TruthArchive.ai - Tweets Saved By @Curiousityfirst

@Curiousityfirst — DogAndBone @Curious Cat

Posted - November 3, 2024 at 1:47 AM

Saved - November 3, 2024 at 5:50 PM

reSee.it AI Summary

I discovered that the GA Data Hub lists over 140,000 voters without age information, despite proof of ID with age being mandatory in Georgia. Total turnout stands at 4,013,046, but age data is only available for 3,872,145 voters. Check it out for yourself.

@Curiousityfirst - DogAndBone @Curious Cat

Well here it is folks - GA Data Hub has voters with NO AGE! Total Turnout -4,013,046 By Age -3,872,145 Extra 140K voters - By breakdown Last time I checked proof of ID with age was mandatory in Georgia. Right now. Check for yourselves👇` Election Data Hub - Turnout | Georgia Secretary of State (http://ga.gov)

Georgia.gov georgia.gov

@Curiousityfirst — DogAndBone @Curious Cat

Posted - July 26, 2021 at 11:42 PM

Saved - December 30, 2023 at 8:11 PM

@Curiousityfirst - DogAndBone @Curious Cat

Prediction: Full list of States that require an immediate audit. They used the same software for online ballots. Georgia and Arizona used custom-built "crafted" to Brad's and Katie's specs. #Arizona #maricopa @HuttonPulitzer @FannKfann #texas #michigan #Pennsylvania #Nevada https://t.co/BQaYZnEbV7

@Curiousityfirst — DogAndBone @Curious Cat

Posted - December 22, 2023 at 10:21 PM

Saved - December 27, 2023 at 12:06 PM

reSee.it AI Summary

In Maricopa County, Arizona, documents reveal a discrepancy of 45,483 registered voters between pre and post L&A testing. Screenshots show different numbers of registered voters before and after testing, and evidence suggests that write-in candidates are out of sequence. Notably, neither Republican signed the post test. Stay tuned for Part 2, which will explore the composition of these registered voters.

@Curiousityfirst - DogAndBone @Curious Cat

BREAKING: Maricopa County, Arizona General Election 2022 (Part 1) Documents reveal that the Pre L&A Testing and the Post L&A Testing HAVE DIFFERENT DATABASES. A VARIANCE OF 45,483 REGISTERED VOTERS. Screenshot 1: PRE L&A Testing Registered Voters: 2,480,880 Screenshot 2: POST L&A Testing Registered Voters: 2,435,397 Screenshot 3: Slog file Message confirms Election database version: 1.24 is not same as election domain version Further evidence shows that the write-in candidates are out of sequence. Neither Republican Signed the POST test. STAY TUNED: Part 2. The composition of the 45,483 Registered Voters. @KariLake @FannKfann @BarnettforAZ @RealMarkFinchem @ShawnSmith1776 @ParikhClay @mad_liberals @FSociety_1942 @LeadingReport @Rach_IC @DC_Draino @ConradsonJordan @CannConActual @VoterGa @GAballots #arizona @KariLakeWarRoom @AbrahamHamadeh

@Curiousityfirst — DogAndBone @Curious Cat

Posted - December 25, 2023 at 9:34 PM

Saved - December 26, 2023 at 8:36 PM

reSee.it AI Summary

Evidence suggests that the election program in Maricopa County, Arizona was altered. PRR documents reveal that two candidates were added after L&A testing, affecting the tabulation of election results. The author believes that Steve Robinson should have won the race and calls for answers. Merry Christmas to all.

@Curiousityfirst - DogAndBone @Curious Cat

BREAKING: MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA, 2022 GENERAL ELECTION - EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT THE ELECTION PROGRAM WAS ALTERED - RT RT RT PRR Documents reveal 2 candidates were ADDED AFTER L&A TESTING DURING THE ELECTION. Please see Pre and Post L&A TESTS.👇 Legislative District 22 - Pre Test had 11 Candidates and Post Test had 13 Candidates. That affects the tabulation of the election results. I firmly believe that with the repositioning of the candidates Steve Robinson should have won this race! Please share - the good people of Maricopa deserve answers. Merry Christmas Everybody!!! @JenWEsq @j3669 @mad_liberals @KariLake @KariLakeWarRoom @AZGOP @TheAndersPaul @FSociety_1942 @AzPinkLady @ShawnSmith1776 @CannConActual @AbrahamHamadeh @MadLiberals @realAlexKolodin @wmahoney5 @Ryan_L_Heath @voterGA @GAballots @WethePeopleAZA1 #Arizona@BlehmLawAZ#arizona @ParikhClay @KariLakeWarRoom @Rach_IC @CannConActual #arizona #Trump #trump2024 @j3669 @mattvanbibber @MAGAIncWarRoom @pjcolbeck @RealMattCouch @TalkMullins @realLizUSA

@Curiousityfirst — DogAndBone @Curious Cat

Posted - December 22, 2023 at 10:21 PM

Saved - December 26, 2023 at 7:20 PM

reSee.it AI Summary

In Maricopa County, Arizona, documents reveal that the Pre L&A Testing and Post L&A Testing have different databases, with a variance of 45,483 registered voters. Further evidence shows that write-in candidates are out of sequence, and neither Republican signed the Post test. Stay tuned for Part 2, which will discuss the composition of the 45,483 registered voters.

@Curiousityfirst - DogAndBone @Curious Cat

@Curiousityfirst — DogAndBone @Curious Cat

Posted - December 24, 2023 at 8:58 PM

Saved - December 25, 2023 at 7:59 PM

reSee.it AI Summary

Overnight, 45K registered voters were added and then removed in Maricopa County, Arizona for the 2022 general election. Official records show the following: 2,435,397 registered voters at the cutoff, 2,480,880 before L&A testing (including the extra 45K), and 2,435,397 after L&A testing. Any registrations after the cutoff are excluded from the election. Share to help the people of Maricopa get the answers they deserve.

@Curiousityfirst - DogAndBone @Curious Cat

BREAKING: 45K EXTRA REGISTERED VOTERS ADDED OVERNIGHT IN MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA 2022 GENERAL ELECTION then REMOVED THEM DURING AN ELECTION.👇 Cutoff 11th October 2,435,397 L&A Testing 12th October 2,480,880 Election Certification 2,435,397 According to their Maricopa County's own official records. Slide 1: Registered Voters as at the Cutoff 2,435,397 Slide 2: Pre L&A - 2,480,880 (extra 45K) Slide 3: Post L&A - 2,435,397 Slide 4: Chart for visual understanding Any registrations after the cutoff are excluded from the 2022 election. Please retweet and share so that the good people of Maricopa can ask and get the answers they deserve. #Trump @AZGOP #Arizona #Trump2024 #Elections2024 @KariLake @KariLakeWarRoom @BlehmLawAZ @LeadingReport @FSociety_1942 @Rach_IC @Ryan_L_Heath @WendyRogersAZ @Peoples_Pundit @RealAmVoice @realLizUSA @AbrahamHamadeh @TalkMullins @ShawnSmith1776 @pjcolbeck @PatrickByrne @TPPatriots @realAlexKolodin @RealAlexJones #MerryChristmas @ElectionWiz @ArizonaSunTimes @elonmusk @KristenNHammond @JenWEsq @j3669 @RealSKeshel @RealMarkFinchem

@Curiousityfirst — DogAndBone @Curious Cat

Posted - November 11, 2023 at 10:56 PM

Saved - November 13, 2023 at 7:45 PM

reSee.it AI Summary

On election day in Fulton County, only 14,152 people had voted by 5:00pm. However, the county certified 59,143 votes, indicating 45,000 votes were cast between 5-7pm. A screen capture from Nov 4, 12:49am, showed only 21,843 votes. This video explains the discrepancies. A poll pad from State Farm Arena was also involved. Other poll pads were turned in, but not from State Farm Arena where they were still "counting ballots."

@Curiousityfirst - DogAndBone @Curious Cat

As at 5:00pm Nov 3, 2020 Fulton County's Ralph Jones reported only 14,152 people had voted on election day. The County certified 59,143. Meaning 45,000 voted between 5-7pm. I found evidence that as at Nov 4 at 12:49am 6 hours AFTER had closed this screen capture shows that only 21,843 people, had in fact voted. David Cross @GAballots and I put our heads together to work out the numbers. Here is the video that explains it all👇. It would be a shame if this video went viral. https://rumble.com/vxr5x3-suspected-election-day-fraud-in-fulton-county-november-2020.html @VoterGa @GAballots @hw_floyd #Georgia @Rach_IC

Suspected Election Day Fraud in Fulton County - November 2020 rumble.com

@Curiousityfirst - DogAndBone @Curious Cat

Additionally, this poll pad was from a technician based at State Farm Arena on election day. ##georgia. . @hw_floyd

@Curiousityfirst - DogAndBone @Curious Cat

@hw_floyd All other poll pads were turned in on election day at close of polls @ 7:00pm. Luckily for us, not State Farm Arena where they were still "counting ballots". @hw_floyd

@Curiousityfirst — DogAndBone @Curious Cat

Posted - January 8, 2023 at 10:17 PM

Saved - June 4, 2023 at 9:05 AM

@Curiousityfirst - DogAndBone @Curious Cat

@jhalderm the same guy that found the Dominion vulnerability, wherein instead of stating they breached their contract, he ensured that DOMINION's CVR's were "sanitised" to make it difficult to analyse. @JanuszP20 @noodles @CannConActual @TxSaving https://t.co/AL4uliCgdh

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

🚨Hacking America's Election System 1 hour of computer scientists, election security experts, and Senate Democrats talking about how easy it is to hack voting machines. @KariLake @katiehobbs @GenFlynn @realMikeLindell @bgmasters @PatrickByrne @JackPosobiec @DavidSacks @elonmusk https://t.co/sH4Ft0iMsB

Video Transcript AI Summary

Voting machines in the US are vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, according to security researchers. These machines, which come in various models, have been found to have security vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious software and change election data. The most efficient way to hack the machines is through the machine used to program them, as it can pass rogue software to the voting machines. Contrary to popular belief, many voting machines are connected to the internet, either through wireless modems or other means, making them susceptible to cyber attacks. The lack of proper security measures and outdated systems make it only a matter of time before election results are compromised.

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Full Transcript

Speaker 0: I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine like a computer virus, and silently change election outcomes, and in every single case We've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. Across the country, there are about 52 different models of machines. They they fall into essentially 2 styles. Ones that scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen. And many of them have been analyzed now by researchers, looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case where a US voting machine has been analyzed by competent security researchers, They have found vulnerabilities that would let someone inject malicious software and change election data. Every single case. Speaker 1: The better or the more efficient way of hacking machines would be to subvert them all through the machine that's used to actually program those machines. So prior to each election, the county election office or the voting machine vendor will actually program memory cards for that election. It tells the machine who are the candidates, what are the, you know, the the contests being decided, and that gets It's inserted into the voting machine. If you can alter, if you can subvert that machine that is used to program those memory cards, then you can pass rogue software to the voting machine. Speaker 0: Voting machines that are not connected to the internet. This is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately, it's not actually true. Many new voting machines that come with 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connected to the internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me, that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the Internet right in the middle of the election, potentially at the most vulnerable Speaker 2: time. Studies conducted in 2007 by the state of California, state of Ohio, state of Florida found security vulnerabilities that could take advantage of these To engineer viruses where 1 compromised voting machine could then infect eventually the entire fleet of machines for an entire county. Typically at the end of the election day, you move a memory card through each of the machines in the precinct, and that's to collect the vote totals. That process can spread a virus. And there are other processes. The details vary from machine to machine. Speaker 3: When you say hacked, what were they able to do once they gained access to the machines? Speaker 4: All sorts of Executally manipulate the outcome of the vote. They could manipulate the tally. They could delete the tally, and and they could compromise the vote in any number of ways. Speaker 5: The machines used in Georgia have been demonstrated to be hackable through a virus that's carried on ballot definition cartridges. Very much like this Duxnet virus was inserted into nuclear centrifuges in Iran. Speaker 3: There are a number of states that outsource their reporting of elections to third parties, some of which are corporations based in other countries like Spain. So you've got to trust that the aggregation of the votes and the reporting of the votes is accurate as well. Speaker 0: I'm pretty sure my undergrad computer security class at Michigan could have changed the outcome of the 2016 teen Michigan election if we wanted to. It is that bad. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries, and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's that's why I say it's only a matter of time. Speaker 6: Unfortunately, in a lot of these systems, The audit trails are just as vulnerable as the other aspects of the system. So there may not be good forensic evidence of a successful intrusion. With the current design, we cannot be universally confident that it hasn't happened. And it's probably only a matter of time before it will. Speaker 7: I come here today as a computer scientist who spent the better part of the last quarter century studying Election system security. As you're well aware, the integrity of elections across the US depends heavily on the integrity of computers and Software systems. Unfortunately, much of this infrastructure has proven dangerously vulnerable to tampering and attack, and in some cases, In ways that cannot be easily detected or corrected, after the fact. These vulnerabilities can create practical avenues for, corrupt candidates or foreign adversaries to do everything from cause large scale disruption on Election Day to potentially, undetectably alter, election outcomes in some cases. So let me begin with the voting equipment itself. To be blunt, it's a widely recognized, really indisputable fact that every piece of computerized voting equipment in use at polling places today Can be easily compromised, in ways that have the potential to disrupt election, operations, compromise firmware and software, Potentially alter, vote tallies in the absence of, other safeguards. This is partly a consequence of historically poor design and implementation by equipment vendors, but it's ultimately a reflection of the nature of complex software. It's simply beyond the state of the art, to build software systems that can reliably withstand targeted attack By a determined adversary in this kind of an environment. The vulnerabilities are real. They're serious. And absent a surprising and very fundamental break through in my field, which I would welcome, but I don't see coming, soon, probably inevitable. We give most of the attention to vulnerabilities in voting machines, But that's not the whole story. Each of the more than 5,000 jurisdictions responsible for running elections across the nation Must maintain a number of critical information systems that are attractive targets for disruption by adversaries. Most important of these are voter registration databases, the systems that report, final results, and so forth. Unfortunately, There are even fewer standards for how to secure these systems. The administration of these systems varies widely. And the threats against these systems are often even more, acute than the threats against individual voting systems. You know, just as we don't expect the local sheriff to single handedly defend against military ground invasions, we shouldn't expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services, but that's precisely what we've been asking them, to do. Speaker 0: I'm a professor of computer science and have spent the last 10 years studying the electronic voting systems that our nation relies on. My conclusion from that work is that our highly computerized election infrastructure that is vulnerable to sabotage, and even to cyber attacks that could change votes. These realities risk making our election results more difficult for the American people to trust. I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly, as part of a decade of research, studying the technology that operates elections and learning how to make it stronger. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine, like a computer virus, and silently change election outcomes. We've studied touch screen and optical scan systems, and in every single case we've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. These capabilities are certainly within reach for America's enemies. As you know, states choose their own voting technology. And while some states are doing well with security, others are alarmingly vulnerable. This puts the entire nation at risk. In close elections, an attacker can probe the most important swing states or swing counties, find areas with the weakest protection, and strike there. In a close election year changing a few votes in key, localities could be enough to tip national results. The key lesson from 2016 is that these threats are real. Some say the fact that voting machines aren't directly connected to the Internet makes them secure, but unfortunately this is not true. Voting machines are not as distant from the Internet as they may seem. So the way these attacks work Is that before every election, every voting machine needs to be programmed with the design of the ballot, the names of the races and candidates. And voting officials do that by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker can infect that memory card With malicious code, well, when the memory card is inserted into the machine, it can change the programming running on the voting machine And caused the voting machine to, at the end of the election, output whatever results the attacker wants. Speaker 5: The machine that I hacked is called the Sequoia AVC Advantage, now called the Dominion AVC Advantage. It's in The computer program that counts the votes on this machine is in a read only memory that's mounted in a socket on the motherboard. To hack this machine, you have to Remove that memory chip from its socket and install a memory chip, on which you've prepared a cheating program. The cheating program that I prepared, has an extra 100 lines of code basically that, when the polls are about to close, it goes in there and changes some votes stored in the machine. And there is an electronic log of all votes cast, so it changes the log too. So to install that, the attacker doesn't need to be a computer scientist, the attacker just needs to have A bunch of copies of this memory chip, with the fraudulent program on it. And for each voting machine, unscrew 10 screws to remove the panel that that covers the motherboard, pry out the ROM chip containing the legitimate program and install the ROM chip containing the fraudulent program. Other kinds of voting machines store their computer program that counts to votes in flash memory. And this can be updated Under the control of whatever computer program happens to be running in the voting machine. These voting machines, typically the generation developed in the 1990s and after, can be hacked without actually physically changing any hardware in the machine, just by installing a software upgrade Memory card in the same slot that one would normally install the ballot definition. And this particular attack was demonstrated by my colleague at Princeton, Professor Felton, In about 2007, working with 2 of his graduate students. But it's not just us at Princeton, there are many kinds of voting machines and The same kinds of hacks are applicable to all voting machines and have been demonstrated at several other universities, including University of Connecticut, Johns Hopkins, Michigan and others. There are cyber security issues in all parts of our election system. Before the election, voter registration databases. During the election, voting machines. After the election, vote tabulation, canvassing, precinct aggregation computers. Installing new software in a voting machine is not really much different from installing new software in any other kind of computer. Installing new software is how you hack a voting machine to cheat. In 2009, in the courtroom of the Superior Court of New Jersey, I demonstrated how to hack a voting machine. I wrote a vote stealing computer program that shifts votes from 1 candidate to another. Installing that vote stealing program in a voting machine takes 7 minutes per machine with a screwdriver. But really the software I built was not rocket science. Any computer programmer could write the same code. Once it's installed, it could steal elections without detection for years to come. Voting machines are often delivered to polling places several days before the election, to elementary schools, churches, firehouses. In these locations, anyone could gain access to a voting machine for 10 minutes. Between elections, the machines are routinely opened up for maintenance by county employees or private contractors. Let's assume they have the utmost integrity. But still in the US we try to run our elections so that we can trust the election results without relying on any one individual. Other computer scientists have demonstrated similar hacks on many models of machine. This is not just 1 glitch in 1 manufacturer's machine. It's the very nature of computers. So how can we trust our elections when it's so easy to make the computers cheat? Speaker 8: Mr. Appel, in that scenario, an attacker would actually have to have access to all 100 in the 1 county in order to manipulate the records. Speaker 5: In Georgia, that's not the case. The machines used in Georgia Have been demonstrated to be hackable through a virus that's carried on ballot definition cartridges, very much like this Stuxnet virus was, inserted into nuclear centrifuges in Iran. So, and in Speaker 8: that auditing system, in the auditing of these machines. We look at that. Is that correct? Speaker 5: I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question? Speaker 8: So, in those machines that have that vulnerability in the auditing process. Isn't that scanned? Don't we scan for that? Speaker 5: It's difficult to scan for that vulnerability in the sense of if you Ask a machine to report what software is loaded in it. If it's fraudulent software, it will lie. So, the AccuVote TS machines, used in Georgia and in a few counties in other states are particularly vulnerable to this kind of virus that can be carried to the machines even if the criminal attacker doesn't touch the machines or is not even in the same state with the machines. Cap. Speaker 9: With parts made all over the world, and software made all over the world, and as Sherry said, there's only 3 or 4 manufacturers, the the one core point That kind of election security experts and others have been making about why our votes are safe was that the decentralized nature of our, Voting systems, the thousands and thousands of of, voting offices around the country that administer the election is what kept safe because Russians would need to have tens of thousands of operatives go get physical access to machines to actually, infiltrate the election. We now know that's false. And that through a handful of simple attacks, into manufacturers not in the United States, The Russians could plant malware into, thousands of machines all at once and hack the entire U. S. Election without ever leaving the Kremlin. Speaker 10: Or is there a different way where you could just hack one machine and that would transmit a bug to other machines in the precinct, again, even though they're not connected to an internet. Speaker 2: Sure. So before we had an Internet, we had computers with floppy drives. And there were computer viruses that could spread from 1 computer to another over floppies. Electronic voting machines, some of them use memory cards, some of them have these big battery packs, some of them have local area networks. Studies conducted in 2007 by the state of California, state of Ohio, state of Florida found security vulnerabilities that could take advantage of these to engineer viruses where 1 compromised voting machine could then infect eventually the entire fleet of machines for an entire county. And Each of these studies found ways that regular poll workers and election officials going through their standard procedures and and standard operations Could unwittingly be used to transmit viruses from 1 machine to another through the motion. Typically at the end of the election day, you move a memory card through each of the machines in the precinct, and that's to collect the vote totals. That process can spread a virus. And there are other processes. The details vary from machine to machine. Speaker 10: Okay. So it's accurate to say that just because something is not connected to the internet, it does not have a vulnerability to cyber attack. Speaker 2: Being disconnected from the Internet helps, but it's not a panacea, okay? Speaker 11: When you and your colleagues hacked election systems, did you get caught? Speaker 0: We hacked, election systems as part of academic research where we had machines in our system. Did you get caught? Speaker 11: Did they did they see your intrusion into their systems? Speaker 0: The one instance when I was invited to hack a real voting system to while people were watching, was in Washington, D. C. In 2010, and in that instance it took less than 48 hours for us to change all the votes, and we were not caught. Speaker 11: Vice, Chairman. Speaker 0: I have sitting in my office right now actually, a deep old AccuVote TSX machine, a touchscreen machine that's still in use in 23 states, where, I've hacked it to give whatever outcome I want. It it really is that easy. And when you're talking about, when you're talking about these attacks, though, I don't think it's something that, You know, just in every case, a, a freshman in college could do it. Some states are a little bit better protected, but that's not who we're up against. We're up against nation state attackers that are among some of the most Powerful, adversaries in the world when it comes to cyber attacks, and which have routinely compromised highly protected sites like, like military installations, and large tech companies. I think that's the thing that I want voting officials and and voters to understand is quite what they're up against. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries and series, and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's why I say it's only a matter of time. Speaker 3: The standard arguments that, our elections can't be hacked in the US are some combination of physical security. You can't get access to the devices, they're not connected to the internet, they're tested before Election Day, and the system is too decentralized. It's run by, you know, a bunch of individual election officials and individual counties and and jurisdictions. So it's it's a it's a hard target. Most of this has already been debunked by, the previous speakers, but, physical security is pretty lax. Equipment, has sleepovers in school gymnasiums, and churches, and this and that. There are lots of, examples on the Internet of photos of, election, equipment warehouses, where the the Election officials warehouses with the door propped open and nobody watching. Just, it's just not true. It isn't true that the machines aren't connected to the Internet, and even if they weren't to the Internet that would still be hackable through other means. One of the things that hasn't been mentioned so far yet is supply chain hacks. There are components in these voting systems that come from foreign countries. A colleague of ours, Karsten Sherman, at the IT University of Copenhagen, Found Chinese pop songs in memory of a voting machine that he bought, on the Internet. So that those songs somehow made it through the quality control of The election equipment vendor, and then through, how many elections that it was actually used in by the local election official, and, and, you know, we're still there. Moreover, there's an issue in reporting, which I'm not going to talk about that much, but there are a number of states that outsource their reporting of elections to third parties, some of which are corporations based in other countries like Spain. So you've got to trust that the aggregation of the votes and the reporting of the votes is is, is accurate as well. There's a lot of technology being rolled out in this election, that had either not been used or not been used as widely before. This includes, much more widespread reliance on things like electronic poll books, which become a point of vulnerability that can disenfranchise people if they malfunction, if they lose their Internet connection, or if they've been hacked, some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election results using cellular modems or, the internet That, of course, introduces another point of vulnerability, not just to the data that's flowing, but also to the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Voting equipment itself, there are states that have rolled out touchscreen voting for all in person voters. This is, An unnecessary introduction of brittle and vulnerable technology. Many pieces of electronic technology that are involved in elections are Either incorporate, devices that were built overseas, or assembled overseas, and many crucial functions are being outsourced to foreign companies. One, noteworthy example that I'm especially concerned about, there is a Spanish firm, called CITL, which runs, they they provide election reporting for something like 11 US states. They're based in Spain, and they're bankrupt. So that could, obviously, is a point of failure where, someone could shed a lot of mistrust over the election results By simply falsifying what gets posted, even if the correct results could ultimately be recovered from durable reliable records, that would certainly, cast a lot of fear uncertainty and doubt on what's going on. There have been ransomware attacks on, government systems now including some voting systems, We know that there are cyber warfare attacks by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. There most states voter registration databases were, penetrated in 2016, there is a lot of evidence that data were changed, but that could certainly happen this time around. So all in all, there's a lot of confusion, there are a lot of points of vulnerability. There are a lot of known problems. There are some election vendors who have been hacked, before 2016. VR systems was hacked in Florida. Some of their clients were, there were phishing attacks against them this time, around, let's see, I forgot my name of it. Tyler Technologies, which provides some, vote by mail ballot, tracking and some vote aggregation reporting has also been hacked. So overall, there's an awful lot that can go wrong. Speaker 12: He saw no evidence of, Tampering with, no, voter voting machines or voter tallies. That's not true. It didn't happen. We just didn't see the evidence of it. Speaker 13: Well, there has been never a documented incident when votes have been changed during the real election. And my answer was please continue using these machines and that will remain to be true forever, Because these machines don't have a capability of providing you forensic evidence to see if they cannot prove they were honest, they cannot prove that they were have been hacked. They simply don't have the fundamental basic capabilities of providing you that forensic evidence, that data. Only way you can see that that machine was hacked if the attacker wanted to be found that it was hacked. That's a sad truth. So Anyone who says I have a information one way or another, that's an opinion. That's not fact based. Fact is, it can be done without leaving trace. Speaker 14: When you know how the system for looking for the evidence, you know that you won't find it because the systems are not recording, Generating, preserving or protecting meaningful forensic evidence. And this is from the very beginning to the end of the process everywhere. These systems really don't have a capability of recording and protecting any meaningful audit information or forensically important information. So a lot of times I would also argue that even if you try to take a look into the into the evidence, the problem is that there is no Evidence which is trustworthy and and worth on a lot. Even recently, a case where a voting machine was reporting, and I believe that was in the last year in North voting machine was in the race where they had 50,000 votes cast, was cast reporting to 1 candidate 164 or something like that votes. And when the paper was looped, that person actually get 26,000 vote and vote by 1 by 1,000 votes. Speaker 12: Wow. Speaker 14: So we we really need to have that paper ballot. There's nothing we don't have a technology to do electronic voltage. The problem the most most Driving thing is, first of all, from 2006 to now is nothing changed. The actual same version of software I hacked 2005 is still in use. It's those machines are still in 20 states. Mhmm. So they're still around. Even the so called new sold today is In the end of life version of of Windows, etcetera, like, just something which no other industry would be acceptable, would be remotely acceptable. So I think the most as overall, it is how outdated everything is And and how hard it is to make people to understand the the reality and and get the warning through that this needs to be fixed or things will get really, really worse, turn the worse. They're bad right now, but and I cannot even Cannot imagine what the worst would be looking like. Parties, they are not actually but a lot of these voting machines are not US origin. And I'm not only talking about the components being made in China or a voting machine being assembled in in Philippines, but also the very of the machine, the programming. In many many many voting machines, that programming, either whole or in the large part is Coming from a foreign from code sources. And it seems to be the case that actually the voting machine vendors, Generally speaking, either don't know or they refuse to tell the truth where the code actually comes. And it turned out that the system he is using exactly the same system which created this magnitude 16,022 votes in Volusia County for Al Gore. So I took a look into the system, figured out a couple of ways to manipulate the central tabulator. But I told I on this well, this is not elegant. You leave a audit trail. You leave a evidence, the bet bet, breadcrumbles. You can trace it. I was asked, well, if there what is the elegant way? So I have I don't know if there's 1. But if if there is, it's gotta be this memory card. Speaker 15: So it's so it's a memory card that fits into the voting machine that you found could be the more or less untraceable or hard to trace way to manipulate the results, whereas they were thinking it was something in the machine. You thought this was attack because you would see a ton of evidence and, like you said, breadcrumbs being left by the tampering party. Speaker 14: Well, it's it's no. It's if not even that. I was just Thinking about the architecture of the system. And with that architecture, it made sense that there's executable program in the memory card. And I was quickly told that that's impossible because it's against the certified rules. But, also, the vendor was dishonest about the origin of the card. So, well, if they are not Honest about one thing they're probably not honest about. The second thing, I found an executable program on a memory card. I found it's it's completely unprotected. This This memory card is so old. It's older than floppy drive. So it actually, I found it because I was I remember that I have seen it before floppy drives existed. So that's what I found who was the original manufacturer of it. And a, interesting The thing about this explanation afterwards was that demand 16,000 was malfunction Of the memory card, that's the, that's the reason why it happened. Not possible. That reason why it's not possible is that that memory card Doesn't know how to make negative numbers. So whatever caused that man respond 16,000 votes, which we don't know what caused it. At least the official explanation given at the time, not possible. Something else happened. Speaker 1: So everyone was focused in 2000 on the punch card machines and the problems that that brought. But in Fallucia County, there was an incident that occurred. It didn't A lot of attention. And the attention that it did get sort of disappeared and got lost in all of the focus on the punch card machines. What happened in Volusia County was around At 10 p. M. Midnight or sorry, 10 p. M. On election night. Prior to that, Al Gore in Volusia County was ahead of George Bush. But around 10 p. M, suddenly, Al Gore's number started reversing. And it reversed more than 16,000 votes. And in There aren't, it was all happening in 1 precinct, and of course, there weren't 16,000 voters in that 1 precinct. So Gore's numbers were actually showing a negative 16,000 in that precinct. And the explanation that election officials provided was that, a faulty memory card was inserted into the tabulating machine. Now, it wasn't, the, let's say, legitimate memory card. So there was 1 memory card for this precinct, and it was uploaded to a tabulator on election night. But the logs show that an hour after that memory card was uploaded, another 2nd memory card for that same precinct was uploaded. And after that 2nd card was uploaded, that's when the votes for Gore started disappearing. And no one has been able to explain what exactly happened with that, whether that was a rogue card that was intentionally designed to hack the votes and misfired and therefore, Erased too many votes for Gore or whether this was, you know, a software mishap. But no one has explained why 2 memory cards for the same precinct were uploaded. And that's that's sort of the main problem in terms of chains of custody, the fact that a second memory card was actually ever able to be uploaded. Speaker 6: And John Kerry has expressed misgivings about the 2004 vote in Ohio. Speaker 1: Yes. So they had concerns about the machines in Ohio. Ohio was still largely using punch card machines. They hadn't replaced theirs yet. But there were still counties there were counties that were already using optical scan machines and also paperless DRE machines. And he and his group, he revealed this only recently, actually went to court court to try and obtain the algorithms, the software, to look at the software to make sure that it would be counting votes accurately. And the courts denied access to it because the proprietary software on voting machines is considered a trade secret. And so the private voting machine companies go to court to fight against this, and the courts generally agree with them. Speaker 14: When I and others, when we 2005, 2006 got involved And up until 2008, we all thought now when the problem has been exposed, it will be fixed very quickly. It would it was completely Always incomprehensible for me and and other secretary researchers that now 2020, we are talking about this topic. And, also, we are 2020 using the same machines with the same software. It's just you wouldn't be using a a 30 year old PC with with no security patches, But that's exactly how the elections are conducted. Let's talk about everything in the world how this works. Speaker 16: Okay. Speaker 17: So Speaker 14: you have a voting message, a voting terminal. That's how you pass your ballot, either electronically or paper ballot, it's go scanning. And after that, these machines are reporting those results Very often, our our communication lies through the central tabulator. Now in both in the county level, or or state level, where the votes are accumulated in database, and along the path, there are number of data storage, systems databases. And if you manipulate those, you can create an illusion of a different results. And you can even do it in the about election reporting system. So instead of even hacking anything in the tabulator system, you are just creating wrong reporting. So there are a number of ways how you can, through this whole path, influence the results. And we have to actually step even further back, Steph, because if we look the election as whole, it's a myriad of system. We have voter registration system. Them. We have electronic poll book systems. We have the election management. We have the ballot casting. We have the tabulation, and we have the reporting. Any of these, if you have one of these, you can always have the result. You can disenfranchise voters so they can cast their ballot. You can change the the outcome. You can change the reporting. Each of these needs to be secured. None of these is less important than the others. And that's why we have been I think in the public mind, we have been focusing in a very narrow area, Which is you cast a ballot on how the ballot is counted, but not missing the whole big picture. How many other systems from a adversary, how from from ethical's point of view, where the other can go and achieve the same goal. How about the Internet? It really it's everything is connected to Internet either directly or indirectly. And the more modern voting machines, they actually have a mobile phone Modem, in to speak, they have a they have a mobile phone mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters. They are sending the results. So wireless is coming back to the voting message in the newer generations. Nice marketing material trying to tell it's not, but it is. A journalist in a year ago, she found 200 voting machines in the Internet. Voting machine vendors say, well, they are not in Internet because they are not pingable. My answer to that is, are you from the past? Because since since 15 years ago, nothing is really anymore pingable, And they are still connected to Internet. It's the the whole argument is 15 that argument was to have been meaning something 15 years ago. It doesn't mean anything today. And, again, I I was just came from Atlanta, and and they have new working machines because the judge ordered the old ones to be scrapped. And part of the things in the the judge's ruling was that, The finding was that the voting machine were programmed by basically 3 guys from their homes and who sent all the programming of the voting machine for next hours and over Internet to We distribute all the machines. Speaker 15: Oh, so these guys had programmed the machines from home, and then they they pushed the code update to the voting machines via the Internet. Speaker 14: We what they said but they pushed it to the state, and then the state pushed it to the counties. And, actually, this whole thing about, the critical election specific programming going over Internet is very common because lot of this programming is done by private companies, third party management companies. And it's, it has been shocking the last 2 years when I have been working for a number of secretaries of state And looking how the security has done in their state just to find that email, FTP with no security. These are the common methods to send the most mission critical programming from the private company, which might be out of state, to the local county who is putting it into the machines. It is whoever controls that data controls the election. Speaker 15: And these machines, they like you said, they have network cards. You show in Kill Chain, again, the documentary that we'll link in the show notes, that they have USB ports. They have memory card slots. They have modems and phone jacks sometimes. So these things were built for connectivity. They're not immune to connectivity. And we don't by the seem seemingly, we don't have to hack Hundreds of machines. These are networked. You can just make software that infects 1 and then dozens of others or just changes the data. Do you think we could, Is it possible so do you think it's possible that we could create a worm that it yet we get on 1 machine in the voting center and it just connects to the other machines covertly and infects them without the bad actors so much as laying a hand on the machine themselves. Speaker 14: The real, proof of concept virus was demonstrated over 10 years ago. So, that that already has been demonstrated publicly that voting machine virus which can, self propagate from 1 voting machine to another, that's a reality which We have sown it's possible. So beyond and that's one of the things why that was created was because, Again, when you say it's possible by showing the vulnerability, people said, well, I don't believe until you show it. So it's one of the rear Things where, a team of researchers developed in the actual virus just to show the logical outcome of the the the vulnerability. Yes. There can be a voting machine virus. Full stop. Here it is. Speaker 18: We've heard a lot from voting machine vendors and election officials that voting machines Can't be hacked because they're not connected to the Internet. All of those vulnerabilities that Andrew talked about, are not a problem because no one can access the machines. And it turns out that the message that they've been giving us for years, and particularly after the 2016 election, just isn't true. Voting machine vendors have sold election officials on these in use of modems. In some cases, the modems are embedded inside the voting machines. In other cases, there are external modems that get attached to the voting machine at the end of the election. So at the end of the election, the machine goes into shutdown mode And then this option pops up about modoming results. And so the system will automatically then dial in and send these votes, over a cellular modem to a server on the Internet that collects the results. So everyone will tell you, and they've told me every time I've spoken with them, that cellular modems are not really Internet connectivity. They will say that doesn't mean that the machine is connected to the Internet. It's using a cellular modem. Well, that's not true. And Election Systems and Software, which is tax. This is one of their statements over and over again with the public. But this is one of their own diagrams that they actually gave to Rhode Island in 2015. And if you see that circular part in the centre there showing that modem transmission using a wireless modem, They sit there, right there. It's on their own diagram that it's going over the internet. So what happens is that the transmission of the votes votes, that the voting machine will dial in using the cellular modem and it contacts the nearest cell tower. And then the data goes through that cell tower into the carrier's back end network. But then the data actually has to get to that county network, and it goes over the Internet to a system, a server that's on the Internet to receive those votes. So we've already now basically shown the misinformation of the transmission of those votes. So ES and S will then say, well, it doesn't matter because all of that process is secured. So the transmission of the votes are secured so that no one can intercept them and read the votes or alter them. The modem is configured in such a way so that no one can actually dial into the modem, it can only dial out, and it can only dial out when the machine shuts down at the end of the election. So apparently, there are all of these safeguards. And also, the back end system that receives the transmitted votes is supposed to communicate only with one of those authenticated machines with the modem. The problem is none of this has been tested or certified. The voting machines themselves go through sort of a federal testing lab process And through certification, the modem transmissions don't. So we don't know what's inside those modems. We don't know how they work. We don't know how they're configured. And ES and S doesn't have a good track record on implementing security. So we don't actually know that the way that they are saying that these are transmitted securely is actually case. So what can happen with a modem machine that's transmitting? So I don't know if you're familiar with something called a stingray. It's a device that law enforcement uses and the military uses. And what it does is it, masquerades as a legitimate cell tower. It transmits a much more powerful signal than the nearby cell tower so that your cell phone will connect to the stingray instead of the cell tower. And then it might pass it on to the cell tower as well. It's mostly used for tracking phones, but there are also Stingrays that are designed also to intercept the content of communication. So if you've got a cellular modem in a voting machine, a rogue person can put a rogue cell tower near some kind of voting precinct, whatever. And instead of that modem then connecting to that cell tower, they can connect to that rogue The rogue cell tower. You can intercept data. If it's not properly encrypted, you could intercept the data and change the results. Or you could basically swap out the a whole package of results if it's not authentically signed, and replace it with your own package of results. And so those go on to the server. If there's a vulnerability in that modem, A hacker can actually transmit malware back onto that voting machine through the rogue cell tower. And once you're in that voting machine, Either that way or maybe you've gotten into the voting machine prior when it's being programmed, you now actually control the configuration of that modem. So even if ES and S says that modem will only work at the end of the election and will only call out and not receive calls in. If you control the configuration of that modem, you change all of that. You can have that machine contact your system at any time you want, for however you want, so that you can do reconnaissance on that machine and study it and established your attack. There were a group of researchers that decided that they would try and see if they could find those backend servers that receive the votes that are transmitted by modem. So if you've got something that's transmitting the votes over the cellular network, there's something that has to be connected to the internet to receive them. So there is a server. And it turns out that they could actually, based on configuration information that's publicly available on the internet, that the voting machine vendors provide to election offices and the election offices post on the internet. They describe the type of that we have created a firewall that they use. It's made by Cisco. They describe the type of FTP software that receives the votes, that sits on that server. They describe the whole configuration, including the type of cellular modem that's embedded in their machines. So based on that information, they decided to see if they could look for that very specific footprint of ESNS machines that are receiving the votes. And they did a scan and they were able to find these systems on the Internet. So they found 9 Wisconsin counties that had systems connected to the Internet, 7 Florida counties, from 4 Michigan counties. They actually found systems in 10 different states, but these were the primary ones. And of course, these are all important critical swing states. So here's the thing. Election officials will tell you, well, the modem transmissions don't matter because we only turn on those modems for a very brief period, less than a minute at the end of the election to transmit. And that's not sufficient time for someone to hack. Any of the technical attack. But more importantly, it turns out these systems aren't just connected for a few minutes after an election. Those back end systems that receive the votes are quite often connected year round. You can see them when they're doing the scans. You can sometimes see them. They come up a couple of weeks. Some of the ones that are only up temporarily will sometimes come up a couple of weeks before the election because they want to test the transmission. And then they leave it on for those weeks before the election. And after the election, they might forget to take it down and it might stay up a couple of other weeks. But there are some that simply never take them down at all. And Wisconsin was one of them. They were on year round. These systems, so what are they? I describe this as a server, but that sounds kind of benign. What is happening is that the The votes are being transmitted, and on the receiving end there's a firewall that's connected to the internet. And behind the firewall, There is this FTP server that the votes are transmitted on. Now that FTP server is supposed to serve as kind of like a DMZ, a safe zone, right? So the votes are deposited and there's supposed to be then no direct connection to the system that actually tabulates the votes. But it turns out that's not the case at all. This is a diagram that ES and S created and handed out to election officials. And so you can see that the votes are coming over the Internet, and they're coming and there's the firewall, and then you see all those wires connected. And you see at the bottom there that EMS, that's the Election Management system. That is the system that tabulates the final results. So even though they say that, that transmission of votes over the Internet is just unofficial, Connected to that system that's receiving those unofficial votes is also the system that is tabulating the official results. What's more, that election management system is also used to program all the voting machines prior to an election. So when, I brought this To ES and S's attention, they didn't then say that nothing is connected to the Internet. What they said was none of those critical systems are pingable from the Internet because there's a firewall in front. So essentially what they're saying is that even though now first they've said that none of these systems are connected to the Internet. And now when they're faced with someone saying, well, they actually are connected, they say, well, they may be configured in some manner that you're showing, but there's a firewall in front of them and therefore, you can't see what's behind the firewall. But if you can find the firewall, then you find the systems that are behind the firewall. The only thing that's protecting anyone from getting into those critical systems behind the firewall are the rules of that firewall that say, only these certain systems can connect to us, only these certain systems can transmit data. That's simply software. It's configuration rules. And if you misconfigure that software, then anything can get into that firewall. And of course, many, many hacks happen because firewalls are misconfigured. Speaker 0: I was part of the team that did the first hands on study of any electronic voting machine used in the US and it was using exactly this machine. And what we found, well, we got one of these machines from a whistleblower, Brought it into a laboratory. Reverse engineered it. And well, here's the result of what we found. We we would run a mock election with George Washington and Benedict Arnold, just like this. And, wanted to know, well, if an attacker that could get malicious software into the machine somehow. Could they change the results? And what we found after reverse engineering the machine was, well, Yeah. There are actually a lot of problems with it. All the records of the vote are contained in, in computer memory. And, an attacker can manipulate the software that's supposed to be running in the machine in a pretty straightforward way. Before every election, officials program the machine with the names of the candidates on the ballot by, installing some that they can change the software running in the machine. There are, unauthenticated software update mechanisms, there are offer overflows and the code that reads the data files from this. There's even an interpreted programming language and the rules for how the votes will be counted are contained in an unauthenticated program contained on the memory card. So through any of those means, An attacker can change the software running on the voting machine and cause the machine to produce whatever election results they want. So that was in about 2007. We, we published the first paper about this. In and that's what we're going to do. And so we're going to have to do that. And so we're going to have to do that. And so we're flows and so forth. There have been hundreds and hundreds of pages of technical reports about US voting machines like this. But even after that, They haven't even updated the software since before the studies I talked about. That's how bad it is. And it's not even just a single model of machine that's the only problem. Country. There are about 52 different models of machines. They fall into essentially 2 styles, ones that scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen and many of them have been analyzed now by researchers, Looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case where a US voting machine has been analyzed by by competent in security researchers. They have found vulnerabilities that would let someone inject malicious software and change election data, every single case. Before every election, election officials have to program the voting machines with who's on the ballot and what are the rules for counting. Well, they make that election programming on a PC workstation somewhere, either at the, at the jurisdiction or at an outside vendor that does it for them. If an attacker can break into that workstation which is called an election management system. They can spread malicious code to all of the memory cards used to program all of the voting machines in the jurisdiction. And those election management system workstations sometimes are connected to the internet, or they're, or the data that's programmed into them passes through an internet connected system. So we're just 1 or 2 hops away from an online attacker. Now how well secured are these systems? Well, here's, a vendor that did the election programming for, in a large fraction of my state in 2016. And we can just take a look at their website to see how secure this is likely to be. You can see, first of all, they don't have any HTTPS. Here are lots of nice, high resolution photographs of their warehouse, in case you want to break in. And perhaps most interestingly, here's their employee directory with everyone's name, job title, email address and photograph. So if I wanted to break into this company, let's say I was the attacker, I'd probably start by forging an email from, let's say, Larry, the president here, to Sue, his administrative assistant, asking her to urgently open an attachment. Now, of course, when she does, that attachment has my malware in it. I have a foothold into their network, and I can try to spread from there to the election management system and to the voting machines in most of the state. Tampering with the national election result in my country it's easier than well, easier than even I thought in 2016. I keep learning things that convince me that the situation is scarier than, than even experts had thought. You identify the states that are most weakly protected and going to be close. Target the computers that are going to program voting machines there, spread malware to machines to change a fraction of the votes, and then rely on the fact that most states, even if they have a paper record, are not going to rigorously use it to check that the computers are right. But the fact is that in close national contests in the US, the result really only hinges on the result in a small number of states. You've heard about the swing states in any given election. The ones that are, really competitive. In such a situation, an attacker can, before the election, identify which states are likely to be close. Try probing all of them in the way that the Russians did the voter registration systems in 2016 and just find the weakest swing states and attack there. So in this way, the American system converts, diversity of implementation into basically this patchwork of strength and weakness that gives attackers a menu of possible places to strike. It makes us weaker in close elections. So just to review, you look at the polls before the election and figure out which states were likely to be close. Probe all of them, find the ones with the weakest protection, then hack into the, election management systems there or at the outside vendors the states use. Once you hack into the election management system, you can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and have your code say, swap 10% of the votes in the places you infected. Then even if the votes are also recorded on a piece of paper, you don't have to worry. Because in most of those states, they're going to just toss the paper out without looking Speaker 5: Modems in voting machines are a bad idea. Those modems are network connections. And that leaves them vulnerable to hacking by anybody who can connect to that network. Speaker 19: ESNS insists While there are 14,000 of its modems in use, there are firewalls separating those modems from the public Internet. Speaker 5: Once a hacker Starts talking to the voting machine through the modem. They can hack the software in the voting machine and make it cheat in future elections. Speaker 17: What is the vehicle for the transmission from the ICP? Is it cellular modem versus VPN? It is a cellular modem that can be configured in a VPN. Right. And we currently in Chicago and Cook County, we work with Verizon to, secure that network. What wireless chipset Slash modem does the hardware have? We support a variety. So, it's really up to the jurisdictions, what technology they want to use, what's compatible with their networks. Speaker 16: Currently, in some jurisdictions, we're using, Basically a modem that is a three d modem, GSM, but we can support multiple varieties of modem that can be. Speaker 17: Including latest 4 gs standards Speaker 14: as well. Speaker 17: So the answers to the next question, is it Speaker 3: 3 gs or 4 gs? Verizon, 8 gs or 2 gs or Sprint, Speaker 5: I'm assuming Speaker 17: all? Yeah, all networks. Speaker 15: Just to Speaker 17: ask a quick question. Yes, I mean, we actually transmit from the ICP in Mongolia as well. So Speaker 7: We're not committed to networks. Speaker 16: And in Puerto Rico, there is 3 vendors because the island is not covered by any by any of the vendors completely. So we use 3 different cellular vendors for some ICPs with this vendor Claro, AT and T, MT Mobile, I think, in the different parts of the app. Speaker 14: More modern attack voting machines. They actually have a mobile phone modem, and to speak, they have a they have a mobile phone mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters. They are sending the results. Speaker 3: Some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election results using cellular modems or, the Internet. That of course introduces another point of vulnerability, not just to the data that's flowing, but also to the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Speaker 1: Many of these voting machines have modems embedded into them. And the modems are used at the end of the election to transmit the vote totals on election night to the county, The, elections office. So these modems contact their cellular modems, and they contact the cellular network, they contact the cell tower. So the cell tower traffic these In our modern times, it actually goes through Internet. It goes through the same kinds of routers and switches that the regular Internet traffic goes to. But also, in between that cell tower and that voting machine, An intruder can, intercept data going to the cell tower and intercept that that communication, that phone call. If you can trick a voting machine into, contacting your device, A fake cellular tower instead of a legitimate tower. You can actually use that connection to get back into the voting machine and get back into the tabulator, and then alter votes and software. Speaker 20: Virginia just stopped Using touch screen computer voting because it's so vulnerable. Speaker 18: We need to look at Speaker 20: all the voting machines. Every secretary of state needs to be, You know, assisted in making sure that they are not being, hacked and and attacked. Speaker 6: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. Speaker 21: But researchers have repeatedly demonstrated That ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 22: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools, and resources are able to breach voting machines In a matter of minutes. Speaker 23: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 21: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cyber security 101, directing that you install remote access software, which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 24: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 25: You could easily Hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things, but in fact 3 companies are controlling that. It is the individual voting machines That some pose that pose some of the greatest risks. Speaker 26: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, Right? Which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 24: Workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. It was possible to switch votes. 43% Speaker 21: of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, Including backdoors. Speaker 3: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year, where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 26: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the capitol, where we brought in, folks Who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 22: Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software, like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable To the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 24: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state, or maybe 1 or 2, Or maybe just a few counties in one swing step. Speaker 27: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through. You have 21 states that were hacked into. They didn't find out about it for a year. Right now, we have over a dozen dozen states That either don't have any backup paper ballots or only have them partially. Do you think that our adversaries don't know what those states are? Of course, they know what those states are. And if we have a close election in the general election, in a presidential race, and one state's out withstanding And their ballot boxes get hacked into, their elections get hacked into, we will have absolutely no backup.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

25/ In effect, the left was allowed to discuss the vulnerabilities of voting machines after the 2016 election, and the right was banned from social media platforms for discussing those very same vulnerabilities after the 2020 election.

Video Transcript AI Summary

Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerability, highlighting the need to assess all voting machines for potential hacking. Researchers have shown that ballot recording machines and other systems are susceptible to tampering, even by hackers with limited resources. Instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes have been reported. The leading seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. The control of voting machines by just three companies poses significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines, leaving the election system vulnerable to interference. The lack of backup paper ballots and reliance on unsupported software further exacerbate the security flaws.

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Full Transcript

Speaker 0: Virginia just stopped using touchscreen computer voting because it's so vulnerable. Right. We need to look at all the voting machines. Every secretary of state needs to be, you know, assisted in making sure that they are not being hacked and and attacked. Speaker 1: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. Speaker 2: Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 0: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter of minutes. Speaker 3: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switch votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 4: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cybersecurity 101, directing that you install Remote access software, which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 5: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 2: You could easily Hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things, but in fact 3 companies are controlling that. It is the individual voting machines That some pose, that pose some of the greatest risks. Speaker 6: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 5: The workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. Speaker 4: It was possible to switch votes. 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, Including backdoors. Speaker 7: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year, Where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 6: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the capitol, where we brought in, folks Who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 8: Aging systems also frequently rely On unsupported software, like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable To the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 5: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state or maybe 1 or 2 Or maybe just a few counties in one swing state. Speaker 2: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through. You have 21 states that were hacked into. They didn't find out about it for a year. Right now, we have over a dozen dozen states that either don't have any backup paper ballots Or only have them partially. You think that our adversaries don't know what those states are? Of course, they know what those states are. And if we have a close election in the general election, in a presidential race, and one state's out withstanding and their Ballot boxes get hacked into. Their elections get hacked into. We will have absolutely no backup. Stalin was unconcerned about the vote. After all, he explained, he said that who voted was completely unimportant. What was Extraordinarily important, in his words, was who would count the votes and how. It is time to put politics aside and come together to secure the future of our election. So whether you're a 4 star general, A 4th grade teacher or a computer engineer at Foursquare, this is an issue that unites us. Speaker 8: In at least 40 states, elections are carried out using machines that are at least a decade old. And like any technology, -They're susceptible to increasing failure with age. Some state officials have had to turn to eBay to find critical components like dot matrix printers, Decades old storage devices and analog modems, aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software Like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable to the latest Methods of cyber attack. Speaker 3: In 2016, state election websites in Illinois and Arizona were hacked by intruders who installed malware and downloaded sensitive voter information. Speaker 6: It is worth fighting for integrity in our election system, which means that they are free from interference by a hostile Or an unfriendly nation. Let's put the resources into upgrading the state's election systems. Because what we know is this. There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. I sit on the senate intelligence committee and senate homeland security committee. And we receive all kinds of information about the vulnerabilities to our national Security. We are vulnerable in terms of foreign interference with our elections. It's my understanding that some of the election system Vendors have required states to sign agreements, that prevent or inhibit independent, security testing. There's a saying that I'm sure Many of you have heard, which is the you know the difference between being hacked and not being hacked? Is knowing you've been hacked. Speaker 0: And they are still looking for ways to steal information about Voter registration, for example. There are some text experts in Silicon Valley Valley with whom I have met who say that, You know, maybe what they'll do this next time is to really disrupt the actual election. Shut down the servers that you send results to. Interfere with the operation of voting machines because still too many of them are linked to the Internet. So there we are still very vulnerable. Speaker 9: I mean, I can tell you in Virginia, when I was governor, I had to replace all the machines. Because I remember when I first voted when I went to Richmond, moved down as governor, I remember I kept voting in the senate race, kept voting for the Democrat. Republican name kept coming up. Three times that happened. Speaker 1: What do Speaker 4: you mean kept Coming up. Speaker 9: So I you know, we had the touch screens. I was voting for Mark Warner, our senator, and Ed Gosphy's name was light up. Happened to me 3 times. Finally, the 4th time, Mark Damon, I quickly hit vote, and I got out of there. You know, all the cameras are looking at me like this guy doesn't know how to vote. I mean, what's going on? So then I had an investigation done, and listen to this. I brought in some technology experts. They were able to hack into our machines from off-site In about 5 or 6 minutes, and within 4 minutes, they were able to change a vote. IDD certified all the machines. Now in Virginia, we have paper ballots. Speaker 4: 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have Serious security flaws, including backdoors. These companies are accountable to no one. They won't answer basic questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the biggest companies Won't answer any questions at all. 5 states have no paper trail, And that means there is no way to prove the numbers the voting machines put out are legitimate. So much for cybersecurity 101. The vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions Nationwide, use election management systems that run on old software That is soon gonna be out of date and ripe for exploitation by hackers according To an exhaustive analysis by the Associated Press, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, and North Carolina, among others, Are all at risk. Even the state of Georgia, which just passed legislation to buy new voting machines, is on track to buy equipment that suffers from this significant cybersecurity weakness. Let's say the election is decided by a small percentage And people in America don't think that the election was fair. The effect that would have On our 200 year experiment in self governance, our democratic system Would take a real hit. Our elections weren't secure last week And they sure as heck aren't secure this week. And anybody who says otherwise It's either selling the voting machines or simply has a malicious intent towards our elections. At one point in the intelligence committee, both sides seemed to agree that no votes were changed In the 2016 election, and I said, the experts I talk to say that Until you have a forensic analysis of a vote, until you go in there and scrub the whole system, You can't really say that. So they're giving these voting machines specifically the hack into how successful were they? Speaker 1: Well, the the ongoing record Was, they hacked within 90 minutes of, being, being in the same space as the voting machines. Now these are not hackers that are actually touching the machines. They're doing this from across the room, on, on Internet like connections. But what it demonstrated, Pedro, is that the machines that we count on to make the basic connection between the American voter And the election results are vulnerable if they're in any way connected to the Internet. Speaker 4: And so when you say hacked, what were they able to do once they gained Access to the machines. Speaker 1: All sorts of things. They could manipulate, the outcome of the vote, they could manipulate the tally, they could delete the tally, and and they could compromise the vote in any number of ways. Just it was limited only by the hackers' creativity. Just how vulnerable Speaker 10: the machines were. I mean, what we found is that These machines were purchased by, local voting authorities, state and local voting authorities maybe 10 years ago. In many cases, the software and the hardware have not been updated, so they're as vulnerable as an old laptop That we might have, in in your home that you no longer use because it's just so out of date. Then what we found is that the supply chain for these these machines is largely un plotted. I mean, We found parts from China. We found, digital electronic parts from all over the world. By way of hacking, there's the potential that the actual vote tally could be compromised. So votes could be changed from this to that. Or votes could be suppressed, votes could be deleted, votes could be added, so you could actually change the tally itself.