TruthArchive.ai - Tweets Saved By @Bryce

Posted - February 12, 2026 at 2:46 AM

Saved - February 13, 2026 at 5:31 AM

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

"They should be retracted...but of course I don't think these people have the courage or the decency to do so..." Virologist Simon Wain-Hobson calls for retraction of the key publications that misled the world on the origin of COVID (“Proximal Origin” & "The Lancet letter") https://t.co/fFh0UZsNfg

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Speaker 0 argues that the science is very incorrect and very bad science, aside from all the other material Jill Demenov and US Right to Know uncovered. They claim those sources went overboard to disprove something without good data, and that the manipulation and intent to tell a story that is not substantiated are the reasons why they should be retracted. They also state that these people do not have the courage or the decency to retract.

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Speaker 0: It is very incorrect science apart from, as I say, all the other stuff that Jill Demenov and US Right to Know dug up. It's it's very it's it's it's very bad science. Very bad science. They went overboard to disprove something without good data. I mean, when I say without good data, I mean, it's appalling. These are wrong because of the manipulation, the intent to tell a story that is not substantiated. That is the reasons why they should be retracted. They should be retracted, but, of course, I don't think these people have the courage to or the decency to do so.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

6 yrs ago today, on Feb 1, 2020, a group that included Anthony Fauci, Francis Collins, Jeremy Farrar, Eddie Holmes, Kristian Andersen, Robert Garry, Andrew Rambaut, Ron Fouchier, Marion Koopmans, and Christian Drosten came together to discuss how to mislead the public about the origin of SARS-CoV-2.

@NateSilver538 - Nate Silver

Let's start by 1) retracting the "Proximal Origins" paper; 2) having scientists like you (i.e. people sympathetic to the natural origins case) call out Andersen et al for their gross misconduct. Then we might have the semblance of an honest discussion.

@Bryce_Nickels — Bryce Nickels

Posted - October 25, 2024 at 1:28 PM

Saved - October 26, 2024 at 10:33 AM

reSee.it AI Summary

I’ve been reflecting on the criticism directed at Anthony Fauci, who claims that the attacks on him are really attacks on science itself. He finds humor in suggestions he should be prosecuted, questioning the accountability of others regarding the events of January 6th. Fauci emphasizes that the divisiveness in the country is a significant barrier to effectively managing the pandemic. Additionally, it seems unlikely that any prosecution against him would succeed under the current administration, which aligns with his stance.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵1/ RESOURCE - Anthony Fauci "highlights" "They're really criticizing science, because I represent science" https://t.co/EuM96Qgl31

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

2/ "I have to laugh at that... I should be prosecuted" https://t.co/M9ELj4c2Ej

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

3/ "I have to laugh at that... I should be prosecuted...what happened on January 6th, Senator?" https://t.co/aOhtGXcq8O

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

4/ "The divisiveness in this country, to me, is the biggest mistake that supersedes everything that we're talking about...and you have divisiveness that is pulling away from doing the right thing to get the outbreak under control...but they're really criticizing science, because I represent science"

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Divisiveness in the country is a significant issue that overshadows everything else. This division hinders efforts to effectively manage the outbreak. Criticism is often directed at science, which I represent.

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Speaker 0: The divisiveness in this country, to me, is the biggest mistake that supersedes everything that we're talking about. And you have divisiveness that is pulling away from doing the right thing to get the the outbreak under control. But they're really criticizing science because I represent science.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

5/ Bonus: "But any prosecution of Fauci seems highly unlikely to pass muster in a Biden Justice Department... which, in America's ongoing cold civil war, is on the same side as Fauci" Doug McKelway Washington Examiner Nov 2021 https://t.co/oxEo9f8YCB

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

6/ source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XAEsD-bPmoU

@Bryce_Nickels — Bryce Nickels

Posted - August 6, 2024 at 9:17 PM

Saved - August 6, 2024 at 10:57 PM

reSee.it AI Summary

I am raising concerns about the lack of coverage regarding calls for the retraction of four significant papers on COVID-19's origins. These papers are based on flawed premises and may involve scientific misconduct. The first paper argues against lab-engineering claims, the second discusses the proximal origin of the virus, while the third and fourth papers focus on the Huanan market and zoonotic origins. I have formally requested the retraction of the last paper, highlighting the need for transparency in scientific discourse.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵The COVID Cover-Up: Calls for Retraction of 4 Key Papers Mainstream media & scientific journals have chosen not to report on calls for retraction of four key papers on the origin of COVID-19. This decision has enabled virologists to continue misleading the public. (1/n)

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

The four papers that should be retracted are based on invalid premises and conclusions, or are potentially products of scientific misconduct - including fraud. (2/n)

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

The first paper that should be retracted is: "No credible evidence supporting claims of the laboratory engineering of SARS-CoV-2" published online in Emerging Microbes & Infections on February 26, 2020. (3/n)

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

The second paper that should be retracted is: "The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2 ('Proximal Origins')," published in Nature Medicine on March 17, 2020. (4/n)

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

The third paper that should be retracted is: "The Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan was the early epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic" published in Science on July 26, 2022. (5/n)

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

The fourth paper that should be retracted is: "The molecular epidemiology of multiple zoonotic origins of SARS-CoV-2” published in Science on July 26, 2022. (6/n)

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

A letter requesting the retraction of "The molecular epidemiology of multiple zoonotic origins of SARS-CoV-2" was sent to the editor in chief of Science on June 14, 2024. https://biosafetynow.substack.com/p/covid-origins-worobey-et-al-2022

COVID Origins: Worobey et al 2022 and Pekar et al 2022 Retraction Request Request for editorial action for Worobey et al. 2022 and Pekar et al. 2022 (June 14, 2024) biosafetynow.substack.com

@Bryce_Nickels — Bryce Nickels

Posted - July 7, 2024 at 1:23 PM

Saved - July 8, 2024 at 8:42 AM

reSee.it AI Summary

In a 2020 interview with Tara O'Toole, several clips confirm concerns about bioweapons. O'Toole states that any nation can create a powerful bioweapon in a short time. There are worries about Russia and China's activities, and the possibility of the coronavirus originating from a lab in Wuhan. O'Toole also mentions the credibility of bioengineered weapons and the existence of undisclosed Soviet bioweapons facilities. Additionally, she highlights the extensive history and sophistication of the US's own offensive bioweapons program.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵RESOURCE: 8 clips that confirm everyone's worst fears about bioweapons (from a 2020 interview with Tara O'Toole) clip 1: "Just a fact of life today"

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Weapon states and nation states can create biological weapons, and even small groups or individuals may have the ability to do so. The necessary technology is widely available to the public.

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Speaker 0: But the fact that weapon states, I mean, that, nation states can certainly make biological weapons is just a fact of life today. And as you were saying earlier, small groups and maybe even individuals can probably make them. The technology is all out there in the public realm.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵RESOURCE: 8 clips that confirm everyone's worst fears about bioweapons (from a 2020 interview with Tara O'Toole) clip 2: "you don't need a secret lab...It's all dual-use from stem to stern"

Video Transcript AI Summary

You don't need a secret lab or a massive complex to create bioweapons. Unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons can be developed discreetly, blending in with legitimate activities like vaccine production. This dual-use nature makes it difficult to detect a biological weapons program.

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Speaker 0: So you don't really need a secret lab. You don't need a big visible from satellites in outer space complex to do this. Okay? Which is 1 of the dangers of bioweapons is that you're not gonna see somebody, you know, piling up highly enriched uranium or buying all these centrifuges. There's not gonna be a lot of intelligent signals of a biological weapons program that you'll be able to distinguish from perfectly legitimate activities like making a vaccine plan because it's all dual use from stem to stern. Yeah. Right?

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵RESOURCE: 8 clips that confirm everyone's worst fears about bioweapons (from a 2020 interview with Tara O'Toole) clip 3: "the truth is that today given the state of the technology virtually any nation state can make a biological weapon...a big, powerful, nuke-like bioweapon... and probably in a couple months"

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Today, almost any country can create a powerful biological weapon in a couple of months using current technology.

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Speaker 0: But the truth is that today, given the state of the technology, virtually any nation state can make a biological weapon, a big, powerful, nucleic bioweapon, and probably in a couple of months from a standing start.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵RESOURCE: 8 clips that confirm everyone's worst fears about bioweapons (from a 2020 interview with Tara O'Toole) clip 4: "we don't have a lot of insight into what Russia is doing today...there's a lot of concern that the Chinese have BW....and even rumors that the CoV came out of a lab in Wuhan"

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Russia and China are suspected of developing genetic bioweapons, with rumors linking the coronavirus to a lab in Wuhan. However, evidence points to the virus originating from a seafood market. Putin mentioned genetic weapons as the future, but specifics are unclear. Chinese authorities found contaminated food samples at the market. Translation (if needed): Russia and China are suspected of developing genetic bioweapons, with rumors linking the coronavirus to a lab in Wuhan. However, evidence points to the virus originating from a seafood market. Putin mentioned genetic weapons as the future, but specifics are unclear. Chinese authorities found contaminated food samples at the market.

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Speaker 0: So we don't have a lot of insight into what Russia is doing today. Putin has made comments about genetic weapons, that's why he calls them, genetic bioweapons being 1 of the weapons of the future. No 1 really knows what he's talking about. There's a lot of concern that, the Chinese have biological weapons, and even rumors that the coronavirus came out of a lab in Wuhan. There's no evidence for that at all that I know of, and lots of evidence that the seafood market is where the contamination occurred. Since they found, supposedly, the Chinese found a number of samples of food in the market that were contaminated with the coronavirus.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵RESOURCE: 8 clips that confirm everyone's worst fears about bioweapons (from a 2020 interview with Tara O'Toole) clip 5: "the notion of a bioengineered weapon is a completely credible scientific possibility"

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In the early nineties, Soviet defectors revealed the BioPreparat program to the West, causing concern. A senior Soviet official defector later wrote a book detailing the program's exotic experiments, including genetic composite weapons. Initially dismissed as implausible, advancements in genetic engineering now make bioengineered weapons a credible possibility.

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Speaker 0: When the Russian when the Soviet defectors first came out, this is in the early nineties when, the Berlin Wall had fallen. People in the West were very nervous, including American leadership was very nervous that the Soviet Union not just, you know, fall into chaos, which would be bad for everybody. Sure. They did not make a big deal about what these defectors told us about BioPreparat, which was the Soviet BW. Mhmm. 1 of them, subsequently, wrote a book about, the BioPreparat program. He was a very senior Soviet official, and he too said things, and he was, you know, he was in conversation with American scientists. He had defected to the United States after, visiting the US and seeing that we did not have a bioweapons program aimed at the Soviet Union, which is what he had grown up thinking. Mhmm. He said they were doing all of these exotic experiments, including trying to build weapons that were basically, genetic composites of more than 1 organism. And, those of us here, this is now, you know, the late nineties, thought he was crazy and he was boasting about things that couldn't possibly exist. It doesn't seem so far fetched now that we have these more advanced tools for doing genetic engineering. So the notion of a bioengineered weapon is a completely credible scientific possibility.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵RESOURCE: 8 clips that confirm everyone's worst fears about bioweapons (from a 2020 interview with Tara O'Toole) clip 6: "It is definitely possible to engineer pathogens to make them more virulent or more transmissible, etc., etc..."

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It is possible to engineer pathogens to be more dangerous for covert purposes, making it difficult to trace their origin. This could be done to achieve specific goals, although the usefulness to an adversary is unclear.

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Speaker 0: Why would you do that? Well, you might do it so that you couldn't attribute that weapon to anybody if it was completely covert. Where did it come from? That's gonna be a problem, even if it's a natural weapon, by the way, assigning attribution. Maybe you want it to do something, very specific. It is definitely possible to engineer pathogens to make them more virulent or more transmissible, etcetera, etcetera. It's not clear to me why that would be useful to an adversary, but it is possible.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵RESOURCE: 8 clips that confirm everyone's worst fears about bioweapons (from a 2020 interview with Tara O'Toole) clip 7: "there are parts of the former Soviet bioweapons complex that no Westerner has been in... and there is a working assumption that the Soviet Union still has military facilities that are thinking about and maybe even making biological weapons"

Video Transcript AI Summary

We attempted to verify the Soviet Union's biological weapons program, achieving some success as they dismantled facilities and allowed inspections. However, American scientists on these missions felt that Soviet scientists were not entirely transparent. Some parts of the former Soviet bioweapons complex remain unexplored by Westerners, suggesting ongoing military biological weapons research.

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Speaker 0: We tried to do the same thing with their biological weapons program, again, with some success, and, they the Soviets did dismantle a lot of their BW facilities, and they did allow us to come in and look around. I have to say the scientists who were part of those missions, the American scientists, didn't feel like all of the Soviet scientists were being completely forthright. And there are parts of the nuke of the Soviet the former Soviet, bioweapons, complex that no Westerner has been in. And there is, I think, a working assumption that the Soviet Union still has military facilities that are thinking about and maybe even working on biological weapons.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵RESOURCE: 8 clips that confirm everyone's worst fears about bioweapons (from a 2020 interview with Tara O'Toole) clip 8: "We had had our own very sophisticated biological weapons program from World War II through the 60s..most people don't understand how massive and sophisticated our own offensive weapons program was"

Video Transcript AI Summary

We used to have a sophisticated biological weapons program from World War 2 to the sixties, which ended in 1969. Many records of the program were destroyed, but some are resurfacing. Our offensive weapons program was massive and advanced, but not well-known by most people.

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Speaker 0: Now we had had our own very sophisticated biological weapons program, from World War 2 through the sixties. It was, ended in 1969 and for various reasons a lot of the records of that program were burned and destroyed, although some of them are beginning to come to light again. Most people don't understand how massive and sophisticated our own offensive weapons program was.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

source: https://vimeo.com/562708015

Dr. Tara O'Toole: In-Q-Tel And The CIA This interview took place in 2020. It remains extremely relevant today. Dr. Tara O'Toole: Dr. Tara O’Toole is an Executive Vice President and Senior… vimeo.com

@Bryce_Nickels — Bryce Nickels

Posted - July 6, 2024 at 11:44 PM

Saved - July 7, 2024 at 12:16 PM

reSee.it AI Summary

Highlights from the 2020 NSABB meeting include discussions on flu proposals, concerns about international standards for CoV research, the scope of the P3CO review, the dangers of publishing in high-profile journals, communication of dangerous research to the public, arguments for secrecy in scientific review, concerns about offensive bioweapons programs, and the need for more research on potential pandemic pathogens. Transparency and the origins of the NSABB were also discussed.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #1. “nothing’s ever eradicated as long as you have the sequence, right?” - Vincent Racaniello

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #2. “this is a panel to look at flu proposals, essentially” - Vincent Racaniello

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Vince agrees that flu is a major pathogen with high virulence and transmissibility. Other pathogens may have one but not the other. The panel focuses on flu proposals, which is a common sentiment among those outside the field as well.

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Speaker 0: Vince, what about you? Do you have any other comments on that? Speaker 1: I agree with that. I think there are very few pathogens that fall in that category. And flu is probably the biggest 1. Very few have can have potentially the level of virulence and transmissibility. Others have virulence, but no transmissibility. A lot of transmissibility, but no that's the 1. And I think, despite what I've heard today, this is a panel to look at flu proposals, essentially. And I'm not the only 1 who feels that way. I think people outside this area, feel the same way.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #3. “Would we be upset if we, for example, found out today that some other country was doing CoV research to create more pathogenic or more transmissible CoVs in the absence of some very clear international standards” - Tom Inglesby

Video Transcript AI Summary

The US should take the lead in setting international standards for research on dangerous pathogens like coronaviruses. Without clear guidelines, other countries may conduct risky research. Standards should include biosafety records, experience with pathogens, training, awareness, facilities, and a national policy framework.

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Speaker 0: The original guidance for P3CO committed to international engagement around these issues. The US it may be that the US is the only government funding this, although we've heard that in past years, we've heard that China and Wuhan had done some work around flu on this. That's old news. I don't know if that's still going on. But in any event, we don't have international consensus about how to operate here. And as I think Chris was saying or maybe Carrie was saying that, since we are leading the effort here or funding more of it than anyone else, it should be incumbent on us to initiate or continue it has been initiated, but then stopped any discussion about how we should proceed internationally. Don't we want other countries to operate under the same rules that we do? Would we be upset if we, for example, found out today that some other country was doing coronavirus research to create more pathogenic or more transmissible coronaviruses in the absence of some very clear set of international standards. And I would say, to that end, the standard should look something like this but fleshed out in great detail, Globally exceptional records of biosafety, experience with dangerous pathogens of the Type Under study, exceptional training, biosecurity awareness, state of the art facilities, and a national I don't have here, but a national policy framework that is studying these issues, these risks, these benefits.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #4. “by the look on your face maybe you and I should chat offline about it” Chris Hassell (chair of the P3CO review committee) responds to a question from James Le Duc about whether projects outside of the NIH are included in the P3CO review This exchange is noteworthy given when it occurred- January 23, 2020. Earlier that day, Le Duc and Anthony Fauci had an 8am, in-person meeting. At the time, LeDuc ran one of the few BSL-4 biocontainment labs in the US at the University of Texas Medical Branch. He also trained many Chinese scientists from the Wuhan Institute of Virology in BSL-4 biosafety procedures. Later in the day (~4:30 that afternoon) LeDuc and former Ft. Detrick BSL-4 biolab director Dave Franz had a conference call with Robert Kadlec (who was working at HHS at the time). source: https://www.openthebooks.com/substack-historic-release-dr-anthony-faucis-official-work-calendar-november-2019--march-2020/

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Speaker 0 asked if research beyond HHS-funded work is included in the review process. Speaker 1 mentioned that currently, it focuses on HHS-funded work. Speaker 0 inquired about expanding the scope to include agencies like DARPA. Speaker 1 explained that such agencies typically don't engage in the type of work being reviewed, but suggested a further discussion offline.

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Speaker 0: I wanted to follow-up on your very last statement about, the scope of the the research that's being reviewed. And you said federal government. Is that a correct statement? Or is it only HHS? And today, a lot of work is being funded by non HHS agencies. And I'm wondering are these this work being included in the review? Thank you. Speaker 1: Right now, it's come out of HHS funded work. Speaker 0: Is there a discussion to broaden the scope so that DARPA and others might use this review process? Speaker 1: For the most part, they don't get involved in the type of work that would fall under this. For the most part, a lot of that is enabling technology but actually modifying dangerous pathogens. But maybe it's worth a double check on that. And the look on your face maybe and you and I should shout offline about Good question.

Substack: HISTORIC RELEASE: Dr. Anthony Fauci’s Official Work Calendar (November 2019 – March 2020) An hour-by-hour timeline of what Dr. Fauci was doing in the months before and after the public disclosure of the pandemic. openthebooks.com

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #5. “nothing that has gone on at the Dept of Defense would have fallen under [the P3CO framework]” Chris Hassell (chair of the P3CO review committee) responds to a question from Marie-Louise Hammarskjold about whether agencies other than NIH are performing ePPP research

Video Transcript AI Summary

We focus on research not related to Department of Defense or UsamGrid. Our committee includes diverse disciplines, not just HHS employees, to ensure a thorough review. Proposals are primarily from NIH, sometimes NSF.

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Speaker 0: Again, more speak about, for example, Department of Defense, nothing that has gone on at Department of Defense would have fallen under this. So, places like UsamGrid, they're not doing that kind of work, that enhancing organisms or the types of organisms that would be it would fall under this. It's probably worth a scrub for other places. I should point out that the committee itself, the group is not all HHS employees. So we do have defense and other people just because we want to pull disciplines and a collateral benefit of that is, some of these people we have to pull just because of the population, we pull them from other agencies. So it's kind of a check on that. But it's not nothing we've gone back and But the actual proposals are all NIH or NIH and NSF or is it just? Today, it's all been NIH. All NIH. That is what I saw.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #6. Extended discussion between Mark Denison and Chris Hassell (chair of the P3CO review committee) on the difficulties of doing a risk/benefit analysis and the scope of the P3CO

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The speakers discuss the framing of risk and benefit in scientific research, emphasizing the need for more clarity in defining these terms. They also touch on the issue of self-censorship among scientists due to funding uncertainties. The conversation highlights the importance of foundational research despite potential lack of immediate benefits. Additionally, they address the need for more transparency in discussions surrounding risk and benefit in research proposals.

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Speaker 0: It's in 1 of your slides, and it went by quickly. And I couldn't see it, but it was the issue of risk and benefit. And and they were framed in these sort of profoundly global terms, benefit to humanity. And it risks of, you know, of risk in sometimes apocalyptic terms, rather, which is profoundly not how science has performed. And science is incremental, and it's designed best experiment, testing that and looking at that outcome and moving forward. And so it's not designed in some ways that is so how do we how, over this whole process and that's too much to ask right now, but I think it's important because I see this in these publications and everything come out, is risk is assumed to be profound. Risk is assumed to be eventual and absolute in some ways. And whereas benefits are shown as maybe being incremental or minimal, there's the feels like that's the terminology. So how is risk how is absolute risk defined? Speaker 1: Well, I would actually say that both of those are very broad continuum. The risk from minimal to apocalyptic and the benefit from increasing academic knowledge all the way to curing the ultimate universal influenza vaccine. Both of those, again, are to be continue that intersect which squares the problem if not further. 1 example of that is, I know, if you have the discussions about the benefit, and I'll give you my background, I'm very much an applied scientist. I appreciate basic research, but I have a bias for my own work and my own career. I will say though that saying that something is purely academic that really is not justifying the risk, I think is a slippery slope because we do need to have a lot of foundational work go on that could then be pulled together to lead to ultimately very good applied solutions. But I still think there's too much unknown about a lot of these processes that does justify very basic research that the immediate benefit may not be as obvious. I don't know if that even begins to address your question, but I think it is an important issue. And again, maybe just because I just as much as transparency is an overused word, maybe using those 2 terms without giving more definition may be part of the problem. Speaker 0: The second, Juan, just 1 other, is the issue of I don't think you meant this, but I heard it as, the idea that we're not getting enough of these proposals, so we should expand the scope of our our our net. That's what I heard, sort of. I'm not sure about that rationale. So I'd I'd like to III just wanna think of it in terms of I propose the alternative strategy that there is a self censoring and a loss because scientists working are also, they're they're extremely risk prone when it comes to a certainty that they won't get their funding or it'll get tied up in a process that's irretrievable and that they can't get their support. So that there could be a tremendous amount of self censorship occurring. And that may be a better description for why you're not seeing proposals. But they're actually not doing it. Speaker 1: I appreciate you pointing that out. I misspoke, if that's actually what Speaker 0: I said. I don't think you misspoke. I heard that way. So, I could hear it. Well, Speaker 1: I guess I phrase everything as a question. That way, I get myself out of trouble from having gotten my boss into too much of a pickle. The question is, is it too narrow? And other people have raised that question and you're right. I mean, people are not just wildcatting just off the wall ideas at least that we're seeing. People are thinking through these things very deliberately, PIs I'm talking about. So you're right, it may be the self selection, may be taking care of this much more upfront. But I'd point you to that figure and I apologize, I took it out of my presentation for the sake of time. But I gave you the reference. It's in the report itself. It's figure 3 in the I think it's the 2016 report, in that report.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #7. Mark Denison mentions there may be a COVID case at Texas AM, which leads to a joke about the spread of the virus, followed by a “well-timed” cough at the end

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There may be a potential case of coronavirus at Texas A&M, which could mean the virus is spreading more easily. The speaker is feeling anxious and ready to leave the room.

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Speaker 0: So then just a couple of comments about this because now there's a potential case in Texas A&M, looks like, maybe Not confirmed yet, but the coronavirus thing. So working with something that's clear to be able to spread more. And as we're sitting here, I'm about ready to jump up and run out of the room, is, yeah, is

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #8. Pamela Silver discusses an example of how the drive to publish in high-profile journals endangers us all

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I recently experienced a situation where a paper was reviewed by a high-profile journal, and a reviewer requested a BSL-three experiment without the author's knowledge. This highlights the pressure to publish at all costs, even if it means conducting risky experiments. I raised concerns with the journal editor, but it seemed they were unaware of the potential dangers. This incident serves as a warning about the dangers of prioritizing publication over safety. Be cautious of this trend.

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Speaker 0: And I'm gonna give you a first hand experiment or a result of something that happened to me recently. So that it goes into this issue of the drive to publish in the so called high profile journals, which I'm very troubled by also. I'll tell you a scenario where a, a paper was reviewed at 1 of those journals and, 1 of the reviewers requested a BSL-three experiment. And the author of the paper didn't know that it was a BSL-three experiment. And let's just say for the sake of argument that that person was in a foreign country, and the drive to publish was so high. I think we're gonna see more of that. And I was shocked. I contacted the editor of the journal, and I don't think they were even sufficiently knowledgeable to know that it was a BSL free experiment. So then I contacted someone who maybe used to be on this committee and tried to point out how this was a dangerous precedent. So I want this you all to be aware that maybe you've seen this already. This is the first time I'd seen it, and I was shocked. Gonna happen.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #9. ePPP research enthusiast Jessica Belser expresses concerns with the way dangerous research is communicated to the public in the media and on TWiV

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Dr. Barnard emphasized the importance of public perception. While satisfied with the PC30 framework, the concern lies in how future studies will be portrayed in the media. It is crucial to provide context to avoid sensationalistic headlines that may cause unnecessary alarm and hinder understanding of the responsible research being conducted.

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Speaker 0: Great. So I think, Doctor. Barnard said it great when he said that public perception matters. And personally, I again, I'm not applying for NIH style grants and I am satisfied with the PC30 framework and the level of oversight that goes into it. What concerns me is the next study that is approved through the PCO3 framework that will release funding. How will this be communicated in the media? How will this be communicated to the listeners of Twiv and others? I think it's really important that we help others understand the context in which this work is done, so that we are able to avoid sensationalistic headlines like we've had in the past, which can then further alarm people to where they are not fully understanding the need for this work and the responsible work that's going on to make sure this is being done safely and securely.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #10. Ken Bernard makes an argument for secrecy in scientific review, which Marc Lipsitch counters (see clip #11, below)

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Opening up reviews to a wide range of people, like ethicists, security experts, and scientists, can lead to projects never getting approved due to delays. For instance, getting a building permit near the ocean in California can take years. Waiting that long is not feasible for scientific projects. If serious discussions involve various experts, the chance of approval drops to zero.

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Speaker 0: The last thing I wanted to mention is, and this has to do with Tom's and Mark's concerns about review. And that is, if you open up review to a very wide number of people, nothing will ever get approved. Try to get a building permit 2 miles from the ocean in California, for example. You just can't. Now, several years later, you might be able to, but science can't work that way. You can't wait 2 years for a building permit to start a project. And if you open up a review process to a public review that includes ethicists and security people and scientists and everything, there's a 100% chance nothing will get approved, if it's a serious enough discussion about a serious enough PPP.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #11. Marc Lipsitch responds to Ken Bernard’s argument for secrecy in the review process. (see clip #10, above)

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Many journal policies were created during a time of biosecurity focus, neglecting population-level biosafety concerns. Transparency in the approval process is important, with the public having a right to know. If openness leads to disapproval, it raises questions about why approval was granted in secret.

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Speaker 0: In response to the discussion of journal policies, I think many of those policies and I'm anxious to read the ASM ones but many of them were formulated in a period when everyone was focused on biosecurity and there was not much interest or concern about population level biosafety, so the concern of accidental release of an altered organism. So I think that's an area where there's room for improvement, at least in some places. And in comment about if the public gets involved, nothing will ever be approved, I think I want to clarify. I don't think either anyone has called for an open public hearing with anybody just coming up to the mic and offering their comments. I think what was suggested was taking the existing process, which has approved 2 things. I don't know if it's disapproved anything, but it did it quite quickly, apparently. Well, I don't know. I don't know how fast it worked. But it did approve things and making that more transparent to the public. And if that means that it doesn't get approved, then I think there's a real question why it was approved if in secret. I mean, I've been assuming that the secret is because of institutional considerations, not because there was something to hide. But if just making it open would make it impossible to get approval, then I think there's a real concern.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #12. Ken Bernard claims that ~50% of the US NATO allies think the US has an offensive bioweapons program

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The perception, not reality, leads to the killing of bio-threat defense projects. 50% of allies believe the US has an offensive bioweapons program, which is false. Since Nixon, there has been no such program. Developing countermeasures against bio-threats can be mistaken for an offensive program, causing public and political concerns. The information will be published in Science and Nature soon.

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Speaker 0: The reason why this stuff gets killed is often because of perception, not reality, number 1. And public perception matters. And, the other is that it has to do with foreign impressions of what the United States is doing. Right now, 50% of our allies think we have an offensive bioweapons program, 50% about, plus or minus. We don't. We haven't since, believe it or not, Nixon abolished it, what, in 'sixty 9, okay. I wasn't in a position previously where I would have known if we had a defensive program and we do not. So if 50% of our allies, our NATO allies, believe that we have an offensive program that's secret, We have to be very careful with what we do and what becomes public because defending against bio threats by developing countermeasures looks a lot like an offensive program. And a lot of the things that we don't do is because of public concern about it Or political concern about it. But this is all stuff that's going to be published in Science and Nature. It's not something we're trying to hide. It's just a matter of when.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #13. “If Judy Miller wrote an article about it, it would like we were doing offensive bioweapons work” Ken Bernard mentions a project from 2004 that was stopped by the public affairs office because it would not pass the “NY Times test”

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We had a study on highway threats that was classified but got denied last minute because it wouldn't pass the New York Times test. Public affairs thought it could be misinterpreted as offensive bioweapons work. Despite its potential to help biosecurity, it was shelved. Most government work, even classified, is transparent.

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Speaker 0: We came up with another study within the government that was going to be highway classified related to threat. And it got approved, designed I think, Jim, you were involved in it perhaps. And the whole thing got approved, it was ready to go, and it got denied at the last minute, not by the command authority in all of this, but by the public affairs people who said, this won't pass the New York Times test. What did they mean by the New York Times test? Well, it's pretty obvious. Doesn't matter what our intent is. If you write an article about if Judy Miller wrote an article about it, it would look like we were doing offensive biologic weapons work, And it didn't get done. And it didn't get done for that reason alone, even though the information would have advanced our biosecurity efforts. And I think that it's important to realize that very little of that stuff is being done, even in the classified world. Most of what we're doing is, even in the government is really wide open.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #14. “just because there is a definition on a page doesn’t mean that’s how its being practiced in real life” - Jessica Belser

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My understanding of the PC30 framework is that it focuses on a small number of viruses with both pathogenicity and transmissibility. However, there are discrepancies in the criteria used, leading to unintended studies being included. More refinement may be needed to ensure accurate submissions. The definition on paper may not always align with real-world practices.

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Speaker 0: Correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding reading the PC30 framework information and that statement is itself limited to a very small amount of viruses that achieve both pathogenicity and transmissibility. And although there are some discrepancies because sometimes it says or and sometimes it says and, so that probably does need to be collected corrected in future ones. But I think the perception among scientists in general and some of the actual practices in the field is that many other studies that maybe aren't necessarily being intended to be caught up in this are nonetheless being caught up in it, and where it's maybe there needs to be more refinement or maybe eventually we'll see more submissions finally being caught up in this framework. But, I think just because there's a definition on a page doesn't mean that's how it's necessarily being practiced in real life.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #15. “The public health contributions resulting from research with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens--so called gain-of-function studies--are clear” - Jessica Belser

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Research on potential pandemic pathogens, known as gain of function studies, has led to valuable public health insights. Previous NSABB reports support this. While I won't argue for the necessity of this research, there are many freely available studies showing how mutations identified through these studies have helped us prepare for epidemics and pandemics.

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Speaker 0: The public health contributions resulting from research with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens, so called gain of function studies, are clear. Previous NSABB findings and reports support this. I am not here to advocate for the need for this research as there are numerous studies and assessments freely available online that provide many specific examples of how mutations identified via these gain of function based studies have contributed to informed decisions pertaining to and enhancing our preparedness to both epidemic and potential pandemic threats.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #16. Marie-Louise Hammarskjold asks Gigi Gronvall about the lack of data for accidents to base risk assessments on (at 1.5x speed)

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We struggled with risk assessment due to lack of factual data on accidents or deliberate releases. There is no reporting structure for accidents in labs, hindering transparency. People are hesitant to report accidents, like with TB, leading to risks and inhibiting data collection.

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Speaker 0: But remember that I think we know 2, 000 patients are risk assessment, but I followed very closely with many patients. At the end of the day, the hardest part about doing that risk assessment for this kind of events is that we don't really have there wasn't really much factual data of either accidents or certainly not deliberate release of these guys to base the risk assessment on. So a lot of it became this asking 50 experts or whatever what they think the real risk is. And being a basic scientist, that kind of always concerned me. And I think 1 of the things that we had asked for, this I had asked for was that we would get actually something like the Yamcrest, where you do clinical trials and there actually are reporting structure that you need to report accidents. And as far as I know, there is no policy or framework for that. Speaker 1: So your well, I don't want to report on the Griffin report, but I do want to note that that came out right before the winter holiday season as well. So it wasn't just that it was 2, 000 pages, it came out out a very busy time of year. But I agree that there is not a lot of data when it comes to accidents in the laboratory and that is people do not want to report for a good reasons and some of the, there are some biosafety experts who are coming up in future panels, who can talk about some of the challenges, that people have to report. So there is a place where a lot of transparency, you know, knowing who did it and the institution where it was done may inhibit actual information being gathered about the number of accidents. I know when it comes to TB, for example, it was raised in the guidance for how it should be handled in the laboratory went up. But it took a long time to get that data because it was just anecdotal. Nobody wanted to go on record of having TB accidents in their facilities. So it inhibited and put people at risk.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #17. Ken Bernard mentions that the policies they are discussing don’t cover entities not taking money from the US government (at 1.5x speed)

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Our research is increasingly limited to PPI and US government-funded projects, which are now a smaller portion of biotech funding. The biotech landscape is more complex now. The private sector may not follow our oversight recommendations if they don't receive US government funding.

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Speaker 0: A lot of what we're doing here is becoming increasingly restricted, first to PPI, again, enhanced PPP, which is quite restricted. And then, got US government funded, which is now becoming a smaller and smaller percentage of the amount of funding that's going into biotechnology research. Given all of that, do you have any comments on that part of it? The fact that no matter what we do here, maybe increasingly irrelevant? The biotech world is a lot more complex than it used to be. But I have no comment other than But you raise a good point. There's many more actors now than there were at the time when this policy was put into place. I'm not sure if I understand. Well, it has to do with, you know, we're coming up with a set of ways oversight to look for dual use. Right. Whereas the private sector has no reason to adopt any of our recommendations if they are not taking money from the US government.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #18. Marie-Louise Hammarskjold discusses (1) prior concerns the panel had that any policy recommendations that had would be too broad and thus hamper MERS and SARS research and (2) concerns that the public will react negatively if there is not enough transparency in deliberations on risk-benefit analysis

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Some committee members were concerned about making the list too broad, fearing a difficult review process and unnecessary restrictions on research. Transparency was a key issue, with a desire for a transparent review process while maintaining some level of confidentiality. There were discussions about potential oversight by different organizations, but concerns were raised about the balance between transparency and secrecy. Maintaining transparency is important, but opinions on what constitutes transparency can vary.

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Speaker 0: A number of people on the committee were worried that if we made the list too broad, first of all, the review process is going to be really difficult. And second of all, we will go into them, stop research that we didn't really have any serious concern at this point in time, MERS and SARS being some of it, that they really qualified as PPP. And it ended up being mainly flu. The other thing as far as transparency is concerned, we had lots of deliberations. And I think with many of the basic scientists like me on the committee wanted this to be a transparent review process possible, while we realized that this should be prefunding some review because otherwise it's too hard, we didn't necessarily understand that, that would mean that Evotu will be launching the secret. We actually talked about that a lot of it could be Brad Flack to either the RAC that we're kind of losing the gene therapy oversight or to this FACA. That should be a FACA thing. And that obviously hasn't happened. So I am the same kind of concerns about that Pam is raising that if we make this too secret, it's going to really be not considered transparent. And again, transparencies could be in the eye of the beholder. It's still an important concept.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #19. Chris Hassell (chair of the P3CO review committee) mentions that not having a policy that applies to non-federally funded work may represent a vulnerability

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This process only applies to federally funded research, not university funded research. Vulnerabilities in university research may be outside our scope, but they are a reality.

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Speaker 0: I will also add 1 of the things about the process is this only applies to federally funded research. University funded research does not fall under the current framework. What vulnerabilities exist there? That may be beyond the purview of this group, but that is a reality.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #20. Chris Hassell (chair of the P3CO review committee) claims that the emergence of COVID-19 emphasizes the need for more research that would qualify for review under P3CO (i.e. work that creates enhanced potential pandemic pathogens)

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We are having high-level and low-level meetings to address the challenges of the virus. We have learned from the past and are working on improvements in operations. This situation highlights the importance of research to keep up with the virus's mutations as it spreads.

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Speaker 0: And as it's dispersing, it's taking up a lot of time. So there is very high level meetings of the government, low level working level meetings, operational meetings. So, we've learned a lot lessons from the past We're implementing those, but there's still a lot of room for improvement just in the operational side. There is I think what this will also lead to is another emphasis on the need for more research. So again, it could be more timely as we're seeing this virus reassort and mutate as it spreads, it's just pointing out the need for doing this type of work.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #21. “The intention was to allow a deliberative process to make sure that some of those “seven deadly sins”…were not stopped” Ken Bernard, who was involved in writing the original charter for the NSABB, describes the origin of the NSABB, the Fink Report, and how the NSABB was not created to guard against the bad use of research but rather to make sure concerns over safety did not stop scientific progress

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The NSABB was created in response to the Fink Report in 2003, which outlined 7 dangerous areas of biological research. The NSABB's purpose was not to restrict research but to prevent the 7 deadly sins from becoming the standard for all research. It aimed to enable a deliberative process to ensure that beneficial products like vaccines and drugs were not hindered. The group was intended to support research rather than restrict it, contrary to common misconceptions.

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Speaker 0: I just wanted to go back a little bit for some that weren't around in 2004, when the original thing was this was originally created. To say that the origin of the NSABB came from a reaction to the THINK report, which everybody in this room should have at least seen in passing. It was done in 2003. I forget the title of that 1 too. But, it's usually referred to as the Fink Report, which outlined Biological Research in an Age of Terrorism. Thank you, Carrie. And it had a it had these these 7 categories of dangerous work that could potentially be used in a terrorist event or by bad people. And they called them the 7 deadly sins, if you may recall. The problem with the report, as was seen, I was at the White House at the time, that was seen by us was not that it didn't outline the dangers, but it might have restricted research. And so interestingly enough, it the NSABB was not created to guard against so much the bad use of research, but to make sure that the 7 deadly sins did not become the standard against what all research was measured against. So it actually is the reverse of government over control of research, and I think a lot of people forget that the intention was to allow a deliberative process to make sure that some of those 7 deadly sins, which were quite marginal and are used, some of those techniques are used all the time in order to create beneficial products and countermeasures and vaccines and drugs, were not stopped. So it actually started off as an enabling group, not as a restrictive group. But I say that, mainly as background because some too often, I think people look at groups like this as how can science be restricted, how is the government getting involved in our affairs? How are they stopping me doing good science? And that was not the original intent. And I don't think it needs to be the intent of this group in any way. Thank you.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🧵22 Highlights from Day 1 of the 2020 NSABB meeting (January 23, 2020) #22. Gerald Parker (chair of NSABB) asks Chris Hassell (chair of the P3CO review committee) about transparency

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I believe transparency can be enhanced by including academics, industry experts, and subject matter experts in the review group, as well as publicizing their deliberations and identifying group members. Various arguments for transparency have been discussed in the past, and it is important to consider all perspectives on this issue. If transparency is a concern, it is crucial to clarify what it means to you.

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Speaker 0: So I'll take the chair prerogative and ask the first question. And how would you define transparency or how would you like to see that or maybe a dialogue that we could better unpack what transparency may mean in this context? And I'd like the Board members to maybe comment on that too. Speaker 1: Well, I'll answer that by just pointing out some of the options that have been proffered in my discussions with folks. 1 is to right now the committee, the group, the review group is only composed of federal employees. Should we augment that with academics, industry people, other subject matter experts and those other areas as well in biosafety, biosecurity, ethics? Could we augment it with that? Could we publicize the deliberations of the group? Should we identify the members of the group? So there's just a number of those and again, keep pointing back to Tom's Mark's paper, but a lot of those arguments have been brought up in the past. And I would say, if you're reading other because a lot has been published about this, the groups that Carrie mentioned earlier that weighed in on this, I'd say it needs to go on both all sides of this. And I guess I push it back as if you have an issue of transparency, then tell me how that what that means to you.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

Source: https://videocast.nih.gov/watch=35665

National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity - January 2020 (Day 1) National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity - January 2020 (Day 1) videocast.nih.gov

@Bryce_Nickels — Bryce Nickels

Posted - June 23, 2024 at 4:37 PM

Saved - June 24, 2024 at 7:27 AM

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Dr. Steven Quay discusses various aspects of SARS-CoV-2 in a lecture series. Topics include the origin of the virus, the furin cleavage site, and the DEFUSE proposal. He questions the natural origin of the virus and suggests it may have come from a lab. He also mentions the transfer of deadly viruses from Canada to the Wuhan Institute of Virology in 2019.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🚨RESOURCE🚨 Comments by Steven Quay @quay_dr at The Capitol Hill Lecture Series (June 18, 2024) Clip 1 - Dr Quay discusses the science behind why SARS-CoV-2 did not come from a wet market (1/9)

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Scientists analyzed the genetic code of viruses to trace their origins. By studying the molecular clock, they found that SARS-CoV-2 had no posterior diversity, indicating a single source in Wuhan. Research showed hospitals in Wuhan were clustered along a subway line connecting the Wuhan Institute of Virology, the wet market, and the international airport, suggesting a potential route of transmission. The speaker collaborated with the State Department in 2020 to investigate these findings.

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Speaker 0: One scientist today, we're still saying it came from the wet market. Why did it not come from the wet market? And what's some of the science behind why you think it existed beforehand? Speaker 1: Yeah. So what what what you can do is you can look at the genetic code. I mean, so we have a lot of humans and they can tell the truth, they cannot tell the truth, they can lie, they can do all sorts of things. So my focus has been, what does the virus tell me about it? It's almost like looking at a, you know, a body at a crime scene. What can you find in the way of clues? One of the clues is that all of these virus have what's called a molecular clock. So, so they're they're They copy themselves with quite high fidelity, but about every 2 weeks they make a mistake. So, if a virus has been circulating for a year, it's gonna have how many mistakes? About 26. So, in SARS 1, when they looked at the virus in the 11 different markets it was in, there were 30 different letters that were different in the pattern in these markets that they could say, you know, this thing this thing was in its first cat, civet cat, about a year ago. And, this posterior diversity as it's called, was present in SARS 1. It was also present in 2014, 15 in MERS. They could see the same thing. They could see it going back in the camels in the Middle East where it had been infected. And, but it also always starts in a bat. And that was about a 2 or 3 year diversity. What is the posterior diversity of SARS 2? 0. 0. Every person who is infected in this room has a virus that can be traced back to an atom, you know, Adam and Eve, to an atom virus, one virus in one person in Wuhan. I even every time I think that and say it, it just marvels me that we have 2,000,000,000 people infected and it started with 1 person in in the laboratory there. I was working with the state department in the fall of 2020 because I published a paper where I basically looked at what hospitals people went to in Wuhan. There's 9 different subway lines and it turned out all the hospitals were along line 2. What did that line have on it? The Wuhan Institute of Virology, the market, and the international airport. And, a 1000000 people a day were going on that line. So, my you know, I'm I'm not a government guy as as as as doctor Paul said. I I've invented 7 drugs that are FDA approved on on the biotech side, but I get a my secretary gets a call from a guy at the state department and said, hey, you published this paper and and you know, you're replicating the work we're doing behind closed doors here. Would you please come in and help us? And and I did in the in the fall of 2020 and into 21.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

Comments by Steven Quay @quay_dr at The Capitol Hill Lecture Series (June 18, 2024) Clip 2 - Dr Quay discusses the furin cleavage site in SARS-CoV-2 (2/9) https://t.co/cpXB7Foxl5

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Many viruses use a 2-step authentication process to enter cells, involving binding to a receptor and spike protein cleavage. Virologists have been adding furin cleavage sites to viruses since 1992, increasing their virulence. SARS-CoV-2, which likely originated from nature, contains unique furin cleavage site codons not typical in coronaviruses. This suggests a low probability of natural origin.

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Speaker 0: Viruses, viruses, many viruses, have what what I call 2 step authentication, which means they have to have a receptor they bind to, but then they have to have a protein on that same cell that clips their spike and, like a hypodermic needle, shoots the RNA or the DNA into the cell. And, this 2 step authentication, is a unique feature. So, HIV has a furin cleavage site. Many, many viruses have furin cleavage sites. Since 1992, virologists have been putting them into virus and seeing what do they what happens. Every time, it makes them more virulent. So SARS the SARS that, the family of viruses SARS who came from, a 1000 years of of time back to the time the most common ancestors are when the beta coronaviruses split and this class came. About the time William was crossing that that channel into England. None of these viruses have ever had a fear and cleavage site. And we've looked at 800 or 1400, the number varies, but, you all should take statistics. Because what what that means is that the probability this came from nature is, you know, under 1%, under 0.5%. And so you look at various aspects of it because then you look at, well, what are the letters of the fear and cleavage side in SARS CoV 2? Oh my gosh. It has 2, 3 letter codons that are never used by coronaviruses.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

Comments by Steven Quay @quay_dr at The Capitol Hill Lecture Series (June 18, 2024) Clip 3 - Dr Quay discusses why it is highly unlikely that SARS-CoV-2 came from nature (3/9) https://t.co/NmGTVsTWEL

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The speaker discusses the improbability of the COVID-19 virus occurring naturally, citing seven distinct features that make it highly unlikely. These features include the backbone, receptor, binding to human cells, cleavage site, and codonios. When considering each feature independently, the probability of all seven characteristics appearing in nature is calculated to be 1 in 1,200,000,000.

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Speaker 0: One coincidence adds up to another. What would it actually take to have come up with a virus like this in nature? Yeah. It has it has seven features, the backbone, the receptor, the part that binds to the to the, to the human cell, this urine cleavage site in in in its existence and then its codonios. So, you add these 7 together and they're independent, so a statistician can treat each of them separately. And you end up with a probability that of the virus with these 7 characteristics has a chance of 1 in 1,200,000,000 of coming from nature.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

Comments by Steven Quay @quay_dr at The Capitol Hill Lecture Series (June 18, 2024) Clip 4 - Dr Quay discusses the DEFUSE proposal (part 1) (4/9) https://t.co/pUMBH6NY9V

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DARPA rejected a risky grant proposal to create a bat vaccine by spraying a live coronavirus in a cave. The plan involved infecting bats with the virus on sticky particles for self-vaccination. The potential consequences of releasing a live virus in a cave with millions of bats were concerning.

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Speaker 0: So this is a grant that DARPA said was too dangerous to do, and that's my backdrop to it. So it was a proposal by doctor Barrick in North Carolina, Desik at in New York City, Xinjie Shi in, Wuhan in virology, and a gentleman by the name of Linfa Wang up in Singapore. They were going to take they were going to create a bat vaccine by doing a bunch of stuff with the coronavirus. They were gonna put it on sticky particles and they were gonna spray it into a cave. The bats would get it all over themselves and when they cleaned each other, they would take it in and it was a vaccination for bats. Does that just on its face seem a little crazy? Well, what could go wrong? We are going to spray a coronavirus in a cave and see what happens. And it's got to be a live virus then, right? Yes. It absolutely does. Because it has to reproduce. Live virus, we're going to spray in a cave and there's a couple million kit bats flying around the cave. What could go wrong?

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

Comments by Steven Quay @quay_dr at The Capitol Hill Lecture Series (June 18, 2024) Clip 5 - "that's what they want you to believe" (5/9) https://t.co/nbgCTu03QA

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The belief is that the virus originated from a lab near the National Institute of AID Laboratories, not from bats in the Everglades as some suggest. This theory challenges the idea that the virus came from a market.

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Speaker 0: What the people who think it came from a market, are telling you is you're sitting you're sitting in a restaurant in North Bethesda. You're looking out at the National Institute of AID Laboratories. You You get sick with the virus, and they say, well, you know, it came from bats in the Everglades, but they're actually working on it in that lab over there out the building. That's what they want you to believe.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

Comments by Steven Quay @quay_dr at The Capitol Hill Lecture Series (June 18, 2024) Clip 6 - Dr Quay discusses the DEFUSE proposal (part 2) (6/9) https://t.co/0QwYGKl5ji

Video Transcript AI Summary

They planned to create a virus in Southern China to infect humans, possibly adding a furin cleavage site. DARPA considered funding it but had safety concerns. Despite claiming to work in safe labs in North Carolina, they discussed using lower safety level labs for cost efficiency and speed.

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Speaker 0: So, what they wanted So, it was a virus from Southern China. They were going to, train it to infect humans, by growing it on humanized mice. They were going to either If it had a furin cleavage site, they said it might. It's never been seen before in nature, but you didn't have one, they were gonna put one in. They they were, you know, then going to to, put it as I said, put it in these particles. So DARPA decided that it was maybe a gene drive, or there were various reasons, safety reasons why they didn't go forward in funding it. But, but we don't, and we don't know that it was funded, but we, before we get to whether it was funded or not, through, again, through FOIA, The remarkable thing is, so you have this grant that they've given to the government, where they've said one thing about what they're gonna do in writing. They're gonna they're gonna make the virus, the day this dangerous virus in pretty safe labs in North Carolina. And then, and then we got drafts of this, where they're talking to each other about how, about what they're gonna do. And in the drafts, Peter Daszak says, you know, we're gonna try to be really cost efficient and and quick in things, so we'll tell them we're doing it in in the safe labs in North Carolina. We'll go do them at the one in neurology where we know they're they're a lower safety level. We can get Cheaper. Cheaper cheaper, faster, better. I'll leave that out.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

Comments by Steven Quay @quay_dr at The Capitol Hill Lecture Series (June 18, 2024) Clip 7 - "this think looks really like the virus we proposed to make.... maybe it came from a lab" (7/9) https://t.co/mqx0Fix1Ud

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The speaker suggests that Cyrus had all the elements of the grant, including Barrick, Daszek, and possibly Dr. Fauci. They believe that DARPA officials should have acknowledged in January 2020 that the virus resembled one they were working on at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, indicating a possible lab origin.

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Speaker 0: All of this was a setup for then, when Cyrus appears, and has all of the elements. Has 7 elements of this grant. Barrick and Daszek and maybe doctor Fauci, all these under the DARPA people should have said in January 2020, you know, this thing looks really like the virus we proposed to to make in the Wuhan Institute virology. Maybe it came from a lab.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

Comments by Steven Quay @quay_dr at The Capitol Hill Lecture Series (June 18, 2024) Clip 8 - "in 2019, 30 vials of the three most deadly viruses on the planet...are sent from Canada to the WIV" (8/9) https://t.co/hajabn3YBL

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In March 2019, 30 vials of deadly viruses were sent from Canada to China, leading to the arrest of 3 Chinese scientists. In December 2019, the Nipah virus was found in patient samples in Wuhan, where it was being cloned. This virus is highly lethal, posing a serious threat.

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Speaker 0: March 2019, 30 vials of the 3 most deadly viruses on the planet, Ebola, Hendra, and Nipah, are sent from Canada. Canada's only been to the one in virology. The 3 Chinese scientists are arrested by the Mounted Police, escorted out. We don't know what happened. They were sent back to China. December 2019, I and my colleagues find the Nipah virus in patient samples in Wuhan, in the Wuhan laboratory undergoing cloning. So they're making an infectious clone of the Nipah virus. This is this is beyond the pale, and that's a 75% lethal virus. So that's what we're up against.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uj-PtkM1_cU (9/9)

@Bryce_Nickels — Bryce Nickels

Posted - June 14, 2024 at 5:44 PM

Saved - June 15, 2024 at 9:04 AM

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The authors and editor of the paper "No credible evidence supporting claims of the laboratory engineering of SARS-CoV-2" by Liu et al. have been accused of scientific misconduct and fraud. Private email communications reveal that the authors knew the title and conclusion of their paper were unsound, conflicts of interest were not disclosed, and privileged information about a SARS-CoV-2 infection in a Beijing lab was not disclosed. The signatories of this letter urge Emerging Microbes & Infections to issue an Expression of Editorial Concern and initiate a retraction process.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

🚨 Request for Editorial Action for Liu et al. 2020 🚨 We are writing to bring to your attention significant breaches of publishing ethics regarding the paper titled "No credible evidence supporting claims of the laboratory engineering of SARS-CoV-2" by Liu et al.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

June 14, 2024 Subject: Request for Editorial Action for Liu et al. 2020 Dear Editors, We are writing to bring to your attention significant breaches of publishing ethics regarding the paper titled "No credible evidence supporting claims of the laboratory engineering of SARS-CoV-2" by Shan-Lu Liu, Linda Saif, Susan Weiss, and Lishan Su, published online in Emerging Microbes & Infections on February 26, 2020 (1). The manuscript was handled by the Editor-in-Chief of Emerging Microbes & Infections, Shan Lu. The manuscript discussed the emergence of SARS-CoV-2, the virus responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic, and concluded "there is currently no credible evidence to support the claim that SARS-CoV-2 originated from a laboratory-engineered CoV" (1). The authors’ and editor's private email communications (2), obtained through an Ohio Public Records Act request, provide compelling evidence that there is clear basis to infer the paper may be the product of scientific misconduct, up to and including fraud (2-6). The authors' and editor's private email communications reveal the following: 1. On the day the authors reviewed the proofs of the paper (February 21, 2020), shortly before its publication, in email communications having the subject line "Your article proofs for review (ID# TEMI 1733440)," two authors, Susan Weiss and Shan-Lu Liu, made statements that show clearly that they knew that the title and conclusion of their paper were unsound (2-5). • Susan Weiss emails Shan-Lu Liu to express her concern that she does not understand how the furin cleavage site (“furin site”) ended up in the SARS-CoV-2 sequence naturally. Susan Weiss (February 21, 2020 at 5:42 AM): “[T]he RaTG13 spike does not include a furin sequence.... I find it hard to imagine how that sequence got into the spike of a lineage b betacoronavirus- not seen in SARS or any of the bat viruses. The BioRx preprint on Pangolin sequence is very weak- says the RBD from the pangolin virus is closer to SARS-CoV-2 than RaTG13 is. But again pangolin sequence lacks the furin site.” Susan Weiss (February 21, 2020 at 9:06 AM): “I remain concerned about the insertion of the furin site” • Shan-Lu responds that he agrees with her, but suggests that they should focus on denying the “rumor” that the furin site may not be natural. Shan-Lu Liu (February 21, 2020 at 9:50 AM): “Susan, I completely agree with you, but rumor says that furin site may be engineered.” • Susan Weiss responds by emphasizing her difficulties in understanding how the furin site emerged and expresses concern that it “may have been engineered.” Susan Weiss (February 21, 2020 at 10:13 AM): “Henry and I have been speculating- how can that site have appeared at S1/S2 border- I hate to think to was engineered- among the MHV strains, the cleavage site does not increaser pathogenicity while it does effect entry route (surface vs endosome). so for me the only significance of this furin site is as a marker for where the virus came from- frightening to think it may have been engineered.” 2. Ralph Baric and Shi Zhengli, despite clear conflicts of interest, made substantial contributions to the manuscript but were not credited as authors or acknowledged (2-6). Authorship policies for Taylor and Francis requires acknowledgement of all contributors and the source of their funding declared (7): “Contributions made by professional scientific, medical or technical writers, translators or anyone who has assisted with the manuscript content must be acknowledged and their source of funding declared. They should be included in an ‘Acknowledgments’ section with an explanation of their role, or they should be included in the author list if appropriate.” EMI Editor-in-Chief, Shan Lu (February 11 at 1:44 PM) “We don’t want to appear that we are defending Ralph [Baric] even though he did nothing wrong.” EMI Editor-in-Chief, Shan Lu (February 11 at 2:03 PM) “Sure, we are not saying we are trying to defend Ralph [Baric] but just don’t want to give others the wrong impression” Ralph Baric (February 12, 2020 at 10:02 AM) “sure, but don’t want to be cited in as having commented prior to submission.” Lishan Su (February 12, 2020 at 10:11 AM) “Hi Ralph: We are trying to finish it and had no plan to get you too involved, but I do value your input.” Ralph Baric (February 12, 2020 at 12:32 PM) “My comments. I’ve included an excel file comparing the differences in the genome length sequences of the parental and chimeric viruses. Also made some text changes. I think the community needs to write these editorials and I thank you for your efforts . ralph” Shan-Lu Liu (February 16, 2020 at 12:43 PM): “I agree to delete those two parts. One was added by me, based on Linda’s email, and another was also by me, based on Ralph [Baric]’s comments.” Shan-Lu Liu (February 16, 2020 at 9:49 PM): “See Zhengli’s comments. We may not need to make those changes, although some of those are good.” Lishan Su (February 21, 2020 at 1:40 PM): “I have noticed that too, probably happened when we tried to simplify the chimeric virus paragraph, and I think Ralph [Baric] had added the attenuation sentence relative to M15 in mice…” 3. While writing the paper, Shan Lu, Lu-Shan Su, and Shan-Lu Liu had privileged information about a SARS-CoV-2 infection in a Beijing lab in 2020. However, while they discussed it between themselves, they did not disclose this information to the other co-authors and minimized the possibility of a lab accident in the paper (2-5). Lishan Su (February 14, 2020 at 6:39 PM): “Your former colleague was infected with sars2 in the lab?” Shan-Lu Liu (February 14, 2020 at 6:46 PM): “Yes, he was infected in the lab!” EMI Editor-in-Chief, Shan Lu (February 14, 2020 at 7:02 PM): “I actually am very concerned for the possibility of SARS-2 infection by lab people. It is much more contagious than SARS-1. Now every lab is interested in get a vial of virus to do drug discovery. This can potentially a big issue. I don’t think most people have a clue.” 4. Shan Lu (not to be confused with Shan-Lu Liu), did not disclose his involvement in authoring the paper to Susan Weiss and Linda Saif, by carefully managing a separate paper drafting email thread with Shan-Lu Liu and Lishan Su (2-5). 5. The Editor-in-Chief of Emerging Microbes & Infections, Shan Lu accepted the manuscript on the day it was submitted with—in his own words —"basically no review," and even explained to authors Lu-Shan Su and Shan-Lu Liu that he had used his position as Editor-in-Chief to secure a superficial manuscript approval (2-5). Shan-Lu Liu (February 11, 2020 at 7:44 PM): “Shan: Are you sure that you prefer not to be included in the coauthorship?” EMI Editor-in-Chief, Shan Lu (February 11, 2020 at 12:44 PM): “Here is my new version based on SLL’s. highlighted areas are my new version (I did not leave tracking as it is too messy). Please take a look then we can focus on the chimeric one which needs more simplification as I can see. We may not need to go too deep in science as it can only confuse more people and found more issues from those who has suspicion. Shan” Shan-Lu Liu (February 12, 2020 at 6:04 PM): “Lishan: My understanding is that Shan does not want to be included as a coauthor… That is why I thought you would be the first author because you had the first draft” EMI Editor-in-Chief, Shan Lu (February 12, 2020 at 7:25 PM): “I definitely will not be an author as you guys did everything. It can also keep things somewhat independent as the editor.” EMI Editor-in-Chief, Shan Lu (February 16, 2020 at 12:30 PM): “See two attached documents: 1. Title of commentary: I agree that by removing “origin”, it is better. I also wonder if we can add “current” in it? 2. A slightly revised draft of commentary: I removed certain sentences (with tracking) to make the commentary more focused. For your reference” EMI Editor-in-Chief, Shan Lu (February 21, 2020 at 10:36 AM): “Yes, just a secret to you two and not share with others. When I put a super fast review and accept (basically no review), the [Journal Editorial Office of Taylor & Francis], became very suspicious and wanted her boss to check and approve. She probably wonder if we are actually just one person with three fake names” Lishan Su (February 21, 2020 at 10:22 PM): “Thanks for speeding it up, bro! We are doing wonders as three confusing/confused musketeers of Shan-Lu, Shan Lu and Lishan Su:)” Taken together, the authors’ and editor's private communications indicate the paper is a product of scientific misconduct, up to and including fraud, by the authors and by the Editor-in-Chief of Emerging Microbes & Infections, Shan Lu. The authors' and editor's private communications establishing these facts were not available at the time the paper was approved and published. Now that these documents have come to light, we urge Emerging Microbes & Infections to issue an Expression of Editorial Concern for this paper and to initiate a retraction process. Signatories (in alphabetical order) Colin D. Butler, Australian National University, Australia Gilles Demaneuf, Engineer and Data Scientist, New Zealand Joseph P. Dudley, University of Alaska Fairbanks, US Richard H. Ebright, Rutgers University, US Andre Goffinet, UCLouvain (Prof em), Belgium Edward Hammond, Prickly Research, US Neil L. Harrison, Columbia University, US Hideki Kakeya, University of Tsukuba, Japan Stephen Lagana, Columbia University Irving Medical Center, US Yanna Lambrinidou, Virginia Tech, US Jonathan Latham, The Bioscience Resource Project, US Milton Leitenberg, University of Maryland, US Bryce E. Nickels, Rutgers University, US Andrew Noymer, University of California, Irvine Steven Quay, Stanford University School of Medicine (Former Faculty), US Eric S. Starbuck, Biosafety Now, US Günter Theißen, Matthias Schleiden Institute, Germany Antonius VanDongen, Duke University, US Roland Wiesendanger, University of Hamburg, Germany Allison Wilson, The Bioscience Resource Project, US Mohamed E. El Zowalaty, Ahram Canadian University, Egypt References cited 1. Shan-Lu Liu, Linda J Saif, Susan R Weiss, Lishan Su. No credible evidence supporting claims of the laboratory engineering of SARS-CoV-2. Emerg Microbes Infect. 2020 Feb 26;9(1):505-507. https://doi.org/10.1080/22221751.2020.1733440 2. The released email messages are available at: https://usrtk.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/OSU-records-Shan-Lu-Liu-Aug-4.pdf 3. “Chinese-linked journal editor sought help to rebut Covid-19 lab origin hypothesis” by Sainath Suryanarayanan (April 7, 2021) https://usrtk.org/covid-19-origins/chinese-linked-journal-sought-to-rebut-covid-19-lab-origin-theory/ 4. “Scientists who authored article denying lab engineering of SARS-CoV-2 privately acknowledged possible lab origin, emails show” by Shannon Murray (August 11, 2021) https://usrtk.org/covid-19-origins/scientists-who-authored-article-denying-lab-engineering-of-sars-cov-2-privately-acknowledged-possible-lab-origin-emails-show/ 5. https://typefully.com/gdemaneuf/GP3bmOS 6. Why Do People Not “Trust the Science”? Because Like All People, Scientists Are Not Always Trustworthy (Paul Thacker, Jan 11, 2022) https://usrtk.org/covid-19-origins/scientists-who-authored-article-denying-lab-engineering-of-sars-cov-2-privately-acknowledged-possible-lab-origin-emails-show/ 7. https://authorservices.taylorandfrancis.com/editorial-policies/defining-authorship-research-paper/

Chinese-linked journal editor sought help to rebut Covid-19 lab origin hypothesis The editor-in-chief of a scientific journal with ties to China commissioned a commentary to refute the hypothesis that the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 came from a lab, according to emails obtained by U.S. Right to Know. The commentary reinforced a scientific […] usrtk.org

Scientists who authored article denying lab engineering of SARS-CoV-2 privately acknowledged possible lab origin, emails show Four prominent U.S. virologists who published a widely cited commentary strongly rebutting the theory that SARS-CoV-2, the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19, might have been engineered in a lab privately acknowledged that they could not “rule out the possibility” of […] usrtk.org

Defining authorship in your research paper - Author Services Learn the roles of co-authors, corresponding authors, and affiliations contributing to a journal article. Policies on authorship. authorservices.taylorandfrancis.com

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

THIS LETTER WAS SENT TO EMI EDITORIAL BOARD AT 1:29 EDT https://t.co/Rybi2Cha0S

@Bryce_Nickels — Bryce Nickels

Posted - December 7, 2023 at 3:25 AM

Saved - December 7, 2023 at 12:27 PM

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Eddie Holmes, a scientist, faces criticism for spreading disinformation instead of taking responsibility for his lies. This behavior tarnishes his professional reputation. Additionally, his endorsement of a smear campaign against USRTK further suggests his inability to defend his actions.

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

Eddie Holmes chooses to amplify disinformation instead of face accountability for lying to the global public. Holmes is a disgrace to his profession. #RetractProximalOrigins https://t.co/eFkTlXTL6k

@Bryce_Nickels - Bryce Nickels

Markolin's thread is a smear campaign against USRTK followed by this laughable defense of PO. The fact that Holmes amplified the thread is #StrongEvidence that he has no defense for his actions. https://t.co/jN2MJ6Oyva

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