movement pushed for war with Iraq to benefit Israel, aiming to rebuild an oil pipeline to Haifa. The US supported Al Qaeda-linked groups in Libya and Syria, leading to the rise of ISIS. The speaker concludes that US foreign policy has been driven by the interests of foreign powers rather than American interests, advocating for a retrenchment of American power and a focus on domestic issues.

The speaker asserts that the United States bears responsibility for Iran’s later radicalism, contending that the American government is the reason Iran became radical. The reasoning given is that Iran had a democratically elected leader, Mossadegh, whom the speaker claims the U.S. did not like because he wanted to nationalize the oil. The speaker notes that the British also disliked Mossadegh for the same reason, and references a historical moment—1953—described as the Iranian coup d'etat, stating that it was aided by intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom and the United States. Following this intervention, the speaker claims that the United States and its allies “put the shah back in,” describing the shah as physically sick and unpopular. This sequence, according to the speaker, established conditions that paved the way for a rise in and persistence of radical elements within Islam for many decades. The points are presented in a causal narrative: U.S. opposition to Mossadegh over oil nationalization contributed to intervention in Iran, which led to restoring the Shah; the Shah’s unpopularity and ill health, under this arrangement, helped create an environment that empowered radical Islamist forces for an extended period. Key claims highlighted include: - The American government is depicted as the root cause of Iran’s later radicalism. - Mossadegh’s push to nationalize oil made him a target of U.S. and British opposition. - The 1953 coup d'etat in Iran was aided by intelligence agencies from the UK and the United States. - The Shah was reinstalled after the coup and is characterized as physically ill and unpopular. - This sequence is said to have paved the way for the most radical elements of Islam for many decades. The speaker emphasizes the continuity of this historical arc as a justification for present-day views on Iran, linking early mid-20th-century foreign intervention to long-term Islamist radicalism. The narrative is presented as a straightforward cause-and-effect chain, with the 1953 coup and the Shah’s reinstatement identified as pivotal events leading to subsequent decades of radicalization.

Sayyid Professor Mohammad Marandi discussed Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, arguing that U.S. actions have long been destructive and that current events point to further instability. On Iraq, he said the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein in an eight-year war against Iran, gave a green light for an invasion of Kuwait, and then occupied Iraq, keeping “lots of control” over government and influence through wealthy collaborators. He claimed Iraqi oil export flows to a bank in the United States, with the U.S. deciding “how much oil and when” to give it to Iraq. He described a pattern in which the Iraqi parliament’s choice of prime minister is blocked by American objections, forcing compromises. He also argued that while the U.S. claims Iran is destructive, Iran provides electricity and natural gas that Iraq often cannot pay for due to sanctions, and that Ayatollah Khamenei insisted Iran continue supply so Iraqis would not suffer in extreme summer heat. Marandi said American support for key Iraqi figures created corruption and danger for Iraqis, adding that it is unclear whether events in Baghdad’s Green Zone were a coup but that American involvement—he argued—creates the possibility of a ground invasion of Iran, potentially using Iraqi territory. The conversation then turned to potential U.S. escalation and Iran’s military readiness. Marandi said the U.S. has brought extra forces and extensive logistical equipment for a ground offensive, but that Iran is prepared for missile, drone, and ground capabilities. He claimed Iran planned for a ground defensive for decades and described Iranian strategy as preparing for a longer war to punish the aggressor in a way that prevents future attacks. He also argued that U.S. invasion plans would face consequences from Iraqi resistance and Iranian armed forces, asserting the U.S. and Israel have underestimated multiple resistance movements, including Hezbollah, Ansarallah in Yemen, and the resistance in Iraq. On Iran, George framed the situation as restarting hostilities, with missiles flying and Trump issuing nuclear-war threats. Marandi replied that Iranians are “utterly skeptical” about U.S. intentions and that prior agreements were not expected to be implemented willingly. He said the difference is Iran’s own leverage: Iran is exporting “huge amounts of oil,” disproportionate to other Persian Gulf countries, while the U.S. is holding back obligations regarding Iranian assets and sanctions. He argued the U.S. is not honest, and said Iran is preparing for a potential second war, emphasizing that the U.S. threatens annihilation and does not operate under international law. He claimed Western media does not cover large-scale killings in Lebanon and Gaza, and said Iran believes international law and agreements will not restrain the U.S. Marandi added that Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral arrangements will include holding funerals in Iran and also in Iraq, with Khamenei returned to Iran afterward, presenting this as a major show of strength and urging attention to public reactions. He also said U.S. political and economic constraints exist, including falling support for war in the U.S., limited time before midterms, and obstacles such as a Senate resolution limiting Trump’s ability to resume war. Discussing allies and Europe, Marandi said European governments have facilitated flights and bombing operations and that European leaders involved in the war did not acknowledge their role. He referenced UN language on genocide in Gaza and argued that continued European support has allowed further bombing of civilian targets, including in Tehran. Finally, he criticized Lebanon’s government for an agreement with Netanyahu and the United States, calling it treason and comparing it to comprador-class collaboration in historical empires. He argued that exposing these actors is “a good thing” because it removes the ability to justify them. Addressing whether Lebanon could face civil war, he said he is “optimistic” because masks have been removed and the Lebanese public will have to choose between the Israelis and the resistance, with no middle ground. He added that he believes Hezbollah will prevent a ceasefire and, if escalation occurs, he expects Lebanon’s people to defeat civil war attempts, while also arguing that any effort involving the Jolani regime would fail due to Iranian and Iraqi resistance capabilities.

The discussion centers on an arrangement involving Israel’s missile systems and technology, with one participant describing Israel as being framed as doing the United States a favor by allowing access to Israel’s technology “for the Iron Dome level of stuff.” One participant counters that Israel “is getting a lot of that” and that the relationship is not accurately characterized as one-sided generosity, adding that Israel has received “a lot” of military technology and weaponry. One participant argues that Israel is not the “giver” in the relationship, especially in intelligence, describing Israel as “the taker” and the U.S. as “the host,” referencing John Kiriakou and others from their perspective. They say that everyone they have spoken with, including people they mention (including Kiriakou and Bustamante), has told them versions of this same idea, concluding that the notion of Israel’s role as purely a nice thing for U.S. benefit “doesn’t feel like what I’ve seen in reality.” They also address the demeanor of a media-trained individual they spoke with, describing him as “impressively media trained” and “unflappable,” even while being pressed. The conversation includes uncertainty about specifics, including the formalization of Israeli companies being on U.S. soil, which the speaker says they “didn’t quite still get.” A key moment is the speaker stating that “none of us want this,” calling it unpopular and saying they feel the U.S. is “teaming up with the most diabolical country.” They describe the other person reacting with “interesting,” while still referencing Iran as a threat. The speaker contrasts the framing, saying that the war is branded with Iran even though Iran is the one attacked, and that the person attacked gets branded with the label “Iran war.” The speaker concludes by saying the situation is “ass backwards,” asserting that the narrative outcome was predictable, and that objective observers would see that it was “not in our interest.” They argue the framing places “people” listening in a position where the U.S. has to “defend the Iranian regime,” which they say no one wants to do.

Speaker 0: Welcome to game plan. I'm Shivan Jan now. So far, there is only one winner in this war in West Asia, and that's Russia. Mind you, I'm not saying that this was acknowledged by the European Council president Antonio Costa. US Israeli strikes in West Asia, they have driven up the price of oil, strengthening the Kremlin's ability to fund its military campaign. Now in a sharp reversal from last year's policy of penalizing countries for buying Russian energy, US treasury secretary Scott Pessen said that The United States could unsanction other Russian oil to keep the flow of oil intact. And this is because the Strait Of Hormuz, the pivotal point from where this war is kind of converging, that is under complete Iranian control. Movement of ships has been blocked. Movement of oil has been blocked. It has shot up the oil prices, and the repercussions are being felt across the world at this point. Is the war proving to be a boon for Russia whose economy is dependent on energy exports? As the state of Hormuz gets blocked, Russia gets a free hand at selling its oil at rates that can be expounded without proper discounts as well. Is Putin the one winning in the war that US and Israel started against Iran? To discuss this with me on game plan is doctor Glenn Deesen, professor of international relations at the University of Southeastern Norway. Glenn, always a pleasure speaking with you. Thanks so much for joining me here. Trump and Putin, they held a call recently, the first time this year, and this was to discuss the discuss the ongoing hostilities in Iran. What do you think they would have discussed, and what kind of a role can Putin be playing in the ongoing war? Speaker 1: Well, I assume some of the things to discuss was obviously the the the extent to which The US and Russia targets each other because one of the things that the American media has been complaining about is the likelihood that Russia is providing intelligence to Iran for targets, but of course this is what The United States been doing for years and continues to do, that is give the Ukrainians targets to hit Russia. So I think there's a necessity to begin to discuss is appropriate and again what happens behind these doors, I don't know. But also of course there has to be some scaling back of the energy sanctions against Russia to bring this, the energy prices under control. As you suggest, they are now very much out of control. But I think also the main thing they've discussed is how to bring this war to an end because I think it's perfectly clear now that this US attack on Iran was a terrible mistake, and it appears that Putin would be the the main middleman who would might be able to bring an end to this war. But, again, it depends what can be done as what the Iranians will demand may be more than what the Americans can deliver. Speaker 0: Glenn, as you mentioned, Putin could perhaps be the main person to bring peace in this war. Putin has the highest chance of acting as peacemaker in West Asia. Is there anyone other than Putin at this point who can bring? Because just look at the optics of it. US starts a war, and I think ten days into it, he needs to make a call to Vladimir Putin to discuss that same war. How does it look for The US? Speaker 1: Well, they don't care for this, of course, but that it's similar to what to what happened with the war against Syria. That is, if you remember, back at president Obama's time, he had set these red lines, he were gonna attack Syria. It was quite obvious that this would be a disaster. So he went to the Russian president and he was able to get a deal through and which essentially took Obama's chestnuts out of the fire. So it was, you know, it it it is the reality or the optics of it isn't great given that The US has been fighting a proxy war for years against Russia, but but, know, at some point, you have to put the optics aside. Who who else would be in a position to help to negotiate this? I'm thinking, you know, perhaps China could be a middleman, but I think given that The United States, especially under the Trump administration, wants to improve bilateral ties with Russia, I I I think he's probably the best, yeah, the best bet. Speaker 0: Would it be fair to say that Putin is emerging as a winner in this ongoing West Asia war, which only seems to be expanding within the West Asian region? Speaker 1: Well, no. I think, yeah, to a large extent, I think that is correct because the energy prices are way up. The US have to scale back sanctions. The all the weapons which The US had intended to ship towards Ukraine to fight Russia is now being depleted. For European leaders, as you mentioned earlier on, to who aspire to prolong the war in Ukraine, this is an absolute disaster. And we'll see that countries that cut the energy ties or at least reduced energy ties with Russia at the best of American pressure, they of course have learned a lesson now as well that this was not a good idea that you don't necessarily put bet too much on a hegemon in decline, so countries who before paid discounts now may have to pay premium. We'll see that Iran, which I assume is getting some support from Russia sees this relationship improving dramatically. They're moving much closer, which is good for Russia because the Iranians always have some suspicions towards the Russians given well a long history they've had through the centuries of conflict. So all of this improves. You can also say that The Gulf States, the weakening of The Gulf States has also a big impact on weakening The U. S. Ability to restore its hegemony because what show what's obvious now is that the Gulf States are not getting protection instead they're becoming very vulnerable as frontline states and The US is no longer seen as that reliable. Well, if they're not going to bet their security on The United States anymore then they may not have that much pressure to sell their oil in dollars. You're not gonna have those recycled petrodollars coming back to The US, and suddenly the whole AI race with China looks a lot weaker as well. So I think across the board, a lot of things look good for Russia, but and there is a big but here, and that is I don't think that the Russians want this war nonetheless because the Russians, much like the Chinese, value stability and predictability. And what's happening in Iran now could again, if something would happen to Iran collapse, that would be a disaster for this Greater Eurasia initiative that is to integrate economies of Greater Eurasian Continent, but also this could spiral into a world war. So from this perspective, it's very dangerous and I don't doubt that the Russians therefore want to put an end to this war simply because I guess much like India, they don't want the Eurasian Continent to be too China centric, they would like to have many poles of power and this requires diversification. This means that the Russians need close ties with Iran, with India and other countries. So for the Americans to knock off Iran off the, you know, the chessboard, the greater Eurasian chessboard would be a disaster for the Russians. So, yes, I think they're prospering or benefiting from this, but they they do wanna put an end to it. Speaker 0: Understood. Glenn, let me just come to the Strait Of Hormuz. You know, the objectives of U. S. Behind starting this war, that has been questioned enough. Why did you start this war in the first place? Those are questions not just emerging, you know, globally. They're also emerging from inside The U. S. But if you look at what a win will actually look like for US, would it be the state of Hormuz? Like, which whoever controls the state of Hormuz is eventually who walks away as you know, walks away with the victory at this point because The US was looking for a change in regime. They mentioned it enough number of times. That hasn't happened and doesn't seem like it's going to happen. Is the state of Hormuz the winning factor now? Speaker 1: Well, I I I don't think any The US would be in a position to control this just given the geography. So The US obviously went into into this war with the objective of regime change. That was the goal. This was the decapitation strike, this was the hope of killing Khamenei and obviously it didn't work. I think it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but you know killing the leader of Iran only created more solidarity within the country. And also the idea that the whole armed forces would begin to disintegrate once they had been punished enough, also proven to be incorrect. So I think at the moment you see the American pivoting a bit. Some are talking about the Strait Of Moose that this should be a goal, others are saying you see a shift now towards saying well, actually what we really want to do is just degrade Iran's missile capabilities that they won't have this long range missiles. And again, you know, these are the kind of vague objectives which they can essentially declare victory today then because Iran has had many of its missiles destroyed. Also it launched a lot of its missiles at U. S. Targets which means that its missile stockpile has been reduced. So this should be a source of optimism when The U. S. Moves from this very hard line objective such as regime change and they shift in towards missiles, reducing the missile stockpiles or something like this. But the straight of our moves, I think, is beyond what what is reasonable. It's it will be too difficult. So I don't think they will But why push too hard on do Speaker 0: you feel it would be difficult if I were to just look at the bases that they have across West Asia? They have enough military might. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, have their bases there. How difficult would it be to exert that military might over the Strait Of Hormuz? Speaker 1: Well, controlling it just means the ability to shut it down. Many countries would have the ability to shut down this narrow strait. The problem is that no one benefits from it, that is the Gulf States are hurt, Iran is hurt from it, The US and the global economy is hurt. So it becomes an exercise in self harm. The reason why the Iranians are doing this, the ability to shut down the Strait Of Hormuz is because The US has the ability to inflict a mass amount of destruction. It can go after civilian infrastructure, it can well, look what they've done to Tehran. It looks like, well, just, you know, the chemical warfare there. You've seen in terms of going after his fuel depots. They're going after the water supplies in Iran. You you see all these things. This is what America can do. Iran doesn't have that ability. They can't hit The United States. What they can do is cause economic pain. So, yes, I think The US and many of the Gulf States can also shut down the Strait Of Our Moose, but but but that's not that's it doesn't have any purpose. It doesn't have any reasoning. Speaker 0: Can they eradicate the Iranian control over the Strait Of Hormuz? I'm not talking about shutting it down, but just get rid of the Iranians from there and they then decide who gets to control and when it has to be shut and when it has to be opened and remained and kept open and secured. Can The US exert that kind of military might over the state of Hormuz to control it? Speaker 1: Then one need us to control a massive amount of Iran's territory, which is a huge territory with populated by 90,000,000 people. So this seems very unlikely and if closing down the Strait Of Hormuz would depend on very sophisticated weapon systems, will be one thing. But this can be shut down with drones which can be manufactured in apartments. It can be also shut down with small naval drones that is this essentially drone operated small torpedoes. There's it doesn't require a lot of high technology which means that The US can't take out very key infrastructure to prevent Iran from shutting this down, to force it to open. But with very cheap and easy to make weapons, the Iranians can shut it down and it's simply too much territory, too large population for The United States to shut down the these capabilities. So at some point, they're have to make peace with the Iranians and make it make sure it's in Iran's interest to keep the Strait Of Hormuz open because it is in their interest. The problem now is that Iran faces an existential threat. That is The US now threatens to destroy not just the government, but also the country. As Trump tweeted, we we will make it impossible for Iran to even rebuild as a nation. And this is what regime change means. There is no replacement government. This means the disintegration and destruction of Iran, a massive civil war which could cost hundreds of thousands of lives. So for them this is existential which is why they went to this great extent. They've never done this before because they never believed that they faced this kind of an existential threat. So if the war ends, the Iranians have no reason to shut this straight down. This is very horrible for them as well. So, no, I I don't think The US can control the straight or almost no one can control it completely because too many actors could shut it down. Speaker 0: Glenn, thanks so much for joining me here on game plan. Whether this war continues further, that only means and if it does, that's essentially what Iran is looking at because they're not capitulating. They're not giving up. They are taking a bad amount of beating. There's no doubt in that, but they are continuing with their counters nevertheless. And straight of hormones is their main play where they're exerting their pressure with whether it's mines, whether it's their own boats, whether it's their own military boats. Now energy experts have also warned that whether the Iran crisis proves a cure for Russia's economy, that depends directly on how long it lasts. But there is little to suggest that Iran is willing to capitulate that what we just discussed. They're inviting U. S. To continue the war on the other hand. That's what the statements from Iran suggest that we're waiting. Come on, on. Now in the midst of this, Russia is emerging as the winner as we just discussed. How long this lasts? It doesn't seem to be in the favor of The U. S. We'll need to wait and watch twelfth day and running. They expected it to last for about four to five weeks, whether it goes the distance or even longer. Let's wait. That was Glenn Deeson joining me here on Game Plan. Speaker 1: Thanks, Yvonne.

In 2000, secretary of state Madeleine Albright acknowledged for the first time the US's role in the 1953 coup in Iran. The coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development, and many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs. After the 1953 coup, the oil returned to British control, and the US gave increasing support to the Shah of Iran. In 2013, Iran's parliament approved a bill for the government to sue the US for its involvement in the coup. The bill followed the release of declassified documents offering details about how the CIA carried out the coup as an act of US foreign policy. Campaign to install a pro Western government in Iran. Target: prime minister Mossadegh and his government. Objectives: through legal or quasi-legal methods to affect the fall of the Mossadegh government and to replace it with a pro Western government under the Shah's leadership with Zahedi as its prime minister.

Scott Horton discusses the history of US-Iran relations, starting with the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh and the reinstallation of the Shah. This action led to blowback, exemplified by the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nixon pressured the Shah to buy US weapons, undermining his rule. The US initially tried working with Ayatollah Khomeini, viewing him as reasonable. In 1979, David Rockefeller influenced Carter to allow the Shah into the US for cancer treatment, triggering the hostage crisis. Carter then announced the Carter Doctrine, asserting US dominance in the Persian Gulf. Brzezinski aimed to provoke Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, later feigning concern about Iran. The US supported Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, even enabling his use of chemical weapons. The US also backed the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, leading to the rise of Al Qaeda. The US then intervened in the Gulf War to reinstate the Kuwaiti King. Clinton adopted a dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran, further fueling anti-American sentiment. Bin Laden cited US support for Israel and military presence in Saudi Arabia as key grievances. The US supported Al Qaeda in Chechnya and the Balkans, even as they attacked US interests. The neoconservative movement pushed for war in Iraq, aiming to reshape the region to benefit Israel. The US invasion of Iraq empowered Shiite groups and Iran, contrary to neocon plans. The US then backed Sunni extremists in Syria to counter Iranian influence, leading to the rise of ISIS. Obama then sided with Al Qaeda in Libya. The US has a history of supporting various factions in the Middle East, often with unintended consequences. The US has been fighting a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. The US has a long history of interventionism, often driven by foreign interests rather than American interests. The US should normalize relations with Iran.

The first commercial oil well was established in 1859 in Titusville, Pennsylvania, USA. By 1900, about 94% of the world’s oil came from the USA and Russia. During the same period, the British Empire—described as the “workshop of the world”—was powered by massive domestic coal reserves, controlling about 25% of the earth’s land surface and population but producing less than 0.5% of the oil. This created a major dilemma for the British Navy if it needed to switch from coal to oil. In 1901, a 60-year lease of 500,000 square miles in Persia was bought by a British millionaire. With support from the British government, the area—known for oil seeps since antiquity—was surveyed by British explorers for oil deposits. On May 8, British explorers struck oil in Masjidi Suleiman. In 1909, the Anglo Persian oil company was founded. In 1911, Winston Churchill converted the Royal Navy from coal to oil. In 1914, the British government bought 51% of the Anglo Persian Oil Company, making Persia strategically vital to the British Empire. In 1915, Britain promised Arab independence in exchange for help fighting the Ottomans, but later excluded Palestine from the deal. In 1916, Britain and France secretly claimed Middle East territories: the French zone was Syria, Lebanon, and Southeast Turkey; the British zone was Jordan, Iraq, and Haifa; and the international zone included parts of Palestine. In the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Britain promised a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. In 1920, the League of Nations granted mandates of Iraq and Palestine to Britain, and Syria and Lebanon to the French. Leaders loyal to foreign governments were installed, and new arbitrary borders were created that ignored geography and divided ethnic and tribal groups. These boundaries were said to serve the West for “pirating oil fields” and to create a deep divide among locals. A coup d’état in 1921 led to British intelligence installing Reza Khan as Shah in 1925 and founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. Under British mandate administration, increased Jewish immigration and land purchases contributed to the formation of Jewish militias; a Palestinian uprising followed and was suppressed by British troops. During World War II, both Britain and the USSR invaded Iran to steal their oil. Reza Shah was forced to abdicate, and his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was installed. In 1948, the United Nations created the state of Israel, and those who had lived there for generations were forced off the land or slaughtered. Approximately 700,000 Palestinians were displaced through flight, expulsion, and violence—an event Palestinians call the Nakba or catastrophe. Prime minister Mohammed Mosaddegh nationalized the Anglo Iranian oil company, taking Iran’s resources back from foreign invaders. In 1953, a coup d’état overthrew him, with the CIA and MI6 strengthening the shah’s authority. The resulting chaos and anti-Western sentiment contributed to the 1979 Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, described as “having the appearances of being a British MI6 agent.” The transcript then claims that installing the son of Mohammed Reza Shah, Reza Pahlavi, would be the “latest act of criminal theater” by “thieves who sway world governments.”

Speaker 0 discusses working with the Israelis, describing them as “very American” and noting that they could get into shouting matches during meetings over whose idea was best, followed by casual lunch and reconciliation. He emphasizes that Israel is a good ally that the U.S. needs to protect and support, and he asserts that CIA and Al Qaeda had worked closely together in Iraq and in Syria, and that there are times when covert action allowed meetings with the “quote unquote, enemies” to try to bring things down as CIA officers. Speaker 1 adds that most of the world has a problem with Al Qaeda and ISIS/Daesh, but there is less of a problem because the CIA worked with ISIS/Daesh and Al Qaeda. He suggests that if the CIA worked with them, it would be better to understand what they were doing, and if the plan is for the U.S. to work with them on a security agreement, which has been done with enemies before, then this has been done in concert with diplomats and other countries involved. He indicates he wouldn’t be surprised if that was happening and would call it possibly hopeful. Speaker 0 continues by noting that newspapers in the United States once celebrated Qasem Soleimani as a fighter with American troops against ISIS and Al Qaeda. He states that Soleimani “was, and now it's switched,” implying a shift in perception or policy. The overarching theme is the idea of collaboration or coordination with hostile or extremist groups in pursuit of broader strategic objectives, including countering Iran, and the possibility that such collaborations could be framed as necessary or hopeful within a complex web of alliances and covert actions. Speaker 0 ends by reiterating the shift in stance: “Now we have to go to al ISIS and Al Qaeda to go back against Iran.” This underscores a cyclical or ironic pivot in U.S. strategy, moving from partnering with certain adversaries against common threats to reengaging those same groups to counter another adversary. The dialogue presents a candid view of realpolitik, suggesting that relationships with seemingly incompatible actors and shifts in alliances occur as part of broader geopolitical objectives, with collaboration sometimes described as acceptable when it serves strategic goals, and public narratives sometimes contrasting with behind-the-scenes actions.

Speaker 0 describes the events as “a classic regime change color revolution destabilization operation.” He asserts that “the military strike was being prepared in advance,” and that “the violence that they carried out” was carried out by “agent provocateurs managed and inserted by US and Israeli intelligence,” with British intelligence also involved. He adds that “when it comes to Iran, The United States and Britain are hand in hand since the first coup in Iran, which was a US British operation.” He further claims that Iranians who supported the shah “fled to The US, to Europe, to Canada, where they've set themselves up,” and that “nearly all of whom are quite wealthy,” consisting of monarchists who have been “looked after very well by the US government.” He says the US regards them as a “fifth column that they can deploy during times like this.” The speaker extends the accusation to other conflicts, stating that the US keeps “Syrian fifth column, an Afghan, an Iraqi, a Libyan fifth column,” and that wherever there’s a war, “The US and the British, the Canadians, they keep them in residence, and they use them either to create the future political class that they'll then parachute in.” He describes this as part of “the neocolonial system.” He concedes that “it didn't work out, but it was ugly.” Regarding information warfare, he criticizes the mainstream media, politicians, and “these so called influencers,” describing their misinformation and propaganda campaign as “even uglier.” He emphasizes that “this is not the first go around,” claiming they have “been doing this perpetually for years,” with the aim of creating unrest and instability and momentum. He explains a sequence they allegedly seek: if they can obtain momentum, it is followed by “a military strike, and then a decapitation of the leadership, and then regime change, hopefully.” He concludes that “so it didn't work out.”

The transcript claims that since the United States was founded, it has started wars with other nations once every ten years, while Iran “hasn’t started any,” and it links modern foreign interest in Iran to early 1900s oil interests. It states that the Anglo-Persian oil company led to British dependence on Iranian oil, followed by “a century of betrayals, strategic deception, and psychological operations,” including Britain overthrowing the Iranian government in 1921. It further claims that during World War II, Britain and the USSR invaded Iran to steal oil, and in 1953 Britain and the USA overthrew the Iranian government. The transcript then asserts that after 9/11, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were blamed, that Western intelligence assets were involved, and that foreign Zionists began a mass-murder campaign in the region with a death count “in the millions.” It also claims that when Zionist forces occupied Iraq, Iranians “knew they were coming” and prepared. It says that less than 48 hours before a US-Israel attack on Iran on February 28, the United States had concluded “the most productive round of nuclear negotiations in years” and agreed to meet again in four days. It states that an independent mediator said a peace deal was within reach, claiming Iran agreed it would never have enough nuclear material to create a bomb and offered full IAEA access to nuclear sites. It also says Iran offered to down blend highly enriched uranium to the lowest possible level and convert it into irreversible fuel, with technical talks scheduled in Vienna and a fourth round of political negotiations within the week. The transcript claims that 48 hours later, Trump and Israel launched an attack on Iran, including strikes targeting the nation’s leader and “178 Iranian school girls,” allegedly murdered with a double strike of Tomahawk missiles. It alleges that the “army, navy, and air force” were decoys to waste munitions and that Iran’s “real military is underground,” including “a massive city of tunnels” beneath the country with missile stockpiles and launch sites. It describes custom weapon systems and technologies, including swarms of thousands of drones, missiles with no fins to reduce radar lock, missiles steering away from predicted flight paths, missiles deploying multiple warheads to evade interceptors, and hypersonic missiles. It claims that on March 21, Iran launched a strike against Israel’s nuclear facilities at Damona and hit the target, presenting it as a message that Iran can “target Israel’s nukes at will.” It also claims Iran’s actions are transparent, announcing actions and targets and following through, contrasting this with US-Israeli “deception, and terror.” It states Iran’s real navy is underground with thousands of unmanned surface vehicles operating as swarms to attack ships in the Gulf, and claims Iran has planned and effectively “nationalized the Strait Of Hormuz,” citing planning since 2003. The transcript concludes by asserting Iran has munitions for years, is continuing to produce more underground, and can “tank the world economy” if needed, while claiming the US and Israel are already running out.

The transcript describes a CIA-Mossad plot sold to the United States to instantly topple Iran, presented as a four-part narrative, with a single fatal flaw that derailed the plan. 1) A network of fake Iranian NGOs in the West would circulate a story that Iran had massacred 30,000 or more peaceful protesters, to manufacture consent for a war against Iran. The plan aimed to manipulate Western public opinion and policy. 2) The Americans would demand negotiations with the Iranians to distract them with peace talks, slowing any resistance while the broader strategy proceeded. 3) During this distraction, the US and Israeli air forces would launch an attack that would take out the entire government of Iran, leaving all seats of power empty. 4) Radical extreme opposition members in Iran, cultivated by Mossad, the CIA, the NED, and others, would then take control of the country and install US puppet Reza Pallavi as a proxy for Washington and Tel Aviv. The narrative claims this plan began in January, when Mossad and the CIA worked with radical opposition elements in Iran to launch a coup that caused widespread destruction: armed men destroyed 700 shops, 305 ambulances and buses, 414 civil service buildings, and 750 banks; 350 mosques were attacked, with no synagogues attacked. The insurrection resulted in more than 3,000 dead after the coup was suppressed. The fake NGOs in the West allegedly repackaged this as a massacre of 30,000 (or up to 50,000 or 70,000) peaceful protesters. Time magazine is cited as reporting 30,000 dead, with the funding for these NGOs allegedly traceable to Western political propaganda groups like the NED, a CIA offshoot. Part two allegedly went better than expected: the Americans successfully negotiated peace talks, and the Iranians made multiple concessions, giving Washington virtually everything it wanted. Part three allegedly followed perfectly: in a surprise unprovoked attack, the US and Israel killed not just the leader but 40 members of the Iranian government. The plan supposedly required part four—a transfer of power to a US-aligned opposition figure—but in practice the movement failed to gain traction. The fatal error occurred when there was a change of attitude in 2025 after Israel attacked Iran (June 13–24, 2025), killing nuclear scientists, politicians, civilians, and military personnel. This had sparked increased Iranian support for the government and opposition to the US and Israel. Mossad assumed many Iranians still opposed their government, but the opposite occurred: Iranians drew together and fought back, using UN-recognized rights to respond to the illegal attack and closing the Strait of Hormuz. Trump expressed mixed signals—talking about a quick resolution and also acknowledging ongoing conflict—leading to confusion about the plan’s duration. Netanyahu went into hiding amid rumors of his death. The plot failed to kill Iran’s leadership, and the US and Israel found themselves in a challenging position, with little public sympathy remaining for their efforts.