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TRUMP SAYS "IRAN WAR OVER", IRAN ACCEPTED DEAL - w/ Brandon Weichert(@WeTheBrandon) https://t.co/XzBsIOWwKR
Video Transcript AI Summary
Participants discuss Trump’s recent announcement of a “deal” involving Iran, focusing on the claim that it is the “thirty-ninth victory in a row” and on how media outlets and commentators are portraying the announcement as potentially unserious or temporary. They say the agreement being discussed is not a peace deal, but a sixty-day memorandum of understanding (MOU) and temporary ceasefire.
The conversation centers on what the United States and Iran demanded during the negotiations. The U.S. attempted to strong-arm Iran into accepting two additional terms reportedly tied to faster timelines and stricter conditions than earlier drafts: (1) faster actions related to highly enriched uranium (HEU) and (2) a faster timetable for reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Participants say Iran rejected both additions (“no, thank you, we’re not gonna do that. Come and take it.”) and that Trump later dropped the added terms, returning to “the original wording.” They also note reported uncertainty about whether Iran has formally approved any text yet, citing claims that a draft agreement was mediated after Washington dropped its additions, still awaiting Iran’s approval, and that approval may be blocked at higher levels of Iran’s decision-making system.
A key concern is that even if Iran accepts the sixty-day MOU, the underlying causes of the broader conflict would not be resolved. Participants emphasize that the MOU does not address wider regional issues among the U.S., Iran, and Israel, including threats involving Hezbollah and Lebanon, and that Netanyahu’s position may affect how events unfold. They also discuss that Netanyahu reportedly claimed he was not part of the MOU, expressed appreciation for removing enriched uranium, and referenced additional objectives such as limits on missile production and cessation of support for terrorist proxies—while framing those references as possibly distancing from the deal rather than incorporating them as enforceable terms.
On the Israeli side, participants describe multiple reports presented as positive indicators for caution or skepticism about escalation: they mention an Axios report about the U.S. not participating in certain Israeli actions or intercepting missiles, claims that Israel struck “unimportant targets,” Israeli reporting that officials were “puzzled” by Iran’s leadership in approving a deal, and reporting that discussions in Israel’s security cabinet were cancelled due to a planned call between Netanyahu and Trump. They say these mixed signals don’t amount to a full endorsement of the deal but may indicate confusion, exclusion from the process, or reluctance.
Much of the conversation argues that Trump’s announcement could be another “punt” rather than a final settlement. Participants discuss earlier claims that Trump floated ideas about military actions (including references to Carc Island), and they link such statements to media strategy and reaction-management. They state that the U.S. military allegedly told Trump landing options could not be done, and they cite the idea that Trump is sensitive to public reaction. Participants also repeatedly return to the idea that a temporary ceasefire does not answer the question of an “end state,” pointing to what happens on day sixty-one.
Economic and energy consequences are discussed as a driver of instability. Participants say Politico reported that American oil executives warned the U.S. could reach the “bottom of the barrel” as soon as July 4th, and they argue that reopening the Strait of Hormuz would not occur immediately and would likely be delayed within the sixty-day period—creating continued strain on global energy markets.
Finally, they speculate that renewed hostilities could resume soon even if an MOU is reached. They suggest possible developments within days, including additional strikes or reopened fronts, and predict continued “world of pain” through at least the rest of the year due to the temporary nature of the ceasefire and ongoing leverage dynamics. The session ends with the host saying they will monitor breaking news and possibly pause further interviews until new developments emerge.
Full Transcript
Go live guys, go live. I told you. So what? What? We have a deal. This is in the last hour because I haven't, I've been away from the computer the last time. Trump, Trump, Trump said so. Okay. Okay. Yeah, this is the thirty-ninth victory in a row. I don't know if you saw that, but somebody online went through and counted all the times he said that. Tucker did, Tucker, Tucker. Was it Tucker? Yeah. Yeah, we were, we were talking I was interviewing him earlier today. I saw part of that. I, I didn't see the whole thing. Yeah. Yeah. In the interview, the, the post of Trump comes up about the deal about him announcing a deal, and then Tucker McKeon, like, "What do you think?" 'Cause we're talking about the earlier threats about taking K I'm like you, optimistic, but this is the thirty-ninth time. Oh my God. That's right. And then Fox News does a post, "Wow, me and Tucker are alive," and they're like, "Don't take it seriously, guys, this is Trump's thirty-ninth time." That's right. So they're even trolling him as well. I actually wanted to-- I figured you were gonna bring this up, I wanted to tell you about this because I've been-- I, so I was on this morning with Sagar and Crystal, and the guest before me But he, when, when initially the news came out that, you know, Trump announced a deal, number thirty-nine, he kinda laughed it off, and I've been kinda following him and some of these pro-Iran regime accounts on Twitter, there seems to be a universal sort of panning of the news coming out of Iran that this isn't really a real thing, and I'm-- have yet to be refuted when I-- it's, has yet to be refuted when I find These news stories that the Supreme Leader Khamenei is not on board with it. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. I hope that it leads to something, but let's just be clear, let's talk about the particulars of the deal, because it's not a peace deal, it's a sixty-day ceasefire. This is exactly what we were talking about two weeks ago, and it's very clear to understand. Now, you had mentioned yesterday, and you might have, you might end up being right on this, you had said that you thought maybe the, the attacks by the Americans were actually sort of just leverage getting, and I sort of said, I don't know. it Trump tried to strong arm the Iranians by getting them to accept two new components to the proposed MOU, memorandum of understanding, and basically the Iranians told him to pound dirt. And r-rather than you know, rather than say, okay, we're going back to, to blowing you guys up Trump quietly accepted it. Basically, Trump wanted stronger metrics for and regulations for denuclearizing Iran, and the Iranians said No, and the other requirement was a faster timetable for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranians said no. And you know, here we are. In the original sixty-day MOU, as I understand it, the one that's probably now, if they do accept it, which I don't think they will, but if they did, it's gonna be this version Which basically what were the two-- Can you go, sorry, correct? What can you go, the two terms that he added two weeks ago, what were they? The two, well, today, he, or, or in the last twenty-four hours, he tried to strong-arm the Iranians to accept stronger, yeah, I've been following this. In fact, this is gonna be my next Substack post, I'm working on it actually right now, I'm looking at the draft right now. but basically the American negotiators tried to get the Iranians to accept stronger measures and regulations Timetable the highly enriched uranium. They wanted that thing, they wanted the HEU basically done away with quicker than what the original sixty-day ceasefire was talking about and then they also wanted a faster reopening by Iran of the Strait of Hormuz. In both cases, my understanding is the Ayatollah said, "Uh, no, thank you, we're not gonna do that. Come and take it." And Trump quietly this morning basically slunk away. And said, "Okay, we're just gonna go back to the original wording." No, these two terms, Brandon, these two terms are from two weeks ago. They weren't this week. So Fox News reported them. No, no, no. No, no. But he, he attempted-- and he dropped them now. He, he's dropped them. He, he's dropped them as of today. But my understanding is he tried again in the last twenty-four hours to get the Iranians to-- Because the Iranians were balkin' originally, and so what you said yesterday might end up being true, Those terms, the same terms try-- he tried to sneak in two weeks ago. That's right. Well, he sneaked in two weeks ago. That's right. And the Iranians are saying no. so there's a larger issue here, which is that what I've been saying for the last several months is, is accurate. Unfortunately as much as I love the US military and I, I, I do a lot of work with the US military our force of arms have not affected at the political level, the strategic level, which is the important thing in war, have what this tells me is that Trump has no choice but to accept Iranian terms, and that's what's happening here on Trump's side. Now, I don't think the Iranians are really keen because the Iranians are still saying, "Hey, you're not addressing the other, the other elephant in the room, which is Hezbollah and Lebanon, which is still very much under threat from Israel." And as of two hours ago, and again, I-- the last hour I've sort of been out of pocket, but two hours ago, RT was reporting that Netanyahu said that- He knew nothing about the deal, and he wasn't accepting of the deal. So you know, here we have again, it's Wednesday night, going into, you know, the last two days of the week, closing the markets, we got a big SpaceX IPO coming up too tomorrow. you know, Trump is, Trump is, I think, more geared toward handling the markets than he is toward actually getting a deal, 'cause I still don't see the makings of a deal, and even if we accepted, even if the Iranians tomorrow accept the sixty-day MOU, it's 60 days, the underlying issues that caused the war on all three sides aren't being addressed. The Iranians aren't having their issues addressed in diplomacy, the US isn't having its issues addressed, and the Israelis aren't having their issues addressed. So, you know, in 60 days, what happens? Right? You know, that's my fear is, you know, even if we do this, what happens? We're back to square, you know, square one. So where we agree 100% is I've been extremely optimistic for so long now, but I wanted to be clear for, for everyone, I'm only optimistic for an MOU, I'm not optimistic about a nuclear deal, I'm not optimistic about a long multi-year peace in the region, those I don't know at all. now what I'm Why am I, I, I really like those developments today? A, a few, a few reasons. Number one is I always pay attention to what's coming out from Iran. Obviously everyone is, even the Israelis, by the way, according to i24, the Israeli official said, "Everyone's depending on Trump's posts. We don't know what the hell is going, going on. We're waiting for Iran to comment on it so we know what really is happening." That's a, a Israeli official to i24. Now, Fox News did say today, I'm sorry, Fars News. I, I assume Fars, Fars, nah, and Fars News. I'll check after and let me-- I'm assuming they're the same, but don't hold me to that. I think so. Fars is like the Iranian yeah, I think, yeah, pronunciation. I know one of those networks yesterday asked me to come on, and I, I'm not, I'm not gonna do that, but so they said the following. Let me, let me read out. A draft Iran-US agreement was almost Since mediated and informed Iran that Washington dropped those additions, returning to the original draft, still waiting to Iran's approval. And Farsh News later said, no new, no text for an MOU has been approved. Yeah. But then they said that the proposal is likely heading for a final approval after the US quietly dropped its demands, just heading to a for final approval. And lastly, Al Jazeera said about an hour ago, the agreement must go through levels of approval with Iran's decision-making system. Yeah. Has- Passed most of the necessary stages, but remains, remains stalled at the highest level of approval. These are the most optimistic statements we've seen from Iran yet. Now, unless Musharraf decides something that surprises all of us, or unless Trump comes in and adds new terms, I think we're good. You're, you're not bringing up the, the actual factor here that's gonna affect everything, which is Netanyahu, yeah? I, I can, he's my next point. Because the, what I've heard so far is that he's not on board with this, and furthermore, the ayatollah in the Iranian system, they can go through all of the different processes they want, and that's good that they are. But ultimately, the final approval is the supreme leader, and I am, so far, unless the deal is even worse for America, which I think it would be, unless the deal is even worse for America than what, it sounds like it is in terms of our strategic goals not being met I can't imagine Machaba's going to accept this, and if he does, I think that's a tell that Trump basically folded. and you know, either way you look at it, this isn't good for America. We went into this war with all of these ambitions, we didn't achieve any of it, and now we're trying to, you know, at best, slunk out the back and hope that nobody notices. It's, it's very sad, it's very embarrassing. We should have never done this thing. We should never done the war. Of, obviously we agree with that, it's hard to disagree. I'll tell you why I'm optimistic on the Israeli side. Now I've, I've mentioned before, the US, the Axios report, I believe it, the US not inter-- not participating in the Israeli strikes on Iran, not intercepting Iranian missiles struck at Israel, and Israel striking unimportant targets in Iran, even though there were a lot of missiles, nothing important was struck there according to Morandi, when I spoke with him, and according to Tirta Parsi with sources in Iran, Escalated, that's good news number one. Number two is I twenty-four and Channel twelve are reporting, this is Channel twelve, according to a senior Israeli official, we have no knowledge of a deal and are puzzled by Iran's leadership of approving one. Then you got in Israeli Channel twelve as well saying the discussion in the security cabinet was cancelled this evening 'cause Tr- Netanyahu and Trump wanted to have a call. So they're all confused and puzzled being kept out of it. That's good news number two and th- third and last positive indicator from Israel is the statement from Netanyahu's office. He said the following. He said, "Trump spoke with evening with Netanyahu, blah, blah, blah. There's an MOU. While we're not part of the MOU we appreciate Trump's commitment to getting rid of Iran's nuclear program, removal of enriched uranium, fine. That's fine, that's fine, 'cause that's part of-- This is part of the MOU as a promise, which is fine, just symbolic. Whether they do it as a result..." That's symbolic, all right. There's a lot of symbolism here. Yeah. Yeah, but no, the It says this would also include the limits on Iran's missile production and cessation of Iran's support for its terrorist proxies in the region. The reason this isn't concerning to me is I see it as Netanyahu saying, "Hey, I want these objectives." We all know that's not included in the deal. For him to mention them, I think he's distancing himself from the deal a deal he's kept out of to not lose too much politically with Trump striking a deal without adding Israel, Israeli interests in there. That's how I see it. Well, Israeli interests, if the deal goes forward, really Israeli interests aren't being upheld. again, every Israeli, every Israeli, every Israeli that I've spoken to though, who's some level involved with the current ruling party there, is saying that this isn't acceptable in terms of how Trump's trying to get this done. The, the Israelis are gonna do what they're gonna do. End of the, end of the day, it doesn't really matter. Trump can make a deal, doesn't make a deal, the Israelis are still gonna press Ahead, the Israelis are still gonna have, they, for them, the key thing is maintaining the freedom of action for their armed forces. And I think that they're gonna do what they're gonna do regardless of what Trump decides to do here. I again am not sold that this is a serious-- I, I just, to me, this doesn't seem-- this, this came out of left field. This morning we woke up, and I know 'cause I was, I was talking about it on the air. This morning we woke up to Trump Talking about taking Karg Island, we woke up to Sy Hirsch in the last few days reporting that people close to Trump are saying that he's asking, "Why don't we use nu- tactical nuclear weapons to, to destroy these underground facilities?" So you know, I, I, I don't buy for a second that this is anything other than another punt. And I don't know if you're familiar with American football, but, but to me, this is a punt and this is just resetting the tables until we have another- Fortuitous position. You know, we've had a ceasefire since April technically and it's been very leaky, shall we say. So I am just not optimistic here. And to your point, and, and I'm glad that you did, s-- you did say this, you know this is, this isn't a peace deal. This is a sixty-day memorandum of understanding, and then what? Right? Sixty days? Okay, great. It gets us through the two hundred fiftieth anniversary of America's founding. Great. you know, and by the way, under the current MOU, and this is what the Iranians fought to keep in there the Iranians have up to about thirty days of those sixty days to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and I have a feeling they're gonna take their sweet-ass time on reopening that thing. So in the meanwhile, what happens to the world economy? Because we're on a, a, we're on a from when the, the American buffers for these energy shortages hit zero or near zero, and then things get real very fast here in the United States and around the world when we can't rely on the buffers anymore. And again, I remind your audience, last Friday, Politico reported American oil executives had a quiet meeting with the president, and apparently they informed him that we're gonna start hitting bottom of the barrel as soon as July 4th. So Unless Strait of Hormuz is reopened, unless the oil starts flowing more freely and it needs to be more than ten percent, I mean, this is what, you know, Trump was, was celebrating last night, where we got, you know, two hundred, was it million or whatever barrels through, it's ten percent of the normal the normal daily flow of energy. Yeah. So that's not enough. It's just not enough. In terms of the Sibolho statements about- Trump talking about nuking their underground facilities, et cetera. that misalignment into the craziness in the morning and the peace we have now, it's the same one we saw last time. Everyone's talking about wiping out a civilization, boots on the ground, is he gonna use a nuke? And then by the next day or that afternoon, a deal happens, he off-ramped. But that's his way of doing it. That's his way of doing it. But we didn't get a deal. We haven't gotten a deal yet. Not a deal. A, a cease, a ceasefire. A ceasefire to what end? But to what end? It's not perfect. It's not, it's not perfect. It's not a question of perfect, it's a question of what end. What is our-- This is the problem. What is our end state? What are we trying to achieve? The ceasefire is temporary, at most sixty days. What happens on day sixty-one? Why I'm not really that enthusiastic. I wish I could be, but it's like, we've been down this road. We were down this road in April, right? And I think the president really does say crazy things not for show. I think he says crazy things and then he sees people freak out in the media and he-- And remember, the president, Trump in particular, is a man of the media. He is a man who loves ratings. He's a man who says-- I know this for a fact. He says things to crowds to see what the reaction will be. The whole drain the 16, where he said it to a crowd and everybody went crazy, and then that became one of his themes. He didn't really even know what it really meant, but he thought it was a great slogan and he liked it, and the people went crazy, and that became a big part of the MAGA movement. And that's how he does. He feeds the audience what they, what they wanna hear, and then he responds accordingly, 'cause he's a great showman. And I think that when he says crazy things, I think he's seriously floating them, waiting to see what is the public And when there's a lot of pushback, he pulls back. But I don't trust for a second that this is part of some game. I think this guy, I think we've got a very big problem on our hands in the United States with a very unstable leader who's in way over his head. This president is in way over his head on this one. Yeah, I, I definitely don't wanna defend him 'cause I'm so upset with this war in Iran and a lot of other decisions being made. Now, in terms of him saying crazy things because he wants to test or not, I don't know. There's not much to test when you make statements about the Pope or when you make statements about taking Greenland. I think this is more the strategy of, of like, you, you, you, you, it's like the clip I saw of a daughter, she goes to her father, she goes, "Dad, dad, I'm pregnant." Holy shit, I thought you were pregnant. Yeah. All she wanted to tell him was she failed her test, but she told him something a lot more extreme so that he'd fail his test and make it seem a lot more digestible. But in either way, we're talking-- I'm not saying that's why he's doing it. I'm not sure. But in either way, we're talking about manipulation here and it's, it's not for-- it's not for a strategic end goal. It's, it's because Trump is in over his head and he's flailing and No team of rivals like Lincoln had. He's got a bunch of sycophants who don't wanna upset the Mad King, and so everybody around him's just, "Yes, sir, this is great." Whereas everybody around, outside of DC is going, "What the hell is happening here?" The, the President of the United States needs to do more than just get a sixty-day MOU, okay? If he's really committed to this, we need to be done with this thing forever, because the Iranians right now are still very much looking like they're in the driver's seat. And around saying, "Uh, well, we're not so sure yet. We're you know, we'll, we'll see, we'll see. Don't call us, we'll call you." Now, yeah, part of that's probably a negotiation strategy, but another part of it is signaling. The Iranians are signaling to the region, "It's a new day. We're not going back to the way things were. America is now a diminishing power. We're on the rise, and the Americans haven't done anything to prove otherwise. If anything, everything we're doing is, We can do though, to be honest with you, which is why I actually think if Trump wants to get an MOU, my personal theory, this is what I said to Al Arabiya at the beginning of the war and Andrew Day is now saying this as well, my buddy at the American Conservative, great guy, but he's with me on this, is that, you know what, if you wanna get a sixty-day MOU, great. But that's gotta be paired with complete drawdown of US forces permanently in the region, because we can never again allow ourselves to get into this position and let the locals figure it out, and we'll come back home. And I think if that's the play, then he will end up looking like a genius again. But I don't see it yet. To me, he's just really flailing, and I don't buy for a second that this is the end. I don't buy for a second that this is truly the, the great finalization of the war. And frankly, he Hours with all this military action, he blew a lot of stuff up. He didn't achieve a strategic end state that was conducive to us, and you still have to worry about the wild card, which is Mr. Netanyahu. And by the way, I, I heard this today I wish I could remember who said it but I think it might have been, might have been Saager. Somebody said it today on one of the shows I was on where they said that they said that for Netanyahu to win reelection in October he needs the war to continue for Trump's party to win reelection and stay in power in November. Actually said that. Was it actually-- Okay, the he, Trump needs to end the war. So this is, you know, this is that It's fascinating, but I, I just don't buy for a second that this is the end. I think that in another forty-eight hours, we're gonna be blowing up stuff, or the Israelis are gonna do something. And I think the fact that the Israelis aren't freaking out, 'cause remember about a week and a half ago when Trump was talking again about really doing the deal, the, the, and eleven and all these guys were, were lighting-- well, eleven doesn't have any hair, but I was gonna say they're lighting their hair on fire and screaming about I haven't seen the Fox News reaction 'cause I don't have cable, but you know, a lot of these Israeli accounts I follow on Twitter that are usually very aggravated when Trump announces a deal with Iran, they're being muted. they're not really that loud this time. So either this is-- Interesting point. You know, so there's something going on here that, that's not-- Maybe they're just exhausted or they've, they've learned to-- Well, who could blame Tehran? No, 'cause after a while, you just allow people just digest it. So I think these realities have been digesting over the last few weeks that, hey, this is probably the end. People I spoke with before at the beginning, they'd be like, "There is no way we're gonna let them have their proxy network, there's no way we're gonna have the ballistic missile program." Now speak to them, they're like, "You know, probably we're not gonna have that, but at least we won't have their nuclear weapons." So they've had two months of, of digesting Defense officials in the last twenty-four hours. I think the military told Trump that they can't do a Kargan Island landing, and I think that they explicitly outlined it in a way that was impossible for the commander in chief to ignore this time. And I think also that might be at play here, where Trump really was, 'cause he keeps coming back to this, you know, land on Karg Island. Back in March, he was talking about this you know, and I think that, I think somebody in the military finally got through to him and said, "Mr. President, we literally can't do it." And I think this time might-- 'cause you don't have to think about this, the, the president is, this is a very media savvy and media sensitive president because of his background, not only with He's been a creature of the media, and he's always worried about what plays well, and he knows, and he made the comment today on Fox and Friends, I did this clip I did see on the internet where he made the comment that he really was thinking about landing troops on Karg Island, but quote, "The American people don't have the stomach for that." as if that's a bad thing. That was a statement, that was one of the posts about, is an incredible statement. Well, I mean, what a, what a, what an incredible statement. Yeah. And so my point here is, I think at some point in the last twenty-four hours, someone must have hopefully gotten through to him and said, "It can't be done, and if you do try it, it's gonna be, you know, a disaster." And because he's so media savvy, if it was said to him in a very certain way at a briefing, he Wouldn't leak it to the press. And so he's got to manage this thing in such a way. So he punts. That's what this is. This is another punt, I think, another forty-eight hour or maybe, maybe two week you know, punt. But I don't believe for a second that this thing is over. I think that he's-- I, I think that we are locked in still. I don't see any off-ramp yet. Yeah, I think the kind of guidance statement I didn't talk about it earlier, that's a really- That, that's a strong statement to make. He did it as a Truth social post. A strong statement to make about his own people. I mean, this, he's not talking about foreigners, he's talking about, oh, the own people. Yeah, yeah, but it's, it's, sometimes he makes, he makes posts that, it's like, well, Natalie makes posts, he doesn't make posts anymore. It's Natalie, what's her face? Nah, Natalie, Natalie, Natalie does, no, he doesn't, man, he does, he does, she's a bad Lindsey's post about Karg Island. I think, but this is part of the strategy. Trump would have asked them to do this. This is them trying to pressure Iran to accept the deal. I, I don't give that much credence. Oh, look, if Iran accepts the deal, it, they, they'll be the deal that Iran wants. It's not gonna be the deal that- Oh, already the deal. The- The- It's been, it's been the deal that Iran wants since they- Right. Well, like I said, Trump tried to inject the two new None of this is good for America. You know, I'm not in favor of strikes or anything like that or another invasion, but the fact is, we committed-- The president committed us to a major military action, and the whole thing's gone sideways from the beginning, and he has had no solution for that. And the rest of the world sees this, okay? The rest of the world sees this, and it's-- this isn't, this isn't what America needs right now, not on the heels of things like the Afghan withdrawal. Like, we don't look good right now to the world at a time when there are many challengers arising to try to challenge us economically and militarily. so the-- I wanna go back to that post you mentioned. At some point in not too distant future, we will be taking Cayo Island and other oil infrastructure points and assume control, total control of the oil and gas market, much like we have in Venezuela. and he does say somewhere else, I didn't find that one. oh, there it is. My preference has always been to take Karg Island. Once you do it, it will make it a bit longer, but it's guaranteed, and we'll make a massive fortune. But I don't know if America has a stomach for it, to be honest with you. I think the American people would like to see us come home, but we would make a fortune if we take it. There is, you know, some statements are made where Trump is trying to pressure the other side. I don't think this one is. No, I think he was venting. Taking Carthage, I think that option was on the table. Having control of Iran's oil would be one of the most strategically powerful lever, levers that the US would have over China and over the rest of the world. So yes, of course you would, from a legacy perspective, it's terrible legally, terrible huma-- from a human, humanitarian perspective, because the death and destruction But for him, legacy, the US interests, it'll be incredible, just not attainable. And I'm glad he didn't make that mistake. Well, that's the thing. But, but, but, Mario, you have again, I've been calling it the Venezuela syndrome. You have again where the president is, is fixated on what happened in Venezuela on January third and using that as some kind of a model for the Middle East, and it's like they're two totally different situations, for one, and for two, we're- We're talking about different geographies, and for three, by the way, the, the, the oil infrastructure on Karg Island has been booby trapped. The Iranians have had two months to prepare for the contingency of the United States landing and possibly taking Karg Island over. I guarantee you, that entire oil infrastructure on Karg Island is set to go up in flames the moment Marines land, because again, this is an existential fight for the regime in Iran. Do they wanna have to blow up their own oil production facility? No, but they will if they feel they have to, and this is the same logic of the Soviets when the Nazis invaded, doing the scorched earth policy as they were retreating when the Wehrmacht was moving in. These regimes aren't just gonna go off into the good night, they're not gonna just let the Americans take it, they're gonna, they're gonna do something. And I think that was probably also conveyed to the president in the last forty-eight hours. I agree. Yeah, I think this is it. So as a final, I always like to ask you speculation. Yeah, this is my next question for you. what do you expect to see in the next few days, by next week? I wouldn't be surprised if bombs are dropping again. I wouldn't be surprised if Israel opens up on Hezbollah or if Israel reopens the fronts against Hamas. I wouldn't be surprised if, if you know- But those fronts haven't been closed yet. Well, but, but they've, yeah, but, but they've been- There's rockets fired just now, a few minutes ago. But, but the, the, they've not been the primary focus anymore. I wouldn't be surprised if the whole thing by Saturday night is blown up again and we're right back into it, and then Night, Monday morning, Trump's talking about a deal again because the markets are freaking out. but we're, you know, the-- Listen, this is gonna come to an end inherently because of what I said about those, those, those oil shortages that are coming. Because even if the Iranians accept the deal, they get thirty of those sixty days to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. They aren't gonna reopen the Strait of Hormuz immediately. They are gonna keep making us suffer, and they're gonna keep trying to extract more and gain more leverage because this is- It's not a permanent deal. So we're, we're-- Either way you look at it, we are in for a world of pain going forward for the rest of the year at least. Brandon, thanks for jumping on, man. I always appreciate it, and we'll be speaking again very, very soon. I believe we will, yes. See you, man. Good night, man. Take care. All right, guys, this I don't think I'll do more interviews. We can do more, but there's nothing to cover. It's been quiet now, In the next forty-eight hours, by the weekend, I guess fingers crossed that we'll get at least an MOU, so we could say the bombs will stop for now. but unless something happens, I'll, I'll always be live if some breaking news happens, if there's any bombings or anything significant, I'll be immediately live. But otherwise, I'll give you guys a break. There's no need to do more coverage. Hope you enjoyed today's interviews and make sure you check out, Ozzy did some great interviews and check out the first interview of the Otherwise, I'll see you tomorrow, bye.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Iranian ballistic missles launched in response to Trump w/ Stefano Ritondale https://t.co/v98QzZA1Hh
Video Transcript AI Summary
Iranian missile and drone attacks continue in real time, with alerts reported in Kuwait and Bahrain and interceptions seen over Oman and other areas. The discussion notes that multiple targets appear to be involved, mentioning Kuwait and Bahrain, and that Jordan was struck first about ten minutes earlier. Interceptions are described from Lebanese skies against missiles heading toward Jordan, framed as Lebanon being “stuck in the middle” of missile traffic and interception.
On the comparison of today’s strikes with yesterday, the analysis says the pattern mirrors prior activity: targets are described as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, with the MSA in Jordan identified as an interesting development. The speakers discuss that earlier US officials denied significant damage from yesterday’s events, and that today’s strikes appear geographically more expansive than yesterday, including areas near Iran’s capital—specifically Qaraj and other locations up north.
Geographically, the strikes are said to include concentrated activity around the Strait of Hormuz and additional targeting near the capital, suggesting a broader scope than confinement to the strait region seen earlier. The discussion also links the northern strikes to possible “message” effects—warning/pressure tied to energy infrastructure near the capital—and compares US behavior to Israeli strikes that targeted similar areas.
A major theme is why certain Gulf states are not being struck as directly, with suggested explanations including diplomatic concerns within the GCC and the risk of inviting retaliation. The speakers argue that Iran’s selection of targets like Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan—described as militarily capable but not large enough to drive major retaliation—could reflect deterrence and escalation management. They also say the UAE and Saudi airspace have been used extensively, and that these states appear less likely to be targeted in this phase.
The conversation then shifts to US and allied air operations. Tankers and aircraft are discussed via flight tracking, including a refueling tanker near the Strait of Hormuz and other transport aircraft. The speakers interpret these overflights as supporting ongoing military operations, potentially reconnaissance, drone interception, or preparation for further waves. They highlight that airspace access appears to show integration among Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the US, and that Saudi airspace has not been shut down during this period.
The discussion addresses whether radar/flight tracking could be affected by GPS spoofing or data gaps, and asks why the aircraft’s track and transponder behavior changes, including whether it might indicate activity near the Strait of Hormuz or possible operations closer to Iran. Tanker positioning is described as consistent with earlier “waves” and as potentially enabling aircraft to operate inside or near Iran.
On escalation, the speakers describe concern that the pattern could become a “new normal” and resemble past high-intensity cycles, even while claiming today’s strikes are not yet targeting oil, power plants, or other major energy infrastructure (based on what is known in the moment). They debate objectives including pressure toward negotiations, symbolic messaging, and deterrence dynamics. They also argue that Iran’s ability to exert pressure on the US via the Strait of Hormuz is the key leverage and that further escalation could involve broader regional disruption (e.g., energy infrastructure or sea-lane closure).
Additional real-time developments are mentioned: an explosion is reported in Bahrain near the US fleet base (Manama) and smoke/explosion imagery near a Jordanian base area is referenced. Kuwait Civil Aviation Authority is said to have announced temporary closure of Kuwaiti airspace due to Iranian attacks, and Kuwait’s army general staff is said to announce air-defense interceptions of hostile aerial targets per operational procedures.
The speakers also note ongoing Iranian ballistic missile launches from Isfahan, with uncertainty about which country they are targeting as explosions continue. Later, the conversation turns to reports that Kuwait City is affected by Shahed drones, alongside commentary comparing drone intercept scenarios to major symbolic locations. They conclude that the conflict is likely to continue and expect similar cycles “tomorrow,” while acknowledging that additional strikes could come as alerts persist across the mentioned countries.
Full Transcript
So we have so Iran's retaliating as we speak. there's alerts in Kuwait alerts again in Kuwait twice, alerts in Bahrain, just started again, there was alerts in Bahrain half an hour ago. so I know that about seven missiles were fired so far. There's interceptions all the way over Oman, which means that there's more than one target in Kuwait. I also think Jordan. Jordan, sorry, of course, Jordan had, was the first one struck about ten minutes ago, yeah. and I saw interceptions KK, if you can show that video, interceptions of Iranian missiles that were seen from Lebanon, they were heading towards Jordan. I was making the joke before as I was wrapping up the other stream, Lebanon's like stuck in the middle of everything. They see Israeli missiles fly Iranian missiles fly, interceptions from Jordan. that's one from Lebanese skies of missiles that were heading to Iran, and missiles heading to Jordan being intercepted. so sirens, Bahrain and Kuwait. yeah, so and we went through the strikes we were talking earlier a couple hours ago, the strikes, what was targeted in Iran, what's your analysis of the information we have so far? I mean, it's not unsurprising and not unexpected. It does look like at least again, we didn't really get final numbers yesterday from the amount of ballistic missiles that were launched by Iran. Originally, we said four with more drones, but we didn't get a total amount. This does look like it mirrors what we saw yesterday. I guess we're gonna wait for the quantity, but it looks like the, the targets are the same Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. With MSA being the one in Jordan so that, that, that's an interesting development, but I think it just mirrors that and I guess the question is how many of the targets that they did when we were doing your, by the way, co-hosting your space on X, when I was co-hosting it. I mean, the Iranians were claiming they already did a lot of strikes, and it, you know, flatly that wasn't just true and now what we're seeing is the actual strikes and how they're going on, a-and we'll see if they have any impact or effects. I think the one yesterday, the one clear that, what's somewhat clear that we saw was the one that probably hit Bahrain. the others we weren't a hundred percent sure what happened. I mean, obviously, US officials to US media has denied any significant damage that was, which one today? No, no, the one yesterday, the one yesterday. So the question then today is the same. the strikes today were pretty interesting from the US perspective, and first there was the fir- yesterday it was very concentrated in the south around the Strait of Hormuz Today there was the strikes in the straits around the straits of Hormuz, similar targets, and then near the capital as well, specifically in Qaraj and some of the strikes there and the targets there. So at least from a geographical sense, more expansive, it does look like from a quantity area, the amount of targets hit, probably a little bit more expansive as well. So the question is, from the Iranians, are probably gonna launch more missiles, and the question is, how many of those actually reach, and then how many of those gets intercepted, and how many The situation that we're trying to debate and figure out while we're doing this and trying to guard under the information, but I'm not surprised. It looks like the fact that Jordan has been targeted does indicate to me more than just this isn't just a, an eye for an eye in the sense that they're trying to get a win and hit an American target. I think they view Jordan as a military base that is playing a key role in strikes against Iran, and as such, they want to conduct those strikes. But again, interesting that UAE has Jordan as targeted, having- Exactly, that's a good one. UAE and Saudi, Saudi, the air, we've seen the airspace in Saudi and the base in Saudi used extensively in these attacks. So also, yeah, yeah, not as much as Saudi, but yeah, the UAE as well. What's your analysis why they're not being struck? I, I, I'm wondering if the reasoning is there could be an argument from a diplomatic sense? Obviously, UAE and Saudi Arabia are heavy lifters within, within the GCC so there might be a diplomatic concern that they don't wanna draw that. Maybe there's an understanding be-beetwen the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and And Iran from a diplomatic sense, the other aspect is they, they don't want to invite retaliation by those countries who might have said, "Look, if you do something against us, we're gonna have to be forced to retaliate." And maybe in Iran's perspective, they said, "Look, what, what, let's just hit targets where it's a little bit harder for these countries to retaliate, right? Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan." So all the countries, all those countries do have militaries, all those countries have capabilities to launch some sort of strikes, but they're not large militaries in and of itself, and it's a lot-- and, and generally, the-- out of all the countries, right, we talk about the difference between the UAE, that appears to be much more aggressive in their ability to conduct strikes against Iran, then we have conversations about like maybe Saudi Arabia, obviously with the largest military in the Gulf I think the fact that these countries are the least willing to conduct offensive military operations and the much more hesitant, so maybe Iran is targeting US bases there because there's an understanding that those countries probably wouldn't retaliate and so enables Iran to say, "Hey, we struck back against the United States." Yeah. and from the targets that were struck by the Americans in wave two, they went up north I don't know the town, the name of the, the city, probably, but Karaj was one of the main centers once. Yeah, exact. Karaj, there it is, Karaj and Varamin all, very up north. that was a surprise. Do you know anything about those territories at all? I mean, we don't even know what was targeted. I mean, obviously they're near the capital, they have military installations as well, Did the US only focus on military targets? I mean, obviously we saw the US SenCom statement a-and how it phrased it, but we don't have really any video from inside of Iran with, like, was there economic and civilian infrastructure was targeted as threatened by President Trump and, and the Secretary of War, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth? So, you know, I think those are the things that we, we don't know. Obviously, Karaj And those areas, as there, you know, there's military installations there. Iran has military bases all across the country, especially along the urban areas. We just don't have much information as what was targeted. I wouldn't be surprised. So the, the ones in southern Iran, obviously, are tied to the Strait of Hormuz. If it's Qaraj, I'm wondering if it's more of a, as well as, look, let's hit military targets to send a message that if the president, like you were talking about the shaping operation, if the president makes a decision to talk Power plants as such, I mean, that areas where the targeted threat happened today, if you want the most amount of effects, you wanna target the energy infrastructure nearest to the capital. These could be at least shaping operations as a way to say, look, we are prepared to conduct strikes against these energy infrastructures, and it also sends a message that we're not just containing this to the Straits of Hormuz, because historically, before today, as the ceasefire was happening, most of the strikes happened around the Straits of Hormuz. It was almost like the argument I've even said in your show before, that President Trump and even some way Iran were trying to like keep the war contained geographically around the Strait of Hormuz. I, I think the US strikes in Karaj in that area clearly shows that the US is now much more willing to expand the geographical scope and even mirror the Israelis, because when the Israelis did their strikes over the weekend, they targeted very similar areas as well. Interesting. Yeah, I like the explanation that the reason they struck targets up north is more of a warning sign. So this is, I think there's two objectives of these strikes. One of them is the shadow Hamas, as me and you believe, that they do want more ships to go through 'cause Trump's obsessed with the economy, inflation, energy. Yep. And the second one is pressuring Iran for the negotiations. But my last guest said something interesting. He said It just doesn't work. Iran's made it clear whenever they're pressured militarily, they, they, they, they, at least publicly, they seem less willing to concede. So there's also the risk of that backfiring. Even Jonathan Conrig, who's earlier IDF, former IDF, he said to me like the strategy of doing it through force, he doesn't believe it works trying to use force to get Iran to concede, unless I misunderstood him. Do you agree? Like, that one is just a bit bizarre, the strikes up north. Unless there's specific targets there, maybe... I don't know. I don't know what the targets are. I mean, I think it's hard to say, right? I mean, people say, "Well, I mean, if we're at an impasse, it deploys, so we've been here for months." I mean, as, as, I mean, it Right, like let me, let me just play devil's advocate for a bit, 'cause I don't necessarily disagree, and I think there's a lot of issues a, and problems that the US is gonna face in Iran, specific with the hardliners, right? and they're very entrenched, and they've been empowered, and they've been emboldened. Right, but if sanctions don't work, military and, and, and diplomacy from the US perspective doesn't work And military strike doesn't work, I mean, then my counter to them is, well, I mean, is, is that the argument that the US just has to capitulate and that's it? Right. Because I hear that argument, but then it's like, well, then how do you, from the US, if you're analyzing the US- I would even, but I would what I'm saying is, because I don't disagree with you, let, let me make this clear, but the, the argument is, you almost hear in many aspects of many analysts who say the same things, like sanctions don't work, economic, and it's also depending on who do you ask, right? Because some would even say diplomacy doesn't work, right? And so it's like you're kind of this-- and I think what we're getting at Mario, is that it's a quagmire. Right? It, it is an, it is an entrenched conflict where neither side feels the necessity to give or take, and, and, and this has been an issue that we've seen consistently is that both sides think they're winning, as such the other needs to, you know blink first and give up a demand. I mean, what's interesting though now is, like, this specific strike today is clearly because Although House and Comphrased it as self-defense strikes, the strikes today were clearly because of everything we hear from President Trump and, and, and Secretary War-Pie Hekseth or Secretary Defense, because of the frustrations with the negotiations. A-and since the ceasefire collapsed, I mean, since the ceasefire was established, I mean, I'm not recalling any other times where the US has conducted military strikes inside of Iran Because of frustrations with the negotiations, they've always been in response or because response to an Iranian threat or because of an Iranian action, right? The, the strikes, all the ra- all the raiders, all like the raiders in the last year, right, right, but all those were generally because Iran did something, Hormuz, yeah, right, that threatened either US military forces or threatened shipping or threatened whatever, and the US responded. It was interesting because even Iran has conducted strikes against these Gulf countries without a US- Military response, right? And there was even this conversation as well as the US even willing to respond militarily if, let's say, Kuwait gets hit. But the strikes today is the first time, which is directly because of frustration with the negotiations, with an explicit threat that tomorrow, if Iran doesn't agree, there would be more strikes, right? now President Trump did say that the Iranians' leaders reached out for them to, to kind of halt the strikes, and, you know, they did the strikes, and they kind of did that again, open for interpretation and debate if we believe it or not. But I think what's interesting, Mario, and it goes to the viability of the ceasefire and, and can it be sustained? I think we've crossed a rubicon from the US perspective, which is now we're willing to conduct military strikes inside of Iran because of frustration with the negotiations. Right now, these strikes have just been US. That's it. The question then becomes, do these become also involve Israel? Right? Is the next round, do tomorrow strikes, for example, only happen with the US? If these strikes happen, or do the Israelis get involved? But there's always been reporting since the ceasefire was announced that the US and President Trump has been considering to launch more significant strikes to force the negotiations to move in a more positive directions for him, for his perspective and for the US perspective. I think today we kind of crossed that rubicon. We're not at The worst case scenario for military strikes, we're not targeting the oil infrastructure, the energy infrastructure, the power plants, and the bridges that we know of right now. It just seems, it still looks like mostly being military targets, but the fact that that happened today might Mario indicate that there's something-- This might be new, a new normal and push the ceasefire to a very, very tenuous position. So let's see if tomorrow we see strikes and what the targets and does Israel join as well? Yeah, also I don't think I don't think the Iranians need really to strike more than Kuwait, Bahrain, and, and and and Jordan, because these strikes are not the, the real way Iran could cause damage to the US or pressure to the US in the global economy is the Strait of Hormuz. The, I think these strikes will be symbolic. I don't expect them to drag the rest of the Gulf unless we see escalation, because that'll be the next step, we're closing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait or striking the energy infrastructure in the Gulf. I don't expect Iran to They might strike Saudi, but that means that diplomatic discussions aren't going too well, Emirates as well. but so far they've been limited, which shows that's actually really positive development. The fact that haven't struck Saudi in the Emirates means that diplomacy between the Gulf and Iran is improving. Your theory is that maybe they just don't want-- They, they, they, they don't want the retaliation from Saudi and, and, and And no, no, it could be-- It, it could also be unlikely. You know, there could be a diplomatic I think, and, and to be honest, I don't think this is an either or. It could be one of those where it's all of the above, right? Like, there's, there's diplomatic understanding, there's probably negotiations, and they don't wanna risk a response militarily because both Saudi Arabia, UAE obviously a lot more, but even Saudi Arabia conducted strikes against Iran, and I think even from the Iranian perspective, it's like you know, let's, let's do this. I do agree with you where Iran views their power From a deterrence perspective, is through the streets of Hormuz. But I think that's why what we saw yesterday happen happened in the Apache helicopter. Is that refueling tanker, is that refueling tanker heading there now? I can't read it that well. what is it? Yeah, is another, my team is telling me another tanker heading to the region now. Oh, K, oh, so that's a KC, I think that's a KC, yeah, forty-six A, that's the the, yeah, that's a, that's a tanker. It just took No, I think it's from, I think it's identified as Tel Aviv. It's just, I think the issue is that it wasn't tracked until now. okay, okay. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's all the way from Tel Aviv. no, actually, you can, you can see the track down there. Right? Isn't that the blue lines over there? And then there's like this gap. So it was over Saudi Arabia, and now it's heading over to the Gulf, right? Isn't that the blue line? I believe? Yeah, that's Would look, so maybe, but let, let me, let me just focus on there's reconnaissance aircraft as well, so it could be for those. So, so if you look at the image, look how important this is, right? Like Just from, from a US military perspective and from the region, these were, these tanker, and they're publicly announcing this, right? And they're showing the track, at least that we can verify, and, and, and let's just assume there's no GPS spoofing and everything, that looks, everything here we're seeing is true. please, yeah, yeah, zoom out, like it goes from Tel Aviv Through Saudi airspace, what looks like also Jordanian airspace, then through there it's going up to the Strait of Hormuz, indicating that from the Saudi perspective, they have no issues of US military aircrafts launching from Israeli airspace to then con-do operations in, in, in, in, in the Persian Gulf, which Shows that I think what this war has done is, is I think it's, it's publicized or made public something that's always been known privately or behind the scenes, which is kind of this idea of Israel, Saudi, US from a military component have a deep level integration, right? Yes, this is a US aircraft. But the messaging of it that's coming from Tel Aviv, flying over Saudi airspace to conduct operations against Iran in one way shape or form, either defensive, offensive, is this, is, is it something significantly important for the region from the US perspective diplomatically? And shows, you know, again, like I, I think there's a lot more that happens. And, and to your point earlier, from an airspace perspective, Saudi is fully on board with this. They haven't shut down their airspace, unlike when Project Freedom was announced. And then it c- it stopped less than twenty-four hours later because the Saudis halted all these air flights. The Saudis have no issues with US tankers flying. The reason, I think the reason they halted it after Project Freedom a few weeks ago is because the UAE was attacked and Trump was making it, made it pretty clear he didn't want to retaliate, he dismissed the attack, I think that's when Saudi shut it down as a way to tell the US, hey, if we get attacked, you have to defend us as to, to, to defend the Kurds. Now, I think the longer this ceasefire has drawn out, I think that, that threshold for US to respond is getting lower and lower and lower to the point now that, yet these strikes today aren't necessarily in response to anything. Like that was yesterday, right? The strikes today were just President Trump and the White House just saying, "I'm gonna do it." We're not into escalation the escalation trap now. We're just into strategic strikes to achieve different objectives. there's large explosion in Bahrain two minutes ago a huge explosion near the US fleet base in Bahrain. So we'll get more information on where that explosion is. I had a question for you. so the, the objective of that refueling tanker most likely for reconnaissance aircraft, could we see a new round of strikes by the Americans? I mean, Senka already announced that the strikes are over. could they be for another round of strikes, sure. Oh, they did, you're right, yeah. But, yeah, it could be another round, but I think that'll be it for today. Yeah, I, I would agree. So it could just be reconnaissance, it could be also because you know, now they're conducting strikes against Bahrain, like are these drones or do you have aircraft doing defensive operations, DCA, they're called defensive combat missions, right, to, to shoot down these drones, is it reconnaissance? Could it be another wave? Sure, I mean, there's a lot of ways, but seeing an air, a tanker like that overflying that area does indicate that in many aspects military operations are still continuing. When you, when Trump makes a statement that he obviously got the call from the Iranians, blah, blah, blah, but more importantly, when the, the strikes, they've asked him to stop and there's impact in Bahrain, by the way in Manama Oh, Bahrain is tiny anyway. but if you can show that photo, okay, I'll just show it to you now. But when Trump talks like that, do you think that we could see a continuation of the military operation by the Americans? What's more likely? The end of it today, yesterday, today was just a, a two-day operation, and that's it, 'cause if that continues, this is the image of from Manama that's being shared of what seems to be like an impact. I guess the question is, where's the impact when it-- I, I, I think this is the new normal, Mario, many aspects. I think, you know, it, it's not to the degree yet of what we would consider what we saw during Epic Fury, but we're obviously not even close. Yeah, right, not yet, but I think we're going to that direction. Oh, wow. Okay, wow, I didn't expect you to say, think that. Because, well, I mean, you know, like the threshold for military action is getting lower and lower and lower, and more importantly from the US perspective, right? Because I do believe the Iranians had a lower threshold to conduct military operations, right? A-a-and specifically to do it to hurt America's interest in the region, to- cause a split within our allies and our partners to undermine the American image in from an information warfare perspective. So for the Iranians, it made sense for their threshold for military operations to be lowered, and I think this is where the famous taco from Donald Trump. Oh, Donald Trump tacoed, he tacoed, he tacoed. But the fact that now the US, this threshold to conduct military operations is lowering and lowering and lowering and lowering, and we're now going from a period from the ceasefire where there was onesies and Tuesdays every other day, or maybe even one every other week in many aspects, to now, since this weekend, Mario, at least, first started with Israel and now with the United States, has been very consistent. The concern is, do we now run into a situation where this is now gearing towards a epic fury two point zero? Man, that's crazy. Well, that's insane to even think that. You're talking about Iran retaliating and striking energy infrastructure in the Gulf. You're talking about, like, it goes against everything Trump has been saying. He wants off ramp, he doesn't want Israel to escalate. He's de-- the, the, he's de-escalating every time. This is an exception in the last two days, since the strike on the helicopter. but to go from this to Project Epic Fury two point o and risk a calamity again in the region? I said, "Well, that's, that's a risk." I mean, it's a risk. I mean, I'm, I, I think, I think that's, I think the con-- but I think the concern is, do situations on the ground, even though nobody wants it, creates it. Now, what was interesting is, is the, the secret naval operation, which we kind of discussed earlier, I think that was a way for the US to operate behind the scenes. And interesting, like, again, the fact that it was secret, I- Look, I, I think the, of course the Iranians are gonna know this in many aspects, right? There's only so much you can hide. on the down, did the Iranians know everything of the US operations to get vessels out of the Strait of Hormuz? No. But did they know, oh, some of it? Absolutely. it's almost into the point where even if it's like the fact that maybe they did this secretly was a way to kind of even save face of the Iranians, where they didn't feel like they had to get the response. Now Diplomatically, we're, you know, I don't see any breakthroughs. The Qataris left today, and they said there's no real breakthrough, there's no, we're no closer to getting to agreement. So the fact that now the United States is doing military response, military strikes to force Iran into the negotiation table, maybe President Trump wants an offer, but you can't control what the Iranians do in response. And do they take a decision to say, "Well, we need to respond more forcefully," because we can't allow Iran to just continually to be viewed As being punched without a retaliation. Like, the, the irony was that because of Operation Epic Fury, which I didn't disagree, I agreed with this assessment, it, it was going to force Iran to say, "All bets are off. All bets are off. If you try to assassinate the, the, the supreme leader, all bets are off." The problem that Iran is, is happening right now is US and Israel conducting flights over Iranian airspace twenty-four seven. We have drones flying there twenty-four seven. That hasn't stopped. Those drones aren't flying. That was something from the Iranian perspective before the war was unthinkable, that you would need the most top secret drone to do this. This now MQ-9s are flying over Iran no problem. Now you're also running into situations where Israel and the United States are now conducting strikes regularly, although not at the epic fury perspective, conducting strikes regularly, and I think from Iran's perspective, if President Trump escalate this to the next level, the, the risk is The Iranians say, "Well, we gotta go back to this deterrence aspect, so we need to conduct very significant retaliatory strikes, maybe energy infrastructure, to force Trump to back down." And now at that point, you know, Mario, now you can see the beginnings of a two point zero Operation Efficure. Interesting. So the Iranians could escalate to establish deterrence again, 'cause look, the, the US has- It's attacked Iran more than they ever have since the ceasefire by far. Right. so Iran needs to establish deterrence again, like they did in Beirut, in Lebanon, and the way to do it is potentially striking the energy infrastructure. What's this, KK? That's another, it's just a Hercules, but interesting out of Kuwait City. Very interesting out of Kuwait City. What's a Hercules? Just a, a transport plane. I mean, I can't see if there's, I can't necessarily see like if it has a specific nomenclature outside of the C-130 says Hercules. that's a transport plane, unless it's a specially modified one. I just, I can't see if there's any letters or anything like that after the C-130. over Oman, interestingly enough, out A, a flight to, to kind of track and monitor as well. It says C130J. I think that's just a Super Hercules, if I'm not mistaken. smoke rising over the base in Jordan, the Muhafazah base, I just saw. Yeah, it's a Super Hercules. I've just sent you through the video, okay, if you could show it, just the smoke rising from the US base in Jordan. if you could zoom in. There it is. So you know, because I've been there, with MSAB, it's a big base. There's a lot of open space. So the question then is for that, like, because we know the Iranians launched ballistic missiles, did it hit something? If it did, what did it hit? Or did it just impact in an area not a significant area, and that's just the, the smoke of the debris from the ballistic missile and everything that's going on? Or what did it hit specifically because MSAB is a very- Very expansive base, it's huge. it's a pretty big base, kind of isolated out there, so what do you think that refueling tanker so close to Iran, again, in the middle of the Strait of Hormuz, that's at the same location as before, KK, it's the same location as before is, is, would it be there for reconnaissance or be something else? Well, the tanker's there to do refueling. Yeah, but what would they be refueling to be-- Because that's the location they were in during the waves of attacks we saw earlier. Correct. So that probably indicated that they were doing that to provide refueling capability to aircraft to operate inside of Iran, right? again, Mario, I think the issue for Iran is the US is operating over Iranian airspace. Uncon-- in many aspects, in, in some ways, you can even make the argument uncontested. And so now you're gonna have these tankers going there, and these aircraft are gonna come back, because then, that to me indicates that this is probably like a halfway point from Iran to whatever base they are more than likely I would look at. You know, we see Tel Aviv, we see MSAB, are they using Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia? I think they've kind of already kind of left a lot of the areas in, in, in along the coast. We do know they Kuwait City, indicating they still are using military station Kuwait, but most of the US air power is outside of the immediate vicinity of Iran. And I think Mario goes back to, right? The, the, the Iranian government and the Islamic Republic aren't gonna be able to allow the United States and Israel to kind of operate with impunity in strikes, and that's why the concern of this kind of two point O and the resumption of major combat operations. And, and that's the direction we're pointing towards, right? We're not pointing towards a direction of de-escalation We're not pointing towards a direction where negotiations are achieving a breakthrough, even the Qataris today acknowledge that. So the-- there's only one other direction we're looking at. Yeah, I agree. There's an attack by the rocket attack by Hezbollah against Israel just a few minutes ago, about five minutes ago. not a major attack, but the reason it's important is it's the first attack since the warning two days ago by the Israelis that they will strike Dahieh, they will strike Beirut if any rockets fired at northern Israel. So Hezbollah defied that warning by Israel and struck and fired rockets at northern Israel. If Israel now strikes Beirut, then we're pretty fucked 'cause you got Israel stra-crossing the red line that the Iranians have put, put, put in place deeper to Iran. that refueling tanker's getting way too close to Iran. This is what is- But I, again, it goes back to Mario, I just, I think from the US Air Force usually it does a holding pattern, usually it does a holding pattern, it's like flying into Iran. Is that- Are we seeing a pilot defect, Stefan? Are we seeing a pilot defect into Iran? I would say, be careful with flight radar on this specific area because it could be spoofing Where it just, it gives the impression it's doing something it's not there. But at the same time, I mean, if it's flying over the Persian Gulf, I mean, clearly I said this yesterday, I mean, I don't think the US Air Force... Oh, yeah, they just, they disconnected or GPS spoofing, so they just disconnected it. Now I'm interested. Is it, is the radar just flying over Iran or is it heading over to Iran? Now this is yeah, my, my, my my producer's just losing his crap. He's like, "Turn off, turn off radar, it's going to Iran." He's obsessed with taking this business. So what I would say is, what I would say is, what is it? So it, it just looked so legitimate till-- How does this work, the whole, the whole radars? Why did they turn it on in the first place? Most of it is probably because of the air traffic responsibility, air traffic control, also agreements with the host government. And, and to be honest, Mario, I just think from the US perspective is there's not a concern about Iranian strategic surface-to-air missiles, that the air, the, the missiles that the Iranians have- So to, to start interrupting Stefano just on that point. So I was asking so I, I- Why would they turn it on in the first place? Why don't they keep it off if there's a refueling tanker going there? Why does it need to show the world where it's located? I'm wondering, again, I'm not an Air Force guy, so let me just preface this very clearly, I'm not an Air Force guy, nor do I do air deconfliction. But I'm wondering if that accident during the war where the KC-135 crashed that killed the six airmen, the fact that two KC-130s hit each other in one crash I'm wondering if that might have en-forced changes on how, because then it was easier for us to start tracking more of these KC-135s. Most, more of them were starting to publicly release their information, and I think it was one of the ways to avoid these types of a similar accident from happening again. Okay. So then I've got another question now. Yeah. so why did this aircraft fly from Eshuall refueling aircraft all the way to the middle of the Strait of Hormuz, where it usually just starts going in circles does a holding pattern, but instead of stopping and doing the holding pattern, kept flying all the way around and turned off I, I would just go back to just be careful with, again, it, it, we don't know if it's just GPS spoofing. In other words, is this an anomaly where, look, like, for example, I can tell you right now, I've, I've tracked military crafts flying along the US-Mexico border, obviously because I focused on Mexican cartels, right? And, and sometimes because there's gaps There is an impression that these military aircrafts are going through Mexican airspace when they're not, but because there's gaps of coverage, that's what happens. So over there, the question is one, is there gaps of coverage? Two, is there GPS spoofing and EW going on that's giving the wrong impression of im-implying that the aircraft is in one area when it's not. or three, as you're saying, which I doubt, I would be very surprised that this is happening. If an air, if an air, if, if a KC-135 is flying or a KC-46 is flying over Iranian airspace, that just tells me the US has zero concern about Iranian surface-to-air missile capabilities or their air force. That's probably an overexaggeration. The, my producer says, my producer's like, "Straight lines aren't spoofing, zigzag lines are spoofing." I watch these a lot, zigzag lines are spoofing. By the way, there's no more missiles fired from Isfahan just now, by the way. Is that it, K- is that it, KK? That's the spoofing one. Is that spoofing you're showing us right now? I think you're showing us the spoofing. Is it, KK? Just an example spoofing, yeah. So he's saying this is a spoofing 'cause it's a zigzag line rather than a straight line, but he said a straight line isn't spoofing. but there's more missile launches from Isfahan right now ballistic missiles from Isfahan just launched. KK, if you can play them I'll So the attacks from the Iranians are ongoing, we'll see how aggressive, how significant it was gonna be and how aggressive they'll be. But so just back to the discussion, why is a refueling tanker going to Iran, Stefano? Well, I don't think it's flying over Iran though, I think it just stayed in the streets of Hormuz. I don't think it's going into Iran, I think it's gonna fly over the streets of Hormuz. Why wouldn't it turn off its-- Go all the way close to it and then turn off the transponder? Because probably they're doing military operations there that they don't want people to be aware of, right? Because look, the, the fact that they have an air tanker means that there's other assets in the area that they're doing. I, I don't, I believe that they're doing air operations. It could just be, maybe they're intercepting drones, maybe they're doing something inside of Iran. Look, it's an indicator. I think it's Do you think it's a new wave? Could be, it could be. I don't think it's a defection. I don't. I, I just, I, it could be sure, but I don't think so. I, I don't. I think, I think the Pentagon has confirmed it's done. It's very hard to believe only a couple of- We'll be funny, we'll be funny if we get a report tomorrow that an American pilot defected, we're like, "Shit, we're just watching the first American defection in, I don't know how We would have risked it as something historic. Let's see where these new missiles are being fired now, but Iran, where they're heading. I thought the Iranian attack is coming to an end. Let's see if they attack Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, we're good, we're still in safe territory. If we start hearing alerts go off in the Emirates, can you see me turn off my Bluetooth again so it doesn't cut off my stream? In the Emirates or Saudi, now we're talking, now it's something. Kuwait is the target again, so it seems they're targeting Kuwait. based on initial OSEN reports. I would say there is GPS, I mean, when I, when I said GPS spoofing, maybe not jamming, but spoofing maybe your producer might, you might know this more, but what I was referencing as GPS spoofing, i-it's just false, like those do show up as straight line, not zigzag. So the, maybe the jamming aspect, but the spoofing, which is already said, it's giving off the false coordinates of where it's really at, and that's where my, my whole- The only thing about that line going through was that GPS spoofing. Please don't. But again, I'm not a flight radar expert in any way shape or form. No, don't, don't give him too much credit. My producer's one of those keyboard warriors that they believe they're suddenly in Austin. They have no experience as a UX. They suddenly become the experts. so Kuwait is a target again more reports saying that Kuwait is a target. so we might see a few more waves of this. Same, same old, same old as we've seen over the last- Is it drones or ballistic missiles, do we know? Ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles. We can show the video again, please, KK. Kuwait Civil Aviation Authority has announced the temporary closure of Kuwaiti airspace due to Iranian attacks. We saw, I think we saw that yesterday as well. They closed the airspace as well? Yeah, yeah, I think they closed the airspace as well. That's the- Yeah, thirty-seven minutes ago the general staff of the army announces that air defense systems are currently intercepting hostile aerial targets in accordance with adopt- adopted operational procedures. It urges everyone to adhere to the security and all of that. So thirty-seven minutes ago they announced that this is when it started so it just indicates a continuation with that and all these other additional strikes that are going on. So it looks- I think there's ba-basically broad agreement, Mario, that the three areas, again, it's like yesterday, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, similar to yesterday, which is interesting because the US strikes weren't like yesterday, because the strikes yesterday from the US were concentrated around the Strait of Hormuz. We saw one wave of attacks concentrated around the Strait of Hormuz, but the other wave of attacks targeted areas near the capital, and that just seemed like a very interesting aspect. Is that Kuwait, Bahrain, fifth? No, that's Bahrain, Manama. Okay. I'm wondering if that's just the same, this, it looks like that's the same fire from the first- The same one from before, yeah, just more images of it. Fifth Fleet seems to be getting hit nonstop, but as many of my guests have said, there's not much there. It's what I told you yesterday, like if Iran wants an easy win, that's the one they're gonna keep on hitting, because it's just not going to be that occupied and there's not much there to really do, and so Iran can get a lot, like that's the one Yeah, it looks like the you know, the Iranians can claim, okay, we kicked the Americans out, would be from Bahrain. But Bahrain was, isn't I've never been to Nafsan, but from my recollection, it's not, it's not a large military base like, let's say, MSAB. I think Al Dafra is even bigger. MSAB is where I'm sorry the Jordan one, Jordan, the Mo Mustafa Airbase, like the, I, I just, I Acronyms. So, MSAB, Jordan, PSAB is Saudi Arabia, that's just by their acronyms. So, Prince Sultan Air Base, Mufakhar Sultan Air Base in Jordan are bigger, IUD Air Base, I think it's even bigger than NASAF's headquarters. there's another one though in Bahrain called ISA Air Base. There's another airbase there, it's called ISA Airbase, and that one is the same, it's probably been absolutely evacuated, not being really used. But again, it's in, it's in Bahrain as well. In Bahrain. It's called ISA Airbase, yeah. That's another US base installation in Bahrain. And so that's another easy target. It sucks to be one of those countries right now, like you have nothing to do with this war, you're just getting, having to keep closing your airspace, intercepting missiles. Because the rest of the Gulf... I mean, I think I think from their perspective, well, you're using our airspace, like even during the war, Kuwait launched strikes against you know, against Iran and mostly against pro-Iranian groups in Iraq and allowed the US to do a lot of these operations from their own country. So from the, from the Iranian perspective, it's fair game. Oh, absolutely, absolutely, absolutely. These bases and airspaces are being used. You host your enemy, of course, your enemy, if there's Ukraine- Which is interesting. If you look at Russia-Ukraine, that's one of the areas, like for example, from Ukraine, we didn't really see that many strikes or, I don't think, like Ukraine against Belarus. More explosions in Bahrain, by the way. Okay. Still ongoing, as expected. Yeah, yep. Yep, yep. So you know, you were saying about Belarus and Ukraine, right? Like if you look at, like Russia, Ukraine, for the, for, yeah, maybe some Russian drones hit NATO targets, European targets, but for the most part, that's not the main focus of Russia. Ukraine, right, against Belarus, they haven't really-- That's not been a focus of the strikes. Like for Russia, Ukraine, all their military strikes and operations have been between each other, right? Yeah, it hasn't been as asymmetric as this one. This is more asymmetric warfare, you have Iran facing the US military. It's a bit different to Ukraine and Russia, but also it's a bit different to having-- There's no Ukrainian bases in NATO countries either. Belarus, Russia is different, but there's no na-- Ukrainian bases in NATO firing missiles out of NATO territory. So I wouldn It's the same, but also strategic benefit is different, the, the, the, the, the, the risks involved is different. So like if you strike the Gulf, what else could the US do if they're already bombing the hell out of you? If you strike NATO, you might involve NATO. If you strike the Gulf, you impact the global economy and pressure the US. If you strike NATO, it doesn't have that same pressure on Ukraine, if anything, Ukraine would like to see that happen. I, I think, I think what's very interesting about this war is how it's, the, any construct of geographical boundaries of the war has been kind of shattered, and it's been, it, it, you know, kind of this aspect of, of, of a regional war, and but it fits the model of the Iranian military response and how they would do it. Like, again, this isn't something that is new, like this was known, it just reinforces that. And even with this, this contract, which, if you looked though at June twenty twenty-five, when it was Israel and Till midnight hammer, and then the Iranians did that strike against Qatar. But in twenty twenty five, it was just very much contained between Israel, Iran, Israel, Iran, Israel, Iran, that's it. What's-- it was very interesting over the weekend when these strikes were happening between the Israel and Iran, you know, one of the things that clearly, I think President Trump wasn't so comfortable back then, was You know, these Israel continuing these strikes. Like there was an argument to maybe be made, like if you're President Trump, well, you know, if Israel just do all their strikes again against Iran and then they launch ballistic missiles against Israel, like, you know, the US could take a step back and say, "Oh, well, we'll just negotiate, but, you know, let these guys fight it out," and there might even be an interest from the US perspective, say, "Well, we could get more, we can get more because of this." But I'm wondering, I think the next step I'm looking for Mario is from the US side is economic strikes, like strikes against economic targets inside of Iran, and do they do that? That's if they wanna escalate. That's if they wanna escalate. Okay. And the next one-- That's if they wanna escalate. That's a full-blown, that's the end, just to be clear. This is the end of the ceasefire. This is a full-blown war, and my statement of the war is over, it just goes to shit. So what, what, what, so I Right? We see a repeat of today, but now it's US and Israel for a duration of time, and they're the ones who do it. What would you, what would you- We're getting close to a full-blown war. We're get- We're getting pretty close. That's, that's- Yep. Depends on the severity of it. I think this is a- IGC strongly rejects Trump's claim about Iranian officials calling him a "pure liar." Yeah, the Iranian media is adorable. I like the, I like the graphics of it. so the missiles fired from Isfahan should have arrived by now Kuwait, so I'm guessing the probably explosions we'll be hearing about now, unless they didn't go to, they didn't go to Kuwait, they went to Bahrain instead, 'cause we just heard explosions in Bahrain, so maybe those missiles actually were heading to Bahrain not Kuwait. but yeah, I think we've Covered everything extremely well extremely extensively and well. so I hope the audience appreciate the analysis. We've been doing this for hours. I've been doing this for what, twelve hours? Now we were, we were, we, I think we were in your, me and Vladimir were co-hosting your space on X for about, before we wrapped it up, like five hours yesterday as well, and then we, you know, jumped over to your livestream as well. So between your X space and here, it's been nonstop, man. Yeah, I started my interview first one was Miranda at, far out, 9 PM my time, and now 7 AM. It's like 10 hours. But I thought it'd be a quiet night. Yeah, I don't know if I thought it was gonna be a quiet day. But tomorrow, I think tomorrow, I think tomorrow we're gonna be seeing a repeat of this. Right now, that's what it's pointing towards. Cool, man. Appreciate the analysis with your expertise in the region, someone that's worked there and dealt directly with ballistic missiles from Iran for years. So this is your area of expertise. Shahed drones are roaming Kuwait City. Huh? Look, I was just flying over Kuwait City. Can you play that, KK, quickly? I'll just send it to you now. Where's the drone defense? I know this is a touchy subject for you, but there's just a drone flying around Kuwait city. It's hard, it's hard because that's the thing about drones, because between the low altitude and all that, and the, I mean, again, it's, it's like, it, you can launch it very close from the border, like Kuwait is right there in Iraq. Play it with Ojo, KK, play it with Ojo. Yeah, yeah. That is wild. That is wild. That's just a Kuwait- And I think people don't understand the Gulf is considered such a safe area. These aren't countries in Kuwait, less than the, the Saudi, and less than the Emirates, but still, these are countries that don't, aren't used to this. It's not Ukraine, this isn't Lebanon, it's not Israel. We're talking about the Gulf that are usually away from all this mess, all this craziness. They've got that kind of, that, that bubble of, that protective bubble around them, that perception of protection and, and stability and, and predictability. Now there's just randomly Okay, okay, before we wrap, one of the most memorable events in the UAE was when a drone was intercepted near the Burj Khalifa. Correct. It's like someone in the US, it's like someone in the US, 'cause I live in the UAE, so I can relate to this one. But in the US, I've lived, spent a lot of time in the US, but it's like a drone being intercepted next to the Statue of Liberty, for example, or one of the big towers in New York. That's, oh, Trump towers, 'cause that'll be symbolic. But that's kind of the symbolicism of it. I'm glad that, that drone wasn't intercepted, 'cause otherwise it would have been catastrophic for the, for the UAE. But yeah, man, we've done incredible coverage, guys. I hope you enjoyed it. Let us know what you think in the comments, and I'll see you live if there's anything urgent, we'll be live again tonight, today, but most likely it'll be tomorrow 'cause things are quieting down, that's usually Coming up, we have the weekend coming up, we do have the weekend. Oh, then, yeah, then we're screwed. What are we doing? Thursday. Thank you, Stefano. Thank you guys. Bye-bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m joined by energy economist Stephen Schork to discuss whether markets are pricing peace while overlooking another oil shock. We examine negotiations with Iran, the pullback in oil prices, rising bets on diplomacy, and how the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions, Iranian crude, inflation, and key risks may be shaping oil markets.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
INTERVIEW: Is the market pricing peace while ignoring the possibility of another oil shock? Negotiations with Iran appear to be advancing, oil prices have pulled back, and traders are increasingly betting on diplomacy. But with the Strait of Hormuz still at the center of global energy markets, is the market getting ahead of reality? Energy economist Stephen Schork (@schorkgroup) joins @realazadeh to break down the proposed Iran deal, Hormuz, sanctions, Iranian crude, inflation, and whether the biggest risks to oil markets are still being overlooked.
Video Transcript AI Summary
Steven Shork says energy markets are driven by the physical realities of supply disruptions and logistics rather than headline-driven narratives. He describes a market dislocation that began at the end of February, when events around the Strait of Hormuz caused immediate reactions in oil derivatives, including NYMEX WTI and ICE Brent, while the Atlantic Basin was still supplied and therefore saw more muted impact initially. He argues that the most acute panic showed up among Asian refiners, who buy crude oil, not among traders who mainly trade derivatives.
Shork contrasts “political price” in the prompt futures markets—with large speculators potentially reacting to news and social media—with “real market” conditions reflected in physical freight and risk. He emphasizes that when uncertainty rises around passage through the Strait, tanker charter costs, insurance rates, bunker fuel, and other logistics costs rise, forcing sellers to price crude based on the higher cost of moving it.
He says the Strait-linked disruption plus Europe’s reduced access to tanker transit (he cites about 70 vessels losing transit access) created supply disruption and price pressure, while sanctions relief for Russia (and strategic petroleum reserve releases in Europe and the United States) worked to reduce panic by improving supply availability. He also claims the market’s behavior is inconsistent with the physical magnitude of the disruption: he says the globe has effectively lost around a billion barrels of oil since the conflict began (noting some of that has been masked by weak seasonal demand early in the year).
As demand moves toward summer peak in June, Shork highlights a “make-or-break” period. He describes shifting global trade patterns as the United States becomes the marginal producer, with vessels and cargo flow shifting toward the US Gulf Coast export markets (Houston and Corpus Christi) to access US barrels, along with stepped-up supply from other Western Hemisphere producers such as Guyana and Brazil. He says this does not replace the roughly 15 million barrels per day he says have gone missing, but it helps “mill” price pressure.
A key claim is that “headline resolution” is not matched by “risk resolution.” Shork repeatedly argues: “Price is suspended, the risk isn’t.” He addresses reports that President Trump expects a deal with Iran within days, and he says the weakness in oil is “nonsensical” given the ongoing physical constraints and logistics bottlenecks. Shork also describes a bifurcated market: futures markets appear to assume a quick resolution, while physical dislocations (tankers and insurance) suggest normalization would be delayed, potentially until the end of the year.
To explain what would convince him that resolution is becoming real, Shork focuses on two diagnostics: (1) spreads/differentials across benchmarks (such as Oman/Dubai vs. Brent) and (2) the forward curve shape. He says a healthy market tends to show backwardation, but when backwardation reflects not only convenience yield but also fear of supply cutoff, it creates large differentials—he cites roughly $20–$25 per barrel between near-term and later delivery months (he includes a comparison between next month and 2027). He says he wants to see regression toward a more normalized forward curve and reduced stress in logistics pricing, including tanker chartering costs and freight insurance costs.
Shork argues that Iran’s approach is not fully about closing the Strait, but about leveraging choke-point economics through financial blockade mechanisms affecting insurance. He says insurance markets reacted immediately when the blockade began (he dates the war as February 27) and that ships are already being attacked. He describes a scenario where, even if ships can transit physically, insurance risk pricing still raises the all-in cost enough to “queer” the economics of shipping and keep barrels from being moved.
When asked whether the “Hormuz” issue is the true core or whether it is about Iran’s nuclear program, Shork says he goes with the nuclear program. He connects Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability with the broader impact on global risk, including recognized links between Iran and regional armed groups, and he argues that Iran’s internal oil investment neglect and diversion of resources to the nuclear program and broader networks leave Iran unable to fully benefit from oil output. He says Iran and its choke-point position can lose leverage over time as the world adapts and finds alternatives.
He cites infrastructure changes that he says reduce the importance of the Strait, including the UAE dropping out of OPEC and doubling pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait, and Saudi Arabia already increasing pipelines crossing the desert to Red Sea export facilities. Shork says this adaptation will encourage investment and supply growth across regions including Eastern Africa, West Africa, and South America (Guyana and Brazil), and also in the United States.
Shork also discusses tanker-market signaling as a leading indicator for demand. He says the high daily cost of tankers translates into higher required selling prices for crude, and rising insurance and logistics costs amplify that.
On reports about Iranian frozen funds, he says that if sanctions are lifted and Iran’s crude returns, futures could be supported via the supply-demand expectation channel. He provides a price reference from the NYMEX WTI spot market, saying prices had dipped to about $85.95 and later rose toward the high-$80s/near $90, with a rally occurring on headlines including an Apache helicopter being shot down and possible US reaction. In his view, however, underlying market signals and the behavior of key players (including the UAE’s actions) matter more than single headlines.
He concludes that markets may be pricing wishful thinking around rapid resolution, while physical conditions and shipping/insurance constraints remain. He says it “doesn’t make sense” that so much risk has been taken only to return to February status quo, implying that even if headlines point to peace, the market’s assumptions may not match how long de-risking and normalization would take.
Full Transcript
Hi, Steven, how are you? Welcome. I am great. It's great to be here, thank you. Yes, good to have you here. You know, Steven, you spent decades analyzing energy markets, you know, from this perspective of someone focused on the physical reality rather than the headlines. You kind of read between the lines and go a little bit deeper, first on, you know, New York MEX floor, and then now through Short Group your, your, your group there. One thing that's I've noticed about your work is that while a lot of politicians seem to, or even analysts, even in the financial sector, they talk about the diplomacy and the deterrence, the military strategy and the ceasefires, you know, and, and a lot of the conversations we have s-- you know, stem around this, you actually look at what happens to actual barrels. You, you get into the nitty-gritty and look at the shipping lanes, the insurance rates, you know what happens to producers hedging, the refinery margins, those, you know, the Ultimately, what happens to prices, and I think that's, you know, essentially relevant to today because, you know, as you saw over the last twenty-four, forty-eight hours since even Sunday I've noticed you know There seems to be two different realities happening here that seem to be impacting the markets. On one hand, you have President Trump saying a deal with Iran could be only days away. We have reports suggesting, you know, these discussions around this framework that we've been talking about now for a couple of weeks that could include this fifteen to twenty-year suspension on enrichment reductions to their enriched uranium stockpile, expendit-- you know, these, these expanded inspections and future negotiations over these sanctions and the frozen assets. But on the other hand, Trump also announced that, you know, we saw just a few- Hours ago, there was an American Apache helicopter was just shot down over the Strait of Hormuz, and, you know, Trump put in his Truth Social post that, you know, the United States must, out of necessity, respond. And as we were going live, I got some of those reports, you know, some of them unconfirmed, but some, they're, you know, it seems to be getting really active there. reports of fighter jets going over Iraq, you know, airspace is closed, commercial commercial jets leaving Mehrabad Airport in, in Tehran. And, you know, Iran at the same time is warning that, you know, any new US-backed kind of military strikes could also escalate it, and they will respond in, in force. While we watch all this happen, Steven Tell me what, what is, what is that doing, and, and for those watching as well, what is that doing to the markets right now? Because we do know that a lot of the negotiations are driven by what's going on with the Strait, potentially even the Red Sea, where the Houthis emerging now recently saying, you know, they're gonna get involved, and, and they did to an extent. So is the market really correctly pricing the reality of it, or is it pricing the outcome it perhaps wants to see or even anticipates? Yeah, it's, it's an excellent question, and We've seen that since day one the festivities in our part of the world began right at the end of February, and immediately we saw a dislocation. we did see prices react in the futures market, whether they be the New York Mercantile Exchange, which is a US-based oil market the ICE Brent market, which is considered more of a global market, and, and that's based on oil sourced in the North Sea and also the Dubai and Oman markets. And what we saw initially was a massive reaction where you would expect to see it, and that is you saw it in the Dubai and Oman markets and the NYMEX and the Brent markets were kind of secondary markets. And so why is that? Well, these are markets that deliver oil or take delivery of oil in the Atlantic Basin. The Atlantic Basin isn't short of oil, regardless of what was transpiring around the Strait of Hormuz. So you had kind of a, a Muted response, you did have a response because, as they say, a rising tide lifts all vessels so you did have a panic in the Far East, and this is refiners in South Korea, Japan, China, so India, so forth this is their oil that, that, that's being held up. So it was a- Discussion oh, Stephen, how, and, and every analyst out there, well, how high can prices go? Well, we can model it, and we do a lot of quantitative modeling here, and statistically, probable-- from a probabilistic standpoint, yeah, I, I, I was able to make a case, worst case scenario, two hundred and thirty-eight dollars a barrel, yeah, and, and can-- you know, mathematically could we get there? Yeah, we, we- Could get there where we going to stay there? Absolutely not, 'cause oil sustained at two hundred dollars a barrel is just gonna kill demand, it's gonna kill the global economy. So, yes, we could have gotten there, but the, the, the discussion was being mixed beca- because when- Especially here in the West, in the United States, when we talk about oil prices, we're always gonna reference NYMEX WTI or, or ICE Brent. And yes, they did get up to a hundred and twenty, a hundred and thirty dollars a barrel, didn't stay there all long, but, but we got up i-into that vicinity and they kept on asking, "Oh, can we see a hundred and fifty dollar oil? Can we see a hundred and eighty dollar oil? Can we see two hundred dollar oil?" Well, the bottom line is, w-we were already So that was the physical market reacting to to reality as it were. So what you saw at that point was just a major panic in the market amongst Asian refiners, the only people, a refinery is the only entity that buys crude oil. We can speculate on crude oil, but you and I, we don't put crude oil in our car, we don't put crude oil in our furnace to heat our homes, we put the derivatives of crude oil in that. But the people who were actually- Buying, the only people that buy refiners were panicking. So what you saw here was a major blowout. Sorry, and, and Stephen, those, those panicking predominantly also were in Europe, correct? Because that's one of the reasons why Basnet has, Secretary Basnet has repeatedly extended that exemption for Russia to be able to sell their crude oil to Europe, correct? If, if you can explain that as well too. Yeah, absolutely. So, so what we have here is a market, and I'm- What's great about commodities are there's only two drivers for price, supply and demand. now of course there's little, little subsets of, of those. but to your point, so with Bassein and Europe and, and extending the Russian, yes. I mean, a-at the end of the day, we lost and have still lost the transit of about seventy vessels carrying Oil, petroleum products, petrochemicals, natural gas, so forth. We've lost access to that, and, and we've still lost it. So that, that is the supply disruption end of it, and moves by percent or to try and ameliorate and open up other access to supply, and that is the lifting of sanctions on Russia, which is had, had gone a great deal to try and quell the market, a, a quell that panic. So you had two events Events going on at the same time. You had granted the pardon relief to Russia to open up that market to consumers in the West. You also had the suspension, or excuse me, not suspension, but the release of strategic petroleum reserves both in Europe and both in in the United States. So we have a, so what we're seeing right now and what was happening, it was a massive release of- Supply strategically and, and also sanctioned with Russia that was coming into a market where demand was at its weakest point of the year. Remember, this, this, as we said, this conflict began at the-- in late February and March, when global demand for oil is at its weakest. we're now into June and in the northern hemisphere, we're going into our summer peak demand season, and, and this is where the real concern is, and this is the make it or break it point, the, the inflection point, as it were, because up until this point, what the market's been dealing with are a number of things, supply being addressed, whether that, to your point sanctions being released relieved on oil the increase in output on a east-west Pipeline that runs in Saudi Arabia that Saudi Arabia can avoid having loaded on a tanker and put it put it in the Gulf and get it to the Strait, they're actually loading down in the Red Sea, and the same in Abu Dhabi where you have a bypass pipeline that, that, that skirts the Strait of Hormuz, and that's increased production. So we're, we're taking all of these little vignettes here and putting them together to get supply relief. And at this point, what we saw indeed was the US barrel, the US producer is now the, the globe's marginal producer, United States being the largest oil producer in the world, and what we saw over the last two months is a massive shift in the global trade of vessels. And you, you have to have a-- if you're gonna move oil, you have to have a vessel, and that vessel has to be where that oil is being produced, so you're gonna load it, you're gonna take it where it's being consumed. And so what we saw at this time was a massive shift of a, an arm going to the US Gulf Coast, to the export markets in Houston and Corpus Christi to access US oil, and once again, you have a tremendous amount of oil coming on the global market from the United States, as well as other Western Hemisphere producers, Guyana, Brazil so forth, that have stepped up. And again, it's not going to replace the fifteen million barrels a day of oil that's gone missing since the Strait has been closed, but it's going to a great deal of trying to milli- and, and get some of that, and, and off- Some of that supply, and then the other assets that the only other way you can, you can impact price is of course, impact demand, and, and, and that is the story more so from a China standpoint, more so than a, a Western consuming world. Thanks for that. You know, over the past several months, you've consistently warned against these confusing headlines, you know, the, the headline-driven market reactions, you know, with the actual changes in physical risk. I think you were explaining a little bit about that. I, I think it was when I was you know, preparing for this, I, I saw that in April you had argued that the ceasefire on-- was only seen as a headline by oil market. and then you also continue to write that the energy market blinked, the war didn't. And I was hoping if you could, you know, explain what you mean by that, because you also said, "Price is suspended, the risk isn't." And we're, you know, as we hear President Trump saying repeatedly, "We're very, very close, we're just a few days away, it's almost there, there's a very good chance of reaching a deal in the next two or three days." I mean, how many times have we heard this over and over and over Based on, on what I said what I just read from you, do you do you think that the markets appear to believe him to an extent or where, where are we with that aspect of it? When you, when you look at the way oil is trading today, for example, do you think that traders are really pricing it based on this genuine structural shift or is it simply just another opportunistic headline from Trump coming out and they're reacting to that? I, I do think it, because from a physical standpoint The weakness in oil is nonsensical. as we said, we've lost, when we add up all those daily transits with the Strait of Hormuz that, that are effectively still blocked the globe has lost a billion barrels of oil. since this has started. Now, part of that has been masked, as I said, because we are in the weakest demand port of the year, but we're now going into said June, so we're going into over the next three months, the, the biggest demand of, of, of that we see on the calendar, and the markets don't really, are, are not reacting to this, and that was one of the biggest Surprises, I think, is the President Trump's ability to jawbone, as you said, or talk the market lower. As you said, he keeps on talking with these very annoying helping verbs. We should, it could, probably. so you, you can't base anything on that from a reality. What we can see is where, where the shortages are and, and the differential in prices and that brings us to where's the tanker market? You know, you know, for people who are, are, are- Not init- or uninitiated with this, tankers, where we load the crude oil, that's a commodity in and of itself. So when I go ahead to contract to buy or sell oil, the first thing I have to do is I have to go out and charter a vessel, 'cause I don't own that. the vast majority of traders or oil companies don't own their vessels. They, they go to shipping companies and they charter those vessels. So when you wanna start to look at, okay, where are, are some of the clues of where the demand is, where Are, you first go to the tanker market, 'cause it's an excellent leading indicator. And so when we look at this and look at where the tankers are traded, right? So how much is it gonna cost me per day to buy a tanker? Well, that price is extremely expensive. Well, if I'm gonna load a tanker, I have to cover that cost, so my price that I'm selling my oil has to be reflective of what the, what I'm being charged for my tanker. The same with the insurance rates and the bunker fuel and, and all the other logistic costs that go into To this. So when we add this all together and we look at the dislocations, what we're seeing now are, as I, you know, led this off, is a bifurcated market where we have one, the headline or the po-- and I'm calling the prompt market in Nymex, WTI or ICE Brent, the political price. This is the price that could be any large trader, speculator out there that has, has- Some AI agent linked to a, to a Trump social media post or any media post, and they react on these headlines, and, and it causes a great deal of confusion, a great deal of volatility in the front market. So you almost have to kind of like- Throw that out and, and ignore it. And what you have to, again, is go back and look at where the physical market is, and, and that's a completely-- that's the other half of the market, that's the real market, and that isn't, that isn't reflective of, of what we're seeing in, in the futures. The futures are almost fantasy land right now, and when we look at what the futures market seem to be pricing in at this point is a quick resolution. Which, again, being just commonsensical here, okay, let, let's say we have a complete peace tomorrow, let's say it happens right now, we are six months away from the best case scenario, a complete end to hostilities, a, a complete open to the trade free flow of oil coming out and through the Strait of Hormuz. We are six months away from de- from, from, from any sort of normalization to the flow, flow of supply, and, and yet the futures market seemed to say that, "Oh, Trump says there, there could, there could be, we're almost there, it's probably gonna happen." and even if you wanna go on that, that, that fairy tale of, of a resolution we're nowhere near de-clo- de-clogging, as it were, and, and, and, and what, and so what's gonna happen is all those Tankers that have come over to the Gulf Coast, well, they're loading up now and they're gonna go to their destinations, then, then they're gonna have to get back to the Gulf to the Persian Gulf to start unclogging all the pent-up demand or, or supply there, and that, and that's a process that it is June, so best case scenario, we're, we're talking by the end of the year that we'll see any kind of normalization. Again, that is assuming and that we see any sort of peaceful resolution. And as we were just chatting right before we came online with regard to US Army Apache being downed in Sadr City, I, I think I saw the headlines, I think the pilots been saved. Yeah. but once again we're seeing a, a, a, and, and, and this is what's frustrating about this, is President Trump keeps on, again, talking all these useless helping verbs about we could, it could do this, should do this, we will do this, so forth, and, and we kept on seeing provocation after provocation, the Israelis shelling southern Lebanon, Iran responding to, to the Israelis, and, and all along, the President Trump is telling us Don't believe your lying eyes, we're, we're, we're, a ceasefire is almost here. Well, the Iranians just called Trump's bluff, and Trump is going-- it, it would appear that Trump is going to have to react to this. So how he's gonna talk out, out of one side of his mouth saying, "We're gonna, we're gonna strike 'em, we're gonna strike 'em hard, we're gonna strike 'em like we've never struck 'em before," blah, blah, blah, blah. We, we all know the hyperbole. Now, on the other side, he's gonna talk out of the, out of his mouth because he's looking at gasoline prices, he's looking at the November midterms. historically, that's never a good election for the power, for the party that's in World Cup is beginning in the United States. He doesn't want that to steal away from the headlines. He's looking ahead to the fall, but the Iranians are pushing him and pushing him. So the bottom line is there's no resolution, but the futures market continues to trade that way. But reality, our eyes, what we're seeing in the conflict, what we're seeing in the disruption of, of, of flow and what we're seeing in the physical market belies all of that, and there is no resol-resolution to this at any time In, in, in in the foreseeable future. So now you have to ask yourself, what's this gonna do to price? Well, as you said, it's June. We, we just here in the United States, we just had the fourth of July holiday, and not fourth of July, Memorial Day holiday, the unofficial start to the vacation season, and that's just gonna ramp up till we get to the fourth of July, and that's gonna last all the way to the end the summer with the Labor Day holiday in September. So we're And right now, prices have been held in check more importantly for the consumer, they're high, but they're not as high as they've been-- they're, they're much, they're much higher four years ago than they are today, but every politician and every American thinks Sub two dollar gas was somehow Thomas Jefferson wrote that into the Constitution, that, that, that we, we, that is our God-given right to have cheap, cheap, really cheap oil at this point, and President Trump really is given the impression, at least to me, I don't wanna get too political here but really seems to give the impression that, that he is just He's, he's playing it as it goes along, and there really doesn't seem to be a lot of forethought there especially with all of his hyperbole, and the market is just sitting there, and, and I think that's what's happened here. The market's lulled itself into a false sense security. So I think to answer your question, and I think I answered it, but ju-just to reiterate, I think the market i-i-i-is buying into this wishful thinking and this Trump speak that there's going to be a resolution and hits the market, and that's the way the market's trading from a physical standpoint, that doesn't seem the way you re- that doesn't make a lot of sense. No, I, I, I see what you're saying. So in my world, I deal a lot with words, like the, from the communications and the PR aspect of it, so I watch a lot of how the public engages, whether it's, you know, the markets voters, you know businesses, politicians, you know? The entire spectrum of it. So I, I tend to agree, and, you know, I've, I've heard critics argue this that you know, these traders have become sort of desensitized or conditioned to buy these de-escalation headlines, if you will, and they're grossly underestimating to an extent how fragile these arrangements are and, and how they could be. And it sounds like, you know, you're, you're also making a case for that. I wanna ask you, Stephen, what would convince you that this agreement, this MOU, We're at the MOU phase of this, right? It's not like the full deal, and I think that's throwing a lot of people off as well. what would convince you that, you know, this is materially different from any kind of previous temporary pause, ceasefire, negotiation? And then for you even, in, in your industry, at what point does a ceasefire stop being a headline anymore and start becoming a market reality? How, how do you see that? And, you know, especially since this is just technically- An MOU, and perhaps this could go on for much longer you know, before we get to a full stop and stop. Right. So there, there are two things. The first thing you always want to look at in the market are the spreads, the differential between a spread either being the differential between prices traded on the Oman market or the Dubai market or the Brent market, and you look at those price differentials And then what you also, if want to look at, in that particular, whatever exchange or whatever market you're looking at, there's going to be a forward curve so there's a price for July, there's a price for August, price for September, and in a healthy market what you see is market that's called backwardation. So backwardation, and just your, your n-nemonic is you start off the x-axis, prices are gonna be high, say for the, the spot market is now, if I wanna buy oil and take delivery, the first month I can take delivery now is July, that's the spot market. in the futures, and that, that is high. The next market for August is a little bit cheaper, so we'll go-- and then for September and so forth, like you're, like you're going back down staircase. So think of the backwardation. So in a healthy commodity market, they're defined by backwardation. Why, why is that? There is an inherent bid or- A premium to own the spot market because it's a commodity. It is, I'm sitting in my office I turn the lights on, I expect those lights to go on immediately. I pull into the gas station, I expect to be able to fill up my car. I turn on the heat, I expect the heat to go on, I expect there to be fuel in the line, gas in the pipe coming into the house. So to have that convenience of, of having supply on demand comes at a premium. So it makes sense that in a healthy economy, in a healthy market, you should see a backwardation. But as with anything, there's backwardation and then there's backwardation So that healthy backgradation is inherent and, and should reflect that premium for July over August, August over September, that backgradation should be reflective of that convenience yield or, or, or that, that supply supply on demand. But then we get to a point where we begin to speculate, we begin to worry about our ability to supply the market, or, and, and then, so that is either gonna be because there's too much demand or there's not enough supply. In this case, it's Concern about supply. So now what we see is a dislocation in that backwardation where it's not only reflecting the convenience of having supply on demand, but it's also reflecting risk of a cutoff to supply. And so what we're seeing now is a market that is in backwardation that has led to twenty, twenty-five dollars a barrel differential between oil to take delivery next month as opposed to oil taking delivery in the fall or at some point in twenty twenty-seven. So to answer your question, when, when we begin to re- Reflect and, and things are changing. I want to see a normalization to backgradation, because what's really again, neat about commodity price markets is not only it's, it's the yin and yang between supply and demand, but it's also seasonality, and seasonality is a sine wave. And so what we can do is we can model that sine wave, and then what we look for is deviation. So what, so what we're saying is, okay, at this point in June, the beginning of, of the season Where, where, what, what, what is demand normally like? What is supply normally like? What is price normally? What is, what is the differential between different spreads, different marks? We, we, we can normalize it, and then it's never gonna be perfectly on that sine wave. We're gonna have deviations, jumps above, jumps ab-abelow, and then we have to measure, okay, how significant is that jump? How long does it take us to regress back towards it, towards that line? And, and then we can begin to look at, okay, this It, it, it's a normal healthy market that where supply and demand, there's an understanding on both, both sides. We don't have that right now because of this constant threat, these constant headlines. So to answer your question is, when we begin to see a regression back to a more normalized forward curve where we don't have prices up here and it's almost like going-- oh, not, not straight line, but a, but a, but a, a, a steep slope lower, well, that, that, that- I, I wanna start to see that kind of like even out right now, and and, and in given market areas. And so once, once we begin to see a normalization in spread and curved geometry, then, then I'll say okay we're, we're onto something. We're, we're, we're, we're, we're, we're leaning towards a k-kind of a, a resolution now. And, and, and as we, yeah, as we can say, like, we're, we're nowhere near that at this point. Yeah, thank you. I, I wanna move a little bit more into the straight, but from a different perspective from the from the energy in general. So You know, you've repeatedly argued that while Iran may threaten the Hormoz, they won't fully close it because it would actually hurt their own customers, particularly China and India. You know, of course, this reported framework would reopen these shipping routes, would it eliminate any of those proposed toll systems or environmental fees, as, you know the Foreign Ministry's office said, even remove some of those maritime restrictions. There's this you know, reported negotiation or this deal between Oman And Iran, although they have for years been working together to kind of manage the, the in and out flow, you know, is the Hormuz the real story behind this deal? Because we repeatedly hear, and even as Americans, they hear it's, it's the nuclear program, you know, the, the world has heard it's the nuclear program. We had to do this, hey Japan, I know you're waiting for your oil and your energy, I know, you know, I think Trump, it was about a week ago or so, I think it was last week I met with the the farmers' associations, you know, the, the American Association of Farmers, and he was talking about fertilizer and saying, "Hey, I know, you know, we're struggling here, but it's about the nuclear, it's about the nuclear," but it doesn't really seem like it's the nuclear when you peel back the layers of that onion. it seems to be centered around the hormones in this conversation, you know, a-and I talked about this with somebody a few weeks ago actually, but back in the '80s, Trump was Power and the hormones from a protection standpoint. you know, he wanted access to Iran's oil, but it wasn't necessarily about the oil, it was, you know, the US posturing to navigate that maritime security in the Strait. Earlier today about two hours ago, I think it was about an hour before we, we started our live Trump was I think getting off F-1, and he said something to the effect of, "You know..." We're gonna get ha-- we're gonna help Iran rebuild their infrastructure, and we're gonna get half of their oil. Now, again, this is Trump, this is another headline, but you know, I'm curious when you hear rhetoric like that You know, what matters more today? Is it these actual shipping conditions? You know, is it the trader confidence in future shipping conditions given Trump's position on this and historically from the '80s he's had this position about those conditions in that Strait, the maritime security? How do you see this going? Where do you see this framework centered around really? Is it the Strait of Hormuz or is it as Trump says The nuclear program. I, I'm gonna go with the latter. I'm gonna go with the nuclear program. I'm not really, still, even with all that. Yeah. I mean, I, I don't like, I, I, you know, may, maybe it, it's, look, I'm fifty-nine years old. So when the Islamic Revolution took place in the late nineteen seventies, I was, I was a young teenager. I spent the nineteen eighties, nineteen nineties, the last twenty years of, of, of the new century That along with its former satellite, Syria, and North Korea, are the only three nations that the United States State Department has on to fi- li-list that country as an official state sponsor of terrorism. Iran, I think, Syria's been on since the early '80s Iran has been on since '83, so, you know, from from Reagan to Clinton to Bush to every presidency, ever, every- Swing back and forth in Congress has always listed over the past thirty years a country, Iran, that is an official state sponsor of terrorism, and, and we know the links between the terrorist Hydra of the Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas, so forth, all sponsored by Iran. So I do think there is a case to be made that a country that is pursuing the nuclear weapon, and that every administration since the early 1980s recognizes it's a state sponsor of terrorism. Do we really, do we really want to go there? So I, I do, I, I am on that. So I, I think your question is kind of two-parted. I, I do think there, there is a, I'm not a I'm not a military guy, I'm not a, a, you know, school in international law protocol, so forth, but I do think there is a case to be made that was that part of the reason Trump went into this? I do, I do think that. and I'm, I'm, you know, I, I can, I can give credit where credit's due. I'd like to bash Trump 'cause he's easy to bash, but I, I, there, there, there is a method to, to- I, I tend to Turn, you know, we hear a lot of, a lot of political scientists call Iran, and, and for those listening, I, I'm gonna say rational actor, but, you know, it's from a political science perspective or international relations, they're a rational actor. And so in that context, they very cleverly kind of have this chokehold here on the Strait, and immediately it just, the game changed. So, you know, it's interesting to hear your thoughts on where do you think this, the, the core of this is it still- Still nuclear or not, and, and I appreciate your perspective on, on that still being nuclear. Yeah, I, I thank, thank you. And, and that's why I lost my mind last Thursday, and I put it in my, in my daily report when Trump said, "Oh, maybe we don't need the dust, maybe we don't need the proof." It's, it's, right? And I'm like, "Oh my God, is he really saying this?" Well, what, so, so there's always, there's always that caveat there. And but I, I'm sorry, I just lost my train of thought. But with regard to the nuclear-- Oh, so with the straight, we have to keep in mind, Iran is hurting I mean, this is a country that has spent the le-- since its ince-- since its inception as an Islamic republic in the late 1970s, it has spent all of its wherewithal, the majority of its money that it earns besides exporting pistachios is oil. but this has been a country that's never even been able to s- Supply enough gasoline, diesel, or kerosene to its own people because it doesn't invest in its own resources, it doesn't invest in its oil industry. So there are times over the past decades where Iran has actually had to sell its oil to India. India will refine it and then sell refined oil, which is basically Iranian oil, coming right back so the Iranians can, can, can sate their own demand. So this is a country that has, has, doesn't even have the wherewithal, the Fully benefit from its oil, its position as a very large oil producer, because why? Because that money's been diverted into a nuclear program and a terrorist network globally that, again, ha-has been recognized. So the Strait of Hormuz, where the oil tankers, the, you know, Iranians are trying to, the, the, the, they stand to lose a lot more. And I'll give an anecdote. So when I started the Shork Report back in two thousand and five, at that time, United States wasn't a major oil produ- crude oil producer, this was before the shale gale we were highly dependent on imports of, of oil from Venezuela. Venezuela traditionally had always been the number three, number four supplier of crude oil to the United States in the seventies, eighties, nineties, and so forth. And then they had their own socialist revolution. Hugo Chavez came to power, and he does whatever good socialist dictator does. He suspended the constitution and, and put in stooges in the Supreme Court, and now he was the democratically elected dictator for life until he handed off to Maduro, who until this year assumed that role. So Ugo Chavez took a lot of fun knowing how vulnerable the United States was and how dependent the United States was on oil. And what we saw at that point was- Supply contracts that refiners in the Gulf Coast had to buy Venezuelan oil, which is a very easy, you, like you load, you'll you load it up on Maracaibo just and then you just ship it straight up the Gulf of Mexico into the refinery epicenter in the Gulf Coast from Minnesota and Minnesota Mississippi Louisiana, through Texas. And Hugo Chavez was actually diverting cargoes and selling them below market to China because he was trying to- He'd steer supply away from the United States 'cause he wanted to hurt the United States in general and specifically George Bush, who was president. And I wrote at the time, this was two thousand and seven, two thousand and eight Chavez not realizing how dependent he was on his customer He thought he had all the power. And then, and I wrote at the time that the one thing Chavez was losing to the United States was, okay, yeah, we're not getting as much oil from them as we used to, but we're getting something much better, the brain drain, the inteliencia who were fleeing Venezuela, and a lot of them wound up in the United States. So we were getting an asset much greater than Venezuelan oil. And so what happens? Oh eight, oh nine hits. What, what's that? The Great Recession. Demand, you know, demand of the globe falls off. So who's Venezuela gonna sell their oil to? Well, no, we're not buying it as much as we used to. And oh yeah, what happens is the old adage in economics, high prices are the best cure for high prices. All of a sudden, you drove prices, which averaged about seventeen dollars a barrel, oil prices in the nineteen nineties, you drove to one hundred and fifty dollars a barrel ten years after that. All of a sudden, you get all that price, there Incentive to get a lot of oil to the market, and hence the shale gale. So when we finally came out of the Great Recession, not only did Venezuela get hit a lot harder than the United States, now the United States is independent, and we, we, we no longer need, needed Venezuelan oil, and the Venezuelan oil and its economy never recovered from that, and that's where we are with Iran at this point. This is a country like Venezuela that, before Hugo Chávez came to power in nineteen ninety-seven, Venezuela was a major oil producer, largest oil reserves in the world, Petróleos de Venezuela, the state oil company, was a very well-run national oil company but Chávez shifted all the economics there, and instead of investing in Petróleos de Venezuela and, and bringing and, and, and growing Venezuela's oil industry, what did he do? He's a socialist. He butchered the mea- Off the cap, so he never inve- never invested back in getting more oil out of Venezuela. He just butchered whatever was there, and they are a fraction of what they w- once were a generation ago. And this is what Iran has been doing, and they've been doing it for longer. Chavez started doing it around two thousand one, two thousand two. The Iranians started doing it as soon as the Mollus came into power in nineteen seventy nine, and they've been butchering that Iranian oil infrastructure. So now what's going to happen now is markets are incredible and they're dynamic and they reinvent themselves. So the world is learning how to grow and not being so depending on Iranian oil. And when we talk about the Strait of Hormuz, what is happening? Well, one of the biggest surprises that's come out of this since the conflict began was the UAE dropped out of OPEC. I didn't have that on my bingo card, and anyone who says they saw that coming, they're lying to you. No one saw that coming. So now we're looking at a UAE, which was the only other marginal swing producer other than Saudi Arabia and OPEC, meaning that they had ex-excess supply to get on the markets. everyone else is essentially maxed out. So the UAE quit OPEC they're doubling the size of their pipeline that's gonna bypass the Strait of Hormuz altogether. Saudi Arabia has already increased its pipeline that crosses the desert there to their export facility in the Red Sea, which will bypass straight to HaMOOS. They already upped it from five to seven million barrels a day. I assure you They're gonna take this lesson and they're gonna increase that even that much more, as will the UAE, which just doubled capacity, it will double it by next year from one point five to about three million barrels a day. So the Strait of Hormuz, which was always recognized as one of the seven critical choke points in the global shipping industry will now cease to be as important as it once was. So the Iranians, their stranglehold right now, it's playing well for them, but the powers that be are going to do what they can to, to to take that power away from Iran. And at the same time, what you're, you're gonna start to see is a tremendous amount of investment, I believe, in Eastern Africa. There's already significant Western production in West Africa, you'll see coming out of East Africa now. You're already seeing it in South America with Guyana, you'll see it more so in Brazil, Argentina and of course here in the United States. So ultimately, capitalism, free markets are, are going to win out. And Iran, just like Venezuela, will be the loser when this, when the dust settles on all of this Yeah, I'm, I'm glad you mentioned even Africa, because I remember at some point during the war there was a shift, there was some chatter about how you know, this was again, I think around the time, it was be-- between the first and the second extension of that exemption to the sanctions for Russia to be able to sell their oil, but this whole idea of going into Africa for some of that oil as an alternative. So I started to notice, you know, that they're doing that. I, I wasn't- I wasn't following close enough to see if they're actually actively now going in and grabbing it going that route. I wanna ask you another question, speaking of how Iran has played, you know, this, this, their hand on this Strait of Hormuz choke, choke point. One of the things that I've repeatedly heard, even from military analysts you know, markets analysts, et cetera, is that, you know, when it comes to insurance, so the insurance markets also seem to be as equally as important as the oil markets, you know, and, and everything else with en- energy. And even the threat at some point, it was even the threat of dropping mines. You know, I was listening to a military analyst saying this, that even that threat Could trigger a response, even if it was fake, fake news. But just saying that there are mines could increase the insurance rates from that threat alone. Also, the environmental threats, because, you know, if you have any kind of kinetic activity going on in the area, i-in a waterway, and you have oil spills, et cetera, I think there were I wanna say, I think there were two, two oil spills, like very contained, a small amount, but I think it impacted just in, in two points. But if this does continue as well, or if there's still uncertainty with it, because there's no, you know, closure on all of this At what point do the markets also stop worrying about the Hormoz? Like you said, perhaps it's working for Iran now and it won't work in the future, but if insurance is also a variable in all of this, how much more realistic are these threats? and at what point do these insurance companies say, "You know what? We're, we're not even insuring anymore if you're going into that area." Aa-and actually, I was just, as I asked that question, I just thought to myself, could that also be part of the leverage? to address some of the issues going on over there, you know, i-if we won't ensure anyone going there, then Salt- Yeah a- absolutely. So so we've effectively s-day one. I, I think the war began on Friday night on February 27th. that was a blockade. We, we, the, the, the the effect was the blockade went in almost immediately. Not, not, not a physical blockade i.e. Drop in mines but a financial blockade that if I-- and so the insurance companies reacted, Lloyd's of-- I mean, re-reacted to this immediately, and then, and then all it takes is one attack, and we, we've seen ships attacked right now in the insurance. So it's the economics, the economics have the blockade, and that more than anything else mine, you know, laying mines or, or, you know, taking a, a rusted VLCC very large crude oil carrier and, and scuttling it in the Strait of Hormuz and, and effectively blocking part of it there's all sorts of different ways you, you can manually blockade the Strait and but laying the mines which the Iranians have, I mean, that, that could be reacted, the US fleet can clear that and, and, and try to prevent that, but what the US mil- what Is lift the economic blockade, and that, that being of course insurance. And then there's always a knock on. So when, when we're calculating a deal to take my production out of Texas and I wanna sell to Europe, I wanna sell, wh-wherever when I'm factoring in my price, okay, I know what, I know what my production price is But what, what, what are the economics of that? And that, and that is going to be the vessel the charter, as we said before, and that's also going to be the insurance also, and, and that's a major ma-major variable cost that has to get factored into every single, every single- If you in if you're by any coast where there, where there's a port, and you see, it doesn't matter if it could be oil, it could be a any sort of freighter, every freighter you see out there, the economics, the cost of moving that freighter, forget the goods on board, just the, the cost of moving it from point A to point B, and being the charter rate, the insurance rate, the fuel cost, so forth. Every deal has, has to go through that process. So so at this point, with, without any sort of Clarity on on, I can move a freighter through, but the Iranian said I can do it, but are they gonna attack anyway? Well, the, the bean counters at the insurance companies are gonna factor in what is that risk, and they're gonna charge that premium accordingly, and the, and that premium, and according, a premium is going to effectively queer the econ- especially now. Now, there, there might be, there might have been a case to be made when this started, where Oman crude was trading at a hundred and seventy dollars a barrel, or even Brent crude was trading at a thirty dollar premium to what the, what the futures market was saying. Maybe the economics were there, but even those markets have recessed, and, and I'll, and I'll, I'll- I'll say that I doubt the economics are there. So until there, there's any sort of resolution, and, and so as we said before, you asked the question of, you know, what, what would I be looking at? Well, one is the spreads, as we said that this location, what we wanna see is a normalization in the forward curve, and also what we'd wanna see is a normalization in the chartering cost and the, and the, the freight insurance cost. And once we start to see a relaxation those markets then we'll have like, this is a real potential lasting piece. Other than that, we're, we're just, we're, we're just hoping at this point. Yeah, it seems like there's a, a, a lot of people, a lot of business and industry making decisions on hope, maybe trying to predict what that's gonna look like. I, I wanna kind of We have just a couple more minutes. I, I just wanna spend one last thought on, on one particular point here. Just before we went live, there were additional reports, although some of these, you know, are unconfirmed, but, you know, we're hearing them from multiple sources. I was looking at this around those frozen Iranian funds. So these reports, there was a report that there was a, a, an aircraft arriving in Tehran's Mehrabad Airport from the UAE, you know, with the speculation about some kind of economic arrangement or three billion dollars Of cash that arrived, and now this is given, it, it was the only aircraft that landed. Again, these are just reports, right? But if true you know, if these reports ultimately prove to be accurate, markets, d-- how are the markets reacting? Because it kinda seems like, you know, they would perhaps begin to think about the world where Iranian crude returns more fully to the global markets, Iran got some of the money that they wanted, you know, there's gonna be perhaps, you know- Some sanctions lifted. How, how do you see that actually impacting what we see now right now, given that critics also argue that traders may be pricing these barrels that don't actually exist yet, based on-- Again, I don't wanna go back to the whole headline conversation, but, you know? But if this actually proves to be true, the sanctions are lifted and Iran has, you know, that the Strait is open, it's open, and you know, they have the billions of cash that they want, huh? You know, what does that do to the markets right now? How, how do, how do people engage in that when Iran could potentially enter the global market again? Yeah, ab- absolutely. and if that happens, but and I think a futures market is what you're speculating on the future. Demand, s-supply of oil and certainly that, that could be a one of the drivers that is helping to keep prices muted. I read that, I'm just gonna go look at my screen today 'cause the market you don't wanna- See here. Okay, yeah, so we had gotten down as low as, and this is the Nymex the WTI market, we had gotten down to as low as in the spot market, eighty-five dollars and ninety-five cents. Last week, we peaked at almost ninety, we peaked at ninety-seven dollars a barrel. So we were, we were already off more than ten dollars a barrel. Now we came up, we, we rallied a little bit in the afternoon, likely on that headline of the Apache going down and a potential, a US reaction. But if, I, I'm gonna look at, to, to answer the question, I'm gonna look at it more from a John-- I mean, I know I'm supposed to look at, oh, what's the market gonna react? So, but, but I'm just giving you Steven Shorke's kind of common sense here, it's what we saw with the UAE, i-is, is really interesting, and, and so that's why I'm gonna look at this this report, if it's landing, we're gonna start with the jaundiced eye here because it always-- one, one of the things that, that really struck me, and I thought was odd, is when this started, is why did Iran- Okay, you're, you're going after US military assets, I get that. You're going after Israel, I, I get that. Why was Iran going after infrastructure in Qatar, in the UAE, in Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait and so forth? That, that, that didn't make sense. So and then so one thing led to another, and part of it is the UAE was, was hit particularly hard. Now, the UAE it's been recognized, I mean, these were-- this is the financial system that- That launder a lot of Iranian dark money. Why is Iran going after their financial backer as, as it were? And my takeaway is, well, the UAE's already back, or, or, already walked away from Iran. And then you, so that, that was like a, like we, we looked for little flags, and that was a little flag that if Iran is going heavily after the UAE, well, the UAE's already sent a message to Iran, you can't count on us. And then about two months ago we had LAL, the national airline for the state for Israel. they're the only airline that was open. All the Western air, every other airline, you know, ceased operations flying to Israel or suspended operations to Israel. And then about a month and a half ago, the UAE said, "Okay, Emirates said, we're gonna start flying to Israel again." I thought that was really interesting. And then about a week later it's announced that the UAE is pulling out of OPEC. So my takeaway here is regardless of these reports of planes flying, you know, what, what is potentially on that plane? Let, let's look at some of kind of the facts that we had. The, the UAE has been bombed heavily by Iran. The UAE is resuming flights to Israel. There was actually reports of an Israeli air defense team in UAE. Think about that. Israeli soldiers on Arab land installing a, a pro-protective shield, as it were. Open cooperation, right? Their Iron Dome that they got, I think it was just-- So, so open cooperation, no, no, there's always cooperation between the Arab states and Israel, but, but that's, that's always under the table. Now we have an overt cooperation between an Arab state and, and, and the Jewish state which again, very interesting, and, and then now the UAE quitting OPEC. So there, there's a sh-- there's there's underlying, there's a shift going on in the market that, that, you know, you have to kind of like, again, pick Trump, put a muzzle on him, just don't, put an earplug, just don't listen to anything he says. same with the Iranians, 'cause the Iranians are just gonna- Do sit the opposite of what Trump's gonna say, so you can't listen to them. But you kind of look at, at s-some of the, the important players in that, and I think the open coordination between the UAE and Israel is something that is telling me, all right, this is, this isn't, this isn't George Bush's misadventures in the Middle East in the early two thousands or, or the, or Osama bin Laden's invasion of Kuwait in the early nineteen nineties. This, this is a different dynamic that, that- We don't know how-- we don't know the game plan here, and there's a lot of behind-the-scenes stuff that, that's taking place, and some of the stuff that's just punching you in the face is, is what we're seeing in the UAE. So if the, if the reports are true, the speculation of that what was on that perhaps, but I would look at more from a standpoint what, what do we want? We, we, we, we, we want peace. I mean, the people, the Arabs, the, they, they, they want, they want peace, they want prosperity, they want an opportunity and if it's some sort of of a, a growth, of, okay, and let's bring Iran, not, not the mullahs, I mean, but let's bring Iran into, into, into the fold. it's a, a Culture there that would add a trem-- in a, in a peaceful setting would add a tremendous amount to, to, to the, to, to, to wor- to the world in general. So perhaps this is what's being priced in. But I, I'm, I'm skeptical that we went through all of this. Iran took out seventeen percent of Qatar's natural gas production, which, as you alluded to before, which natural gas into fertilizers and the, and, and other important petrochemical feedstocks. did Qatar really take a seventeen percent hit? It's gonna take three to five years to get back to where they were just this past January in the market share they're now gonna lose to the United States over the next three to five years. Did Qatar really take that hit? Did the UAE really take this hit? Are the economies in China and, and, and India and the, the further Asian countries, did they really take this hit just so we could go back to status quo Iran just kicking the can down the road in pursuit of a nuclear weapon? I hope we didn't, because a tremendous amount of, of, of, of life and treasure has just been sacrificed over the past four months, and I have to think there's gonna be something above and beyond of just, "Oh, we're just gonna, you know, make nice with Tehran, and we're gonna go back to where we were in January what was it August twenty-fourth It's February twenty-fourth, that Friday before. I don't think we're returning there, so and I think the, and if the market's pressing that, look, I'm not gonna argue with the market. I follow the market, I trade the market. I'm not gonna say I'm smarter than the market, but I can also sit back from a common sense and go, "Like, it doesn't make sense that so much has been risked to this point just for us to go back to where we were in February." I, I feel like I end every single one of these lives, these, these interviews with, I guess we'll have to wait and see. It remains to be seen, right, Steven? I, I wanna thank you so much for spending your, your hour with me and we'll be following this closely and, and I hope to get to see you again to, to see what happens on the other side of this, hopefully. Thank you. I hope so. Alright, very well. Alright. Thank you so much. You have a great day. Okay, bye.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
INTERVIEW: Col. Larry Wilkerson, fmr Chief of Staff to Colin Powell, is worried Iran may already have a nuke. Enjoy this conversation, and great analysis of yesterday’s call between Trump and Netanyahu. https://t.co/d7RP9pyxPY
Video Transcript AI Summary
A discussion centers on a report that Trump allegedly called Netanyahu an “effing idiot” during a tense phone call, with claims that Netanyahu received U.S. permission for an operation involving Beirut that was intended as a “bluff” with an evacuation order rather than actual bombing. The conversation explores whether Netanyahu could have obtained authority to strike Beirut through other officials in the U.S. administration without Trump’s direct approval, emphasizing how leaders can “work the system” via gaps between decision-makers.
The colonel argues that the characters and relationships among decision-makers heavily shape national security outcomes, citing volatile leadership dynamics and describing how powerful political figures can conflict even when both consider each other “indispensable.” He links Netanyahu’s increasing vulnerability to domestic political setbacks, including the Knesset moving elections up, and to attacks from political opponents using Netanyahu’s perceived responsiveness to Trump’s instructions as a weapon. According to the discussion, Netanyahu initially seemed likely to follow Trump’s guidance about Lebanon, but the issue escalated across Jerusalem through diplomatic and political spillover, leading Netanyahu to reverse course and return to a “warpath” posture in Lebanon.
The speakers discuss how rhetoric may diverge from action, and then broaden into a broader pattern: opponents are portrayed as escalating pressure by citing Netanyahu’s listening to the U.S. president in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Iran, accusing him of not securing enough U.S. action. The colonel also points to Netanyahu’s use of terminology described as invoking “final solution” and says the phrase about completing the Iran mission “in a way that constitutes a final solution” is “nasty terminology,” while stating a hope that it is being used as material to “bluff.”
Another major thread claims that Pakistan has moved toward China and Iran as its preferred alignment, with a described arrangement involving Pakistan’s ISI and the military and a transfer or provision of nuclear weapons capabilities to Iran, framed around AQ Khan’s network and Pakistan’s nuclear history. The discussion claims that logistics networks connecting rail and ports (including a Chinese rail route into Iran and maritime routes) support Hezbollah and Iran’s resupply, especially for ballistic missiles, and argues that the Strait of Hormuz situation is being worsened by continued confrontation rather than contained by it, with the claim that many ships have passed after paying tolls and that Iran would benefit if it gained full control.
The speakers criticize what they describe as a lack of direct diplomacy with Iran, arguing that third-party communications and intermediaries have replaced real talks, and describe Iran responding more aggressively in Lebanon by freezing talks, threatening strikes on Israeli forces inside Lebanon, and issuing evacuation orders for northern Israel.
The conversation also discusses whether Iran could develop or already have the capability to match warheads to missiles quickly and whether Iran might conduct a nuclear test as a warning to the U.S. and Israel to deter further strikes. A point is raised that openly demonstrating could force Trump into escalation, while another perspective suggests Iran might focus on deterrence vis-à-vis Netanyahu. The dialogue extends into nuclear deterrence and first-strike capability debates, alongside references to U.S. nuclear posture thinking and the idea that some in the U.S. government argue for using nuclear weapons rather than relying solely on deterrence.
In closing, the conversation turns briefly to Ukraine and NATO, with a claim that Putin is seriously considering striking NATO and an argument that a “Not a penny more” approach from Trump could pressure Zelensky and NATO allies toward an outcome without needing NATO strikes. The host also plans to bring up the nuclear-warning-shot discussion with an upcoming guest and references a Pakistani-source report that Iran may already have a nuclear weapon and might do a test to deter further attacks.
Full Transcript
Well, let's start with there, Colonel. what was your reaction when you first saw that report? Of just for the audience, we were just talking about the report of Trump allegedly calling Netanyahu an effing idiot. What are you doing? You'd be in jail without me. Everyone hates you. Everyone hates Israel. What the eff are you doing? Says according to Axios. And and Channel 12 col- I think not Channel 12, one of the Israeli media outlets also corroborated that there was a very tense call, but Yeah, that, that was one of the things I was reading just before we went on and I was trying to figure out exactly what they were hiding. I don't think it's unusual, given what I've heard before about one or two phone calls and one or two meetings that they had. Trump gets volatile, volcanic might be a better term with him from time to time. I really don't think, looking back on Trump's career and his association with Bibi, he likes him very much. And I'm not at all sure BB likes Donald either, but both of them realize the other is indispensable to them. And BB said, "I misheard, sorry, you said Trump doesn't like BB much." Yeah, yeah. Okay, I misheard. Okay. Yeah, that, that's what I'm getting from friends of Trump, if you will, friends of friends of Trump, and others who've left him and are, you know, whispering in my ear. and I, I can understand that because in many respects, with some vast differences of course Of course, they're similar characters, and similar characters usually have difficulty with one another when they are in great positions of power. at least that's been my experience. You know, I taught this. I taught that the people in the decision-making process in states were more important than all the processes, more important than all the money, more important than anything else you think impacts decision-making, particularly national security decision-making, is the characters involved in it. And so they, they create a, a, a volatile mixture sometimes FDR is a great study in that regard, in there so long and so many different people, and then that last term when he was really telling everybody stories all the time Lying really, but he was doing it, it's stupidly about who was gonna be vice president and so forth, 'cause he knew he was dying, and he knew that the person he selected out of the thirteen that started and the six that it boiled down to, and then the three, he knew that person was gonna be president. And, you know, FDR was the kind of person who would think, I think, very rightfully so, perhaps This can't happen because no one can handle it as well as I can. And then he went, he did exactly what the doctor told him he was gonna do and died. good thing he picked Harry Truman too when you look at the rest of the list. The rest of the list probably wouldn't have-- So it's the people in the system, and this is showing it in vivid terms, I think, now. And what it's also showing is how desperate Bibi Netanyahu is becoming, because now the Knesset has passed- That's the first wicket on moving the elections up, which is disadvantageous to him, and he has people coming out now and attacking him on issues that he's very vulnerable on, like he's listening to President Trump And President Trump told him to stop what he's doing in Lebanon, and it seemed at least momentarily that Bibi was gonna go along with it. Man, it ricocheted all the way across Jerusalem, and LePew picked it up, and e-everyone who's standing in Netanyahu's path, if you will, either blocking him or no longer a confidant or a friend or been hurt by him or interested in replacing him is now seeing blood, smelling blood. And so it's getting dicey for BB, and Trump waits in and has a phone call like this, I'm sure that added to his angst. And he, he immediately reversed himself, apparently, if, if I'm reading the teles right, he told Trump he would do something that I think he was at least remotely sene-sincere doing, that is watching what he was doing in Lebanon with a, with a much more careful eye, and then he got these attacks. You can't let- Let the American president, no matter who it is, tell you how to run our state, let alone run our security. And they're very, very barbed attacks, and he's very vulnerable to them. So now he's back on the warpath again in Lebanon. Yeah, that's, that's what, what's exactly, that's the reports we're hearing. It's hard to differentiate the rhetoric, like, "We're gonna do this, we're gonna do that," versus action, like, are they going to actually do it? the- There were, there's two questions I have. First, there was a one report, I think it was Channel 12 or 13 or 14, there's so many of these channels, that said that the way this went ahead was there was a call initially, and that was true, that Netanyahu got the permission from Trump, but the permission wasn't to strike Beirut, the permission was to bluff That they're gonna strike Beirut, issue an evacuation order, and then what Netanyahu did was kind of find a way and maybe spoke to another official to get the authority on delivering on the threat, but Trump didn't okay that last part, actually bombing Beirut. He okayed everything up to the ev-evacuation. And then when Trump found out, sorry, yeah, when Trump found out that Netanyahu was gonna actually bomb Beirut, that's when he called him and, and had that very tense call. is that possible? Is that how-- So one of my guests told me they were spec What happens probably Netanyahu spoke to Rubio or Hextath or someone else in the administration and got the authority to strike Beirut, kind of was a bit slimy about it without Trump's okay. Is it possible, could something happen without the Trump's okay to that level? Yes, it could. you work the system if you're a, a leader in the world, especially an ally, you work the system to find the, the spots where if something happens with the- Big guy, and you don't like it or you don't wanna comport with it, you don't want to even follow it in any way, fashion, or form, then you find one of those people whom you can later blame if you have to, who will give you the leeway to do what you need to do, maybe because he doesn't know what the president has said, or, and Netanyahu's not about to tell him what he said, or they're operating at cross purposes, and I would submit right now that Marco Rubio is Operating from time to time at Croft's purposes with what the rest of the administration, as it were, wants. Because, a-and you're gonna see increasingly the Vice President doing that too, I think, because I think he knows he's been put out to pasture. Fields, Fields going down to Argentina may be the biggest indicator of him having been put out to pasture. so you're gonna have more and more fighting between these two pachyderms, if you will, I dare not- I call them that, they aren't that powerful, but Rubio and, and, and, and the Vice President. And you're gonna have more dissension amongst the decision makers and their advisors because when things get really tense, that's what builds, and it builds to the point where your enemy, your friend, your neutral can, if he knows anything about Washington, can take advantage of it. It's called wading, wading into the cracks. It's, it's just so wild seeing how the system works. Let me give you the outside. Let me give you an example. Powell comes back, Colin Powell comes back from the National Security Council meeting with Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor, H.W. Bush, the President Jim Baker, the Secretary of State, all good buddies, all friends, one of the most collegial decision-making teams I've ever seen or studied, and he comes back and he says First thing he does, he picks up the phone and he calls the most powerful man with regard to this issue, Saddam Hussein having invaded Kuwait, in the Senate, Sam Nunn of Georgia, who himself is running for president, he thinks, the next time around, and who has aspirations to that effect, even if he wasn't gonna run that time, and he, he tells him what has happened in the meeting because the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has two responsibilities. He has responsibility to the The President of the United States and his boss, the Secretary of Defense, and he has responsibility to the Congress of the United States. It's a very difficult road to hoe sometimes to be honest and loyal to both of them, as we've seen in testimonies and other things. So Powell calls right away to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn of Georgia, and he tells him, basically, we decided we're gonna throw sanctions massively at them, there'll be no use of military force. Sam Nunn goes out and starts spreading that word in the Congress. A few hours later, President Bush has changed his mind and he says on TV, and I happened to be in the office when Powell was watching CNN, it's about the only thing we watch then, TV right in the chair of office, and Bush says, "This invasion will not stand." And Powell looks at me and he says, "I think I just got new orders." And sure enough, he, he did. And of course, none is spreading the word in the Congress is gonna be sanctions and no war and everything and looking like a fool. So that creates a, a new animosity between the chairman and the Congress, particularly none, and that animosity doesn't even go away until the confirmation hearing for Chairman Powell's second two years in office, and it's a bitter hearing. It's so fascinating. And so you do believe that Trump would have called Netanyahu and had that tense call, but my question then is, how significant is that? Because I've seen similar reports about Biden and Netanyahu, where Biden is criticizing him, say, I can't remember the terms that were used. and having a very tense discussion. There's the famous quote by Bill Clinton, "Who the, who the, who the fuck does he think he is? Who's the superpower here?" Something along those lines telling his aide about Netanyahu, and also a lot of reports about heated exchanges between Obama and Netanyahu, but that wasn't as prevalent in the press. So then one of my guests told me that Mario, like, "You see that in the press, you see that in the rhetoric, but when it comes to action, it doesn't amount to much." Is, is that true It is in effect, I think, because Netanyahu's gonna do what he wants to do and what he feels like he needs to do, both politically and national security-wise, and these things are coming together now because his opponents, his most likely opponents, are successfully using his listening to the US president rather than listening to Israel's needs as a weapon against him. And they're using it all over. They're using it in the Gaza struggle, they're using it in the West Bank struggle. They're using it in big time in the Lebanon struggle, and they're using it in the Iran struggle because they're accusing him of not doing what he needed to do to convince the United States to go whole hog. So he's in political trouble right now, he's in hot water, and he's gonna do whatever is necessary for his survival first. This is what I think is the dastardly thing about Netanyahu, and Israel survival, survival second, which brings me back full course now to the Comments he made about the final solution, using Hitler's own terms. What does the final solution mean when you say it, BB? Does it mean you're thinking about using nuclear weapons? When did he say that? About two days ago, in one of these- We must complete the mission in Iran in a way that constitutes a final solution. Yeah. Oh. Nasty terminology to use, 'cause you know he knows that terminology. What do you think it means? I think he's, I hope he's using it as, as material to bluff with. It's a powerful bluff. There's another instrument coming into, or, or another issue coming into play here now, though. Work at the Eisenhower Media Network and other places like that have pretty good information, as do others, that Pakistan has finally decided which side of the bread it is gonna butter the most, and that side is China and alternatively, Iran because of China's interest in Pakistan or interest in Iran. And so what's happened in the last forty-eight hours? Is a blood seal deal between the ISI, the Pakistani military. I have no idea where the Pakistani civilian leadership is because it's not really powerful right now which is usual in Pakistan. Imran Khan, Imran Khan gone got a figurehead in there, so to speak. And that deal includes Iran, you need a nuclear weapon, you got it. Okay, can you repeat, can you explain that further? I've heard someone mention that before, but I, I'd love to, I don't expect you to say it. We don't want that. When you say it, it has more, more weight. Well, the word is, we have lots of nuclear weapons, you know we do, you know we produced the father of the Islamic bomb, bomb, bomb, AQ Khan. we have one for you if you need it, and that has been very reassuring. I've been doing a map survey of the railroad that comes in from essentially the almost about Seven hundred kilometers, maybe, I think right at the border, it's the mountain town, Mashhad. It comes in there and it goes almost due west to Tehran. This is the Chinese railroad that comes out of Western China, goes through Central Asia, weaving through all the key capitals, and then comes into Iran. Then I looked at the ports that would be used on the Caspian, the southern ports, and the ports in the north that Russia would use, and you look at it and you say, "Well, I understand where Hezbollah is getting all of its weaponry, and I understand where Iran is getting a lot of its logistics support, and probably lots of other things too, like artillery, tanks, whatever it needs." probably mostly ballistic missile and ballistic missile replenishment, because it doesn't seem to have a whole lot of interest in a ground military, other than the kind of military it threw up against Saddam Hussein when they had human wave attacks and that sort of things in the long war it had with Iraq. So you look at these logistics, and anybody will tell you logistics is the essence of victory, you look at it and you have to say that, Donald, you've lost. You've lost, and if anybody is m- yeah, there you go. If anybody is making any sense of this in the Pentagon, some colonel, some lieutenant colonel, maybe some general, I don't know, they don't seem to be very competent strategic thinkers of late, or Hicks has gotten rid of them if they are. If they're making any sense of this at all, they've gotta be saying to the president, "Get out, get out, shut this down, and get out," because the odds are just- Yeah, the odds are just stacking up so dramatically against any kind of success in this war, and they're, they're stacking up for a resounding defeat, even if you leave a foot in it or you even look like you're concerned with it, like staying around the Strait of Hormuz. the, the Strait, as was been proved in the last forty-eight hours Three hundred and three hundred or something, or thirty, thirty-five, I guess it was, key ships, but more than that have gotten through, and they've all gotten through 'cause they paid the toll and steamed out, and they weren't supporting Israel. so if, if you look at what would happen were Iran to have complete control of the Strait, it's better than what happens when we contest that control, because we can't make a complete blockade, we can't close it off, we don't have the forces to do it. So we're Actually making the situation that Iran is curing, the situation that we might have global recession or even depression, we're making it worse. Iran's making it better, and the world recognizes this. So the pressure on Donald Trump is gonna become enormous if he doesn't shut this down. And he's, he's gotta find some face-saving way to do it, but he's gotta shut it down. It looks like he's trying, no? Yes, it does. It does, but he's not having any diplomacy at all, which is what we really are doing. We, we don't have any diplomacy. He, he said it, he said it himself, you know, "I don't care about the diplomacy, it wasn't working anyway." Well, it's not working 'cause we don't have any diplomacy. We aren't sitting down across from our interlocutors on the other side of the table, Persians, Iranians, and having serious talks. Everything is third party, everything is- Fears say, everything gets injected with whatever that good office offerer wants to inject it with, and it's not diplomacy. So we haven't had one moment of diplomacy with Iran since this started, not real diplomacy. Can I go back to your, to your reference of Pakistan? So you think that, that might have been discussions between Pakistan and Iran where Pakistan would have offered nuclear weapons to Iran as a last resort? I don't even think it's a last resort. I think, I think AQ Khan's dream, the father of the Islamic bomb, AQ Khan's dream, very powerful dream for a time there, was to make sure the Muslim world had a counter to what the white Christian world had, and that counter would have to be nuclear to make it any meaningful instrument at all. And so he was busy putting the bomb wherever he could put it, not totally in the, in the Islamic world, but he was putting it in places where he could. Just for the audience just for maybe tell them just briefly for the context, A.Q. Khan, the father of the nuclear weapon, he sold it to multiple countries. Yeah. Yeah. And he, he's the one that gave Pakistan its bomb and then started Spreading the wealth, if you will. we spent lots of time and lots of effort trying to stop that and, and did a fairly successful job of it with everyone from Gaddafi to, well, essentially everyone that was looking at it in a substantial way, like South Africa, like Argentina, like Libya either backed off or was compelled to back off. And more important than that, we got all the NATO countries, for example. Who were providing help? France, Germany, and others. Now, we never dug deeply enough, I didn't dig deeply enough, the intelligence people I was working with didn't dig deeply enough, I don't know, they never told me, I don't know, but their governments knew. It was concerns, corporate concerns, big concerns, people that made miraging steel and centrifuges and magnets and things all necessary to reprocessing facilities and to uranium enrichment, who were selling to this network, knowingly selling to this network, and many of them who were challenged directly or indirectly said, "Well, we didn't know it was going for nuclear weapons. Those things are also used in you know, whatever industrial..." Machinery or whatever, dual use stuff. For which network, which network you're referring to here? The AQ Khan network? This was AQ Khan, yeah. He had buyers all over the place getting components for these weapons. Which countries did he help? I, I remember reading about it a long time ago. Beyond helping Pakistan develop nukes, which other countries did he play a big role in helping? I know he tried with a few. I, I think he helped Marketly, until the Soviet scientists at the end of the Cold War decided to unass Russia and go to Pyongyang, North Korea they got most of their help after that from the Russians dissident Russian scientists who were making lots of money until Gorbachev came along and shut things down. Well, they went all over the world He did probably some significant work with Gaddafi, but we happened to do better work, I think, and we talked Gaddafi out of it. He did some very good work with other countries, but not to the point where they actually started a program. And I think the, the biggest disincentive there, and I'm just talking off the cuff here because I'm remembering some of these briefings and I can't say something about a lot of it. But my appreciation of it was the cost, was the disincentive, and they realized how much it costs to really have a viable twenty-four-seven nuclear program, either uranium-based or plutonium-based, God forbid. Now the cost has come down a little bit because you've got countries like Japan that were producing tons and tons of plutonium in their type of reactor, which they would ship to France, and France would use as fuel in its reactors. Very nuclearized country there. Two, France. One of the problems we had after nine eleven was these ships were going on the high seas from Japan to France with no security to speak of, and we just knew one of them was gonna get hit in a dirty bomb built out of the plutonium being carried in the ship. So we sort of started at that time the tracking of the ships and even on one or two occasions, fast roping down onto the ship and taking it over, but we always did it in concert with international law We would call the flagging country and tell them what we were gonna do. If they objected, we would say, "Well, tough, we're gonna do it anyway because we suspect that there's plutonium about to be stolen on that ship." We never did have a successful rope down. We did find some weapons several times and drugs several times, as you might imagine, but we always did it in accordance with international law. We didn't, in other words, kill two hundred people in the Pacific and the Caribbean without any due process whatsoever, while at the same time- At the same time we were doing that, we had the Southern Command commander go before the Congress the other day and say we have not influenced the input of drugs into the United States one iota. We haven't influenced the price on the street, we haven't influenced the volume, it's still the same, so why are we killing these people? but we started that in the Bush administration. We started tracking ships and fast roping down on them from helicopters and searching them for contraband and such. And the main reason was we were very frightened of Al Qaeda building a dirty bomb which is of course not as powerful as a real nuclear weapon, but it can really do a job on a municipal area if you place it right and you build it right. You can get a lot of people with it and a horrible death too. So that was a big concern still a big concern really, but not so much because a lot of terrorists, I think terrorist organizations with the capability, there aren't a lot with the capability to do this, have sort of fallen off that because there are other things to do, especially if they're local, if they're regionalized in their objectives, like Hezbollah, they don't have any truck with us unless we're in their face in the region. They're not gonna kill Americans, their interest Which is Israel. so the only time Hezbollah is ever coming in contact with us in a negative way is when we get in their face somewhere in Lebanon or Israel or whatever. Eighty-two forty years ago. Yeah. Yeah, and Israel got a big lesson there that it apparently forgot, because it's kinda doing the same thing again, looking like it might try to invest the entire state of Lebanon. I can't believe Erdogan won't let that happen either. I just can't. I, I-- And then we're talking about would that, would that what happen? Erdogan won't let what happen? Wouldn't let Israel take Lebanon, completely take it. I wonder what we would do, you know, we just built one of the most expensive, largest complexes in Lebanon. I forgot about that, yeah, you're right, you're right. It's the biggest embassy in the Middle East. Yeah, it's, it's an intelligence center, is what it is, from Mossad, MI6, and CIA. The ambassador sits there and says, "What have I got back there?" It's interesting, Turkey hasn't done much in Lebanon, it's mainly been Iran And Saudi, from what I understand, so Turkey, like it's still waiting there. Do you-- There's a lot of people talking about Israel, you know, there's that guy Pollard talking about how Turkey is a new threat in Egypt. Right. This- This, there's no way this is serious. This is just talk by a minority, a fringe voices trying to get clicks. It's not really-- Is there really a concern that there could be a problem between Israel and Turkey directly? Well, you have to throw into that bin of loonies, if you will, the US ambassador to Jerusalem, because when he waxed eloquent about what Israel was doing, he waxed from Turkey all the way to Africa. That was, that was the mission. Of the ultra-Zionists. And Huckabee, Huckabee acted like he was in full concert with that mission because he came right out of Genesis. This is our ambassador. Talk about that interview, the interview he did with Tucker, yeah? Right. It, it's-- no, this is different. This is when he made the statement from his seat in Jerusalem as the US ambassador to Israel. It was an interview, I think, with the Jerusalem Post or something like that. And he just- Just said it outright didn't retract it afterwards either. Now, you can say that, that's nonsense, that's the ultra-Zionists, that's the people like John Hagee and others who support Israel through thick and thin Huckabee being one of them, but there is a there's a strain in Israel-based thinking that says, "All right," Is much bigger than where we are presently located. It usually doesn't include Turkey, though. Now, how could that statement must be an exception? No, I think, I think, I think Netanyahu would say it would have to-- I mean, he's, he's a sh-- he's a shrewd thinker. It would have to include Turkey if he thought Erdogan would object to Lebanon. Lebanon, it definitely includes. All of it? All just the South? All of it, all of Lebanon. That's the only way you really make sure that you have no future problems with Lebanon, and no future problems with terrorists coming into their, their version of terrorists, their view of terrorists coming into Lebanon using it, because it's so strategically placed. And you have to remember the history, Lebanon was once the pearl of the Mediterranean. It was once the, the entrepreneurial center, certainly of the Eastern Mediterranean Mediterranean, and I would say the whole Mediterranean. It had a reputation, it was the Paris of the Mediterranean. And Israel has made it a point of periodic bombing of Lebanon under the guise of hunting terrorists like Hezbollah, in order to destroy Lebanese infrastructure so that they can't rebuild that entrepreneurial, dynamic business center of the eastern Mediterranean. Clearly understandable from the same perspective that we'd be doing the same thing to China if we could do it. How best to, you know, defeat your enemy than destroy his infrastructure from which all his power comes? But China has become so powerful that that's not possible, and we just don't do that very well these days, and we don't do it very well especially eight thousand, nine thousand miles away from home. On the Pakistan possibility that Pakistan offered Iran nukes. So Pakistan's economy is very vulnerable, and they do need some sort of hedge, they need some sort of guarantees, because if the US turns around and just lashes out at Pakistan, Pakistan is a very vulnerable country economically. You think they would have gotten some sort of guarantees or permission from China? Because I don't think they'd do it otherwise. Iran is economically in a difficult position too. That's the question of the hour, I think, for Pakistan. The-- they have been vacillating and they've been lying about that vacillation, if the word I'm getting is right, to both sides, between China and the United States. They don't want to divest themselves, as it were, from either state. And so they did put on hold China's build out of that massive port that they were building in the southern part of Pakistan, which was very much a part of that particular base road initiative. They put that on hold, all, all the development is stopped. Which one, which port is, which port is that, sorry? It's, it's the big one that China was building on the southern coast of Pakistan. It's, it's already a, it's already a port for Pakistan, but they were, you know how they do, they were coming in and they were building it out. It was gonna be a, a place for Chinese submarines, I think, Chinese ships, other things. A huge port, kinda like the one they built on the western side of South America in Peru. And it's, as I understand it, was pushed out, it was put on hold. It's not stopped, it's just put on hold, and the Chinese have been very circumspect about making any really forceful objections to it, but at the same time, they were making overtures to the United States about keeping the relationship the ISI and the military had, civilian government be damned, they don't care anymore with this, with the United States, and so they're walking both Roads right now. They're trying to maintain good rela- and you can say, if you wanna be really pragmatic, you can say they're waiting to see if the United States really implodes. Yeah, true. And there's a lot looking at it, a lot of the rest of the world too. Exactly, exactly, exactly. If that happens, they wanna have everything ready, you know, everything ready to say, "Beijing, here we are." Everyone's hedging, everyone's starting to hedge right now. Exactly, exactly. Exactly. The port is you're referring to is the Gwadar port. Yeah, yeah, that's it. You, you keep referencing Imran Khan, such a shame. He was such a good leader for his country, at least I see him as such. I've interviewed him, I know him, his family, I've interviewed his family, his kids. Sad what's happening to him. Have you met him before? I met him, I met him briefly. the Pakistani leader I met at length was Bhutto, and sadly the last time I met her was about a And we, in that meeting, a four-star Navy admiral, a three-star Army general, myself, several other people, a couple of civilians that were that kind of rank in the civilian world, we all told her as she was leaving, "Be careful." I mean, everybody did, "Be careful, be careful." Amen. It's a sad, sad the country what it goes through. Pakistan's been through a lot. okay, so w-with that, with that because I can talk about Pakistan for, for a while as well, 'cause I've covered it extensively in the last few years. Asim, I'm not a-- Asim Munir isn't a big fan of mine. Maybe he's changing now, but I'm sure he wasn't a fan before. I interviewed Imran Khan a few months before he got arrested, and then we didn't, we didn't like, we Oh, yes, we did. Exactly, exactly, exactly, exactly. just going back to the Iran thing, so you're saying Trump should be, should be, should go out of it as soon as possible. Since we last spoke a few days ago, is it looking more or less likely Trump will be able to pull out? Less, but I don't know how, I, I don't know how anything else happens other than disaster. I mean, it's If he doesn't extricate himself in some way that, with him, it has to be some way that he can accept, and some way that Sustains the Republican possibilities in the Congress for the midterms, if they happen, and sustains his possibility of being sustaining for that to happen, then he's gotta get out, and he's gotta get out in a way that doesn't mar him too badly. If people right now aren't talking about, he's gonna deflect attention people, he's gonna go down to Cuba and do the thing down there. He's gonna snatch Raúl and, and that's gonna, you know, light up the fireworks and everything, and everyone forgets about Iran. Just like Maduro, yeah. Just like, captured him. It was a crazy story of, of, of, for, for many years, and then suddenly everyone forgets about it. And he's, he's in jail thinking, "Why no one paying attention to me anymore? I don't even make the, the, the third page on the newspaper anymore." And we still are trying to figure out if Chevron's gonna, I think it's Chevron, is gonna go ahead with that deal because they're the only multinational that even bit. And they're, they're having problems with the people as I understand it, they're having problems with the very people that Maduro was having problems with. Just one other thing, I forgot to ask you, what's your an-what's your interpretation of the, the way Iran responded to the Israeli threats to strike Beirut? That was similar to how they reacted with Project Freedom. They're reacting in a much more aggressive way, in a much more forceful way when it comes to Lebanon. They froze the talks and then threatened to strike Israeli forces inside Lebanon and even issued one of their senior advisors to the, the supreme leader, I think, issued evacuation orders for northern Israel. Yes. I think it's Iran using its weight. It's gained some new stature, some new weight, and it's using it, and it's gonna use it as long as it has the ballistic missiles to back it up, and it does. And so you're not just looking at the Houthis at Iran's behest closing the Bab el-Mandeb, or practically speaking, and as I understand it, they pretty much have you're looking at Iran itself. Feeling a new verve, a new s-- a new spirit, a new willingness to use its advantage to further its goals. And the ironic thing about this is we attributed these goals to the IRGC in particular. We, we killed the general, Soleimani. We, we did all manner of things to indicate to the world that Iran was dangerous, that it was moving here, moving there, doing this, doing that. And now, they weren't doing any of that really. They were doing a little bit, but they weren't doing a lot. I'm not even sure they were supporting the Houthis to the extent, Al Ansar to the extent that we, we said. But that notwithstanding, they weren't doing extra regional things or extra Iran things that were truly harmful to the GCC or our interests. Now they are. So not only did we not accomplish what we said we were setting out to accomplish to stop all this extracurricular activity in the region by Iran, we've caused it to be amplified majorly. in fact, we've caused it to go global or to have global ramifications. Put the control of the shared trades, correct? Yeah, yeah. Or a second round of missiles taking out real substantial petroleum and other facilities. Talking about missiles, reports of explosions just reported now near Qasham Island, according to Iran's news outlet, Mehr News. I don't think it's anything significant, but these happen every few days, sounds of explosions, maybe air defenses intercepting a drone, but just thought I'd mention it because of the timing in your statements. another question I have on the news as we, we get close wrapping up is if Iran- Does get a nuke, whether they develop one, I had a guest I can't remember who it is, but a credible guest tell me that Iran may very well have the capabilities. Former military head, head postal, probably. No, wasn't Ted. I haven't had Ted on the show. It was someone else, Ted's been referenced. Yeah, he's been referenced. It's eighty percent or so probability that they, they could match a warhead to a missile and have one in very short time. Yeah, he was referenced, he was referenced before. I'll ask my team, Lisa, if we get Ted Postle if he's, if we book him in or not. He'd be great to have. But the question I have for you, Ken, was if they do have, another guest was talking about the, he had a, a source, a Pakistani source, funny enough, mentioned to him that Iran may actually conduct a nuclear test as a warning shot We've seen that report. For me, do you think they could, because that sounds politically, that doesn't sound like a good idea, 'cause then Trump, it makes Trump look so bad that he has to act on it. It would be better, wouldn't it be better to kind of send that warning? You know, kind of discreetly to, through, through a mediator to American intelligence or diplomats, so it doesn't reach the press as confirmed, but a-achieves its its its objective of be-acting as a deterrent. But when you, you know, openly demonstrate it, that could backfire. You made a good point. I'm not sure how I would feel about that if I were a Persian in a Persian's shoes. I'm sure there's probably some desire to focus on Netanyahu, and that would probably be the issue that would cause them to make a decision like that just to make sure that the deterrent was real with him, because he's the only one, I hope, that might use a nuclear weapon or two on Iran. but you're right, the bigger issue is Trump, and that might put him in an untenable position, one that won't allow him to do anything but escalate. And I, I don't put it completely beyond us. I hope I should, I hope I would, but I don't anymore put it completely beyond us to use our, our weapon stockpile as well. There are people in our government who say things like, "Why do we have them if we can't use them?" Why are we always getting in these conflicts where we don't use our full arsenal? But that's not the point of nuclear weapons, that's the, the, the deterrent. Well, some pe- some people would like to see them become for the empire anyway, war fighting weapons. Dangerous people, I think, but They have a, they have an argument, and their argument is essentially, why do we have them? Why do we possess them if deterrence really doesn't make a whole lot of sense anymore, particularly if we're, we're striving to build first use weapons so that we can preempt everybody else and restore our empire to its full stature? I really hope aliens come to this planet soon, so then we stop attacking each other and we have a common enemy, and we stop bombing each other. Well, there's never been a better time. Deal just went to Argentina to get away from this, right? Exactly, exactly, exactly. well, Colonel, it's, it's always a pleasure to go ahead. There, there, there's, there's some rationale for people like that the Rothschilds, the J.P. Morgans, you know, the, all these people in the past who were the financiers of war, especially big war, they usually figure out how to jump ship when it looks like the main bastion of their wealth might be going down. They, they switch allegiance and they go somewhere else. Yeah, but when you get into nukes, there's nowhere to go. Well, I like to think that, I don't like to think it, I do think it. But there are people who think that nuclear weapons used judiciously. I mean, Pollard wasn't an exceptional person in that regard, if you heard his full testimony or his full spiel on nuclear weapons. Yeah, use fewer nuclear weapons, we should use fewer nuclear weapons. There are people who think that way. There are people right now in our laboratories working with the nuclear posture statement and over a trillion dollars, possibly two to three trillion, once they're through And they think that they can build a first strike capability that would guarantee the United States, if it struck first, not only devastation of its nuclear weapons state enemies, but also the ability to ride out whatever came back, if anything did, because it would be so devastating a first strike. Why do you have to end it on such a note, Colonel? Why do you have to end it on such a note? It's not, I, I don't, I don't care for that thinking at all, but I know it's going on, and I'd, I'd be remiss if I didn't acknowledge it. Well, look, I, I didn't acknowledge the risk of a direct war between Iran and the US. I thought that would be, even Israel and Iran, I thought that wouldn't happen, a-and here we are. And I never thought we'd be stuck in a prolonged conflict war of attrition in Ukraine, Russia, and here we are. Yeah, I never would have thought Putin would be making remarks like it seems he's inevitable in his judgment that he's gonna go to war with NATO. Either. That would be a different, that could, that's something. I know we're out of time, but that's something else I'd love to ask you about because more and more people are starting to mention to me the, I had a guest just before the last guest, a nice, very nice, you might know him and he was telling me, he's a, he's a regular on the show, he's telling me Mario, I really think that Putin's seriously considering striking NATO. just for him to say that, and this isn't someone just gonna, he's, he And he's very convinced about it, and I, we had a debate 'cause I just, I keep telling him I don't think it's necessary, I don't think he needs to. Ukraine is, you know, they don't have the air defense munitions, they're more-- I think with US walking away, Europe being in economic trouble, I think there's enough incentives for them to reach a deal, and there would be some sort of middle ground that, that Putin doesn't need to strike NATO. But he, you know, he made a very good argument, and he's someone You, you remember how Trump many, many moons ago said, "I could stop it in a heartbeat." He could, he could. That's the sad thing about it, he could. He could stop it in its material effect on Russia and therefore stop it in essence, in what it's doing and promising to do even wider, just by simply saying to Zelensky, "Not a penny more." And saying to his NATO allies who would listen to him, which would probably be most of them ultimately, "You don't give me anything else, yourself. And it's over, it's over, because Zelensky can't survive without that, and he's still getting major support from NATO and from Washington." Good, I know you have a call shortly, so it's a pleasure to have you. I'd, I'd love to do this again as soon as you're available again, 'cause there's a lot more to discuss, a lot more to ask you about, and we haven't really done a deep dive on Ukraine yet. We never had that chance because of everything that's happening in West Asia, so I'd love to be able to do this soon. Good, take care. See you again sometime. Thank you, Colonel. I hope. Don't say those words. Stay safe. Stay healthy. Bye, Colonel. Yeah. alright guys, I'll be live again in exactly seven minutes with Anthony Aguilar or Larry Johnson, these are, I don't know who's first. will be Larry Johnson, perfect timing 'cause we, me and Larry were having this discussion, if you remember yesterday, and he had a source, he was the person I was referencing, he had a source. source, a Pakistani source that told them that Iran may already have a nuclear weapon, a nuclear warhead, and they might do a test strike as a warning shot for the US and the rest of the world, the US and Israel to stop striking them, to stay away, so as the ultimate deterrent. So I'll bring that up with him, I'll tell him what Larry Wilkinson just said as well to get his thoughts. So I'll see you live in seven minutes and let me know what you think of the conversation as well, guys. Bye.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇨🇳 Censorship in China is backfiring now that young Chinese are secretly learning about the Tiananmen Square massacre. Even with AI scrubbing every trace of June 4, 1989 from the internet, China’s Gen Z is finding the truth anyway... and often in the weirdest ways! Olympic skater Alysa Liu’s dad was a Tiananmen protester who fled. When she won gold, Chinese netizens exploded: some called him a traitor, others got curious. One 20-year-old Wuhan student dropped a hint on RedNote and her comment got nuked in hours. Teens are stumbling on it through random livestreams and digging behind the firewall. They come out stunned: “I had no idea the protests were that huge” or “my whole worldview just collapsed.” The regime’s total blackout is actually creating curiosity bombs. Young Chinese are horrified when they learn students were shot and tanks rolled over people, and some now want out. Truth will always find cracks. Even the Great Firewall can’t stop it forever. Source: Washington Post
Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker suggests there may be a better way and asks if there is another hospital they can go to via “back street.” They propose taking the bus: hop on, continue, and then hop back on the bus when they reach the next bus stop. The speaker then says, “the guy is down, he’s dead.”
Full Transcript
Maybe there's a better way. I mean, is there another hospital we can take back street to? Okay, well, hop the bus, go on by, and hop back on the bus when we get to the next bus stop. You're you're at the, the guy is down, he's dead.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇨🇳 Marco Rubio: "The CCP ordered its army to attack thousands of peaceful demonstrators. They were murdered for demanding democracy. No censorship can erase history. Those who sacrificed for freedom will one day be vindicated." Tiananmen square 1989
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇨🇳 Today is the 37th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre (also called the June Fourth Incident). The Chinese government deployed the People's Liberation Army to clear pro-democracy demonstrators from Tiananmen Square in Beijing. Troops used force,
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇨🇳 Censorship in China is backfiring now that young Chinese are secretly learning about the Tiananmen Square massacre. Even with AI scrubbing every trace of June 4, 1989 from the internet, China’s Gen Z is finding the truth anyway... and often in the weirdest ways! Olympic skater Alysa Liu’s dad was a Tiananmen protester who fled. When she won gold, Chinese netizens exploded: some called him a traitor, others got curious. One 20-year-old Wuhan student dropped a hint on RedNote and her comment got nuked in hours. Teens are stumbling on it through random livestreams and digging behind the firewall. They come out stunned: “I had no idea the protests were that huge” or “my whole worldview just collapsed.” The regime’s total blackout is actually creating curiosity bombs. Young Chinese are horrified when they learn students were shot and tanks rolled over people, and some now want out. Truth will always find cracks. Even the Great Firewall can’t stop it forever. Source: Washington Post
Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker suggests there may be a better way to get to another hospital via the back street. They propose hopping on the bus, getting off by the next bus stop, and then hopping back on the bus there. The conversation also notes that the “guy is down” and “he’s dead.”
Full Transcript
Maybe there's a better way. I mean, is there another hospital we can take back street to? Okay, well, hop the bus, go on by, and hop back on the bus when we get to the next bus stop. You're you're at the, the guy is down, he's dead.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇨🇳 Marco Rubio: "The CCP ordered its army to attack thousands of peaceful demonstrators. They were murdered for demanding democracy. No censorship can erase history. Those who sacrificed for freedom will one day be vindicated." Tiananmen square 1989
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇨🇳 Today is the 37th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre (also called the June Fourth Incident). The Chinese government deployed the People's Liberation Army to clear pro-democracy demonstrators from Tiananmen Square in Beijing. Troops used force,
reSee.it AI Summary
I talked with Brandon Weichert about claims Trump blocked Netanyahu from striking Beirut, reportedly calling him a “fkn idiot” and warning Netanyahu would be in jail without Trump. I ask whether Trump is truly turning on Bibi or if it’s a facade.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
INTERVIEW: Trump just stopped Netanyahu from striking Beirut, and according to Axios, called him a 'fkn idiot" and warned that Netanyahu would be in jail if it wasn't for Trump. Is Trump turning on Bibi, or is this all a facade? Enjoy my convo with Brandon Weichert @WeTheBrandon
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on conflicting statements attributed to Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump shortly after a call, with Netanyahu saying there would be no ceasefire and operations would continue as normal, while Trump allegedly claimed a full ceasefire would take effect. The speakers argue this contradiction is expected, and they suggest Netanyahu may pause for 24–48 hours but will likely resume operations, framing the conflict as continuing rather than stopping.
They describe Netanyahu’s political survival as the key driver, arguing he cannot afford politically to end the war, and instead needs to maintain momentum to justify his leadership to the Israeli public and handle legal and political challenges that they expect to intensify after the war. They also claim Netanyahu would prefer “the man on top of a burning cinder” to losing position in a more stable environment. The speakers say Trump may use harsh language to pressure Netanyahu, but that Netanyahu has “experienced far worse” from other U.S. presidents, with Obama cited as particularly difficult due to resisting involvement and pursuing an attempted nuclear agreement with Iran.
A separate point is raised about U.S. legislative constraints—specifically Section 224 of the Pending National Defense Authorization Act—described as ensuring future administrations cannot reverse aid to Israel and integrating Israel more fully into U.S. defense and industrial infrastructure, making it harder to disentangle.
On escalation and de-escalation, the speakers say a real de-escalation is not happening, arguing that violence resumes quickly when ceasefire arrangements break down. They claim Israeli actions show they are not pulling back, including continued strikes and specific reference to Beirut. They argue that Israel could be slowing or “slow-walking” strikes temporarily, potentially to reposition, while Hezbollah prepares defenses and maintains contingency planning.
The conversation also addresses an I24-reported assessment that Hezbollah has not resumed its core leadership or central command structure in southern Beirut’s Dahi district since the ceasefire, with Hezbollah reportedly relocating major parts of its command network to other Beirut areas. Israeli officials in the report are described as believing additional Israeli strikes on Dahi would have limited impact on Hezbollah’s operational capabilities, and that Israel’s push toward Beirut is partly to pressure Lebanese actors against Hezbollah.
A broader strategic framing is offered: the speakers suggest Iran’s threats to strike Israel’s northern homeland could provide Netanyahu with political leverage to portray continued fighting as existential and necessary. They also discuss “red lines,” saying Iran drew a red line and that what comes next depends on which side dictates actions. Trump is described as wanting a peace deal, while the speakers claim Israel does not mind sabotaging it.
Regarding Iran’s posture, the speakers say Iran escalated in a way that surprised them less than it might have otherwise, noting Iran threatened significant escalation against Israel and recommended citizen evacuations. They argue this looks more like calibrated retaliation than chaotic escalation, describing Iran as a “counter puncher” and suggesting the conflict could include off-ramps. They also criticize rhetoric that labels Iran “crazy,” arguing that ceasefire terms involving Lebanon were not implemented and Israel was breaching the ceasefire.
The conversation extends to the broader question of U.S. involvement, debating arguments that the U.S. should walk away versus the idea that the U.S. owes allies an effort to stabilize—particularly stopping hostilities in Lebanon. One speaker argues the U.S. struggles with post-war stabilization and that pulling back could force regional actors to be more reasonable, describing this as reducing moral hazard.
Finally, the speakers discuss press access and censorship, including reporting that the Pentagon restricted journalists by designating its press office as a classified area and barring journalists from entering to interact with public affairs staff. They argue this is inconsistent with claims of free speech, and they also mention bans or restrictions in the UK against controversial media figures in connection with Israel-related debates.
The transcript closes with the host listing additional interviews and guests from the channel lineup and stating more interviews will follow.
Full Transcript
Well, good to chat to you. It's gonna be a fun day today, yeah? Yeah. you can't ask, ask for a better for a better news cycle. Well, it's classic Trump. It is it is wild. there was a tweet, I did tell the team to tweet it. Did you see the Netanyahu and Trump statements at the same time? Well, I saw the Netanyahu's. Yeah, go ahead. Netanyahu said there's gonna, there's no ceasefire, operation's gonna continue as normal, and Trump said, yes, literally within the hour after the call, there's a full ceasefire, both sides aren't gonna attack each other. Literally after the call, they both posted completely contradictory things, which, which is expected here, Mario, because unfortunately Trump is disconnected from reality on this. Netanyahu's not gonna stop I think it's very obvious that Netanyahu may pause to give some breathing room for the next twenty-four to forty-eight hours, then he'll restart. This is, this isn't gonna stop, and he cannot, as we talked about yesterday, my opinion Netanyahu cannot afford politically the end of a war. He, he needs to keep this going. At the very least, he needs to be able to go to the Israeli people when ultimately the legal system there- Does come after him as it, you know, is, but it will come in full force once the war is over. And I think in his mind, he needs to be able to sell enough people in Israel that, hey, I'm the guy who got rid of the great bugaboo of Iran. I'm the guy who ended the threats to our periphery. Now, you and I both know this is probably not how it's going to end, but I think in his mind, this is his calculus, and Trump can huff and puff and have all the profanity laced Conversations he wants, as he did today, my understanding is that it was quite a nasty exchange but I don't think Netanyahu's gonna be cowed. He's, this is, this is no longer about the US-Israeli relationship. This isn't about the Trump Netanyahu relationship. This is about Netanyahu's political survival, and I think he has assessed that he would rather be the man on top of a burning cinder rather than have no position in a more stable environment Environment, and that's where we are. So first I wanna give you credit, you predicted in this show, you said that if it escalates in Lebanon, Iran would pull out of the negotiations. You remember, you remember you said that a while ago. Yeah. Yeah. So that, that materialized. But I don't think what you're saying now will materialize. I'll tell you why. I think you're right. I hope you're right. I hope you're right. And I'll tell you why, I'll tell you why I think that. Obviously, I'll And most likely once again, Iranian Air Force jets, the Air Force that was destroyed, obliterated. Yeah. Yes. yeah. So the reason I think that's the case, I think you're right when you said Netanyahu needs this war, 'cause politically he needs it, but you know what's more toxic for him than an end to the war? Trump turning on him. Yes and no. Netanyahu has survived American presidents turning on him before. I, we talked about this, I think, the last time I was on. You know, everybody says, "Oh, Trump said this really harsh thing about Netanyahu a few days ago, where he said, 'Uh, Netanyahu will do whatever I tell him to do.'" And yeah, that was a pretty blatant statement for sure. But again, the, the, the-- I think the, the nastiest American president to Netanyahu specifically, the most difficult one, I think, was Obama. To turn- In terms of Obama, in which Obama resisted the pull of Netanyahu to get us sucked into another war in the Middle East, and he went the other way, Obama did. Now, I thought the deal wasn't a great deal, but he, he went the other way and actually negotiated in secret a, a, an attempted nuclear agreement with the Iranians. So I actually think that Netanyahu's not really phased by Trump having these sort of, you know, ex- Verbal, I, I think Netanyahu has experienced far worse from other American presidents, far more threatening to Israel's, you know, safety. I mean, Obama really- Really was causing a lot of problems for Netanyahu, and actually initially Bill Clinton was causing a lot of problems when he was president for the Israelis. I, I, I don't believe that this is-- I don't think that he's really worried to that extent about Trump. Plus, there's Section, what is it, two two four of the Pending National Defense Authorization Act. Now we'll see if it gets passed as is, but Congress is clearly working to ensure that no American president or- Future Congress, for that inst- for that matter, could ever reverse the aid to Israel they will be integrated fully into the US industrial and defense infrastructure. That is a huge deal. It's not even the United Kingdom has this level of special access to America, and once the Israelis are integrated fully into that defense base, into that tech base, you can't dis- Untangle them not very easily. You get, you're not giving enough credit to the Axios report. The Axios report is a very significant development, even if it's not true. If it's true, no, no, I'm sure it is true. I'm sure that they got into a cursing match. But, but, but Netanyahu's got, yeah, but, but remember, it's true and it leaked. Well, it didn't really leak. I mean, I, I mean, let's face it, Axios is basically an unofficial organ of the Israeli security service, but that, but that makes my point. But that makes my point. Of course, but I don't think they get it out there. No, no, I'm not. Listen, he, he's had vituperations before w- between, there's been vituperations between Trump and Netanyahu before. Remember, famously, I think it was in last fall when Netanyahu, or maybe it was during the twelve-day war, when Trump was walking to the, the helicopter on the White House y- lawn, and he the South Lawn, and he went on this expletive-filled rant about how Netanyahu doesn't know what, what the f they're doing. you know, this is, to me, this This isn't new. I, you know, I, I will believe it when it, I will believe it when it happens, when the actual de-escalation happens, not a pause, a real de-escalation from everywhere. And it's, I don't think it's possible right now. I think everybody's too primed for violence. And today you saw it play out, right? I mean, we saw how quickly everything went into action as soon as the very tenuous ceasefire broke apart, the whole thing just started ripping apart. And Trump was able to, to stop it temporarily again by these claims that he has reined in Netanyahu, but Netanyahu's tweeting and, you know, his office is saying, "Oh no, we're gonna continue with our operations as per our plans," which doesn't include the United States. Outside of receiving whatever aid they receive from us, they are going to continue doing what they're doing, I think. And God help us. But they didn't help the attacks on Beirut. Doesn't that say something? You said you wanted to see it. He halted it, he halted it, he halted Israelis aren't pulling back. The Israel-- The Israelis aren't making any indication. They think they're still strike Beirut. I think that they're gonna do whatever it is they were gonna do, irrespective of what Washington wants them to do. The only thing that would actually stop this, I think, in terms of pressure points, I think is if Trump actually didn't just call and say, "Hey, I'm gonna cut you off from this, whatever, you know, pick your, your plan, whatever we give them in terms of supplies that they need," if he actually did it. That I think would be a wake up call but, you know, we're not there. I mean, Trump can call and huff and puff, but you need to have-- When you're dealing with Netanyahu, especially, 'cause this is a guy who's been in power for a long time. He's come and he's, he's outlasted every American president since the '90s. He's looking at Trump going, "Yeah, this guy's a headache and he's unstable, but, you know, I can get through this." And, in, in his case For his political and legal survival. So I just don't see this, I don't see this de-escalating, and I'm happy to be proven wrong on this. So you believe they will strike Beirut eventually? I think at some point this is gonna escalate again. That has been the-- I, I don't know if it's Beirut, I don't, I don't know specifically where, but I think Israel under Netanyahu, under current conditions, Israel's gonna keep trying to push. And, you know, the-- I, I just don't see any indication that there's any real de-escalation outside of some, you know, temporary pauses here and there, but that actually helps the Israelis, you know, reposition and kind of get in a better strike position. It also gives Hezbollah time to, to plan for defenses, which they absolutely are. But if you're making the argument that Netanyahu will do this politically, you know how embarrassing this looks politically to him. He announced with cuts that he will strike back multiple times. Oh, I know. Look, look, look. Yeah. No, I know. It's look, he's, he's not looking- And he's not looking- Oh, he's being embar- He's being embarrassed by Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, especially Ben-Gvir. Oh, he's being embar- He's being embarrassed by Hezbollah itself because of all the, you know, they've had a lot of Completely stops the conflict. He loses a little bit if the conflict goes on and, yeah, you know, there's, there's some setbacks, but, but ultimately his personal calculus of how do I stay in power and how do I keep the, the lawfares he sees it back And, and this is how, this is how he's gonna keep and running the Israeli domestic political and legal system that's coming after him, is he's gonna keep pushing, keep opening another front. This has been his pattern since twenty twenty-three, open another front, open another front. And it gives him temporary bursts of power and popularity, and that's all he needs to keep going. And I think this is the same thing playing out, again, happy to be proven wrong, because this thing needs to end now, but I just don't see it. So there's a report here from two days ago. Hezbollah hasn't resumed, hold on. Hezbollah hasn't, okay, so this is the argument. My producer sent me this. He's like, "Mario, according to i24, Hezbollah hasn't resumed its core leadership or central command structure in southern Beirut's Dahi district since the ceasefire, according to i24 citing Israeli assessment." Quote, "Hezbollah moved major parts of its command network early in the conflict to other areas of Beirut, including Maron, Maron neighbors, exactly, yeah, as well as locations in the south." Which is outside the Capron, has kept them there. IDF officials believe the additional strikes on Dahi would have limited impact on Hezbollah's operational capabilities. And they said, "The only reason Israel is going for Beirut right now is to pressure on Hezbollah by pissing off the Lebanese to put more pressure on Hezbollah." True and not true. Yeah, I, I think there is a possibility for that. It doesn't really matter 'cause they do, they're striking Hezbollah. First, they're still, they've moved some of their command structure out of Dahi, but there's still significant infrastructure and homes of Achieve. That's number one. Yeah. Yeah. And that's number one. Number two, that, that doesn't move away from the point that even if the goal to strike Daphne is to pressure, is to pressure the Lebanese to, to, to turn on, on Hezbollah, or even if, even if it's just for Netanyahu to pla-- to, to score political wins in Israel, Netanyahu wanted to strike Beirut. Politically, he needed it. And he didn't do it because Trump told him not to. He hasn't done it yet. Now, you make the argument he-- Exactly. You make the argument he might not, he might not do it yet. But just the fact that he didn't do it is, is showing an indication that-- No, I mean, he's, he's slow-walked. He's slow-- Why would he do it? He's slowed down before because he doesn't wanna have to risk-- The thing is, this is a, this is a balancing act with Trump. You have to keep him at bay has figured this out. A lot of them use flattery, a lot of them use inducements financially with his family and friends. So this is just sort of how it goes. You have to, this is a, it's a marathon, not a sprint when you're dealing with Trump. And so my view is Netanyahu said, okay, fine, we're gonna just pause it here. Remember, he paused it last year. Everybody thought, okay, thank goodness, the war is over last year. That wasn't the case. They just spent several months repositioning and planning and, and, and Of Netanyahu's choosing, which is what happened with this current con conflict this year. So in my view, this isn't no different. This is just as long as Netanyahu is running the show in Israel, and as long as these legal and political problems is, are facing him, he is going to continue to keep the, the, the pot boiling because that tension gives him maneuvering room domestically. This is a wag the dog situation in my point of view. And he, he will absolutely respond to inputs from, from Trump as a temporary stopgap so that he doesn't totally risk alienating Trump, and he hasn't yet. He's going to continue to walk that line, and I think he's going to continue being able to achieve what he wants, which is the continuation of hostilities or at least the tensions. Do you understand that Iran would- Has threatened to strike Israeli homeland, the northern part of Israel. Oh, I just got off the phone with Larry Johnson, who says that he has a source I think I'd-- about the nuke. Yeah. Yeah. So, honestly, Mario, I think we have, we have crossed a Rubicon here in this conflict, and I don't think anybody really realizes it's certainly not in the White House. And so I, I, and I think when it comes to, you know, Israel, on some level, it's perverse as this- Sounds, if Iran were to open up as they're threatening to do on northern Israel, guess what? That works in Netanyahu's favor, 'cause then he can point to that and say, "See? I told you, I told you they were unreasonable, I told you you can't trust them. We're going to continue this fight, this is existential, and that's where we're headed, I think." No man. I think this is an indication. I hope you're right. Yeah. That we have that, that Trump is able to rein in Netanyahu. Trump calls the shots and not Netanyahu. Obviously, I doubt this. I, I'm not firm in that belief, 'cause sometimes I question it when I see things like first Israel passing the yellow line, Israel continuing strikes in Lebanon. But what they, what's happening right now is they're seeing how far they can push it before they push too far. Iran drew the red line, okay? What happens now that we- We know what the red line is. We'll dictate who calls the shots. 'Cause Trump want-- Do we agree that Trump wants a deal? He wants a peace deal, yeah? I think if it was on him, yeah. Yes. If it was only up to him, he would get a deal. Yes. Exactly. Trump personally wants a deal, so Trump wouldn't want Israel to escalate and sabotage the deal. Israel doesn't mind sabotaging, they don't mind sabotaging the deal. So I think it's fair to say over the next week or two, if Israel doesn't cross that red An American nationalist, I would welcome that. That'll be great for you. I'm gonna do a post on that. I have been, I have been, I have been very worried, obviously, that the president is a little too under the spell of his Israeli partner. so if that played out as you say, and, and I would love that, then I think there's hope still. But right now, I just, I am very worried about where this is going. Were you surprised of Israel's sorry, Iran's response? They they didn't only draw the line, they drew it very publicly, took action and threatened significant escalation. They didn't threaten we might strike the UAE. Remember Tito Parsi said one, one strategy by the Iranians would be to strike the UAE instead of striking the Israelis directly. They're like, "Screw that, we're gonna go directly to Israel and not only strike Israelis in Lebanon." That was one of the escalation ladder steps that they could take instead of striking Israeli- Well, proper. No, they're like, no, we're gonna strike Israelis in Lebanon and strike Northern Israel, and we recommend citizens to evacuate. That's a very different Iran to what we're used to. I think the Iranians are feeling their oats right now. I think they know they've got the last remaining superpower on the ropes in this boxing match get-- and that's in honor of the pending UFC fight that's coming soon to the White House. the-- I think that they know they've got us on the ropes, and they're, they're now And I think the Iranians are flexing right now, and so it doesn't actually-- it didn't surprise me that they they did this, and it was, again, actually very-- in terms of escalation, it was a very measured response, which again indicates to me that we are not dealing necessarily with a band of crazies, which is what Glenn Beck is running around saying right now, and I would have agreed with him. Well, Glenn Beck just posted about two hours ago that clearly the twelveers- Shiites have taken complete control of, of Iran because they broke off the negotiations. And five years ago, I might have been you know, amenable to that assessment, but again, it's very clear that no matter how hard line the Iranian regime may be, they have demonstrated from the beginning of this conflict that their escalation is responsible, it is predictable, certainly, and it is, it is tailored to ends, ways, and means. That is a rational- Actor, that means we don't, we, we don't have to push this thing to the level that we've done it, because we're not dealing with a crazy person that's looking to self detonate a nuke. We're dealing with a rational actor that clearly has strategic ambitions that rival our own and, and, and the Israeli position. So we may never be able to agree with them on things, but it doesn't mean we have to take things to the end of the line. We can, we can find off ramps, and this is a, this is a, a major awakening, I People those who are willing to listen, because most of us who have some experience in DC from either party always, rightly, I think, for a period of time, viewed is Iran suspiciously, but it's very clear now that Iran is a counter puncher. If you hit them, they will hit back, and it will be in a calibrated way, and it will go back and forth but it won't be this mindless rapid escalation. I think what they threatened to do to Israel makes perfect sense in the context context of the conflict, and it would just be good if Israel would, would ratchet it down now, we would ratchet it down, and I think in turn you would have a general cooling effect on the overall conflict, 'cause I don't believe that Iran is seriously trying right now to suddenly take over Lebanon, for instance. I think what they're trying to do is create a, a sphere of influence for themselves. the, the Sunni Arabs ha-will have a sphere of influence, the Turks have a sphere of influence, the Israelis- Will have a sphere of influence, and I think that's where things should go I don't know if they will though, but, but I, I don't believe right now that the Iranians are demonstrating that they are crazy. Yeah, first it just bothers me when people make statements like this, like the Iranians are crazy, they've walked out of negotiations. It's you know what, it bothers me. I, I don't mind, you know, b- being very against Iran or against Israel or against Lebanon, taking a position. But what bothers me is that you're just ignoring the fact that part of the ceasefire that was agreed on, including cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, and it hasn't happened. Yeah. Why don't you ignore that fact? If you make a deal with someone, someone The context on why Iran walked away. Well, that's, that's political. The, the, the people like Glenn Beck who are, are tweeting and saying this on their, their syndicated radio shows, they're saying this, Mario, because they're politically aligned with the Israeli position, and they, they are going to promote that position. I think the proper position for the United States, for any America firster, is to not have a side in this conflict. It's not our fight. And I think that, yeah. It's normal to have a side. I think I, I'm not referring to Glenn Beck. I, I know Glenn, I've got a lot of respect for him. It's just in general I don't mind you, that someone picks a side, but I think it's important to give it in context. You can call the Iranians over-exaggerating, no, I, I agree, I agree, the context is key. You can be critical of that, but I think it's important to mention that Israel is breaching the ceasefire. Yes. Now, I, I, I'm Brendan, I understand Agree. From the Israel-- I've always said from the Israeli perspective, they are operating rationally as well. But from the American perspective, which is the perspective I care about, in my opinion, the, the proper perspective is to say, "We don't have-- We shouldn't have a dog in this fight. This can't be our primary-- We shouldn't be taking sides. We should be trying to exfiltrate ourselves from this problem." I have a question on that. So the second guest I had today, kind of as the news broke of Iranians walking away from the deal, the second guest or first guest was Joe Kent, and he's been advocating for a while for the US to just walk the hell away. Yeah. So I said, I made a point, I've, I've advocated for this, he's, I've advocated for this, but I have a counterpoint to it that I've also made this I actually believe as well. Like, the US created this mess, okay? I understand The Iraq war, if you break it, you fix it. And if Cheney or someone else doesn't- No, it was Colin Powell. It was Colin Powell. Colin Powell. There, the Pottery Barn rule. The Pottery Barn rule, there you go. So he mentioned the Pottery Barn rule and said that this, it just doesn't work and led to catastrophe after catastrophe. But at the same time, there is a fair argument to be made that at least the US owes it to its allies to try to at least get something sorted, at least stop the hostilities in Lebanon, And obviously you're in a different position, you don't think the US can- Oh, I think, I think if we wanted to, we could, but the problem is our political leaders don't want to. That's the problem. Yeah, yeah. Alright. I agree. But, like, I do, do you not agree that maybe there should be some fixing to be done? Not everything, but some fixing to be done before just walking away and leaving the mess completely as is? In a state of almost control by Iran war going on in Lebanon, just- you know, the only thing that we've ever been able to, to build effectively in terms of post-war stabilization was after the Second World War, and there's a litany of reasons for why that played out the way it did. America doesn't do post-war very well. Go back to our own Civil War, Mario, Reconstruction in the United States, in the, in the Southern states, that was a disaster, and the, the North pulled out prematurely from what was supposed to be the, the original plan that Lincoln had had wanted before he died and that John-- that, that the, the Republicans, the Radical Republicans in Congress were pushing in the eighteen seventies. the, the American people in New York and the Northeast said, "You know what? We're done. We're-- the war's over. We're done. Bring the troops home." So we don't do reconstruction and post-war stabilization very well. we don't really-- we're not really good at that. That's-- we don't have the patience for it. And frankly, I understand what you're saying about, The lurch, but I think that you now see with the way those Gulf states have been targeted because they hosted US facilities in their territory I think that the best thing we could do for the entire region would be to exfiltrate from the region and focus only on doing trade with the region rather than trying to, you know, but then what happens? But if you don't, you don't, then what? What's gonna happen when, between Israel, Lebanon, and Iran, man? That's gonna be a shit show. I'm not saying it's America's problem, I think you make a valid point, but that's gonna be a shit show. Well, at that point, I think, this is what I personally am coming to think that if the, if Big Brother, America, wasn't always there at Israel's back I think at some point it would force them to be a little bit more reasonable. True, true. And I think that, I think it's, it's sort of like moral hazard, you know, we talked in two thousand and eight about bailing out, it was moral hazard. I think this is the equivalent of that. I think it's a moral hazard when-- and it's not just Israel, by the way. You see this playing out with Ukraine, you see it playing out with all these smaller proxies of the United States that are in these hot zones geopolitically. They start They have this special bond with the Americans, but they don't realize that there's a limit to that and, and then they push their luck. And I think you see this playing out right now with the Israelis, where they really think that, that all they have to do is push, and no matter what comes back at them, Big Brother will always be there. And, and I think the best thing we could do is to condition all the players in the Middle East with the idea that, no, Big Brother won't be there always. Big Brother has other problems closer to home he's gotta worry about. Big Brother has other ambitions you know, beyond just being the policeman of of the the Middle East. And so I think ultimately, if we were to just pull out, I think the region would stabilize itself. I think it would probably figure out how to do business with each other without this sort of, you know, elephant in the room pushing everybody around. Well, if I had a be- a younger brother that's doing to any human being what Israel's doing to Gaza, I'd beat the shit out of my younger brother. well, and again, I think we need to rein in, I think we need to rein in the Netanyahu, and I-- and that's why I hope you're right, I hope that this is the beginning of Trump starting to throw his weight around. Yeah, but now it's, but now it's, now it's harder, man, because absolutely. I also empathize with Israel's position. What Well, and furthermore, Hezbollah, Hezbollah, Hezbollah also now is saying, "Well, 'cause remember, they did ratchet down their, their positioning in the southern part of Lebanon after the Pajer operation. It wasn't completely gone, but they, they started to reduce a little bit and to kind of pull back to give some breathing room and ultimately they, they're gonna say, 'We can't do that now, 'because when we did that before, the Israelis took advantage." so you, you know, you're gonna have all of that playing out. I, again I'm not resting easy right now because I'm worried about what Iran and its proxies are gonna do down the line. But unfortunately, you know, I am not sitting in Tel Aviv, and I, I am, I am not an Israeli, I'm not an Arab, I'm not an Iranian, I'm, I'm an American, and, and I think the American people are, are pretty much pretty much ready to be done with the Middle East and let the Middle East figure out its own mess. You know, it's just heartbreaking seeing those videos. By the way, Ukraine's getting pummeled right now. Yeah, Ukraine's getting ready. Yeah, I don't think I think that war's gonna be over sooner than people realize, and it's, I think I agree. I, I think Russia's gonna be taking everything up to Odessa, including Odessa, and they're gonna draw the line there. I think that's happening like, like now. I expected the, and yes, but I didn't expect you to throw Odessa into the mix. Jesus Christ. I think Odessa is the-- Well, think about it, geographically, you know, you've got the, the, what is it, the Dnieper River? They've got to basically- I believe, and I have believed this for several years, I believe that, that the Russians aren't viewing what they're doing in Ukraine as a territorial invasion. They aren't going there to take territory, they're going there to create a strategic buffer zone. So they, they want the Russian-speaking enclaves in the east. They obviously, absolutely from a strategic level, need Crimea because of Sevastopol on the Black Sea there, but they don't want to go all the way in to- Kiev now, because it's, it's gonna be more of a headache to run that thing than it's worth, so they'd rather just split the country in half, I think. What do you mean they don't wanna go to Kiev because it's a headache? They tried to go to Kiev and failed. Right, and that's, they don't wanna go through that again. Why would they? They, they've got the parts that they want. They've got the industrial base in the east, they've got a bunch of the rare earths, they've got all their fellow Russian speaking people What they wanna do now is they wanna take Odessa and draw the line right there, and everything west of Odessa is neutral territory, and everything east is theirs, and then they also deprive the rump state, post-war rump state, of you know, Ukraine in the west, they deprive it of a port, the last remaining major port, which is Odessa, and I think that's the play, I think that's where Russia is angling for, and I think they're gonna get it. The Pentagon has designated its press office as a classified area and barred journalists from entering to meet with public affairs staff who traditionally handled media inquiries. The change, which took effect in recent weeks, was par- partly driven by the relocation of Pentagon speechwriters in the office. The move means that even if reporters regain broader access to the Pentagon, their direct interaction with the Defense Department spokespeople will be significantly more restricted. I don't blame them trying to prevent all these leaks that are happening. you know what bothers me is that you saw that footage first, Todd, and you didn't like my statement. Is that censorship? What do you think of that? 'Cause I don't know much about it. If I'm sitting in the Pentagon as a If I'm sitting in the current position that I have, which is I am a journalist I, I don't agree with that. And actually, I think, I, I think that the press can serve a very vital function for keeping our, our, our people honest in government, particularly at the Pentagon, which is one of the most well-funded organizations. They can just, you know, hide behind all their bags of money. and, a- I, I really think that we need a free press, and I, I really think that we-- and Both sides of this equation in my career, I'm increasingly of the mind, and I think if I ever did go into government again, I would still be of the mind that we need a free press, and either you give 'em access to the building or you just don't give 'em access at all, because this whole thing about signing letters, you know, you have to, you know, respect certain-- It's like that's, that-- It's not gonna work. I think you either have 'em in and you let 'em do what they're gonna do and you deal with it that way Situation, and nobody's coming in here. This middle ground isn't gonna work. I agree. Okay, I didn't know about the middle ground. I didn't know the details of it. Yeah, because right now, the group that's in there, the group that's in there, and I get it, you know, they signed these letters saying they would respect these, these restrictions, and it sounds like the restrictions are increasing. What are the restrictions? Basically, they can't walk around the building, they can't, they can't really interact with the staff the way that the previous generation of Perfect sense why they would want that but, you know, from a journalistic standpoint, you just don't have any journalists in the building at this point because it just isn't a good look. And, you know, in, in the case of Trump, the, the Trump administration, we talked about this a little bit two times ago, Trump, one of his selling points that people got on board with was he was a free speech president. This doesn't sound like free speech. And if you're gonna make the case it's a war, okay, well then go full bore and just say no press in the building at all. Yeah. That one bothers me less than the Seb Coaker thing, working with an agency to try to target those journalists that are anti-Israel. And you saw how Israel, apparently the UK banned Hassan Piker, I don't know much about him, but Cenk from the Young Turks is banned from going into the UK. Did you know this? No, I didn't know any of this. He was banned from I understand some people could be extreme with their statements, but Chank, I don't know who, I mean, Hassan, Hassan is the, the live streamer, and I think isn't he related to Chank? Isn't he like a son or a nephew or something? Oh, someone said to me he's a nephew of Chank, but I, I thought it was a joke. He might be. I thought, no, no, I'm pretty sure they're related somehow. But the point is, is that the UK, I lived in England for a little bit Democracy is, is, you know, it's like saying East Germany was a democracy 'cause it had a, it, the, the name in its title. it's, it's not. It is it's not a free speech area, it's not freedom anywhere. so it's not surprising to me that he would be-- that anybody who's saying anything controversial that disagrees with the narrative over there, which tends to be generally left leaning and I know that Hasad and Jenk aren't, aren't, aren't, aren't, you know, Right wing, but I think on I think on an issue like Israel, I think the elite will make special, you know, cases regardless of their political orientation, it's-- they don't like when people are critical of Israel no matter what, and I do think there is a lot of- Critics of Israel who do veer into antisemitism, but I think that, that calling out Israeli foreign policy or even being critical of Israeli elected officials isn't antisemitic. It is, it is- That is wild, man. That is so fucking wild, how crazy it is. Like, I've had Sheng many times on the show. Yeah. I understand some people could go extreme with their statement, you know, talking about eradicating the state of Israel, et cetera. I understand, at the same time, I'm a believer in free speech. I think anyone should They're acting on those statements, but that's not what Chechnya says. Chechnya is, is a pacifist at heart. I know that about Chechnya, I've had him on the show. So for someone like him, I don't know enough about Hassan to comment on him, but I just think, I think that it's another example of how far gone. I mean, you know, supposedly the, the, the West is fighting the Russians for our freedoms. Well, if you look at Europe today, I don't know how anybody says that they're free. I don Why they're saying that, oh, we're fighting them for our freedoms, it's, we're not fighting anything for our freedom, we don't have any freedoms. And the, and the US isn't that far behind, by the way. you know, the, the, the, you mentioned the thing with the, the counterterrorism office at the, at the White House. This is you know, this is sort of-- It's still not as bad. This isn't still as bad as what was going on under Biden, but it's almost but ultimately, I, I just think that we're not a free, we're not a free society anymore. We are the most censorious society in existence. I think we-- I think that the Soviets would be blushing at the kind of censorship that we have here in the United States, included, as well as certainly in Britain and Europe. I agree. I always enjoy our conversations. Thank you for jumping on. Thanks for having me, and I think I'm on tomorrow, so I'll see you I'll see you in the afternoon. Thanks for your sweet single. Well, I'll talk to you later. Bye. Alright guys, this is it for today. I hope you enjoyed the conversation with Brandon. I'm gonna go through the comments for the night as I do every night. So let me know what you think of all the conversations we did today. The interview with the surgeon, KK, let me know if the interview with the surgeon went out, 'cause I know we did it recorded. A lot of people are waiting for it. Part one of the interview with the surgeon, that went, British surgeon that went to Gaza. so we did part one. I'm not sure if the team published it or not What's today, second already? No, first. We had Professor Nick Pano, that was the surgeon. We had Alex Christoforo, Joe Kent, Malcolm Nance, Elijah Magnier, then we had Sal Mercogliano. Highly recommend you check out Sal, more episodes I do with Sal, I really enjoyed him as a guest. Trita Parsi, Dimitri Lascares, Lieutenant Colonel Karen, Larry Johnson, now Brandon Wyckard. They're all on the YouTube channel and on X, you can check them out. And I'll see you again Tomorrow, incredible. just looking at tomorrow's guests, an incredible lineup for tomorrow as well. Alright, guys, hope you enjoyed it. Thank you, as always. And by the way, there's two other interviews by my co-host, Aziz, she did Steph and one more Iranian activist. She also did those on the channel as well. So there's a lot of interviews for you guys to check out if you have spare time. Bye!
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇹 A 32-year-old Colombian tourist was abducted near Rome's Termini Station by a migrant gang and held captive for 72 hours, gang raped by 5 men who drugged her and threatened to kill her. She was lured by a man offering to sell her hashish, then forced into a van and taken to an abandoned building occupied by 22 illegal migrants on the outskirts of the capital. She escaped and was found lying half-naked on a street nearby. 5 men were arrested: 2 Gambians, 1 Malian, and 2 Nigerians. At least 3 others remain under investigation. 11 of the 22 migrants found in the building were issued expulsion orders. Europe should be having a very hard conversation about this. Source: Daily Mail0
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Elon said it. People called him crazy. Now Microsoft AI and Anthropic are saying the same thing. "Most white-collar work will be fully automated in 12-18 months." Meanwhile the government can’t comprehend how to keep up. https://t.co/FZSACueG9J
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸 SpaceX recently announced a major AI compute partnership with Anthropic, leading to speculation about a massive long-term compute leasing business for Elon. He's now clarifying what the deal actually is: a 180-day lease with a 90-day mutual cancellation notice. The short term was SpaceX's call, not Anthropic's. Elon says SpaceX won't leave them hanging but may need the compute back if things get tight. Anthropic gets what it needs now, and SpaceX keeps what it may need later.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
INTERVIEW: NETANYAHU & TRUMP CALL - WILL TRUMP BE ABLE TO CONVINCE ISRAEL TO STOP THE WAR IN LEBANON, OR WILL BIBI SABOTAGE THE CEASEFIRE? https://t.co/cEhnUoqnUW
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation focuses on developments around U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, the Israel–Lebanon war, and concerns that actions in the region could undermine or complicate a potential agreement.
The discussion begins with a reported Israel–U.S. tension: the IDF was said to be abandoning plans to bomb Beirut after American pressure, driven by fears Iran might retaliate. The caller links this to U.S. opposition to Israeli plans to restart a large-scale war in Lebanon, particularly mass bombing campaigns in Shia-majority districts of Beirut, and to concerns Iran might walk away from peace talks. The Iranians are described as being “very serious” about negotiations, even while the war between Iran and Hezbollah continues, including strikes and counterfire between Hezbollah and Israel.
Attention then shifts to U.S.-Iran clashes at sea: the Americans said they shot down two boats laying mines, while the Iranians shot down one drone and posted video showing targeting of another fighter jet that was not shot down. The Americans also shut down one surface-to-air missile site on the Iranian side. The caller asks how worried the participants are that negotiations could break down, noting that Donald Trump had been unusually quiet the same day—no posts and no media leaks—creating an impression of behind-the-scenes activity, though the conversation treats the silence as out of the ordinary.
The conversation then broadens into patterns of escalation: the caller says Israel often intensifies actions in Lebanon when negotiations approach an end or a solution seems possible, accelerating operations while not heeding the United States, despite periodic Trump statements. The caller argues that U.S. forces are not at “optimal capability” after prolonged deployments at sea, and suggests that if military action is planned, it could be preferable sooner rather than later. The discussion also reflects concern about timing after the Hajj and the possibility that strikes could occur after major public milestones, potentially undermining trust in the U.S. if negotiations were treated as a “facade.”
A central topic is Iran’s demands and lack of compromise. The conversation states Iran is firm on what it requires, including unfreezing assets, and that this posture could indicate diplomacy moving in the right direction. However, the caller also suggests Trump would face opposition from Israelis and neocons if a deal advances.
The discussion includes detailed domestic U.S. politics around a potential agreement: Rubio reportedly said a deal was possible within days, with holdup tied to specific nuclear-language and sanctions language in the initial document. Meanwhile, Ted Cruz called the announced deal an “MOU” a disastrous mistake; Roger Wicker warned it would be null/useless; Pompeo criticized it; and additional senators and figures piled on criticism. The caller describes a shift when Trump said the deal would be expanded to include the Abraham Accords, leading to conflicting reactions from figures like Senator Lindsey Graham. The conversation claims other countries (Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi) said no, while Iran also said no and positions were not changing. The caller argues the Abraham Accords have not helped Gulf signatories in practice and have been linked to broader issues involving Palestinian rights.
The conversation then introduces a harsh statement by Mustafa Kamane during the “hush season,” describing a new order in which U.S. influence shrinks and framing Israel’s actions as a religious confrontation between Islam and what he calls the “Zionist regime.” The speakers express concern that Iran’s messaging is becoming more radical and anti-U.S. compared with earlier positions. They also discuss a purported power struggle between Netanyahu and Trump, emphasizing that the next steps will reveal who is directing events.
Several reports about Israel–Lebanon dynamics are cited: the foreign minister calls Iranian actions and ceasefire violations blameworthy; Iran accuses the U.S. of maritime piracy and claims the strikes show suspicion justified. On the military side, Israeli commanders reportedly say the situation in southern Lebanon is “more unbearable by the day,” with footage described of drones hitting Israeli troops and trucks. Israel is said to have moved toward more nighttime operations, while Hezbollah reportedly uses FPV drones with night vision. Additional reports claim Israel is procuring more anti-drone nets from Europe due to drone threats, and an Israeli official says Israel cannot accept the current reality in Lebanon without ability to respond, constrained by understandings and agreements with both the U.S. and the Lebanese government. The Lebanese government is described as refusing to negotiate unless bombing stops before talks.
A particular focal report states senior Israeli officials say Israel does not want to be seen as deliberately sabotaging Trump’s potential agreement with Iran. It claims Israel rejects random building bombings in Beirut at this stage due to fears of harming the ongoing Iran negotiations, while maintaining freedom of action in southern Lebanon. The conversation interprets this as evidence that strikes in Beirut are restricted compared with activity in the south.
The speakers also analyze the region’s broader security shift: they describe regional countries seeking security architectures that replace U.S. bases and may not include Israel, referencing institutionalizing control of Persian Gulf straits under a Gulf security system by a “Gulf Strait Authority.” They also mention “Isaac Accords” as a similar Israel-centric concept applied to Latin America and Central America, involving trade/technology cooperation and countering Iranian influence.
Finally, the conversation includes concerns about escalation risks if Trump uses military force, including the possibility of catastrophic retaliation affecting energy infrastructure, undersea cables, and the wider Gulf economy. They discuss information warfare and social media influence, including a claim that social media accounts of Colonel Aguilar may have been wiped out simultaneously with upscaling across pro-Palestinian platforms. The closing return to geopolitics includes discussion of a “new world order” and multipolarity, the Saudi–U.S. civilian nuclear track, and related regional missile developments attributed to North Korea. The conversation ends with acknowledgment of a technical glitch earlier in the show and a preview of upcoming guest interviews.
Full Transcript
Colonel, so good to see you again. How are you? I'm fine, I'm fine. so we were talking, I think yesterday, about the possibility of this being sabotage. So today there was a long call between Netanyahu and Trump. Netanyahu was having a, a, a meeting with his cabinet, and then he had to walk out of it for a call, a pretty long call according to reports, according to KANU's. And then according to KANU's, apparently the IDF is abandoning plans to bomb Beirut after American pressure over fears Iran may retaliate against Well Khan You stated that US was opposed to Israeli plans to restart the war in Lebanon and carry out mass bombing campaigns on the Shia majority district of Beirut, fearing that the Iranians would have withdrawn from the peace talks. So the Iranians seem very Serious about these negotiations. So that's one big development while they still-- by the way, there's still a war between them and Hezbollah, they're still striking Hezbollah, Hezbollah's firing back in terms of Israel. But that comes a day after the, the clashes yesterday between American forces and Iranian forces, where the Americans said they shot down two boats that were laying mines, and then the Iranians shot down one drone, and they also put, put a video where they were locking in on another fighter jet, not sure if you saw it, but they didn't shoot it down. And the Americans also shut down one surface-to-air missile site on the Iranian side as well. So how worried are you that this could break down? Trump has been awfully quiet today, not one post about the deal, there hasn't been one leak to any media outlets, very very Relatively odd day. Maybe that's how it should be. It should be quiet like there's things happening behind the scenes. But this one, if you look at all the other days, this one seems out of the ordinary. I'm not sure what to, what to make of it. Yeah, I don't know. I mean, it, it's, it's sad that we're reduced to trying to interpret the whole entirety of US foreign policy by how many tweets or how many Truth Social posts the president makes. you know, Israel had doesn't Intensification of their campaign in, in Lebanon. So and they've done this before, I mean, it's so predictable, like when the war comes close to an end or there's talk that, hey, we, we can come to some solution Israel Accelerates whatever it is they're doing, and they don't really listen to the United States, even though Trump periodically says, "You know, like he said last week, no, do whatever I tell him." That's not, that's not true but it's nice that Trump is aware that he has to actually vocalize that because everybody thinks it's not true. That's why he has to say, "Oh, let me correct you," he'll do anything I tell him, even though You know, the situation is Netanyahu is well, I shouldn't say Netanyahu, the whole government of Israel is they wanna continue this war, and they wanna get as much done as they possibly can in case the war does come to an end. But I'm not optimistic I'm not optimistic, and I, I see really, not that I know any more than anybody else, I don't, but the, I think what we were doing with the shooting of the boats and some of the land targets that we had, that, to me, And probe to test what are they gonna do? I had someone else tell me that, yeah, yeah. And so if, if that's the case, then you know, and, and plus, you know, you think about our military sitting out there, a lot of 'em are on ships, you know, the Marine Expeditionary Ships. I guess they jog around the top of the ship and they lift weights, they do what they have to do, but, you know, you can't stay completely ready at sea for, for, you know, indefinitely. You know, you, in theory, you would put 'em out to the, where they're gonna go, and then they would go do their operation, especially the marines. Otherwise, they're just in a practice mode in really the not best, not ideal conditions. And a lot of our ships have been out at sea for a long time already, so our, our Not optimal. I don't think we're at optimal capability. So I think the, the military doesn't wanna do it, but if they're gonna do it, they'd rather do it sooner than later. And Trump of course can't-- I don't think he's gonna go in during the Hajj. I, I don't think he'll do that. but I think- Yeah, exactly. A lot of people are worried that after the Hajj, yeah. Or, or at least after the bulk of the folks have returned to the, to-- or on their way out And and so imagine how crazy that'll be to, to the trust in the US if again all these negotiations were a facade and they end up striking after Hajj. But nothing would surprise me anymore after what's happened in the last couple of years. You know the, the, and we've-- The Iranians have been very steady and, and solid on what they need from the United States, and then they've fine-tuned a little, they, they've-- But they've been firm. I, I really don't see them giving, they haven't given much You talked about what could they give, what, what will be the thing that they sacrifice or compromise on, but they're not being very compromising, and everybody kinda knows it now if they're still paying attention to this war, I'm sure there's war exhaustion in Washington, they're probably like, "What is going on? You know, when is this, when can we go do something else?" And I know that's how Trump feels, he's ready to, to be done with it, but the Iranians are standing firm on what they want, what they require, and, and they're a good faith thing, like, hey, why don't you unfreeze some of those assets? Unfreeze some of the assets, yeah. Yeah. And they haven't asked for that before, which could mean diplomacy is moving in the right direction. Now they're ready to try a few things, and let's see if we can go further. That's fine. But can Trump really do that? I mean that's a-- That, that will be shoved in his face by the Israelis and, and the neocons as, "Oh, Yeah, that happened. I'll give-- Let me tell you what happened. This is exactly what happened in the last twenty-four hours. So Rubio said today that a deal was still possible within days. The holdup is now specific language in the initial document on the nuclear program and sanctions. Now, what happened domestically? Ted Cruz, as soon as the deal was being announced and they were talking about an MOU, Ted Cruz called it a disastrous mistake. Roger Wicker warned that the operation would be null, like would be like, you know, useless. Pompeo said, "Not remotely America first Senator Graham and, and, and John Bolton also piled on, on the criticism. And then what Trump did is he talked about a bigger deal that includes the Abrahams Accords, which has nothing to do with the United States, just to be clear. But suddenly Senator Graham called it simply brilliant. I don't know if the others are gonna pile on to that. Even though it's just a facade, like there's not, nothing. Qatar said no, Pakistan said no, Saudi said no, and Iran obviously said no, and all of them said their positions weren't changing. That, that's just totally ridiculous. I couldn't believe-- And he wrote a very lengthy, Trump had a very lengthy piece on it, like how great it was gonna be. And you know, those Abraham Accords, we had UAE in there Bahrain. that's supposed to give them some sort of leg up on cooperation, trust, improve trust, you know, all these things between Israel and the United States, the whole thing. And they were left wat-high and dry on, on February 28th, and we didn't give a anything, we didn't care about them. We didn't, we, we evacuated our troops to hotels and then later out of the country ab-pretty much abandoning them, didn't coordinate the attacks on, on Iran, even though obviously it was an illegal war and maybe it wanted, But the Abraham Accords did nothing for those who had signed on, it actually harmed them. And then after Netanyahu and, and others, the Mossad guy, you know, embarrassed the UAE by saying, "Oh, yeah, yeah, we've been working with them and doing all this stuff," you know, that, that's not a good look. And that just tells you what you get with the Abraham Accords. You get treated like, you get treated like dirt with or without the Abraham Accords. It is totally stupid. And not only that, the Abraham Accords are trading away Well, pretty much Palestinian rights, whether it's Gaza, West Bank, anywhere. It is, it is basically saying, "For money, I will turn the other way, I will, I will go ahead and support whatever you wanna do with the Palestinians." And whether those leaders in the Gulf states that might be considering the Abraham, whether they don't care about the Palestinians, some of 'em don't like 'em, you know, whatever, the people have right to have their opinion. But that is a very unpopular position to take in not only the Arab world and the, It is an unpopular position to take in the globe, the global world, because the whole planet is up in arms about the, what's had the brutality of the genocide, and they don't really understand it. Nobody thinks that that's necessary. It's, you know, is it necessary to kill reporters and medics and children and women? Maybe there's collateral damage, but is it necessary to actually target them for years and years? No, it's not. It's probably not. I, I, Israel, Israel's so such an accomplished country, you'd think they would have figured out a way not to do that, but they want to do that because this is an extermination operation. And killing women is actually better than killing men, 'cause, you know, we're the ones that control the birth rate. So yeah, shoot all the women. I, I mean, I guess it works Enter into the Abraham Accord, which basically says, "We're okay." Worse than ever right now. Yeah, this is the worst time ever to do this war. Absolutely. So why would Trump do that? Somebody whispered in his ear that this was a good idea, or he's not writing his own tweets and, and maybe Graham or... That was, yeah, so exactly, someone, someone told me that Mario must have, someone must have written him that stupid tweet or told him to write it, because he just sabotaged himself, mentioning the Abraham Accords, knowing that Gulf countries won't know that the Abraham Accords have this fatal flaw. it doesn't matter to them, they would-- they, they're willing to risk it if they can get people to sign on, great, but they understand why Arab countries and Iran would never participate in that. They know why, they know exactly why, they know it's the Palestinian question, that's why. So if some-- if they took-- it probably came from Israel They, they, you know, to sabotage Trump, to make Trump look like you know, to throw Trump off of his whatever progress he may or may not be making with the negotiations, put something like that out. It's just so stupid. I mean, it's just so incredible. It is very odd. well, today, the person that spoke today is Mustafa Kamane, he put out a statement during the, as the hush season ends, I think, wraps, oh, no, wraps up, in the middle of hush season. To have a safe haven for its mischief or-- and for establishing military bases in the region, Middle East nations will no longer serve as shields for US bases. Israel and its leaders are approaching the final stages of their, of their wretched existence, and he talks about a new order in which the US influence is shrinking day by day. He says Iran's faith-driven resistance left Israel gasping its final breath and reduced to helplessness during the June, June twenty twenty-five war. Credits the same forces with enabling Hamas's October seven Attacks and crushing ISIS frames the entire conflict as a religious confrontation between Islam and what he calls the, the, the Zionist regime. two things. We were worried he's gonna be more radical, whatever term you wanna use, more anti-US, anti-Israel than his father? Seems true. And Trump is trying to off-ramp, he's at least trying to save face, they're not giving him even leeway for that. They're trying their best to humiliate him, and Trump's still walking away. That's how it looks like. Instead of, like, why talk about the new order now? Just sign the deal and then talk about the new order. Why talk about the wiping out the Israeli government now or the, the state of Israel now? You believe in that rhetoric, do it later, not in the midst of negotiation, but they just don't care. They're like, they're just waiting for something wrong to happen for them to attack again. They don't mind going back into war. Their, their mindset is so different to the Iran one you before. Yeah, it, it is. And they've been, they've been activated by being attacked unjustly. I think yeah, they're not giving him any space. They're not giving Trump any space at all. They And I think it's fair to not give him space because he's so untrustworthy, they probably think he's gonna attack at any time. Yeah. honestly, I'd be, I'd be flabbergasted if he attacks again. So let's see what else happened. There's the clashes that happened yesterday. The foreign minister called it ceasefire violation, blatant ceasefire violation and says we'll not leave any evil unanswered. Iran accused the US of maritime piracy, called the strikes clear violations, says the attacks prove Iran's deep suspicion of the US, of the US was justified, and then holds Washington responsible for all consequences of its action. So we may see Iran respond to the attack but you make a very good point. Mine-laying boats? Why the hell would be-- Why would Iran be laying mines now? That is very bizarre. There's no point in doing it now in the middle of negotiations. So yeah, maybe they are probing. That's a very interesting point. Yeah. Well, I mean, you think about you know, they've, they've made progress. Yeah, I can't, I don't know. Oh, I took off. I got worried. Let's pause for a second. I started seeing you tear, I thought something happened. No, because I'm choking, I'm coughing. Oh, okay. go get a glass of water. I got really worried something bad happened when I saw your face. Oh, no, no, no. No. Do you need a glass of water? I can, I can. I can read the news updates for the audience if you need to. Well, I just want to say that you're right. They, they're-- What The big news is the Omani, what is it, they called the Omani Iranian Strait Authority or something? Gulf, Gulf, Gulf Strait Authority or something? Yeah. So they are actually-- Persian Gulf Straits. Persian Gulf Straits. So they're moving ahead with institutionalizing a system of control, a system of some, some, you know, monetary benefit, you know, environmental fees or whatever they may not call it a toll, but they are moving forward with this new security architecture, at least of the Gulf, and that's gonna- lead to other things because you know, the, the region is looking for what's gonna replace these American bases, what's going to replace the United States, I mean, as because clearly, clearly we're leaving, we're leaving it's just a matter of time. So I think they're all working towards regional security architectures, and those won't include Israel. That's why, and that's why Trump's like, "Oh, Abraham Accords, that's the security architecture that my son-in-law thought up a few years ago." Well, guess We're not buying it. Kushner can take his Abraham Accords and go somewhere else with it. maybe we'll have more luck in Argentina with the Isaacs Accords, you know, they've done something similar. But this concept-- What's the Isaacs Accords? It's, it's just like the Abraham Accords, but it's for South America and Central America. Really? And, and Milay, who is-- With Israel or unrelated? Is Israel, oh yeah, big time. Yeah, have you not been following what's happening in Argentina? This- I know that, I know that Mila is a big fan of Israel and goes there all the time, but I don't know, there's something that, that, another accord's happening there. Yes, the- The- Isaac Accords, so the, one of the other twelve tribes. so the Isaac Accords Malaise of course signed up to him and they're, they're recruiting some other pro-Israel leadership, and I don't think they've-- I haven't heard that anybody else has signed on, but it's it, it's basically similar to what Israel is doing in Greece and Crete you know, it's, it's an expansion, it's kind of like as the American empire declines, which it clearly is It can kind of, maybe I think the Israelis have an idea that the financial and business and military technology empire that they kind of have under our umbrella, that they will actually flip sides, that, that they'll be the leaders of that as our country kind of fades away. And certainly, we are a tool of the Israelis in many ways, right? I mean, they need a war, they call us they didn't use up their, you know, their interceptors and all their supplies, we did, and that's how they like it. And, and again, it's smart if you Country, you don't take care of somebody else's country first. But yeah, anyway, so the ISAAC Accords, it's the same exact concept, it's a, a group of people, but you, you would never boycott or divest or criticize Israel if you're a member of the ISAAC Accords, you would be you would, Israel could count on you to back them up at the UN or whatever. So it's, it's the same idea, it's an Israel, Israel-centric idea. Developed by Israelis I consider Jared Kushner an American Israeli, and he's the father of this concept, he's the one that sold it, and did a lot to you know, arrange the finances that caused the UAE to, to agree to it, and, and Bahrain too. But anyway, yeah. That is so bizarre. But they're bringing stronger Israeli-Latin American ties. Sorry, stronger Israeli-Latin America ties, trade and technology cooperation, security and counterterrorism cooperation. Countering Iranian influence. Countering Iranian influence. What does Latin America have to do with Iran? I, I don't know. And then we're gonna have, we're gonna have the, the Australian echoes where Australia's countering Iranian influence, South Africa's countering Iranian influence. That's right. Because when it is, when it's Israel centric, this is part and parcel of being Israel centric. Iran is trying to bomb you. It's getting a bomb, and it's gonna bomb you, whoever you are. So yeah, it's an extension of Israeli paranoia. but anyway, I don't know how successful it will be, but I, I know the Abraham Accords came, came up because as Rubio goes around the world, did you see Rubio went to India and nobody met him at the airplane? That's, I don't, I don't, I don't see that, really. I saw, I don't know if it was real or not, it looked pretty real. very strange, you know? He gets on the airplane. Countries are really not happy. Countries are just really not happy. No But, but I mean, you know, so, r-Rubio's being very ineffective in kind of sustaining the American security architecture around the world. Everything's kind of fraying at the edges, it's not working very well, and meanwhile, Iran is being very effective at exercising existing relationships that provide security, Russia, China, trade you know, they've got ways of getting their oil out both by land and by sea, and they're really, you know, they're working with Oman, you know, they're- You know, they're not in love with Oman, and Oman's not in love with Iran, but they are able to build something together. And I think I think some of the other Gulf countries will, will come along to that because it's a better-- it's, it's more rational than what the Americans are doing. You have no choice. You can't change geography, something that we've said so many times now. You cannot change geography. So, you have no-- they have no choice but to work with Iran. And those countries are just too small, except Saudi, they're On, on security and stability in the region, especially the Gulf. Yeah. So they have no choice. And you know, if you're-- I mean, if you're, if you can make maybe not a friend, but if you can make somebody you can work with, these are the people that are closest to you, and then your enemies are farther away, like America, like Israel, perhaps. That's gotta be a better situation than having friends have an enemy right at your doorstep, like the Gulf in Iran, you know, if they're opposing each other all the time. And then, and then having your savior be way back behind the lines, the US and Israel. Israel won't lift a finger, but even we didn't protect the Gulf states, and they had done all-- They had done everything for us. I mean, they cooperated with-- They've been cooperating with the United States since 1970s. So you know, we It doesn't matter who the president is, it just happened to be Trump, and, and Trump makes it worse by constantly saying stupid things and reversing himself. You know, he's not the kind of person that- I don't know. I was speaking to- I don't know. I was speaking to someone I wanna ask you about this. today, his name is, you'd know him. Where is it? Ch-ch-ch-ch, there it is. he was a lawyer, Robert Barnes. He was a lawyer of Trump a long time ago, in 2020. So he was on the show today, just full of knowledge, great guy. And he said 'cause he speaks to people around Trump, and he knew Trump from before, he He, he's also worried that Trump may have early stage behavioral dementia frontal lobe. I'm not, I'm not an expert in all these, but he's talking about, it's a behavioral dementia, not cognitive. So he's talking about his behavior, how he puts out posts that contradict each other, talks about things that haven't happened things that just don't make logical sense, you know, making enemies with allies that have been his allies for a long time. That's what he believes. I'm not, I've spoken to some doctors, there's The years. But there's well, to be honest, I, I, like, I kinda hope this is true 'cause the alternative is scarier. Like, if this isn't true, then that means what? Someone is really telling Trump to walk away from Tucker and MTG and Thomas Massey and post these things and, and post this thing about the Pope? That wouldn't make sense. Yeah. That, that could be-- I don't know much about any of that, but you know, so many people, so many people my age In the '60s and '50s, they have, we have parents right? You're only '60s. No, you're only '40s. You're only '50s or '60s. No, I'm in my, I'm on the second half of '60. Yeah, it's terrible. But no, but our parents are in their '80s, right? So people my age have parents in their '80s. And in their '80s, you start to see, you know, mobility issues sometimes, sometimes You know, we look for that in our parents. Every, everybody I know watches their parents closely and when they're very forgetful or of, of their mood changes and being angry. And I know that's what Trump has been doing. He's been getting more angry at things, and, and then he forgets. He, he, you know, he's not really consistent, but his anger against his former supporters has been really It, it's, it's been embarrassing for him. And the things he says when people die, I remember when Rob Reiner died or got, Rob Reiner, his wife was, oh, bizarre, yeah, yeah. Yeah, he was very very crude and evil things that he posted, I mean, almost immediately. And then somebody else died recently, it was just of old age, I think. yeah, yeah, yeah. But the guy it's someone politician, one of the people that were targeting I don't know who you're referring to. Is that good riddance or someone who don't want to be on this panel? So, so that kind of thing isn't really the trump of earlier days. So that could be an age related thing. Maybe in other p-- I, you know, I have heard people say, you know, there could be some decline, but what I'm afraid of is the people around him, so many of them are Zionists and they're so pro-Israel, and Israel is under great, great stress, most of it they brought on themselves, but I mean, Having issues and they're fighting on all fronts and politically, their government's about to break, they're gonna get a new prime minister, people are angry, they have problems in Israel, and if your, if our president has a little bit of a judgment problem, maybe because of age or, or some, some brain thing, then- Israel's not gonna care about his problem, they're gonna utilize his problem for their benefit. And so I think the people around him-- and this is where you wouldn't do this to your parents, you know, if your parents are declining, you won't make it worse by making jokes of them or setting them up so you can watch them lose their minds, right? You don't do that. Yeah, so the, the-- I found the thing about Trump, by the way. The thing, huh? So I found the one you were framing, too. Sorry, it's Robert Mueller Yeah, yeah, Robert Mueller. Yeah, he died, he died in March 2026, Holland. Right, and he's kind of- Oh, yeah, two months ago, and, and Trump said, "Good, I'm glad he's dead. He can no longer hurt innocent people." Yeah, and, and even to say, you can hurt innocent people after all this stuff Trump is doing in the Middle East with, you know, with denying the, the Manab bombing and things like that. I mean, that's really bad. But anyway, the people around Trump, I don't think are treating him like we would treat our parents. I think they are treating him as a tool, as a, as a mechanism to get what Israel wants. And so if Trump can be goaded or led into flying off the handle Assuming he's writing this stuff himself, maybe they're just writing it for him and he's, he's blasting it out. I really don't know. But w-anything that disrupts the peace process and his Abraham Accords message, I-- And, and what did he say? He said, "I mandatorily request" or something. What, what kind of language is that? That's insane. Nobody even talks like that. He, and, and plus he's in no position to mandate anything to anybody in terms of joining something, but his language is very, seemed set To disrupt peace, to anger Iran, to to confirm to Iran that you can't make a deal with Trump 'cause he's a, he's a nutcase. I, I would see some of his Zionist advisors around him. Susie Wiles, she's supposed to be taking care of him, you know, like she's been with him for a while, he appointed her first woman chief of staff. That's great, you know? That's really nice. She has a lot of experience. Why isn't she protecting him from looking like an idiot? That was cognitive issues because of his age. If that's the case, w- you know what the lawyer told me that he believes Trump is being used. Robert Barnes told me that he believes people are just, you know, taking advantage of Trump and I asked him how, like, why is he listening to those people and not the people like Tucker? He's like, they're saying the things he wants to hear. And he told me he has calls with people like Laura Lumer, for example. I'm like, why would you, or They know what to say to kind of stroke his ego, and that's something that works with someone that his age that suffers from this. Now, whether he suffers from this, maybe mild, mild levels, maybe significant, it's impossible to know. But there are some things that he's saying, that he's doing that just make him so different, and his, you know, people like Marjorie Taylor Greene, they were his supporters when no one dared to support Trump in twenty sixteen. For sure. Yeah. Now, you know, he-- Trump may not be getting enough sleep. He doesn't sleep at all, that's true. Yeah, he may, he may not be getting enough sleep. He's in, he's got a lot of things, things he wants to do. He probably feels like he's running out of time, just it's his last three years, and maybe his last one year if the Congress stands, you know, if it changes over to Democrat or something. Although the Democrats like war just like the Republicans, so I'm not sure the Democrats are really hurting that bad. But I'm sure he has a lot of things he wants to get done Doing stuff, they hit the road running, you know? It was very different than the his first term. In his first term, he was, he tried to appoint people and he couldn't figure out who he wanted, he was firing 'em. This time, he learned from that and he spent a lot of time preparing for it. He hit the road running until he, until he hit the, the Epstein file roadblock. But he was- That's what Robert said exactly. Everything changed after Epstein files. I was- That's right. Exactly that. You guys are very aligned with this But he's-- even after the Epstein thing, he figured that would go away. He's like, "Why are you guys still talking about this? We have..." But his idea is he has a lot of stuff he wants to do, and he clearly does. A lot of it includes wars, but then there's also the peace that he takes credit for, and all the little pieces that he has so-so-called made. But I think in his mind, he has an agenda. I think he has not a lot of time left. He probably never slept well in his whole life 'cause he's Type A Now he needs sleep. He probably needs more sleep, he's not getting it. So maybe not the cognitive decline as much as he's, he's having stress reaction, because I know when you-- if you stay up too much, and I don't mean like partying or anything like that, but if you're just working and you're pulling all-nighters, two or three in a row. What happens is your temper will get bad, at least it happens to me. Your, your, your temper gets bad. Yeah, your cognition also struggles, you have less filters, the list goes on, like it just screws you in so many different ways. And especially when you're at an older age, you need it more than someone's younger. That's right. That's right. So he may be, like so many people and, and Trump would be a, a prime candidate for this, you know, they don't think they're old. They, they don't think, they But he really, he kinda needs to take care of himself. And honestly, this is just gossip, but, you know, he has his Melania, his wife, twenty years of marriage, but she's, she doesn't seem to be like the kind of wife that, that Biden's wife was, Joe Biden, that I totally don't like, Joe Biden at all. Personality, personality-wise and capabilities. But she took care of, of her husband. Now she also put him out there, you know, and made him look stupid by pushing him, but she monitored who was with him. She, she tried, I mean, she cared about him, I think she took care of him, but you don't see Melania, their marriage isn't like that. So I'm wondering who is the person in his life that's taking care of him, and, and I, that's why I see Susie Wiles as a kind of caretaker type person, yeah, but I don't see her doing it. So You know, whatever. And the problem is, gonna humiliate our president, drive him nuts, make him do crazy things, that's fine, nobody cares, except he's the president of United States. So what he does reflects on all the people of this country, it reflects on our, our state. And if what people are saying is true that the last person that has his ear is the one that influences him, a lot of people have said that to me. If that's the case, then when you see reports like now he just had a call with Netanyahu, he's speaking with Netanyahu more than all More than anyone else, Europe, Hezrona, Israel, he's speaking to Netanyahu, every time it's like, "Anakolbun, Netanyahu that's not a good look, that's not a good sign, not a good sign." No, it really, it really isn't. Imagine if Netanyahu sabotages this, I, again, I, I've said this a lot, but I'd be so shocked. Yeah, I don't, I mean, look, I mean- I think they're, the, the Israeli government, Netanyahu and his advisors, and they all, to me, they're just a bunch of murderers, they're a murderous gang. But I think they're fine-tuning their plan, and they're looking at what they're capable of doing in a limited amount of time, because you know, and that could be a lot of, but I think they're looking to contain the situation that they have got themselves into in Lebanon, and dominate what they can. But I I, I don't know, I don't know. For the Gazans. Well, they're bombing it, they bombed it today, they bombed Lebanon today. No food, no medicine, nothing's coming in. They got 'em crammed together. this, this, this- It's on a terrible path that will meet their objectives, which is most of those people are gonna pass in some way or the other. But in Lebanon, I think there's debate in their security council as to how do we do this, and And they're facing significant damages as well. So a report an hour ago, Israel is- By To procure more anti-drone nets from Europe due to increased drone threats from Hezbollah, Israeli commanders say the situation in southern Lebanon is becoming, quote, "more unbearable by the day." We're seeing a lot of footage of drones just hitting Israeli troops in their, in their trucks and just walking around. another, another report here, Israeli troops, after Israeli troops moved to more nighttime operations to avoid, to avoid drone strikes, Hezbollah began using FPV drones with nighttime vision, night vision. Their latest re-up from Iran is proving to be costly for Yes, so Iran is supplying them with significant weapons supplying Hezbollah with significant weapons. The the the corridors they had earlier during the Assad, they're still there, and I spoke to people that said, "Mauri, these corridors aren't easy to close, especially though, for the Al-Shara government, which is already struggling as is to keep the country together." we got another report here. Excuse me, a senior IDF official says Israel's unable to accept the current reality in Lebanon, quote, "without the ability to respond and being limited by understandings and agreements with both sides, the US and the Lebanese government, 'cause they're also negotiating with the Lebanese government. The Lebanese government saying, "Look, we will not, 'cause Trump wants a win there. The Lebanese government saying, "We will not negotiate unless you guys stop bombing us before we talk about anything." And that's the Lebanese government that wants to disarm Hezbollah, so they, they-- Yeah. I think everyone is turning on Can figure out something, but oh, there's no, they need peace. Yeah, one more report. Let, let me re-This one's interesting, I'll just read this one quickly for you, Karen. And Channel 13. Senior Israeli officials say Israel doesn't want to be seen as deliberately sabotaging Trump's potential agreement with Iran, stressing that despite the escalation in Lebanon, Israel quote, "can't do whatever it wants, especially in Beirut." The remarks came after IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak reportedly pushed during recent discussions for buildings for- bombing buildings in Beirut in Beirut to be struck in response to drones being fired by Hezbollah. According to the report, senior political officials rejected the idea of randomly bringing down buildings in Beirut at this stage over fears it could harm the ongoing Iran negotiations. What about the humanitarian fears instead of the negotiations? officials added Israel still maintains quite sig-- very significant freedom of action in southern Lebanon and other areas, but acknowledged operations in Beirut remain, remain far more restricted. The issue The issue is expected to be discussed tonight during the security cabinet meeting, and then he had a call with Trump then. And nothing's changed since, so there's still strike in the south, but not one strike in Beirut. So hopefully, we'll see. I think we're seeing unfold in real time a power struggle between Netanyahu and Trump, and I- Yeah. It's impossible to hide the results, 'cause what happens next will tell us who calls the shots. Yeah, yeah, that's true. I still think, I, I still think Trump- Is close to he's ready to use the military that he has amassed in the region. You know, we aren't, we haven't seen any redeployments, everybody's there. If, if what they did in the, in the Strait with the firing was a practice to see, you know, like ready, like a You know, let's see if we can do this. I mean, they had an F-35 that was chased out, that's the air, aircraft that was... You saw the video, yeah? Turned, turned tail, I guess. But, and, you know, that's probing and checking the response and seeing what they can get away with, and I'm sure that if, if the commanders, the naval commanders or whoever's operating, probably the navy guys they are, they are preparing for Trump's orders. And there's gonna be a, a, a, you know, let's practice this, let's go, we're doing some, they're doing, you know, I'm sure they're flying over the ocean, they're doing all the normal stuff they have to do to keep sharp, but he wants, you know, I, I think, I think Trump wants to go out with a big bang like he did in the twelve-day war. He would kill the military, he would kill the military, he would kill the global economy, the damage would be insane. Yeah, so, oh Even if he harms Iran, which he would, the retaliation will be you know, terrible. It will be- Unimaginable. Yeah, no, it'll be, it'll be. Iran's made it very clear, they said they'll make it into the new Gulf War for the region if they're attacked by anyone, even if it's just Israel. They said they'll drag in the Gulf, they'll strike the energy infrastructure and the whole of the Middle East. Maybe that, maybe Iran should be more clear with the damage that they're gonna do specifically, specifically to Israel Let's hold this fight for another day. The thing is, it's easier, it's easier for them to damage the global economy and American allies. It's much easier than damaging Israel. Israel needs to be attacked time and time and time again to deplete their munitions. The global economy fire a few drones on boats, not even that, just say, "Hey, Sadrhamus is closed." That's it. And then they wanna escalate? Alright, cool. Three drones were able to strike the nuclear power plant in the UAE. They could do the same thing across the Gulf, strike the energy infrastructure. There's more. The cables, the internet cables, undersea cables. Imagine internet being cut out for the Gulf region and for Europe and Asia being impacted as well. Like there's, the, the, all the, the Data centers being dev-- being built in the region as well and obviously the oil refineries and stuff. There is so much they could do that would just screw up the global economy from the helium for the microchips and the, the MRI machines and all the other products, and then you've got the fertilizers, oil, gas, you know, we, we know these. The thing that can happen is what the US and Israel hoped would happen in Israel, in, in Iran when we, you know, attacked them, that the people would rise up. I wouldn't want to be in Bahrain when the air conditioning goes out and the water is limited, because they've got a Shi'a majority who is mistreated. I say mistreated, they don't have full, fully equal rights, they're ruled by a, an elite, kind of like we are, that's not one of them. So you could, you could see you could People rioting against their own governments, I can see that happening in Bahrain sooner than I can see it in, in Iran if the situation got to you know, a dire situation. And that's what-- and Iran is capable of, of setting that off. Now, the one thing though, Iran seems-- and even with the new, even with Moushdebah, with his message which seemed very harsh, you know, a little strong on Israel, like Israel's gonna be gone, that kind of thing, that's hard, that's some scary language. But they also Muslims, and they don't wanna hurt Shia Muslims in particular in Bahrain. So, you, you know, would-- I mean, that's a humanitarian crisis if they hit water, energy, infrastructure, and cables. The whole Gulf financial system and economic system is gonna be wiped. That's gonna harm a lot of Muslims you know, a lot of Shia Muslims too. So why would-- I don't, I don't really think Iran would want to do that. Certainly it's, it can be threatened, but, you know, ideally People could negotiate, but we have a president who may not be fully competent. he's influenced by somebody that doesn't act- The influence is what worries me. Yeah, yeah, this is a problem. But I don't know. And you've got meanwhile, just to let you know that we're gonna start seeing the reality of this new world order, whatever you wanna call it, the multipolar world order, the diminishing of American hegemony. Saudi and the United States are entering the final stage of, of civilian nuclear agreement, and the joint efforts to finalize the wording related to future nuclear fuel cycle rights. So it just came in now, and there's been talks about Saudi going from civilian nuclear enrichment to, you know, taking up and actually building a nuclear weapon that's been talked about for many, many years. and then on the other point North Korea has conducted a test of a new multipurpose missile launch system that just happened now, and North Korea just doesn't give a shit anymore. Like, they're watching Iran, they're like, "Iran doesn't even have a nuclear weapon, and they couldn't stop them. We have ICBMs that could reach the US." So it's it's also sad to see the outcome of this war because, like, who's What's to hold North Korea back? Like North Korea's not a country I want them to have a nuclear weapon, okay? Obviously the military means isn't the way to solve it. But then China, w-would China focus on that sphere of influence? 'Cause I'm sure China doesn't want to country autocracy on its border with a nuclear weapon, maybe one day in ten, twenty years it might turn on it, so this could be a potential security risk What happens to Europe? What, what, Europe is kind of lost in the middle, trying to figure out their alliance network. Then you've got, obviously, the Gulf now just lost. The Gulf has just been like, you know, they've just been thrown in the ocean, like, figure it out. I feel so bad for the Gulf right now. And then you've got Iran coming out stronger, and you've got the US trying to figure out how to, how to kind of recover from this and get, and Trump wants a new win, and what's gonna happen in Cuba now Better for the worse, we'll, we'll be able to know soon. Yeah. Well, I mean, I, I, my Substack article I put out today is-- talks about the new architecture, not in a lot of detail, but, you know, we have a plan that we've been working on for seventy years in the US, and that is, we will Have our military everywhere on the planet, and we'll control most of the governments, all the ones we can coo or intimidate or buy off, in the-- all in the name of democracy. But of course, we don't really want democracy. Like in Iraq, they, they have election, they want a prime minister, we say, "No, you can't have that one, you have to have a different one." So, but this is our security architecture. It is a forward-deployed security architecture, and that's not working anymore. We can't afford it, and it's a little That's collapsing, that's coming home, that's at least gonna come to the hemisphere. It may have to stay right in the United States at some point. What's replacing it isn't another competitor doing the same thing we did. What's replacing it is these regional, neighborly agreements complex relationships, which include security, but also include all kinds of other things, you know? and it includes more tolerance, I think. This is what's gonna be strange. It incl- you know, the Middle East Peace that will, that will include the Gulf states and Iran at some point and Pakistan and what China's doing in its theater, those things are gonna be way more tolerant than what the United States has done in the name of freedom and democracy, because we aren't tolerant, okay? You need to do what the Americans tell you to do. This has been our policy for, for at least sixty years. Do what we say, and we will, we will either protect you or we won't destroy you. This is our thing. Well, that whole paradigm's gone. It's collapsed. The balloon has popped, it's no good, can't put it back together, it's over. The empire is gonna contract into, hopefully, a republic, but if not, it'll be a much, much smaller empire. And these new security arrangements, its architecture, will, are emerging right now. They're emerging right now, and they're only gonna get more complex, they're only gonna get stronger. And nobody wants war, that's the thing. Like Americans say, "Well, we don't want war." Well, we've been the cause of war on this planet for, Somewhere, you know, we, we have Afghanistan for twenty years, we finally pull troops out of Afghanistan, and next thing you know, it's Ukraine. Next thing you know, it's Venezuela. Next thing you know, it's Iran. It feels like the, the American, the American the average American just doesn't understand how unusual this is. How unusual this is. let me show you can you play that video, Mike? So as we're speaking, tell me if you get an idea, what, what's supposed to be a peacetime now ceasefire, well, this is Lebanon as we're speaking right now. give you an idea. Yeah, that's- There you go. So that's happening as we speak, and then me- meanwhile Hezbollah, so IDF has already installed more than two hundred and fifty thousand square meters of anti-drone netting along its northern border with Lebanon. Reminds you of those scenes, you can remove, like, thank you. It reminds me of of those scenes in Ukraine. Remember the, all those nets on the border on the Ukrainian and Russian side. It is Yeah, that's that's insane. I think somebody's keeping track, probably somebody in Lebanon or, or Hezbollah or somebody, is keeping track of all of the ceasefire violations that are, that Israel has done since the ceasefire was declared. And of course, you know, Hezbollah says like, "Everybody, you know, I'm, we're, we're counterattacking, we're defending because of Israel did the ceasefire." And Is-- and Israel says, "Of course, no, no, we had to break the ceasefire because you were hitting us." So it's like, Elementary school kids. Yeah exactly, exactly. With Hezbollah, I said I've criticized Hezbollah so much when they, when they dragged Lebanon into this war by defending Iran. I'm like, look, they did a great thing for Iran, a bad thing for Lebanon. But now Hezbollah, I said this to someone today, they're like they're like Israel is just responding to Hezbollah attacks. I'm like, look, I promise you, if Is-Is-Isreal stops bombing Lebanon right now, I can guarantee I'll put money on it, Hezbollah will immediately start, stop bombing. Hezbollah doesn't want-- the only reason Hezbollah dragged itself and the country into this war is to defend Iran. But if the war in Iran stopped, there's no in-incentive for Hezbollah to do this. Hezbollah hasn't done this since two thousand and six. plus they need to lick their wounds. They've been pummeled I think the, the incentive for war is right now for Netanyahu from a legal perspective, and for, in a sick way, just for Israel because of that, they're just used to it, as in, it's like they need violence to feel secure, which, which actually should be the opposite. They feel like, and someone told me this there, they feel like there's threats there and Israel being able to bomb and advance Is the reason they are safe. What they don't understand is that cycle, that Israel aggression in, in Syria and Gaza and Lebanon and Iran, that aggression by Syria is what's leading to those retaliation, but the region is just done. Most of the people in the region just done with this. If you think about Israel's strategy, which is to fight 'em wherever they are and, and al-- you know, always be on a hair trigger alert, bomb, punish, whatever the, the enemy And this is the very aggressive fighting all the time. for a long time, the counterattacks have not been effective. So, you know, it's shooting fish in a barrel, just like it was in, pretty much in Gaza. I mean, for the most part, Gaza was fighting against bombing and targeting and burning, blowing up buildings, but there wasn't a lot of-- It certainly wasn't equal what was coming out from Hamas. Hamas isn't much. I mean not, not super capable, and it- Anyway, so they're used to, just like we were, just like we were when we went and did this latest Iran thing, and Iran held back, they told us the first time in June They held back, they said, "Oh, we're gonna do this, we're gonna do that." They've, they've done that twice in a row letting us know very careful, very controlled response, very orchestrated. And then this, this last time, of course, they didn't, they-- it was maybe orchestrated from the Iranian side, but they didn't hold back. So all this stuff is hitting us, forty-two aircraft you know, probably a hundred billion dollars already spent and wasted, and we're not done wasting it. So this has inflicted a cost on the Good, 'cause we may rethink how we do defense and offense, and we, we, we need to, because we're behind, we're, we're behind. If, if we really wanna be a leading military, we are gonna have to go through a, a, a complete reevaluation and redesign of how we do business. But anyway, we weren't used to being hit back either, and we got smacked, and so we're kinda stunned. But this is the case with Israel, all of their enemies have-- nobody stands still, nothing stays the same. There's And, and react, react, and so Israel's enemies are getting better while Israel's strategy is staying the same. It's the same bomb and, you know, it's the same strategy they've had for years, probably a couple, three decades. This is what they've been doing to keep Israel safe. We, we kill our enemies at the border, and we are very scary. we never- They've never dealt with drone warfare. They've never dealt with drone warfare. Iran is too far to fire drones at them, it's easy to intercept them. And They haven't even, and they're supposed to be the really top military, technology-wise, but again, they had been protected from having to really improve their game or reevaluate their strategy, and that's what they have to do. the, the other problem, though, that makes it worse for Israel, since this fight with the Arabs everywhere around them and Iranians has been going on for so long That the level of the spirit of war is ingrained, not just in the Israeli side, which we clearly see, they are a, a war, they, they, they're, they're murderous, okay? They, they, as a society, their government, it's all united, we must kill the enemy. Okay, great, they're a little Spartan country, fine. But the problem is, all the guys that they've been, all the countries, all the people they've been victimizing and hitting, who couldn't really hit back, now might be able to or have friends And they're also mad. They're also, they've also developed a major chip on their shoulder because they've been mistreated, they've had losses inflicted for what they see as no reason. And honestly, I'm with them, because, you know, I'm, I have, I'm a farmer. So I see these pictures of settlers, you know, killing Palestinian sheep and going in, you know, burning their, their crops down, uprooting their olive trees stealing their property, and I see that and I go, "Why are they doing that?" Why are they doing that? I don't understand it. So I'm, I stand with the Palestinians in not wanting to be you know, to have my neighbors come in and kill my animals and burn my house down. You know, this is something that you, you hold a grudge now. As an American, we know we're, we're pretty, we're, we're pretty feisty, we like to argue and fuss and fight. I am amazed at Palestinians in their patience and they're kind of you know, if the will of Allah, you know, it's like, well, we're suffering, but God must will it for us, and, and it'll all be good in the end That's, that is that's admirable. I don't, I, I don't think Americans would be able to put up with that. We're not like that. We, we, we are quickly, we're quick to anger, I think, in our country. Six, I also feel like they have no choice. Like as heartbreaking as it is, they fought for so long, they're in a position now where they saw Hamas fought in a horrible way, obviously, but even before October seventh, but October seventh was the horrible way, but Hamas fought in their way, In the West Bank, they're like, "Look, we hate our life, but seeing those videos out of Gaza it's, it's my, it's, people have a family, who would want his family, their family, to live in a world like this? Some of the videos that I see..." You know, it's, it's, it's, it's crazy, it's crazy. It's gotta, and, and how it doesn't break their spirit, and actually they, they, some of the folks in Gaza, they're saying, not some of the folks, people who are looking at the problems, not just the health issues, but the mental health problems are they're compounding, you know, the grief, just sustained grief, the loss, the anxiety, you know, and of course, the Israelis are, are facilitating this anxiety, you know, by, they have you know, they're, they're running their drones close by, some blow up, some don't, but it doesn't matter because you hear a drone and, you know, your blood pressure goes up and you're scared and your kids are crying. So this is this is institutionalized torture of a whole nation And I don't know, I don't know how forgivable that is. I I think when you go too far, you can't-- Forgiveness is really hard to come by. But when you want, when you make peace, when you make an agreement, when you settle your, your differences, and you agree to go forward peacefully, you have to have an element of forgiveness. And I don't see where that's gonna come from. I don't see how anybody there can forgive Israel, and the Israelis aren't in any way ready to forgive of any Arab or, or Iranian or even an American, if they've perceived that the Americans have somehow left them high and dry or not fulfilled our duty to, to Israel not protected them or something like that. So it's there's a video I did, I'm trying to find it now, with a young boy in, in Gaza. It was about a year ago. I'll have to ask my team if they can find it. It was just so sad. He's a young boy and he's telling me how he Life. He's got a good following on YouTube. He posts a video whenever he can get internet. We did an interview a year ago, so I wanna check up on him. Haven't, I've been, something crosses my mind. But it's just like I remember he had hope when that ceasefire was happening. I was so happy, and I, I watched one of his videos. but it's just seeing what's, like, how long before, before you're just, you're, you're just, you're just gonna give up? Yeah, and it's amazing that they, many of them have not given up. They are basically professional sufferers. They are suffering day after day, and they're not giving up. And, and maybe it's we should all-- I guess we can learn, we can both learn about the evil that we're able to do to each other, but also the, the strength of of persisting. yeah, I'm so, I'm so sorry, go ahead. Well, I mean, the, the Iranians say we won because we are still Like you hit us and we are the victors and we're not, we're not going anywhere, and you hit us really hard and you killed, I don't know, three thousand people and destroyed a lot of our military, but you know what? We're still here. So that's it, we won, we won. You hit us, but we're still here. So there's a way to interpret just staying alive as, as a victory, and it is, it is a form of victory. But anyway, I don't know, 'cause you A year ago, not the most recent ones, but the ones that were on trial, and they weren't really on trial. They ended up, all charges were dropped, and they were celebrated as heroes for what they had done. Yeah, Ben, Ben, Netanyahu. Yeah, but if those same guys, if we had prison guards in the United States that conducted themselves like that Our culture is a little different. American culture, we're, we're you know, we're not unified by a particular ethnic or religious thing, and we have these standards and things we expect as a, as a society, we think, "Well, this is wrong." W-we woulda hung those guys. I mean, in a-if they'd been- I know, I know. I, I, I did a tweet about this. I used the Abu Ghraib prison example and compared the two. Bush, right after when the Abu Ghraib in Iraq Investigation instantly. Yeah, yeah, they did. And now, they weren't-- We weren't looking to hurt, to, to hold those guys accountable when they were in Abu Ghraib, but once it got out, once it was exposed, which is the same with the IDF, once it was exposed, what happened? Yeah. We acted. And that was something that re-- that Democrats probably didn't matter about your party, it didn't matter, you wanted that justice to be done. And the only thing Americans complained about is that we actually punished the lower-ranking people People more than we punished their officers. Some of the officers didn't receive punishment, but we, we wanted more punishment up the chain because we said, "This is wrong, this cannot be tolerated." And no, w-w-we're not perfect, but it's just a different culture. So yeah, that's what I'm actually so, I'm- So 'cause, like, the reason I started doing these shows and interviews years ago is like I'm always very curious to understand the sides that is misunderstood. For example, after October seventh, I was really trying to get some-- when it was at the beginning, beginning was like taboo to even talk about the Palestinian issue. At the beginning, it was like a red line, if you don't say babies were burnt and beheaded, whatever it was, then you're an antisemite. Like, it was extreme at the beginning. So I was like very keen to understand what the Hamas operatives I couldn't get anyone from Hamas, but this is where my mind goes. And re-recently, I've been really tempted to speak to more people that I spoke to only once so far, but I wanna speak to more people, and like similar to Ben Gvir or Smotrich, then it's like How does your brain get to a conclusion where, hey, let's level ten villages for every drone they fire, or being, we are saying things like what he says, let's wipe out a civilization, as Trump said that, but let's wipe out Palestinians but not different to what Trump. Trump put out one post that seemed obvious, he was just threatening to get out. But in this case, like they mean it, they say it, and then they actually deliver on those threats, like let's wipe out Palestinians in Gaza, and they wiped them out. And I'm really To, to as a society, I, I look, I started looking at the polls recently. It's, you know, twenty to thirty percent of people support Ben Gvir, that, have a favorable view of him. Yeah. That is a hugely big, it's concerning number. So in our country, we have serial killers, right? And we have crime shows. And I don't know, I think we're running out of serial killers, but anyway, there's this guy I think John Wayne Gacy, real famous guy from the late '70s and '80s, and he killed all these boys, young men, in Chicago, I think it was Chicago. And he's in prison for life, he didn't-- I don't think he's on death row, I think he's in prison for life. Well, he gave-- they did some television show, I don't know if it was a series or a show, but it was I can't believe he did that. He was like a great guy, you know, what, what the heck? But he was a terrible guy. He was a, just the worst. And you know, like twenty-eight, thirty kids he killed over a period of time, buried him in his basement, you know, it's just really a, a sick story, which is why it was in TV over and over again. But he didn't interview. He's been in jail for many years, and he didn't interview. And they talked to him about all kinds of things about what was It was pretty disturbing, because on the one hand he could say, "Yeah, that probably wasn't right," but on the other hand, "This is what he, this is what he did, and this is how he did it," and he did it, then he did it another time, and he made some mistakes. I mean, he's very matter-of-fact about it, so- He's a psychopath, okay? Yeah, exactly. And, and, and you know, so if you, you-- I'm not sure you wanna get inside of the head of a psychopath, 'cause we aren't, we're still going to not recognize that. But that'll be, but that'll be a good description for, let's say Ben Gvir, that's a very likely possibility. I think what intrigues me more... What intrigues me more is why is there thirty percent of Israelis that are there? What is their mindset? And I, I spoke to, I think, Former years ago, I forgot his name, and I asked him that question to try to really understand, 'cause he's very critical of, of the Israeli, current Israeli government. And he's like, "Mario, it's like people have been conditioned that way. Number one is being victimized, number two is in their mind, they believe the whole world is against them. " Yeah. "And number three is they wake up every, every day on the news, it's like, we're being attacked here, we're being attacked there, that's what leads the news into your head. And it kind of, if people have studied it, historians have studied like, you know, a lot of wars and how, you know, world wars as well, how events and circum- different circumstances can lead people to do certain things or to feel certain ways or to believe certain things. And the herd mentality, it's, it's just so, so, it's just so insane seeing it unfold in real time in our day and age when there's access to internet, it's not like information could be hidden. They can go, if they choose to obviously, and check these things. to check these things and see them themselves, so it's like to see what's happening in Gaza, but, you know. You know, remember COVID? Like, I just know it from the American experience, but I mean, it was a global thing, and they did lockdowns and all kinds of stuff, but The very beginning of COVID, when it first started, it was just like a flu and, but, you know, whatever. They, the state, the government, all the government, state and federal government, everybody, they worked on frightening people. They had very scary messages, you know, it was killing all the people, and those messages started one way, and of course, I'm not talking about where it came from or anything, I'm just saying there's this thing, the government's all worried about it, we, you should be worried about it, we have to do all these things, and Got to where people wouldn't go see their grandparents, grandparents wouldn't go see their grandkids, people wouldn't gather together, and the state was telling you, "Don't gather together because people are gonna die." Now, the actual death rate of that particular virus, once it was, was very tiny. It was basically bad flu. and bad flus always kill people on the fringes of the health spectrum, you know, the elderly, the, the sick, the weak, whatever. But but anyway, we were all very scared, and even people like You know, pushed back on that, read everything I could find out about it, I kind of made my own decision up. I thought it was a lot of propaganda, it didn't matter, I knew it was propaganda, I, I, you know, I would push against it mentally. At the same time, when I went to Walmart, when I went to, to where people would be to shop, I would wear my mask, right? 'Cause in the back of my mind, well, what if they're right, right? So fear And the massaging of fear that, that a government can do, particularly a government, because especially a government in Israel could do it very well because they control the media, but any government can do it, all governments did it, European governments were worse than the American government. But you take fear, you massage it, you exaggerate it, you emphasize it, you hit 'em every fifteen minutes like you say. Yeah. You can get people to do just about anything. So I would, I guess, I-- we should reserve judgment on some of the, the thirty percent of Israelis who say these things, 'cause maybe they are victims of of the government and victims of the fringe, the- Exactly. Yeah, yeah, that's, that's my mindset. The media, the government all together. The, the-- One thing I've learned in this war, How easy it is to influence people watching that with Massey and Edwards. Edward, it's scary how easy it is to influence people, and it's getting easier and easier with social media dominating our life and AI. It's it's a very worrying world. Like if you imagine, I, I was speaking to Colonel I forgot his name, I'm, I'm so bad with names. But I was speaking to Colonel Aguilar, and his his social media accounts all of them got wiped out in one day. I heard that this afternoon, and I, and I looked for him on X, and I didn't see him. So is it true? Is it true that Aguilar- That's what he said. I don't know if it's true, that's what he said to me. And it's the reason I said I don't know if it's true, 'cause it's Usually X, usually X doesn't do it, yeah, but then all of them at once, and they can't create a new account even with his phone number or name, and then upscaled, like upscaled the pro-Palestinian platform, you know, it's like X, it's, yeah, upscaled and X and YouTube and it's all at the same time. So either, you know, something happened or like someone deleted them or something, but or it's true, and if it's true It is terrifying. It is terrifying. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. it'll be interesting to see because, you know, the hackers, you know, Hamdullah, I don't ever see any of the things they supposedly release, but I see their announcements that they've hacked this and they've hacked that, you know, the Iranian hacking group. Oh, the anonymous of Iran. Yeah, yeah. I don't even know if that's for real, but and I've, I've never gone to their site to see like, "What do, what have you They've done, and some of them are quite could be really bad. I mean, very put people in a very vulnerable position, you know, people's information and make them targets of other people. So you know, there's a lot going on in this battlefield, so in, in, in information space. I realize that people don't realize that people have no idea how bad it is, yeah. It's wild. Karen, it's always, always great to chat to you. Thank you so much for giving us your time, the audience loves it as well. There was a glitch on, there was a glitch on X, so it wasn't posted on X, but will be posted tomorrow. But always a pleasure to chat to you, Karen. Okay, wonderful. Same here. We'll talk to you later. Have a great day. Thank you, Karen. Bye-bye. Bye. Alright, guys Karen, one of our favorite guests, always, always enjoy her call her, the chats with her, and she speaks from the heart. That's one thing that I really adore about her, such a genuine person, and also extremely knowledgeable. so I hope you enjoyed that conversation more casual. And there were two interviews that didn't happen today. One of them had a technical glitch with Colonel McRaege, you might have seen it for a few seconds and then it cl-crashed and then we had to reschedule We had an issue, so it's a bad day when it comes to the lines, but I hope you enjoyed all the others that I did and that Azia, the co-host, our co-host, did as well. let me know what you think of Azia, you should listen to her interview, she's great, such a nice person as well, very knowledgeable, check out her interviews. Tomorrow's gonna be a pretty wild day, the team told me, I haven't checked the calendar yet, but let me see what we have tomorrow. it is a wild day. Samy Hamdi, who was meant to be today, by the way, he rescheduled. Arash Azizi, it's the first time we have Arash Azizi on, on the he's the author of What Iranians Want. And then we have, I have a break, maybe Aziz has others, so these are mine, and then Aziz might have others. We have Elijah, one of my favorite guests, who we always debate, and you guys enjoy our debates, you guys are big fans of him, so I get criticized in those debates. We got Amit Segal, who's a chief political analyst at N12 News, Israeli News, and lastly, we have Dave Rubin got a great show called The Rubin Report, i-in the US, great host, great guy and I think he disagrees with a lot of what I believe in a lot of the, not what I believe in, a lot of the positions that I have, the political positions that I have, which makes the conversation even more interesting. He's a very smart guy, very nice guy as well. So these are the guests for tomorrow, and they'll probably add more guests to the show tomorrow. Alright, guys, have a wonderful day. Pleasure And I'll see you again tomorrow. Goodbye, guys.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 The country that reportedly lost 20% of its ballistic missiles and 70% of its manufacturing capability may have still come out strategically stronger. Fmr. U.S. Navy intel officer Malcolm Nance says the war consolidated power inside Iran instead of weakening it. “They’ve come out stronger. A harder-line government. The IRGC is solidly in control now.” The ceasefire optics may favor Trump, but the long-term political and strategic math could end up favoring Tehran. @MalcolmNance
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Elon just offered to fund a wrongful death lawsuit against UK police officers who handcuffed the victim of a stabbing. Henry Novak had been stabbed by Vickrum Digwa with an 8in Sikh martial arts knife. When officers arrived, Vickrum claimed he had been racially abused, while Henry was lying on his side, telling the police he’d been stabbed and couldn’t breathe. Officers immediately took Vickrum’s side and told Henry that he was under arrest for suspicion of assault, dismissing claims that he’d been stabbed. Henry died as a result of his injuries. The UK is beyond a joke
reSee.it AI Summary
I recently heard former U.S. Army officer Stanislav Krapivnik argue that the Xi summit was mostly “good optics” for Trump while he urgently needed positive news on Iran. He expects Strait of Hormuz moves to accelerate, with China’s role growing, land routes helping Iran bypass pressure, and Washington facing impossible political demands as its Gulf presence erodes.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇨🇳 INTERVIEW: Fmr U.S. Army officer Stanislav Krapivnik expanded on his view that the Xi summit functioned as little more than good optics for the U.S. when Trump was in desperate need of delivering something resembling positive news on Iran. "Trump needed him in Anchorage fast because he needed a picture. Trump needed the PR. This is the same thing." In this discussion, Stanislav talks about what will likely happen next in the Strait of Hormuz, the role China will play, and how Trump will be forced to respond to a rapidly changing war. @STANISKRAPIVNIK 03:30 - Trump’s China visit described as unprepared and diplomatically weak 05:51 - Venezuela cannot quickly replace Iranian oil exports despite huge reserves 09:06 - Taiwan’s political factions still fundamentally see themselves as Chinese 12:26 - Russia and land routes helping Iran bypass the blockade 16:41 - Is China quietly pressuring Iran toward concessions? 19:21 - Iranian demands viewed as politically impossible for Washington to accept 22:57 - U.S. attempts to control global chokepoints versus China’s Belt and Road strategy 25:43 - U.S. missile production and rare earth shortages are becoming critical 33:23 - How Israel may be driving escalation while Trump wants out of the war 35:02 - U.S. military presence in the Gulf is collapsing after heavy damage 44:50 - Gulf states to gradually improve relations with Iran 46:02 - On a U.S. withdrawal cementing Iran as a dominant regional power 47:05: Israel’s influence in America said to be weakening, especially among younger Jews
Video Transcript AI Summary
- The discussion begins with concern about the quality of Speaker 1’s internet connection for recorded YouTube work. Speaker 1 explains that their neighborhood has a monopolist limiting updates to local software/hardware, and says their own Starlink setup is going up, with 20+ or ~30 satellites already online and deploying quickly. Speaker 1 then jokes about sponsoring revolutions abroad, noting France and the UK should be ready.
- The conversation shifts to international developments, focusing on the “Iran war” and later Ukraine/Russia, and then on Trump’s visit to China.
- Speaker 1 describes alleged details from Trump’s China visit: Tajikistan’s president was visiting the same day, and during Trump’s arrival only part of the route’s flags were reportedly changed from Tajik to US flags. Speaker 1 frames this as a “soft insult.”
- On Xi Jinping meeting Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin at airports/tarmacs, Speaker 1 says some claims are not true and emphasizes protocol and past examples: in prior meetings (Xi and Putin; Trump arriving previously), Xi reportedly met Putin at the tarmac, sat down with the top down, and drove into the city. Speaker 1 also says that in Trump’s last China arrival, Trump reportedly had Xi waiting.
- Speaker 1 assesses the Xi–Trump meeting as unprepared compared with highly structured US-style or adversarial-country meetings. They describe how security teams, working diplomats, document preparation, possible joint statements, and agenda negotiation are typically handled before leaders meet. Speaker 1 compares this to earlier dynamics seen in Anchorage (with Trump allegedly seeking speed for a PR/picture moment).
- The thread links the China visit to energy leverage involving Iran and Venezuela. Speaker 1 says Venezuela’s capacity is limited (around 800,000 barrels/day) and that significantly expanding it takes time and large investment. Speaker 1 argues US refining limitations matter: US refineries were set up for heavier sour crude (described as “viscous” and “sour” due to sulfur) and the US has not built a new refinery in over 30 years, citing bureaucracy and environmental laws as reasons companies left.
- Speaker 1 elaborates on why the US cannot easily expand refining quickly, citing high insurance costs for factory work and related regulatory burdens, leading factories to move elsewhere.
- Speaker 0 asks whether Trump intended a different sequence: Speaker 1 says the initial idea was to seek earlier wins and use Venezuela and Iran concessions to gain leverage, but the meeting reportedly came with Trump facing weaker leverage and needing help on Iran.
- Taiwan discussions: Speaker 1 says reunification preferences exist among the Taiwanese opposition party that met Xi in China, with Taiwan described as the “Republic of China” and some groups categorized as seeking reconquest/reunification. Speaker 1 discusses why supplying Taiwan for conflict is difficult across open water and notes past US War College war-game conclusions that China would win if the US fleet intervened between China and Taiwan, while US strategy (as described) aims to make invasion costly rather than “winning.”
- Proxy-war framing: Speaker 1 describes Ukraine and Iran/Yemen conflict patterns as proxy dynamics, referencing Marco Rubio’s admission that one war is a proxy war.
- Iran supply/blockade claims: Speaker 1 says Iran is supplied via multiple routes—ports on the Caspian connected through Russian ports, and a rail line through Pakistan to China—plus other smaller export/storage options. Speaker 1 argues Iran’s weakness has historically included refining and diesel shortages, comparing it to the US importing refined product because it cannot refine enough to meet demand.
- Venezuela capacity and US-advantaged/refinery/infrastructure problems are revisited, including discussion of reserves being held in gold in the US, social spending reductions of reinvestment, and US confiscation/export restrictions on equipment replacement, leading to worn-out infrastructure and the lack of “quick fixes.”
- Straits of Hormuz and alleged “fee” idea: Speaker 0 cites a White House statement that China agreed to buy American oil to diversify from Hormuz and that Iran should not charge a fee for the Straits of Hormuz. Speaker 1 responds that Iran does not charge China fees (as stated by Speaker 1), then argues China’s commitments would only be clear if China confirms them, and compares this to past statements where purchases were claimed without matching agreements.
- Speaker 1 argues sanctions can be moved/bypassed by the US government, not lifted by it, and says only US Congress can remove sanctions. Speaker 1 also claims the US continues buying sanctioned Russian products, while Europeans are criticized for accepting costly resell markups.
- Speaker 1 also argues Hormuz isn’t treated as international waters in their view, and that Oman involvement matters, including claims about Oman not installing tollbooths and Iran striking ships—contrasted with the idea that a long-term/perpetual fee would open global choke-point “can of worms.”
- Broader geopolitical framing: Speaker 1 says the “global system” is effectively gone, arguing the US helped build it and then killed it when it no longer served US interest, citing examples like the WTO and the strategic focus on controlling key choke points. Speaker 1 contrasts sea routes with Eurasia land connectivity and high-speed rail, linking this to belt-and-road connectivity.
- Back to Iran: Speaker 0 asks whether China is pressuring Iran to concede or offering Trump political support with words. Speaker 1 says China prefers status quo and would prefer an end to war without weakening American stockpiles; Speaker 1 also says Iran’s ceasefire is not a full ceasefire and that both sides continue actions.
- US military capacity and escalation: Speaker 1 argues that if Trump restarts the war, missile production is “null and void” at scale, and US manufacturing/industrial ramp-up would take years, citing the “missile production is null and void” point and the difficulty of rapid industry re-shoring due to state regulations. Speaker 1 discusses rare earths as a limiting factor in a different way—refining/processing capacity rather than shortage of elements—then argues chemical/electrolysis processing is expensive, energy intensive, and environmentally complex, often causing multi-year delays similar to refineries.
- Soft-power indicators from Xi’s alleged absence and flag changes are used to explain Chinese behavior toward Trump, contrasted with prior high-level airport greetings and seating/handshake optics. Speaker 1 compares seating arrangements and perceived humiliation in European/Serbia contexts as a recurring pattern of power display.
- Iran-war outcome speculation: Speaker 0 proposes a 50/50 scenario: continuation of conflict with Israeli strikes (and Iran mirroring strikes in the Gulf) versus Trump walking away. Speaker 1 says Israelis are driving outcomes and that APAC donors and money make turning away difficult, arguing Trump wants out but is constrained. Speaker 1 also says Iran and even Saudis/Kuwaitis reportedly would prefer US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf.
- US military withdrawal and logistics: Speaker 1 says the US fifth fleet has left, its forward headquarters is moving to Israel, and damage estimates/repair costs are discussed. Speaker 1 argues the US is drawn into a genocide-perception dynamic once bases/equipment and US involvement are present.
- Historical Iraq/Kuwait/Persian Gulf narrative: Speaker 0 asks why the US wanted Saddam to invade Kuwait. Speaker 1 asserts the US wanted Iraq to enter the Persian Gulf and become positioned for broader US presence, describing US backing for conflicts involving Iran and chemical weapons channels, and claiming Kuwait engaged in slant drilling stealing Iraqi oil. Speaker 1 says the US/Soviet coalition dynamics allowed the Gulf buildup and entry point into the region.
- Final escalation discussion and regional future: Speaker 0 asks whether Trump will walk away or get trapped into escalation for a “win.” Speaker 1 says Israel’s influence over the US is expected to decline, claims generational shifts among American Jews/Christians and anti-Israel demonstrations, and argues Iran and the Gulf could reshape into new blocks with improved Gulf-Iran relations if stability is prioritized.
- The conversation ends with debate over perceived misconceptions about Iran’s treatment of minorities and religious/political representation, plus discussion contrasting Iran with Saudi Arabia in terms of women’s legal status and religious policing, followed by a plan to do a future live recording using appropriate software.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Hey, man. Hey. How are
Speaker 1: you doing?
Speaker 0: Good to see you again.
Speaker 1: Same. Same.
Speaker 0: We need you to get a better Internet connection, man. You you're you're famous on YouTube. You can't be famous on YouTube and have a bad Internet connection. It just doesn't add up.
Speaker 1: Well, we've got unfortunately, my neighborhood's got a a monopolist. So he's Oh. Doing less than enough to update his his software and his hardware. So I've I've And
Speaker 0: you don't have there's there's no Starlink?
Speaker 1: Well, we've got our own Starlink going up. So
Speaker 0: Oh, really?
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. We've got 20 something satellites or 30 satellites up already, and they're them up pretty quick.
Speaker 0: Oh, shit.
Speaker 1: So, you know, we we can now sponsor revolutions in other countries just like The US.
Speaker 0: Yeah. It's good. France
Speaker 1: and The UK need to be ready. We because, you know, they can't switch their crowds off. They they could piss them off, but they can't piss them off. Well, I guess
Speaker 0: they guys for a while. They don't make anything. I mean, something we talk about is obviously the Iran war. We haven't spoken in a while. So we'll talk about the Iran war, the latest developments since we last spoke.
And then at the end, we kinda talk a bit about Ukraine and and Russia because there's a lot of developments there and how that fits into the bigger picture. Cool, man. Okay. You good to go live? Not live.
Oh, it's recorded. So not live. Alright. Cool,
Speaker 1: man. Do do you wanna talk about Trump's most was it Trump's most glorious vacation in China?
Speaker 0: Of course. Yeah. We'll talk about that also. That's a fun one to talk about.
Speaker 1: They actually didn't even take half the Tajik flags down.
Speaker 0: Oh, Tajik what? Sorry. Two secs. What's Tajik flags?
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, the the president, Tajikistan was visiting with, with he the same day Trump was flying in. And as a fact, while Trump was landing, the the president Tajikistan was still there. And as he was driving in, apparently, they only changed, like, half the flags to US flags from the the Tajik flags.
Speaker 0: So I swear.
Speaker 1: It's it's a soft it's soft insult to put you in your place. Yeah. The Chinese are good at that. They're quarries
Speaker 0: all that. Is there also there's people talking about Xi having a welcome Kim Jong Kim Jong Un and Putin at the at the tarmac in the airport previous meetings. Some people said, no.
Speaker 1: It's not true. And it's protocol
Speaker 0: they got. 100% that it
Speaker 1: It's the mega guys trying to ration away. No. He meets him at the tarmac. They sit down in his last time Putin was there, they sat down in his convertible with the top down and the backseat, drove into the city. Oh, yeah.
Yeah. That absolutely. The previous time Trump showed up, he had him, waiting. Here. Let me switch my VPN off.
It'll, help.
Speaker 0: Did you say she had Trump be awaiting the first time Trump visited?
Speaker 1: Well, the last time Trump visited, he he had him waiting. Key c whatever. However you pronounce that.
Speaker 0: She. Yeah. She.
Speaker 1: She. X y. X I. Yeah. He had him waiting.
So
Speaker 0: that's Let let's talk let's talk about that meeting. What's your analysis of the meeting and how it went?
Speaker 1: It didn't go any better than, I would say, Anchorage. It was unprepared. There was nothing, there was you you know, the the the way you normally do these kinds of meetings is I mean, this is a serious level of meeting. Now China Xi sometimes comes over to Moscow, Putin comes over to Moscow, but to China, and they'll have more of a buddy buddy meeting. But they meet a lot.
Right? And and they have a different relationship. But when you have countries like this or Russia coming to US, US coming to Russia, or The Soviet Union before that, or when you with China or any major countries, you normally send out teams about two months ahead of time. First, you send out the security teams that figure everything out because there's conflicts this time around with with Trump's security. They wanted to go armed where they weren't allowed to go armed.
So they they had so there there's no coordination that was done for that, one. Two, the diplomats go in. The actual working diplomats go in, and they they get all the points out. They negotiate everything except the maybe the very key points. They prepare documents.
They prepare possible joint statements. Everything's prepared, then the heads meet. They be greet and grip and greet. They say nice words about each other. They debate.
Maybe they negotiate on something or other, but the points the agenda is already there, what they wanna discuss. And then if if already they had worked toward making a a joint declaration or signing something, it's all prepared. It's very, very, very structured when when especially if the countries are somewhat adversarial. It's very structured. There's nothing.
This is the same thing as when Putin arrived in in Anchorage. Trump needed him in Anchorage fast because Trump needed a picture. Trump needed the PR. This is the same thing. Trump was planning on coming a month earlier.
I guess he wanted to throw the severed heads of, Venezuela and Iran on the table and say, la, we've got your energy. Now you're good. So we're gonna tell you how you're gonna run it.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Yeah. I thought that as well.
Speaker 1: Well, they got Venezuela. Venezuela is is is is a you know, we talk about a cat in a bag. It's a dead cat. Venezuela can't produce more than 800,000 barrels a day. That's nothing.
It it could But
Speaker 0: they can build it up a fair bit long term.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. Just a $100,000,000,000 in about five years, and The US companies aren't willing to invest that right now. They they've always said, you know, if the government wants to do, yeah, sure. We'll come in.
And Trump's talking about giving them $4,050,000,000,000 dollar loans. You know, not per 0% loans. But either way, yeah, I mean, look, you put the investment in. Yes. You could do it.
You could get it up to three, four, maybe 5,000,000 barrels, maybe even higher. But you need time. The crisis is here. That's the problem. US imports more than it exports, a.
B, US exports light sweet crude, but most of its refineries are set up for for heavy sour crude, which is the stuff that's coming out of Israel. It's heavy because it's viscous, sour because it has a lot of it has a a lot of sulfur in it. So there's separate processes to to clean it up. Mean, you can dilute it some for surplus. Problem is The US hasn't built a new refinery in over thirty years.
Try building a refinery in America. There's a reason all these companies have left The US. It wasn't just because pay for employees. It's because of bureaucracy. It's because insane environmental laws.
I mean, seriously, a lot of these laws are absolutely insane.
Speaker 0: Which companies which companies left The US? Sorry. Which what are you referring to?
Speaker 1: Industry. Well, industrial most are manufacturing. Manufacturing. Yeah. Well, I mean, just if you look at it, just to get insurance so you have to have workman comps insurance for anybody that's working.
Right? Workman comps insurance, it states every state has its own list. Basically, the friends of the governor. That way, also works. The insurance is a percentage of the salary dependent on the job.
So if you have people working in the office, you pay 5 percent equivalent 5% of their salary on insurance. So if they make a $100,000, you're paying $5,000 for their insurance. Mandatory insurance for on the job coverage. That's if they're office workers, software developers, clerks, accountants, whatever. They're they work in an office.
The worst thing is maybe, you know, they might drop a laptop on their foot or, you know, get a paper cut I fall down the stairs, I guess. But you go into a factory setting, it's 75%. So if you got a if you got a guy who's making a 100,000 on the factory floor, you have to pay another 70,000 just to cover his insurance. And that's like cutting taxes and everything else. So that's why a lot of that's one of the reasons a lot of factories leave The US.
It's good to have an office because it's it's much cheaper, but to have a factory, it's easier to go somewhere else. You get, you know, three times
Speaker 0: as many people. Just going back to the China visit. So you're saying he was he wanted to go earlier. It's a very good point. Wanted to go earlier and and have, you know, the two wins controlling the energy flow to China saying, hey.
I've got Iran now I've and got Venezuela. Let's talk about Ray Earth and let's get concessions from you. Instead, now he went there saying, Venezuela, but I need your help with Iran. I'm pretty screwed there. Yeah.
And, obviously, impossible to get Chinese concessions now. If anything, it seems based on his interview with Fox, it seems that he's a Trump is one that may have conceded something when it comes to Taiwan. There's indications of that.
Speaker 1: Oh, yeah. I mean shocking. Yeah. Yeah. No.
I I cannot remember her name. One second. I'll look it up. The head of the Taiwanese opposition party, which is actually the party that Kais Kaisong Shik started, the dictator, the the nationalist dictator. His party, they their party rep went to China about two months ago.
They have a meeting with Xi, and they want reunification. Because, you know, Taiwan is not a separate nation. And it has never really claimed. There there's the people that US backed are separatists, but the majority have never claimed. They just said, you know, we'll reconquer the communist.
We're nationalists. Conquer that. That well, that never happened. And the communist aren't communist either. They're communist in name only.
They're they're more state capitalism at this point, which most a lot of countries are. So, you know, it's it they want reunification even you know, the the you know what the name of the the, army of, Taiwan is? The Chinese Republican Army. Yeah. The Chinese Republican Army.
They don't deny their Chinese. A lot of them want reunification The
Speaker 0: country hold on. Isn't the country's former sorry. Country's formal name is Republic Of China, isn't it? It's not Taiwan.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. So that's the whole point. This is you know, they don't deny their for the most part, they have radicals of The US backs because they wanna create a new Ukraine.
But, you know, how would how would they would supply that Ukraine? You know, the Chinese version of Ukraine is it's impossible across the fleet to see the The US. You know, it's one thing when you have a land border. Well, it's such a smaller just getting there. Yeah.
Yeah. It's 5,000 kilometers across open water where Chinese subs are gonna be looking and the Chinese missiles are gonna be flying. But on
Speaker 0: the counterpoint as well, it's much harder for it's also much harder for China to invade it compared to Russia, Ukraine. So it goes both ways.
Speaker 1: It is. It is. But, you know, back in god. What what was this? I was still on active duty.
So this is back around 2002 or 2003. There was a study done by The US, War College, on the possibility of supporting Taiwan. And, basically, by that point this was twenty years ago. They said by that point, you know, if if The US fleet came in anywhere between China and Taiwan, it'd be just they'd just be sunk.
Speaker 0: Or Yeah. I've heard that the war games all the war games showed that that, obviously, China would win in a in a war in Taiwan. Now the the the but the the the strategy on the American side is not to win against China. It's to make the invasion so costly that China would not do it. That's the strategy.
Speaker 1: Well, China is not planning on doing it. That's the whole point. The actual strategy is to get China to invade. The whole point is to get China to invade just like the whole point was to set up Ukraine as a battering ram against Russia to get the war going as a proxy war, which Marco Rubio admitted as a proxy war on the news. He came out and said, yeah.
This is a proxy war. They're trying to act like he never said that, but he did to the media. He said that about a year
Speaker 0: When did he say?
Speaker 1: About a year ago, flat out, he said on an interview, yeah, this is a proxy war. This is what back when I
Speaker 0: Something not not that big of a okay. Everyone knows that.
Speaker 1: It's not
Speaker 0: that big of a thing. I know. Everybody knows that Iran is like saying Iran it's like it's like saying China supplying a weaponry or or material to Iran.
Speaker 1: Actually, the main one supplying weaponry and material to Iran right now is Russia. Russia. Yeah. That's why you know, the this blockade is pointless because, a, you've got four ports on the Caspian that are working overtime with the Russian ports. B, you've got a a rail line through Pakistan to China.
And c, you've got that that, by the way, is also running oil on the railways. And c, you've got regular Iranians who are buying up oil in barrels and just driving them up driving up to the Pakistani border and selling them there.
Speaker 0: But it's just much smaller volumes. Like, I looked at the numbers. It's still Right. Significantly smaller than the Strait Of Home was. But they do have that float the capacity to have floating storage, and they do a lot consume a lot of the oil themselves internally.
So they kinda got they've got various and they're working on expanding. They're coming up with unique unique ways, and I'm not an expert in this, being able to export more through the land routes, which are not equipped to. They're increasing the capacity. But, obviously, it's impossible to verify the exact numbers. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Let And the other thing that they're doing well well, Iran's weakness has always been refining. It's gotten worse now because of the war, but Iran has never had enough, diesel. It got it's got the oil, but, you know, it's just like The US, The US can't refine enough fuel to feed itself. It has to import about 2,000,000 barrels a day of refined product. Two, two and a half million barrels a day.
That's where prices go up in The US because The US still imports refined product. Same thing with Iran.
Speaker 0: Iran The US imports from what I said, they import the crude oil, and then they export the
Speaker 1: crude refined. Well, they do both. Some the problem yeah. The the problem with with The US is, again, the majority of US refineries in the South were set up for Venezuelan oil. Because Venezuela The US Venezuela was a colony, you know, if effectively for well, it's kinda becoming one again before Chavez took over.
And then Chavez Chavez won his own way. You know, of course, Venezuela, they they did some very stupid things. For example, they kept the reserves in The US in gold, which if if if you're at odds with The US, why the hell would you keep your reserves there? That's one. Two, the and this is a fault of both sides.
Chavez and Maduro, they took out a lot of money out of the oil industry for the social projects, but they took out so much money. They didn't have enough money to reinvest in upgrading and repairing the the the infrastructure. On the flip side, The US confiscated the reserves, and The US wouldn't allow export equipment that was that was US equipment that's running the oil fields, and they wouldn't allow export of equipment to replace, worn out equipment. So now you're at 800,000 barrels a day, and you really can't stretch it any further without the whole system collapsing. Yeah.
It's not a matter of repairing. It's a matter of replacement. So equipment's just worn out at this point. So that's one of the reasons it's good. There's no quick fixes.
Venezuela is a large investment for the next three to five years, at least, to get any significant volume. The problem is the crisis is here. We're in the middle of the crisis. Yeah.
Speaker 0: Yeah. And they they kinda increased capacity to what's needed, obviously, far from it. So going back to that meeting with Xi, so Trump came in much weaker. He's gonna thrown Taiwan in a way under the bus, but we'll see. You know, sometimes he says things and later, you know, the Greenland, we're gonna invade it and then he just moves on and forgets about it.
So
Speaker 1: Oh, I don't know if he's forgotten about it yet. Yeah. True. True. True.
Greenland is on the back burner. May come back to that yet.
Speaker 0: So what do you make of that meeting? I'm prepared. Talks about some business deals, nothing too significant. Some nice words from China, at least according to the White House, on China accepting saying there should no not be a fee on the straddle homosem. They'll they'll buy American oil to diversify from the Strait Of Hormuz.
Actually, what do you make of that particular statement that came out of the White House that she agreed to buy American oil to diversify from Hormuz and that Iran should not charge a fee of the Strait Of Hormuz?
Speaker 1: Well, first of all, Iran doesn't charge China any fees. Let's begin with that.
Speaker 0: But they didn't say China. They said in general. They didn't they weren't specific.
Speaker 1: Well, you know, until you hear it from the Chinese, they've agreed to buy or they've agreed to do something. It's just like Trump's, oh, they're gonna buy 200 of our, of our planes. Boeing Boeing. Yeah. Boeing.
Thank you. God. Good lord. Yeah. So they said, you know, we're we're gonna buy 200 of our, they're gonna buy 200 Boeings, which is funny because they just signed an agreement with Airbus.
So no. Yeah. They didn't say anything of that sort. They were gonna buy anything. So, again, it's one thing yeah.
Trump just I I don't know if he knows he's lying or if he just because if you've ever met a pathological liar I'm not saying he is, but I've I've served with a pathological liar, and they absolutely believe the crap that comes out of their mouth. And some of the crap that comes out of their mouth is you you're just looking at it. It's like, good god, man. You you how could you not know this is crap? And they're like, no.
No. They're convinced. You you can't catch a pathological liar on any lie detectors because they're absolutely convinced of what they're saying. I don't know if Trump is, but he lies a lot or and exaggerates a
Speaker 0: lot. Yeah. That one came that one came in that one is a bit different, came from the White House. So that's why I think that could be it must have come from coordination with China. Now China didn't say it.
I do wanna offer a caveat. We don't know how much American oil. I saw it as two ways, and my audience knows this. I'm like, either one is just China giving some political support to Trump because they really couldn't give it much more. Trump wanted more, they didn't.
To you know, Trump wanted the commitments not to supply, not just words, but actual commitments not to supply Iran with weaponry, etcetera. And they might have refused or some help with Iran seeking enough ramp. So they're like, you know, we'll give you some political support that you can go back to Margo with, but that's it. Or the other option is that Iran is being pretty extreme in their demands right now, lot more than early on. They wanna control the share of Hormuz in perpetuity, charge cable companies.
They want lifting of sanctions, unfreezing of assets before they even discuss the nuclear program, plus they want reparations. So they want all these things where even China's like, look, guys, you won this war, but you know, ask for some concessions, but you gotta be reasonable something that Trump can accept can reasonably accept because Trump wants an off ramp. So maybe China is siding with The US only slightly to pressure Iran to to meet The US somewhere in the middle. That's like the two theories that I have in my mind kind of floating. One is just a bit of nothing, but a fluff to support Trump because they gave him nothing significant strategically, or the other one is actually a pretty significant strategic step to pressure Iran.
Speaker 1: You know, true. Some of the positions Iran wants are undoable. Reparations from The US, I think the average American congress critter would rather eat his own liver than than than to vote that. Removal of sanctions is impossible for the same reason. Because Trump no president in The United States can remove sanctions.
He can postpone them. He can modify the how much they're gonna enforce them, but he can't remove them. Only the US congress can remove them, and and the US congress is absolutely bought and paid by whatever special interest. None of Israel is one of the is probably the biggest, but he's not the only one. Everybody that wants to play pays the US congress, and those very few exceptions like people like Massey and and Ron Paul Rand Paul in this case.
And Ron Paul when he was serving. Yeah. People like that are the honest brokers, but they're they're 10% or less. The other 90% are absolutely bought. They go there to get bought.
They they get bought before they actually come into their office from day one. I've known several members of former members of congress and the, you know, the things they tell you. They they they lost their bids because they weren't bought. So they had big lobbies against them. Yeah.
Yeah. That that's so that that's not gonna happen. Sanctions are and that's gonna get lifted. They can get ignored, and The US is good at ignoring sanctions when it needs it. Just like The US will continue buying Russian uranium, Russian fertilizer, Russian oil products no matter what the sanctions because otherwise, The US gets screwed.
Now the Europeans, on the other hand, how dare you even think about it smack on the back of the head. Just like The US has bought Russian LNG gas and resold the Europeans out of, like, 50% markup. Then why not? If you're stupid enough to go for that, you know, take that markup so just buying it from Russia, then, you know, you're stupid enough to pay. I don't feel any sorrow for Europeans.
You know, that's that's something, you know, stupid should hurt. Yeah. Yeah. Stupid should hurt. And and they're doing absolutely self inflicted wounds or and that's not in the feet.
They're shooting themselves in the gut. So but, you know, it's if if they wanna pay more, why not? Go ahead and pay more. That's how markets work. It's just like, you know, you you buy a t shirt that has, you know, nothing on it, and you pay $5 for it, and you pay the same t shirt with Gucci on it, and you pay $500 for it.
It's the same freaking t shirt. So if they wanna do the same thing with the oil, by all means, go bankrupt. Go for it. You're adults, kinda, sorta. So from that point of view, yeah, sanctions can be moved, lifted well, not lifted, moved, bypassed by the very US government, but they're not gonna get lifted.
As for the Straits Of Hormuz, they're not international waters. I don't know why did it where
Speaker 0: They wanna control even the Omani. They wanna control even the Omani side.
Speaker 1: Well, the Omani's are allied with with Iran. Yeah.
Speaker 0: But but they're not allowing. Right now, Oman is allowing. It hasn't installed any any tollbooth. So if there's any ships that are going through the Omani side, Iran is striking them. I'm not saying they don't have the right, right, you know, because they've just been victims of a war, but they they seem to want a long term ability to charge a fee.
And they want not long term. Sorry. A perpetual perpetual. That's the issue. Perpetual.
Where even China's saying no. Because then it just opens up a can of worms where the Danish Danish traits, they could do the same. Denmark and Sweden could do the same there. And then Russia would suffer from there, Malacca traits, Indonesia, others would do the same. China would suffer.
So it kinda it shakes up the global system that allowed countries to flourish.
Speaker 1: You know, the global system's gone. I mean, let let's let's face reality. That global system's gone. The US killed it. US helped build it, and then The US killed it, which is done several times.
WTO was one of those things. The moment that no longer fully served The US interest, they just killed it, basically. It's still there, but it's it's like one of those, mass multiplayer games, where the game's still running, just nobody's on the server. You know? Two people are still running around in that server, but the game's still there.
But, you know, it it's not really anybody cares about, you know, what's up there. It's the same thing with the WTO and a lot of these things. Look. The US grabbed, the Panama Canal to try to control. The US strategy right now is to try to control, the four key choke points.
Those would be the Red Sea, Panama Canal, Straits Of Hormuz. Because The US was planning on taking over the Straits Of Hormuz and the the the Molucca Straits. The thing is is and this is what the the great threat to America of China and the the road and belt initiative. It's take bypass all those streets except for Panama, obviously. You know, you've got the the massive landmass called Eurasia and Africa that's all connected.
You don't need to go by sea. In fact and, honestly, if you got high speed rail, you're you're better off going by rail. The only thing The US The US was fumbling around to produce something to to woo countries back over, then they never did come up with anything. They had a couple ideas, but they never funded them. They never come up with so the best they could come up with revolutions and civil wars in countries along the different routes.
Yeah. And that that only takes you so far. So look. What do you mean in China?
Speaker 0: In China. Yes. So China. The the the the sorry. Just on the China one just because I I'm really keen to get your thoughts.
The two options that I mentioned. Is it to actually pressure Iran to concede a bit more so they can end the war there, or is it just, hey. We can't give you anything, Trump, but here's a few nice words for you to take to MAGA. What's more like?
Speaker 1: Maybe something in the middle, even there. You know, of course, Iran wants, everything peace and quiet. Iran, of course, in Iran, not China. Iran does too. In the end of the day, Iran was attacked.
And it's still being attacked. I mean, the the the ceasefire is not exactly a full ceasefire. There's still issues and actions being taken now from both sides. A little raze and little things like that. But for China, of course, Chinese are are very status.
They prefer status quo whenever they can.
Speaker 0: Do not prefer even if it's even as even even over weakening The US and Iran. So if US wants to continue the war in Iran, China prefers an end to the war, which means not weakening and depleting American stockpiles? Because that's pretty tempting as well.
Speaker 1: American stockpiles are gone. I mean, we're we're looking at if if Trump restarts this war, he's got maybe a week, two weeks max. Missile production is null and void, no matter what they're being promised. I mean, look, some some, magnets are still gonna get through just because people do contraband, and, there is a good chance of making a lot of money. And there's a good chance of getting shot too for it, for the effort.
But the point is is on a mass scale, they don't have what they need. It's gonna take The US three to five years to set up enough manufacturing just to cover its own weapon systems, let alone the electronics industry and everything else. And that's if if they can push that through in states. Again, what I was saying, there's a lot of reasons industry left The US. State regulations is one of them, and the federal government can't do anything about that.
They can pressure the states, but if the states don't wanna reregulate themselves, that's that's a whole different issue. So from that point of view, I mean, they didn't get the rare earth magnets. They didn't get those deals. Not not for the military anyways. And the Chinese do check if suddenly Samsung because they've gone to Samsung before.
I know it's not US company, but The US the CIA has gone and work tried to work with Samsung that, you know, order a bunch more magnets. I'm sorry. Hell no. Because So China you're talking
Speaker 0: about Chinese restrictions from last year from the trade war. Right. Right. Which are still
Speaker 1: in place.
Speaker 0: Which are Targeting the US military, from US military use.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Exactly. The dual purpose use. And Samsung said, hell no. Because as soon as we up our orders, the Chinese, race said, we're gonna come and inspect it.
Let's see all the, all the electronics civilian electronics to put all that extra, material in. Ah, you did some of the That's
Speaker 0: why Trump had lula. Brazil's good it has a lot
Speaker 1: of rare earth. Well, it's not rare the the problem everybody's missing the problem. It's not rare earth. It's the refineries. US has tons of US has tons of rare So every country
Speaker 0: Brazil doesn't have refining capacity?
Speaker 1: Nope. And Brazil doesn't have refining capacity for few for fuel either. They sold that off to the to the Saudis, unfortunately, and and made a very big mistake in that. So, yeah, the you know, out of the 17 rare earth elements, there's only two of them. They're actually very, very rare.
The rest are trace they're trace materials and other formations, but they're not that rare. The problem is it's it's a chemical or electrolysis process to get them out, chemical bleaching out of different materials, electrolysis to get them out, bleaching that way. It's expensive, it's energy intensive, and there's a lot of byproduct. Basically, that needs to be recycled, clean, and so on. So to set up something like that in The US, you're gonna get environmental study after environmental study.
You're have people protest, and they're gonna bring you up issue. But this could stretch out for years, And there's nothing unless it's built on federal property, which is a I guess, an option, but I don't think they've ever sure looked at that. Unless it's built on federal property, you know, at the state level and then the local municipality level, they could delay this for years. And that's what happens with refinery. That's one of the reasons The US can't build a new refinery because it just gets delayed and delayed and delayed and delayed.
And people just go, I I can use my money somewhere else than this crap. And then you go build a refinery somewhere else. I mean, The US shoots itself in the foot that way. It's because everything gets taken on extreme. So that that's a problem.
So, yeah, they didn't get that bone they didn't get the bonus from China of getting those rare earth minerals. And the Chinese looked just just the way the whole meeting came off, the fact that Xi wasn't at the airport to begin with. He was meeting with the president of Tajikistan. Half the flags along the route hadn't been changed to US flags. There's still Tajik flags hanging.
This is all soft indicator. You know, the I won't say a direct insult, but it's that soft indicator of, yeah, you wanna have some drinks? Wanna eat some of the expensive Chinese food? You wanna go see some sites? No problem.
And then go away. And that's exactly what the Chinese did. When when Kim Song arrives, when Putin arrives last time Putin arrived, she met him at the airport. They sat down in his convertible and with the top down drove into the city, Basically, hand in hand. That's the different level.
And here you got a number two guy one of the number two guys showing up to meet Trump. Not the number one guy. Number one guy standing at the palace of the people on the steps, like the own like, the the big honcho. You come to me. You shake my hand.
And that's that's all soft power plays at that point. It's the same thing as, you know, when Trump won and Wusic from Serbia came to Trump, and they put Wusic they they Trump's sitting at the in the Oval Office at the desk. They put Wusic's chair. Oh, Wusic's Serbia. Yeah.
Yeah. Yeah. And it was a yeah. It was a low chair. Wusic is a tall guy, but he's a low chair.
So he sit there like, you know, like a a school kid in
Speaker 0: front of It's so funny. Yeah. Yeah. Let me let
Speaker 1: me find a photo. Hell. Yeah. If I was in this place, I would've turned around and walked out and gone, go to hell.
Speaker 0: Was so funny. Yeah.
Speaker 1: But it's the same thing. The Chinese are basically the same thing. Oh my god. And by the way, Trump what Trump did to the leaders in Europe. I mean, it's the same thing.
Speaker 0: And then didn't didn't Trump say something? He didn't say and then that meeting, didn't Trump there? Is as rich as on on this side, yeah, on that small table. No. Sorry.
Speaker 1: This side.
Speaker 0: And this is
Speaker 1: They have one of that that's when they were signing. But before that, they had a photo come out. We were just sitting right up in front of the
Speaker 0: In front of Trump. Oh my god. That is That's gonna lower chairs.
Speaker 1: It's lower sitting lower than Trump's,
Speaker 0: like Let me get a better
Speaker 1: resolution of it.
Speaker 0: That is crazy.
Speaker 1: That was embarrassing as hell.
Speaker 0: But He got he got attacked so much back home.
Speaker 1: Oh, yeah. Exactly. Well, yeah, the the delinquent school kid has showed up, and the director's smacked around.
Speaker 0: Isn't there also a video of him him saying something about Serbia and then Rich is like, I didn't sign this and starts going through the agreement. Do you remember that or no?
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah.
Speaker 0: So Trump says, yeah. We signed this and that, and we also signed this and Rich is like, looks at this guy. Did I sign this? And starts going through the agreement. It's confused.
Like, I don't think I signed this. Can't remember the details of it.
Speaker 1: Before that question that. I was just so I
Speaker 0: Continue. Continue. Was
Speaker 1: when shoots shows up. Why? Because the master called and shoots comes running over, and he's this is the Biden. This is Biden. So he comes running over, then the they normally come in a car with his the back country's flags.
So they came in an American car up to the White House, basically, through the servants' quarters, and somebody audio taped them where where shoots is saying, you know, I'm glad to be of service to America. Like, Jesus.
Speaker 0: Man, this is Nothing nothing nothing makes sense. Nothing compares to the to the daddy to Trump. NATO's guy.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. Rudy. Rudy. Fruity.
Fruity. Yeah. That's it it's pathetic. So yeah. That's that's pathetic.
Speaker 0: So what does that what does that mean for the war in Iran? What's your analysis there? Are we seeing because Trump is in a difficult spot. My analysis is he obviously wants to get the hell out of it. But Iran are in a very different mindset, they've got a lot of demands.
In a way, they're kinda telling Trump just walk away. And then, you know, according to Robert Kagan and others, that could be his least bad option. However, the New York Times is saying next week is gonna be a continuation of the war. The Israelis are saying we're locked and loaded, waiting for the go ahead. We probably think Trump will be dragged back into it.
And he should and would will strike their energy infrastructure, which means Iran would do the same in The Gulf. So it's honestly fifty fifty. I never thought I'd say this. I thought he'll just walk away. What's your take on it?
Speaker 1: You know, first of the Israelis are are driving this bus. Like it or not, a mat Madeline Adesen, all these other donors, the APAC donors, they're you know, you you you take their money, you're not gonna turn away and leave. It it's worse than going into a gang. I know. These gangs, the only way you leave is when you're dead.
This is pretty much of the same thing here. You're you're not get you you can't turn around and say, here's your money back with a percentage. Just leave me alone. No. They own your soul.
Look. Yeah. Absolutely. I think Trump wants out. I don't think Trump actually really even wanted in, but he's in whether he likes it or not.
He he wasn't gonna risk his life for these to to counter these people. So he's in. Like it or not, he's in. Iran, no matter what it says, would just prefer for The US to leave. And I think at this point, even the Saudis and the Kuwaitis would just prefer The US to leave just leave.
The US fifth fleet has left. The forward forward headquarters fifth fleet is now, know, moving to Israel. They've announced. They're moving to Israel. A lot of the equipment is in Israel.
Yeah. Well, they they've talked about well, I don't know if it was an official announcement that they've been talking about. They're leaving. Yeah. They're gonna relocate to look.
You know, out of the 13 bases, there was a an inspection done. They said 288 structures either damaged or destroyed. I mean, that's that's most everything there. You know? Yeah.
So these they've estimated up to 200,000,000,000 to replace everything. True or not? I don't know. But, you know, they they didn't include me on the, on the inspection board, so I can't say for sure. But that's the estimates I've been running in between a $102,100,000,000,000 dollars.
He just doesn't have that money. Let's just begin with that. They didn't get Trump didn't get his 2,000,000,000, 200,000,000,000 to, continue the war. So he's pulling this money out of other funds, out of existing funds for the military and for the military, out of other minister or secretariats, departments. So he's gotta come up with money somewhere for this.
So that that there's a big problem, you know. Plus the big problem for the US military. I mean, the US military already has people in Israel. They're on TDY, temporary duty assignment. It's it it's but the it's it's very permanent temporary duty.
So they're not officially there forever, but they're there for very long times. Now they're gonna be there forever, basically, because it's no longer, you know, when the fifth fleet forward headquarters moves there, it's no longer, you know, a TDY. You can't say it's a TDY. So the problem for The US, by the way, is you're now inside the country committing genocide on three fronts. Well, guess what?
Tell us you didn't know what's going on. You're now just as guilty. You're gonna get painted with a tarp with the same brush if you had any kind of deniability before that about what Israel was doing, and that was paper thin in that, You know? Because, sort of, The US is the the one that that gives Israel 2,000 pound bombs to to level apartment buildings to supposedly kill somebody except for all the civilians. You know, for for Israel, collateral damage is a collateral damage bonus points.
That that's that's the whole problem there. Now The US is now absolutely in the middle of this. So try to say you didn't know what's going on. Try to say you're not a direct participant of the genocide. Nobody will believe you.
So that there's that perception that one one way or the other, perception that The US is not gonna be able to shake on a world stage. But, yeah, that's that's the point of this. The US is already leaving the Persian Gulf, and that's the main aim for in Iran is to oust The US out of the Persian Gulf. And The US was not really present in the Persian Gulf until a desert storm. That's when The US really got itself in there.
That's what The US convinced the Saddam to invade Kuwait. I mean, they they gave him all the green lights. And as soon as he did that, oh, well, buddy. Yeah. You're you're you're aggressor.
You're this or that, and they start building up. So that was just stupid enough think
Speaker 0: What was can you can you remind me the story there? What was the very briefly, what was the I remember reading it a while ago. What was the indicators what was the reason they wanted Saddam to invade Kuwait? What was the benefit for The US?
Speaker 1: It got into the Persian Gulf. The US was pretty absent from the Persian Gulf. All of these bases, everything started coming off in the nineties after they got into the Persian Gulf. The US preposition equipment there in Saudi Arabia, started opening up a lot more bases. That that was the
Speaker 0: I don't remember they because what I remember they were they vaguely told they told Saddam, like, not to invade Kuwait, but they'd kinda they didn't give him the go ahead, but kinda were very vague about it or something along those lines.
Speaker 1: Oh, they said we don't give a damn. Yeah. You see, I mean, Rumsfeld fed Saddam with chemical weapons through the the French. The US was The US The US is who got Saddam to invade Iran in the first place. They need to get this whole conflict going.
Speaker 0: No. That all
Speaker 1: makes no sense. And because, you know, they need to get they need to get somehow at the mullahs in Iran. Carter got embarrassed, so they start pushing Saddam. And Saddam took the bait, he said. And they backed Saddam fully with equipment and and weaponry and intelligence, and and we started this war.
But Kuwait was the nineteenth province of Iraq previous until the British drew some new nice new lines. And Kuwait was slant drilling. So, yeah, the Kuwaitis were stealing Iraqi oils because they're slant drilling into Yeah.
Speaker 0: I heard that. That's that's yeah. They were drilling underground going to Iraqi territory. They sort
Speaker 1: of been faulty.
Speaker 0: That's confirmed? That's, like, that's just
Speaker 1: like No. No. That's con that that's confirmed. That that they've they were absolutely doing that. You can slam drill up to 13 kilometers out, so you don't have to be right on the border to get into these formations.
So, yeah, they they were doing it. Absolutely. They were doing it. And and and there's the problem. Hey.
Can you hold one second?
Speaker 0: They of course. The
Speaker 1: cat go. My cat's trying to get out of out of one of the bedrooms, and he's
Speaker 0: just trying to of
Speaker 1: Oh, he's yeah. One second. Yeah. He jumps he jumps at the the handle to try to open it, but it's like slam slams. He'll he'll eventually do it, but it's slam slam slams like, jeez.
Speaker 0: The whole city was kicking in.
Speaker 1: Yeah. So so yeah. So I mean, they convinced Saddam to do it. And then once Saddam did it, when he actually went for it, they he asked Washington. Washington, we don't give Kuwait was an extremely anti American country at that point.
They're one of the leading anti American countries. So, yeah, we don't care. They're not our friends and all that. But then Saddam took that bait and got that hook right in there, and then he just went in, grabbed grabbed Kuwait, and voila. And everything goes, oh, we are it's illegal invasion.
They got a UN they got UN permission. They had a I'm not even sure how many countries were in there. And this is still during the Cold War. And Saddam was being supported by both The US and the Soviet Union at that point. Even Syria was in the coalition.
I mean, everybody is in the coalition. So and that that's what The US used as its entry into The Gulf, and it's been building up ever since. So Iraq, Iran, and allied now with Iraq and Yemen, their job is to drive The US out, and they personally basically already did. You know, there's there's So you Trump will
Speaker 0: be will they be able to drive them out, or do you think Trump will be dragged in and and force, try to force a win? That's the escalation trap. Will he get into that escalation trap, you think? Or he'll be he'll be able to walk away despite the loss and make it look like a win?
Speaker 1: I no. He could make it look like a win for his base. Obviously. I mean
Speaker 0: He's already done that. Most of his base, he's won.
Speaker 1: He lost more half of his base because the people actually vote the real MAGA people, the people have voted, hey. Know, take care of America's issues, no wars, all that. Those the the real MAGA people, they all left. The peep the quote MAGA now are basically groupies. You know, they're they're cult they're cult fanatics.
You know, no matter what Trump says, it's the it's like God. You know? I mean, when you have a golden statue of Trump that was anointed by these Christian Zionist preachers, I mean, the golden calves or anything like that. Oh, no. No.
It's it's a golden Trump, so it doesn't count. You know, this is ludicrous. I mean, you go, gee. Good god, man. But that but this is real.
So you've got that issue now. Those people would believe anything Trump said, but that's not the problem. They don't drive the train. The people who drive the train sit in Tel Aviv or in Jerusalem, whatever you wanna call And they're driving that train. And, no, they're not gonna let Trump out.
So I think he's gonna wind up going back in. He's and I think the facilities are gonna break out sometimes. See, Xi basically told him, you know, if if you start the sub, don't bother coming to China. So Trump couldn't do anything until he went to China. Now he's been coming back from China.
Yeah. I think it probably will restart it. Unfortunately, for everyone, including The US, it will restart. Things are not gonna get better. Economically, we are in the middle of a tsunami.
It's only getting worse. It's only gonna continue to get worse. Qatar is out for the next five years to repair all the damage it's already done. That means that fertilizer is gone off the market for for years to come. Fertilizer prices already doubled.
So wait till the early harvest come in in June. That's when prices start spiking or if not skyrocketing. That extra gas is gone for years to come. The oil is not as badly damaged, but it's still you know? Look.
The Saudis and by the way, the Israelis have vested interest to make sure this conflict's going, not just because they want to destroy Iran. They want all the shipping stopped out of the Persian Gulf. Two years ago or maybe it was three years ago, we had the the gen insider in chief Netanyahu up in the UN going with a map. This is the the the the dam, dude, which is basically Iran, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the promised land with a pipeline going from the Persian Gulf, that he drew this red line through Israel. Yeah, he's laid out his plan.
He he needs but for the these pipelines to be emergency built, he needs what? To to the regular access points destroyed or the facilities loading facilities so damaged, nobody can do anything with So he's got a vested interest, and it doesn't believe you me, he doesn't care how many Arabs or Persians or anybody else dies in that area. It's it's it's absolutely irrelevant to that man. He's he he's swimming neck deep in blood as it is. Once a few more mill a million people are dead.
It's it's at this point. And if they kill each other in a conflict he helped instigate, that's even better. And I I think the Saudis have seen this the the writing on the wall, but The UAE Gulf countries. Even I
Speaker 0: think even The UAE, most people disagree with me. But based on discussions I've had, even The UAE has. But their decision if if The UAE does not end up because they're I'm sure they're pissed because they've been attacked the most, but if they don't end up improving relations with Iran, I think that would be one of the biggest strategic mistakes they make. They need that stability and security. And I think they will.
Absolutely. I could be proven wrong. I've been wrong many times before. I really think they will. I think all the Gulf will come together, even Bahrain.
All of them will come together. I mean, that's the only way forward. And I also think this is the beginning. I I'm not sure about Trump getting back into the swamp and saying for a while it's over even before the ceasefire. I'm like, guys, it's gonna end.
Trump's gonna walk away. But considering the Iranian demands and their stance on things and their rhetoric, I'm like, shit. They're acting like it's like, I dare you. I dare you. Hit me.
I dare you. That's the Iranian saying that.
Speaker 1: Saying that. But for them, you know, the best thing even no matter what demands they're putting out there, the best thing that for them is for Trump to just walk away. And I think they're doing it. They're they're making demands at that level that Trump would just go, you know and Trump's suicide, I'm bored with this. Well, yeah.
He's he's he does have a short attention syndrome. He's bored with a walk away. That's what the Iranians want. The Israelis don't.
Speaker 0: Walks away. You know how massive of a win that is for Iran if he walks away?
Speaker 1: Oh, yeah. That is regional superpower.
Speaker 0: That is wild. And I think that Israel Israel's days of being of having that impunity, I've said this a lot, of having that impunity in the region, This is the beginning of the end for it. That's why they kinda grasp me at the straws trying to get as much as they want. Not saying it's Israel's gonna be destroyed, etcetera, as some people are saying. I'm like, no.
Israel will remain a big superpower in the region, but not the only superpower. And there'll be, I think Iran will be the second big another big one. Obviously, it's Turkey, Saudi, but the Gulf may come together as well. So because they have to as a deterrent against Iranian aggression, but also improve relations with Iran. So we'll kinda see a block, the Gulf block, even though it's not looking realistic now, especially with the split that we're seeing within The Gulf, especially Saudi and The UAE.
But I think they'll come together because that's what makes the most sense. Iran doesn't need a block, and they'll improve relations with The Gulf. And both sides have shown willingness to do that, except the Emiratis. I haven't seen it yet, but I'm I think we'll see it. And thirdly, Israel, I think, would maintain its influence in the region just a lot less.
Speaker 1: If The US pulls you you see, think Trump more likely, maybe depending on who the the Democrats run next. But Israel's days of influencing The US are numbered. They're gonna go down quite a bit. Yes. Because they they've had to force it so hard.
I mean, they've lost it's not just they've lost American, you know, Christians or ever. The the young generation of Jews in America are anti Israel. They've lost they lost everybody oh, yeah. Yeah. Look look who's leading a lot of the the these demonstrations for the Palestinians or Jews up front.
They've got, you know, not in my name, those t shirts, that those are those are Jews. Those are American Jews. For traditional Jews, you know, if you look at it just like for for Christians, the Christian Zionists are heretics. Flat out, they're absolute heretics. They have they have very little in common with actual Christianity, except maybe a name.
And there's I mean, I can give you theological reasons for that. There's plenty of them. But for traditional Jews, the Zionist Jews are heretics. Because traditional Judaism considers that they've been punished by god, and they cannot while they can exist in the in the promised land, and they have, and they always have, they cannot rule it until the the Messiah comes, and then he'll gather them together in their promised land. So to build any government and call it Israel is absolute heresy.
And traditional Jews are probably happy. But the the Jews living in living working and serving in the military of Iran are traditional Jews. This is one of the reasons, know, when when that one Christian Zionist preacher on on Passover for Easter Catholic Easter or Protestant Easter in this case. On on Trump's little Easter party comes out there. Yeah.
The Iranians wanna kill all the Jews. Well, except for the Jews that are in Iran, except for the Jewish politicians who are I mean, Jews, just like Christians in the restaurants have a representation in the Iranian parliament. And that synagogue that Israel blew up in the military around, the reason they blew it up, one of the congregates there is a, is an Iranian general. He's Jewish. He's an Iranian general.
So there's there's Yeah. Woke up to reality. I mean, it's an Islamic republic, but it has constitutional guarantees for all minorities, religious and ethnic. People when I tell them
Speaker 0: and they tell them that when you say to them there's Jews in Iran, they'll be like, no. Are they alive? Are they okay? It's crazy people's misconception about the region.
Speaker 1: Oh, yeah. And and believe
Speaker 0: me They're they're they're fine. They're fine. The synagogue was bombed, but they're fine. Oh, these IRGC bombed their synagogue. I knew it.
No. No. Israel bombed it.
Speaker 1: Oh, yeah. People are you you know, near there's, like, over six six hundred and sixty churches working. So when they're like, oh, yeah. We're gonna we're sneaking bibles into Iran. Really?
Why don't you just go to a store and buy some? There are Armenian churches, Orthodox churches, Catholic churches. I mean, and there I think there might be some Protestant church. I mean, for god's sake, it's not that hard to find one. As a result, I haven't been to to to Iran yet.
I I was supposed to go right before the war started, but that broke down for obvious reasons. Security issues. They didn't bring us in. I'm hoping to go sometime soon. The but I've seen I've seen the photos.
I've been set to photos. They they opened up a new, metro station right below the, the biggest Armenian church in Tehran, and it's all dedicated to the Virgin Mary with Christian symbolism, etcetera. And you're looking at that, you know, and oh, yeah. They hate Christians except for yeah. How does that fit into I mean, they've got Zoroastrians, which are not even people of the book.
They're a very tiny minority. I mean, it used to be the religion of, Persia, at one point. But, I mean, they're a very small minority, but they've got representation in parliament. They may have one voice, but, you know, find find minority yeah. Look at the Saudis.
Find a minority representation in the Saudi parliament. Oh, is there a Saudi parliament?
Speaker 0: Yeah. Exactly. It something you Exactly.
Speaker 1: Oh, and and I I want this
Speaker 0: no. You just cut off.
Speaker 1: Come on.
Speaker 0: No. The perfect time.
Speaker 1: Here we go.
Speaker 0: Are you back?
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. It's just like was it Morandi was taking a part of this British journalist journalist in in in quotes? And she's like, yeah. Well, you've got an apartheid state.
Your women have to wear the veil. Like well, first of all, there'll be the the what was it? The hajj not the hajjab. The the the no. No.
No. The the the scarf.
Speaker 0: Okay. Whatever it is. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. They and by the way, most half half Iranian women probably more don't or they swear very loosely because the the laws have been very liberalized. And the veil and the and the burqa That's
Speaker 0: not what apartheid is. That's that's not what an apartheid state anyways, but okay. Right. And the hijab is the hijab. The Muslims cough as well.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Hijab. Hijab. Right. It's a hijab.
But they don't they they don't have to wear that by law anymore. There's no religious police running around forcing it. But by the way, guess where there is? You know, that there'll be US allies of Saudis where women are property quite literally. They
Speaker 0: don't I think other people
Speaker 1: yeah. Yeah.
Speaker 0: The the the bullshit, the propaganda there. Man, I I love our conversations how it flows so well. You've got way too much information in that mind of yours, man. I enjoyed it as always. We should do it live next time.
We'll get there. I know we can't use Streamlab. We'll have to get the right software for it. Told the team so we do it live. But, yeah, man.
Good to see you again. Waited too long
Speaker 1: for it,
Speaker 0: but we're gonna do it again
Speaker 1: soon. Yep. No problem.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇱 AIPAC just dumped another $3 million into Thomas Massie's primary… Sec. Hegseth was sent to campaign for his opponent. The full might of the Israeli lobbying machine is working to unseat him. Massie's response: "They're panicked and haven't been able to gain a lead in this race." Think about what's actually happening here: a sitting congressman is being bombarded relentlessly with foreign lobby money and White House pressure. If Massie survives this, it sends a message every member of Congress will hear loud and clear. @RepThomasMassie
Video Transcript AI Summary
Speaker 0: The RJC, APAC, and Miriam Adelson and Paul Singer are described as part of “the Israeli lobby,” and Speaker 0 says this is where “all the money comes from.” Speaker 0 characterizes the situation as a referendum on foreign policy, saying Israel would be able to dictate foreign policy through “bullying members of congress.” Speaker 0 says they have been the one they “haven’t been able to bully,” so “they’re putting all the brunt and the force on me.” Speaker 0 claims they are ahead in the polls and that opponents are “desperate,” adding that “they’re sending the secretary of war to my district tomorrow,” the president is “losing sleep and tweeting,” and APAC “dumped another $3,000,000 into my race this weekend” because they are “panicked” and have “really haven’t been able to gain a lead” in the race.
Speaker 1: Speaker 1 says the president is not necessarily desperate, pointing to a “pretty good record of defeating people he wants to target in Republican primaries,” citing Bill Cassidy and what happened in Indiana. Speaker 1 asks how Speaker 0 will overcome the president’s opposition.
Speaker 0: Speaker 0 says their situation is different because they have endorsements from “the right to life organizations” and “the gun organizations.” Speaker 0 also says four members of congress came to “this” yesterday and campaigned with them. Speaker 0 adds that they have received millions of dollars from the grassroots, with “tens of thousands of donors to my website, thomasmassey.com,” and says funding is still coming in. Speaker 0 concludes that this is how they will beat opponents.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Well, the RJC, APAC, and Miriam Adelson and Paul Singer, they're all part of the Israeli lobby, and that's where all the money comes from. And it it will be a referendum on foreign policy whether Israel gets to dictate that by, you know, bullying members of congress. And I'm the one they haven't been able to bully, so they're putting all the brunt and the force on me. But you can tell that I'm ahead in the polls, they're desperate. That's why they're sending the secretary of war to my district tomorrow.
That's why the president's losing sleep and tweeting about this. That's why APAC has dumped another $3,000,000 into my race this weekend. It's because they're panicked, and they really haven't been able to gain a lead in this race.
Speaker 1: You say the president is desperate, but he's got a pretty good record of defeating people he wants to target in Republican primaries. We saw Bill Cassidy yesterday. We saw what happened in Indiana. How are you gonna be able to overcome the president's opposition?
Speaker 0: Well, I have endorsement of the right to life organizations, the gun organizations. I had four members of congress come here yesterday and campaign with me. So my situation is a little bit different. Plus, I've had millions of dollars come in from the grassroots, tens of thousands of donors to my website, thomasmassey.com, and it's still coming in. And that's how we're gonna beat them.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇱 Over $1.5 MILLION from Jewish-funded super PACs just got dumped into the anti-Massie campaign this week... Including $470k straight from the Republican Jewish Coalition. They’re really not playing around. Source: @QuiverQuant, @RepThomasMassie https://t.co/FAdHcJ1IJk
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸 New Big Data Polling shows Thomas Massie pulling ahead in the Kentucky-04 GOP primary at 50.6%, despite $10 million in Israeli lobby money pouring in to defeat him. The age breakdown tells an interesting story: -Gen Z: Massie 81.5% -Millennials: Massie 68.6% -Gen X: Massie https://t.co/wI6zntm1NL
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 Operation “Roaring Lion” could be the final push that forces Trump to pick between keeping the Gulf secure and going for a full decisive win against Iran. Col. Larry Wilkerson says that despite the huge economic risks, the White House looks ready to follow Netanyahu’s lead and launch a renewed military campaign. According to the colonel, political pressure from Israel is now the main driver shaping U.S. strategy in the Middle East.
reSee.it AI Summary
I discuss how Iran tried peace with the U.S. two decades ago and Washington left them on read, and what that silence produced and may mean next. I note Iran’s 2003 grand offer, the new Ayatollah’s likely stance, and how leverage shapes responses. I outline wartime losses, reparations, law, UAE-Israel ties, and why Iran used mass missile and drone attacks, plus postwar ideology and policy shifts. I also predict Iran may become more aggressive.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 Iran tried to make peace with the U.S over two decades ago, and Washington left them on read. Tehran University professor Foad Izadi explains what that silence produced, and what comes next. "What would you do? You would use all the leverage that you have to make sure that Trump doesn't get a success." Iran offered a huge deal in 2003, put everything on the table, and got bombed anyway. You can be sure the new Ayatollah isn't making that offer again. @IzadiFoad 01:33 - Iran’s position on controlling the Strait of Hormuz 02:26 - Iran’s wartime losses and use of leverage 05:51 - Reparations, sanctions, and international popularity 07:24 - Iran’s view of international law after the war 08:52 - UAE ties with Israel and Iran’s justification for strikes 10:59 - Israeli companies in the UAE before the war 11:45 - Why Iran used mass missile and drone attacks 14:47 - Why Iran continues targeting UAE-linked assets 15:46 - Iran’s ranking of regional countries involved in the war 17:14 - Alternative routes to the Strait of Hormuz 19:49 - Blockade, ceasefire, and diplomacy 24:09 - Iran’s postwar ideology and foreign policy 27:46 - Reformists, the 2015 nuclear deal, and its aftermath 32:30 - Iran’s past “grand bargain” offer to the U.S. 42:41 - Prediction that postwar Iran will become more aggressive
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation covers a wide, interwoven set of points about Iran, the Gulf, and international power dynamics, centering on how Iran’s posture and regional actions are shaping the future balance of power.
- Strait of Hormuz and ownership: The speakers discuss whether Iran believes the Strait of Hormuz permanently belongs to Iran. There is mention of a deputy parliamentary speaker saying “the Strait Of Hormuz belongs forever to the great nation of Iran,” and the implications of Iran’s rhetoric for sanctions, cables, and fees. The dialogue notes that this rhetoric risks pushing Trump toward continued conflict and highlights a distinction between legal territorial claims and the practical control Iran seeks to exercise.
- Leverage, sanctions, and war aims: Speaker 1 argues Iran faces immense pressure and has suffered enormous casualties and damage, and would use all leverage to prevent a US victory. The frame presented is that Trump cannot easily compensate Iran for its losses, and that Iran’s leadership seeks to deter further US action, potentially by threatening critical regional chokepoints and economic channels.
- UAE, Israel, and regional bases: The discussion addresses UAE’s normalization and hosting Israeli assets, with Speaker 1 insisting that if a country starts an illegal war, “you get to hit these assets.” They note Israeli presence in the UAE before the war and Israeli bases in the region, arguing that alliance and bases do not equal occupation, and acknowledging the UAE’s sovereign choices amid a complex security environment.
- Iranian strategy and volume of attacks: The participants discuss why Iran used hundreds of drones and missiles against the UAE and other targets, suggesting the aim was to overcome air defenses and to send a signal given the breadth of anti-missile systems in the region. There is acknowledgment that while such strikes cause damage, they occur within a context of a broader blockade and ongoing hostilities, including the broader war dynamics in Lebanon, Gaza, and beyond.
- Fujairah and other theaters: The discussion turns to the Fujairah incident (and a similar strike in Qatari waters) and whether Iran officially claimed responsibility. Speaker 1 notes that Iran did not accept responsibility due to ceasefire constraints, invoking terminology from Persian/Arabic to describe such “shots that come out of the blue.” There is speculation about other potential targets along alternative routes to bypass Hormuz, including Fujairah and Yanbu, to deter or disrupt overflow routes.
- Regional outlook and strategic lists: The speakers speculate that Iran may maintain a prioritized list of targets among those responsible for significant damage to Iran (including Fujairah and Saudi pipeline routes) and that it could pursue other routes as part of a broader strategy to constrain Hormuz and diversify its leverage.
- Ideology vs national interest in Iran: A major thread concerns whether Iran’s Islamic-republic ideology should or will give way to more pragmatic, interests-based diplomacy (such as re-entering or renegotiating the nuclear deal, minimizing sanctions, and engaging with the US while criticizing its allies). Speaker 0 argues the ideology often appears to guide policy, while Speaker 1 contends that Iran’s ideology is an enduring element of its foreign policy, shaping its support for Palestinians, Lebanese groups, and other allies, and that this ideological frame is not easily separated from national interests.
- JCPOA and US policy: The dialogue references missed opportunities to return to the 2015 JCPOA framework, highlighting Robert Malley’s position that a revised, longer, stronger agreement could have been pursued after 2015, and noting that the withdrawal under Trump and subsequent sanctions contributed to the current crisis. There is critique of US internal politics and alleged influence from various actors, including assertions about the role of the “Epstein class” and other external pressures.
- Post-ceasefire expectations: Looking ahead, Speaker 1 anticipates Iran becoming more aggressive in advancing its interests after any ceasefire, while Speaker 0 probes how Iran’s approach might shift if diplomacy were more effective, and whether a more calibrated policy toward the US and Israel could ease sanctions and improve conditions for ordinary Iranians.
- Concluding note: The dialogue closes with mutual reflections on the enduring competition between ideology and national interests, regional power dynamics, and the potential trajectories for Iran and its neighbors in a post-ceasefire or negotiated settlement environment.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Are we in a position right now where Iran believes that the Strait Of Hormuz is permanently belongs to them?
Speaker 1: You would use all the leverage that you have to make sure that Trump doesn't get a success. Trump cannot do it. It's too expensive. It's not that rich.
Speaker 0: You and others have criticized The UAE for working with these rallies for a defense.
Speaker 1: When that country starts an illegal war against your country, you get to hit these assets. We have many, many Israeli companies working in UAE before the war.
Speaker 0: Choice. But there's their choice as a sovereign country.
Speaker 1: They're providing bases with Israelis.
Speaker 0: And alliance is not is not occupation. So struggling to make sense on on what's happening right now, you've got the Iranians are pretty and probably they've they've responded to the Americans, but the Iranians are pretty set in their demands. And there's a statement by the parliamentary speaker, sorry, the deputy parliamentary speaker who says, today, the Strait Of Hormuz belongs forever to the great nation of Iran. So it seems that Iran is set to control the Strait Of Hormuz forever, and there was a statement yesterday on Forest News about charging the cable companies a fee for the Internet cables to go through the Strait Of Hormuz, and those Internet cables go through to The Gulf, but also to Europe and to Asia. While also requesting the lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of assets in return for concessions on the nuclear program.
But are we in a position right now where Iran believes that the Strait Of Hormuz is permanently permanently belongs to them. What I mean by this is ignore the the the law of the seas and and legally whether it's Iranian territory. I'm just talking about how it's been for the last few decades and how it's going to be now. I was under the impression it will be temporary ownership, but it seems based on the rhetoric when I say ownership, I mean fees. But based on the rhetoric, they want this to become permanent.
And I worry that this gives Trump no choice but to continue the war because that's that has pretty significant implications beyond just Iran and the region.
Speaker 1: Iran is under a lot of pressure. We were attacked by two nuclear regimes. They killed the country's leader, a lot of politicians, a lot of military leaders, a lot of ordinary citizens, more than 3,500. You know, we we have lost more than 270 school children, not not just on the first day. That was, like, 170.
We lost hundred hundred more in in the days after that. So when you are a country that has experience in American Israeli rampage, what would you do? You would use all the leverage that you have to make sure that Trump doesn't get a success. What does Trump want? He says he wants Iranian oil.
He says that the people in the US Navy are pirates is what he said when when they took over that Iranian oil tanker. And he wants to change Iran's government. He wants to change Iran's borders. He may want to kill more Iranians. We we don't know.
He killed more Iranians during ceasefire. He was shooting at places in Iran. So when you're dealing with this type of people with, you know, people in in Europe and US call them the Epstein class, then you are going to use your geography. And when you see some Iranian politician says that set of Hormuz belongs to Iran, it means that a set of Hormuz is in Iran's territorial waters and contiguous waters. Same thing is sort of with regard to Oman.
So it doesn't so I haven't seen that statement. So it should say the more accurate sentence would be a state of Oman that belongs to Iran and Oman, and and then we can go through the conventional law of seas to see why if that is legal or not.
Speaker 0: He also he also mentions about how Iran is officially the world's fourth superpower. So, like, I feel the Iran that's coming out of this war is gonna is is gonna be very different, but also a lot more demanding than the previous Iran. Now I understand to a certain extent you face significant damages that you need reparations for. But if if Iran's position right now is we control the Shirdo Humores, we charge we control who goes in and out and we charge a fee for the ships we decide to charge a fee to and we decide the amount. And then we also wanna charge a fee to the cables coming under under the under the sea cables, the Internet cables that go through the straits.
And we want American bases out of the region. These are pretty significant demands that I don't think The Gulf, The US, or even the rest of the world would agree to. Like, isn't there a concern there that you turn the global community, which has been relatively empathetic to the Iranian cause as a as a victim of this war, you turn them against Iran as well? Because we've seen some pretty harsh words come from other countries.
Speaker 1: You know, if if you're an Iranian leader and your country has suffered $250,000,000,000 worth of damage, This is what the estimate of the Iranian government is. And you know the Americans are not going to pay US cents. They're not going to do that. Fact, it's you know, Trump cannot do it. He needs to get bill out of the US congress to be able to pay Iran.
He can't you know, he's not going to pay Iran out of his pocket. It's too expensive. He's not that rich. And, you know, the US congress is Israeli occupied territory. They're not going to pay you on anything.
And and you need you need to fix all these damages. So what are you going to do if you have a choice between fixing the damages that was inflicted on your country illegally and being popular, if you have these two choices, being popular internationally, I I think it would be the first choice very easily. In fact, I I think it's Iran is quite popular because Iran is resisting the Epstein class. A lot of people all around the world realize that. You don't wanna live in a world when people like Trump, bullies, take over other countries and kill their leaders and their people.
This is not the nineteenth century. So it it depends on how you frame things. And the frame that Iranians are interested in is that we are not going to be nice guys anymore, you know, following every letter of every international law with a western interpretation and then getting hit in the manner that Iran did. And in fact, if you follow international law you know, I didn't know this. I I mean, I'm not an international attorney.
Understand Remo manual, which is the main text for war at seas. If you have a country attacking another country, in this case, US attacking Iran, article 60 of San Dimo manual. And then that country the country that has attacked says that they're going to escort ships. Those ships are legitimate military targets. Did you know that?
I didn't know that. So these are interesting things we are learning that that we this is what Iranians are realizing, that you you have these Persian Gulf countries like UAE, the place you that that is another Israeli occupied territory. They're providing bases to the Israelis. It does provide
Speaker 0: What does it become? Alliance alliance doesn't become you know, an alliance is not is not occupation. Like, you and others have criticized The UAE for working with the Israelis for air defense systems and doubling down on the American alliance as well. Well, they've also diversified to South Korea, and they're talking to European countries as well. And what would you expect from a country that that has been attacked more than any other country in this war that had no direct involvement in the war?
Indirect, yes. So I understand limited attacks. And then I I remember speaking to someone in the military two days ago on this show and I asked him a question, I think it was Malcolm Ness. I asked Malcolm Ness who's very critical of the war, very, very critical, finds it to be a stupid war. But I asked him a question, I'm like, looking at the scale of the attack on The UAE, Malcolm, do you think Iran was was was, you know where their attack was limited to limit the damage, or did they wanna cause significant real harm in The UAE?
It's like Mario. You don't fire hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones if you just wanna I don't have the exact number I'm gonna find it, but if you just wanna threaten or cause limited damage, you wanna burn a country down when you fire that amount on one country. So then when he said that to me, I started thinking, I'm like, okay. It's fair to criticize The UAE for being hawkish on Iran for having an American base for diverse for for working with Israel. Fine.
But what what about the other side of that argument? The UAE did business with Iran. They were trading partner to Iran. From what I understand, their bases were not used in the war. You can correct me.
In the early days of the war until they were attacked. In the early early days, they were not used. Their bases also the aircraft carriers that were used. And then they got involved when they started being attacked. You can't expect them to tell the Americans, hey, don't use our base as they're being attacked more than any other country.
So now I've I've found that that that kind of the counterpoint to be a very fair point. The UAE is in a very difficult position in a war they never wanted with a country that had cordial relationships with.
Speaker 1: You know, Israelis were in UAE many years before the war. We have many, many Israeli companies working in UAE before the war.
Speaker 0: Choice. But that's their choice as a sovereign country.
Speaker 1: Right. But when when that country starts an illegal war against your country, you get to hit these assets. These were generally military industrial Israeli companies. They they get hit. And why did Iran use hundreds?
It's very accurate. The the military experts you you talked to, it was accurate. Iran used hundreds and hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles. Thousands. They use
Speaker 0: 2,200 drones and Yeah. Five hundred and fifth almost 600 missiles.
Speaker 1: That that may be true. Why? You answered the question earlier because they have all these Israeli American anti missile systems. So you have to fire a lot, so you make sure you hit a few. That's why they use the lot.
Because Iranians, this is how they think. They realize that if Iran is the only country that gets hit and UAE is scot free, I think that's the terminology, because we they say we are an independent country and we want to be part of the Abraham Accords, and we want to have relations with the Israeli in the middle of genocide, fine. But if these Israelis start a war against Iran, then there's going to be a price to be paid because if Israel was not based in UAE, a lot of intelligence that was used by Akira was not available to Israelis. So they used UAE territory before the war to basically engage in that war and do well in that war. How do we know they did well?
More than 1,600 sorties 16,000 sorties according to the secretary of war crimes. So these are not black and You
Speaker 0: guys you guys have to tip my hat. You guys, from a rhetoric perspective, from the Epstein class to the secretary of the war crimes, Whoever whoever is is coming up with those ideas on the Iranian side, deserves a raise.
Speaker 1: I just thought about that. So this is
Speaker 0: Oh, that that was that was that have
Speaker 1: you have blood, I guess.
Speaker 0: Do you mind if I just comment on this quickly? Sorry to interrupt. But first, I think you make a valid point because the point I was making is that the volume of attacks on The UAE shows Iran did not respond proportionately to pressure the UAE to then pressure the US. Iran wanted to burn down The UAE, which I think is way too you know, that's not a right way to respond. Now you made a counterpoint.
You're like, no. The reason they fired that much is because the air defense system was so effective that they needed enough volume to be able to cause limited damage, which I think is a very valid point. Not saying it's justified. I'm saying it's a logical counterpoint. I wanna ask you one more question about The UAE, then I wanna ask something I'm a lot more fascinated by.
It's about how the region is going to look like in your view. Because you were very open to me last time when you were asked you to criticize the regime and you came back with a critique that I didn't expect, I enjoyed that part of the conversation. So I wanna, you you know, kinda expand on it and talk about how the region would look like with this new Iran. But one more question on The UAE first. Why strike The UAE today and yesterday and the day before and the vessels around The UAE?
And today, there's a vessel struck in Qatari waters that belong I think that that originated from The UAE, so may have belonged to The UAE. Why still The UAE? What is it between the two countries? What am I missing?
Speaker 1: You know, the Israelis and Americans started violating a ceasefire on the first day under international law doing blockade is an act of war. And Israelis never stopped shooting at Lebanon. You know, they killed 23 people just yesterday. They're doing to Southern Lebanon what they did to Gaza. This is what they said they would do.
They are doing that. Just destroying, you know, the scorched earth policy. Just it's it's not just Hezbollah, targets. You know, they they're just they're just destroying Southern Lebanon. So we are not in a ceasefire.
Iran is still under a blockade. So Iran is going back to the old policy of responding that Iran getting tired of the blockade. These negotiations are not advancing.
Speaker 0: But why just The UAE out of all countries? That's what I'm
Speaker 1: I think you know, I'm not in the Iranian government. I'm just a professor. But I think if they have ranked the countries that have caused more serious problems for Iran, military problems. So if you are ranking six, seven countries that that have fought with US shoulder to shoulder, that's another quote from US secretary of war.
Speaker 0: But he mentioned only not only The UAE. He said Saudi and others as well, not just The UAE.
Speaker 1: Yeah. True. I said six or seven countries Yeah. Out with The US shoulder to shoulder. But but what do you do?
You rank them, and guess who's coming on the top?
Speaker 0: I can guess it's The UAE.
Speaker 1: Yeah. There we go.
Speaker 0: Well, congratulations to The UAE. I don't know what they're doing to come on the top, but that is a surprise to me because I it is a surprise to me because I think The UAE depends on security and safety and and neutrality. That's how I've always seen The UAE and it makes pragmatic sense. So I don't know whether this is the actual reason, and I I know you're not in the government, so you're speculating as I am, or whether it's just a better target to to cause more damage to the Americans and the global economy or global system is to to to kinda strike the heartland in The Gulf, which is The UAE. That's rather strategic rather than
Speaker 1: I agree with you. I agree with you because Iranians want to make sure that there are no alternative routes to the to the state of Hormuz. Yeah. And for Jairah, it was an alternative route. The Iranian government did not accept responsibility for the fire that that I think still continues until today.
The Fujairah fires, I think, still continues.
Speaker 0: Oh, wow. I thought was important. I don't know. I haven't checked it, but, yeah, I'll check after this.
Speaker 1: So I think one one thing Iranian government will do is that they will look at the
Speaker 0: So while waiting for for I to come back oh, you're back. Sorry. Yeah. You're back. Sorry.
It's okay. Yep. Continue.
Speaker 1: Yeah. I was saying that the you have me? Is it okay? Okay. I was saying that I think Iranian government has another list.
So we have one list of countries who have done more damage, ranking priorities. And I think they have this priority list of hitting places if this illegal blockade continues and these attacks continue in Lebanon and in Iran. And on the top of that list, we have these alternative routes that would that that would be designed or are designed to go to give alternative to this data foremost. So Fujairah would be on the top of that list.
Speaker 0: Yanbu would be second, I guess, the the Saudi pipeline.
Speaker 1: Yeah. So so I I'm I'm just guessing. But
Speaker 0: That's a very logical guess. That's a good guess. Yeah. I agree. By the way, the fire stopped.
So the drone strike was on May 4, and the blaze was was under control and extinguished by May 5. But that that's as you said, Iran did not that was not by Iran. Correct, professor?
Speaker 1: No. I said that Iran did not accept the responsibility.
Speaker 0: Do you think it was Iran?
Speaker 1: I think since we are officially in ceasefire, accepting responsibility would be officially violating the ceasefire. And they they don't want to the country to do that among the countries that are involved in this war. But, you know, as I said, under international law, blockading a country is an act of war, but then you you get into this legal document know, legal arguments. And so overall but I think if if The United States after Islamabad talks, if they actually negotiated in good faith and wanted to come up with some diplomatic solution, diplomatic solutions that were available before the war. I think we could avoid we could have avoided all these things we have been talking.
Speaker 0: I agree. I agree. Are you saying that you think it is Iran that did I don't wanna put words in your mouth. Iran struck Fujairah, but Iran cannot take responsibility for it due to legal legal reasons because of the ceasefire, or it's not what you said?
Speaker 1: I'm saying that I'm not in the Iranian government. And if you ask Iranian leaders, they they are not going to accept responsibility for that. You know, we have since I like you, I'm going to teach you some Farsi. We have in Farsi, and is actually an Arabic word. You know, I I don't know if you're familiar with the Quran, but in the first in the second chapter after Surah Fateha, the believers are are those who believe in.
The proper Arabic pronunciation is right. And tir means shots. So the English translation of tirapai would be shots that come out of the blue or out of nowhere. And so this is the terminology that that is used when shots are fired and nobody is taking responsibility for it. So if I were UAE officials, I will learn some Farsi to help them with their policy planning.
Speaker 0: So on the discussion we had last time and again, people I highly recommend you listen to kind of the the our last interview, the last 20% of it, I think. And I'll ask you what is the one thing you criticized about the Iranian government. So my goal was to put you on the spot because I think the there is heavy censorship and not put you on the spot, actually. I was genuinely curious what you disagree with with the with the government. And then your answer was the the the ideology after the Islamic revolution was not really taught in political science and in schools in Iran and outside Iran from what I remember correctly.
So my question to you, kinda continuing on this, is the ideologies of the Islamic revolution seem intact, not stronger right now under this new government. So there is a concern in regional countries of what they call the exporting of that ideology. And that's through the support of various groups, you know, of the the militias in Iraq, support of Hezbollah, different groups in Palestine including Hamas, which I know is Sunni, and the Houthis. And there's a lot of countries that have talked about Iranian cells that are trying to cause instability or kind of build support. Bahrain, I think, is one of the countries that has been most vocal about it, they actually criticized Iran today to stop that strategies, stop the, I think, the intelligence cells, they called them, in their statement today or yesterday.
There's another one here. Iran has been accused of conducting assassinations, bombing cyber operations, covert influence campaigns abroad through IRGC linked networks. I know it's a bit different from political science and ideology, but they they do overlap in some ways when ideology and foreign policy, you know, being implemented by the same people. So my question to you is, how will this new Iran look like? Will we will we see a continuation and acceleration and strengthening of the previous Iran?
Do you expect to see a different Iran with a different approach to foreign policy? I heard that there's been some changes already after the protests in January. They're less strict on the wearing of the of the of the headscarf, for example. So I I hope I was clear with the question, but I'm genuinely curious to see what an Iran and a region would look like following the war, objectively speaking, what we could expect.
Speaker 1: In that list that you had, it was a good list. You can add countries like Venezuela before kidnapping of president Maduro. So you don't you don't have to be a Shia Muslim. So you already mentioned that that that Sunni Muslim organizations that you run has the honor of supporting. And then non Muslims, the people in Venezuela are leftist Christians.
Iran and Iran did support Venezuela because because Venezuelan government asked Iran for that help. You know? Iran has been under sanctions for forty seven years, so Iran has learned things that is use are are useful for peep for countries like Venezuela, like fixing American planes. They they had all these Boings that they bought when relations with The US were normal, and then they they were on they were put under sanctions. And the American companies, Boeing, they stopped providing services that they normally do because of sanctions.
So one option is just park your Boeings and buy new planes. The other option was send them to Iran to be fixed, and they did. So they they would send planes that needed repair or needed upgrades, and Iran provided that service to Venezuela and many many cases like that. So what Iranian Islamic ideology is is is that if you are opposing American hegemony and if Iran can help you with that in any way, give us a call. That's that's Iran's foreign policy in two words in two sentences.
And I think that will continue because I think Iranians are proud of basically not going with that hegemony because they realize if the American Israelis can take over Iran and take over this region, they would want to take over China, Russia, other places, South America. And we we don't wanna live in a world like that. So Iran is fighting for Iran. Iran is fighting for the civilized world because people like Trump and and not on you who are not civilized. They're war criminals that engage in genocide.
Speaker 0: Isn't that an example of putting ideology, and I'm using the term loosely here. We're moving away from religious ideology of the Islamic revolution, but aren't we putting ideology above the interests of the Iranian people, the Iranian people that were on the streets in January? Because change keeping that approach is almost guaranteed to maintain sanctions. Changing the approach and and, you know, being more open to work with The US, again, you can be critical of them, like the Brazilian not Brazilian. The Colombian president is extremely critical of Trump right now.
Some Asian countries are very critical of Trump, but they still do business with The US and don't support groups that fight militarily with The US. So why not change that policy? And then doesn't mean you you bow to the to the American empire. Just saying you just do business with them and remain critical. And that would be better in lifting the sanctions and being better for the for the people that suffering economically because of these sanctions.
Speaker 1: You know, we have some people that argue the same way in Iran, basically saying the same things. And and we call them reformists, and they were responsible for the nuclear agreement in 2015. And look what happened with that thought. They gave a lot of concessions on Iran's nuclear program. The the the other side had extensive access to Iranian sites that they used in in the recent attacks they had on Iran.
So a lot of that data came through the nuclear agreement.
Speaker 0: But it doesn't mean it doesn't mean the agreement was bad. The agreement was good, but, unfortunately, it wasn't enough. If if maybe we had another president instead of Trump, he wouldn't have ripped it up, and we would have had a better an agreement that lasts longer. And, also, what didn't change then that might have led to where we are today is that Iranian opposition to The US and the supporting of these groups that were anti Israel and anti American empire, and that could be the issue. Why not change that policy?
Now I understand that the terms aspect and projection of power, but if those groups focus on advancing Iranian interests, but not also, you know, fighting against American interests, maybe US would not be as hostile towards Iran. I'm not saying what's right or wrong and whether you're fighting for what's right. It's more about what's better for the Iranian people.
Speaker 1: You know, this Robert Malley, the guy who was in charge of Iranian file in the Biden administration had this interview with Al Jazeera maybe about a month ago. And the host asked him about the fact that when the Democrats came into power, and it was the Obama Biden administration that had the agreement, they asked him, why didn't why didn't you return to this agreement that you signed? Okay. We had a bad president. His name was Trump, but, you know, they were supposed to be the good guys.
And Robert Malley's response was, I agree. He agreed with the host. He said that this was his recommendation. You know, he wasn't president. He wasn't secretary of state.
But he said that this was his recommendation that if we want to change terms of that agreement, the best thing for US would be to return to the agreement with the understanding that some articles of that agreement needs to be changed. And then if you want to do something to run, do it afterwards. And at that time, we had a reformist government in place, Rouhani's government. And I think if they had listened to Robert Malley, you you probably would not have this war because the the The US would actually return to the agreement. Iran would accommodate the concerns they had.
You know, this Anthony Blinken was talking about longer, stronger a longer and a stronger agreement, and I think Iranians would have been receptive to changing some articles. But since Biden didn't listen to Robert Malley, they stay you know, he returned to 18 agreements that Trump left during his presidency. Trump left 19 agreements. They returned to 18. The only one that they didn't return was this nuclear
Speaker 0: Oh my god. That is and you think that's because of I'm guessing based on our previous discussions, that's Israeli influence over US foreign policy.
Speaker 1: Let me go. You don't have to be an Iranian professor. You can follow Joseph Kent, the the high ranking Trump official that resigned. He's he's he's on Twitter. He talks about this issue.
Speaker 0: I we've I've had him on the show many times, four four times, and, yeah, he's been very vocal about it.
Speaker 1: Very cool. So Yeah.
Speaker 0: So Then this Okay. Then I'll I'll rephrase the question. So why not why not change, you know, as critical as you and what Israel is doing in Gaza, West Bank to Palestinian Israelis as well, the way they treated in Israel and, of course, in South Lebanon. But why not change the policy approach to The US and Israel? Maintain your critique of Israel like Qatar, but don't go to the extent of supporting militant groups fighting Israel.
And I understand that you say it's because of the Palestinian cause. Is it really is it really about the Palestinian cause, or is there other reasons why Iran wants to see a weaker Israel?
Speaker 1: You know, to be honest with you, if because we had some people that taught in those lines. You have this document. It's available on New York Times. And this was a text that Iran sent to The United States in February the year that the Iraq war started, 2003. And in that, they they said that they're available to negotiate on every issue, Iran's support for resistance groups, Iran's nuclear program, ballistic program, everything.
Speaker 0: Sent the letter sorry. Who sent the letter to the UN?
Speaker 1: To The US. Who sent it?
Speaker 0: Iran Iran?
Speaker 1: From from the Iranian side, very much inside the Iranian government. Okay. People in the foreign ministry. They didn't sign their name because they wanted to see how The US would respond. And it's available on on the site of New York Times.
So if you do New York Times, Iran, grand bargain, it's a PDF document. Okay. And they they wanted sanctions with it. That's all they wanted. And they and they they called it grand bargain.
Grand bargain means that whatever grievances US has on Iran, they they they would they would try to fix all those grievances. And then they wanted normal relations with you with US and end of sanctions. This is this is what you just said. Why why why don't you try that? And what I'm saying is that Iran did twenty three years ago.
Speaker 0: Why do you think they didn't accept?
Speaker 1: Because the problem they have with Iran is not Iran's policies. If you want to dominate this part of the world the same way Israelis and Americans do, either you have to have subservient governments like UAE that allows Israeli companies to roam around during genocide in Gaza. Or you want weak and disintegrated and balkanized countries if you're dealing with countries like Iran or Turkey. Turkey will be next if if Americans get away with their policies towards Iran. You're saying a native member
Speaker 0: a member of NATO would be next.
Speaker 1: Yes. Yes. I think so. I think so. You know, they they already had a coup a few years ago in a country that was a member of NATO.
So so this is the idea that is you know, this is Greater Israel. Greater Israel is more than just territory. They they want domination. And if you want domination, you look at serious countries, and you want to eliminate serious competitors. Iran would be a serious competitor.
Turkey would be a serious competitor. So either you are Egyptian government totally under control, or you you get the Serbia treatment that you you have a civil war.
Speaker 0: But you have but based on that, why is why is Turkey continuing to be armed? And I understand they're not getting the fighter jets from The US, and that's a valid point. There are certain fighter jets. And the Gulf countries are getting armed very heavily and they're countries that are not subservient to Israel. Some of them work with Israel, some of them don't.
But wouldn't they be perceived as a threat as well based on that mindset? Because on the Israeli side, when I speak to them, they're like, Mario, you know, we don't care about Iranian territory. Greater Israel has nothing to do with Iranian territory. I'm not saying they not saying they agree with greater Israel. I'm saying even if you wanna go down that path, that that that that theory, it doesn't apply to Iran.
We just don't want the Iranian threat. We don't want Iran supporting Hezbollah, which has been attacking us for decades. We don't want Hamas attacking us. Now I understand the Palestinian cause, which we agree on and I empathize with, but I'm talking about Israel Iranian interests and Israeli interests. We don't want to be, you know, have the Assad regime up north and Iran is the one support and Yemen, Houthis.
Iran supports all the various groups that are a threat to Israel. Now as much as you dislike Israel and I dislike their foreign policy significantly, of course, you'd Israel would have a policy of weakening Iran. Now we can speculate about Turkey. That's pure speculation. But over the last few decades, they've always been vocal about Iran.
Iran's gonna have a nuclear weapon since '9 whatever it was, nineteen nineties, whatever. So wouldn't Iran changing their approach to Israel lead to a change on the Israeli side? Support to remember Israeli Iranian relations before the revolution. I'm sure you hear that a lot. Iran was probably the most friendly country to Israel in the region until that revolution.
Speaker 1: True. And there's this old Nixon tape, Richard Nixon, and someone asks him, why did you have a coup? Because he was vice president in 1953 when when we had the coup. And he said that if Mossadegh was around, he would not sell oil to Israel, and Shah was providing the main Shah was the main source of energy to Israelis. That's why they like his son too much because they remember what Shah did.
So so
Speaker 0: so if we go with that theory, let's say it is Israel's the main reasonable the main reason for a lot of what's happening to Iran. Why not change your foreign policy towards Israel as much as you dislike them for because of Iranian interests, putting your interests above any other country, including the Palestinians, unfortunately?
Speaker 1: Two reasons. This is an Islamic republic, so that the word Islamic means something. And as long as Iran is an Islamic republic, they're going to support Palestinians, Lebanese, people from Venezuela. This is ideology. That's what ideology is.
Sometimes you you think that advancing your ideology is actually advancing yourself. You don't separate ideology from from what you are doing. So this is the first word in the country's name, Islamic Republic Of Iraq.
Speaker 0: This is where this is where my critique comes in. You know, I've always told you, if I have to criticize the Iranian government for one thing, putting January aside, we'll be putting ideology above national interests.
Speaker 1: Yeah. But you're you're assuming that the the ideology and national interests are separate? And I think they should be. Yeah. Both the the people who wrote Iran's constitution disagree.
They say they say that in order for an independent country in this part of the world to exist, they need to have a strong ideology. Because if they don't have if they don't have any ideology, could be communism. It could be some of the thing, nationalism, whatever. If they don't have ideology, if if they just go with the flow, they will be destroyed. So do you so you need to have some sense of where you are in the world, what do you want to do with your country, how you're going to define your friends and enemies.
And this is Islam. This is an Islamic republic. So in in Islamic ideology, in Islamic teachings, you are not supposed to be friends with everybody. You're supposed to be friends with the oppressed. You are supposed to be enemies of oppressors.
Now you may say that sometimes being friends with oppressors may have some sanctions relief, and then the the people who follow Islamic ideology will tell you that that that is that is not Islam. So this is our Islamic Republic. So that's one reason that that you see the foreign policy of Iran the way it is. And the second reason I was giving you, some people were doubting whether they should be that Islamic or maybe they could be a little bit less Islamic. And then the response from the other side was very negative.
All the time, Iranians have been trying to have some sort of political solution for the last twenty years, and what they get is either people in Washington leaving agreements or bombing Iran or killing Iranians. So that's
Speaker 0: was an exception. Obama was an exception, obviously, in JCPOA, and I'm sure there would have been potentially more exceptions.
Speaker 1: And and Obama even Obama did not follow the agreement the way he was supposed to. When you know, we under the agreement, US was supposed to refrain from causing difficulties for Iran's international trade. And the US government officially stayed away, but these former government officials, both Democrats and Republicans, created this organization called United Against Nuclear Iran. And they were sending this was, you know, officially a private entity. They were sending letters to every company that was trying to work with Iran after the nuclear agreement, telling them that the next president will leave the agreement, so don't work with Iran, threatening letters, threatening to sue these companies for violating US law.
So, you know, we have done it all. We have seen it all. We have done it all. The the the thing that you see happening today didn't start today. It started in 1953 with the Americans bringing back Shah in a coup.
That's when it has started. It's it's been seventy three years.
Speaker 0: And the final quick question is, so you believe that same Iran will continue operating post the ceasefire with this peace deal if we reach a peace deal? And even was it fair to say it will be even more aggressive in advancing its interests using the similar strategies? I'm not saying if it's good or bad. Obviously, we've had that discussion in a way already, but it'll remain relatively the same.
Speaker 1: It's going to be much more aggressive. So you add much in into that sentence, you'll get it right.
Speaker 0: Okay. Professor, always a pleasure to speak to you. Thank you for your time.
Speaker 1: Thank you. Bye bye.
Speaker 0: Bye. Nafat, it's a pleasure to speak to you.
reSee.it AI Summary
I note Marandi warns another U.S.-Israel assault on Iran could be imminent, and that de-escalation is meaningless if decision-makers aren’t logical. “If I were a betting man… I would not bet against war.” Troops in Kuwait, jets in Qatar, ground-ops gear—the region is postured. The question is whether Washington has the will to stop it. Discussion touches Trump’s diplomacy, a refused ceasefire, Hormuz shifts, emotion-driven policy, UAE attacks, and a $1M bounty on Marandi.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 Another US assault on Iran could be imminent, and the groundwork is already in place. Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi says the logic of de-escalation means nothing when the decision-makers aren't logical. "If I was a betting man, which I'm not, I would not bet against war." Troops in Kuwait, jets in Qatar, equipment for ground operations. The region is already postured. The question isn't whether the pressure exists. It's whether anyone in Washington has the will to stop it. @s_m_marandi 00.00 - Marandi’s stark warning: another U.S.-Israel assault on Iran could be imminent 05.46 - On Trump and the negotiations: why diplomacy may already be collapsing behind closed doors 07.41 - Why Trump changes direction so rapidly he’s almost impossible to predict 10.00 - The ceasefire off-ramp Iran says Washington deliberately refused to take 13.19 - On the Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s position may have changed permanently 16.07 - The uncomfortable truth: Marandi says Western policy is driven by emotion, not logic 19.54 - The UAE question: why Iran made the decision to strike Emirati targets so relentlessly 22.12 - Marandi’s explosive allegation that the UAE directly participated in attacks on Iran 30.17 - Marandi reveals that a $1 million bounty was placed on his head during the war 37.41 - Was the nuclear issue the real reason behind this conflict?
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on the prospect of a renewed full-scale war in the Middle East, the motivations behind it, and the strategic implications for the United States, Israel, Iran, and regional partners.
- Probability of renewed conflict: Speaker 1 argues that the chances of another US-Israeli assault are high and could be imminent. The war’s continuation is described as driven by Zionist policy, not by US national interests, and there is belief that “the forces surrounding Trump” are not rational. The capacity and readiness for a major operation are described as significant, with US equipment and ground-force preparations in Kuwait, the Emirates, and Bahrain, plus jets in Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
- Iran’s stance and Hormuz: The conversation asserts that Iran did not intend to take control of the Strait of Hormuz; rather, that move came as a response to the war and hostile actions in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s side contends that the Strait should not be used as a foothold to wage war against Iran, and that its demand for secure passage is tied to preventing further attacks on Iranian infrastructure. The claim is that Netanyahu pushed for occupying the region and that the war’s origins relate to Zionism.
- Netanyahu and policy: The speakers attribute the onset of the war to Netanyahu’s actions, arguing that his approach forced escalation and that the US reoriented its strategy in line with Netanyahu’s goals. The claim is made that the real policy of the US and Europe supports a scenario in which Israel could dominate the region, with the two-state solution presented as a long-standing facade.
- Trump’s stance and rhetoric: The dialogue notes fluctuations in Trump’s rhetoric, including posts that reference military action against Iran. It is suggested that Trump wants to withdraw but is constrained by the gap between Iranian demands and what the US is willing to concede. There is a sense that Iran is not satisfied with limited concessions and that Tehran seeks broader sanctions relief plus a permanent adjustment to the Hormuz situation.
- Negotiations and concessions: The speakers discuss the negotiations’ sticking points, particularly Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief. There is a view that Iran should retain control over the Strait of Hormuz permanently, rejecting any plan to relinquish control or limit enrichment in a way that would be perceived as a concession to Trump or the West. The suggestion is that while limits could be easy to manage through the IAEA, the control of Hormuz must not be offered as a temporary concession.
- UAE and Gulf dynamics: The UAE is described as strategically vulnerable and heavily aligned with the US and Israel, creating a target profile for Iran. Iran’s attacks are framed not as personal but as strategic, aiming to impact the global economy by targeting the UAE as a hub. The UAE’s role in regional politics is portrayed as aggressive in its push toward conflict, although the possibility of reconciliation with Iran is acknowledged.
- Alaster Crook and decision-making: An anecdote about Alastair Crook is used to illustrate a point about Western decision-making, suggesting that rational analysis often does not drive policy; emotional factors and perceptions influence choices in Washington and European capitals.
- Human costs and damage: The discussion references the human and infrastructural toll, including the destruction seen in Gaza and Lebanon, and alleges the US and Israeli campaigns have caused widespread harm, including to schools and civilians. The speakers assert that the war has inflicted severe economic and humanitarian costs and warn of deeper global recession or depression if conflict deepens.
- Specific incident and online safety concerns: The host reveals that Speaker 1 has a bounty on his head, stemming from a Twitter account fundraising for kidnapping him; the account was initially not removed, drawing attention to online threats associated with the conflict.
- Nuclear diplomacy and a potential deal: When considering a hypothetical deal, Speaker 1 asserts that Hormuz control must be permanent and rejects a proposal for temporary limits or enrichment concessions in exchange for sanctions relief or assets unfrozen. He emphasizes that Iran believes its nuclear program is a sovereign right and should be handled through international mechanisms like the IAEA rather than through punitive terms tied to Hormuz control. He also reiterates that the nuclear issue has long been used as a pretext for broader policy aims.
- Final takeaway: The conversation closes with a sense of caution about the likelihood of avoiding a renewed war, a recognition of the high stakes involved, and an insistence that Hormuz control be non-negotiable for Iran, while acknowledging the potential for reconciliation if Gulf states reevaluate alignment with Israel and the US.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Do you really think we could go back to a full blown war?
Speaker 1: Yes. I think the chances for another US Israeli assault are high. I think it could be imminent. Netanyahu can go shoot himself in the head for bringing this about because Iran had no intention of taking control of the Strait Of Hormuz. It was only as a result of this war and the Persian Gulf being used as a foothold to assault Iran.
It's because of Zionism. And I continue to have a a bounty on my head. Twitter allowed a a known account, a blue tick account, to fundraise a million dollars to have me kidnapped.
Speaker 0: Professor, it's a pleasure to speak to you. And as we're we're doing this interview, I remembered our conversation a while ago. It was before this war, and you said to me it was after the twelve day war. We had a conversation, and I think I was, like, congratulating you for, like, you know, everything being okay, the family being okay. And you told me, Mario, I don't think this is over.
And, you know, that stuck with me in that conversation. It was only you and Trita Parsi that were telling me this back then. And and, you know, I didn't expect us to be where we are today. I thought it was just a foolish idea to start this war. And to my surprise, here we are.
And the reason I mentioned that is this links to my first question. I've been saying since the ceasefire, even before it, the war is about to end. And since the ceasefire, I've been saying it's it's over because I just don't see there's any appetite on Trump's side to continue the war. There was been a strategic disaster, you know, munitions stockpiles for The US, alliances in the region. Long term damage is gonna be is gonna take years to really be fully fully understood.
So my question to you as object you know, just looking at the state of things now, do you think it's over? I know negotiations are ongoing, and you've been very active in in the scene. But, realistically, do you really think we could go back to a full blown war?
Speaker 1: Yes. I think the chances for another US, Israeli assault are high. I think it could be imminent. The United States has prepared itself, and it's been prepared for the last couple of weeks. They brought in a lot of, equipment.
And, the problem with your assessment is it's is that it's based on logic. And I don't think that, those who surround Trump are logical people, and, of course, Trump isn't either. I think this is Zionism, that is, the driving force, and it is pushing The United States towards war even though it's not in the interest of The United States. It's not in the interest of anyone in this, on this planet. I don't even think it's in the interest of the Israeli regime, but that's that's another thing.
So I think the chances are quite high. It's going to become the later The United States carries out an assault, the worse it's going to be because, as you know, the weather in the Arabian Peninsula will soon become very hot, and it's going to be very difficult to wage war under those circumstances, if there's going to be a ground war. Because most of the equipment that The United States has brought into the region since the ceasefire, from what I've been told, is for ground operations. And that those troops have been brought to Kuwait, to The Emirates, and to Bahrain. There are also large numbers of jets in in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and The Emirates.
So they are poised for a major air assault, but there could also be a major ground operation as well. Of course, ground operation a major ground operation, I mean, in relative terms. I don't know if it's going to happen. The reason is that no one can really tell us what goes on in the mind of Donald Trump. From what we've from what I've heard from Tucker Carlson in his interviews, even Trump recognizes that this is foolish, but he's he's been pushed in this direction.
And I don't think the forces that started this war have gone away. When, Ken when Joe Kent says in his resignation letter, a Trump appointee of the highest ranking intelligence officer in The United States, except for Tulsi Gabbard, when he says that there's no nuclear weapon, there's no Iran threat, this is all about Zionism and the Israeli regime and the Zionist lobby, I don't think that in the last seventy days or so, anything has really changed. I don't think the Zionist lobby has sun suddenly melted away. I know that Israel is becoming increasingly unpopular and that the Israeli regime and Zionism is becoming increasingly unpopular, not just because of the genocide, but because of this war. But I don't think it's gone away yet.
So I and for unfortunately, I can't give a clear cut answer, but if I was a betting man, which I'm not, I would not bet against war.
Speaker 0: You you mentioned Joe Kent. I've I've spoken to him multi we actually spoke yesterday as well. And in our last couple of conversations, we both agreed that it seems Trump is changing. Obviously, it's too early to tell. I was more optimistic than he was, but we're seeing a change of rhetoric and a change of strategy.
For example, when when Iran attacked The UAE three days ago, I I laugh because Trump puts out a post. Everyone's waiting for it. You've got a lot of influencers talking about tonight's gonna be a terrible night. It's gonna be retaliation. And Trump puts out a post, and he doesn't even mention The UAE.
He talks about the South Korean vessel that was struck. And then he was asked by ABC about the strike on The UAE. And he said, you know, there's only a few missiles. Most of them intercepted. One landed.
Limited damage, which close to reality except it's not limited damage, and the target was a very sensitive target. So the rhetoric shows and and the actions as well, and the political report that came out two days ago says the same thing that Trump needs to get out of the war, wants to get out of it, needs to get out of it, and and political went a step further, and I agree with that position is that the Iranians are not letting him save face. Is that Iran is just so upset with this war. It's like even when I see Trump trying to walk away, the Iranians mock him. They mock his statements.
So I do believe he wants to walk away. The if he does go back into war, it's, I think, because he's not able to get the concessions he's looking for. And he's looking for pretty extensive concessions on the Iranian side, especially when it comes to the nuclear program, and he's not willing to give something in return. Iran needs sanctions removed. So my position is he wants to walk away, but the two positions are so far off in the negotiations that finding a middle ground is very difficult.
That's the issue that I'm concerned about.
Speaker 1: Well, first of all, I think the problem with Trump is that he says one thing now, and then he'll see something different two hours from now. As we're speaking, he may have put out a two social posts and then create
Speaker 0: a
Speaker 1: whole news direction for our discussion. And, just hours ago or yesterday, he spoke about, an orange light over Iran, implying, an orange glow or something like that, implying nuclear weapons. And he's been saying that on and off for quite a while, and it's quite extraordinary that Western journalists won't condemn it. Western media won't condemn it, annihilating Iran, obliterating Iran. Sorry.
What else? Sending Iran back to the stone age.
Speaker 0: Wiping out a civilization.
Speaker 1: Civilization. And he just goes on and on. And you don't see any Western journalists outraged. You don't see any Western parliament putting out statements and condemnation about threatening Iran with the greatest holocaust of human history. And so it says a lot more about West about the collective West and Western elites than about just Trump.
So, the problem, I think and so it to assess what he says, based on his truth social posts or what he says, it's very difficult because he's saying all sorts of different things, and he's, therefore, almost impossible to analyze. Whenever people invite me on a, let's say, TV program or something and say Trump just said something and we I want to discuss that, and I I always tell them, I I I'm not going to listen to his speech and join your conversation because it doesn't help me at all. And and I don't I don't watch his speeches. I don't read his social media posts unless someone sends it to me or it's in my face or something like that, or I I'll just read the headline. But but Iran did provide Trump an offer up, and he didn't take it.
When the 12 when the twelve day war began, we didn't start the war, of course. It was a blitzkrieg attack. He demanded unconditional surrender. Didn't work out well. They lost the war, as we know, and they were seeking a ceasefire.
After twelve days, Iran said okay. Then they launched another war this time. The Americans brought in everything they had, much much greater firepower than anything that the Israelis could provide. They used all the territory in the Arabian Peninsula as their base to strike Iran. So, they had many options.
And, again, when the war started, he said unconditional surrender. And after thirty three thirty nine days, he had to accept the Iranian endpoint plan as the framework for negotiations. Of course, after he was ridiculed and attacked and criticized in the West, he said you know, his spokeswoman said we threw it in the bin, but it does show how things did not go well. Well, after that, we had a ceasefire agreement, and there was supposed to be a ceasefire across the region, including Gaza and, of course, Lebanon where there was heavy fighting. Lebanon was named just on to be on the safe side.
And then Netanyahu started carpet bombing the country. Why? To wreck the ceasefire. And Iran said we're not going because the ceasefire was you know, in in return for the ceasefire, the Iranians would allow ships linked to the five countries that were linked to The US campaign against Iran, The Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, because the Strait Of Hormuz was never closed. It was only closed to them.
It wasn't closed to the Chinese or the Russians. Indians have taken their ships. The Pakistanis have. The Iranians, Iraq. So it's only these countries, but Iran agreed to allow ships from these countries to pass through.
And Netanyahu didn't, allow that to happen, and Trump sided with Netanyahu. After ten days where the Iranians said, no. We're not backing down. This has the ceasefire has to happen. Netanyahu accepted.
Of course, later on, he restarted the genocidal attacks in Gaza and in Lebanon. It never stopped really. But Iran said, okay. Now that ships can go in accordance with the ceasefire agreement, the ships can go through the strait. What did Trump do?
At that point, he because a few days earlier, after the ceasefire, he imposed a siege on Iranian ports, which is an act of war and in violation of the ceasefire. He could have then said, okay. Now that the trade is open and ships are going to pass through, I will I will remove the siege. Excuse me. He did the opposite.
So he didn't use that opportunity to deescalate that off ramp that was provided to him.
Speaker 0: I'm trying to understand why. Yeah. But he did. But is it because of Iranian demands to control the Shared of Hormuz or what they call now they create and Iran created a website, sent out an email to companies on how to go through the Shared of Humuz. And that's something that's that's difficult to accept not only for The US but for the rest of the world.
Without getting into the legalities of being Iranian sovereign territory, just from a negotiating position, Do you think this is the reason that Trump put the blockade to be able to get concessions on that demand from the Iranians?
Speaker 1: No. I think it's far beyond that. Iranians, of course, are this is a permanent change in policy, and Netanyahu can go shoot himself in the head for bringing this about because Iran had no intention of taking control of the Strait Of Hormuz. It was only as a result of this war and the Persian Gulf being used as a foothold to assault Iran and countries in the Persian Gulf being complicit in the the murder of thousands of Iranians and the destruction of Iranian infrastructure that Iran made that move. So if I was a Zionist, I'd go I'd go after you know, I'd be seeking Netanyahu's head for this catastrophe that he's brought about, but that's not the reason.
The reason is the same reason why the war started in the first place. The reason is the same reason why the twelve day war started. It's because of Zionism. It is because when you go back and watch the interview bet between The US ambassador to the Israeli regime and Tucker Carlson and when and and hear him, it's clear what The US policy is. If if the Israeli regime takes the entire region, that's fine with The United States.
That is the real US policy. That's European policy. The real poll just like I've been saying for decades now, that the two state solution has always been a facade. It was never real. The Europeans and the Americans were lying from day one.
That was only to buy time to allow the Israelis to colonize the West Bank, and that's what happened. That's why you see European, EU, diplomats in in in in Israel and, European diplomats. All of them are if you look at their Twitter accounts, it's they they behave as if they're in, I don't know, some vacation island or some utopia. You don't hear about any of the atrocities that are being carried out because that is European and American policy. So the real issue is the the enormous influence that Zionism has over The United States and has over our region.
And it is because of that that The United States is being pushed to war and has been pushed to to war against Iran, which is not in its interest. It's against the interest of the
Speaker 0: No. Of course. I I think everyone knows that. I think everyone knows that. I am in a position where I know there's Israeli influence over The US, but it's reached its limits.
I think at the position now where the munitions are 50% depleted, American bases have faced significant damage, the global economy is still facing a lot of a lot of windfall, and then you have the e the the the political damage that Trump is facing out of this, and then you add to it that Iran is now controlling the state of Hormuz, I I think that we don't
Speaker 1: Let me let me
Speaker 0: Israeli influence bit off more than they can chew.
Speaker 1: Let me respond. Let me respond. I I agree with you. I don't disagree, but let me respond to you with I I you I'm you know Alacer Crook. Yeah.
He's been out
Speaker 0: for sure a times. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Alacer Crook is a is a is a very old friend of mine. We've been friends for two decades. And I remember when I was young, I was I'm you know, I was, like, forty forty, and we were having a conversation at one of his conferences. He he had some he had the best conferences that I've ever been to. You know?
The best people, very fantastic discussions. But I remember at the very first conference that I where I joined him when I was young, and we were discussing I don't remember what it was. And I was saying, well, why Alasir is like The United States or the West pursuing this policy? It's it's not in their interest. And and I was trying to explain why these are bad policies.
And he was saying, Mohammed, you you you I don't remember the exact wording, but he said, like, you you are thinking in rational terms, and you you have to keep in mind that most of these most of the decision making process in the West is not based on rationality.
Speaker 0: I get told this a lot. Months
Speaker 1: and then a few months later, I went to another one of his conferences, and he having a good he he has a good memory. Very smart man. Very principled person. And his wife too. And he told me like, I if something like that came up, some other policy in the West.
And, again, I said, but, Alastair, you know, this is not in the interest of the West and what they're doing. And he said, Mohammed, remember what I told you a few months ago? The decision making process in your mind, meaning me, Mohammed, you you you think that it's based on rational rationality and reason. That's not how it works. It is very emotional.
So what you say is and I'm saying I'm just giving saying to you what Alice told me twenty years ago. What you're saying makes sense based on a rational worldview, but these people don't have a rational worldview. I get I get told this
Speaker 0: a lot. I've been in the last few weeks have been mentioned to me many times by different guests. I've, to an extent, dismissed it, but maybe I shouldn't dismiss it as much. Look. Let let me ask you another question.
That's one I'm struggling to understand is The UAE. So I understood the strategy of striking the Gulf. And whenever someone's up and out, look at Iran striking the Gulf, Look. Look. I'm not justifying it, but, you know, asymmetric warfare, that's how it works.
You've got the world's biggest military pummeling Iran, killing their leader with his family. How do you expect them to respond? And they've made that threat clear before the war. But then now they're responding solely at The UAE, and that was a bit of a surprise to me. So when Operation Freedom happened, they struck a few vessels, and then they struck Fujairah.
What is it between and I've seen also the the some of your statements as well. What is it between Iran and The UAE? And is it true to claim, but on the Iranian side that The UAE bombed one of the islands that had a refinery there and with their mix. You that would you genuinely I'd be shocked if this is true because that makes no sense to me. Do you really think The UAE did attack?
Because from what I understand before the war, professor, is Iran and The UAE had a a cordial relationship, did a lot of business together. Now I understand The UAE is really upset. They were attacked more than any other any other country. Understandable. I understand Iran's upset because they were pummeled and they were bases American bases across The Gulf, But I'm trying to figure out if there's more to it between The UAE and Iran that I don't understand.
Speaker 1: Well, as you know, though, I I've been saying this for a decade. And the first time I said this, recall it going viral was about ten years ago. And that's when I don't know. But years ago, a few years before corona, and I said that if The United States wages war against Iran, that that what we are seeing today in the Persian Gulf, that would happen. And it went viral, and some of my friends in the in countries in the Persian Gulf contacted me and said, why did you say this?
And I said, because if if they launch an a wager war from your territory, you are part of that war. You cannot pretend to be, neutral when we're being killed from your territory. And I've been saying this for many years, and there'll be and some people say, why do you say this? Why are you a warmonger? And I say, I don't say this because I'm a warmonger.
I'm saying this so that people would understand and not wage war. So if these five countries and Jordan, of course, but forget that Jordan is a different case. If these five countries had told the Americans, you cannot use our air or our sea or our land, to attack Iran, there would be no war. If they can gather together today and told the Americans, you cannot use our territory against Iran, that would resolve many of the issues, and there would not be another war. Because logistically speaking, without these countries, Americans cannot wage war against Iran.
They can carry out airstrikes, but they can't wage war. These countries, their their territory is key. But in this war, The Emirates played a special role. They have they had a particularly close relationship both with Israelis and the Americans, and they were pushing for the conflict. And, also, yes, the Iranians, the Iranians have, seen Mirage jets during the thirty nine day war, the last day, bomb Iranian targets.
The Americans don't have Miraj jets, and the the belief is that it was the the Miraj
Speaker 0: You think it was personal opinion, professor, you think they did, if I ask you personally, not the the the Iranian authorities?
Speaker 1: Yeah. I I think they did. I I think that the Mohammed bin Zayed has very horrible advisers, and I think that his, you know, his clinging to the Israeli regime is only pushing the the his country towards destruction, and it's not just Iran. I mean, even we you know as well as I, and I don't want to get you into trouble. But you know
Speaker 0: as well Speak openly. You can speak openly.
Speaker 1: Yeah. The UAE has has significant problems with the other countries in the in the Persian Gulf.
Speaker 0: You're talking about Saudi?
Speaker 1: Yeah. Saudi Arabia first and foremost, but not just this only the Saudis. But The UAE, their policies across the region in the Horn Of Africa, in Northern Africa, in the Arabian Peninsula are all in line with the interest of the Israeli regime. Mossad has a foothold in The Emirates. Israeli soldiers are in The Emirates, and the Israelis travel back and forth all the time, and they are working against Iran in The Emirates.
We know that other countries in the Persian Gulf have relations with the Israelis. We know that the and the the especially Bahrainis. And and the Bahrainis. But the degree to which The UAE is pushing this relationship is is is at another level.
Speaker 0: I think if first, if The UAE diversify so I I had the the adviser to the president, I think, a former adviser on the show, and and we had that discussion to understand his perspective. And I asked him about he put out a poll saying America should pull their bases out of The UAE, and I asked him about that. He said, no. The UAE is doubling
Speaker 1: Who who which one?
Speaker 0: I'll have to I'll I'll let you know after because I'll have to find his name. It was about two weeks ago.
Speaker 1: Abdul Abdul Khalid Abdullah?
Speaker 0: It could be.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. We know each other quite yeah. We know
Speaker 0: each Okay. Yeah. So I had the discussion with him because my position, to be clear, is I understand if The UAE needs to diversify security, and they've got a defense systems from South Korea. Israel put the the the the Iron Dome here in The UAE. They've doubled down on American relations.
That's fine. They have to have deterrence against Iranian aggression, but at the same time, they have to have cordial relations with Iran. And I think any move that involves aggression against Iran, in my humble opinion, is a bad idea for any golf country. Now I spoke to him, and and he told me, Mario, there is diversification. He did not encourage any aggression towards Iran.
But what what he's upset about is he's like, Mario, in this war, The UAE got attacked significantly more than all other Gulf countries. He asked me why. Like, he asked that because I wanted to get the answer from him. He said, Mario, I don't know why. Is it is you know, the alliance with Israel?
Will other Gulf countries, as you said, are allied with Israel? Is it the the American bases in the country? Will America has bigger bases than other Gulf countries? So why did Iran target The UAE? And my conclusion from, especially, the last few days is, strategically, it makes sense.
Not saying it's right or wrong. Strategically, The UAE is easy to target to cause significant impact to the global economy. It's the hub of the global, you know, the global financial center, and it's a close ally to The US and Israel, and it doesn't doesn't have the same capabilities as Saudi to retaliate. So putting all these and it's a lot more vulnerable to security, 90% expats. So my conclusion is a lot of people say it's personal.
I think it's strategic rather than personal.
Speaker 1: It's definitely not personal. Let I mean, let's go over history just briefly. Three wars have been waged against Iran in the last forty seven years. We have not waged any war against any country. In 1980, at the at the with the encouragement of The United States in the West and the support of the Soviet Union, but with the encouragement of the West, Saddam Hussein invaded our country.
These countries gave Saddam Hussein hundreds of billions of dollars. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Europe these countries changed their policy. They wanted better relations, and Iran improved its relations with them. And we saw the Saudi count crown prince at that time, crown prince Abdullah, come to Iran and, meet the president at that time and miss I mister Rafsanjani and Ayatollah, excuse me, Ayatollah Khamenei, and we had rapprochement. Then again, we had, of course, in in the twelve day war, these countries, their bases were being used against us.
And, all the bases in the region were being used against us. And, again, we we did not strike any of them. In Syria and Iraq, they were funding ISIS and Al Qaeda. It was it was Qatar. It was initially Saudi Arabian Qatar, then later mostly Qatar, but all of them were involved.
And, and and then this 39 where where they all were complicit in this act of aggression. So there was never any Iranian aggression against any of these countries, and yet the Emiratis and all of them chose to increasingly take a hostile stance and to and in the case of The Emirates, were pushing for The United States to attack Iran. But that aside, it wasn't only them that the Iranians struck. I mean, the Iranians in in one blow to the the Qatar, they created huge a huge setback to their gas program as a result of the strike on the Iranian South Parris field. And we and remember, we didn't start this war, and we did not escalate at any point.
We only reacted to escalation. At all times, it was always a reaction. We never initiated the cut. But the Emirates is is really pushing it too far too far, and this is not what The Emirates was like before. Ever since Mohammed bin Zayed came to power, it's been like this.
Otherwise, if you look in the nineteen eighties and the nineteen nineties, of all the countries in the Persian Gulf, our best relations were with The Emirates.
Speaker 0: But now happen could that happen again? Could that be mended again after this war? I think it should. Do you think it can be?
Speaker 1: Of course, it can. I mean, look at eight years of war with Saddam Hussein. They gave him hundreds of billions of dollars. The West gave him chemical weapons, and these countries helped him with their money to use chemical weapons to to to expand the chemical weapons project. I survived two chemical attacks personally, mustard gas and a nerve a nerve agent.
Yes. Of course. But the but but if they're going to engage in another because right now, The United States is on is is very close to waging war against us. They think that we don't know, but we know.
Speaker 0: I mean, that's the issue. That's crazy
Speaker 1: for everything is in place right now. They put in a lot of money. It's much more than $25,000,000,000 So, of course, the the cost of the global economy and The US economy is already in the trillions with what they've done to to the to the global energy and petrochemical needs and so on. But the the military cost is you can be sure, direct and indirect, it's well over a $100,000,000,000 already. But you don't put in so many.
You don't invest so much just to, I don't know, just to to to bluff. And and I think if there's going to be an attack, it should be sooner rather than later because I told you the the element of Yeah. The weather and so on. I hope there's no war. I hate war, and I survived war.
And during the thirty nine day war, I was as you may have known, and I continue to have a bounty on my head. So I You have a bounty on your heads? Yes. No. Yeah.
I mean Since when? Twitter Twitter allowed a a known account, a blue tick account, to advertise and and to fundraise a million dollars to have me kidnapped. And they refused to remove the tweet or close the account.
Speaker 0: Do mind do you mind if I ask you who what the account it is? I can break that out.
Speaker 1: That was a big no. You can find it.
Speaker 0: It's not a small one. I'll put it. They're very sorry. They've raised money they've raised money.
Speaker 1: So Yes. Yes. Yes. And, and this account apparently and there was an article by, I think, a Norwegian newspaper which went and tried to figure out who these I tweeted all of this, and a lot of people protested to Twitter. Why don't you remove this?
They didn't do it. The point is that I, during the war, I lived in isolation. I I tried to stay away from other people so that no one would get harmed in case I was targeted. But, so, you know, it's not as if I I don't comprehend what war is all about. I was in the city of Tehran throughout.
But if there is war, the Americans will fail. They will not succeed. It will only make things worse because the Iranians will demand more compensation, and it will only destroy more infrastructure, for oil and petrochemicals and and LNG. And what in my opinion, even if right now we have a if there's peace right now and it's over, Trump suddenly, has a heart attack and Vance takes over and Vance says, okay. We're withdrawing troops.
We're going to have, I think, a a bad global recession. But if this continues much longer as it is, it's going to be a depression. But if we have war, then I think it's going to be a very deep depression worse than what happened in the 1930.
Speaker 0: I by the way, I've first, I found the account. I just unfollowed it since I was following it. It's some unknown account. Or something. I found it.
I found it. But good news is that that
Speaker 1: post has been deleted, which is
Speaker 0: a good piece of news unless Well Grock is standing with the wrong
Speaker 1: after weeks and after a lot of pressure, but Twitter did not remove it.
Speaker 0: They were more Yeah. Last last question for you, professor, is on the negotiations. So this is more, again, a personal question to you rather than than a policy or what the negotiators should do. You know, was just speaking to to Alan Air Air on the show just about half an hour an hour ago. He's he's a regular on the show, and we concluded that the the big sticking point would be the, obviously, the new enriched uranium, the nuclear program.
And for Iran to give that up and maybe some flexibility on the control of the Shadow Home was maybe limited in terms of time period. But for that to happen, there has to be significant concessions on the American side when it comes to sanctions and the unfreezing of assets, which Alan said that he doesn't think that will happen, which is upsetting because it seems like a logical deal for me. If hypothetically, The U. S. Lifts the sanctions or most of the sanctions and unfreezes the assets, do you think Iran should personal opinion, do you think Iran should give up their enriched uranium, their nuclear program?
So let's say limit enrichment to 3.6%, maybe freeze it for five, ten years to give Trump a win, and limit the period in which they control the Strait Of Hormuz. They charge a a fee at the Strait Of Hormuz. You think that sounds like a feasible deal?
Speaker 1: No. I I think that the control over the Strait Of Hormoz should be permanent. We cannot have the Strait Of Hormoz in future ever again to become a foothold for someone to wage war against us. And, for security issues, if that's you know, we we cannot have this war again. Never again.
Never. They tried to wipe us out. On day one, they wiped out 168 children. It was an intentional attack. And the American school you think the school wouldn't
Speaker 0: the school wouldn't be intentional. It's a horrible mistake. You think No.
Speaker 1: No. No. It was definitely intentional. There's
Speaker 0: no doubt. No sense to strike school with kids.
Speaker 1: Oh, they
Speaker 0: have seen class. Definitely.
Speaker 1: The Epstein class does a lot of things with kids, but I've been in war and I've been in operations. The first day of any major operation, all the targets are very well wedded.
Speaker 0: The mistakes so happen, professor.
Speaker 1: Any operation, they're very when I was when I would be in an operation, we knew exactly what was where and, you know, who was there, and it was clear as day. On day 10, day 15, yes, things change because things move around. Many targets are gone. They're looking for new targets. There may be a mistake.
They may think that something is there and it's something else, but not on day one. Not on one.
Speaker 0: Mistake still happen. Maybe they're less likely, but they still do happen even on
Speaker 1: day one. Months. That school was on every map. It was on every app, Iranian and America. They had weeks, if not months.
They and the problem was that many of the children at that school were the children of officers, and they wanted to teach those officers a lesson. Hell, that's a they bombed hospitals. They bombed gymnasiums. They bombed other schools. They bombed department blocks.
They would wait, the Americans and Israelis, for scientists, academics, and universities to go home because they knew where their families were and to visit their wife and kids and then bomb the entire building. That's what the Americans and Israelis were doing. That's what they do all the time in Gaza. That's what they do all the time in Lebanon. The western media will say these are Hezbollah strongholds or these are Hezbollah targets.
We know what
Speaker 0: Oh, Israel. Yeah. Is what Israel's done is doing in South Lebanon. They've changed strategy in Lebanon three weeks ago from before it was targeted towards Hezbollah three weeks ago, four weeks ago during the war, they started leveling villages. That kinda flipped.
I think we had the debate in the EU once about Hezbollah, Dersamming Hezbollah. But what Israel, this policy in Lebanon now is is an excuse. What about
Speaker 1: doing Iran was was basically to wipe out families and neighbors so that they can get a professor at a university who was teaching AI or a professor at a university who taught physics. That that's what that's what they were doing. So, you know, I have I'm not at all surprised that they would do such a thing. They do it all the time. They've been funding the genocide in Gaza for for two and a half years.
However, with regards to the nuclear program, we already had a nuclear deal, and Trump tore it up. I don't agree because you asked my opinion. I don't agree that Iran should give up the straight of hormones. I think that Iran should have control from now on. That's their problem.
They started the war, and that's the result. Permanently, yes. The second thing with regards to the nuclear program, I don't believe Iran should give any of its nuclear material to any foreign country, but a deal can be done where, the if there are real concerns about Iran's nuclear program, that can be easily dealt through super through the international, the IAA, the IAA. Atomic Energy. Yes.
That's easy to do. But, Mario, go back to Joe Kent. The issue not now, not five years ago, was never about animal rights, human rights, global warming, the nuclear program, terrorism. It is all about and has always been about Iran's support for the Palestinian people and its opposition to their extermination. And the West supports the extermination of the Palestinian.
That's as that's exactly what it is. And the the and here, when you a few few months ago, when you were making comments about the, the events in in Iran, the the the protests and then the riots and then the armed insurrection, which were very inaccurate, those though that that armed insurrection was carried out for this war for this war. That's what it was all about. They brought in the weapons. They manipulated the currency market, as The US secretary of treasury himself admitted, so that people would come to the streets.
Limited people came to the streets. They were in they were for two days. No arrests. No harassment. The government said, you are right.
We have to do something about the currency. You have the right to you and then from day three, then you had these organized groups of people coming in, destroying buildings, burning down banks, destroying ambulances, mosques, public vehicles. And then you had armed insurrection where they murdered hundreds of police officers, and a couple of thousand people on the streets were murdered because in the crossfire, and they were trying to kill more people. Why did this happen? Because Mossad and their allies wanted to con to say, to legitimize war against Iran.
And that's the same argument that Trump uses today. He uses two arguments. One is that they killed 40 some thousand people, which is a, you know, nonsense. They're the Iranians named every single person. Their ID numbers, 3117, including hundreds of officers.
The second that Iran wants to make a nuclear weapon, well, we know that Joe Kent said Iran is not making it. We know that Tulsi Gabbard under oath said Iran is not making it. We know that the CIA has been saying it for decades. They admit that since 2003, Iran wasn't making it, even though even before then Iran wasn't doing it. And the IAEA has never produced any, evidence.
So the nuclear weapon is an excuse so that The United States can pursue policies that Netanyahu and the likes of Netanyahu want. Netanyahu, since 1992, has been saying that Iran is weeks away, months away, or a year or two away from nuclear weapons. That nuclear weapon is just an excuse in order to impose sanctions on Iran, to support terrorists inside Iran, and to wage war against Iraq. It's actually Otherwise, Iran Iran pursues a nuclear program because it is it is its sovereign right. Iran after the revolution, the revolution was about independence.
It was about no it was about making decisions in Tehran, not in Washington or elsewhere. Yeah.
Speaker 0: This is
Speaker 1: something that Americans are going to have to come to train terms with.
Speaker 0: If if, Netanyahu is right, professor, you guys are really bad at building a nuclear weapon. Since 1992, you still don't have it. It's very disappointing. Very bad scientists. You you you brought up a lot of points.
I think it's it's good to I know you you're out of time. It's good to discuss those later on because there's so much to it. But, professor, hopefully, we you're wrong. Hopefully, that that they I don't a deal somehow. But last time I said that, you know, you turned out to be right.
I turned out to be wrong. So I won't dismiss it this time around like I did last time and not take it seriously. But I'd be very, very surprised. I'd question a lot of things I thought I knew about US foreign policy if we're back into a full blown war. But I also see the demands, like you just said, the demands on the Iranian side are pretty I find them to be pretty maximalist if the demands they're putting out in public are the actual demands and not a negotiating position.
They see the strength. I think they are like, they should they should limit the time for their fee for the straight of Homuz. Putting it making it permanent just, you know, allowing it sets a precedent for so many other countries in their straits. That's the tricky part.
Speaker 1: Well, in any case, the the point is control is one thing, fees are another. Oh. And, I that, I I don't know. Maybe fees would go up or down, but the point is that Iran no longer wants The United States to or any country to use the Persian Gulf as a foothold, as a as a place to launch attacks on our country. We have not
Speaker 0: That's the second, sir.
Speaker 1: You know, Iran, for the last three hundred years, has not waged war against a foreign country. It goes well before the revolution. It goes well before the Halaabi regime and before it, and it goes before the Dynasty before them. For three hundred years, Iran hasn't waged war against a neighboring country.
Speaker 0: Professor, pleasure to have you back on the show. Thank you for your time.
Speaker 1: Thank you for having me.
reSee.it AI Summary
I see the era of Western dominance giving way as the Gulf’s security framework is rewritten. The shift to China is undeniable, with debt moving from dollars to yuan. U.S. air defenses fail Gulf allies, while Saudi and Qatar tilt toward BRICS via Russia/China. U.S. weapons rely on Chinese rare earths, and Gulf states sell Treasuries, buy gold. The strategy: control Hormuz; logistics falter; a naval blockade seems irrelevant. Trump’s Beijing reception may be frostier.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇷🇺🇨🇳 The era of Western financial and military dominance is facing a massive reality check as the Gulf’s entire “security architecture” gets rewritten. Fmr. CIA analyst Larry Johnson says the global power shift toward China is now undeniable, with countries moving debt from U.S. dollars to Chinese yuan as a cheaper and more efficient alternative. The much hyped U.S. air defense systems failed to protect Gulf allies from Iranian strikes, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar are reportedly drifting toward the Russian Chinese sphere through BRICS. Johnson says the U.S. is burning through weapons at record speed while relying on rare earth minerals controlled by China to replace them. “You’re being fed a buffet of lies and stupidity while the world has already changed.” @newsonof 00:00:00 — Strategic goal of the war: Weakening China through control of the Strait of Hormuz 00:04:15 — The shift from Western and Japanese banking dominance to Chinese global leadership 00:09:02 — Economic blowback: Why Gulf states are selling US Treasuries and buying gold 00:13:45 — Logistics of a ground war: Why the US lacks the 1.5 million troops needed for Iran 00:18:20 — The water crisis: The extreme difficulty of sustaining troops in 120-degree heat 00:23:10 — Broken promises: How US air defense failures shifted Gulf loyalties toward Russia 00:28:30 — The "Munitions Trap": Why US weapons production depends on Chinese rare earths 00:33:15 — Why a naval blockade is irrelevant due to Iran’s 6 open land routes to Asia 00:37:45 — The Ending: Why Trump will face a "frosty" reception in Beijing and the limits of US sanctions
Video Transcript AI Summary
- The discussion opens with trying to map a post-war world, considering both a quick end to the war and a prolonged one, with a focus on US–China relations, US allies, Iran, and the broader region. A participant notes a broader battle between a China–Russia–Iran alignment and the Western alliance, including financial systems.
- A major regional shift is already underway: by 2000, the top banks were dominated by Japanese and European players; by 2025, China dominates the top four banks. The speaker argues that power is moving from Western banks to China, and that countries with US-dollar-denominated debt are converting debt into renminbi because it’s cheaper.
- In the last week, Russia and China signaled to Iran a push to revisit the Gulf security architecture. Putin spoke to Iraq about Gulf security; Wang Yi did the same. The implied shift is toward a Gulf security framework less dependent on US protection.
- The current Gulf security model is described as US bases guaranteeing protection from Iran, coupled with a demand that recipient states buy US Treasuries and military equipment. The speakers argue this model left Gulf states vulnerable and exposed as US defense systems failed to prevent Iranian attacks in the recent episode.
- Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and to a lesser extent the UAE) are discussed as potentially moving away from the United States toward Russia and China. A Pakistani ISI general reportedly said Saudi and Qatari leaders are breaking from the US; one NBC report cited Trump canceling Project Freedom due to Saudi resistance to air operations from Prince Saud Air Base. The implication is a Persian Gulf broadly shifting into the Russian–Chinese sphere, potentially altering Gulf financial flows away from the US dollar toward gold and the yuan.
- An opposing view, aired by another economist, suggests the US will strengthen its deterrence in the Gulf, with UAE as an indicator. The counterpoint argues that the Gulf countries previously supported Iran’s adversaries, including indirect funding for attacks on Iran, implying US deterrence remains necessary.
- The conversation emphasizes the gulf’s deterrence history: Iran has largely avoided offensive military action in the Gulf against the region, while Gulf states have relied on US protection. The lack of a robust Chinese or Russian security guarantee in the region is highlighted as a real risk to Gulf security calculations.
- There is a debate about whether US military power remains credible. One participant argues the US has not won a major war since World War II, with recent actions described as limited or draw outcomes; another contends that US protection remains essential despite past failures, given Iran’s capabilities and history.
- Military-strategy discussions cover the feasibility of a ground invasion vs. airstrike-only approaches. The speakers outline logistical challenges (water, supply lines, mountainous terrain) and the scale of forces needed (potentially large, multi-month training and buildup) to degrade Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Arguments are made that holding the Strait of Hormuz would be difficult if Iran can still launch missiles and drones from interior positions.
- The strategic importance of Gulf exports is quantified: Gulf oil about 32% of world supply; LNG around 20% (centered on Qatar and the Gulf), urea and sulfur for agriculture and industry (urea ~36%; sulfur for refining and semiconductors), and helium from Qatar at about 33%. Keeping the Gulf open is framed as essential to global energy, inflation, and agriculture.
- A possible pathway to open the Hormuz is proposed: Iran could offer broad access to global markets except for countries allied with Israel or those that attacked Iran; Iran would leverage this to restart global flows, particularly to Asia. The idea is that a near-term crisis could force a negotiated settlement with Iran.
- The timeline mentions a forthcoming peace negotiation in Beijing next week, with skepticism about it proceeding smoothly. If negotiations occur, Trump would not likely receive a warm reception due to recent sanctions and US actions against China; China has signaled resolve against US sanctions, instructing its companies not to acquiesce to pressure.
- Overall, the dialogue frames the war as a potential catalyst for a broader realignment: power shifting toward China and Russia, a Gulf region hedging its security through new alliances, and the global economy recalibrating around yuan- and gold-based financial flows, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining a central strategic chokepoint.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I wanna start trying to understand how the world's gonna look like following this war. And I was speaking to an economist or two economists today to try to understand this and, you know, the impact this will have on on US China relations, US allies relations, Iran, and the and the region as well. I had a guest tell me about the kind of the battle between the the the China, Russia, and now Iran, alliance and then the Western alliance as well and the various financial systems. So I'm like, I I I'd love to you know, I pinged you. I'm like, look.
Let's let's jump on a Sure. On a recording and and get your thoughts on how that world will look like, assuming that we don't see a six month war, that we see an end to the war in the next few weeks.
Speaker 1: Okay. Unlikely, but okay. We'll go
Speaker 0: with that. We can look at both we can look at both scenarios, what the world will look like if the war ends now and then if we do see a prolonged war. Right. Which, by the way, Morandi said, unfortunately, he agrees with you, that he does he's he thinks that it's a very high likelihood we'll see a continuation of the war, especially considering the military buildup.
Speaker 1: Right.
Speaker 0: So yeah. But, yeah, that's my question to you, Larry. How's let's start with the region. How do you think the region would look like?
Speaker 1: Well, there is a major change underway that is not readily apparent. And and let me highlight it by giving you the statistic. You know, we we did this I don't know if we did this before or not. In in 2000, the top 10 banks
Speaker 0: Yeah. We did this. Yeah.
Speaker 1: We did so the top five of the top 10 were Japanese. The number one bank was German. Number two bank was BNP, Paris. US, I think, had one, maybe two in in there. But you jump to twenty twenty five, and it's China.
China is the top four. So the notion that The US know, there have been these people out claiming, oh, city of London and the Rothschilds and this European banks, they're controlling everything. Nonsense. It's crap. The the power is shifting to China.
China's got the it is the number one industrial company country, and now it is its banks are dominating. And we'll continue to do so because what it's what it's in the process of doing are taking those countries that have debt in US dollars, and they're switching that debt over into Chinese yuan, renminbi, it actually ends up being cheaper for those countries. So we'll put that as a backdrop. In the last week, since a week ago, Monday, we've heard the Russians and the Chinese say the same thing to Iran, and it is we've got to revisit the security architecture in The Gulf. Putin said it to Iraqi, and, Wang Yi said it to Iraqi.
Think that's a coincidence? I don't. That shows a coordination between them. So okay. What when we're talking security architecture, what are we talking about?
Well, the existing structure in The Gulf has been basically, The United States is gonna come in and establish military bases in your country. We're gonna protect you from those nasty Iranians. And while we're there, buy buy some treasury bills. Buy, you know, buy, like, you know, a couple 100,000,000,000 treasury bills. And gotta buy our military equipment too.
Because if you want our, you know, want our assistance here, you gotta buy our equipment. So, basically, The United States is like a drug pusher. Got all these countries hooked on its particular system. And they and and they made the bet. They said, John, you know, you're gonna protect us.
The United States is gonna protect us. Well, it turns out we're not a very good protector because every one of those countries just got the hell bombed out of them and mistled out of them by by Iran. And the highly touted, very expensive, air defense systems that these countries bought then installed that The US promised would work like a charm didn't work. They failed. So now what's happening is China and Russia are they're they're they're I am convinced they are working behind the scenes.
They're working with Saudi Arabia. They're working with Qatar. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are the two key countries within the Persian Gulf. Qatar, while it's small in size, big, big impact in terms of its product its role in the production of helium, its role in the production of LNG, its role in the production of urea and sulfur. So it is in some aspects, it's more importantly economically than Saudi Arabia, even though Saudi's out outproduces them.
The I heard today from another from a friend who was he's friends with a general in Pakistan's intelligence service, ISI. It's a very senior general. What the general told him is that, the Saudis and the Qataris are going to be breaking away from The United States. That's already baked in. And we got maybe a hint of that yesterday when, it was announced on NBC News that that one of the reasons that Trump canceled project freedom was because the Saudis wouldn't let him fly out of Prince Saud Air Base.
And I confirmed that that was absolutely true from a from a US military source. So the yeah. They they admit, yeah, this has been a problem all all day for us, this person commented. So where we're headed is a Persian Gulf that's gonna basically be devoid of US influence or dramatically reduced. We'll see if, United Arab Emirates survives.
And if so, it will still be in the pocket or the, the hands of The United States. But I I think the rest, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, they're they're gonna be moving into the Russian Chinese sphere. And now this leaves this means that Iran at the same time will now be a major power, in in the region by virtue of controlling the Strait Of Hormuz. And, it's it's not going to relinquish that no matter what The US says and wants to do. So, I I I think we're we're we're where this is headed will be the ascendancy of Russia and China through BRICS and India to a lesser extent that is going to shift the financial investment that The Gulf has traditionally had in the US dollar.
He's gonna shift it into gold and the Chinese yuan.
Speaker 0: So this is this is a really interesting conversation that I've been having. So I spoke to Praveen who former officer in the in the Indian army. He's got a great show. He's an analyst as well. He's been on the show a few times.
You might know him. Great guy. His analysis is very similar to yours, and we are seeing that shift of power and shift of influence towards China and Russia. Then I had today an economist Jeffrey Snyder, and his argument was he thinks that the complete opposite is gonna happen. He thinks that despite the Iran war maybe not going to plan is The US is flexing its military might to expand its influence.
And The Gulf while they're Wait.
Speaker 1: Wait. Wait. Wait. Wait. Wait.
Flexing its military might, how is it doing that, my friend?
Speaker 0: So so it's, the capture of of Maduro and then the the war in Iran. So they've they've declared war in Iran. They've bombed Iran. It didn't go as planned, but they're they're leveraging their military, whether successfully or not, to be able to increase their influence. And what he said is that The UAE is an indicator of the opposite.
So I'm in the belief that the same as you, that we are seeing based on how this war is going, there will be a shift of influence further east, especially in The Gulf. They need to diversify, security as me and you have discussed. But his argument, which I found interesting, is like he's like, Mario, I think the complete opposite is gonna happen. Even though The Gulf was upset at this war, they they they have no choice but American security as deterrent against Iran. And number two is The UAE is an indicator of this as they
Speaker 1: worry Wait. Okay. Wait. Wait. Stop.
As a deterrent against Iran. Excuse me. What a load of horseshit that is. Who who back in 1980 was attacking whom? That was Saddam Hussein attacking Iran.
And who was giving Saddam money to attack Iran? That would be Saudi Arabia, that Qatar, Kuwait, and and Bahrain, and probably Oman, and probably The United Arab Emirates. All of them given money under CIA direction to attack Iran. When did Iran attack any of them?
Speaker 0: No. I I think if you look at Never.
Speaker 1: Of course. This time. Never. That's why god. This economist, what a moron.
I hope he just sticks to, you know, adding up GDP and, you know, imports, exports, but he doesn't know a goddamn thing about military matters and and and history. You know, they gotta protect him against those crafty Iranians, man. They are some vicious motherfuckers. Police. So Sorry.
So That's okay. You got you got me at the end of the day. I'm irritated. It's good.
Speaker 0: It's good. I'm glad. I haven't seen you irritated in a while. So I'm gonna press on that. So even though Iran's history Miranda told me this today as well, you know, highlighted what I what what me and you already know is that look at Iran's history, it hasn't been the aggressor.
Well, back, Mario, you've go back decades. It's always been the country that has been attacked, especially in the last couple of years.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah.
Speaker 0: So, obviously, past history does not dictate the future. So countries in The Gulf would always look at what the you know, have a future leader. They have to hedge against a future leader in Iran. They might not follow the same ideology as the as Ali Khamenei or Khamenei. So as a as a deterrent, they they opted for for now American security.
We've seen Israeli security, some South Korean security as well. And The UAE is an early indicator that we may see the West double down on American security. Now I don't think that's the case. Obviously, I entertain all IDs, but that he we might see, yeah, the West double down on that security. And he also made the argument that while China and Russia have supported Iran financially and to an extent militarily, it's very you know, their support is very different to what would ex what one would expect.
For example, if you attack an American ally like a European country, go and start bombing them, you'd expect The US to immediately come to their defense, NATO as well. Same for maybe a country like Japan, but then you get a very close ally to China and Russia that was just heavily bombed, their supreme leader killed, and China and Russia did not even intervene militarily at all. So it start it highlights to the world that maybe the US military is is overstretched, but it it's it's not a good idea to be an enemy of The US. And being an ally to China and Russia does not offer the same security as being an ally to The US. What do you think?
Speaker 1: Yeah. This that that used to be the case, no longer. You know, it's that's you know, the people who believe that are living in a fantasy world. Number one, US can't win a war. You know?
Yeah. They they they had an inside job that was put together, and I know I know two of the guys that put it together, the this whole operation that went down in in Venezuela. One of them is my former business partner. Yeah. I say former because he's we we we, you know, folded up our our consulting business, basically.
So, you you know, for Trump to take credit for that, Trump didn't have a thing to do, and that wasn't even mill that was a bought and paid for inside job. Guys who were promised $50,000,000 for turning Maduro over. So, you know, to to to use that as a lesson for, you know, US military power is just ridiculous. Other than that, you know, The United States has not won a war since the war in the Pacific and World War two. It has fought to a draw in Korea, abandoned Vietnam.
So the the notion that The United States is gonna come protect you, that look at what happened now to The Gulf. That secure old security architecture that promised Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, that they'd be safe. You just just let us put our bases there. They did. And when the shooting started, number one, we started the war without telling them we're gonna start the war.
And I'd say, hey. Guys, you may wanna hunker down because, we're gonna we're gonna start some stuff with Iran, and it might be pulled back. No. No. No.
No. They didn't tell them until, until it started, and then until Iran shut, you know, shut down the Strait Of Hormuz. Then all of a sudden, countries are very interested in what was going on. So, then The United States offers to provide protection, and yet the air defense systems don't work. The billion dollars two two set two sets of billion dollar radars were destroyed.
Not to mention, at least three or four others that were more in the round of 300 to four
Speaker 0: I have a 100 there. Point on them. I'm gonna give you a point on that, which will probably rile you up again. So I I spoke to a military analyst as well yesterday, and he's, I got his stake on the damage of the American bases. He's the first one that gave an answer.
Everyone I spoke with, generals, admirals, they were all upset. You know? They're like, Mario, that's one thing that really upset us. We didn't expect it to be to that extent. He made the argument.
So he's someone that specialized in in studying the ballistic missile of Iran and planning for attacks exactly like we saw. Mhmm. So that was his what he specialized in when he worked in the military not many years ago. He left, I think, a year ago. And his analysis is like Mario.
Yes. It is. The damage is significant, but it is expected. That's why we evacuated a lot of these bases. We knew that that damage would come.
He actually expected the damage to be worse. And he also made the he made the point that in The UAE, for example, the base, Al Darfur base in The UAE is one of the most damaged yet it was used again in project freedom. It's being used right now. There's footage of it being used. She's like, Mario, of course, we're gonna face damages.
We expected Iran to damage them. We evacuated them for that purpose. We we spent weeks before the war evacuating those bases, but the damage, you know, he said, based on my analysis, I would have expected it to be slightly worse. So that was his argument on the damage to the American bases.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, the The US isn't moving back into them or most of them. Do you think that'll happen? Oh, heavens. No.
That that that that'll be the that'll be the point. If if what this, Pakistani intelligence officer, told my friend, today is pans out, the Saudis and Qatar Qataris, they're gonna move in a different direction. Because look. Do you see them going out and buying more US treasury bills? No.
They've been selling.
Speaker 0: Japan is selling them. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Not just Japan, but Saudis
Speaker 0: The Gulf.
Speaker 1: And Qataris. The Gulf Arabs have been selling, not buying. So and they're moving into gold. You you don't do that if hey. Men, we're with The United States a 110%.
They got our back, or they're they're gonna be they're gonna be around for a while. The the one reason that Japan in 2000 had five the five of the top 10 largest banks in the world was because of its economy. And then when it got into deficit spending, it is now it's got the highest debt to GDP ratio of any country in the world, I think. And that's why there's only, like, one of those banks in the top 10. You're gonna see the same phenomena with The United States.
The the the power of its economy was not based upon what it produces. It's based upon financial, games. And and so this and it offers to, quote, militarily protect these guys. It couldn't protect them. It failed.
So, you know, what what's what what's the reason that we're gonna have this presence of America? Because the the entire reason is the Americans have sold this lie. Hey. Those Iranians, man. They're coming for you.
They are gonna get you. And yet we got forty six years. Iran, the only time Iran sent a military, force into another country was at the invitation of Bashir al Assad to deal with the, radical Sunni insurgency that had cropped up, that was basically funded by and promoted by The United States and and The UK. Other than that, Iran has stayed at home. It hasn't didn't invade into Afghanistan, didn't didn't go into Pakistan, didn't go into Turkmenistan, hasn't attacked Armenia, hasn't attacked Azerbaijan.
So, you know, we've got a track record.
Speaker 0: So I I have a counterpoint to that. So true, Iran has not attacked The Gulf. But one argument would be, yes, they did not attack The Gulf because of American deterrence. And one one person could someone could make the argument that they would have attacked The Gulf, they would have attacked The UAE, for example, if, you know, let's say they wanted to control the Strait Of Hormuz. They decided to control the Strait Of Hormuz.
The Gulf said, no. We don't wanna allow you to do that. Iran could attack militarily if there was no American bases there, and we know Iran wanted to avoid a clash with Iran. So there is an argument that that America, despite the mistake of this war, has offered deterrence and is the only option for deterrence right now as the Russian and Chinese will never put bases in the region. And there's nothing stronger than a deterrent than an American base despite what we saw now.
Speaker 1: Think about what you just said. Russia and China will never put bases in the region. Why? Because they're not a bunch of goddamn imperialists.
Speaker 0: That's a fair argument. Yes. So China's noninterventionist.
Speaker 1: No. Actually, Russia, to be fair, it has a naval base in Syria, and it has an air base. Again, both of those, though, were not at Russia's, you know, putting itself inserting itself, but at the request of the then government of Bashir al Assad. And now that al Jahlani slash Al Sharra is over, he asked the Russians, please stay. Please don't leave.
So the Russians said, okay. And they ended up protecting a large segment of the Alawit population that had gathered up up north. So but but but the point is this The United the only reason The United States sought these bases was to attack Iran. And Iran the the war that the The United States has carried out, you know, let's go back to when they, they got into, Iraq. Remember, Iraq continued to house, protect the Mujahideen al Kalk, the MEK.
And when The United States first got into Iraq in 2003, they thought, oh, man. This MEK, they're a terrorist group. We're gonna have to deal with them. And then when they found out, no. They only wanna attack Iranians.
We were like, okay. Hey, guys. Let's be friends. You know?
Speaker 0: The MEK I'm surprised the MEK as a group is still around. Yeah. There's another point that that economist has made, and that one agrees with what you've said. So he believes that the goal of the of the war is, you know, it's not because Israel said so. It's not because of the nuclear program.
He believes the real reason, similar to my belief, is that it's China. It's a way to to have more leverage over China by controlling the strata humors. Everything's about China. If you look at Venezuela, if you look at the Panama Canal, even if you look at Greenland, the terrorist strategy, everything's aimed at deterring China as a as a long term threat. And he said to me, Mario, that's the goal, the objective has not been achieved, and that's why he believes there's a high likelihood the war will continue.
And he said Trump has given up on the midterms. He's not running again anyway, and he's given up on the midterms. It's too hard to get out of the the political damage this has already caused. Yeah. So he believes they will double down until the objective is achieved or until they lose a lot more if the objective is not achieved.
But the goal is to weaken China.
Speaker 1: Yeah. The how's that working out?
Speaker 0: So far, not good. But if they succeed but if they succeed, that would be pretty detrimental for China. If they manage I don't know how. But if they manage to succeed somehow against Iran let's say they keep the blockade to suffocate the Iranian economy, The global economy takes a massive hit, obviously, but the America America is a net energy, you know, or it does import a lot of energy, but it produces a lot of energy as well. So The US can sustain a blockade of the Shreve Hormuz.
And if it
Speaker 1: Yeah. No. I would argue no. They can't. Again, The United States is weaker economically than it is widely believed.
This it it it is it's become a financialized economy. It is we the the money is made off of not by people making things, producing things like China does, like Russia does, but instead by, you know, creating an app, creating a piece of software that allows people to, you know, to do like what we're doing, chat over chat live over a video link despite being separated by, you know, 6,000, 7,000 miles. The the the vulnerability of The US economy in in terms of its it is overleveraged, and they they they keep getting the numbers like, oh, the employment's up. Okay. Let's let's see how that goes because the the number of foreclosures on automobiles, that's up.
The number of foreclosures on property, that's up. So if the economy is doing well, you'd expect people would be paying for the cars instead of having their cars repossessed. You think that people would be, you know, buying homes and making their home payments instead of having their homes foreclosed on. So those are those are just two indicators of recent that I've seen the last two days that are they've both gone up. They're they're going up, not down.
Going down is a sign of a strong economy. Going up, sign that you got problems coming.
Speaker 0: There's other indicators like, as a net exporter of oil and gas, they do benefit a lot from the closure of the Strait Of Hormuz. So in a selfish way, the global economy is suffering. Aspects of the American economy are doing well, especially, you know, the energy sector, big oil. So if Trump decides, hey. I'm gonna suffocate the global economy, make a lot of money through oil and gas, but to suffocate Iran as well even if it lasts four months, so we should be catastrophic, by the way, the closure of the Strait Of Hormuz, while bombing Iran.
And so let's say militarily, he manages to control the Strait Of Hormuz. That could be a pretty big blow for China.
Speaker 1: No. No. Because China look. There's this thing called a railroad. It goes from China to Iran.
It's wide open.
Speaker 0: A railroad? What was I've never heard of that. I know about boats and planes.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Planes, trains, and automobiles. They quote an old movie. And then the Pakistan has opened now. Yes.
I'd heard six. There's now seven land routes, transportation routes in into Iran. See, this is what's so ludicrous about this US approach. They think, okay. We're gonna quote we're gonna blockade the blockade, and so we're not gonna let anything from Iran out of the Persian Gulf.
Well, Iran, the the only main the main thing Iran's bringing out of the Persian Gulf is oil. So United States is now gonna curtail even more the supply of oil to the world. Oh, that brilliant strategy. Now then explain to me why in the first two weeks of the war, you lifted all sanctions on Iranian and Russian oil. Why?
Because you were scared to death that if the shortage took over, it would kill kill the world economy. Well, guess what? What's happening in The United States because because the price they're keeping the price of West Texas Intermediate so low, and people are paying it's like 81, $85, and somebody in Singapore was paying a $180. By god, they're buying the hell out of that rush, out of that US oil at that price because of the the spread. And so so and and so what's happening to The US supply?
The US supply is draining. We don't have a surplus, which is now, two day two days ago, price of gas, I was paying $4.00 2. Today, $4.00 8. 6¢ in three in three in two days.
Speaker 0: I heard Trump didn't it hasn't started going down yet or stabilizing?
Speaker 1: No. No. No. No. No.
No. No. The the it's going up across the country. And that's that's that's what's gonna kill Trump because people are pissed off. The the because the only reason this price of the price of gasoline continues to climb is because of this war with, this attack on Iran.
Speaker 0: I'm just thinking if there's how how how a military win can be achieved. It
Speaker 1: can't work. It can't. It can't.
Speaker 0: I think it I would argue it can, but at what cost? Like, it'd have to deplete munitions pretty much to the max, hurt the economy pretty significantly, damage the American bases further, damage the Gulf significantly further.
Speaker 1: Okay. Walk walk me through the mill walk me through a military plan for victory. Are you gonna can't. Are you gonna use ground troops? Because the first if you're gonna Let's If you're gonna use ground troops, then you gotta calculate how many do you need because Iran's got a roughly a million man army.
Speaker 0: Limited. Let's say let's say limited one at the at the islands, at the initial plan, the Kashm Island.
Speaker 1: And the
Speaker 0: small ones, the Tunubes.
Speaker 1: Okay. So you land on the Kashm Islands. How do you and the troops you get it's temperature's gonna be a 120 degrees, so you're gonna need, probably eight liters of water per soldier because you can't be guaranteed that the water supply on that island's any good. So, let's say, eight liters a day per soldier and you got 2,000 soldiers, start doing the math. How are you gonna get how are you gonna haul that much water?
That's per day. Okay? So you gotta haul that much water every day. Logistics. Yeah.
The logistics. That's the thing that people don't get is the logistics. And where where's the cover? Where is the protection? They don't they haven't built bunkers and underground shelters.
Speaker 0: The objective would be to would be to to drop enough ordinance. Again, that would deplete munitions to the max. I think it's a terrible idea. So I'm just again, I'm I'm gonna straw manning the the the discussion. The so dropping enough ordinance to to destroy Iran's capability of being able to fire the troops.
Now, obviously, the Wall Street Journal report the Washington Post report says all these munitions have only destroyed 30% of their missiles and missile launchers, which makes it, you know, pretty hard to destroy a 100% of them or at least close to a
Speaker 1: 100%. They're gonna be they're gonna be firing drones, one way drones, suicide drones. They'll be firing short range ballistic missiles and even interrain intermediate range ballistic missiles. So Iran can be firing from this you know, 500 miles away, and we we can't stop that. So that that's why those soldiers are gonna be completely exposed.
So and they hold the island for what's what is the military objective in holding that island? What Offering
Speaker 0: a security umbrella for the ships going through the Strait Of Hormuz, which is essentially offers control of the Straits to The US. Yeah. Yeah. Putting a few batteries air defense batteries on there.
Speaker 1: Yeah. That doesn't but that doesn't make those ships secure until until you take out every every ability the Iranian's ability to launch a drone and to launch a short range ballistic missile and launch, intermediate range ballistic ballistic missiles, the Strait's never gonna be secure. They can be hit. As long as they can be hit, the insurance company's gonna say, we're not insuring that. You can't guarantee us that this ship's not gonna get hit with a missile.
And so Yeah. I found out. Gets back to the military objective. So if you wanna take those missiles out, great. You're gonna have to land troops in Iran and then have them take an area, you know, say, 500 miles long or wide and then penetrate two to 300 miles interior to find every launching spot, every underground city, and destroy them.
Now doing that, the the if you've looked at the maps or the, photographs of that coast, it's mountains. So try trying to fight through mountains when the defending forces they've got the they always have the advantage, and you need a three to one. So you come back and say, okay. Well, the Iranians have, let's let's just say, instead of a million, let's just say they had 500,000 guys committed to this. Well, if you got a three to four to one, you're gonna need 1,500,000 soldiers.
Right? What does The United States have right now? We have 470. So, we're gonna have to take time to train at least, and that's that's everything in the world from, you know, Asia Pacific around the world. So if you're gonna come up with a spare 1,500,000 man army, and and figuring the the average, you know, basic training takes thirteen weeks, and then advanced individual training takes about forty weeks.
That's that's where you go to learn how to how to either run a radio that could be a communicator, how to fire a mortar, how to drive a tank, how to shoot artillery, you know, or how to, you know, how to handle a rifle. So, you know, you get in to learn your skills that are gonna be applied in the battlefield. So at a minimum, you're looking at a year to try to round up the size force. And then where do you where do you deploy them before they can be launched into Iran?
Speaker 0: Let's put the troops out of it then. What if we what if The US doesn't worry about the Gulf countries getting hit, doesn't worry about their bases getting destroyed, and just keeps pummeling Iran from the air. Iran can't strike The US Mainland. They haven't been able to destroy any warship. So if Iran keeps pummeling them through for just with their fighter jets and their missiles, that will be their strategy and just keep doing it until they keep a blockade going while you they strike them.
They strike their energy infrastructure. So if The US just want if The US decides, you know what? We don't care about our Gulf allies anymore. And, obviously, our US bases are already destroyed. We're gonna strike the energy infrastructure and keep striking their infrastructure, which they haven't crossed that line where they, you know, fully carpet bomb their infrastructure.
I'm saying these are horrible IDs, by the way, I don't think they'll do them. I think they're terrible, but I'm just looking at various scenarios. Knowing that Iran cannot strike The US Mainland and cannot sink an aircraft carrier, potentially, obviously, there's a
Speaker 1: It can sink an air it can sink an aircraft carrier, but it's it it would be difficult to do. But, your assumption is United States has unlimited missiles and bombs to drop.
Speaker 0: This is a big problem, of course. Yeah. They already they'll be gone before.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yes. They'll they sold the depleted. So in the process remember, you're talking earlier. Why are they doing this?
To weaken China. And so what they're gonna do, if you follow this strategy, they're gonna completely deplete all all of The US weapons that United States might use against China so we have absolutely nothing to fight China.
Speaker 0: It's catastrophe. Then buy they buy rare earth from China to produce more of them to to replenish the the munitions. Yeah.
Speaker 1: I could see, Trump. Yeah. We we need to here's our shopping list, Shi, of all these rare earth minerals we need, you know, because we gotta rebuild these weapons that we're gonna come kick your ass with. And I'm sure she will go, oh, that's so good. Yeah.
Let me let let let's get those to you right away. Yeah. Please. Yeah. See, this is this is why there there is not a military solution.
If the if the what is the object? The objective is get the Strait Of Hormuz open so that normal commerce goes so that I ran the numbers. You'd be a little you may be surprised at some of these numbers. But let's see here. Where oh, there it is.
So, the the number for oil from The Gulf is 32%, not 22%. The LNG, 20%, and that comes mainly from gutter. So gutter is about 20% of the the world's LNG supply. Urea, critical for agriculture, 36%.
Speaker 0: That's for the fertilizers. Yeah?
Speaker 1: Yeah. As is sulfur. Sulfur as well is used with the urea to both produce what they call phosphate fertilizer as well as the the the sulfur and sulfuric acid is used for metal metal ore processing. It's also used for petroleum refining and for cleaning semiconductor wafers. So, you know, when you go through and then helium, here's the big one.
That's Qatar, 33%. Now so when you've got all of this, you know, significant commodities that are essential to industrial processes and you wanna get those back flowing into the world to, you know, stop having a recession, to stop fueling inflation, then, okay, how do we get that go how do we get the gulf open? And Iran says, hey. We're ready to open it. We're gonna open it to everybody except those who are sending stuff to Israel.
They don't get to use it. And those who supported the attack on us, they're gonna have to pay. They're gonna have to pay reparations. But other than that, everybody else can use it. And that means oil for China or for Japan, for Philippines, for Indonesia, for Malaysia, for Vietnam, for Cambodia.
The the Russians say screw those other people. They wanna take care of themselves. But there is there is a critical crisis that is going to hit within the next week or two that will necessitate it's gonna really put the pressure on The United States that you can't win this militarily. You're gonna have to negotiate a deal Yeah. With with Iran.
Yeah. I made
Speaker 0: a post. I don't know if I posted it yet. I made a post saying the the peace negotiations for Iran haven't really started yet. They'll start next week in in Beijing. So there's a point I was making that I think she and Trump would be making a lot of decisions on what happens next.
Well, that kinda leads to my my final question. What what do you expect to happen next week?
Speaker 1: I'm actually skeptical that it will come off. But if it does come off, Trump is not gonna get a warm reception. He's gonna get a frosty reception because, you know, he's he's taken actions just in the last couple of days against China, trying to, punish China, trying to continue to sanction China and companies. And remember, the the Chinese earlier this this week were adamant about telling their companies that were being threatened with US sanctions. Don't pay it.
We're not we're we're not gonna accept any more US sanctions. We're done with them. And so that, you know, that's that's a pretty strong position.
reSee.it AI Summary
I report that Copenhagen's Green-led council is limiting elderly care residents to 80 g of beef a week for climate reasons—about 11.4 g a day, less than a taco. A Green rep says the elderly “have been the biggest climate sinners.” Critics warn of undernutrition in a vulnerable group, while the council says it’s flexible.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇩🇰 Copenhagen's Green-led council is limiting elderly care residents to 80 grams of beef per week for climate reasons. That works out to 11.4 grams a day, which is less meat than most people put in a single taco. A Green party rep explained the logic: the elderly "have been the biggest climate sinners throughout their lives." So the plan is apparently to make them atone for it in their final years, one thimble of mince at a time. Critics, including opposition parties and elderly advocates, say the policy risks undernutrition in a population already vulnerable to it. The council says it's flexible, but the elderly eating climate penance for dinner might disagree. Source: BT, Ekstra Bladet
reSee.it AI Summary
I discuss with Prof Foad Izadi: diplomacy is dead; Iran would shoot through the blockade rather than yield. The UAE is the Gulf target most valuable to the West; he treats them as the easiest target. He offers a sharp, surprising critique of his government. We cover Trump’s off-ramp, Iran’s military prep, a U.S. ship as a target, and why Iran’s and UAE dynamics matter.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 INTERVIEW: PROF. IZADI FROM IRAN - “Diplomacy is dead” This conversation changed how I'm reading the next 60 days, especially after Prof Foad Izadi broke down why Iran would prefer to shoot through the blockade rather than yield to the pressure We then discussed the UAE, why was it targeted more than all other Gulf nations: in his view, the UAE became the easiest and most valuable Western-aligned target in the Gulf We also got into something I didn't expect: his sharpest criticism of his own government. And to my surprise, it was very different to what I expected, and made for a very interesting conversation. We discuss: * Why Foad thinks Trump never wanted an off-ramp * What the Iranian military command is now openly preparing for, and why a U.S. ship in the Gulf is a target waiting to happen * Why the UAE was hit far harder than Saudi Arabia, Bahrain or Qatar, and the warning he sent through this interview * His most surprising critique of the Iranian government, which has nothing to do with the Supreme Leader, the IRGC, or the nuclear file @IzadiFoad 00:48 Trump Blockade Is Act Of War 04:13 Iran Won't Cry Uncle To Trump 09:08 Both Sides Negotiating From Leverage 13:14 $250 Billion In Damage To Iran 17:10 Iran Will Shoot Through The Blockade 20:51 Why UAE Got Hit Harder Than Others 25:47 UAE Plundered By Western Companies 29:50 Israel Funding Global Islamophobia 35:24 Iran's Biggest Failure Since 1979 41:13 Engineers Are Good But Politicians Aren't
Video Transcript AI Summary
The dialogue centers on the current crisis between the United States and Iran, two weeks after a previous discussion. The speakers outline the evolution of events, the prospects for negotiations, and the broader political and ideological context driving the confrontation.
Key events and the trajectory of negotiations
- Speaker 1 describes recent moves as undermining talks: “Trump announced this blockade, which is an act of war under international law. … And then they were supposed to have a second round of negotiations … and The US shot at an Iranian ship, took over the ship, took the crew hostage.” Negotiations are framed as lacking good faith, with derisive language used by Trump toward Iran.
- The atmosphere is described as deteriorating: “democracy diplomacy is not doing well. More chances of a military confrontation.”
- There is concern over a potential new round of attacks by the US, and about the legality of continued operations beyond a sixty-day War Powers window without congressional authorization.
Iran’s leverage, demands, and feasibility of a deal
- The discussion centers on whether Iran’s demands—such as delaying nuclear negotiations, removing the blockade, and controlling who passes through the Strait of Hormuz and at what cost—are feasible for a deal. Speaker 0 notes Iran’s desire to delay negotiations and control Hormuz, while asking whether Trump would accept not getting any concessions and whether Iran’s price could be feasible for a settlement.
- Speaker 1 counters that Iran has long-held leverage over Hormuz, which the US seeks to counter with pressure, and argues that both sides seek a diplomatic solution but with differing terms. There is an assertion that blockade of Hormuz is illegal and that Iran has a right to respond under self-defense if attacked.
Strategic calculations and potential actions
- The Strait of Hormuz is treated as a central strategic chokepoint; Iran’s coastal status and territorial waters are discussed at length. The possibility that Iran would shoot back if attacked is framed as legal self-defense, while the blockade is described as an act of war.
- Speaker 1 entertains a mixed approach for Iran: “Both. I would advise Iranian leaders to do both. Give diplomacy opportunity if Trump is interested. … don’t accept bullying because if you accept bullying, then you have to hand over Iranian oil to Trump.”
- There is acknowledgment that if Iran chooses to respond, it would be legal and within its rights to do so, given the blockade’s status.
Regional dynamics and actors
- The UAE’s actions are scrutinized: Israel’s presence and the UAE’s alignment with the US and Israel are discussed, including the UAE’s role in OPEC and broad regional ties. Speaker 1 characterizes UAE as having provided more support to US/Israeli aims and notes a “wrong decision” by the UAE in its current course, suggesting a potential recalibration.
- Iran’s broader strategy of “resisting” is described as its single option, with emphasis on not accepting bullying or endless concessions, and with a call to pursue both diplomacy and sustained pressure.
Ideology, governance, and internal critique
- The conversation shifts to a discussion of the Iranian revolution’s ideology and its domestic implications. Quotes attributed to the late leader Ayatollah Khomeini are examined, with Speaker 1 arguing that translation matters matter and that Islam, properly understood, is a world religion that seeks justice, not domination. The claim is made that Islam is not inherently violent and that the misperception of Islam as a violent force is part of Islamophobia.
- A critique is offered of Iran’s domestic social sciences: Iran’s engineering and medical achievements are praised, while the social sciences are described as underdeveloped and too reliant on Western frameworks. The suggestion is that Iran should develop indigenous social sciences to better guide policy and society, arguing that “Iran could do much more” in this area.
Personal outlook and conclusions
- The speakers acknowledge that both sides appear unwilling to yield on core issues, with a double-track approach suggested: pursue diplomacy when possible, but prepare to resist and potentially escalate if pressures persist.
- The conversation closes with an openness to future discussions, including the possibility of a separate program focused on Iran’s internal dynamics and the revolution’s core tenets, to better understand regional concerns and policy decisions.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Professor, it's a pleasure to speak to you again. Last time we spoke, you know, I was the optimistic one and you were I think if I remember correctly, you said there's above 50%. I think 60% chance we'll go back to a state of war and well, the war hasn't really ended, but we'll go back into a kinetic war. We're going through an economic war right now and for the first time, especially after seeing the statements from the from the supreme leader, statements from the other officials in the last few days, I'm worried that you may be right because it doesn't look like the negotiations are progressing. I know that what happens behind the scenes is very different to what is said in public, but putting it all together, I am definitely more pessimistic than the last time we spoke.
But I'd love to get your thoughts on where we are today versus when we last spoke about two weeks ago.
Speaker 1: You know, last time, I think we had some of what negotiations. And then twenty four hours after that, Trump announced this blockade, which is an act of war under international law. It's an act of war under US law. And then they were supposed to have a second round of negotiations some days ago, and The US shot at an Iranian ship, took over the ship, took the crew hostage. And, you know, when you are doing negotiations, you're supposed to negotiate in good faith.
That's international law. And when you're negotiating in good faith, you don't shoot at to the other side at the other side. And you don't use profanity when you are talking about the other side. You're supposed to lower rhetoric. Yesterday, Trump said that he wants Iranians to come and cry uncle.
This is what he has been saying for for many months that he wants total surrender by Iran. And if you are in Tehran you see that you survived forty days of indiscriminate bombing, The US has not reached its goals. Trump had talked about taking over Iranian oil. He hasn't done that. He talked about changing Iran's borders, changing Iran's government.
He hasn't achieved any of his stated goals. And you saw what happened in the US congress yesterday. It's not just Iranians that are unhappy with what he is doing. His own people, people in the US congress, are quite upset about what he is doing. So if if you are in Iran, you don't see any reason to, you know, do what he wants the crown prince of Saudi Arabia to do.
Kiss his behind. Why why would anyone in Iran want to do that? And so I I don't think we are going forward with any type of negotiations because the other side is not negotiating in good faith. And the Iranian military is getting tired of this blockade. Today, we had the head of aerospace division of Iran's military issuing a statement.
A few days ago, we had the the joint chief of staff issuing an statement. The chances of they sort of escorting an Iranian ship outside the state of Hormuz and then responding to any military attacks is quite high. We have had access reporting that The US is actually planning a new round of attacks. So democracy diplomacy is not doing well. More chances of a military confrontation.
Speaker 0: You didn't say anything that's untrue, but I also wanna would you agree that the demands on the Iranian side are it'll make it difficult for a deal to happen. Iran wants to delay the nuclear negotiations. Now their argument is that these negotiations take time and we need to remove the blockade for the sake of Iran and the global economy. But they do also want to control the Shere Homuz, which ships go through, how much to charge as a fee, who has to pay what amount if anyone participated in the war has to pay a higher amount. Do you really think this is feasible for a deal to not concede anything?
I'm not saying what's right or wrong, professor, but do you really think Trump will accept not getting any concessions whatsoever? Nothing at all and Iran controlling the Strait Of Hormuz.
Speaker 1: You know, when the Iranian delegation went to Islamabad, 80 people, they had very good offers on Iran's nuclear program because at that time, US had not announced that they're planning to blockade the state of Hormuz. So so the blockade of the state of Hormuz by US was not something Iranians talked about because that hadn't started. In fact, you you don't have to accept my analysis. Jake Sullivan, the former national security adviser, said this some some time ago that in February, Iran's offer on its nuclear program was good. The American side, Kushner and Witkoff, did not understand what Iran was offering.
This is his words, not mine. So it is not true that Iran is not doing something that would be useful for Trump. The analysis here before before Islamabad, during the Islamabad talks, was that the Iranian side should actually provide an off ramp to Trump so he can declare victory and then go and take, you know, take over Greenland or Canada or do other things. So it's Cuba. Cuba.
I said Cuba. We're up to Cuba now. Cuba. Yes. Cuba, you know, this is a culture of resistance there longer than what you see in Iran.
They're good people. So that was the idea. That's why you had the Iranians going to Islamabad to provide some with an opportunity to declare victory. But what happened was that when they returned to Tehran, we have this blockade. And, you know, he doesn't seem to be interested in a negotiated settlement.
When you negotiate, you're supposed to negotiate in good faith. Negotiating good faith is that you don't shoot at the
Speaker 0: other side. But you also you also sorry to interrupt, but you meant to also negotiate from a point of leverage. Iran had leverage with the control of the Strait Of Hormuz, and Trump is trying to get the same a similar leverage to counter Iranian leverage by also blockading the Strait Of Hormuz. So Iran is holding the global economy as leverage. Trump is holding the Iranian economy as leverage.
So I think both sides want a diplomatic solution. It's not one wants a solution, the other doesn't. I think both sides don't want war. It's only on whose terms? That's the question.
And I feel and I worry that Iran's demands, the people that are making the demands are very different to the people that were part of the Omani negotiations before the war. And the demands are something that I just don't think Trump will accept, not put aside whether he should or shouldn't. It's very difficult to come out of this war from an Oman talking about the nuclear program, come out of the war, have similar concessions when it comes to the nuclear program, even less concessions, but also control the Strait Of Hormuz. This is the biggest sticking point and not accept any joint control with The US.
Speaker 1: So when when you're saying that Iran had leverage with the state of Hormuz and Trump wanted to create leverage for US, maybe true, but that means that he's not interested in reaching a settlement. He's interested in creating leverage.
Speaker 0: Leverage is to reach a settlement. Just get better terms. You
Speaker 1: know, if he thinks that because yesterday, he said that he wants Iranians to come and cry uncle. So he if he thinks by putting pressure on Iran, you'll you'll have Iranian leaders crying uncle, he's making a huge mistake. They're not going to do that. And as I said, we have reports that he's getting prepared for another round of attacks. And if you're interested if you think you still have a military option, then what should you do with regard to negotiations?
You should shoot at Iranian ships right before you start the next round, and this is what he did. So he's talking about negotiations and getting prepared. He needs some time to get prepared for the next round. And then he have he has this, you know, oil markets that he needs to control. He has this public opinion that he needs to control.
He you know, tomorrow is the sixtieth day after the start of the war. We have this war powers resolution. If he continues the war after tomorrow, that's going to be illegal under US law because with War Powers Act, the president has sixty days, and then he needs to get permission from the US congress to continue.
Speaker 0: Do we agree that Trump wants to off front? Do we agree on that point? No. No. I just You really don't think so?
Speaker 1: No. I think he if he if he doesn't get what Obama got, you know, Obama got a lot from Iran under the nuclear agreement, If he doesn't get that agreement or something better than what Obamogad, then he doesn't want that. He he wants to blockade Iran, put more pressure on Iran with the hope of Iran capitulating Iran surrendering.
Speaker 0: Why not but why not give why not give a similar deal to Obama? Iran has control of the Strait Of Hormuz. I understand Iran is looking for some concessions on the American side lifting of the sanctions and maybe unfreezing some of the assets and these are these are very fair demands. Do you think would Iran accept a deal better than the Obama deal if there was some assets that were unfrozen and and limited removal of sanctions? And is there any conditions where Iran would accept not declaring sovereignty over the Strait Of Hormuz?
Speaker 1: You know, the Strait Of Hormuz is in I think we talked about this last time. That's in Iranian territorial waters. You you cannot make the state of Hormuz bigger. It's 21 miles. 12 miles plus 12 miles is 24.
That's in Iranian. 12 miles is countries, Any country's territorial water. So that's in territorial waters of Iran and Oman. And in the conventional law of seas, you have 12 miles of territorial waters and 12 miles of contiguous waters, the the waters that are not your territory, but the laws of the coastal state needs to be respected in the other 12 miles, which covers the whole state of Hormuz. You know, the damage on Iran has been about $250,000,000,000 in the forty days that they bombed Iranian mostly civilian infrastructure.
The damage is submitted to be more than $250,000,000,000. The US is not going to pay that. They don't have the money. They have the money for wars, but they don't have the money to clean up their mess after the war. And that money has to come from somewhere.
But then why are price
Speaker 0: why not for the time limit, though? Time limit for the control of the Strait Of Hormuz? Because right now, it's like we're gonna control the Strait Of Hormuz, and there's no time that's indefinite based on the law that's passing.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yes. So, you know, you you read the conventional law of seas. You are not you you don't have a time limit with Iran being a coastal state to a state of Hormuz. Iran has been a coastal state since the beginning of civilization, and Iran will be a coastal state to a state of Hormuz many generations after your, you know, grandchildren become granddaddies.
So, you know, United States is 11,000 kilometers away. They are a coastal state to Gulf Of Mexico, and it is Gulf Of Mexico. They they have no right here. And, you know, this is this is what the Islamic Revolution in 1979 was all about. Iranians don't want to be bullied by some people who come to this region, not their region, and want to push people around.
That's why they kicked out and they kicked out the mess.
Speaker 0: You know, obviously, you know, the audience doesn't know. Iran has never really controlled the Strait Of Hormuz for decades, centuries. I don't
Speaker 1: know when
Speaker 0: if when was the last time they controlled the Strait Of Hormuz and were able to charge a fee?
Speaker 1: They they they they controlled it from the beginning of time, and the way they control it was that they allowed ships to pass through. You need to coordinate your passage always. You needed to coordinate
Speaker 0: your passage. But when did they charge a fee?
Speaker 1: They didn't. We have regime change and not in Tehran in the state of Hormuz because of the war. So because we didn't have war, we didn't have $250,000,000,000 to cover. But the so this charge a fee. Now we need to charge a fee.
Speaker 0: I think I think a fee I I agree with charging a fee. I just think it needs to have a limit. My worry, professor, is Iran's coming out of this war, and I've said this before, emboldened, and they've got some pretty pretty I see them as maximalist demands. You know, charging a fee with no time period, delaying discussions or any concessions when it comes to the nuclear program. And what we're seeing right now is both sides trying to pressure the other, and I think it's pretty clear.
We're seeing who blinks first. There's a lot of reports that Iran is about two weeks away from running out of storage for the oil that's coming out of the wells. And if the storage runs out, they'll have shut down the oils. That's very significant damage, even permanent damage in some cases to the infrastructure. Do you have any information on on what capacity Iran has in being able to store more of their oil?
And what happens next? Is there any alternatives that could be built in time? Because otherwise, based on objective analysts, Iran doesn't have more than a couple of weeks. By May, max June, Iran's economy will begin to suffer even more than it has for the last few months.
Speaker 1: You know, according to Trump, Iran was supposed to run out of storage yesterday, and Iranian oil pipes were supposed to blow up yesterday. They they haven't. I don't know where he's getting his information on Iranian oil facilities, probably Netanyahu or someone like him. Not not someone serious. I don't have the exact information, but I do know that if Iranians have an option of damage to Iranian oil facilities and shooting their way out of the state of Hormuz, they're going to choose the second option.
And this is what the Iranian military has been saying for for the last seven days at least.
Speaker 0: So you're saying that Iran will not they will not yield to the pressure. Instead, they will fight through it. So it could be Iran that begins kinetic action against The US if the
Speaker 1: blockade continues? And they have the right to do so because blockading Blockading is an act of war. Do they're not supposed to do it when you have ceasefire. When so when you
Speaker 0: Do you think do
Speaker 1: you think they should? You allow the other side to shoot at you. And that's the they should do
Speaker 0: you personally think they should, professor, if you were making the decision, do you think that's the right decision to take?
Speaker 1: You you know, I'm just a professor. We have very good military commanders. What I know is that if Iran decides to shoot back, that's totally legal. The war was illegal. The blockade was illegal under article 51 of the UN Charter.
We have this idea of self defense. This is what Iran is doing. Iran has a right and a responsibility for the civilized world. We're dealing with the Epstein class. Iran has the responsibility to shoot back.
Speaker 0: Yes. But do you think they should? I'm gonna press you on it. I wanna get your personal opinion because you've always every time I have you on the show and and you do other shows, you do a great job of showing the other side of the argument within Iran what people believe. But I've never had you give us your personal thoughts on the matter.
How do you think Iran should what what should Iran's next steps be? Breaking through the blockade or maybe accepting more concessions to try to resolve this diplomatically?
Speaker 1: Both. I I would advise Iranian leaders to do both. Give diplomacy opportunity if Trump is interested. That's why they went to Islamabad. And don't accept bullying because if you accept bullying, then you have to hand over Iranian oil to Trump because he doesn't have any limitations on what he wants.
He wants Iranian oil. He wants to change Iran's border. He wants to change Iran's government. And if you start accepting his threats, then there is no end to it. So there's no other option.
Iran has given US has given Iran one option, and that is to resist US pressures.
Speaker 0: I actually found a few quotes I'm gonna ask you about. I just remembered them now from Khomeini, the former supreme leader, not Khomeini, the one before him. I wanna get your thoughts on them. But before that, talking about the current events, what do you make of The UAE's actions? We had reports that Israel was here throughout that they've sent boots on the ground here for the and set up the Iron Dome defense system to protect The UAE from Iranian attacks.
And now we see The UAE pulling out of OPEC, threatening to pull out of other organizations, including the the I forgot what it's called, one of the Gulf organizations in the Arab League. So freezing the Arab League membership. And they seem to be doubling down on their relationship with The US and Israel, but also diversifying the crown prince was in China. Now when I had a discussion with the former adviser to the president a few days ago, he said to me I I asked him the question. I'm like, why not find a way to coexist with Iran?
They're like, Mario, we've done business. We're a pretty big trading partner with Iran, but they've attacked us significantly more than any other Gulf country, including Israel. It was not proportionate in any way. And he said, what what are the justifications for these attacks? We didn't attack them.
If the argument of having a military presence, American military presence here, there's more American military presence in Qatar and Bahrain and Saudi, yet The UAE was attacked more. If it was the relationship with Israel, well, Bahrain has a great relationship with Israel, wasn't attacked the same way as The UAE. So do you think Iran made the right decision in attacking the not in attacking The UAE as a strategy, the horizontal strategy, the horizontal warfare, of attacking The UAE to that extent?
Speaker 1: You know, we we have you're familiar with this concept of greater Israel. Israelis have taken over UAE. They did it before the start of the war. You had many Israeli companies either working as Israeli companies or working as European companies. They were Israeli companies.
You had UAE welcoming the genocidal president of Israel in the middle of the Gaza genocide, red carpet treatment. And you have UAE that is doing its best to make sure that Trump achieve Trump and Netanyahu achieve their goals with regard to Iran. Qatar is not doing that. Even Bahrain is not doing that. They they are you know, we had Hegsit, the secretary of war.
It should be called the secretary of war crimes, saying that these Persian Gulf countries fought with US shoulder to shoulder. I I think he's accurate with regard to UAE.
Speaker 0: He mentioned but he mentioned Saudi as well, sir. He mentioned Saudi, but Saudi was not attacked. Exactly.
Speaker 1: But but the the the country that actually did that fighting with United States and Israel shoulder to shoulder against Iran was UAE. Wrong decision. They they put their bets
Speaker 0: on But it was after it was after being attacked. It was after being attacked, significantly attacked. I understand Iran's strategy of striking The Gulf as a as a form of asymmetric warfare, but why was The UAE attacked to that level? You can't make the argument of Israel behind normalized relations with Israel, and that's their decision. That's the UAE's decision.
I I'm a big critic of Israel's foreign policy, the genocide in Gaza, what they're doing in South Lebanon. But that's the UAE's own decision to have that relationship with Israel. Why does that justify for Iran, a trading partner with the The UAE, both part of OPEC, to attack it at such a disproportionate level? And do you think it was the right decision? I'm I'm I know I'm repeating the question.
Speaker 1: The UAE was attacked more because they helped more. This is what I was trying to say. Others helped. Others helped. They helped.
They helped more. They got more missiles. It was the wrong decision by UAE. You had the UAE ambassador to Washington. You know, I don't I don't know if you saw that Wallister Journal op ed he had maybe about a month ago.
He he's not a good ambassador because he's causing a lot of difficulties for his country. If you're UAE, you are on the other side of the Persian Gulf to Iran. You shouldn't be kissing Trump's behind in the manner that the ambassador is trying to show that he's doing. Not not a good idea. You know, at the end of the day, US is about 11,000 kilometers away.
Israelis, if they could protect it, they would protect themselves. How why would you think that Israelis can protect you? They even cannot protect themselves. So getting so close to Americans and Israelis in this manner, not a good idea. They have I think, you know, since we are in a semi ceasefire, they have a chance to correct course.
I hope they do that.
Speaker 0: Do you think Iran has a chance to correct course do you think Iran has a chance to correct course as well?
Speaker 1: Iran has one option that and that is to resist. There is no other option. There's no way to
Speaker 0: Kuwait there's reports of missiles fired from Kuwait onto onto Iran. Jordanian air base is used. Qatar has a much bigger base than The UAE. So the involvement of other Gulf countries seems, from a military perspective, more significant than The UAE. I'll give you my theory.
Let me know if you agree. The UAE makes more sense because it's Iran's it's the lowest hanging fruit for Iran to cause damage to the to Western interests. The UAE is the hub of, you know, global trade and 90% expats. It's done really well moving away from the dependence on energy as while other other Gulf countries are still very dependent. So that makes it made it a much better target, especially when you look at the airport, for example, as well.
The tour is airport, one of the biggest in the world, the tourism sector. Is that a fair argument that it strategically made sense for that reason or some people are saying it's more personal? Iran just doesn't like The UAE, what The UAE has achieved, And, also, there's that dispute with these islands, the Tulum And Abu Musa Islands as well. So is it more personal, or is it more strategic?
Speaker 1: I don't think it's personal. UAE has given Western companies to come and do business with, you know, charging the host country two or three times more than what they should. The things that were built in UAE was not built by these princes. These princes are busy enjoying themselves on billion dollar yachts. This is not progress.
This is plunder of a country's resources, and The UAE has been available to be plundered more than other countries. It's not personal. This is a decision that they have made. And this is what Iranians said that if you attack Iranian infrastructure, US related infrastructure will be attacked. And as you said correctly, United States has more infrastructure in UAE than in some other countries.
Speaker 0: I'm one of them. Not in in US infrastructure, but I'm in The UAE. So I'll give you my address if this breaks out again. You give me yours. We'll we'll I'll you try to get the IRGC not to strike my address and and vice versa.
Speaker 1: I'll do my best. You are a young young, nice man. Good looking. Cool. I want to lose you.
Speaker 0: I'm gonna I'm gonna ask you a question about statements made by the supreme leader, the former supreme leader, Rudola Khomeini. He said and someone sent me those a few days ago. He said, we do not worship Iran, we worship Allah for patriotism is another name of paganism. I say, let this land Iran as in Iran burn. I say, let this land go up in smoke provided Islam emerges triumphant in the the rest of the world.
Another quote here, we shall export our revolution to the world until the cry, there is no God but Allah resounds over the whole world. There will be struggle. And two more quotes. And by the way, some of them are direct quotes, some of them are people quoting him. So it might not be wholly accurate, but it give you an idea of of his mindset and the mindset of the Iranian government, Iranian revolution.
The the other third one here, all those against revolution must disappear and quickly be executed. And the last one is Islamist politics or it is nothing. So, obviously, as I said, these are not all exact quotes and you can correct me. I'm sure you know them better than I, but someone sent me those and I quickly checked them before before this interview. And it highlights my, you know, my disagreement with the current Iranian government.
Now, obviously, I'm a foreigner. I can only give my opinion. No country should dictate any other country how to run their country. But I have a worry that Iran prioritizes ideology in the form of their foreign policy, whether it's through their allied network, the the axis, or their approach to Israel above the well-being of their people. I would love you to clarify whether what you think of my concern with the Iranian government and whether these statements represent the the ideology of the Islamic revolution.
Speaker 1: The first and the third quote that you had, inaccurate translation. The second and fourth needs, you know, editing with regard to translation. What among Khomeini opposed was not the patriotism. That that's in in Islamic theology, there is no opposition to patriotism. The opposition is with racism.
So if you think that because you are an Iranian, you are better than Arabs, that is not accepted in Islamic theology. But if you think you are from Iran and you like your country and if someone like Trump attacks your country, you need to sacrifice your life for your country. Islam has no problem with that. The ideology here, you know, Islam is an international looking religion. It's it's not unlike Judaism that deals with one ethnicity.
Islam doesn't consider borders in order to spread its message. So it's a world religion, not a religion just for Arabs or for people from the Middle East. And, you know, Imam Khomeini was a theologian. So he until his seventies, he he was a scholar of Islamic theology. He was a professor at theological schools.
And if you translate his statement statements correctly, then you will hear what Islam teaches about looking internationally when it comes to establishing justice, establishing a form of government that opposes oppression. This is why he led a revolution because he realized that Iran's rights was attacked by The United States and the puppet government they installed in Iran in 1953 to the coup. So it it shows that he had some concern about Iran. So he did not distinguish between Islamic theology, you know, Islam. People who who believe in Islam believe that it comes from god.
They believe in god. They believe in the prophet. They believe the prophets is a prophet of god. And the message is given to humans so they can live better lives. It's a lifestyle.
And if you believe in these things that I just said, then you would want to make sure that that thought is at least understood internationally. If if people understand what Islam teaches, then this wave of Islamophobia that you see in Western countries and countries like India, other other places, that that should stop because they are labeling Islam as a religion of violence. It is not. It's a religion of peace, but it's a religion that does not accept domination. So if you're Israel and The United States, you want to get rid of political Islam.
They they don't mind people going to a mosque and praying all day and not doing much. But if you think that Islam has teachings with regard to how a country is supposed to be run, how people can work to become better people, then then they want to get rid of Islam. That's why you have Islamophobia in these countries. That's why Israelis are funding Islamophobia internationally. Because if you want to dominate the Middle East, then you don't want to see political Islam because that has been the reason they have not been able to do that.
I I don't know if you are familiar with this guy, Daniel Pipes. They have this organization in The United States, Middle East Forum, and he has a a famous quote that if Israel was not surrounded by Muslim countries, Israel would not have any problem because it is the Islamic teaching that would dictate that you need to free your land from an oppressor. Other religions may do that, but it it is this level of fighting domination that you see in Islam that that maybe you don't see in other schools of thought. So it's very understandable that we have Islamophobia because it's Islam that's causing difficulties for hegemonic powers.
Speaker 0: I think it's like, many countries, Muslim countries that either have good relations with Israel or are working to improve the relationship with Israel. The UAE being one of them, Bahrain, neighbors, Jordan and and Egypt. I think the concern that I have with the Iranian government, it's not about Islam. You know, Saudi is another country where Islam plays a key role in in their policies, at least before more than now. My bigger concern, again, an outsider, my bigger concern is their approach to foreign policy.
And it seems sometimes ideology when making decisions, ideology is prioritized above the wellness of of their own population. I have actually a direct question for you is, what is your biggest critique of the Iranian government? What would you say is something that you disagree with the most?
Speaker 1: You know, there are a lot of there are a lot of problems in Iran. And if you want, we can do a separate show on difficulties that we have in Iran. One difficulty is that, you know, the social sciences that that we teach at our universities are generally translation of Western texts. If they're not translations, they are more or less translations of western text. Iran had this opportunity forty seven years ago to come up with indigenous social sciences, that opportunity was missed.
And the result was we have a couple of new generation of young people who went to universities, but their mentality was very much affected by Western teachings. And if you look at the history of social sciences in the West, it it was fully invested by Western governments, by foundations to make sure that the people who are intellectuals internationally follow these guidelines that are set by the West. So they either support western thought in their countries or even work for western governments. So when you talk about Muslim countries like UAE or Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, they are Muslim because the majority of people in these countries are Muslim, But the rulers are basically following the dictates that come from the West. And Iran had this opportunity to correct that, and it has to some degree.
That's why Iran is attacked the way you see. But Iran could do a much better job in terms of coming up with indigenous social sciences, social sciences that is based on indigenous knowledge. So when you look at our engineers, you know, hard sciences, they're they're quite good. Why? Because they can hit any place they want in Tel Aviv with these missiles, indigenous technology.
But when you look at our politicians, they have this tendency to go to these negotiations and be attacked in the middle of negotiations three times now. Once in June, once in February, again, you know, the the third time, they were not attacking the middle of negotiations. They had this blockade twenty four hours after they returned to Iran. So Iran could do a better job in terms of making sure that the politicians in Iran are as good as engineers. And that has all the
Speaker 0: I I didn't expect you to say that. I from what you said is that your you agree more with the stance of the IRGC and the kind of the core of the Iranian revolution rather than the, you know, the executive branch or those that are maybe more lenient when it comes to the West, lenient in terms of negotiations. So if anything, you think Iran should double down on the core values of the revolution from 1979, or did I misunderstand your stance?
Speaker 1: What what I said was that the the the western social sciences are not really sciences. You you look at I I give you some books to read because I know you like reading. There's this book by this American university professor, American universities in Washington DC. It's called the science of coercion. Science of coercion.
And it looks at the history of mass communication. You know, we have University of Illinois giving the first PhD in mass communication. You are in mass communication. You are doing a lot of shows, so you may be interested. In the nineteen fifties, University of Illinois gave the first PhD in mass communication.
So he goes through this field. You know, we have had now seven years of people who are getting PhDs Robert in Robert McChesney? Robert McChesney is good, but that book is by
Speaker 0: Oh, so Christopher Simpson.
Speaker 1: Christopher Simpson. There you go. Christopher Simpson. Robert McChesney's books are good also. So if you're if you like to read, we have in in mass communication, we have this political economy of mass communication.
It's a subfield. And people like Matt Chesney do, you know, Janet Vasco. These these people, they have done some good work. So what I said was that when you're trying to develop a country like Iran, 90,000,000 people, so you need doctors, you need engineers, and you need people who do social sciences. With engineering and medicine, since it's difficult to transfer ideology through mathematical formulas or medical, you know, treatment.
These people, the people in Iran that have done engineering and and medicine, are affected less by this type of social sciences. And the country failed because forty seven years is a is a long time. Iran failed to develop indigenous social sciences that is good for the people of this region. In Qatar, for example, I I you may know. They have this Ibn Khaldun Center for Social Sciences.
So Qataris are doing some work on developing indigenous social sciences. We have in Malaysia, Islamic University of Malaysia, they are doing some work. Iran could do much more because Iran had the Islamic revolution. So they were not they they did not have all all the limitations that some of the countries have, but but Iran failed. So and if if you don't develop the minds of young people in your country, The US would.
They would take over people's minds. They would want to direct them so they either work for US and Israel, or they would watch US and Israel do genocide. And this is the aim. So you need engineers. You need people in medicine, and you need good social scientists.
Iran did well in the first two. The third one, we are not doing so well.
Speaker 0: That is not the answer I expected, but that makes the conversations we have and will continue to have even more interesting. Because I I'm someone that's critical of exactly what you talked about, so getting getting that perspective would be very interesting. Like, I'd in times of peace, I'd I'd I'd offer to come if you're open to and you could do a sit down to understand this better, to understand the Iranian revolution, the core of it, and the concerns that neighboring countries have, you know, the concept of exporting the theology or the revolution in Iran to other countries, and they see that as a threat, which is obviously a discussion for for a different time. But, professor, we've reached our time. I appreciate your time as always.
Thank you for for coming on again. Hopefully, we'll continue having these conversations in times of peace, and hopefully, the negotiations go well even though you've got you've your concerns. But I appreciate you coming on again.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 The U.S. releasing oil strategic reserves may look like it’s strategy, but it could really just be panic. Professor Glenn Diesen explains why Iran has little reason to fold. "[Iran has] no other choice, what is the alternative here? I think the Iranians will just absorb the pain, and I assume that the U.S. will blink first." When survival is the only option, attrition favors the side with nothing left to lose. @Glenn_Diesen
reSee.it AI Summary
I spoke with Rabbi Elhanan Beck, who says Judaism is a religion, not a nationality or race or geopolitical project. Citing Maimonides, he draws a hard line between Judaism and Zionism, warning religious identity is being used as a foreign policy tool by Netanyahu and others.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇮🇱 A rabbi is drawing a hard line between Judaism and Zionism. Rabbi Elhanan Beck, citing Maimonides and core Jewish texts, says Judaism is a religion, not a nationality, not a race, not a geopolitical project. "Judaism is a religion. Have nothing to do with a nationality. Nothing with a race." I sat with Rabbi Beck to understand the 2 concepts, Judaism and Zionism, and how religious identity is being turned into a foreign policy weapon by Netanyahu and others.
Video Transcript AI Summary
- The discussion opens with an exploration of how religion is used in land claims, focusing on Judaism, Zionism, and the concept of the Promised Land. The rabbi states that Judaism is a religion with nothing to do with nationality or race, and that “Judaism is a pure religion.” He cites Maimonides and Sanhedrin to define who is considered a Jew, emphasizing that belief is what matters, not ethnicity or birth alone.
- The rabbi explains the difference between Judaism and Zionism. Zionism, he says, is a movement about a hundred and thirty years old founded by Teddy Herzl, described as a secular Jew who “didn’t believe in god” or in the Torah. Zionism is portrayed as an effort to transform Judaism from a religion into a national movement, demanding an Israeli passport, army service, Hebrew, and land-based nationhood. He argues that Zionism “transform[s] from a holy religion, from believing in god, from reconnecting to god into a empty, national movement.”
- On the Promised Land, the rabbi asserts that the promise in the Torah is conditional, contingent on the people maintaining a high level of life. He references the prophets (Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Isaiah) and states that God warned of exile if they did not adhere to the covenant. He emphasizes that the exile was a punishment from God, and that returning to the land requires the coming of the Messiah. He cites the Torah as repeating the conditional nature of the promise and notes that the end of Jeremiah describes exile as the outcome when conditions were not met.
- The rabbi discusses the Messiah as a future, peaceful redemption for all humanity, whereas Zionism, in his view, lacks belief in God and the exile, instead adopting a human-centered national project. He mentions the three oaths from the Talmud (Ksumbat) in Numbers 14, 41, describing God’s oaths not to rebel against the nations, not to go up to Israel en masse, and not to prevent the spread of the faith; these oaths are used to argue against aggressive settlement or mass return.
- When asked how to respond to Zionist counterarguments about “the chosen people” and the right to a Jewish state, the rabbi distinguishes between religious and secular Jewry. He notes that among religious Jews (Hasidic and Haredi), attitudes toward Zionism and Israel are diverse: outside Israel, he estimates 95% of people look non-Zionist and 65% are strongly anti-Zionist, with prominent anti-Zionist Hasidic communities (e.g., in Stamford Hill) that advocate dismantling the state of Israel in a peaceful way. He contrasts this with segments in Israel, where settlers are strong Zionists, though there are also anti-Zionist Jews, including those who boycott the army.
- The interviewer asks about the practical and geopolitical implications of dismantling the state of Israel, and whether a peaceful dismantling is feasible. The rabbi says he is not a politician and reiterates Torah authority, citing that “a rebellion against god cannot be succeed” and re-emphasizing the belief that if the state is in rebellion to God, it will come to an end. He offers a religious perspective that dismantling could be peaceful and envisions living in a Palestinian-governed framework or various arrangements, but insists the core principle is adherence to divine command rather than human political prescriptions.
- The rabbi provides anecdotal and contemporary context to illustrate his point: he asserts that Muslims and Jews have lived peacefully in many places, citing Iran as an example where Jews have their own MP and a Jewish hospital, and recounts an instance in which Ismail Haniyeh embraced Jewish rabbis at a conference to illustrate that opposition is directed at occupiers rather than Jews themselves. He argues that within the Arab world there can be acceptance of Jews when “the occupiers” are not present, and he contrasts this with what he views as Western or Zionist framing.
- The conversation ends with an agreement to continue the discussion, with the rabbi reiterating his stance that the peaceful dismantlement of the state of Israel is prayed for in the Torah, while the interviewer signals an openness to further dialogue on these complex religious and political issues.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Why do some people use religion to make the argument that some land belongs to them?
Speaker 1: Judaism is a religion. Have nothing to do with a nationality, nothing with a race. Who is not a yao to speak about the promised land? But he he's an unbeliever. He don't believe in God.
He don't believe in the Torah.
Speaker 0: To be able to return to the promised land, yo, it's conditional on the return of the Messiah.
Speaker 1: Today, we are sworn by gods to stay in exile patiently waiting for the coming of Messiah. As long as the state of Israel is a rebellion against god, they will not succeed. They will never succeed. They will come to an end.
Speaker 0: Rabbi, it's a pleasure to speak to you. Thank you so much for for making the time. I know we tried to do this a few days ago, but we had some Internet connection issues. So And it's a pleasure to meet you for the first time. So I wanna there's a lot I wanna ask you because there's a lot I don't understand.
I I don't understand how religion and foreign policy is being conflated across especially in The Middle East. It's being conflated when when some some people refer to Jews as the chosen ones for the land of Israel. For me, these things and I was born a Christian, but I I don't practice some I don't practice my religion. I you know, atheist or agnostic now. And I've never really looked into it.
So what I would love to do in this discussion is I would love you to take me through what the mindset is. You know? What is that belief? What is Zionism? What is the greater Israel project?
Why do some people believe that? Why do some people use religion to make the argument that some land belongs to them? Because I I cover foreign policy around the world, and and it almost never comes up, barely comes up a bit in the Ukraine war talking about Orthodox Christianity, but barely, and I never really discussed it because not many analysts talk about it. But when it comes to the Middle East and Israel and the region, and not only about Israel, obviously, Shia, Sudanese, not only about Judaism, but it's always always one of the core issues. So I'd love you if you can explain it to me, please, rabbi.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Look. I will try to explain it from the beginning. We have to understand what is that Judaism and then what is Zionism, and then we will have a better understanding in the whole in the whole thing. And I will start from the beginning.
Judaism is a religion. Have nothing to do with a nationality, nothing with a race. You Judaism is a a religion have nothing to do with I mean, you can be a Jew, a white, a black, Australian, a Indian, Argentina. No difference what background you are from the East, from the West. Judaism is a pure religion.
As long people believing in this state and principles of Judaism, they are considered as a Jew. If not, they are not considered as a Jew. This is not my words. This is the words of Maimonides, one of our greatest leaders about a thousand years ago. He pulled down the death and principles of Judaism.
I give you the reference, at least for these people who are understanding my language. It is in Sanhedrin, the end of. The is my monadis in English. He put down there the 30 principles of Judaism, and they finish off that everybody who is clear in these 30 principles is considered as a Jew. Who is not?
He can be born by Jewish parents, but he's not considered as a Jew. So I come back to the point. Judaism is a pure religion, have nothing to do with any nationality, with the color, with the race. It's no difference. And I will come to this point.
We have to speak it later, really, but I will bring it up in the front to understand it better that, you mentioned the chosen people. What means the chosen people? Like, we hear often on the media and the Yao say, we are the kings. Everybody are the slaves. We may kill everybody.
It's our right. We can do whatever we want. We are the children of god, and we can do everything. It's completely taking out of of concept completely changing the concept of chosen people. Chosen people is means that god gave for the whole world seven laws of Noah.
I'm sure you will be, you know about it. However, for Jewish people, god gave them the Torah on Mount Sinai with 613 commandments. Jewish people, god chose these people to enlight the the world with a believing god, to be connected to god, to pray to god, to be more closer to god. This is completely a religious concept, the chosen people. It's not we are the kings.
Everybody are the slaves. To bring out the fact that Jewish people through the history, since God gave the Torah on the Mount Sinai three hundred, three and half thousand years ago. Only as, less than about twelve hundred twelve hundred years, they had their own country. Most of the time, from the three thou three and a half thousand years, they didn't have a country. And even when god gave the Torah on the Mount Sinai, he didn't gave it in the holy land.
He gave it before in the desert. Why? Our sages say because god wants to show. That means our nation is not a nation only by the Torah. We are I I the something what unite us, it's only the religion.
Not the land, nothing. Because of that, God gave the Torah on the desert to show we are we are a religion. We are not people like all the nations that we are united by country, by our language, if someone is so. So, again, this is what Judaism is. Now I come what is Zionism?
Zionism is a movement about hundred and thirty years founded by Teddy Herzl from Austria Vienna. He was a secular Jew. He didn't believe in god. He don't believe in the Torah. He don't believe in nothing.
So he had a different look completely on Judaism. Zionism try to transfer to transform Judaism from a religion into a national movement. Zionism say, if you want to be Jewish, you have to be a Israeli, have a Israeli passport, leave in Israel, save in the army, at least give much money for Israel and so on and so on. Speak Hebrew and so on. So they transform from a holy religion, from believing in god, from reconnecting to god into a empty, national movement.
What their their their achievements is only to have a strong country and to speak Hebrew and so on and so on. So Zionism is a try to transform Judaism from a religion into a national movement. Now I will come back I will come to another point to understand it better. We often hear speaking on the media that the the the the promised land, the promised land. Now it's true that god promised the land for the Jewish people as you can see in the Torah, but this promise was only conditionally.
If you keep a high level of life, god gives us the holy land for people, but god chose them to be more close to the to him. God give them the holy land, but this was only conditionally if we keep at the high level. If not, it's written the Torah 40 times that we will be exiled of the land. And then you can see that in the books of the prophets, especially in Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Isha'al, that god sent the prophets to warn us to repent to god and to come back to him. And if not, then we will be exiled from the holy land.
And at the end, you can see in the end of the book of Jeremiah that we were exiled by god. So, again, the the same god who gives us the land, he took it back from us. Firstly, to speak Who is not Ayahu to speak about the promised land when he he's an unbeliever. He don't believe in god. He don't believe in the Torah.
It's so hypocritically. When he was here in England for a few years ago, he going to eat to our noncosher restaurant. Why? He wants to demonstrate I'm not I'm not religious. I don't believe in god.
It's enough kosher restaurants here. He can eat money. Kosher, no. He go to a non kosher to demonstrate he is not religious. He don't believe in god.
So how he speak in the name of god? Name of the Torah and the promised land. Who promised that? God promised that you don't believe in god. The Torah promised that you don't believe in the Torah.
You're eating non kosher. You don't keep shabbos. You don't keep the whole Torah. How you speak? This is so hypocrisy.
But, however, I come back to the promised land. The promised land was conditionally. Now Jewish people are following god completely. We are believers in god. And one of the first steps in religion is believing god, trusting god.
Not only the Jewish religion, every religion, the first step of the religion is believing in god and trust in him full. The Jewish people, we believe in god. We trust in him. Believing don't means on its light. And it's light, you can see.
You don't have to believe. And it's dark, then you have to believe. And god send us an exile. We are in exile. We are not rebellion against God.
We are staying in exile like good children. It's like if you have a child, he's bad. You told him, okay. I punish you. Stay in the corner for ten minutes.
He coming down. What means that? That means rebellion. I don't I I don't care about you, about your punishment. I'll do whatever I want.
The same thing Jewish people, when god send us in exile, we're staying in exile. We are awaiting the coming of messiah. God promised us to send us the messiah. Messiah will take us out from exile. Maybe we will come later to the point of messiah to speak about it.
However, I want just to, in one word, just to say messiah will not be another until you even not kill innocent men and women and children. The messiah will come to be peace on the whole world. All the mankind will say the same. God in harmony and peace. However, maybe we will come back later to this point, but I want just to point out.
But we're waiting patiently in exile for the messiah. We know that the exile is a punishment of God and not rebelling against God even in the dark times. However, Zionism, Teddy Herzl, and all his friends, he have a different look. He don't believe in God. He don't believe in the Torah.
He don't believe in the promise of the land. He don't believe in the exile. Don't believe in nothing. So he have a completely a little cloak. He say, oh, how long we will stay in exile?
What's going on here? We have to organize ourselves. What should the English people do if they're an exile? They have to organize, make a strong organization, and then grab a piece of land. So this is really what Zionism doing because the comments in the background of the not believing in god, not believing in the exile, so they have a completely different look on that.
So they say, we have to build up ourselves. If we will not help ourselves, nobody will help us. This is so you can understand that the stand of Judaism is believe in god, trust in god. When god send you in exile, stay in exile. Don't do bad against him.
The the the the point of Zionism is exactly the opposite. Don't believe in god. Don't wait for messiah. Don't you you haven't got a lot to believe. There is no god in the world.
So you can understand Judaism and Zionism is extremely opposites. Judaism is believing, and Zionism is don't believe in god. So the Zionist, in basic, they cannot come with any religious background. That's what they're using the Torah to justify themselves like the promised land, the chosen people, blah blah blah. This is all taking out out of context.
It's completely taking out of context from all this.
Speaker 0: This is fascinating, rabbi. I'm learning so much. So in the holy book in the in the Jewish holy book, god did promise Jews the promised land, and that's what's being used by Zionists. But he's saying in in the book of Jeremiah, Jews were exiled from that land.
Speaker 1: Not only that. Not on that. In the Torah itself, the Torah itself, it's written 40 times that the the the promise is only condition if we keep our eye on the throne of life. In the Ijema, you see the fact that you were exiled at the end. Yes.
So you can continue. I just want to clear
Speaker 0: So that's that's how the religious base are. So so Jews were exiled, and to be able to return to the promised land, you'll it's conditional on the return of the messiah. Is that what it's conditional on, or is it conditional on other factors based on the on the Torah and the and the and the book of messiah?
Speaker 1: At the moment, we have to wait patiently for the coming of messiah. When it's really the redemption on the whole world, god will come out come down to this world more. People will see god. People will be all the people on the world will be more close to god. They have to go they have to wait for messiah.
God with three oaths. You can see that in the Talmud in Ksumbat in Ksumbat, page one one one. It's very clear there that god with three oaths not to rebel against the nations, not to go up to Israel in mass and, to the holy land in mass and not, yes. Three oaths got miswound us to stay in exile. So we are today, we are just warm by gods to stay in exile patiently waiting for the coming of messiah.
Speaker 0: So what is the counterargument for people that are that follow Zionism? What is their counterargument when they say we are the chosen ones? When you tell them, like, look. You were expelled from the land, and we have to wait before we're able to return to the land. You know, we have to be patient.
What is their counterargument to this?
Speaker 1: You know, look. In today's world, you have money, money, movements. Yes? And you can see money movements is building build it up on completely false arguments. And you will ask them, oh, but when they answer, they don't answer.
They just ignore the right fact. That's all. They know that people usually, non Jewish people are ignorant. They don't know the Torah. They don't know, what the Torah is saying that.
They can sell them whatever they want. They take out a small a small wares of the Torah, and they know that nobody can answer them. Nobody knows. That's all. I mean So But that's what I tell you.
This is something that it's open. The Torah is open today. It's translated in any any language, and everybody can see that, that the promise of the land was only conditionally. And everybody can read what was happened in the or in Issacho, in Jeremiah, in the end of Jeremiah, it's open. Everybody can read it.
Think you're with with the three oaths. This is open. Everybody can see the thing. That one one one, page one one one. Everybody can see that there.
Speaker 0: So I think you're staying with that. Judaism as a religion was hijacked for the purposes of Zionism. Zionism is a national movement achieving national objectives. How how prevalent is Zionism in Israel? You know, we see the polls.
The polls are pretty concerning. The number of Israelis that don't believe in a two state solution, the number of Israelis that support the war in Iran. And I've really tried to understand why that is. You know, my conclusion is that, you know, the media the way the media is framed, the way the politicians speak, the way in some ways, Israel way Netanyahu is always surrounded by enemies. He puts that map of tiny little Israel and all these big red countries around it.
That framing as well as the history of what Jews have gone through historically, which I think is an important factor, should not be forgotten either. You put all that together, and there's a kind of a sense of survival in Israel. That's my conclusion. But I'd love you to explain what the mindset is of Israelis in Israel, how prevalent it is Zionism, how prevalent it is, and what is their mindset within Israel? Where is it coming from?
Speaker 1: I'm a religious rabbi. Yes. I cannot speak in the name of nonreligious people because we are completely two different nations. Even both of us call themselves Jews. Yes.
But according to the Torah, they are not counted as a Jew. As I explained you before, Judaism is a religion. As I mean, you told me you are you are coming from a Christian background. You can understand who have the right to call themselves Christian, the people practicing the religion who have the right to call themselves Muslims. The people who are practicing the Muslim religion.
Yes. If somebody say, I'm a Muslim, but I'm not a believer, you will tell them you are a fake Muslim. That's all. Finish. If he had the power to call himself Muslim, yes, he had the power, he had the money, and he has, millions of people following him.
Could be, but it didn't change the fact that this is fake Islam. Islam means believing in god. I don't know. A Muslim principle is exactly, but, it means the Muslim principles. He has the same thing.
He's the Christians. The same thing is in Judaism. If people have the power to call themselves Jews, but we are nonbelievers, but we are atheists, but we are still Jews. I mean, they can't call themselves what they want if they have the power to death. Could be in the today's false war.
Everybody have the power. They can do whatever they want, but this doesn't change the fact. What means a Jew? If he wants to know what it means a Jew, you have to look in the right scriptures to find out whether it's a Jew. This is not something that you can Google in the Internet.
It's you have to look in the right scriptures what they say, and and that's what I told you before from my monadis. Again, the reference of that is in end of the in Sanhedrin. But you can say that you see that very clear what that means a Jew. So I'll come back to the point. When I speaking, I speaking in behalf of religious Jews.
What's going on in the secular world is not something what is in my I'm I don't speak about the secular people. Even though what I can say that even between the secular Jews, there are large movement against Israel. How I know that is only from the rallies, what's on the streets here in London, you can see that half of the speakers have Jewish names. In the among the the secular complete secular, but you see large amount of Jewish people taking part in all the rallies for Palestine. However, again, I'm speaking in behalf of Jewish people, and I can't say more, even not only of religious people.
I'm speaking really of Hasidic Jews. You can call it Hasidic Jews, Haredi Jews, all the all the Jews. I can just tell you people looks like me, have the keros, a bear with a hat. These type of people. Yes?
When you're speaking outside Israel, firstly, outside in the whole world. Yes? In the whole world, I can say very clearly that 95% of people looks like me, they are non Zionist. And 65% of them, they are anti Zionist. Strong, strong anti Zionist.
I give you example. Here in London, yes, the main community here, it's called Sattmer. Again, I'm not from Sattmer. I'm from Natuikata. But I just tell you the story.
Here in in London, the main the biggest community here is Sartmoor. Here in in North London, Stamford Hill, they have 12 to 15 synagogues. In a few of them, they're paying thousands of people, very big. Everybody knows the area, knows that. Yes?
And they are very strong anti Zionist. Yes? They're for the dismantlement of the state of Israel. Of course, they're looking for a peaceful dismantlement. Nobody looks for bloodshed, but they're waiting in a praying for that.
I mean, yesterday, it was in the Jewish calendar. It was the Israeli independent day. In the world, it is Israeli independent days on the May 15, about around the May 15. But in the Jewish calendar, it's a bit different. It's every year different at three.
But this year is coming as well as yesterday, the Israeli independent day in Israel themselves. The the it was yesterday, the Israel Independent Day. Yes. In the synagogues, they come together. They're fasting.
Not everybody, but many people are fasting and they're giving speeches and have special prayers to god for the dismantling of the true state of Israel. I mean, in Saturn, it's not only The U the the the the the leading community only here in Stamford Hill. All over the world, from Australia to Argentina, in New York, and Montreal, in everywhere in the world where you have concentrated people, looks like me, this type of people with kales there, this type of people. Sadler is the leading community, and they are strongly opposing the state of Israel. Even though they are not agreeing everything with into account.
One second. I want to come to the point about
Speaker 0: Of course. Yeah. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Of course. Take your time. In Israel. Take your time. They're just bringing out first outside Israel.
Outside Israel, 65% are strong anti Zionists. In the rest of them, up to 95% are non Zionists. Non Zionists means they have their lives, their businesses, their families, the the the education, the prayers, the the studies, Israel is not a part of their life completely. I mean, I will say I will say it in this way that when Israel will come to an end, they will not shed a tear on that. It's not a part of the life at all.
This is up to 95%. There's a small percentage Zionist people looks like me. This is outside Israel. And therefore, when you come to my area, you won't see there's thousands of thousands of Jewish people living here. You won't see even one single Israeli flag in the whole area.
And it's not only here. The same thing is in Manchester, same thing in Newcastle, same thing is in Belgium, in Antwerp, in New York, in Brooklyn, in Upstate, in Montreal, in Toronto. And I don't know. I mean, in Argentina, everywhere, you see people this type of people in their concentrated areas. You won't see the Israeli flag completely.
Now in Israel, himself itself is the situation a bit different because the settlers, unfortunately, looks like me. And and they are very strong Zionists. They are real madness. What he's doing here, this is unbelievable. We see in the media what the settlers doing.
And, unfortunately, they looks like me, but still in Israel themselves, are also hundreds of thousands of Jewish people. Well, they looks like me, but they are strong anti Zionist, and they don't take any benefits like you call it here in England. You know, basically, get it. Yes. I think in Israel, they call it.
I think so. They're boycotting that. They're boycotting the votes, and, they try to boycott the the the boycotting the army. You know, in today's day, there are 55,055 of Ayod, but they are not going into the army. They they call them in, and they just, boycotting that.
If the police catch him, they put him in prison. And our rabbi say for Ayod, better to prison not to go to the army. And 55,000 people yachts, today, like, there's a deer, we call that. People when they're running away from the army, they just don't go in, just ignoring that. They cannot fly out.
They cannot go out of the city or the state because they stop them in the airport and imprison them. 55,000 is a very large amount from people when they are boycotting the army. I mean, you won't see that in the mainstream media, but you can see that in the social media very much. So the situation in Israel, it's there are a large amount of people where they are against the state. But, unfortunately, there are a percentage what they are settlers.
However, this is these people, what you what I calling Hasidic Jews or Haredi Jews, people looks like me. The other people, the secular people, I'm not sure exactly what's going on there. And on their side, they call themselves Jews, and I'm not sure.
Speaker 0: I have I have a I have a few questions, rabbi. Yes. A lot of questions. So this first one, about the belief for the dismantlement, because there's a lot we agree on. Like, what the settlers are doing is heartbreaking.
Zionism was a concept. I don't oppose the state of Israel, but I definitely oppose the greater Israel project. Israeli foreign policy, I'm very critical of. There's so much we agree on. There's you know, I'm trying to find something where we can debate a bit.
The dismantlement of the state of Israel. So while a lot of lot of Israelis oppose Netanyahu, the majority of Israelis, I think, about 98% sorry. Major majority of Jews do not believe in the dismantlement of the state Of Israel. Now I understand from the interpretation you've just explained, it's something I'm learning from you now. You've explained the framework on why the state Of Israel shouldn't exist because Jews were expelled and they haven't you know, there hasn't been the opportunity or there hasn't been the scenario for them to return to the promised land.
Sorry if I'm saying it wrong, so I'll let you correct me. But isn't there also an argument to be made that I think Jews should have their own state? Because you do have state that are majority Christian. You do have state that are majority Islam, shouldn't you at least have at least one state that is majority Jewish? I'm not saying I agree with their foreign policy, but I think the when when the Jews that believe they should have a state, the state of Israel, I empathize with this, and and I find it to be a fair a fair thing to to request, to demand, or to aim for, to work towards.
Not they didn't achieve it the right way, but I think the end goal they're trying to achieve is a is a is a just one.
Speaker 1: You have a look. Yeah. You mentioned a few things. You mentioned the right that Jews have a right to have their own state, and you mentioned about the dismantlement of the state.
Speaker 0: I didn't think I don't think I said the way. Sorry. I didn't think I said right. I said I think it's fair to have right. I don't know what who gives the right.
I don't think that makes sense.
Speaker 1: I understand. Yes. And you say that 98 of Jews are not looking for dismantlement of Israel. Again, I'm not agreeing with that. Again, it depends whom you're calling.
True.
Speaker 0: True.
Speaker 1: According to my religion, no. Religious people are looking for the dismantlement of the state of Israel. They're praying for that constantly, including these people who are leaving in Israel yesterday. Sorry. Yesterday, in Israel in Israel themselves, there was large amounts of people in the Israeli independent day.
They're fasting, and they're going out in the streets with Palestinian flags, and they're going out to demonstrate against the state, and they are waiting for the peaceful dismantlement of the state of Israel. But this aside, but you didn't ask that. I just say that you're speaking about 95%. You don't speak about people looks like me, these religious Jews. You're speaking maybe about secular Jews.
And we will come back later to the point what our belief is about the dismantlement of the state of Israel. But, I want to come to your question what you're asking that Jews, it's fair for them to have a state. If I look, it depends on which background we're coming from. I coming from the religious background. Yes?
You you coming from the secular point of view. I'm sorry. I didn't want to offend you anymore.
Speaker 0: No. No. Offended at all. At all.
Speaker 1: At all. Not at just bring out the point. When you look when you have a secular look on that, yes, you have a point. Jews have to have it's fair for them to get to get their own land. Firstly, even when you go in this point of view, yes, still, you know, design say so many times, one of the arguments for the right for the land, they say, oh, we're through a holocaust.
Six million people has been died. We need our land. We need to protect ourselves fiercely before we go in to understand what the Zionists say. But firstly, doesn't the Holocaust the Nazis made a Holocaust, not the Palestinians. Why the Palestinians have to pay the bill for that?
I mean, what the Nazis done. If they want to claim a state, okay. Go to the Nazis. Ask them for some city to give them from Germany. It's big enough.
They can give you some. I don't know. If America wants to give the Jews a state, okay. Give them Florida. Give them, California.
I don't know. Give them Alaska. Give them something. Why the Palestinians have to pay for that? This is firstly I mean, this is completely unfair.
Before we're thinking, if Jews have a right and they have no right, as you're saying, not the right. If the if it's fair or it's not fair, let's say even if it's fair, what what why the Palestinians should pay for that? The Palestinians didn't make the Holocaust. They didn't do anything bad for Jewish people. Palestinians don't hate Jewish people at all.
I mean, I myself are coming from Jerusalem. My mom and Jerusalem. I'm already seven generations there. My mother told me she remember we used to live with the Palestinian neighbors, such a good relationship. We used we used to babysit each other to children.
We used to dance at the weddings each other. I, myself, I know many Palestinian songs. What my mother lay at me, what she remember. We used to be one at the other at the weddings. We was very best friends in Palestinians.
So why do why are you taking away a land from other people if even if it's fair? Now I come back to the point if it's fair or not fair. Again, with secular eyes, it's could be you can say, oh, it's fair. There is a large amount of people, 6,000,000 60,000,000, 18,000,000 Jewish people. It's fair to have for them alone.
Okay. Fine fine for them. Empty empty place. I don't know. But not going with the head of other people and kill them, exile them from the land.
But I have completely a different look. We are not a nation Yeah. Like all the nations. We are a nation. We are derived by God.
God runs the whole way of our life. And when God gives us the land, we're taking the land. When God took it away and send us an exile, we are believers. We accept the decree of God. We believe in god.
We stay in exile. We it's not fair. It's not something fair and not fair. We are in the hands of god.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I understand.
Speaker 1: I understand. No.
Speaker 0: That makes complete logical sense. It just depends on from which lens you look at it. You talked about the
Speaker 1: I want to come back to the point what you asked me before. I just looking if I can show you the reference here. Give me one minute. I look for the reference.
Speaker 0: Time. Of course.
Speaker 1: Yes. That happened.
Speaker 0: Sweet.
Speaker 1: Yep. This is just the Torah, the the Bible as he call it. I mean, when you're speaking about the dismantlement of the state of Israel, we Jewish people, we can we we constantly praying for the peaceful dismantlement of state of Israel, and we're waiting for that. I mean, again, I'm not a politician. I'm not a politician.
I'm just a Jewish rabbi, and I just can say the words of the Torah, the words of god. In the Torah, it's written, a rebellion against god cannot be succeed. As long as the state of Israel is a rebellion against almighty. As I said, god send us into exile. The Zionist are rebelling against god, against the victory of exile in the going out by force.
This rebellion against almighty in the Torah is written. The reference is numbers 14 verse 41. I will just show it to you here. Here is it. Numbers 14, verse 41.
A rebellion against god cannot be succeed. As long as the state of Israel is a rebellion against god, they will not succeed. They will never succeed. They will come to an end. Again, according to the Torah, even you don't see that with a political eyes.
But, again, I am a rabbi. I just say the words in the Torah. If you want, believe it. If you don't want, don't believe it. But we believing in the Torah.
We are sure that the state of Israel will come to an end. We hope and pray to our peaceful end. Nobody looks to blame, but it will come.
Speaker 0: If we so if someone tells you, rabbi, from a nonreligious lens, not a secular one, but just looking at it from a different lens, how would a dismantlement of the country look like? Because I worry and I fear, especially after what we've seen over the last few decades, is that it I know you kept mentioning a peaceful dismantlement of the state, but it's very hard to imagine that if Israel doesn't have the right to defend itself, not the right, the ability to defend itself. There's a lot of people you talked about Jews and and Palestinians living in peace many, many years ago. That's a very different world to the world we have today. Whatever led to the world we have today, whoever you wanna blame, we are living in a world where there is people in in Syria, in Lebanon, Palestine, and other neighboring countries that would not like to see a peaceful if their country is being dismantled, they would not like it to be peaceful.
Do you not have that worry as well if the country does head in that path that it could end up being a pretty violent end to the nation? Not that it's feasible now based on from a political perspective, a geopolitical perspective. It's not really a feasible scenario unless things drastically change. A different discussion. But the worry is that it won't be peaceful.
Speaker 1: You know, look, again, I'm not a politician, and I can't say the words of the Torah, and I didn't have to bring a a a solution for that. Listen. The the world is not my I'm not driving the world. Nobody asked me what to do, not Trump and not no. Nobody asked me what to do, and my words is nothing.
I can just say in the words of the tollway, and that's all. But then you ask me
Speaker 0: Does it worry you sometimes? Yeah. Exactly. I'd love to know your deep thoughts or if you think about it sometimes, if you have any any opinions on that concern. Sorry to interrupt you.
Speaker 1: I was
Speaker 0: just saying that, away from the Torah, if you have if you think about it yourself, do you have any opinions or worries that maybe it can go wrong? Is that a worry whatsoever? Yes.
Speaker 1: Yes. Yes. I come to this point. Give a look. You said that today is a different world, and people don't look to bring an end to Israel peacefully.
Fine. You have to differentiate where you stop. It's very important to bring out the point. The Arab world is blamed very much with anti Semitism. However, it is completely false.
And you don't have to believe me. Just open the eyes and look. Jewish people living today in all the Muslim countries peacefully. From Morocco, Tunis, Alger, Turkey, every land, you won't hear any of this. Iran, I want to leave it for the last.
Iran, there is a large community of 35,000 Jews. And under the messiahs, still, the Iranian people didn't concentrate. You know, these Jewish people. They had a concentration camp. So Jewish people have their golden life, and it's a open world today.
For £200, you can't have a ticket to go to Iran. Just go in here, open the eyes, and look. Jewish people have their, schools, high schools. In Iran, there's a Jewish hospital funded completely by the government. In Iran, to have their own MP, if every MP, I think the rate is about a half million people to get the MP.
Jewish people with a 35,000, they have their own MP representing them in the parliament. In Iran, the Jewish people have a golden life. There are even rich people with big businesses. They have a golden life there. Nobody can deny that.
I can't understand how people can be so blind in going with blind eyes after the Zionist propaganda that the Muslims wants to kill the Jews, one to two of the Jews into the sea. It's completely false. It's completely false. It's a open world today. Again, I myself, I was in Morocco.
Yes. I just crossed the border from Saulter from the Spanish part into Morocco. When I crossed the border, the Muslim people come to me. Rabbi, bless my children. I couldn't believe it.
After sixty after fifth seventy years of occupation, of genocide, still the Muslim people coming to me, rabbi, bless my children. It's almost unbelievable. The Muslim people have no problem with Jews even today in 2026. Even in Iran, they have no problem with Jews. They have a problem with the occupiers.
They have a problem with the genocide. I I'll tell you a nice story. It's happened, on, I think, on January 2023. I didn't remember exactly. It was three months after October 7.
We were invited in Turkey to a conference. Our rabbis came to the conference, and in the middle of the conference, it appears there, Ismael Alai Miyah. I believe you know who is that. It's not legal here to say who is that in in England. However oh, it's legal.
It's I'm just joking. He was the political leader of Hamas. We are not allowed
Speaker 0: to sympathize. He assassinated
Speaker 1: in Iraq. Yes. Yes. Yes. Are not allowed to sympathize with them and and, support them, but they may say the fact that it is.
The fact that he come up to this conference and he saw our rabbis. He told them to come up to the podium. Yeah. Rabbis come up. He embraced them and say, these rabbis will be welcome in the future Palestine.
We are not we have no problem with Jews. We have a problem with our occupiers. Jewish people who wants to live in Palestine peacefully, they will be welcomed. We have no problem with that. Again, you might I'll tell you my personal story, what I have.
This was about fifteen years ago. I'm not sure. At the time, Yassi Arafat has has passed away. If you remember that, I didn't remember how many years or not. I go up to the Palestinian embassy in London to give my condolence for that.
I took the opportunity to say, Fadame Bessada, look. I'm a Palestinian Jew. I want to claim a passport, a Palestinian passport. He told me, unfortunately, we're not issuing passport. Well, then we will.
One of the first passports will be for you. It will be a honor for us to give a passport for a Jewish rabbi to show that we have no problem with Jews. We have a problem with occupiers. This is the fact. Both parties in Palestine, Fatah, and the other one ex declared that many times, they have no problem with Jews at all.
So, again, I know when we look in politic in the in the political eyes, no. It's impossible. This is to fantasize, to say political, peaceful sentiment. It will never happen. I will give you two examples that it can happen at least.
If you I I don't know if this was in your lifetimes, for thirty years ago, more than thirty years, the the USSR. You remember that? I don't know. The USSR Yeah. Yes.
The USSR was very strong power. It was maybe the second to want power after The USA. And people think to bring it into the USSR, this will cost millions of lives. It didn't cost even one single life. Even not once in this that's happened in our days, not for five hundred years, a thousand years ago in our days.
And the second example is in South Africa. Of course, in South Africa, it costs lives much less than people think what's going to be there. So that shows that if there is a will, there is a way. So, again, I'm not a politician. I didn't have to bring the way to justify the words of the Torah, the words of God.
The words of God are stronger than everyone. And if God say in the Torah that our our rebellion against God will not succeed, they will not succeed. But I say just what our prayer says to be on a peaceful way, and it can happen. The land can be given back for the Palestinians anyway. That doesn't mean the Jewish people have to be killed.
Jewish people have to be expelled from there. No. We can live there like we live in Iran, like we live in Morocco, like we live in Turkey under Palestinian government. That doesn't mean that that should be killing or something like that. And, again, I know yes.
So I know I to hear I know you coming from the political point of view. Yes. But I coming from the point of view.
Speaker 0: I enjoyed I enjoyed I know you have a hard stop now because I had a lot more questions. So I'm gonna ask you to do this again to continue the conversation at a future time because I you know, one thing you said, Isma'il Hani, example of him embracing Jews and saying, you guys are welcome to Palestine, and we have no problem with Jews, is an image that's not portrayed anywhere really outside maybe some some some countries in the Arab world. And the statement you said that Arabs do not have a problem with Jews, they have a problem with occupiers, I think it's a very important statement because they perceive Jews in Israel as occupiers. And the same way and as you were speaking, I'm thinking the same way people in Israel believe in a one state solution, That means they want the Palestinians the the state is not a state, but the state of Palestine to be to be wiped off, to no longer be a state of Palestine. So everyone it's illegal in some countries to talk about the dismantlement of the state of Israel or or the wiping out the state of Israel, not killing old people, just wiping out the state as a state.
It's illegal in some countries to say that, and it's like something is taboo to say. But, yeah, a lot of Israelis are saying the same thing about Palestinian land. So why is it okay to say that about Palestinian land, not say it about Israeli land? I think both. I'm a believer in a two step solution, but these are all points that was that that were coming to me as you were speaking.
Looking at it from a religious lens, that was just fascinating. I learned a lot, and that's why I'd love to to do this again when you have time again.
Speaker 1: Okay. Thank you. The only thing I finish off is that we we pray for the peaceful dismantlement of the state of Israel. We hope it will happen soon in our days.
Speaker 0: Hopefully. Thank you for your time, Robert. Really, really kind of you to give us your time. Thank you so much, sir.
Speaker 1: Thank you. Thank you. Bye. Bye bye.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇱 Israel hired Brad Parscale on a $9M contract to build fake "neutral" think-tank websites designed to feed pro-Israel narratives directly into ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini. The sites look independent. They're not. They're engineered to shape what AI tells you about Israel before the models even finish training. This is hasbara for the algorithm era, and if Israel is doing it, you can be sure they're not the only government that figured this out. Source: Axios
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇱🇱🇧 Netanyahu and the Lebanese president may be sitting across from each other in Washington next month. This is huge. Two leaders from countries that have spent decades trying to bomb each other into the Stone Age, sharing a table in D.C. The catch: the meeting only happens if the region stays calm enough to allow it. So basically, peace is the prerequisite for peace talks. Source: Reuters
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇵🇰🇮🇷🇺🇸 Demands delivered by Iran's FM Araghchi in Islamabad: - lift the naval blockade - stop U.S. attacks and threats - reject "maximalist" demands or surrender terms (such as full nuclear dismantlement) Araghchi used Pakistan as the messenger, passing Iran's demands and https://t.co/eWX0oFBN8k
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸 Anti-gravity researcher Amy Eskridge was found shot dead... ruled a suicide. One month earlier, she texted a friend: “If you see any report that I killed myself, I most definitely did not.” She also said she was being hit with “energy weapons” and needed to “disclose soon.” Yeah… this one doesn’t fucking add up AT ALL Source: Daily Mail @CollinRugg
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇩🇺🇸🇨🇳 The Iran war is teaching Indonesia a lesson, and the implications could reshape Asian trade forever... Indonesia's Finance Minister just floated the idea of imposing a toll on ships transiting the Strait of Malacca, explicitly citing Iran's Hormuz strategy as the inspiration: "If we split it three ways between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, it could be quite substantial. Our stretch is the largest and the longest." The Malacca Strait is the most important chokepoint in the world for East Asia. Middle Eastern oil reaches China, Japan, and South Korea through it. Global supply chains depend on it. And China gets 80% of its energy imports through this waterway. Singapore and Malaysia immediately rejected the idea. But the genie is out of the bottle. Iran demonstrated that a single country with coastal missiles and small boats can hold global shipping hostage. Every nation bordering a chokepoint is now doing the math on whether they could do the same thing. The strategic picture is clearer than most people realize. The U.S. signed a cooperation deal with Indonesia during the Iran war. American military cooperation in the region is expanding. The first island chain of Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines gives Washington the tools to restrict Chinese access to the Malacca Strait if needed. Control the chokepoints and you control who gets what resources. That's the logic Trump is operating on, and Indonesia is watching carefully. China's dependence on foreign energy through narrow waterways is its greatest strategic vulnerability. If tensions with the U.S. ever escalate, Washington doesn't need to attack Beijing. It just needs to control Malacca. And Indonesia has just publicly signaled it's open to being part of that leverage structure for the right price. The Iran war may end up reshaping the financial architecture of every global chokepoint, from Hormuz to Malacca to Panama. Source: CNA, Fanack
reSee.it AI Summary
I sat down with former Israeli PM Ehud Olmert to discuss actions in Southern Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Gaza and the West Bank, and Netanyahu’s leadership. We debated ethics and strategy, agreed on some points and, most, that Netanyahu needs to go. I asked about the U.S.–Israel relationship and Trump’s influence. The conversation covered multi-front challenges, diplomacy, hostages, regional stability, and humanitarian concerns.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇮🇱 I just sat down with Fmr Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to discuss Israel - Their leveling of villages in Southern Lebanon - Their role in convincing Trump to strike Iran - The soldier smashing the statue of Jesus - The bombing of Syria - The future of Hezbollah - The future of Gaza and the West Bank - Netanyahu calling soldiers who stuck a knife in an inmate’s rectum “heroic fighters We agreed on some things, disagreed on others, but it was a rational conversation with a pragmatic leader, one that disagreed with the atrocities in Gaza, Lebanon and the West Bank The thing we agreed the most on: NETANYAHU NEEDS TO GO! PM Olmert was actually in Washington the day the war started, and I asked him a lot about the relationship between the U.S. and Israel, and how much influence Netanyahu has over Trump It was a great conversation, I hope you enjoy it! 01:43 – Multi-front challenges: navigating the complexities of Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon 05:12 – The Trump factor: evaluating the U.S. administration's role and long-term strategy 09:30 – Retaliation and deterrence: the strategic necessity of responding to Iranian strikes 14:15 – Lebanon sovereignty: debating the influence of Hezbollah vs. the Lebanese government 18:44 – Political solutions: the urgent need for a diplomatic exit from the South Lebanon conflict 23:02 – Military ethics: addressing controversial footage of soldier conduct in conflict zones 28:15 – Leadership critique: analyzing the decision-making of the current Israeli administration 33:40 – The hostages: prioritizing the return of captives in the broader war effort 39:10 – Regional stability: the potential impact of normalization and peace treaties 45:22 – Economic consequences: the cost of sustained warfare on national infrastructure 52:18 – Humanitarian concerns: balancing security needs with the protection of civilians 58:05 – Annexation debate: addressing internal voices calling for territory in South Lebanon 01:02:47 – Final reflections: the path toward a secure and peaceful future for the state of Israel
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation centers on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Iran, and regional dynamics, with Speaker 0 (a former prime minister) offering sharp criticisms of the current Israeli government while outlining a path he sees as in Israel’s long-term interest. Speaker 1 presses on US interests, Lebanon, and the ethics and consequences of the war.
Key points and claims retained as stated:
- Iran and the war: Speaker 0 says he supported the American strike against Iran’s leadership, calling Ayatollah Khamenei’s regime a brutal threat and praising the move as punishment for Iran’s actions, including backing Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. He questions why there was a lack of a clear next-step strategy after the initial attack and asks whether a diplomatic alternative, similar to Obama’s Iran agreement, could have achieved nuclear supervision without war. He notes the broader regional risk posed by Iran’s proxies and ballistic missiles and emphasizes the goal of constraining Iran’s nuclear program, while acknowledging the economic and security costs of the war.
- On Netanyahu and influence: Speaker 1 references the New York Times report about Netanyahu’s influence on Trump and asks how much Netanyahu affected the decision to go to war. Speaker 0 says he isn’t certain he’s the best judge of Netanyahu’s influence but believes Netanyahu sought to push the war forward even during a ceasefire and that Iran’s threat required action, though he questions whether the next steps beyond initial strikes were properly planned. He states, “Iran deserve to be punished,” and reiterates the need for a strategy to end hostilities and stabilize the region.
- Proxies and regional instability: The discussion highlights Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis as Iranian proxies destabilizing the Middle East, with Speaker 0 insisting that Iran’s support for these groups explains much of the regional violence and Israel’s security concerns. He argues that eliminating or significantly curbing Iran’s influence is essential for regional stability.
- Gaza, West Bank, and war ethics: Speaker 1 cites humanitarian and civilian-impact statistics from Gaza, arguing that the war has gone beyond a proportionate response. Speaker 0 concedes there were crimes and unacceptable actions, stating there were “war crimes” and praising investigations and accountability, while resisting the accusation of genocide. He criticizes certain Israeli political figures (e.g., Ben-Gvir, Smotrich) for rhetoric and policies that could protract conflict, and he condemns the idea of broad acceptance of annexation policies in the South of Lebanon.
- Lebanon and Hezbollah: The core policy debate is about disarming Hezbollah and the future of Lebanon-Israel normalization. Speaker 0 argues against annexing South Lebanon and says disarming Hezbollah must be part of any Israel–Lebanon peace process. He rejects “artificial” solutions like merging Hezbollah into the Lebanese army with weapons, arguing that Hezbollah cannot be permitted to operate as an independent armed force. He believes disarming Hezbollah should be achieved through an agreement that involves Iran’s influence, potentially allowing Hezbollah to be integrated into Lebanon’s political order if fully disarmed and bound by Lebanese sovereignty, and with international support (France cited).
- Practical path to peace: Both speakers acknowledge the need for a negotiated two-state solution. Speaker 0 reiterates a longstanding plan: a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Old City administered under a shared trust (involving Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and the United States). He emphasizes that this vision remains essential to changing the regional dynamic and that the current Israeli government’s approach conflicts with this pathway. He frames his opposition to the present government as tied to this broader objective and says he will continue opposing it until it is replaced.
- Personal reflections on leadership and regional hope: The exchange ends with mutual recognition that the cycle of violence is fueled by leadership choices on both sides. Speaker 0 asserts that a different Israeli administration could yield a more hopeful trajectory toward peace, while Speaker 1 stresses the importance of accountability for war crimes and the dangers of rhetoric that could undermine regional stability. Speaker 0 maintains it is possible to pursue peace through a viable, enforceable two-state framework, and urges focusing on disarming Hezbollah, negotiating with Lebanon, and pulling back to an international front to prevent further escalation.
Overall, the dialogue juxtaposes urgent punitive action against Iran with the imperative of a negotiated regional settlement, disarmament of proxies, and a concrete two-state solution as the viable long-term path, while condemning certain actions and rhetoric that risk perpetuating conflict.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Iran deserve to be punished.
Speaker 1: What's your stance on the war? And more importantly, why is Trump in this war in the first place?
Speaker 0: And I'm afraid that there wasn't much thought about what should be the next step.
Speaker 1: I've seen the image of this soldier breaking the statue of Jesus. Terrible. Do you think the ones that are dictating policy want South Lebanon annexed?
Speaker 0: I think that this is against the real interest of the state of Israel, and we have to move forward towards a political solution with the Lebanese government and pull out.
Speaker 1: I really don't know where to start. Like, if we spoke three years ago, there's only maybe a a couple of topics we could discuss, but there's so much going on, especially for Israel. Gaza's ongoing. You've got the the West Bank as well, the settlements in the West Bank. You've got a war with Lebanon that has a ceasefire, and, obviously, the war with Iran.
So I'm gonna start with the big one, the war with Iran. Before we talk about the ceasefire that's ongoing right now, would love to get your reaction when the war started. When there was that military buildup, is that something you expected? And more importantly, one big debate that's being had, mister prime minister, why why did Trump do this? You've got on one side voices blaming Israel saying it's Netanyahu that pushed him into this war.
On the other side, you know, the discussions about nuclear weapons. My position, it's more strategic because of, the stray to Homos, controlling the stray to Homos along with influence by Israel. So maybe I'd love to start there, mister prime ministers. What's your stance on the war? And more importantly, why is Trump in this war in the first place?
Speaker 0: Well, I was on the February 28. I was in Washington, not in Israel. And my at 3AM, my wife woke me up and says, hey. There is a war. So that's how I got to know that there is a war.
And my initial reaction and to this day, my my still my reaction is that when the president of The United States says that, an enemy which threatens the annihilation of the state of Israel, which, Ayatollah Khamenei, was doing for more than thirty years, and, that he's, building the ballistic missiles that can reach Israel and reach every point in Israel, and that he is trying to possess nuclear capacity, and that the ultimate goal of Iran is to liquidate the state of Israel. So when I hear the president of The United States says he is my enemy and, I had to fight him, you know, my initial reaction was great. I mean, this is something that I can understand, and I appreciate and congratulate the president for doing it. Second thing which I did, I said, I hope that there is a thought about the next step that they have articulated before they're starting. So while I was entirely in favor of hitting the Hezbollah guy, the Ayatollah that killed more than 30,000 of his own citizens in the most brutal manner deserved the punishment.
And so when the president is declared that this is the American decision to do it, I was very I'm very, very happy. However, I immediately asked myself and I asked everyone else that I could ask, what's the next step? Is there any thought? Is there any strategy that the president had about what we want to achieve and how we want to move forward and where we want to end this? And what can be achieved in a continued military operation.
And I'm afraid that there wasn't much thought about what should be the next step. Now the president is focusing on the nuclear, which is very legitimate expectation and demand by the president. No one wants the Ayatollahs. The Ayatollahs, they took over from the Ayatollah. I mean, we started with Ayatollah, which was 86 years old, and now we continue with the Ayatollah, which is 56 years old, but with the same name, Khamenei.
So and no one wants them to develop nuclear capacity, and therefore, the demand of a president is legitimate. Question is, and I don't know to answer this, but this is a question, a legitimate question. Could this be done ahead of a military operation in an agreement with Iran similar to the agreement that president Obama made with Iran, which president Trump withdrew away from? But if there will be an agreement that they from now on, any involvement of Iran in nuclear will be supervised effectively by the international agencies and by The United States and by the United Nations and by the international community. Then if this is and president says that this is the important goal.
This is the goal. This is the one thing which we want to achieve. Then, of course, one may have asked a question whether it could have been achieved before starting the war. In any event, this is what rises, you know, when we think about the military operation and the difficulties that it creates to the international economy, which is not insignificant. And also, the relative inconvenience, if I could put it mildly, to live for over a month under the attacks of ballistic ballistic missiles coming from all directions to the North, to the center, to Tel Aviv, to Jerusalem, to the South Of Israel, to the North Of Israel was not very pleasant.
So if all this was made in order to achieve a control over the nuclear the program of Iran, and it could have been achieved without war, then there is a question why was this war coming altogether. If not, then still, as I said, I don't feel any mercy for a leader that killed brutally 30,000 of his own citizens as the Ayatollah Khamenei did.
Speaker 1: So my position, mister prime minister, is very similar to you in my critique of the regime. In January, I was probably the loudest voice on next criticizing the the regime's actions against the protesters. So I have no sympathy for the for the government of Iran. Now I feel like you're implying the war was unnecessary, especially for The US and the global economy. Because the the negotiations right now are focused on two things, Iran's nuclear program and the opening of the Shreve Of Hormuz.
Well, as you know, the Strait Of Hormuz was opened before the war. There was not even any discussions of charging a toll at the Strait Of Hormuz, which is now being negotiated by Iran. And Iran was conceding on their nuclear program according to the Omanis and according to the Europeans. So then one begins to question I've had many debates on this, on the real reason Trump got into this war. And I've spoken to people privately.
I'm sure you've spoken to even more people than I and people on in my interviews. And I my initial thought was, as I said, strategic interests when it comes to the Strait of Home Wars. I just found it to be unfathomable that the world's biggest democracy and, you know, most powerful military would get into a war this risky and this, you know, dangerous or catastrophic for the global economy. Just to it's obviously not for the nuclear program because they were conceding, but for Israeli interests. And then the New York Times put out a story that says Netanyahu gave an in person presentation to Trump and his top advisers arguing Iran was weak and ripe for regime change, and the Israeli intelligence portrayed the war as low risk and fast, especially after what happened in January.
And according to the New York Times, there was limited pushback within Trump's own administration and intelligence officials. They were skeptical, but it was very, very limited. So they framed it framed it in a way that Israel was the main reason or elements of the Israeli government were the main reason that Trump took this step. I don't wanna oversimplify and just blame everything on Israel. That's not my position.
It hasn't been. I think it's too much influence. Now you were the prime minister of the country. So what do you make of that article by New York Times and and that narrative? How much influence does Netanyahu really have over president Trump in your opinion?
Speaker 0: I'm not sure that I'm, the best person to answer this question first because as you may know, I'm not the greatest supporter of Netanyahu on the contrary. So I'm I'm I'm ready to believe anything said against him because I have so much to say against him anyway. But I'm not familiar with this story. I read the New York Times, and I read this story. And I'm certain that Netanyahu was trying then, and he's trying now to convince the president that he should carry on the military operation against Iran even now while there is a ceasefire, and, hopefully, there may be an agreement that will end these hostilities.
But as I said before, don't underestimate the threat that Iran posed to world peace and to stability in the Middle East. Over the last three years, the war that started with Hamas on the October 7, the famous October 7, started because Hamas was fully equipped and financed and supported militarily by Iran. Hamas is a proxy of Iran. Hezbollah in the North is a proxy of Iran. The Houthis in the South are proxies of Iran.
They are shooting ballistic missiles to Israel almost used to almost every day ballistic missiles that were made in Iran. So the threat of Iran and the the the instability and the turmoil, which the Middle East was put into, was largely, almost entirely, a result of the provocations of Iran. And that was not something that a president of America can ignore or or overlook. So he had a a good reason to want to try and convince the Iranians to change course. Now was it necessary or essential or inevitable to start a military operation rather than to continue negotiations with Iran.
I'm not familiar with all effects to be able to judge the president. What I want to say in conclusion to this question is this, Iran deserve to be punished. The Ayatollahs deserve to be punished. What they were doing over the last three years, not just the threats to the existence of Israel, which they spell out on a daily basis, but also the actual actions of supporting Hezbollah and providing the weapons and the ballistic missiles to the Houthis and to Hamas, all of these, that needed to be taken care of, and I can't and why president Trump was aware of this. Two things which I can't answer you is number one, did Netanyahu convince him to do it against what may have been the judgment of the advisers of the president of what is the best interest of The United States?
And number two, which I don't know, is the president Trump before striking the initial attack on the February 28 had any idea of how he want to take it forward, the next step. What would be the end game? Was there any discussion? Was there any plan? Was there any strategy that was articulated by the administration?
This, I don't know, and this is a good question to ask president Trump even now.
Speaker 1: Yeah. The the reasons you've talk you were talking about why Iran is a threat, and I know it's a difficult now I'm asking you a question about US interests, but you were the prime minister of Israel, so I know I'm putting you in a difficult position. But when you're talking about why Iran is a threat, and you've mentioned points that we agree on supporting Hezbollah, supporting Hamas, supporting the Houthis, but those are threats to Israel. Hezbollah has no intention of attacking The US. We're not gonna go back to what happened decades ago.
If we go back decades, everyone's a threat to everybody at at some stage. But Hezbollah is a threat to Israel, and Hezbollah focuses on Iranian Iranian interests and and Lebanese interests on Israeli borders. Hamas, again, is a threat, to Israel. It cannot reach any US bases, and the Houthis, a threat mainly to Israel. So the question oh, that's why I go back to the question is, what were the American interests in this?
And you talked about Iran getting what they deserve. Very fair point. But at what cost? Because we're now in a position where there's a fertilizer shortage that could lead to world hunger that if this war especially if this war continues, a shortage of helium, oil. So it's impacted the global economy, harmed American interest in the region.
We saw the adviser, the former adviser of the president of The UAE, who I'm I'm seeing next week, and he put out a statement two days ago saying that The US should pull out of The UAE, pull out their bases of The UAE. They're not needed there. So there's massive, you know, negative repercussions against The US, even from our allies in Europe after this war, to target Iran that was supporting proxies that were a threat to Israel?
Speaker 0: Okay. Two things. Number one, I don't think that I can answer what is the interest of America. This is something that has to be articulated and defined by America. And and what I can say though is that I think that the the the threat to, you know, to the world at this point is mostly an exaggeration.
There are difficulties. There are of course, the Iranians are trying now to block the movement of ships. But I'll remind you that the movement of ships from the Indian Ocean was bad for a very long time because of the Houthis, because of the Iranians prior to the war. And this also had to be somehow taken care of. And so all not all of the difficulties that are now surfacing are a result of the military operation, and the difficulties which are surfacing have to be taken care of.
But they haven't yet reached a point where you can say this is really a danger, world hunger, there would not be food to eat or or, you know, unnecessary
Speaker 1: No. We're not we're not at that stage. Not We're at that. What I'm saying, if the war continues, this is a risk.
Speaker 0: The the the if the continue if the war continues without any strategy, what is the right thing, when is the right thing to stop, what is the right way to convince the Iranians to refrain from further dealings with military nuclear military plan and so on and so forth. If there is not any coordination that will make sure that the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon are continuing that may block one very important area of instability from furthering on and so on. So, you know, the initial military operation of America, as I said, in my judgment, was in a way also unavoidable and acceptable. The lack of strategy about what's next and the rhetoric which sometimes sounds a little bit extreme about destroying the civilization and so on and so forth are not helpful in reaching a reasonable agreement that will end these hostilities in an agreement that will be also positive for the stability of the region.
Speaker 1: Mister Prime Minister, I wanna move to Lebanon. So this is a topic for me that in my stance for a long time is that Israel had the right to defend itself. It was Hezbollah that attacked Israel first after October 7 and now again after the the the war, after the killing of Khamenei. And so that's been my stance. When when I debate people that tell me, Mario, if Hezbollah's not there, there's no deterrent against Israel annexing Lebanese territory doing to Lebanon what they did to to what they're doing to Gaza and the West Bank.
And I said, no. I don't think the the majority of Israelis don't want that. They just want peace on the Northern front. That's always been my argument. And then I saw what happened in the last few weeks.
The defense minister Katz, he made a statement. He said any about 20% of the population, so everyone that lives South of The Latane that had to evacuate for this war is not allowed to go back home even after the war ends. And then I started seeing those videos that you you've seen the footage of them leveling villages. I And kinda took a step back after months, even years, saying, guys, look. I really think Israel, their policy towards Lebanon is very different to that, against the Palestinians, and the approach is more similar to what we saw in Jordan and Egypt.
They want normalization and coexistence. But when I see the actions in the last few weeks and months, I'm starting to question that as well. So I'd love to get your position on Netanyahu's foreign policy when it comes to Lebanon and the line between self defense and something more sinister.
Speaker 0: Well, this is precisely where I stand with my criticism over the government. I I fought Hezbollah when I was prime minister in the second Lebanese war. Also, as a result of repeated attacks by Hezbollah over the Israeli northern section to the point where we had to do something in order to allow people living the normal way of life. We had to do it then. We had to do it in the last couple of years.
Israel started the military operation against Israel on the October 8 when they saw the events on the October 7, and and they moved forward rapidly into the border. And we had to evacuate more than a 100,000 Israelis from their homes for a period of a year and a half because they couldn't leave where they were the targets of the rockets and the missiles of Gizballah. But and again, as you mentioned, when the war with Iran started, after the ceasefire agreement was signed in November '25, they started again shooting. They they there there is still a change which has to be recognized. Government of Lebanon announced for the first time that they are prepared to negotiate peace with the state of Israel, which is, I think, an objective, which has to be a priority for us.
And therefore, I think that the ground operation in the South Of Lebanon is unnecessary because the range of the missiles that they are shooting is way more than the 50 kilometers from the Israeli border with Lebanon to the Litani River. And and therefore, no ground operation in these 50 kilometers is going to stop the shooting of the missiles anyway. And on the other hand, negotiations with the government of Lebanon and a joint operation of Israel and Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah by agreement as part of a of of a process that will have to be negotiated with the possible involvement of the international community, France, particular, that was always very conscious and very sensitive about Lebanon and is ready to help and support that kind of process. In other words, I'm not in favor. I'm I I criticize.
I criticize in in the harsh words, the statements made by minister of defense of Israel. We don't need to be in the South Of Lebanon. But, of course, we don't need to be there within the framework of an agreement that will disarm Hezbollah and that will make sure that the Israeli North part is not under the attacks of the rockets as it was for such a long time. But, of course, needless to say, I think that threatening the buildings and the houses is outrageous and unacceptable.
Speaker 1: Why, though? Why do you think they're doing it?
Speaker 0: There are so many whys that I have about the Israeli government. This is not the only one. Why and why and why and why? Why are they still there when they need to be thrown away and be replaced by a reasonable, solid That's responsible government. You see?
So, I have my wives as well.
Speaker 1: But I'll ask it again, prime minister. I'll be more direct though. Is there a risk the people that warn me, Mario, Israel's intentions, at least the current administration? So when I say Israel, I'm talking about the current administration. Yeah.
The current administration, their intention is to annex Lebanese territory?
Speaker 0: There are voices in the Israeli cabinet that the South Of Lebanon is actually also part of the Greater Israel, which has to be annexed to the state of Israel. But it's not a popular voice, and it's not it's not realistic. I mean, they they they carry on the hostilities. They carry on the military operations. They have the excuses that the Hezbollah is shooting rockets and so on, and it has to be disarmed, which it has to be disarmed.
Speaker 1: Agree.
Speaker 0: But but annexation of the South Of Lebanon will be totally unacceptable in Israel.
Speaker 1: Even under the current administration, you think it's going to be very difficult?
Speaker 0: Yes. I I don't say the same about the West Bank, of course.
Speaker 1: Yeah. The West Bank and and Gaza is heartbreaking. You know, you see I'm very nuanced when it comes to Iran and Lebanon, but Gaza and West Bank is is another level. Just going back to Hezbollah. So the disarmament of Hezbollah, I think it should be a condition for normalization between Israel and Lebanon.
And do you agree with that? And and I was I was think you know, I've been thinking in the last few days, is there any scenario or should there be any scenario where normalization would include Hezbollah remaining as a military force, or that's completely unworkable?
Speaker 0: You can't you you you can't take the risk, and you can't miss the opportunity. You can't take the risk because we know that for seventeen years, as a result of the second Lebanese war, the Hezbollah was deterred, and they were not shooting. Even one single bullet was not shot from the Lebanon into the state of Israel since August 2006 until the 10/08/2023. But but they have accumulated lots of weapons and lots of rockets and and missiles and the long range missiles and short range missiles, thousands of them. And you can't live in the hands of terrorists and radicals such as they are, these weapons.
And you you are going to pay one day, and Israel paid a lot enough in order not to want to have it. So the disarming of Hezbollah has to be part of the agreement and the cooperation between Israel and Lebanon. And I think that I think that there is a change. I I I'm not certain about anything. Okay?
And I I I kept saying it in Israeli media while I talked about it. I'm not certain that the Lebanese government will have the power to force the disarming of Hezbollah. But maybe together with Israel and with the international community and particularly with France and others, there is a likelihood that gradually, we will be able to achieve it, and that will have a strategic change in this that region, which was the source of so many pains and and hostilities over a long period of time. So this is certainly something that needs to be tried.
Speaker 1: Agree. I've been saying Hezbollah should be the same. I continue to say this for a very, very long time. Yeah. You know, putting the putting aside not only for Israeli interests, for also for Lebanese interests as well.
You can't have a state within a state. There's no examples right now of any country where that works. What about the concept of merging Hezbollah into the Lebanese military? So on one extreme, it's complete dismantling them and getting rid of their weapons, but another example would be merging them into the military so their weapons would still be part of the Lebanese military as a deterrent.
Speaker 0: Don't don't look for artificial solutions.
Speaker 1: Why is it artificial?
Speaker 0: This is artificial because if you want to disarm Hezbollah, you want to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah is not going to change. Hezbollah is going to remain a terrorist organizations dedicated to the annihilation of the state of Israel. If you give them air you open their way for them to be within the framework of the military of the Lebanese military to have their military units with weapons, you haven't done anything of in terms of disarming Hezbollah. So let's take let's take it for what it is.
Let's let's disarm Hezbollah in order to allow Lebanon for the first time in many years to live in an entirely different democratic circumstance and and environment that that will be also will be within the framework of an agreement with Israel, which will change everything in the North rather than being engaged all the time in trying to stop the radicals and providing them with weapons and and then control them when they have their weapons. This is
Speaker 1: this mister Baminissa, but, you know, but disarming Hezbollah, Israel under your administration as well in 2006 and now again in this in the last couple of years, Israel is one of the most powerful militaries in the world, was not able to destroy Hezbollah. And you're asking the Lebanese military, one of the weakest militaries in the world, to be able to achieve it. You talk about the international community, no but one will have no one would want to have troops on the ground in Lebanon. No one has appetite for that. So I worry that the other alternative, which is the disarmament in getting rid of their weapons completely, would lead to civil war, which is something that Netanyahu, I don't think, minds really to weaken another neighboring country by having civil war like Syria.
Speaker 0: Look. We Izbollah is not the same Izbollah as it used to be three years ago after the repeated blows that they suffered from the Israeli military in the last couple of years. That's number one. Number two, if the agreement with Iran is going to take place, then Hezbollah is going to lose the main provider of weapons. And without Syria as well, there is a likelihood, actually, that Hezbollah can be disarmed.
So instead of trying to make use of all these advantages at the time now that we have them and make the agreement with Iran also covering the Lebanese situation. And the Iranians say that they talk for the Hezbollah, and they say that they want a ceasefire to apply to Lebanon as well. When the ceasefire was announced only a couple of weeks ago, they say that they it's conditioned to apply this also to Lebanon. So we have an opportunity here for using the process of negotiations with Iran. If nothing works with Iran, then anyway, we are in a turmoil in a war and what what knows what.
But if there is an agreement, and I am very much in favor of such an agreement, then it should cover also Lebanon, and that means that Hezbollah will lose the main providers of weapons. And under these circumstances, together with Israel, the Lebanese army would be able to to force Hezbollah to disarm itself.
Speaker 1: Okay. So that this we agree. I think if Iran agrees to disarm Hezbollah, then they will disarm because Hezbollah has two parties to answer to, Lebanon and Iran. So, yes, and and I've always said, I think the person that will decide if Hezbollah disarms is Mushtaqa Baha'amenei and what his what deal he has with The US, whether that's one of the concessions for unfreezing of assets or lifting of more sanctions, the disarmament of Hezbollah and maybe other proxies. But if Mustaba does not agree, let's say the Iran US deal does not include the disarmament of Hezbollah and Iran wants to maintain that proxy, then it is impossible for the Lebanese military to disarm them.
The only option will be to offer them a path to merge with the military, which has historically happened multiple times. There's been examples of militias in different countries in like the FARCs in Colombia where they merged into the national army, and they were a terrorist organization as well.
Speaker 0: The national army, but in Colombia, I I think I'm a little bit familiar with this. They merged with the deferred army after they laid down their weapons, and they say that they they end their rebellion against the government.
Speaker 1: Yes.
Speaker 0: K. So if Hezbollah will be disarmed and will become a political party, will be merged into the Lebanese society, not as a distinct terrorist organization separate from the authority of the army. This is a different question. But
Speaker 1: That's what I meant. Yes. That's what no. No. That's what I meant.
I apologize.
Speaker 0: Not with arms, not with weapons, not not as a military unit. Because if you keep them as a military unit, the only, purpose for them to remain a military unit is to be able to carry on military operation against Israel. And this
Speaker 1: So what I meant
Speaker 0: we can agree.
Speaker 1: So what I meant is that the their arms, there's two options, either destroy them completely or provide them to the Lebanese military where Lebanese army generals and commanders control.
Speaker 0: They are Lebanese, so, they are part of the land. If they are not a separate organization, military organization, which does not comply with the discipline of the govern the elected government of Lebanon, then this is one thing. But if they are part of Lebanon and they are part of the political process in Lebanon, this is another thing.
Speaker 1: Agree. We're in agreement there. And I because when they merge with, and I know merge is a vague term, but if they merge with the Lebanese military, the armed forces, that then they only answer to one country, and that's Lebanon for Lebanese interests and not act as a proxy of Iran. This is the difference of them acting independently because independently, they're answering to, as I said, Iran. It's misaligned incentives, misaligned interests, Iran and Lebanon.
So that's why I think it's the best solution. And especially after the leveling of villages, mister prime minister, It's much harder now after the actions of Israel in the last two months. It's much harder to convince Lebanese people. I'm not saying impossible, but it's harder after these actions. If you talk to Lebanese people two months ago, Hezbollah support is at an all time low.
People are tired of Hezbollah. But now what they see happening in South Of Lebanon
Speaker 0: You're the people
Speaker 1: are starting to get very
Speaker 0: It's defined. Who who are the Lebanese that you can't convince? The Christians in Lebanon, which is a large part of the country, are anxious that Hezbollah will be disarmed today just as they were before. You're talking about the Shiites that live in the South, which were forced out of the where they live. So they they were not in favor of acquiescing with Israel then, and I don't believe that they will be prepared to acquiesce with Israel now.
Again, the question is, if Hezbollah is not allowed to operate as a military fully armed terrorist organizations not under the discipline of the Lebanese government, then this is one thing. If they are disarmed of their weapons, they don't have Iran as a provider of weapons, and they are part of the political process in Lebanon, this is another issue. And I I don't don't think that involving the Hezbollah as an organization in the military of Lebanon with their weapons and their military units still intact. No. No.
No. No.
Speaker 1: That's a bad idea. That doesn't as an organization, they need to be dismantled. We fully agree there. They should have no commanders, Hezbollah commanders, or leaders whatsoever. So we agree on that.
Okay. Another incident that happened in South Lebanon I wanna ask you about, mister prime minister, is and I'm sure you've seen it. I had it open on my phone. Let me open it again. But you've seen the image of the soldier breaking the statue of Jesus.
There it is. You've seen that one there.
Speaker 0: Terrible. Terrible. Terrible. Outrageous, terrible, shaming. It's the this is an expression of extremism.
I mean, of course, this soldier has to be called martial and taken care of by the military judicial system. But I I think that this is really something that uphold all of the Israelis. And there's no no way I can defend anything of this nature, obviously. This is terrible.
Speaker 1: So I I'll I'll I'll let you what I'll let you know what the question is because I'm I'm sure we agree that it's a terrible thing to do. And I also wanna say, and the actions of one soldier don't represent an entire army. And I also made the example of what happened in Abu Ghraib Prison in in in Iraq. I'm sure you remember well. When there were American soldiers doing horrible things to Iraqi inmates, torturing them, humiliating them.
So I I made those two comparisons to kind of remind people that every army has bad apples, has soldiers that don't do the right thing. But then I also started looking at the numbers, and I looked in Gaza. There were during Gaza, there were only three indictments and one conviction throughout the entire war in Gaza. And you know how horrendous that war is, the country. I was looking at the numbers a few days ago.
And for the first time, I'm starting to call it a genocide, I think, in in the last few days. Just looking at the the the impact it's had, it's been horrific. Now, obviously, genocide depends on intent. So I'm I'm using the word because I think the intent is different to what I initially thought. But there's only been three indictments throughout the entire war in Gaza.
And among the 260 complaints between 2017, 2021 about Israeli soldiers harming Palestinians, only 11 led to indictments. And, I remember the there were the soldiers that were torturing a Palestinian. They they they dragged him, stomped him, broke his ribs, punctured a lung, and then stabbed him in the buttocks as well with a sharp object, and that was caught on camera. And when the charges were dropped, because I think the person was in Gaza, so they could not have the charges if the person is not in Israel. When the charges were dropped, Netanyahu called them heroic figures, heroic fighters.
Sorry. And these were people that were torturing a Palestinian. That was only a couple of weeks ago. My question to you, mister prime minister, is because of the rhetoric we're seeing from people like Smotrich and Ben Givir and after October 7 and with the rhetoric of prime minister Netanyahu, are we seeing, kind of a a different mindset within the Israeli military as we saw under your administration? Because the numbers, they just don't show there's there's justice being served, and that worries me.
I know it doesn't represent everyone in the IDF, so I'm not putting the IDF all in one bucket. But the numbers themselves worry me a lot because they're you know, we saw a lot more indictments in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan of American soldiers.
Speaker 0: Well, again, as you have mentioned, the particular case where the charges were dropped and the prime minister called them heroics and so on and so forth. I'm not familiar with these the details of these, but and therefore, I don't I don't I don't want to argue. I know that the the judicial system in the army dropped the charges because for whatever Yeah.
Speaker 1: The charges illegal reasons. Yeah.
Speaker 0: They couldn't they couldn't bring enough evidence to court martial the soldiers. But I said, and I think I said it long ago, and I said it in the most explicit and blunt manner that there are crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by Israel. There is no genocide. There was never genocide. There was never a policy of genocide.
And therefore, I think that the arrest warrants against the prime minister and the minister of defense at that time were unjustified. But there were war crimes that were committed, and I spelled it out and criticized it. And I think that this is absolutely shameful and unacceptable, unforgettable and unforgivable. And it's not something that we can ignore or deny. We have to admit that we need to take the most severe measures and to make all the necessary investigations in order to reach out for those who committed it and to court martial them in a way that it will be clear that we are not capable of tolerating anything of this nature.
Full stop.
Speaker 1: So on the on the soldiers that were that were, the charges were dropped, I'm not talking about the the legal reasons the charges were dropped because I think there were legal reasons. I'm talking about Netanyahu's comments. Why call them heroic fighters, mister Prime Minister? Why say that to people that were caught on camera? When the people in Abu Ghraib Prison, when those, photos came out, Bush condemned them with very strong words.
I'm trying to find the terms he's used. He called them disgraceful, and he was deeply disgusted. That's president Bush when the photos came out of Abu Ghraib Prison in 2000 and I can't remember what it was, 2004. But then you got Netanyahu calling these fighters heroic fighters. What precedent does that set for other soldiers?
Speaker 0: The only thing I can say is that I'm deeply disgusted by the Israeli prime minister.
Speaker 1: And then on another thing as well, there was that law that passed where Palestinians convicted of lethal attacks facing the death penalty. You saw that. And you've got, I think, popping a bottle of champagne. What's happening?
Speaker 0: The government of Israel is run by thugs. And amongst the thugs, there is a messianic group led by Ben Beard Smotrich, which once and I say that when the war started and they were expressing their support and enthusiasm about the military operations of Israel, I say, their war is not our war. Our war is in defense of Israel and in in response to the mass killing of innocent Israeli civilians by the Hamas and in in attempt to reach out for the leaders and the killers of Hamas in order to try and eradicate the Hamas as a military power. The purpose of Bengvir and Smotrich is different. They want to clear their territory altogether from Palestinians in order to annex these territories into the state of Israel, and that is what they are sponsoring in Gaza.
And they said it and spelled it explicitly time and again. And I believe that what they want to do in the West Bank is the same, and I'm totally against it. I I'm not going to defend those things, you know, which I criticize because I think that they are against the interest of Israel, against the basic fundamental human values that characterize the state of Israel. And I I want the commanders of the Israeli military, chief of staff and the chief of the central command in charge of the West Bank and the chief of the and the commander of the division, which is in charge of the West Bank, And they against the inspector general of the police, I say to them, sooner than later, the International Criminal Court in The Hague will target you guys because you are responsible for what happens in the territories. And when things of this terrible nature happens and innocent people are attacked on a daily basis by Israeli settlers and they are killed and the olive groves are burned and the properties are burned and destroyed, you guys are responsible if you don't take the necessary measures in order to stop it.
So that's what I have to say about it.
Speaker 1: Do you think Israel bit off more than they could chew, mister prime minister, in this war and in the last few years? I'll tell you why. The polls, there's some polls that I saw a few days ago that shocked me. That's an aggregate of many polls. Young Americans 18 to 29, 10 to 20% believe in a one state solution called Israel.
50 to 60% believe in a two state solution, Israel and Palestine, and there's 25 to 35% believing in a one state solution of Palestine. So more than double or about double amount of people that are 18 to 24 in America, and that's America and Europe, it's even more, believe in a one state solution Palestine over a one state solution of Israel. And a real a large number of samples show over half of people believe are open to the ending of the state of Israel. So my worry, mister prime minister, is that the actions in the last few years have changed global sentiment across the world, including Israel's most powerful and most important ally, The US, that's gonna be felt for generations to come?
Speaker 0: Israel is a very important ally of The United States, and America is even more important to the state of Israel, and we are always grateful to all the American leaders over the years or generations, which were helpful, supportive, and friends to the state of Israel. I used to work with some of them. And I can tell you, with all due respect to president Trump, president Biden was a great friend of Israel. I every day, I thank him for his, friendship, for his support, and and for the inspiration which he provided to the people of Israel when the war in October 7 started. Never to be forgotten.
Never. And George and and Barack Obama I worked with Barack Obama, a great friend of Israel. And George w was a great friend of Israel, and Bill Clinton was a great friend of Israel, and all of them. And and George w senior George senior and Rand Reagan. Everyone of them was a great friend of Israel.
And I think that Israel is important for America. And, of course, America is a lot more important because America is so much more powerful and and and and strong and rich and very important for the state of Israel. I think that always the support of the friendship of between Israel and America was a bipartisan friendship. Israel was associated not with a certain section of the American public opinion, not just with one party, the Republican party, but with both parties. And and then how it should have been.
Now there are many things that are doing damage to the state of Israel. The present government of Israel is, as I said, is a government that has to be replaced, and the sooner, the better. And I'm totally against this government, so I can add to the damages that are caused to Israel in the international community with the damages which are co caused to the sense of solidarity and unity within the state of Israel because of the policy of polarization and divisiveness, which characterized the pro government of Netanyahu and his friends.
Speaker 1: You said Israel is a great friend to The US and The US is a great friend to Israel. You know, as a as a final question or two last questions is, how did Israel benefit The US and the region?
Speaker 0: Well, you know, America invested a lot in the Middle East, and that, in in, not because of Israel, because of American interests. In in the, Arab countries and in Afghanistan and in Pakistan and in Iraq and everywhere. This was not a war that was waged because of Israel. It was waged because of American interests. The only friend, consistent, stable, democratic friend that America had in The Middle East is the state of Israel and the existence of Israel as a strong military power in a democratic country.
And, of course, we are fighting on the nature of the Israeli democracy in these days, but Israel has been recognized as a democratic country for over so many years. And the existence of Israel as such, as a stable democratic country and a powerful that share the same values with America. The values of democracy, the values of humanity are is a major interest for the state of for The United States Of America in this part of the world.
Speaker 1: You know what what I'm implying there, sir, is is, I think, you know, as a prime minister of Israel, and I think any leader of Israel, Netanyahu being one of the worst, but any leader of Israel has done great in getting The US supporting Israeli interests. But I'm very critical of how much influence there's been Israeli influence over The US because I think is The US has supported Israel at their own detriment, especially recently. If you look at just recent history, the Iran war is one of the costliest, most damaging wars to The US. The nuclear program was resolved under Obama, not resolved, temporarily resolved, you could say, and was almost resolved in the Omani negotiations. Yet we got into a regime or The US got into a regime change war that cost them greatly, economically, militarily, dead servicemen, their allies in the region, and the repercussions could be felt for a long time.
Iran, one could would say is stronger in the region, not militarily, at least not now, by controlling the Strait Of Hormuz. You've got the issues in Lebanon that The US is not directly involved in. You've got the war with the Houthis a couple of years ago as well. I understand that was because of the Beyblah Mendeb Strait, but that was caused by what happened in Gaza. No.
That's what the Houthis said. They were responding to Israeli atrocities in Gaza.
Speaker 0: But how did the war in Gaza start?
Speaker 1: October 7. I mean, October 7
Speaker 0: Was there one person in the whole world, one political leader in the whole world that didn't make a very strong statement of support for the Israeli need to respond to the terrible attacks
Speaker 1: that Of course. I think but, mister prime minister, I think you'd agree with me. But you'd agree with me. There is a response, and then there's what happens afterwards. The response, there was a response, but it went well beyond responding.
So when you look at the damages of yeah. I I saw you know, I'm sure you know the numbers. When I saw the numbers, ninety to a hundred percent of the population displaced, Three point four percent killed, eight percent injured. Now this is criticizing, Netanyahu, obviously, not yourself. Seventy seven percent face acute food insecurity.
92% of buildings damaged or destroyed. 93% of schools damaged or destroyed. 4% of agriculture that's undamaged. So 96% is damaged. And there's $71,000,000,000 that's needed, and half of it's still invaded.
And there's talks about the war restarting because Hamas has still not been disarmed. So it's gone well beyond proportionate response to the atrocities of October 7. And if you also go back to the history before October 7, I think Netanyahu could have done a lot more in solving the issue in Gaza instead of making it worse. And I think his intentions are he's got sinister intentions, mister prime minister, when it comes to Gaza, when it comes to the West Bank, and when it comes to South Lebanon. And those intentions are playing a role.
They're playing a role in the cycle of violence. When you bomb Syria a few weeks ago, when Al Sharra is trying to bring peace to his country, to his fractured country, I'm not a fan of his and his history, but mister Trump is working with him and praised him, mister prime minister. The US, Israeli ally, is trying to work with Syria. Tom Barakum Let's put
Speaker 0: let's put some some things in the in the right perspective with your permission, please. Please. For one, number one, The president of The United States decided to attack Iran and say it to the American people time and again. Iran is a radical terrorist, brutal enemy of The United States Of America. They were responsible for the loss of many Americans' lives over the years in very many different terrorist operations against Americans in different parts of the world.
Now this was the the statement of the American president, and this was the policy of The United States Of America. Now, you know, if someone wants to say that the Israeli prime minister influenced him and that he became a stooge of the Israeli No.
Speaker 1: Not stooge. I wanna say stooge. Influenced him. Yes. But not
Speaker 0: You know, I I I'm not going to argue with this. What I think that needs to be put into perspective is the fact that for generations, the Islamic extreme terrorist organizations are are unsettling many different parts of the world. In '19 in 2005, Israel withdrew from every part of Gaza as part of the disengagement policy, which at that time, prime minister Sean and myself as a vice prime minister were executing in order to try and create a momentum for cooperation with Gaza. What was their response? A day after we pulled out, they started to shoot rockets.
So you can't cut the events and the rage and the and the intensity of emotions which characterized the situation over the last three years from the a long history where the Palestinians and the Hamas organization, the jihad organizations were perpetrating atrocities against
Speaker 1: Why why would net why would Netanyahu
Speaker 0: fund them
Speaker 1: for years?
Speaker 0: Don't ask me about Netanyahu. I am his political rival.
Speaker 1: I understand. But where
Speaker 0: I think that he has to be removed. I think
Speaker 1: We agree.
Speaker 0: Would be indicted for the crimes that he committed against the national interest
Speaker 1: But I'm but this is I'm doing, mister prime minister. I'm blaming his policy for that cycle of violence. That's what we agree. I'm blaming it. Not only I'm not saying he's
Speaker 0: responsible You're taking it one step, I think, beyond reason.
Speaker 1: I'm not I'm not I'm not
Speaker 0: The cycle
Speaker 1: is violence
Speaker 0: started because of Hamas, And the cycle of violence started because of Hezbollah. And the cycle of violence started because of the Houthis. And the cycle of violence started because the Iranians were shooting 300 ballistic missiles into the state of Israel with 1,000 kilos each warhead of these ballistic missiles. So that's how it started.
Speaker 1: We agree we agree on some
Speaker 0: You want to or you want to argue that the the Israeli response was exaggerated that we were killing many non involved people in Gaza. That's what I said also. I said it. I criticized the Israeli government. I think that there were it it went beyond a reasonable proportion, but it started by then.
Speaker 1: No. We agree. Mister Prime Minister,
Speaker 0: we agree. I'm not the
Speaker 1: look. We agree. I told you that I I think Israel has justifications to attack Hezbollah because Hezbollah is the one that attacked him first. We agree there. But what I'm saying is Netanyahu's policy is feeding it.
So for example, when he levels I'll tell you what I mean. Yeah. Exactly. This is I think if if you have no ID, mister prime minister, you have I wish Israelis understand how their country would be so much better off as well as the region and the world if there was a different administration. I think there's no election as consequential right now as the one in Israel.
And I I you know, the polls show a different story, and I don't think Israelis know this, but it's it is so upsetting to watch because there's so many Lebanese people and in other regions as well, other countries that just want peace even if it doesn't if they think something's unjustified, whether they think the Golan Heights shouldn't be part of Israel, they just want peace. But when they see villages being leveled or stains by cuts or Ben Giviar popping a bottle of champagne I remember when Ben Giviar popped a bottle of champagne in the Knesset, do you know there were soldiers in Syria that amassed together and they were marching towards the Israeli border and stopped at the last minute thanks to Al Sharra? So that these actions are feeding the animosity.
Speaker 0: Look. Look. Look. I don't we don't
Speaker 1: have an
Speaker 0: argument. I you have a similar opinion about the Israeli government and the Israeli ministers, and I am in a daily fight with them. Unlike you, you you you live out there. I live down here, and I have this war with them on a daily basis. Let let's let's focus in conclusion to one thing which I think is very important.
We don't have to lose the hope for an eventual conclusion of the historic conflict between Israel and Palestine. I have proposed to the Palestinian leaders in 2008 when I was prime minister, a comprehensive plan, a solution of a two state on the basis of the 67 borders with the Arab side of Jerusalem as capital of Palestine. And of the old city of Jerusalem, including the Temple Mount, which is perhaps the most sensitive place on earth, is not under the exclusive political sovereignty of either Israel or Palestine, but administered by a trust of five nations of which there will be Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and America. Now this was the solution that I proposed then and that, unfortunately, the Palestinian leader at the time, Mahmoud Abbas, still president of the Palestinian authority, didn't have the courage or the inspiration to say yes. In a year and a half ago, almost two years ago, I signed a joint statement with the former foreign minister of the Palestinian authority and the ambassador to the United United Nation, doctor Nasr Al Quidua, by the way, nephew of Arafat, I signed a joint statement with him offering or or or suggesting the end of the war in Gaza in line more or less in the same basis of what president Trump proposed in his 20 points, and also a comprehensive solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict on the basis of the peace plan, which I presented Ahmad Abbas in 2008.
Now people come to me all the time and says, how serious you are now talking about a comprehensive solution of two state? And I said, I'm very serious. There is no alternative. There is only one way to change the entire Middle East and make the Middle East something entirely different from what it was over the last generations. And this is a solution of the Israeli Palestinian conflict on the basis of two states, on the basis of the 67 borders, is the Arab side of Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, and of the old city of Jerusalem, not under any political sovereignty of any in order to keep this outside of any potential conflict.
This is what we have to fight for, and this is what we have to campaign for, and this is what we have to raise all our political and the power of persuasion across the world in order to force the sides involved into engage in a serious dialogue towards the realization of this. And this is what I'm trying to do. And this is in total opposition to everything that the present Israeli government is doing, and that's why I'm a political opponent of this government. And I will keep my opposition to this government until it is replaced by a different government.
Speaker 1: Well, I hope you keep your efforts, mister prime minister. I wanna ask one final question to wrap up is it's a difficult question. It's gonna ask you to speculate. Being pragmatic, do you think that the voices in the Israeli administration, the current government, do you think the ones that are dictating policy want South Lebanon annexed? I know there's voices that want it annexed, but I'm saying, they the ones that are dictating current policy or not?
Speaker 0: They certainly influence it. Whether they dictate it or not, I don't know. But in any way, as I said, I think that this is against the real interest of the state of Israel. It has to stop, and we have to to move forward towards a dialogue with the Lebanese government towards a political solution with the Lebanese government and pull out back into the international line and to make sure that Hezbollah is not in any position to attack Israel any further.
Speaker 1: Mister prime minister, it's an absolute pleasure. I hope you continue being loud about the issues you believe in. You're you're doing not only Israel a favor, a big favor, but the the entire world. So thank you so much for what you do.
Speaker 0: Thank you. Thank you.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷🇺🇸 Iran is using the Strait of Hormuz as a wartime card, but it's also building the legal case to control it permanently. Iranian lawyers argue that a strait loses its status as neutral international waters when one side turns it into a military platform. Under that logic, the U.S. naval presence gives Iran justification to claim the strait as a hostile military zone indefinitely. This war could end next week, and that argument doesn't go away. Source: Guardian
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 Iran couldn't beat Trump militarily. So it hit him where it hurts: the economy. 7 weeks of strikes failed to topple the regime or meet Trump's demands, but Iran found something that worked. It closed a strait, spiked global energy prices, and watched Trump's approval ratings slide and his MAGA base start to grumble. Trump shifted from airstrikes to diplomacy on April 8. That pivot didn't come from military logic. It came from financial markets, rising gas prices, and Republicans quietly panicking about the midterms. Iran took a military beating but figured out early that the real battlefield was economic. The IMF is now warning of a global recession, U.S. farmers are feeling it through fertilizer costs, and airfares are up. Trump ran on cheap gas and low inflation. Iran ran straight at that promise, and it worked. Source: Reuters
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨 BREAKING: 🇨🇳🇸🇦🇮🇷 Xi Jinping told Saudi Crown Prince MBS directly that normal traffic through the Strait of Hormuz must be maintained. Source: Al Arabiya https://t.co/QN9ievZXsO
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 One bold prediction is already in motion. Ex. U.S. Navy Malcolm Nance says when American carriers leave, Iran will demand U.S. warships never enter the Gulf again, and we'll be forced into a confrontation to prove we still can. "You can trust Iran when they talk about these things that benefit them." The map is changing. The question is who blinks first. @MalcolmNance
reSee.it AI Summary
I spoke with Tehran University Professor Foad Izadi, who warned me not to trust Western claims the war is over, as Iran seems prepared for worse. He says Trump’s aim to control Hormuz isn’t finished, so war could resume. Negotiations often mask prep for conflict, and extra U.S. troops fuel fear. We debated Hezbollah’s Lebanon vs Iran interests and whether a real U.S.–Iran deal is possible amid sanctions, Congress, and Netanyahu.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 EXCLUSIVE: Tehran University Professor Foad Izadi warned me not to fall trap to the Western narrative that the war is over, and that Iran is preparing for a continuation of the war The discussion shook me, as it gave me a glimpse to a completely different narrative in Iran, one of distrust, anger and preparedness for the worse Foad told me that Trump’s objective of controlling the Strait of Hormuz has not been completed, and therefore the war is more likely to continue than to have ended He’s seen this playbook before: Negotiations used to disguise preparations for war. And the additional troops Trump has sent to the region fuel this fear We also had a heated discussion about Hezbollah’s role in all this, debating whether the group acts in the interests of Lebanon or Iran, and what the future holds for the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire Here’s what we talked about: • Whether the true objective of the war was Iran’s nuclear program, securing influence over global oil flows, or leverage against China • Why Foad thinks the odds of war resuming are still alarmingly high despite Trump’s recent comments • Why he believes Hezbollah is acting in Lebanon’s interests, not as a simple Iranian proxy • Whether any real U.S.-Iran deal is possible when Congress, sanctions law, and Netanyahu still shape the playing field @IzadiFoad 00:00 – Iranian influence vs. Lebanese sovereignty in the Hezbollah conflict 02:14 – Analyzing the "Regime Change" narrative and Trump's influence on Iranian policy 05:32 – The proxy debate: are Hezbollah and regional militias independent actors? 09:45 – Escalation risks: the potential for direct military conflict between Israel and Iran 13:20 – Economic impact: how sanctions and regional instability affect the Iranian public 17:55 – Diplomatic deadlocks: the challenges of reviving international nuclear agreements 21:12 – Misinformation and the media war: how both sides shape the regional narrative 25:40 – US foreign policy: the role of the Israeli lobby and Washington’s strategic goals 30:15 – Regional alliances: Iran’s relationship with neighboring Gulf states and Russia 34:50 – The "Two-State" vs. "One-State" solution: debating the future of Palestine 39:12 – Internal Iranian politics: the evolution of the regime under international pressure 43:25 – Youth perspectives: shift in American public opinion regarding the Middle East 47:33 – Closing reflections on historical precedents and the path to regional peace
Video Transcript AI Summary
Professor and Host engage in a wide-ranging discussion about the Iran-Israel-Lebanon dynamic, the prospects for war, and the potential paths to change.
- They open with tensions around Iran, suggesting that Netanyahu and the Israeli lobby won’t let Iran “rest,” and that Iran is implicated in the current Lebanon conflict while insisting that Lebanon’s fight is Lebanon’s own. The Professor stresses that Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization and not a direct Iranian proxy, and that Iran’s involvement is framed by its own interests rather than as an intrusive occupation of Lebanon.
- The Host challenges this view, noting that Lebanon’s government decided not to join the war and that Hezbollah rearmed in the south, arguing that Iran has influence in Lebanon and that Hezbollah’s actions reflect a broader proxy dynamic in the country. The Professor counters that Hezbollah is not a proxy and emphasizes Lebanon’s sovereignty and internal affairs, while arguing that Iran can assist resistance groups when asked but should not be blamed for all Lebanese actions.
- They discuss the state of the conflict: is the war over or a ceasefire that could resume? The Host asks for a probability estimate (1–10); the Professor places it at six or seven that it could re-ignite, arguing that Trump and Netanyahu will continue to push Iran and that the regime in Tehran will respond, given new leadership and a determination to avoid being disarmed or appeased.
- On aims and capabilities, the Professor cites Trump’s stated desire to take over Iranian oil (per a Financial Times interview) and to “change Iran’s government,” including the idea of disintegrating Iran and establishing an Israeli-driven hegemony in the region. He also suggests Trump views oil leverage as a strategic tool against China, drawing on broader geopolitical ambitions such as the North-South Corridor. The Host and Professor discuss the idea of leveraging Iran’s oil to pressure or blockade China and to influence global power dynamics.
- The conversation moves to the larger question of how to achieve U.S. objectives short of full-scale war. The Host suggests non-military options beyond sanctions, including possible tolls, business deals, or new arrangements around the Strait of Hormuz, while the Professor argues that sanctions relief would require Congressional action and that Netanyahu’s influence makes relief unlikely. The Host proposes that sanctions relief could be tied to dismantling proxies like Hezbollah, with Iran receiving asset unfreezing in exchange, and a tollbooth mechanism as possible recompense.
- They compare political systems: the Host asks whether a more pragmatic Iranian leadership could compromise with the West, while the Professor challenges the notion of embracing Israel or normalization absent broader regional changes. They discuss Iranian internal politics, including protests and the 2021–2024 leadership shifts, arguing that the current leadership is generally more energetic and less likely to exercise restraint under renewed pressure.
- The Wall Street Journal summary is invoked: a shift to a harderline leadership within Iran, with Mustafa Khamenei described as consolidating power and surrounding himself with hardliners who view destroying Israel as central. The Host and Professor debate whether this portends greater confrontation or potential pragmatism in dealing with the United States, emphasizing that any significant rapprochement would hinge on broader regional dynamics and the role of Israel.
- The discussion turns to the prospects for a two-state solution versus a one-state outcome in Palestine. The Professor contends that a one-state solution would be unlikely unless Israel changes fundamentally, while the Host notes shifts in Western public opinion and some American youths showing increasing sympathy for Palestinian rights. They acknowledge that most polling in the U.S. still supports a two-state framework, even as younger demographics show divergent views.
- They close with mutual acknowledgement that there is no straightforward path to peace, reiterating concerns about possible future confrontations, the influence of external powers, and the complexities of Lebanon’s sovereignty, Hezbollah’s role, and Iran’s internal politics. The Host and Professor each express hopes for peace, while recognizing the likelihood of continued strategic competition rather than a clear, immediate resolution.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I don't think the Netanyahu or the Israeli lobby are going to let Iran rest.
Speaker 1: Iran is the reason Lebanon is at war right now.
Speaker 0: Israel is not a proxy. Lebanese are fighting for Lebanon.
Speaker 1: But the Iranian government makes its decision for Iran. The Lebanese government has the right to make its own sovereign decisions, and Hezbollah has to abide.
Speaker 0: The fight between Lebanese government and Hezbollah is an issue that belongs to Lebanon.
Speaker 1: Trump said they really do have a different regime now.
Speaker 0: There is no achievement to come up with. So he says that I already I said I of the regime change, and I have done that.
Speaker 1: Congratulations that the war is over. First, do you agree with me that the war is over?
Speaker 0: No. It's a ceasefire. It can start it can start again. You know, we were under ceasefire when Americans attacked the in in June when Americans attacked. They asked for a ceasefire last time, and then Iran accepted.
And then we had this attacks in February. So one thing we know about The US is that they ask for ceasefires, and then once they get enough rest, they start shooting again.
Speaker 1: Looking at things objectively, I understand that maybe you are already being kinda objective at all. I understand that fighting could resume, and I understand that previous ceasefires did not stand. I was pretty surprised on this war happening after the twelfth day war. Never expected this to happen. So I could be surprised again.
But from what we're seeing right now, including Trump's comments yesterday that the war is over, considering the economic damage Iran has caused, seeing how markets are reacting, I understand there's a military buildup in the American basis, but it seems more like it's replenishing the basis rather than preparing for a new war. If I ask you to analyze the likelihood of the war starting, what would you give it? One to 10?
Speaker 0: It's about six six or seven.
Speaker 1: You think it's more likely that we're back to a full blown war than this ending permanently?
Speaker 0: Yeah. I think so. You know what? Trump is going to be president for another three years. They haven't achieved their goals against Iran, and Netanyahu is the same genocidal man that he was he has always been.
So I don't think they're going to give up on damaging Iran more, and he's going to be around for for some time. I don't think we can do twenty fifth amendment on him. So he's going to be around, and and then he's going to try to attack Iran again. You said
Speaker 1: they haven't achieved their goals against Iran. What are those goals?
Speaker 0: This is what Trump said. He wants to take over Iranian oil. He he said that in the interview he had with the Financial Times. And then the next day, a reporter asked him, why do you wanna take over Iranian oil? And he says that he's a businessman, and he he wants to make money.
These are his words. People have asked
Speaker 1: him Are you talking about the interview a while ago?
Speaker 0: No. No. No. Financial Times, this is about ten days ago? Yeah.
Speaker 1: I mean, during during the war.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Yeah. So I I I think he he wants he likes Venezuelan oil. He likes Iranian oil. He thinks he is successful with taking over Venezuela oil.
He wants to do the same with Iran. And I don't think he has given that up. He wants to change Iran's government. He actually, he wants to create a new country. He wants to separate oil rich parts of Iran, create a country.
You know, Bahrain was a province of Iran. It was the British that separated that, and that's how you have Bahrain. They want to do a similar thing, create a new country and put put some some ruler there, and then they can enjoy the oil. It's you know, Iran taking over Iran, disintegrating Iran, creating an Israeli hegemony in this part of the world, and having some leverage against China and Russia, these are very tempting goals that Trump has. This is not my analysis.
You had Lindsey Graham saying that they want to have leverage against China. Right now, when UAE or Saudi Arabia or Kuwait sell oil to China, they cannot pressure these countries too much because that would increase the value of Iranian oil. But if you have Iranian oil in your hands, then you can do a blockade as they're doing now. Whenever they want to push China around, they can reduce the amount of oil that's going to China. That's the leverage they don't have.
Trump thought that he has the tariffs to push China around. Then you had the US Supreme Court stopping that. China has leverage on US. They have these rare earth minerals. They they produce 90%.
So they have a leverage on United States, but US doesn't have any serious leverage on China. They want to use the energy of the Persian Gulf to create that for The United States. The North South Corridor that starts in Russia and goes all the way to East Asia, goes through Iran, goes through a state of Hormuz. So they they want to have that lever leverage as well. So it's beyond Iran.
It's bigger than Iran. What you are seeing is a lot of geopolitics. United States is a country in decline, and they want to reverse that, like, decline by basically dominating a very important part of the world.
Speaker 1: I agree with everything you said. I Yeah. Congratulations. I've been I've been I've I've been saying this from the beginning because and I get a lot of slack for it because everyone wants to take the easy path of blaming Israel fully. I'm not saying they don't have influence, but they're not the only reason for this.
Blaming the nuclear program, saying Trump is helping the the protesters, whatever narrative resonates the most with the readers. But for me, this one makes the most sense. And I also like your analysis because based on that theory, the possibility of the war restarting increases. And that's true because the objective of controlling the trade almost have leverage over China has not been achieved. But a counter argument to that is and the reason I think the war is over is the military the the the the achieving that objective through military means has just failed.
It did not work. The global economy can't take this again. The US took a fair bit of casualties. Iran adapted to the bombardment by The US and Israel. They're importing the air defense systems from China.
They're importing man pads from China. We know they're getting intelligence from Chinese satellites and potentially Russian satellite satellites as well. Russia's supplying Iran. So Iran has gotten has has is well prepped if this war resumes. So wouldn't the solution to achieve that objective, wouldn't the US try to seek to achieve it through non military means
Speaker 0: and that
Speaker 1: we might be seeing phase two of the war right now, but more of an economic war or or or just another, you know, version of asymmetric warfare that does not include direct kinetic warfare?
Speaker 0: We have had that for the last forty seven years since the nineteen seventy nine revolution, and it didn't work. It's been about half a century that they have tried that without much success. We had a coup attempt in January. You know, Trump talked about sending arms to the so called protesters. When you shoot at police in English, they don't call that person a protester.
They call that person a police shooter or a cop killer. This is these are the things that Trump has talked about. So that coup failed in January. This attack the military attack failed, as you correctly said. They they may try to attack Iran again sometime before the midterm elections, a couple of and it has to end a couple of months before the midterm elections.
And then after midterms, they got two years until the next election to achieve their goals. I I don't think they're giving up. I don't think the Netanyahu or the Israeli lobby are going to let Iran rest. I think they they want to they want to change the map of the Middle East. But why not?
Speaker 1: There's other means other sorry to interrupt you, professor. But you could do this, achieve that objective through non military means, but also through means other than sanctions. So sanctions have not worked. We've just bombed Iran. We've got a new leadership there and then we're gonna talk about the new leadership because it doesn't look like it to be more friendly to The US in any way.
But we've got new leadership in Iran. Again, like, there must be other ways other than achieving it through sanctions, and maybe it's just doing business deals. You know, Trump already floated the idea of sharing tolls with Iran, the Strait Of Hormuz. That doesn't sound feasible, but I'm sure there's other ways to be able to achieve the objective of having more influence over the Strait Of Hormuz or just giving up on that objective completely. And just maybe over time, over the next few decades, we may see a more friendly Iran or an improvement improving of relations.
I just don't see us I see the cons outweigh the pros of going back into war. And maybe that's something you can comment on as well as how ready is Iran for a new war.
Speaker 0: You know, Iran makes these drones and ballistic missiles underground. You know, when the war started in Gaza, Iranian leaders realized that sooner or later Israel will attack Iran. So they had two years of preparation to make sure that the country can continue firing these missiles because they realize Israelis have a good air force. They realize that if these factories are on the ground, they would be hit quickly. And this is the reason they continue to fire missiles under heavy bombardment.
You know, the American and Israelis brought everything they had. Everything they had. They had no limitations. They were bombing schools, hospitals, railroad stations, people's homes, just ordinary citizens. They had no ethical limitations.
And, you know, it was the other side that asked for the ceasefire through the Pakistanis. Iran was ready to continue. And there are a lot of people in Iran that are upset that the fight has stopped because they are worried about Lebanon, what's going on in Lebanon. They they don't like what they see in Lebanon, and they don't want to give the other side time to rest. So Iran can continue can continue for many months to come.
Speaker 1: We'll talk about that in a in a second about economically how prepared is Iran to continue the war because the blockade of the Strait Of Hormuz hurts the global economy, but also suffocates the Iranian economy as well. But just going back on a statement you made there, worried about Lebanon. I think that's unfair to say. Iran is the reason Lebanon is at war right now. Now you might go back to the ceasefire that Israel was breaching the ceasefire.
I would respond that Hezbollah was breaching the ceasefire by rearming in the South. We Israel kept saying that. We didn't know whether it's true or not. What we saw that is true when Iran Hezbollah fired at Israel right after a few days after Khamenei was dead. But it's unfair to say, unless you unless you admit that the reason Lebanon is at war right now is because Hezbollah made the decision to support Iran at the cost of Lebanon.
Would you agree with that?
Speaker 0: You know, we talked about this last We talked on your show that Lebanese are fighting for Lebanon because they're next to Israel, and Israelis like Lebanese land. They they want to eliminate they want a weak government in Lebanon so they can push that government around. They don't want any strong government in the Middle East. That's why the Turkish government is worried. Pakistani government is worried.
They they want weak states so they can push these countries around and create hegemony. So Lebanon has a problem. Lebanon had a problem before the Islamic revolution. You know, this is this is not due to Iran. Sure.
They you know, Israelis and Palestinians had serious difficulties before 1979. Iran did not create All accurate. The US.
Speaker 1: So But the government but the government decided not to participate in this war. The government decide asked Hezbollah. Hezbollah agreed. The political arm reportedly agreed not to involve Lebanon in this war. The Lebanese government that makes a decision, and the decision was made not only not to get involved, but later on to also disarm Hezbollah and make it illegal for anyone to work with Hezbollah.
So if you wanna respect Lebanon as a sovereign nation, you have to respect their decision not to get involved. Now I just to let you know what what I said, Iran made the right decision in their interests to involve Hezbollah, which Iran has the right to do. They funded Hezbollah for decades. And on the Iranian side, one could argue, hey, we've we were the reason you exist, you as in US Hezbollah, we're the reason you exist, you're so powerful. Now we ask you to support us.
We ask so we expect you to support us. But it's unfair to say or you can say that Iran is worried about Lebanon, but it's also important to admit that Lebanon is in this situation because of Iranian actions as well as, obviously, Israelis.
Speaker 0: You know, you're assuming no agency for Hezbollah. You you're making the same mistake as American and Israelis. Hezbollah is not a proxy. I I think you know a few things about Lebanese people. Lebanese people are very proud, ancient history, strong people, very dedicated people.
You know, we have these young people facing one of the strongest armies in the world, a nuclear state. We these people this is not a country. Hezbollah is not a country. These are just young people, and they are pushing back against very a sophisticated army with f 30 fives. This is amazing.
This is amazing. What's Sir, what a professor the And for for for these people, very strong people, very tough people, to think that they're just sitting at the phone waiting for a phone call from Iran to tell them what to do, I I think that's a huge mistake.
Speaker 1: So, professor, in our last discussion, I think you put me on the spot and and when I called the Iranian government, the Iranian regime, because I'm upset what happened in January, you corrected me there. And I I I took that you had the right to correct me, and I I don't like using the term selectively because I could also say the Israeli regime, for example. So I've I've corrected and said the Israeli government. Would you agree that the Lebanese government, the same way the Iranian government makes its decision for Iran, the Lebanese government has the right to make its own sovereign decisions, and Hezbollah has to abide?
Speaker 0: The Lebanese government, as any independent government, can make any decision that they want. These are internal affairs of Lebanon. It's not Iran's business to interfere, and Iran tries its best not to do that. And Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization. They disagree with government policies.
They don't like the talks going on in Washington between Lebanon and Israel. And Iran if Iran wants to tell Hezbollah to do this or that, that would be interfering in Lebanese affairs because Lebanon Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization. It's not an Iranian organization. They they speak Arabic. They don't speak Farsi.
They're from Lebanon. So these are internal issues. The the fight between Lebanese government and Hezbollah is an issue that belongs to Lebanon. What Iran is supposed to do, and Iran has done that, is that when resistance groups ask for Iran's help, Iran can provide help as much as it can, and and sometimes it cannot. You know, we we Syria Syria used to be a route for the help that Iran was giving to Hezbollah.
And since Jolani has taken over Syria, that route has been closed. So Hezbollah is managing on its own, doing their own finances, doing their own factories. These are very, you know, genius people.
Speaker 1: Sorry. I was about to sneeze. Look. I think this is unfair, professor, and this is a point where we disagree. We agreed on the first point, but I think we heavily disagree on this one.
Hezbollah is not any group. It's a it's a military more powerful than the Lebanese military. When Lebanon as a sovereign nation asked the Iranian ambassador to leave the country, the Iranian ambassador refused and Hezbollah started making threats as well supporting the Iranian ambassador. But that's a sovereign nation. Like, I'm I I don't have I can you know, I'm sure you cannot name one other example where this has happened.
Iran has influence over Lebanon. They have probably more influence than any other other country. They're not the only one. Lebanon let me know if you agree with that statement. Lebanon is a battlefield of proxies, unfortunately.
You you could blame whoever goes back to the PLO and the Israeli Lebanese sorry, the Israeli Palestinian issue, which we'll probably agree on because I'm very critical of Israel there. But Lebanon has become a a a proxy battlefield where Syria under Assad, less so now, Israel, less so now but they had the militia in the South, more more so Saudi through the Sunnis. Iran probably won that battle and the Americans to a lesser extent. And they all have influence, they all fund different groups and you have all these secretarian divisions in the country. So would you at least agree that Iran along with other nations does have significant influence in Lebanon And one could argue it's it works it's in Iran's best interests, but not in Lebanon's because you've got a militia that that is that has agency, professor.
They do this they do make decisions, but they're also split because they have their own nation to defend against these rallies and to support support the Lebanese people, but they also need to execute on the orders or the demands of the Iranian backer that is that allowed them to be more powerful than the Lebanese military. And a solution to that would be and I'm sure you I don't know what your stance is on this. The Hezbollah should merge with the Lebanese armed forces, which is a lot more popular than Hezbollah, a lot more popular than the government. It's the most popular and well supported agency organization in the Lebanese government.
Speaker 0: You know, these are internal Lebanese issues whether Hezbollah wants to merge inside the Lebanese army. This is what the Iraqi Hashtagi did with the Iraqi army. They merged inside the Iraqi army. Whether they want to do that, they want to be out. I hope that, know, we talked about this last time.
These these people are not proxies. Sometimes they consult. Sometimes they don't. And this is the reason you have this long years of relationship. They are not in it for the money.
If they were interested in money, Saudis, Qataris, UAE would fund many, many times more what they needed. So this is an ideological group. They don't like their country to be attacked. They don't like their country to be occupied. We had the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1978, a year before the revolution in Iran.
And the difficulties that Lebanon has with Israel dates back many, many years. And the fact that you have Hezbollah is a good thing for Lebanon because it was if it was not for Hezbollah, the Lebanese army, as you say, is not strong enough to defend the country. True. And and have you would have Israelis basically occupying Southern Lebanon going very close to Beirut, and then they would want to create a proxy government in in Lebanon. So if if you didn't have Hezbollah, you you would have half of Lebanon, almost half of Lebanon occupied by Israel, and then the other half would be run by a proxy government, and Lebanon would be finished as a country.
Speaker 1: Potentially, professor. Or it could be or it could end up like Jordan and and Egypt and make peace with Israel and act as a sovereign nation. Both options. I'm not saying your options are false, and I I do I don't wanna dismiss Hezbollah's role in defending Lebanon. I think Hezbollah's not purely an Iranian proxy, but they do their allegiance to Iran along with Lebanon makes the structure very flawed for Lebanon's interest.
You can't there's no other nation where you have a proxy that's more powerful than the government's military that has allegiance to the government itself, to the country itself, or the people of the country, but also its funder, which is a sovereign country, another foreign country. This is my concern with Hezbollah, and this is why I don't think completely disarming and dismantling Hezbollah is the best option even though I don't oppose it, but I think merging with the Lebanese army. So then the incentives are fully aligned, but there has to be something in it for Iran because Iran spent a lot of time and money funding Hezbollah over decades, but the incentive might have passed because if we have a good deal with The US and and I made a post today, which, you know, I I it's more of a hopeful naive post. But I made a post a few hours ago where I said Trump made it could use this post to kinda it could go back to the Iran peace negotiations. In that post, I said there could be a way for Trump to turn this into a win.
Let me know I I put four points there. And let me know which ones you think are likely and which ones are very flawed or highly unlikely. So number one is accept the proposal similar to the prewar Oman offer. The Oman negotiations would have been a great solution for this war, I'm obviously against, and that is the dismantling of Iran's nuclear program, which according to many reports is on the table right now. Now I wouldn't be surprised because it was on the table in the Iran negotiations.
Now I'm using the word dismantling very vaguely, getting rid of the enriched uranium up to 60% and keeping the uranium enrichment to four point whatever, 4.6 or 7% that is used for civil purposes. That's number one. Number two, offered to unfreeze Iranian assets, wholly or or portion of them, and the lifting of sanctions in exchange for Iran dismantling their proxy network including or mainly Hezbollah. So Iran would get rid of that proxy network, is a threat to Israel. So Israel has no excuse anymore to invade Lebanon or or use the proxy network as a way to justify their foreign policy.
And in return, Iran because they have to have something in return for spending decades building that proxy network or allies alliance network. And that is the unfreezing of the Iranian assets so that people could don't keep suffering. Three is potential tollbooth where Iran could make up some of the reparations by charging a toll for a temporary period for a short period of time, a few months because that will be unheard of from a legal perspective, international law perspective. The US could get a portion of it. And number four is force Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory as Hezbollah's military wing gets disbanded.
So this is a four point plan where Trump, if he achieves it by some magic, perfect. But that could be a positive outcome from a war that I consider a mistake. Which of these points do you consider the more likely ones to happen, if any, and which ones are highly unlikely?
Speaker 0: You know, with regard to Iran sanctions, these are passed by the US Congress, and they have this law they passed in 2015. It's called Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. So whatever agreement that exists between the executive branch of the US government and Iran, the people in the US Congress have to vote on it. This is what Lindsey Graham said the other day, which is accurate.
Speaker 1: Isn't there isn't there two types of sanctions, professors, like primary, secondary, or something that one of them can can be can be changed or removed through executive action and one of them cannot? Not sure if you know what I'm referring to.
Speaker 0: I I I know. We have primary sanctions. These are sanctions that apply to American companies. We have secondary sanctions. These are sanctions that apply to non American companies.
And in sanctions law, the the legislative branch has allowed the president to suspend for short periods of time sanctions on Iran. But if he wants to do that through an agreement, that agreement has to be approved by the US Congress. And that means that even suspension of sanctions for short times have to be approved by the US Congress. The US Congress is Israeli occupied territory. Pat Buchanan, the old the old politician in The United States.
This is his terminology.
Speaker 1: That's good terminology to use. Israeli occupied territory.
Speaker 0: It is. And, you you know, when when Netanyahu goes to US congress, he gets more applauds than the US president because both Republicans and Democrats like him too much. So there there is no there's not going to be any sanctions relief on Iran because Netanyahu will not allow that. And then if you cannot do sanctions relief, you cannot put anything of interest to the Iranian government. So I think you add one more line to to your scenarios, and that would be the continuation of the current situation, which is no war and no peace until the end of the Trump administration.
So the I think for the next three years, they're going to attack Iran a couple of times more. They're not going to be successful. Iranians are learning a lot of things on how to deal with The United States, but that doesn't mean they will give up the goal of taking over Iranian oil and creating hegemony. So they'll they'll try their best a few times before before Trump is out of office. And we are not going to have any any deal that The United States would keep.
They will not keep you know, it was Trump that left the agreement. It took it took two years for the nuclear agreement to be negotiated. And when he came into office in 2018, he just left the agreement. So the confrontation between Iran and United States will continue. In Iran, you have an Islamic Republic.
In United States, you have a fascist government in place. And on one side Are
Speaker 1: you are you seeing are you seeing there's a massive sentiment shift? Are you not noticing that? Americans are are realizing the foreign policy decisions that are being made by the politicians in favor of Israel over US interest. They they start to notice Israel first versus America first. You're seeing that in the polls.
Isn't that enough to shift? You know, Trump sees that as well. He sees that before the midterms. I still think that's why I was surprised about this war in the get go. This war I consider it a mistake.
He thought it was gonna be a lot easier. Now that he realizes how difficult it is, I highly doubt he'll make the decision to go back into war with Iran. And again, add the poles into it and logically the war no longer makes sense. Do you not see that as a possibility as well? I know you're very pessimistic and I don't blame you after what happened last year and and the one before that twelve day war.
So this war and the one before. I don't blame you. But are you not seeing the shift as well? Trump is saying that he can Juchi Trump said, professor, like, if that's not clear enough because usually before war, the rhetoric has to start. And Trump said today, this guy's an incredible politician.
He says where is it? He told ABC, I think a deal is preferable because they can re then they can rebuild. They really do have a different regime now. We took out the radicals, they're gone. So obviously this is false and what is a different is it different people same regime, different leaders.
But doesn't that show that he's he accepts that this will continue being the government, number one. And number two, maybe it it could time to also tell us about who the who the new regime is. Who who are the people now that are making the decisions?
Speaker 0: We got some new people in Iranian military, new commanders. We have politicians that were assassinated. They were replaced. But the new people are generally younger in age, so they're more energetic, and they don't want to be the victim of American Israeli bombs. So they are not going to exercise restraint.
You know, the previous leadership was cautious. And when the twelfth day war happened, no American soldiers were killed. And the reason you see the current reaction of the Iranian government is because the people who exercise restraint are no longer with us. So it is true. It's obviously you know, we have new people in different places.
But if Trump thinks that these new people are going to be more lenient towards The United States after what he has done to Iran and Iranians, I think he's making a huge mistake. Well,
Speaker 1: that's his Sorry.
Speaker 0: Is to create a win. He he wants to say that I have you know, he he has spent a billion dollars a day in in the forty days that he was attacking Iran. So in order to justify that cost, in order to justify the American soldiers that have been killed and injured, he has to come up with some achievement. Yeah. And there there is no achievement to come up with.
So he says that I already I said I I'll do regime change, and I have done that. So then he's trying to make up for a failed policy by, you know, creating rhetoric that is not serious. So let me
Speaker 1: read out a summary of the Wall Street Journal article about the new the new Iranian government. The US and Israel were went to war hoping to install a more reasonable leadership in Iran. They got the opposite. The new supreme leader, Mustafa Khamenei, which not sure if you've got more information on his condition. Is his face disfigured as some people say?
Did he lose a leg? Not sure what information is being talked about in Iran. Built his career crushing reformists and elevating hardliners through the revolutionary guard. His inner circle includes men accused of the nineteen ninety four Buenos Aires bombing, a national security chief who killed an American petroleum engineer before the revolution, and commanders who believe destroying Israel will trigger the return of Shiite Messiah. The part isn't fringe this part that part isn't that last part isn't fringe ideology, but the organization principle of the Iranian state now.
Quote, we created a reality that is worse than what Iranians were facing before the war, said the former head of the Iran desk for military Israeli military intelligence. Trump called the leadership, quote, more reasonable. He may want to read the room. So this is something The Wall Street Journal, obviously, very critical, which you disagree with. But maybe you can expand.
Is it are they more hardline? I I know you've kinda answered it already in some way. But will their foreign policy reflect those feelings that disdain for US imperialism or or Israeli aggression in in Palestine and Lebanon? Or will they be more pragmatic and despite them not maybe not being as restrained if they're attacked, but at the same time they understand business above ideology. So they might agree to do business with The US even if it does not accept it does not fit their ideology because it's better for their people because it might lead to their sanctions being lifted.
So which one will they prioritize if you compare them to the previous leadership and you compare Mushtaba to his father?
Speaker 0: Iran is not Venezuela. The Iranian people will not accept the government. You know, we have elections here too. And people who you know, reformists that argued that will go talk to The United States and get the sanctions relief, We had those people, and they won elections. And then what happened?
United States attacked Iran and killed, you know, more than 4,000 people already. So But that's the
Speaker 1: same concern, but that's the same government that killed even more people in January. Understand Mossad was part of it, but it started off as as an organic protest.
Speaker 0: No. I just told you that Trump sent rioters linked to Mossad arms. This is what he's saying. This I'm not making this up. You had New York Times extensively reporting about how Mossad was involved.
You had, you know, Mike Pompeo, the head of the
Speaker 1: I don't deny that. I don't deny that.
Speaker 0: Okay. So when when you have when you have people receiving arms from outside powers and shooting at local police, in English, they don't call that person a protester. They call that person a Mossad agents or police shooter.
Speaker 1: But but these are but these are a portion a minority one would say, versus the the protesters as a whole. I did see the videos and I posted the videos of the protesters attacking the police. I saw those and there's no denying it. But you can't also deny these protests and previous protests of people wanting a different government, wanting a different system in Iran. Because right now, calling it a democracy, this when they when you have a supreme leader that could pick the president, pick this the the national council who the national council picks who runs for president, I think they have to go through approval process.
Any mistakes I make, please do correct me. But you can agree it's a very different democracy than the western democracy. I'm not saying we should not saying we should instill democracy in Iran the same way we should not instill democracy on China, The Gulf. Each country has its its the decision to their own right to make up to to decide who governs them and what system they want to be governed by. But it's also important not to dismiss that the the reason I called the Iranian government regime, I'm doing it less so now out of respect.
But the reason I've called it regime for so long and I'm very critical of it is because of what happened in January. Not the weaponization by Israel and The US, but the crackdown of the peaceful protesters and the fact the Internet is cut off to this day.
Speaker 0: Inaccurate? You know, we get protests in Iran all the time. In normal times, even today, you go outside the Iranian parliament, there's some group protesting about something. Iranian police doesn't shoot at protesters. We have this brilliant attorney, doctor Helia Dothari.
She was fired from Yale Law School because of her support for Palestine. You can Google her name. There's a New York Times story about her. And she returned to Iran. And before the war, we had protests, labor protests in Southern Iran, And she went and covered covered that.
She wrote an article as an eyewitness. That's an interesting read. I'll send a link to your producer. The Iranian police, when there is real protest, legitimate, you know, legitimate protesters, people who are have grievances about something, the Iranian police would want to make sure that no one gets hurt because they realize that we have this Western media outlets trying to demonize Iran. So if you see Iranian police shooting at someone, they're shooting back.
You know, how how would you have more than 200 police officers killed? You know, they don't know how to use arms. They do. They did not have permission to shoot back. That's how they got killed.
These are maybe new things for you. But Iranians Iranian police, Iranian government doesn't shoot at protesters. We are not Syria. We are not Egypt. We we are we are not these Persian Gulf countries, monarchies.
The Islamic revolution was a revolution that came out of protests. The protests are respected in Iran. That that's not what you'll you will hear from Western media outlets. Number two, I encourage you to read the Iranian constitution. It's available online.
It's an interesting read. The supreme leader or the leader of the country doesn't appoint the president. He gets elected to a direct vote, and we don't have this crazy, you know, what do they call it in The US, electoral college. This is this is direct vote. And sometimes we get a reformist government.
Sometimes we get the principalist government. Sometimes they call these people conservatives. You get Ahmadinejad as president. You get Pazishkan, the heart surgeon. You get Rouhani.
People vote.
Speaker 1: They vote by the candidates, but as I said earlier, the candidates are chosen by the council. They have to get approved. Sorry. Not chosen. They have to get approved by the council.
Speaker 0: The the we have
Speaker 1: And and and also on top of it, any decision the president makes could be refuted completely. They they could be not the word refuted, but could be overrode. The the supreme leader can override any decision made by the president as well.
Speaker 0: The system doesn't doesn't work like that. The we we have something that is similar to constitution courts. And like many other countries, when you're candidate to to run for president, then you need they need to make sure that he doesn't have a criminal background, he is not corrupt as a person. You know, United States has been trying to put his his its own people within the political system. They need to make sure that these people are clean.
And when they get into office, they basically act like any president in any country. The the leader based on Iran's constitution, that's why reading Iran's constitution is is good is a good idea, sets the general policies, the direction that the country is supposed to move towards. They don't do the day to day businesses of of running of the country. That's president's job. That's the job of the ministers.
And this is how the country has survived
Speaker 1: for for I do wanna just one thing, professor. I don't want to feel like I feel like I'm instilling democracy on your country. That's not my point. So I I take that all back.
Speaker 0: I Taiwan. So we don't we don't need Yeah.
Speaker 1: And it's a different form of democracy. I I wouldn't many people it is very different. It's not it's not as democratic. You're talking about a constitutional court. A supreme leader has been there for decades.
It's different to a constitutional court for multiple judges.
Speaker 0: More it's more democratic than The US system because we don't in The US system, you get the Epstein class running the the country.
Speaker 1: No. But, sir, you get you get a new president elected every four years, and that president has congress to to to answer to, congress for 500 members, not one leader for decades. But look, I I don't wanna so again, either way, let's it is a democracy. I don't know as well as you. I do think it's a it's a flawed form of democracy, but the I live in a country that doesn't have a democracy.
I live in Dubai. Dubai doesn't have a democracy. So who am I to to say democracy should exist in Iran? I just don't like a a government that putting aside the protest and what happened there, I just don't like a government that puts ideology and that's my opinion obviously in in Iran's Iran and I'm not Iranian, but a government that puts ideology above the wellness of their people. So ideologically, a lot of decisions were taken.
Iran could have been a very wealthy country if decisions were taken differently. I'm not saying they should. That's your decision. But it could be a very wealthy country. Not saying right or wrong.
But if certain decisions were made, Iran would not have to deal with the sanctions they've dealt with for decades. And what my question to you is,
Speaker 0: could that pass the Palestinian cause. This is what the Americans have been studying.
Speaker 1: Among among other Palestinian cause is one of them for sure. Like and I and that's look. That's something is horrendous, disgusting, and, you know, we agree wholeheartedly on what's happening in Palestine. But on the Iranian side, could we see a government that despite being ideologically dissent even maybe more ideological than the previous government, is there any chance they could approach this more pragmatically and take decisions that might not fit the ideology of the rev nineteen seventy nine revolution, but may lead to doing more business with The US, the lifting of sanctions? Because I'm sure Trump has no problem working with whoever, someone that's more ideological than Khamenei, but without calling for, you know, death to America, death to issue, or someone that's more ideological and but approaches things more pragmatically.
Is that a possibility? Sorry for being the optimistic one here and hoping that war won't happen and there might be at the beginning. The first step of, like, a decade or two decade process of normalization of relations between The US, and who knows, you know, magically maybe even Israel.
Speaker 0: Yeah. That that the last word you said was the key. So if if you have no Israel, if you eliminate Israel from the scene, then what you described is very much possible. The problem is that Israelis and Israeli lobby would not allow that.
Speaker 1: Because Israel sees you sees Iran as a threat. Would Iran is there a path where Iran would look at Israel differently and follow a similar path to what other Gulf nations have followed? Not saying full normalization, but one of less hostilities and accepting Israel as a state, still working for a two state solution, but accepting Israel as a sovereign state and avoiding hostilities through proxies, through allies like the Houthis, like Hezbollah, and eventually like Hamas. Is there a possibility as well?
Speaker 0: If you see a repetition of what happened in South Africa, one man, one vote. This is what Iran has been saying about Palestine. If democracy is good because you're claiming that Westerners have democracy. If democracy is good, why not give Palestinians the chance to vote? The this this is a report by intelligence agencies in in Israel.
2020, the people who live in that area are most the bigger the Palestinians are a bigger portion of the of the population. This is why they had the genocide to maybe reduce that number. So if you have a real election, you would not have Netanyahu as Israeli prime minister. You would have an Arab as Israeli prime minister. You would have the Palestinian version of Nelson Mandela.
And we're we're going to see that in your lifetime since you're young. You're you're going to see a reputation of South Africa in Palestine. It's not going to be called Israel. It's going to be called Palestine. It's going to be the one state solution, and Iran will establish relations with the
Speaker 1: Professor, that's as we wrap up, but that's the point that you know won't work. You cannot expect to run. I'm not you can believe that, but it's being objective and pragmatic about it, putting right or wrong what you believe is right or wrong aside. I believe in a two state solution. I understand what your position.
But just looking at this realistically, you have to admit that ship has sailed. You're looking at Israel as one of superpower in the in the region with a nuclear weapon that is very close to The US. One could say even controls US congress as you've said, and you're saying that country will become a one state solution called Palestine. That that belief is coming at the detriment of the Iranian people because you're facing right or wrong aside. You're facing the wrath of American sanctions.
You're facing the wrath of Israeli foreign policy, which is very aggressive. But if you move away from that belief, maybe Iran could end up being as wealthy and should be wealthier than other Gulf nations on a per capita basis and not have to deal with the sanctions.
Speaker 0: Harvard University had a poll in The United States. Majority of people between 18 24 support Palestine, not Israel. And gradually, these people will take the positions of power in The United States. Like Mamdani, you know, he he's he's the mayor
Speaker 1: of Mamdani Mamdani believes in a two state solution, not a one state solution. Same as most Americans as well.
Speaker 0: Right. But he's critical of Israel.
Speaker 1: So am I.
Speaker 0: And what happens is these type of people get into offices in The United States. The support for Israel in The United States is going to diminish. You already earlier today, you said that there are a lot of people who are criticizing Trump because they say that it was Israel that started this war, including conservative Republicans, Joseph Kent. So Israel without The United States is nothing. The the the reason you have Israel is because of American money, American propaganda support, American weapons.
And as the support for Israel diminishes in The United States, Israel would have no other choice but to do another South Africa. And you you would have the Jewish population. Some of them would would go back to Europe. Some of them will stay as the whites some of the whites in South Africa stay. They will have their farms.
They will make their money, but they will do it under Palestinian president. Wow. Your
Speaker 1: your numbers your numbers are your numbers are surprising. You mentioned numbers like young people in The US, I just quickly searched it. 55 to 60% believe the majority two state solution but only five to I'm gonna make your point sir. I'm gonna make your point sir. The other the 20 to 40% believe some up to 50% according to some polls, 50 plus I believe young young people young Americans 18 to 20 four believe in a one state Palestinian solution replacing Israel.
Wow. I didn't expect that number to be that big. Obviously, I'm a believer in a two state solution, and then one state Israel is only five to 15%.
Speaker 0: Good.
Speaker 1: Wow.
Speaker 0: So you we're we're learning something.
Speaker 1: No. I disagree with you. I still disagree with you. I don't think and you agree with me, but you won't say it. There is no way you believe we'll have one state solution of you're a professor and you understand how history
Speaker 0: works
Speaker 1: of Palestine. You know professor. You know what I
Speaker 0: that time. So we can do another interview, and we will celebrate in in Al Quds. It's not going to
Speaker 1: be possible. So you have to end it on that note. Look. Anyway, it's a pleasure to speak to you again, sir. We disagreed on some things, agreed on others, and, hopefully, we won't see another war in Iran, you and your family and other Iranians live in peace.
Thank you so much for your time, sir.
Speaker 0: Thank you. Take care. Bye, professor. Bye.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇱🇧🇮🇱 China and Russia are now sitting at the table with every major player in the Middle East... the U.S. isn't. Former CIA officer Larry Johnson says Hezbollah, hardened by 51 years of Israeli operations and now equipped with fiber optic drones, is more dangerous than ever. Israel is casualty-averse and burning through its window. Pakistan is brokering a ceasefire with China's blessing. Russia and China are talking directly with Iran, Saudi, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Turkey. The American seat is empty. The region is already deciding its future. Washington just isn't in the room.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇩Secretary of War Hegseth met with Indonesia’s top defense official and rolled out a major new defense cooperation deal. While the Strait of Hormuz is the second busiest oil passageway in the world, the busiest is the Strait of Malacca right off Indonesia’s coast. Roughly 80 percent of China’s oil imports flow through it. The US military and its partners are now locking down the planet’s critical oil routes. Trump is putting the pieces exactly where he wants them. Source: @WarClandestine
Video Transcript AI Summary
The United States official welcomed Indonesian Minister Shafri to the Pentagon and announced that the two countries are elevating their security partnership to a major defense cooperation partnership. The official also thanked Minister Shafri for ongoing support in helping the United States find, return, and protect the remains of soldiers who fought alongside Indonesians during World War II. The signing of the memorandum of understanding will enable the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency to recover missing service members and return them to their families. The official expressed appreciation for Minister Shafri’s presence and looked forward to productive discussions.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Well, minister Shafri, welcome to the Pentagon. It's an honor to have you. It's an honor to host your team as well. Your visit demonstrates the importance that the war department places on our growing security relationship, and it is growing and active with Indonesia. In recognition of the important security collaboration we are undertaking, we are announcing today that our two countries are elevating our security partnership to a major defense cooperation partnership.
I appreciate your continued support in helping The United States find, return, and protect the remains of our soldiers who fought alongside Indonesians during World War two. The signing of this memorandum of understanding in front of us will enable the defense POWMIA accounting agency to recover those missing service members and return them to their families. So thank you, mister minister, for being here, and I very much look forward to our meeting and our productive discussion today.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇩 The U.S. just signed a Major Defense Cooperation Partnership with Indonesia. Maritime, subsurface, autonomous systems, special forces training, the works. Indonesia sits astride the Strait of Malacca, the world's second most critical shipping chokepoint after Hormuz. China knows exactly what this means. While Beijing challenges the Hormuz blockade, Washington just locked in the other strait.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇨🇳 The Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that Chinese ships will move through the Strait of Hormuz despite Trump's blockade. This is a moment of dangerous potential escalation, with China already supplying Iran with manpads and HQ-9 long-range air defense systems. If https://t.co/YkPcIFjmMX
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 Major General Randy Manner reveals that the Chinese HQ-9 system is a "game changer" for Iran, giving them the ability to take down U.S. F-35 stealth fighters. Beijing is now actively arming the Iranian regime with superior air defense technology. Randy believes Trump is taking advantage of the fact that most Americans don't understand how these defensive weapons are shifting the balance of power.
Video Transcript AI Summary
One speaker considers the possibility that China, India, or Pakistan might escort a ship through the Strait of Hormuz and worries about a potential direct confrontation between the United States and those countries. He notes there is no expected confrontation between Pakistan and India, highlighting an open line of communication, a good relationship, and that one of them is a mediator in negotiations. China, however, is described as a different case, with increasing parallels to what was seen between the United States and Russia in the early Cold War era.
The other speaker expresses hope that the Chinese will not decide to confront the Americans over the Strait. He bluntly states that the Chinese are not friends with the United States anymore; while they have long-term economic partnership and linked economies, the current administration has been placing tariffs on China and threatening more tariffs. News reports are cited indicating that China will provide the HQ-9 air defense system, which is described as far superior to the Russian S-300, to Iran. He emphasizes these are defensive weapons, not offensive capabilities, and notes that the administration is likely to be distressed by this development.
Despite the administration’s stance, the speaker asserts that providing defensive weapons to another country is something done routinely and acknowledges that this move could enhance Iran’s defensive posture. He mentions the possibility that the Chinese supply could even enable Iran to detect F-35 aircraft, though he notes uncertainty about this point. The situation is characterized as a game changer and described as a behind-the-scenes nuance that the average American might not fully understand, as well as perhaps the administration not fully grasping it. The speaker reiterates that the Chinese plan is to provide these defensive weapons to Iran, describing it as a soon-to-occur development.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: What happens if China or India or Pakistan decide to escort one of their ships through the Strait Of Hormuz? Was just speaking to Malcolm Nass about it, and this is the thing that worries him the most is that we might see it in potential direct confrontation between The US and those countries. Now, obviously, I don't see confrontation between Pakistan and India. There's an open line of communication, a good relationship with both countries. One of them is the mediator for the negotiations.
But China is a different story, and we we're starting to get a lot more similarities to what we saw between The US and Russia back in the cold war. Slight similarities, the early days of it.
Speaker 1: So I am hoping that the Chinese will not decide to confront the Americans on this straight. I think the Chinese are I'll be blunt. Remember, the Chinese are not friends in The United States any longer. They are when I say friends, we've been long term economic partners and trading trading partners. We our economies are linked more than ever before.
This administration, though, has been putting tariffs on them and is threatening even more tariffs. The fact that the Chinese are now going to provide, according to news reports, the h q nine air defense system, which by the way is far superior to the Russian s 300. I mean, they're they're going to be giving them remember, these are defensive weapons. So therefore, even though the administration will be upset about it, they haven't said much yet, but I'm sure they're gonna be very distressed about it. But the reality is giving defensive weapons to another country is something we do all the time.
They're not offensive capability. It's defensive capability. And the fact that they are ratcheting up the capability, maybe even to detect f 30 fives, we don't know yet. This this is a a game changer, and it's it's a very, it's behind the scenes nuance that not the the average American does not get and maybe the administration does not get. The Chinese is going to provide these weapons, excuse me, these defensive weapons to the Iranians soon.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 SEIZING IRAN'S ISLANDS WOULD BREAK THE GLOBAL ECONOMY Fmr U.S. Navy Intel Officer Malcolm Nance on the real cost of escalation. Iran has hundreds of cruise missiles, thousands of drones, and thousands of ballistic missiles; seizing its islands would mean relentless bombardment until they forced a U.S withdrawal. "Trump's foreign policy is mental illness disguised as government policy." @MalcolmNance
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇮🇷 🇺🇸 IS THIS PEACE OR JUST A LONGER PAUSE? Norwegian political scientist Glenn Diesen says don't get too comfortable with the ceasefire. Israel has already used prior pauses as cover to escalate. And with too many parties unable to concede anything publicly, a real peace deal may not be possible. He says extended ceasefires might be the ceiling. Not peace. Just managed intervals between the next round. The guns going quiet means nothing if the politics underneath stay broken. And right now, every side has a reason to restart. @Glenn_Diesen
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 Prof. Mearsheimer: "If we had Nuremberg-like trials, Biden, Trump, and their principal lieutenants would be hanged. Hardly a word was said as the U.S. helped Israel. Trump is desperate." https://t.co/XHNeOjJIDE
Video Transcript AI Summary
Speaker 0 argues that during the Gaza/Israel conflict, genocide is taking place and that the United States is complicit, stating there is “no question” about it. He says, “If we had Nuremberg trials, we’re not gonna have them,” and asserts that Joe Biden and his principal lieutenants, and Donald Trump and his principal lieutenants, would be hanged, because “we are talking about a genocide.” He notes that “the greatest of all crimes” is happening and that hardly a word was said in the liberal establishment in the United States against Israel’s actions, with the United States helping to commit genocide. He adds that this is “truly remarkable” and that even a realist like him is among the few in mainstream academia speaking out.
He then references a “remarkable truth post” on Truth Social, in which Trump says that if the Iranians don’t surrender by nighttime, he will destroy Iran as a civilization and make it impossible for Iran to come back from the dead, calling this “truly stunning” and labeling it genocidal language. He asks rhetorically if anyone thought an American president would speak this way, comparing the rhetoric to Adolf Hitler’s with the aim to exterminate Iran and erase it from the planet, noting it sounds like a Carthaginian solution.
Speaker 0 contends that Trump is desperate, understanding “the basic logic” he laid out and “the hand” is losing, with consequences that would extend beyond Trump’s presidency and threaten the global economy. He suggests that Trump’s shift to extermination is a sign of this desperation. He asserts that “every state on the planet outside of The United States knows now being close to The United States gets you in trouble,” and cites Henry Kissinger’s maxim that “there’s only one thing worse than being an adversary of The United States, and that’s being an ally of The United States.”
In summary, he claims genocide is occurring with US complicity, envisions harsh post-Nuremberg consequences for Biden and Trump, highlights Trump’s genocidal rhetoric toward Iran, labels the language as Hitler-like and Carthaginian, and suggests Trump’s strategy reflects desperation tied to a fragile global economic outlook and U.S. geopolitical dominance as summarized by Kissinger.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: When this genocide was taking place. And it's not only because the Israelis were committing a genocide that I'm shocked and people didn't say anything. In a fundamental way, what shocked me even more was was that The United States is complicit in the genocide. There's just no question about this. If we had Nuremberg trials, we're not gonna have them.
But if we had Nuremberg like trials, Joe Biden and his principal lieutenants, and Donald Trump and his principal lieutenants would be hanged. There's no question in my mind about this. We're talking about a genocide. We know what happened to all those people who executed the genocide between 1941 and 1945 in Europe. They were hanged.
Well, I think the same thing would happen to Biden and his lieutenants and Trump and his lieutenants. It's really quite remarkable, that hardly a word was said in the liberal establishment in The United States against what Israel was doing, and The United States was helping them to do. Committing genocide, the greatest of all crimes. Just truly remarkable in my opinion. And I used to say to myself, there's something wrong here when a realist like me is one of the few people inside mainstream academia who is standing up insane.
This is terribly wrong and something should be done to stop it. He issues this remarkable truth post, truth social post, where he says that if the Iranians don't cave, in other words if the Iranians don't throw up their hands and surrender by nighttime, he's going to destroy Iran as a civilization. He's gonna destroy it and make it impossible for Iran to come back from the dead. This is a truly stunning statement. This is another example of genocidal language.
Is did anybody ever think that an American president would say something like that? I certainly didn't. This is the kind of language language that you would expect from someone like Adolf Hitler. Right? That you're gonna exterminate this country called Iran?
Erase it from the planet? And make it so it can never come back? Sounds like a Carthaginian solution, doesn't it? What's going on here? You wanna ask yourself.
What's going on here is Trump is desperate. He's desperate because he understands the basic logic that I just laid out to you. We are playing a losing hand, and the consequences of continuing to play that hand are that the global economy will go off a cliff. It will do much more than destroy his presidency. The consequences would be enormous.
He knows this. I'm sure he has people who are telling him that. He's desperate. So what does he say Monday morning? I'm gonna turn to extermination.
I'm gonna turn to genocide. Every state on the planet outside of The United States knows now being close to The United States gets you in trouble. As Henry Kissinger likes to say, there's only one thing that's, or he liked to it, as he used to say, there's only one thing worse than being an adversary of The United States, and that's being an ally of The United States.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
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🚨🇺🇸 Trump met with Graham and Barrasso last night to push border funding "Reconciliation is ON TRACK, and we are moving FAST and FOCUSED in keeping our Border SECURE" He wants the bill on his desk by June 1st and says crime is at "an ALL TIME LOW" with murders at "the Lowest https://t.co/Wr20sN4yNs
reSee.it AI Summary
I spoke with Prof. Foad Izadi of Tehran University about why the war started, how Iran survived heavy bombardment, and the region after the war. He says Iran spent years building underground missile and drone capabilities, kept leverage despite airstrikes, and explains Gulf targets. He argues Hezbollah is a Lebanese force acting for Lebanon, not a pure Iranian proxy, and discusses Khamenei’s status and the shifting balance toward Iran.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 INTERVIEW: Wonder what Iranians think of this war? I had the pleasure of chatting to Prof. Foad Izadi from Tehran University, and asked him about his thoughts on why the war started, how Iran was able to survive the heavy bombardment, and the future of the country under the new Supreme Leader He says Iran had spent years preparing for this day, building extensive underground missile and drone capabilities He broke down how Iran maintained leverage despite weeks of airstrikes, why Gulf states became targets, and whether Hezbollah acted for Iran or for Lebanon's own interests. Most importantly, we discuss how the region will look like post war, especially Iran’s relation with the Gulf, Israel, and Hezbollah Interview with @IzadiFoad 00:01:20 - This war was driven by Netanyahu, the Israeli lobby, and Trump’s desire to control Iranian oil. 00:04:52 - Why Iran was still able to fire missiles and drones after the war began. 00:06:23 - U.S. intelligence said Iran had no nuclear weapons program, but Trump followed Netanyahu’s line instead. 00:08:38 - The balance of power: shifting away from Israel and toward Iran. 00:10:22 - The Israeli lobby and the Epstein files as leverage shaping Trump’s position. 00:13:09 - On Khamenei: alive, possibly injured, and heavily protected from assassination. 00:14:16 - Why Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states became targets in the conflict. 00:19:09 - Whether Iran went too far by striking Gulf countries like Qatar, Oman, and the UAE. 00:24:17 - Debate over whether Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into the war or acted independently. 00:29:18 - Hezbollah is not an Iranian proxy, but a Lebanese force acting in its own interest.
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation centers on multiple competing narratives about the war and its wider regional significance, with the speakers presenting their interpretations and challenging each other’s points.
- The hosts open by acknowledging competing narratives: some view the war as a necessary action against a regime seen as destabilizing and dangerous (nuclear ambitions, regional havoc); others see it as Israel removing a geopolitical threat with U.S. involvement; a third perspective argues it stemmed from miscalculations by Trump, perhaps driven by Israeli influence. The dialogue frames the war within broader questions of American, Israeli, and Iranian aims.
- Speaker 1 references Joseph Kent’s resignation letter, arguing Iran was not an immediate U.S. threat and that Netanyahu and the Israeli lobby influenced Trump toward war. They assert Trump’s stated interest in Iranian oil and control of the Strait of Hormuz; they describe Trump as guided by business interests. They frame U.S. actions as part of a long-standing pattern of demonizing enemies to justify intervention, citing Trump’s “animals” comment toward Iranians and labeling this demonization as colonial practice.
- Speaker 0 pushes back on Trump’s rhetoric but notes it suggested a willingness to pressure Iran for concessions. They question whether Trump could transition from ending some wars to endorsing genocidal framing, acknowledging disagreement with some of Trump’s statements but agreeing that Israeli influence and Hormuz control were important factors. They also inquire whether Trump miscalculated a prolonged conflict and ask how Iran continued to fire missiles and drones despite expectations of regime collapse, seeking clarity on Iran’s resilience.
- Speaker 1 clarifies that the Iranian system is a government, not a regime, and explains that Iranian missile and drone capabilities were prepared in advance, especially after Gaza conflicts. They note Iran’s warning that an attack would trigger a regional war, and reference U.S. intelligence assessments stating Iran does not have a nuclear weapon or a program for one at present, which Trump publicly dismissed in favor of Netanyahu’s view. They recount that Iran’s leaders warned of stronger responses if attacked, and argue Iran’s counterstrikes reflected a strategic calculus to deter further aggression while acknowledging Iran’s weaker, yet still capable, position.
- The discussion shifts to regional dynamics: the balance of power, the loss of Israel’s “card” of American support if Iran can close Hormuz, and the broader implications for U.S.-Israel regional leverage. Speaker 1 emphasizes the influence of the Israeli lobby in Congress, while also suggesting Mossad files could influence Trump, and notes that the war leverages Netanyahu’s stance but may not fully explain U.S. decisions.
- The two then debate Gulf states’ roles: Saudi Arabia and the UAE are depicted as providing bases and support to the United States; Kuwait as a near neighbor with vulnerability to Iranian action and strategic bases for American forces. They discuss international law, noting the war’s alleged illegality without a UN Security Council authorization, and reference the unwilling-or-unable doctrine to explain Gulf state complicity.
- The conversation covers Iran’s and Lebanon’s involvement: Iran’s leverage via missiles and drones, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah as a Lebanese organization with Iranian support. They discuss Hezbollah’s origins in response to Israeli aggression and their current stance—driving Lebanon into conflict for Iran’s sake, while Hezbollah asserts independence and Lebanon’s interests. They acknowledge Lebanon’s ceasefire violations on both sides and debate who bears responsibility for dragging Lebanon into war; Hezbollah’s leaders are described as navigating loyalties to Iran, Lebanon, and their people, with some insistence that Hezbollah acts as a defender of Lebanon rather than a mere proxy.
- Towards the end, the speakers reflect on personal impact and future dialogue. They acknowledge the war’s wide, long-lasting consequences for Lebanon and the region, and express interest in continuing the discussion, potentially in person, to further explore these complex dynamics.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Professor, it's a pleasure to speak to you for the first time. I appreciate you coming on the show considering the circumstances. I'm glad, as you said earlier, you, your family, and hopefully your friends as well are all fine, healthy, and safe. So, professor, maybe let's start with what's your sense of the entire war? What do you make of it?
Because there's so many competing narratives, some that are supportive of the war, my bias, some very critical of the war. Some that are supportive of the war believe it was a necessary war for a regime that was very they call they use a simplified term like evil, but a term of causing havoc in the region, building nuclear weapons. That's one narrative. Another narrative is this is Israel getting rid of a a geopolitical rival, and they're the reason that The US got involved. Then there's a narrative like mine where this was all a mistake by Trump.
His objective was to capture the Strait Of Hormuz. It's a strategic objective for The US, but he was misled by either his own intelligence, by Netanyahu, and and Israeli intelligence, or all of the above. What's your understanding of it understanding of it of everything, especially as a professor of world studies? So that's something that you understand well.
Speaker 1: You know, I read the resignation letter of Joseph Kent, a conservative Republican. I agree with him. Iran was not an immediate threat to The United States, and this is due to the influence of the Israeli lobby and and Netanyahu on Trump, Netanyahu has been dreaming about having a war with Iran for many years, and Trump was foolish enough to provide American soldiers for that dream. It is also true that Trump likes Iranian oil. He wants to take over the state of Hormuz.
This is not an analysis of an Iranian professor. This is what he said the other day. When a reporter asked him, why do you wanna take over Iranian oil? He says he's a businessman, and he likes to make money. You are a businessman.
You don't wanna take over Iranian oil. You know, being a businessman is not equivalent of being a thief or trying to, you know, kill little school girls to achieve some popularity among the Zionist class. So, overall, whenever United States attacks a country, they need to demonize it, and this is what they have done with regard to Iran. This is the old colonial practice. Whenever they wanted to plunder a nation, they would demonize those people, look at them as subhuman.
And this is what Trump called Iranians the other day. He called them animals. So overall, I think the three scenarios that you presented, the three all of them are accurate. The the one that demonizes Iran is also accurate because that's part of the propaganda that needs to be presented so they can attack Iran. Yeah.
Speaker 0: I think he's demonized even though his rhetoric is not right. He's always said crazy things, you know, from Canada being another American state. I don't wanna defend Trump's decision to get into this war because I'm critical of that. But at the same time, I found his rhetoric a few days ago for me an indicator that he's ready to walk away from the war, and he's trying to pressure Iran for concessions. Not sure if you saw it the same at the time, but I and I knew he meant the regime even though his words were genocidal, really, when you say you're gonna wipe out an entire civilization.
But I also knew the same Trump that was ending the war in Ukraine is still the same Trump now. You can't flip from being someone that's ending wars to someone that's become genocidal or someone like Hitler. That was why though that rhetoric, I wasn't as people like Tucker were up in arms, and rightly so. It was pretty crazy things to say. And I agree with you.
The reasons for the war were Israeli influence, but also control of the Strait Of Hormuz. Do you also agree with me that he miscalculated? He did not plan for a prolonged conflict? And, also, I wanna ask you another question to that. If it was the case that he did miscalculate, I think you'd agree with me on that.
Why? How is Iran still able to fire missiles? How is Iran able to still fire drones? How does the regimes have I'm also critical of the regime, by the way, so I wanna make sure my biases are clear. I'm not a fan of the way the regime governs.
It's just my personal opinion. But how did the regime get stronger after this war when everyone expected a regime collapse considering what we saw in January?
Speaker 1: The first point, it's not a regime. It's a government. Iran I apologize. That's it. Yeah.
You know, Iran Iranians established the the first government in the world. So respecting the civilization is something that Trump is not interested in, but but you are. You know, a lot of these missile factories, drones factories are underground. After even
Speaker 0: in
Speaker 1: the last two years during the genocide in Gaza, Iranian leaders realized that sooner or later, Netanyahu will attack Iran. So they had about two years to prepare. They built a lot of missiles, lots of drones. And this is what Iranian leaders told Trump before the war, that it is true that Iran is weaker in comparison to two years ago, but Iran is not weak. The country's leader, the assassinated leader, said that if Iran is attacked, this would be a regional war.
So he was warned. And then this is his words. He said that he thought the war would be finished in three days, and he said that nobody told him that Iran will close the Strait Of Hormuz. That was crazy. Nobody expected Iran to fire at US bases in the Persian Gulf.
And, you know, we had Tulsi Gabbard going to the senate couple of weeks ago, and senators were asking her. She's the director of national intelligence in The United States, the Democratic senators. Didn't you tell Trump? And, of course, she has to be careful because she doesn't wanna get fired, but the outcome of that hearing shows people that even his intelligence community told him about the consequences. If you read the annual threat assessment report last year, it says three things about Iran's nuclear program.
The first thing it says this is the consensus of The US intelligence community. The first thing it says is that Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons. The second thing it says is that Iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon program. They say Iran had one before 2003, but they haven't stopped that. This is their statement.
And the third thing they say is that Iranian government has not decided to have a nuclear weapon program. And when they asked Trump about this, he dismissed his own intelligence community, and he accepted Netanyahu's version. Netanyahu has been saying that Iran is two months away from building a nuclear weapon for the last twenty years.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I I remember that. That worried me when that happened, when that disagreement happened. I knew something was up. That's why I think, obviously, we didn't even bring up the nuclear program as a reason because I think me and you both agreed that was never a reason.
We know it wasn't a threat. And, also, none of us brought up Iran being an imminent threat to The US. It was very clear to me Iran did not wanna only avoid a war with The US. They also wanted to avoid a war with with Israel. Their their calculus has changed since October 7.
And I think the reason for that is Israel has had incredible military successes from a military perspective, less so on Gaza, but in in Lebanon against Hezbollah, and even in that twelve day war. But I think that changed significantly now. I think Iran now has leverage with the control of the Strait Of Hormuz. I feel like let me know if you agree with this analysis. I feel like Israel's strongest card in that, you know, proxy conflict or or, you know, I I say just direct conflict really in the last few years, proxy conflict over the last many years, if not decades, is Israel would be like, we have America's support.
And that's something Iran never wanted to clash with The US because they know that would be disastrous for the country, we're witnessing that now. But that card is gone now, professor, because Israel has used it. Iran faced the wrath of the American military and Israel's military as well, and they were still able to maintain the ability to fire missiles. Latest report says you have at least 50% of your missiles. You were able to still fire drones, cause havoc in The Gulf, which we're gonna talk about in a second and what that means for the region.
And most importantly, choke off the entire global economy by closing the Strait Of Hormuz and maintaining it as closed. And now Iran that card has shifted from Israel's hands to Iran's hands because now Iran has the Strait Of Hormuz as their leverage card. And also, everyone is in agreement Trump will never wanna go back in a war with Iran, at least I think so. And that means the card that Israel had of American support is gone for the foreseeable future. So that's why I think the balance of power after this war in The Middle East for the first time will shift drastically away from Israel.
Depends what happens on Friday, but based on what we're seeing right now. Do you do you do you agree with do you disagree with any parts of this analysis?
Speaker 1: You know, the Israeli lobby is very powerful. And, you know, in the US congress, they have a lot of influence. The budget for US military comes from the US congress. The US Congress can stop a lot of things that Trump wants to do domestically and internationally. And I think Trump understands that one reason he's associated himself with the Israelis is because of the influence of the Israeli lobby in the US Congress.
I I agree with a good portion of your analysis, but I think putting more emphasis on the influence of the Israeli lobby for the next three years during his Trump's presidency, that's that that should be taken into account. And then, you know, these Epstein files, we don't know the videos that Mossad has on Trump. I think, you know, Trump is afraid of a portion of these documents because if they're available if they become available, then I think that would be the end of his presidency. And I think one reason he is following Netanyahu's lead in this war is because I I think Mossad has something on him. I I I this is not normal.
What what Trump is doing for Israel is not really normal.
Speaker 0: This war, if it was for Israel I I agree this war is not normal. And, you know, if we spoke in January, me and you will probably be disagreeing on a lot because of my critique of the Iranian government. But we're speaking after this war, which I'm also extremely critical of. So that's why we're agreeing on a on a lot. On the Mossad having files on Trump, anything is possible.
I've been wrong on many things before. I just feel if there's anything on the Epstein files that would have been released by the Biden administration. But maybe, as you said, Mossad has that information, not the Biden administration. I do wanna ask you just a few questions on what's happening right now before we go to Lebanon, and before we talk about Iranian relations with The Gulf, because this was gonna have the effects of this war are gonna be felt for generations. It's gonna change the entire structure of the Middle East.
But Mustafa Khamenei, we haven't heard much we haven't seen him whatsoever since the strike on his that killed his father, his wife, his family members, I think his daughter. What can you tell us about him? Is he is he alive? Is he well? What do you know?
Or what do the Iranian people know or believe? And how much influence does he have over the Iranian commanders? Because when he asked commanders on national TV to stop the strikes on The Gulf, the strikes continued for almost twelve hours. We saw the strikes on The UAE, Saudi, and Kuwait. They stopped since, but I'm not sure if that was authorized by Muzhtaba because the supreme leader did put out a request on national TV for the commanders to stop their attacks.
In general, what can you tell us about him? Because in the western media, get so many reports. He's dead. He's alive. He's in coma.
He's even homosexual. We've seen all these different leaks coming out that obviously some of them are just too silly to even believe. But people in the West really have no idea. I'm not sure if you can give us a bit more context.
Speaker 1: He's alive. He may be injured. He was in the area that was heavily bombed. You cannot elect a leader every other day, so people have to be careful that that he's not assassinated. I think Israelis and Americans would assassinate him if they know where he is.
So he had they they have to worry about his security. We didn't have him requesting US Iranian military to stop. No such thing was on Iranian television. Okay. When when the announcement for the ceasefire came, they they were some more attacks, and this is what Iran did last time.
Because when you attack Iranians, they want to have the last shot at you. This is just a project.
Speaker 0: Why why The UAE, Saudi, and Kuwait? Why those three countries?
Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia has been providing a lot of support to The United States in this war. Yesterday, the secretary of war tanked them for fighting shoulder to shoulder. I'm quoting him. Fighting shoulder to shoulder with United States and Israel. And we have seen pictures of American aircraft refueling airplanes in Saudi bases burning, and the pictures were published in the Wall Street Journal.
They said that they had five refueling tankers hit by Iranian drones. Trump tried to dismiss that report, and he said it was just just one, basically confirming the fact that Saudis at least are providing bases to American airplanes. UAE does the does the same thing. So Kuwait one problem Kuwait has is that it's very close to Iran. It's the closest of these Persian Gulf countries.
So it's a target of convenience. But and then there are a lot of American assets there, you know, since the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and then Americans coming and rescuing Kuwait. Kuwait became basically the colony of The United States. They have a lot of bases there. So, you know, it's against international law to help a war that is illegal.
In order to make a war illegal, you need to go to the UN Security Council, put a country under article 43 of the chapter seven of the UN Charter. US didn't do that. Israel didn't do that. So the war is illegal under international law, and then helping United States and Israel in this illegal war would be illegal. In international law, we have this doctrine.
It's called unwilling or unable doctrine. It means that when a country country's territory is used to attack another country, and they're unwilling or unable to do something about that, then they they
Speaker 0: But you're you're saying The UAE. I know about Saudi. I've seen those reports by New York Times. I know about Kuwait. There's been a lot of reports on missiles fired from there.
But in terms of The UAE, we've heard rhetoric. Iran claimed that have you seen that? A MIG a MIG aircraft fighter jet that was only owned by The UAE's truck and refinery in one of the islands, one of the Iranian islands. Have you seen that report? Is that true?
But that seemed pretty extreme.
Speaker 1: We we have had Iranian foreign ministry sort of criticizing. They they didn't name the country, but we have received drones from these Persian Gulf states. You know, The United States to this day said that they have hit 13,000 targets in Iran, and you cannot do that physically by using an aircraft carrier that's 2,000 kilometers away. It's physically not possible. So in order to have that level of extensive bombing of Iran, there is no other way but to use the bases that are close to Iran to engage in that level of bombing.
This is what they have done. You know, on the second day of war, Kuwaiti said that they shot three US jets by mistake. Before, they were saying that they will not allow United States to use their airspace. But how can you hit US jets if they are not using your airspace? So they were they'll be using Kuwaiti airspace, and they were shot
Speaker 0: That's sad. That's sad. Because I was hoping and I'm always the naive optimist, and I've I was hoping that we see normalization of relations with Israel sorry, Iran and the region, regional powers. Eventually, even Israel and Iran, but that's way too far fetched now. But at least Iran and the Gulf countries.
And that was happening after the Israeli strike in Qatar. What happens now? Because Iran has also attacked all these Gulf countries. Some of them were surprised. You guys attacked Oman.
You attacked Qatar. I understand if you wanna attack Kuwait and Saudi, maybe even The UAE. Even The UAE does a lot of business with with Iran, imports from Iran, exports as well, does a lot of trade with Iran. A lot of Iranians have their money in The UAE, a lot of expats in The UAE. So The UAE was a surprise to me.
Saudi, there's that rivalry that's always existed. Kuwait, Bahrain, I understand because of the the position, the political position, and the American bases they have there. But when you go as far as Qatar and Oman, do you think that Iran also went too far there?
Speaker 1: You know, actually, Iranians, as as you probably know, have tried to improve relations with countries like Saudi Arabia. And they would do the same once the war is over because they don't want to be fighting this petrodollar states. They spend billions of dollars on their military, and you don't you don't want to be fighting them. You want to trade with them. You want to have good relations with them.
You you can't you don't, you know, you don't choose your neighbors. These countries are going to be Iran's neighbors forever. So Iran, I think, would be willing to forgive and forget very quickly. With regard to hits, we had Tucker Carlson saying that Mossad was Mossad agents were arrested in Qatar and Saudi Arabia trying to blow up things and blame it on Iran. Some of the hits in Oman, Iranian military has officially put out the statements
Speaker 0: that we didn't do it. But Oman Oman Oman, we know Iran struck Oman, including the oil refinery. Are you saying even those are false flag attacks?
Speaker 1: Specifically, with that oil refinery, Iranian military said that we didn't do it. Now I'm I'm not I'm not saying I'm not taking sides here. They they may you know, so if you leave the false flag operations aside, there there are legitimate reasons for Iranian military to target some of these sites because these sites are used to attack Iran, and they are in these countries. And if they don't attack these sites, the sites would be used for the attacks tomorrow. So they need to take take them out today without considering where they need they may be.
It's the site that's the problem. And we have this problem of debris. You know, they these countries have shut down some of Iranian missiles, and when you shoot down missiles, you don't Iran cannot control where the missiles fall. So some of the damage is due to the debris that is created. Yeah.
And then what The United States did was they moved their soldiers from US bases inside the cities. They evacuated hotels and filled them with American soldiers, which is against international law because citizens of these countries become human shields. And even said that hotels will be targets if they're full of American soldiers. Office buildings are going to be targets if they're housing CIA headquarters. CIA headquarters are providing the data for all the bombings that we are witnessing.
And they're in inside cities. They're they're Latin American bases. You know, Iran has lost more than 2,000 civilians, a lot of damage to infrastructure. Trump has talked about changing Iranian borders. He he has talked about taking over Iranian oil.
So the country is fighting for its survival, they are going to use all the leverage they have to make sure it survives.
Speaker 0: That's the last point you made is one I've been making the whole time. And just to be clear, I was my building I live in The UAE. My building was struck almost struck twice. One was five minutes away, five minute walk. The other one was right next to it in the IFC.
So I I completely oh, first I was impacted by the war. Not as much as you in Iranians or people in Lebanon, not even close. Any people in Israel even. But I do agree with what you said. When people are like, Mario, how is that okay when I criticize the war?
How's that okay? How is it okay for Iran to to strike all the Gulf countries when The US is attacking it? I'm like, guys, in war for as far as we remember back during Sun Tzu, the out of war, the weaker side will always engage with asymmetric warfare. Iran cannot strike Washington DC. Iran cannot strike US bases in Europe or The US.
So Iran will have to resort to other other means, and that includes striking the Gulf. And Iran threatened to drag the Gulf into the war and threatened to close the Strait Of Hormuz before the war started. So for everyone to act shocked that this was done, Iran threatened to do the same thing. When you're fighting for survival against the world's biggest military, that would be one of the that should be something that anyone would have expected no matter what your stance is on the war. I'm not saying it justifies it when a civilian targets.
I think nothing justifies civilian targeting whatsoever. You're saying civilians were not targeted. It's almost impossible to know whether when you strike a building that has civilians, was it intentional, was it not, was it shrapnel? So going into that debate is very difficult. But I I wanna go to to the country that is, one could say, almost forgotten right now.
And the country is I said the biggest loser from this war, the biggest winner is Iran, and the biggest loser is Lebanon. And that's because Lebanon is getting destroyed. And if we wanna be one thing we disagree on or, yeah, we disagree on is is dragging Lebanon into this war. Now I understand why Iran would do it. Iran should focus on Iran and and the government's survival, the country's survival.
And if it means dragging Lebanon into this war for Hezbollah to support Iran, so be it. Iran first, America first, so that Israel first. When Israelis make a decision, they're thinking about their people first. But would you agree with me, professor? I'm not saying it's not it's the wrong thing to do strategically for Iran, but would you say Iran destroyed Lebanon?
Also, Israel destroyed Lebanon. They're the ones bombing it. But Iran destroyed Lebanon by dragging the country into this war so Hezbollah could support Iran?
Speaker 1: Well, to have an accurate analysis, you should you remember how Hezbollah was created? Hezbollah was created after the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in the in the early nineteen eighties. Young people, more or less your age, Lebanese, came to Iran and said that we are under attack. We have been under attack for many decades by Israelis. Now they have taken our land.
Can you help us? And in the nineteen eighties, Iran had an invasion by Saddam Hussein. You if you're thinking based on, you know, a strategic calculus, You you don't want to have Israelis and Americans helping Saddam Hussein by providing weapons to young Lebanese trying to defend their country. But Iranians did that because they realized that the Israeli government is a fascist government. And if they're able to take over Lebanon, Syria would be next.
Iran will be next. So what what you are seeing today was forecasted by Iranians in the nineteen eighties. So they decided to help Lebanese, and this is the origins of Hezbollah. And you remember many months ago, there was a ceasefire in Lebanon, and the way Israelis define ceasefire is that they can continue shooting at you, and you are not supposed to respond. You know, we have had a ceasefire in Gaza, and we have had more than a thousand civilians killed during the ceasefire.
And they Israelis did the same thing in Lebanon during ceasefire. Every day, they were attacking.
Speaker 0: But that's because but the ceasefire included sorry. I interrupt you, professor. The ceasefire included Hezbollah not rearming in the South Of Lebanon. That was part of the ceasefire. And now we know that Hezbollah was rearming in the South Of Lebanon based on the attacks of them firing from the South Of Lebanon, a significant barrage of rockets.
So I think both sides, including Israel, broke the ceasefire. Would you agree on that?
Speaker 1: Right. I agree that Lebanese realized that Israelis don't believe in ceasefire, period, and they didn't. No. They realized
Speaker 0: The Lebanese wanted to disarm Hezbollah, sir. They wanted to disarm Hezbollah, and they told Hezbollah. Hezbollah agreed with the government. The story is that Hezbollah agreed with the Lebanese government. They will not drag Lebanon into this war.
I'm not saying Israel has Lebanon's interest at heart. No. But Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into this war, there's even reports that it was Hezbollah's military arm because the political arm was saying no, was telling the government no. Even the ally, Birri, from Amal said the same thing that Hezbollah should not join into this war and criticize them when they did. The the story is that there were IRGC commanders in Lebanon, and they told the Hezbollah commanders to strike Israel, some of them eventually struck Israel.
Israel responded, and Hezbollah got dragged in. So while forty years ago, Hezbollah was created with the support of Iran in response to Israeli aggression, while Israel has a lot to blame for what's happening in Lebanon, a lot and originates even before that in Palestine and the PLO, it is also fair to say, professor, that Hezbollah did right now they have they're stuck in a position where they have to support their country, they do in many cases Lebanon, and support Iran who support Azerus, arms them and gives them all the money. And it's if you're getting all your arms and money or significant amount of it, if not all of it, from a country, of course, you have to listen to their requests at times. And in this case, Hezbollah or at least a portion of Hezbollah did drag Lebanon into this war for the sake of Iran, and I don't blame Iran for doing it because it did help Iran in the war. Iran used the proxies that it helped build for decades.
Do do you do you understand my argument?
Speaker 1: And you probably should add this sentence that is Hezbollah was very patient with Israel violating ceasefire a few days a few times a day for months. Sure. And they wanted to respond, and the reason they did not respond was because they know Israelis have no ethical standards, and they would engage in massacres as they did yesterday. And when the Iranian leader was assassinated, that gave Hezbollah a reason to respond, something that they wanted to do on their own. You know, the the way Iran deals with these organizations, this is something that you may not know.
These are not proxies. That's the terminology that Israelis use. These are friends, associates, and they make their own decisions. They are not there for the money. You know, if you know, Lebanese, as you know, are quite capable of making their own money.
They don't need money coming from other countries. They they are not there to be at the service of some some government. They are there for Lebanon. Many people in Hezbollah have come from Southern Lebanon. They have been on the receiving end of Israeli aggression for since 1948.
And they they are doing it for themselves, and they they realize that Nathaniel is interested in greater Israel. So whether you have Iran or you don't have Iran, they want Lebanese land, and they want Syrian land and Iraqi land and Saudi land and Egyptian land. Yeah. This is this is what Nathaniel was saying.
Speaker 0: While while I don't sorry. I I was gonna say while I don't believe the majority of of the Israeli farm the Israeli policies to expand territory outside of the Palestinian territory, I also think that there's a high possibility it is, and I'm not, like, I'm not certain one side or another. It's a very valid concern that a lot of Lebanese people have. That's why some people don't like Hezbollah support Hezbollah.
Speaker 1: So so if you're Lebanese and and and you like your country, especially if you come from the South, and, you know, the French are not going to arm you, the Americans are not going to arm you.
Speaker 0: They offered they offered to arm they offered to arm the the Lebanese military, though, the Lebanese army, if as
Speaker 1: well as disarmed. If they they arm the Lebanese military and they pay Americans pay Lebanese military to make sure that they don't respond to Israeli aggressions. They they they're supporting Israel in that manner. So if you're if you're a young Lebanese and you like your country, you like your land, you like your father, you like your mother, and you're looking for support because Lebanon is a small small country without oil and gas, at least until now. And then you you find there is this big country in the Middle East.
They share the same religion, and they have the same concerns about Israel. So what would you do? You would go to them and you attract support. And, you know, Americans have been telling Iran, if you stop or reduce your support for Palestine, if you sub reduce your support for Hezbollah, all your sanctions would go away. All these difficulties would go away.
All these attacks would go away. And Iranian government did not do that. And we have a lot of people in Iran that are criticizing the government. They're saying that you're sacrificing Iran for Lebanon. And some people don't like Iranian government.
Iranians don't like Iranian governments for that reason. So what what I believe is that Hezbollah is a nationalist religious nationalist Lebanese organization trying to defend Lebanon. They entered the war because they got of all these ceasefire violations. They needed an excuse to strike Israel in a serious manner, and that excuse came with the assassination of Iranian leader. If it was not in the interest of Hezbollah, no matter how much Iranian officials would ask them to do something, they would not do.
You know, this this is the same thing in Yemen. You know, when Yemenis wanted to take over Sana'a, it was the request of the Iranian government not to do it. They said it's too early for you to do that. Did they listen? No.
They they these organizations do their own things.
Speaker 0: I think I think we're both right, in my opinion. I think they do have their Hassan Nasrallah, for example, was in a very tricky position because he knows he has to abide by Iranian requests at times because Iran funds the group. And at the same time, he does have loyalty to his own country. So it is a very tricky position to be in, and and the new Nayim Kasim, I think the new leader is in a similar position. I'll I'll love professor, it's, first, pleasure to meet you, and I'd love to do this again if you have the time.
I know it's a pretty crazy times now for you guys to recover from the war. Maybe one day I could do I've never been to Iran. We could do it in person. But there's many other points I wanna discuss, so I'd love to do this again, sir. Thank you so much for your time.
No
Speaker 1: problem. Take care.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷🇨🇳 What if this war was never really about Iran? While everyone watches missiles and oil prices, the real pressure point is energy. Kharg Island handles around 90% of Iran’s oil exports, and most of that oil flows to Asia, especially China. That’s the part people are starting to connect. If Iranian oil gets disrupted, China loses a major cheap energy source. And in a global economy built on energy costs, that matters more than any single strike. Some analysts believe China was the real target. Source: hanocrypto
Video Transcript AI Summary
Speaker 0: This war was never about Iran. And once you see it, you can't unsee it. Everyone's focused on the missiles, the Strait Of Hormuz, the oil price, but nobody's asking the only question that matters. Who actually gets hurt when Iran's oil disappears? Not America. Not Europe. China. 80% of Iranian oil goes to Asia. China has been buying millions of barrels from Iran every single month under the table around sanctions through back channels. Iran is China's cheap energy lifeline, and Trump just cut it off. He bombed Karg Island, the one port that handles 90% of Iran's oil exports. He didn't hit it by accident. He hit it because that's the pipe that feeds Beijing. But here's what makes this genius. Before he even touched Iran, he captured Maduro, took Venezuela, secured the largest oil reserves on the planet for The US. So when Iran's oil disappears from the global market, America has the replacement. China doesn't. Think about what that means. China's energy costs just exploded. Their factories, their manufacturing, their entire economic engine runs on cheap oil, and the cheap oil just got cut off. While America is sitting on Venezuela on domestic production on the strongest energy position in decades, Iran didn't lose this war. Iran was never the target. Iran was the move you sacrifice to take the queen. This was never a war in The Middle East. This is an energy war against China, and most people won't understand that until it's already over. Wake up.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: This war was never about Iran. And once you see it, you can't unsee it. Everyone's focused on the missiles, the Strait Of Hormuz, the oil price, but nobody's asking the only question that matters. Who actually gets hurt when Iran's oil disappears? Not America.
Not Europe. China. 80% of Iranian oil goes to Asia. China has been buying millions of barrels from Iran every single month under the table around sanctions through back channels. Iran is China's cheap energy lifeline, and Trump just cut it off.
He bombed Karg Island, the one port that handles 90% of Iran's oil exports. He didn't hit it by accident. He hit it because that's the pipe that feeds Beijing. But here's what makes this genius. Before he even touched Iran, he captured Maduro, took Venezuela, secured the largest oil reserves on the planet for The US.
So when Iran's oil disappears from the global market, America has the replacement. China doesn't. Think about what that means. China's energy costs just exploded. Their factories, their manufacturing, their entire economic engine runs on cheap oil, and the cheap oil just got cut off.
While America is sitting on Venezuela on domestic production on the strongest energy position in decades, Iran didn't lose this war. Iran was never the target. Iran was the move you sacrifice to take the queen. This was never a war in The Middle East. This is an energy war against China, and most people won't understand that until it's already over.
Wake up.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇱🇮🇷 Your feed just became part of the war While the U.S., Israel, and Iran exchange strikes, they’re also flooding social media with memes, AI videos, and viral clips to shape how you see the war. Iran is pushing AI-generated “Lego-style” videos targeting Americans, mixing in topics like Epstein and past wars. At the same time, official U.S. accounts are posting cinematic clips to frame the conflict as heroic. This is psychological warfare. Both sides are turning serious policy into internet content to influence public opinion, distract, and control the narrative. Source: MiddleEastEye YT
Video Transcript AI Summary
From Iranian AI Lego animation videos to the official White House account uploading this clip of, quote, operation epic fury, The US's name for its war on Iran. Since the joint US Israel war on Iran began in February, hundreds have been killed. Another front is happening, the battle online. Iran's LEGO diss tracks are targeting the American public with mentions of Epstein, the Me Too movement and Pointless Wars. And official Iranian embassy X accounts are sharing commentary and memes while the White House uploaded this, quote, justice the American way clip. You can't conceive of what I'm capable of. Finishing this fight. Yeah. I'm thinking thinking I'm on back. I'm here to fight for truth and justice in the American way. Ben Stiller, who co wrote at one of the clips used by the White House tweeted, quote, hey, White House. Please remove the Tropic Thunder While Ceylon Dorr, the White House deputy communication director, retweeted this clip with the caption. Wake up, daddy son. Both sides are using memes to score political points, filtering serious policy through Internet culture. But propaganda isn't new in war. We've seen it in Russia, Ukraine, Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. And we've seen it in this war. Fake AI generated clips widely shared online. The Pentagon, which is the headquarters of the US Department of Defense, for example has been working with Hollywood since the 1940s and some movies like Ironman one and two were a collab with the Defense Department or music videos like Katy Perry's twenty twelve quote clip on how she found herself when she joined the army was also kebab created to normalize, shape public opinion and glorify war. Iran is also no stranger to propaganda. During the Iran Iraq war, state media glorified the military cause so effectively that hundreds of thousands of children volunteered and were put on the frontlines. States have long tried to make sacrifice appealing and today messages appear as memes online. This time however they're not asking you to join, they're asking you to laugh and pick a side. Every victim screaming in the dark. Iran got you on the play. Which raises the question, is the meme driven version being used to distract from critical reporting, undermine opponents messaging, and reinforce government policy.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: From Iranian AI Lego animation videos to the official White House account uploading this clip of, quote, operation epic fury, The US's name for its war on Iran.
Speaker 1: Since
Speaker 0: the joint US Israel war on Iran began in February, hundreds have been killed. Another front is happening, the battle online. Iran's LEGO diss tracks are targeting the American public with mentions of Epstein, the Me Too movement and Pointless Wars. And official Iranian embassy X accounts are sharing commentary and memes while the White House uploaded this, quote, justice the American way clip.
Speaker 1: You can't conceive of what I'm capable of. Finishing this fight. Yeah. I'm
Speaker 2: thinking thinking I'm on back.
Speaker 1: I'm here to fight for truth
Speaker 0: and justice in the American way. Ben Stiller, who co wrote at one of the clips used by the White House tweeted, quote, hey, White House. Please remove the Tropic Thunder While Ceylon Dorr, the White House deputy communication director, retweeted this clip with the caption. Wake up, daddy son. Both sides are using memes to score political points, filtering serious policy through Internet culture.
But propaganda isn't new in war. We've seen it in Russia, Ukraine, Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. And we've seen it in this war. Fake AI generated clips widely shared online. The Pentagon, which is the headquarters of the US Department of Defense, for example has been working with Hollywood since the 1940s and some movies like Ironman one and two were a collab with the Defense Department or music videos like Katy Perry's twenty twelve quote clip on how she found herself when she joined the army was also kebab created to normalize, shape public opinion and glorify war.
Iran is also no stranger to propaganda. During the Iran Iraq war, state media glorified the military cause so effectively that hundreds of thousands of children volunteered and were put on the frontlines. States have long tried to make sacrifice appealing and today messages appear as memes online. This time however they're not asking you to join, they're asking you to laugh and pick a side.
Speaker 1: Every victim screaming in the dark. Iran got you on the play.
Speaker 0: Which raises the question, is the meme driven version being used to distract from critical reporting, undermine opponents messaging, and reinforce government policy.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇱🇮🇷 Israel has arrested one of its own citizens on suspicion of spying for Iranian intelligence and manufacturing explosives to assassinate a senior figure. Geidrov, from Haifa, was recruited in August 2025. He was paid large sums of money to carry out missions for an Iranian https://t.co/UVoHCqhuAa
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 THE INSANE STORY OF AMERICA'S F-15 RESCUE MISSION The U.S. military has a motto it loves to repeat: leave no man behind. That promise played out on the world stage when an F-15 weapons officer ended up stranded on an Iranian mountain deep inside hostile territory. The U.S military's response wasn’t “cut losses.” It was “send everything.” And they did. Helicopters. Drones. A-10s chewing up mountainsides. Stealth jets overhead. Electronic warfare blanketing the sky. A fake narrative planted by the CIA just to keep the enemy looking the wrong way. At one point, the U.S. literally turned an abandoned strip of land inside enemy territory into a pop-up military base. Not metaphorically. Actually. Then, when things got messy, as they usually do in complex operations, they blew up their own aircraft on the way out. All of this… for one person. Is that admirable, insane, or both? Because on one hand, this is the kind of loyalty that makes militaries function. If you’re the one flying into danger, you want to believe the cavalry isn’t just coming, it’s already airborne, engines screaming, consequences be damned. That belief is priceless. On the other hand, the actual price is very much not. We’re talking about risking dozens of lives, escalating a conflict, and torching equipment that costs hundreds of millions. Not to win a war, not to secure territory. Just to make sure one name doesn’t get added to a memorial wall. There’s a brutal logic to it: if soldiers think they’re expendable, they start acting like it. Morale collapses, missions fail, wars get lost long before the headlines catch up. So the military doubles down on the opposite message: you are not expendable, even if proving that requires something wildly disproportionate. Which is how you end up with rescue operations that look straight out of Hollywood. Source: AI Telly
Video Transcript AI Summary
The rescue operation hinges on a strict code: leave no man behind. Dozens of attack helicopters, over 100 special forces and Delta operators, and a sprawling multi-stage plan were required to bring one person home after an aircraft went down. The mission began when both crew members ejected; the pilot was recovered, but the weapons systems officer (WSO) was injured and stranded.
WSO survival training kicked in as he trekked to a rugged mountainous ridge and activated his beacon just as IRGC militias closed in on the crash site. The CIA was one step ahead, initiating a massive deception tactic designed to make the IRGC search the wrong location. When the enemy realized they had been tricked, they swarmed the mountainous ridge around the wounded officer. Special forces moved in on low-burn helicopters, laying down heavy covering fire alongside A-10 Thunderbolts and MQ-9 Reaper drones. As they moved toward the extraction point, everything went wrong, demonstrating that the military would burn a $100,000,000 aircraft to save a single comrade.
Stage one: after the jet went down, both crew members ejected. The pilot was recovered within hours, but the WSO landed in an incredibly rugged, mountainous region. He hiked over two miles to reach higher ground despite injuries, and triggered his emergency beacon to ping US forces.
Stage two: The CIA launched a deception campaign inside Iran, leaking rumors that US forces had already found the WSO and were attempting to smuggle him out on the ground. The phantom ground exfiltration diverted Iranian military resources and attention away from the actual extraction site.
Stage three: It was 02:00 AM when the US deployed Delta Force and Navy SEAL Team Six with MA-60 Little Bird helicopters, armed with miniguns and missiles, alongside MA-60 Black Hawks or Pave Hawks to insert and extract. Dozens of US aircraft, including HC-130J Combat Kings and EA-18 Growlers, cast an electronic warfare net to blind Iranian early warning radars, while an MQ-9 Reaper kept eyes on the wounded WSO.
Stage four: The US set up a temporary forward operating base inside Iran, seizing an abandoned agricultural airstrip 200 feet wide and 3,900 feet long, about 14 miles north of Sharaza City in Southern Isfahan Province.
Stage five: US Special Forces helicopters reached the objective and established a defensive perimeter around the wounded WSO. A fierce, hours-long firefight erupted as IRGC ground forces, popular mobilization units, and local militias converged. Ground operators relied on a wall of suppressive fire, while overhead air power continued to pound surrounding Iranian positions with A-10s, Little Birds, and Black Hawks, taking a heavy toll and drawing casualties in areas like Kui Siyah and Kaken. Despite the onslaught, the extraction corridor remained open long enough for the team to load the WSO onto an extraction helicopter. Yet, back at the makeshift landing strip near Chereza City, two transport planes suffered critical issues and couldn't take off, prompting a decision to destroy the two transport planes to prevent data from falling into IRGC hands. A confiscated helicopter, an H-6 Little Bird, was spotted near the wreckage of the HC-130J rescue aircraft.
The Zagros Mountains, in Kermanshah Province near the Iran-Iraq border, provided terrain masking for long-range radar but allowed short-range anti-air ambushes. The operation began with 02:15 hours when two F-15E Strike Eagles crossed the border at low altitude to strike a deeply buried command bunker, using terrain-following radar to stay beneath Iran’s long-range BEYVER missiles network. The lead Strike Eagle pulled up to drop its GBU-28 bunker buster, while a TOR M1 surface-to-air missile system awaited a lock in a gorge. A second missile detonated on proximity, causing hydraulic failure; the crew ejected into the mountains. The Sandy protocol activated, and a rescue was organized. By 02:45 hours, a 10 Thunderbolt rescue escort was diverted for resort, and a LiV A-10 performed a low-level strafing run on a convoy, neutralizing it with 30mm cannon while revealing its position to Iranian forces.
Despite the intense engagement, the F-15E pilot managed to steer the crippled jet toward safer airspace, even as the A-10 endured damage yet retained enough controls to continue flight. The F-15E crashed deep inside southwestern Iran, while the A-10 eventually crashed in the southern waters of the Persian Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz. A dedicated CSAR package launched at 03:15 hours, pushing into the Zagros as dawn approached. Pedro 11 located the A-10 pilot’s position; Pedro 12 provided overwatch. An ambush by a concealed anti-aircraft gun interrupted Pedro 12, but a coordinated strike by C-130 overhead and two F-35 stealth fighters silenced the weapon, allowing Pedro 11 to extract the pilot. The rescue helicopter, Pedro 11, flew overloaded, narrowly clearing tree line and exiting into Iraqi airspace by 05:30, battered but alive. The F-15E crew remained missing, prompting a follow-up JSO raid the next night.
Notes on aviation and defense gaps include a discussion of radar-guided versus heat-seeking missiles, including an analysis of the F-35’s vulnerability to infrared-guided threats, the role of distributed aperture systems, flares, and the potential use of a hybrid SA-358/SA-67 system in infrared detection.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: How did The US pull off one of the most daring rescue operations in history, deep behind enemy lines? It comes down to a strict code the US military lives by, leave no man behind. They will literally send dozens of attack helicopters and over a 100 special forces and Delta operators just to bring one person home. The mission started when an aircraft went down. After both crew members ejected, the pilot was successfully extracted, but the weapons systems officer was injured and stranded.
His survival training instantly kicked in. He trekked all the way up to a rugged, mountainous ridge and activated his beacon, just as IRGC militias began closing in on the crash site. The CIA was one step ahead. They initiated a massive deception tactic, a ruse designed to make the IRGC search entirely the wrong location. When the enemy forces finally realized they had been tricked, all hell broke loose.
They swarmed the mountainous ridge surrounding the injured officer. Just in time, special forces swooped in on low burn helicopters, laying down heavy covering fire alongside A-ten Thunderbolts and MQ-nine Reaper drones. But as they moved toward the extraction point, everything went wrong, proving the military is willing to burn a $100,000,000 aircraft just to save a single fallen comrade. This is stage one. When the jet went down, both crew members ejected.
The pilot was recovered within hours. But the weapon systems officer wasn't so lucky. Wounded from the ejection, he landed in an incredibly rugged, mountainous region. Look at the map here. This is the crash site.
And this is exactly where his survival training kicked in. His immediate objective? Get to higher ground. Despite his injuries, he hiked over two miles and scaled a 7,000 foot ridge line. While dodging capture, he managed to trigger his emergency beacon, pinging US forces so they could begin tracking his location.
But he couldn't just stay on the radio. His communication had to be sporadic if he transmitted too often the IRGC's signals intelligence teams, who were actively hunting his frequency, would pinpoint his exact coordinates. Then comes stage two: The CIA's Deception Game. To buy the downed officer time, the CIA launched a massive disinformation campaign inside Iran. They started leaking rumors that US forces had already found the WSO and were attempting to smuggle him out on the ground.
It worked perfectly. This phantom ground exfiltration successfully diverted Iranian military resources and attention completely away from the actual extraction site. That brings us to stage three. The tip of the spear. It's 02:00AM.
The skies over Southern Isfahan and Kogiluwu are usually dead silent. But tonight, the US military's most elite operators, the Delta Force and Navy SEAL Team six, are launching a massive helleborn assault. They arrive in MA-six Little Bird helicopters, absolutely armed to the teeth with miniguns and missiles, built for agility and tight mountain corners. Supporting them are the MA-sixty Black Hawks or Pave Hawks, designed to drop in special forces and pull them out. And they weren't alone.
Miles above the pitch black mountains, dozens of US military aircraft, including HC-130J Combat Kings and EA-eighteen Growlers, cast an invisible net over the region. They unleashed a storm of electronic warfare designed to completely blind Iranian early warning radars, all while an MQ-nine Reaper drone kept an unblinking eye on the wounded WSO. Stage four, and this is the crazy part. The US literally set up a temporary forward operating base inside Iran. They seize an abandoned agricultural airstrip, just 200 feet wide and 3,900 feet long, located about 14 miles north of Sharaza City in the Southern Isfahan Province.
They turned an empty Iranian field into a US staging ground. Here comes stage five. Despite the odds, US Special Forces successfully and helicopters navigated the jagged landscape below radar level and reached their objective, establishing a defensive perimeter around the wounded WSO. But time was up. Just as they prepared to grab him and get out, the horizon started moving.
IRGC ground forces, popular mobilization units, and local militias were rapidly converging on their exact location. What happened next was an absolute slugfest. A massive hours long firefight erupted right in the middle of the day. Look at this ridge, they were surrounded taking fire from all sides. US operators laid down a withering wall of suppressive fire.
The commandos locked down a 360 degree defensive perimeter, guns up, air cover overhead, designed to annihilate any IRGC element that stepped within range. But it was the loitering US aircraft overhead that truly tipped the scales. To keep the extraction corridor from collapsing, American airpower continuously hammered the advancing Iranian units. Assets like the A-ten Thunderbolt rain hellfire down on them. The sheer volume of close air support from the A-10s, Little Birds, and Black Hawks pounded the surrounding Iranian positions, taking a heavy toll and resulting in reported casualties across areas like Kui Siyah and Kaken.
That air support bought the ground teams the one thing they needed most: seconds. Under the umbrella of that intense air cover, the Special Forces helicopters finally managed to load the wounded WSO onto an extraction bird. Just when it seemed like they were in the clear, things went terribly wrong back at the makeshift landing strip near Chereza City. According to the Pentagon, two of the transport aircraft slated for the evacuation suffered critical issues and couldn't take off. Suddenly, it was a race against time.
The IRGC was speeding toward the airstrip in a massive convoy. Commanders decided to send three more aircraft to rescue all US military personnel and the pilot. Then, in a scorched earth move, US forces blew up the two disciple transport planes leaving nothing but charred remains for the IRGC. The wreckage of a USM H6 Little Bird helicopter was also spotted next to the remains of HC-130J Combat King-two rescue aircraft that were destroyed by US airstrikes to prevent secret military data from falling into IRGC hands. But how did all of this actually started?
The Zagros Mountains, Kermanshah Province, near the Iran Iraq border. This terrain is characterized by jagged peaks and deep, narrow valleys. It is a tactical nightmare for aviators but provides excellent terrain masking to hide from long range radar. However, it also allows enemy forces to set up short range anti aircraft ambushes. But how did The US lose an F-15E Strike Eagle, an A-ten Warthog, and nearly a combat search and rescue team helicopter, and a Reaper drone in a single night?
Well, this is how it started at 02:15 hours. A flight of two F-fifteen E Strike Eagles crosses the border at low altitude. A pilot and a weapon system officer were flying or target a deeply buried command bunker. They used terrain following radar to hide in the valleys, staying beneath the gaze of Iran long range Beyver three seventy three missile network. But what happens when they have to strike?
To drop its GBU-twenty eight bunker buster, the lead's Strike Eagle has to pull up and move above the mountains. This is breaking the radar horizon. In a gorge below, highly mobile, TOR M1's surface to air missile system is waiting. It achieves a lock and two missiles leave the rails. The pilot dumps flares and pulls high G S, one missile to spoofed.
But could they evade the second? Well, the second missile detonates on proximity, causing catastrophic hydraulic failure. The crew ejects into the pitch black mountains, and the Sandy protocol is immediately activated. But this is the US military, and they will move heaven on earth to rescue a fallen combat. At two forty five hours in the morning, because the crash is near the border, a 10 Thunderbolt operating nearby are diverted for resort, also called rescue escort.
Down below, Iranian quick reaction forces are closing in on the downed airmen. The LiV A-ten executes a low level strafe on the run with its legendary 30 millimeters of entry cannon, neutralizing the convoy. But how did this aggressive maneuver come at a cost? The noise and tracers give away its position, as the A-ten banks hard, bleeding off airspeed. For context, Iran recently flooded the battlefield with these Chinese shoulder fired missiles, weapons that are essentially reverse engineered clones of Russian MANPAD.
The Iranian soldier fires a missile two infrared guided missile. At this altitude, countermeasures deploy too late. The missile shreds the right turbofan engine. But can the Warthog's legendary armor save it? Yes, the armor did save it from this missile launcher as it flew even with a damaged engine.
Because of the armor, the pilot managed to points the dying jet toward a plateau and punches out. But just how many crash sites are we looking at? The F-15E crashed deep inside Southwestern Iran. Specifically, local reports and verified wreckage photos placed the crash site in the rugged, mountainous terrain of the Qoji Lui and Boyer Almad province, while the A-ten warthog did not go down over the Iranian Mainland. After taking heavy damage during the search and rescue escort mission, the pilot managed to navigate the crippled jet away from the mountains and towards safer airspace.
The rugged battle damage A-ten eventually crashed in the southern waters of the Persian Gulf, specifically near the Strait Of Hormuz. Now this at 03:15 hours. A dedicated combat search and rescue package launches. These are highly trained rescue units built for this type of rescue mission. It includes an HC one thirty j combat king.
This act as an airborne command center, followed by two HAS-sixty Bill helicopters. Call signs: Pedro 11 and Pedro 12. They fly them in the radar, topping off their fuel in mid air to maximize winter time. But will they make it into hostile territory undetected? Well, they push deep into the Zagros Mountains just as dawn approaches.
Four forty five hours. Pedro eleven locates the A-ten pilot's inferred stroke. Pedro twelve circles above, providing overwatch with its 50 caliber machine guns. Pedro eleven flares for landing, and the peas hit the dirt to secure the pilot. Then this happened to hidden Iranian zoo twenty three, a Soviet era anti aircraft gun opens fire from a concealed hideout.
It's an ambush. Heavy armor piercing rounds tear through Pedro 12 as it orbits, resulting in severed transmission lines and an injured crew. The pilot wrestles the crippled chopper into a hard controlled crash near Pedro 11. The rescue mission is now a fight for survival, and Pedro 11 is the only way home. Under heavy covering fire, the crew of the downed Chopper sprints to the surviving bird.
But how do they stop the enemy barrage? Then at five two hours, the C-one 130 overhead coordinates an immediate strike. Two F-thirty five stealth fighter jet loitering high above in stealth overwatch drop precision munitions, silencing the anti aircraft gun. With the A-ten pilot, the PJ, and the crash chopper's crew crammed inside, Pedro eleven is maxed out on weight. But how do you fly an overloaded helicopter escape the Zagros Mountain?
This is how they do it. Pulling maximum power, the engines screaming, they barely clear the tree line and dive back into the valleys, racing for the border. By 05:30 in the morning, Pedro eleven crossed back into Iraqi airspace. Battered, overloaded, but alive. As stated, no one gets left behind.
The F-15E crew is still missing an action requiring a massive JSO raid the following night. And if you don't want your data to get compromised by spam mails, jump calls, and online breaches, This data doesn't just result in spam and scam attempts. It can also affect your insurance rates, and ultimately will lead into a loan denial just when you might need credit. Incogni helps protect your privacy by regularly scanning and preventing data brokers from re uploading your information. You'll also get a clear, real time dashboard to track the status of your data.
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Then wait about thirty to forty five days, and just like that, your data is removed. So take your personal data back with Incogni. Use code AITELI with the link below incogni.com/aitelly and get 60% off on an annual plan. AWAIT, an F-thirty five was also hit during one of its mission sorties. To properly analyze this incident, you need to understand that there are two distinct types of missiles: radar guided and heat seeking.
The F-thirty five was designed to be practically invisible to long range radar, but it wasn't built to completely hide from heat seeking missiles. So how exactly did Iran missile manage to bypass the stealth technology of The US F-thirty five? Well, the secret lies in a major vulnerability that is its HEAT signature. Its geometry and radar absorbent materials make its radar cross section incredibly small, essentially rendering it invisible to traditional early warning and targeting radars. To give you some context, this is how a plane's radar signature compares to a bird's, but the F-thirty five is powered by a single Pratt and Whitney F135 engine, one of the most powerful fighter engines in the world.
The F-thirty five is heavily optimized to defeat radio frequency radar like the billion dollar S-four 100 and S-three 100 missiles. However, stealth does not mean completely invisible. This engine produces a massive heat plume. Instead of using radar, modern air defense networks utilize inferred search and track systems. The answer is this short range heat seeking missile like this one.
These passive sensors scan the skies for any heat anomalies. Because inferred search and track systems emit no energy themselves, the F-thirty five's radar warning receivers would not alert the pilot that they were being painted by a target lock in the same way a radar lock would. But how did the missile lock and how did the F-thirty five use evasive maneuvers? Once an inferrer guided missile is launched, the dynamic of the engagement changes to a race of physics and countermeasures. When the missile's IR seeker head locks onto the massive thermal output of the F-thirty five's engine exhaust.
With the detection, the F-thirty five is equipped with a distributed aperture system, six infrared cameras positioned around the aircraft that provide a three sixty degree spherical view. The distributed aperture system detects the intense heat signature of the incoming missile's rocket motor and instantly alerts the pilot. To break the lock, the pilot executes high G evasive maneuvers while simultaneously deploying flares. If the missile tracks the flares but is already within a lethal radius, its proximity fuse will trigger the warhead. The resulting shrapnel and shockwave can cause significant damage to the aircraft's control surfaces coating, or internal systems without scoring a catastrophic direct hit, which perfectly aligns with reports of the F-thirty five sustaining damage but safely executing an emergency landing.
But what are flares? These pyrotechnic countermeasures are made of magnesium or other combustible metals that burn at temperatures exceeding the aircraft's engine heat. The goal of the flares is to overwhelm or confuse the missile's IR seeker, forcing it to chase the decoy heat sources instead of the jet. But what is Iran's secret weapon? We believe it's the three fifty eight anti aircraft missile or the SA67.
The three fifty eight is a unique hybrid between a loitering munition or kamikaze drone and a surface to air missile. But how does it works? It flies at slower, subsonic speeds and can loiter in a designated airspace in a figure eight pattern until its optical and infrared sensors detect a target. If a three eighty five missile or a more advanced high speed indigenous IR guided surface to air missile, was guided by a ground based IRST network, it could engage the F-thirty five entirely within the infrared spectrum, bypassing the jet's radar evading capabilities entirely. This incident challenges the long held doctrine that fifth generation fighters can operate with total impunity in contested airspace, highlighting the evolving threat of infrared detection.
But it has its advantages as it cannot hit fighter jets far from its radius of launch system. We make original videos from scratch and animated by humans, so please subscribe to not miss a beat.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 Trump reportedly preparing to revoke visas of hundreds, possibly thousands of Iranian elites living in the U.S. Soleimani's niece already detained. Larijani's daughter's visa revoked. Source: AP https://t.co/mAwaAJr3n3
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 BREAKING: Senior official tells Axios Trump will hold off on deadline if a deal is forming. But a defense official says they're "skeptical" of another extension. https://t.co/EPgon6JXqM
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇱🇮🇷 THE WAR ON IRAN IS FOUGHT FOR THE ISRAELI EMPIRE In talking about the ongoing occupation of Lebanon, which is increasingly looking like an annexation of southern Lebanon, Aaron Mate suggested the conflict with Iran is fundamentally about Israeli imperialism. "This war on Iran, and in Lebanon, everything comes back to Israel's occupation and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. That's why Iran and Hezbollah are being targeted; they resist the Israeli project." @aaronjmate
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷🇺🇸🇮🇱 A former Israeli Air Force commander explains why Iran is shooting down American jets... Iran completely rebuilt its air defense doctrine after the 12-day war. A former IAF commander told me "the days when flying over Iran was a walk in the park are over." Here's what changed: Each of Iran's 31 zones now operates independently if Tehran is cut off. No more waiting for orders from a command center that might already be destroyed. Mobile launchers use shoot-and-scoot tactics from tunnels and mountain terrain. New passive infrared systems track jets without emitting radar signals, meaning pilots don't know they're being targeted until a missile is already in the air. The biggest revelation: Iran is using China's HQ-9B, Beijing's best long-range surface-to-air missile, with both active radar and infrared seekers. Standard electronic countermeasures struggle against it. And Iran's homegrown Bavar-373 reportedly outperforms Russia's S-300 and possibly the S-400. Iran ditched Russian technology, replaced it with Chinese and domestic systems, decentralized command, went mobile, went passive, and went underground. The result: two American aircraft down in a single day after five weeks of assumed air dominance. Source: @academic_la
reSee.it AI Summary
I think Glenn Diesen says Trump overestimated firepower, as Iran escalated step by step and—crucially—denied the U.S. control over when the war ends. The Strait of Hormuz remains the defining factor; Iran never sought this fight, but survival forced its calculus after U.S. strikes. Iran is drafting a maritime protocol with Oman to control the strait. Trump bets on a $1.5T defense budget while Rubio dropped regime change and reopening Hormuz. What happens when you win battles but lose the war?
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇮🇷 🇺🇸 TRUMP DESTROYED THEIR NAVY, KILLED THEIR LEADERS, AND STILL CAN'T DECLARE VICTORY...HERE'S WHY Professor Glenn Diesen says Trump's biggest miscalculation was assuming overwhelming firepower would force Iran to fold. It didn't. Iran went up the escalation ladder step by step and denied the U.S. the ability to choose when this war ends. The Strait of Hormuz is the entire ballgame. Trump can claim he wiped out the air force, the navy, the nuclear program. But as long as Iran controls that chokepoint, he can't go home with a win. Glenn says Iran never wanted this fight. They sat out October 7th. They watched Hezbollah get crushed without intervening. But once the U.S. struck directly, survival became the only calculation. Now Iran is building a joint maritime protocol with Oman for postwar control of the strait. Trump just proposed a $1.5 trillion defense budget. And Rubio's victory checklist quietly dropped two things: regime change and reopening the strait. The question nobody in Washington wants to answer: what happens when you win every battle and still lose the war? Full interview with @Glenn_Diesen below 1:00 — Trump Wants an Off-Ramp. Iran Won't Give Him One. 3:29 — Iran's General Staff Responds Live on Air 4:58 — Why Escalation Control Is a Delusion 5:37 — Could Trump Just Walk Away and Let the World Sort Out Hormuz? 8:25 — Iran Is Building a Toll System for the Strait 11:38 — Trump's $1.5 Trillion Defense Budget Drops Mid-Interview 14:09 — Israel Has a Veto Over When This War Ends 17:20 — "I Never Predicted We'd End Up Here. It Doesn't Make Sense." 22:38 — Peace Through Strength or Just the Neocons With a New Name? 35:07 — Iran Could Kill the Petrodollar If Trump Walks Away
Video Transcript AI Summary
Mario and Glenn discuss the evolving Iran–U.S. confrontation after Trump’s speech and recent military actions. They explore whether Trump is seeking an off-ramp and how Iran might respond, focusing on strategic leverage around the Strait of Hormuz, escalation dynamics, and regional implications.
- Trump’s posture and off-ramp: Mario notes Trump’s speech yesterday seemed like a threat if Iran doesn’t grant an off-ramp, with comments suggesting further precision attacks if peace isn’t achieved quickly. Glenn agrees Trump is signaling for an off-ramp but warns the President lacks obvious military targets to push Iran toward surrender. Both acknowledge Trump’s dual tendency to escalate while also hinting at ending the conflict.
- Strait of Hormuz as leverage: The discussion emphasizes that Iran’s ability to control, or at least influence, the Hormuz strait is a key factor in determining the war’s outcome. If Iran maintains dominance over Hormuz, they can set transit conditions, demand concessions, or push for non-dollar trade. The speakers agree that Iran can “hold on to the Strait of Hormuz” to prevent a clean U.S. victory, making it a central bargaining chip.
- Historical lens on victory and war termination: Glenn argues that raw military power often doesn’t translate into lasting political victory, citing Vietnam and the Iraq war as examples, and notes Iran views the conflict as existential for legitimate reasons. Trump’s stated goal of “destroying everything of infrastructure and energy” would raise global energy prices and provoke Iranian retaliation against Gulf states, complicating U.S. aims.
- Possible outcomes and shifts in posture: They consider multiple scenarios:
- If Trump off-ramps, Iran might reciprocate, potentially halting strikes on U.S. bases and negotiating terms around Hormuz.
- If the U.S. presses ahead or escalates, Iran could intensify attacks on Gulf states or even Israel, leading to broader regional destabilization.
- A mutually acceptable security framework may require the U.S. to reduce its Middle East footprint while Gulf states participate in a collective security arrangement over Hormuz.
- Israel’s veto power and potential U.S. decisions: Israel’s security considerations complicate any exit, but the U.S. might act unilaterally if core national security interests are threatened.
- Ground troops and regional dynamics: Both acknowledge the ambiguity around ground deployments; Trump’s denial of ground troops conflicts with the impulse to escalate, creating a paradox that makes miscalculations likely. The possibility of renewed ground involvement remains uncertain, with skepticism about sustaining a ground campaign given logistics and supply constraints.
- Regional actors and diplomacy: They discuss whether a broader regional rapprochement is possible. Iran’s willingness to negotiate could depend on assurances about its security and status quo changes in the Gulf. Tasnim News reports Iran and Oman are developing a joint maritime protocol for Hormuz in the post-war period, with Iran planning a toll-based framework for tanker traffic, signaling monetization and control even as Hormuz reopens for the world.
- NATO, U.S. defense spending, and leadership changes: The conversation touches on geopolitics beyond Iran, noting a forthcoming $1.5 trillion defense budget and a leadership shift at the U.S. Army, with secretary of war P. Hexath ordering the Army chief of staff to retire, signaling a potential reorientation of U.S. military strategy.
- Israel–Iran–Gulf triangle: They consider how Iran’s actions could affect Israel and Gulf states, noting that Iran’s retaliation could prompt U.S. or Israeli responses, while Gulf states struggle with the economic and security repercussions of sustained conflict.
- Timing and next steps: Mario predicts the war could end soon, driven by off-ramps and Iranian willingness to negotiate, whereas Glenn cautions that the conflict will likely continue given the deep-seated security demands and the strategic importance of Hormuz. Both acknowledge daily developments could shift trajectories, and express cautious optimism that some form of resolution may emerge, though the exact terms remain uncertain.
- Final reflections: The discussion closes with reflections on how fragile the current balance is, the possibility of a peace-through-strength stance, and the high stakes for global energy markets, regional stability, and the international order. Mario thanks Glenn for the dialogue, and they sign off.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Trump's speech yesterday to me seems like he's threatening if they don't give him enough time.
Speaker 1: The problem for Trump is, you know, he's he keeps making this point like he's trying to convince himself and destroy their air force, their navy, their military, or kill their leadership. You know, we won. Certainly, Certainly, we won. Won. But if Iran doesn't say that it's over, then it's not over.
Speaker 0: Why can't he just end the war and walk away?
Speaker 1: He's been arguing if Iran does just open up the Strait Of Hormuz, then he'll destroy everything in Iran. On the other
Speaker 0: hand Do think so?
Speaker 1: It could. It's not that the US will be able to control the Strait Of Hormuz. That won't happen. The Iranians could assert dominance over it. This is gonna have consequences far beyond the Middle East.
Speaker 0: Alright, man. Well well, good to speak to you.
Speaker 1: Likewise.
Speaker 0: So we've we've talked before about whether Iran will give Trump an off ramp and we're kinda getting our answer because Trump's speech yesterday to me seems like he's asking for an off ramp. I wouldn't say begging but threatening if they don't give him an off ramp and today he struck a bridge just about an hour ago, an important bridge in Iran delivering on his threats but he's essentially looking if you look at his comments which I know a lot of people the markets didn't like but he said if peace the part that the market didn't like if peace does not come quickly we will go after those other targets with precision speed and skill. Are many targets left. Most of them can be taken out in a matter of minutes. Future attacks will be far greater and a lot easier.
He also talks about another two three weeks of significant attacks. What do you make of this? Because he also said we will finish the job very fast and over he said it's all be over the next two to three weeks, which kind of reaffirms the point that he's not preparing. I don't think he's preparing any ground troops. No one's talking about ground troops suddenly anymore after that speech.
And he's also trying to get off ramp as quickly as possible.
Speaker 1: Well, I guess his key problem has been, that it confuses, raw military power with a simple victory. I mean, if you look at many of America's wars going from Vietnam to the Iraq war, they tend to win the battles. They have a lot of firepower. They can deal a lot of death and destruction. But at the end of the day, they don't actually win those wars.
And, I think this is also the case with, with Iran. That is a thought we're coming. We have, you know, much greater firepower. We can bring a lot of death and destruction, and then we'll bring them to their knees, and they will, you know, yield to our demands. The problem for for him is that Iran considers this to be an existential threat for very good reasons.
And what Trump wants from them, they can't give. Indeed, they don't even wanna go back to the status quo given that diplomacy doesn't seem very authentic anymore, given that they have already had these two surprise attacks plus, you know, the abandonment of the JCPOA, you know, decades of sanctions. So I think, overall, they they they were they're prepared to sit this to stay this one out. And the problem for Trump is, you know, he keeps making this point, like, he's trying to convince himself and destroy their air force, their navy, their military, kill their leadership. You know, we won.
Certainly, we won. But if Iran doesn't say that it's over, then it's not over. And the key thing that Iran can do in terms of making sure that it's not over is by holding on to the Strait Of Hormuz, that is being in a position to put conditions on whoever gets to transit, be it to expel U. S. Bases, get reparations or simply trade in the non dollar currencies, whatever the Iranians want, he can't go home and declare victory.
So I think he doesn't know really what to do. Because he doesn't have military targets, what does he do? And essentially, he's just promising to, in his words, bring them back to the Stone Age, destroy everything of infrastructure and energy. But, of course, if it does this, energy prices will go up. And, of course, Iran will retaliate in a way that hurts United States, which is go after the Gulf States.
They're in their energy resources and indeed their survivability as well. So I think that this As the main
Speaker 0: you're speaking, the general staff put out a statement just said the following perfect timing just now. It will not be like like Trump's twelve day war where he utters the word ceasefire and then goes back to prepare himself for the next attack or stirs up a sedition like the events of January. The longer the war lasts, the greater the humiliation and defeat of The United States will be.
Speaker 1: Oh. Yeah. Well, I guess this is where the miscalculation is, the delusion or illusion of escalation control. Escalation control simply means you get to decide how much you want to escalate, and you can bring it up to the point where adversary will have to, essentially capitulate, and you can bring it down whenever you want. Well, The US can't do any of them if it goes up the escalation ladder as we've seen.
This is quite remarkable if you follow how the Iranians have reacted. They've gone up this escalation ladder step by step with The United States, will showing that they're willing to go up. And also, they're denying The US stability to essentially choose when this war is over. And this is a fair point, the one you just read out, which is you you don't get to declare a ceasefire once the war doesn't go well, go home, regroup, prepare for, and have another go at it. And this is essentially what they wanna make sure that this war does not happen again.
And that's not an easy thing to to to demand, but I think the straight of Hormuz is a key to this Iranian goals.
Speaker 0: But but Trump also hinted is that he's happy to end the war, and I think either he he said it or there's reports that he's happy to end the war even if it does not lead to the opening of the Shared Of Hormuz. So why can't he just end the war and walk away? They're not gonna strike American bases. If America stops, I think they'll stop striking The US. They'll keep they'll start figuring out a solution for the Strait Of Hormuz, working deals with different countries, maybe making money off it.
But couldn't be a win win is that Trump walks away, hey. We killed their regime. Screw them. Let's move on to the next thing, and they can sort out the Strait Of Hormuz with the rest of the world because The US doesn't need it as much. Isn't that also a solution?
It's a funny one, but it is.
Speaker 1: It it is a solution. Yeah. Actually, he could be spun in his interest because, again, he kind of seeks to adjust to this new multipolar world. So in short, what the National Security Strategy ambitions is for The U. S.
To pivot to the Western Hemisphere and East Asia. That means to reduce its presence in Europe and in the Middle East. So if he essentially leaves saying, well, the Strait Of Hormuz is not our problem anymore. It's up for the Europeans and and the regional powers. Then he could, reduce America's footprint in Middle East.
And, also, he happens to declare the end of NATO more or less, not in those exact words, but, you know, we're not gonna be there for you anymore. That's pretty much for US led military lines that is, more or less spelling its death. So he did this could be spun as a as a victory. And, again, it's possible that he will go down this path, but I think I wouldn't read too much into his words because he says a lot of things that, he'll change his mind in twenty minutes. Again, he's been arguing if Iran doesn't open up the Strait Of Hormuz, then he'll destroy everything in Iran.
On the other hand
Speaker 0: Do think could really?
Speaker 1: He could. I I think it would be too much. I think the international system, the disruptions would be too great. That is if all the if that means Iran going after all the Gulf States, not just, you know, knocking out some energy, but going after desalination plants and essentially forcing, know, tens of millions of people to flee. This would be yeah.
No. I I I don't think well, it it would be very mad. But, again, I think this is a danger as well by putting countries like The United States and Israel up against the corner. If they face a humiliating defeat, you know, countries, especially great powers, will do very foolish things. So it remains to be seen.
But but, again, it's this idea. He goes, you know, both ways. So he tells NATO the same thing. On one hand, you know, you you have to come and assist us, but also we don't really need you. So he's, you know, he's he's hard to pin down, and I think this is why it's difficult to make out what he wants with Iranians as well.
I mean, I hear some people suggest that he's just looking for an excuse to escalate, to sound like he wants peace. I'm leaning more towards the idea that he got boxed in, that he was hoping for a short war. It didn't play out, and now he doesn't know how to get out. But I I agree with your assessment. I do think if he decides let's pack up and go home, then the Iranians would then also go down this escalation ladder.
They would then stop striking The US bases. But the foundation of it, the concern that the Americans might come.
Speaker 0: Yeah. You've just your your mic just tuned out. While you're doing this, by the way, I came out of the post. I just post about to post there now. Imagine if Trump I'll write it now.
Imagine if Trump ends the war and walks away leaving the rest of the world to sort out the Strait Of Hormuz. That could actually I'm not sure if you can hear me. You can hear me, Glenn, while you're sorting out the mic. Yeah. Imagine imagine Trump does that.
I know it's it's hard to laugh during times of war, but that's such a Trump thing to do. Like, even people around me that are upset and impacted by the war. They look at some of the comments he makes, and and there's there's a person that I as close to me, she always listens to you know those Instagram analysts? Some of them are good, but they do those little quick recaps in a simplified way as objective as possible. And the analyst goes, you know, I have no idea, by the way, your audio is not back.
I have no idea what Trump is saying, and I don't think anyone has any idea what he's meaning. Because on one side, the contradictory statements just drive everyone nuts. On one side, he wants to escalate. He wants to destroy Iran. He wants their oil.
He posted about wanting their oil two days ago. Remember that video from the from the interview in the eighties? And then I think in the in the in the speech yesterday, he said, I don't want their oil. So it's it's if you're Iran right now, you'd be losing your shit. You need you need mental therapy after after just listening to Trump.
Speaker 1: Yeah. But he made the same point that, you know, we don't want regime change. We never said regime change.
Speaker 0: But we got regime change.
Speaker 1: Yeah. But we have regime change. But, also, he's been arguing for regime change for the past few weeks. So, again, it's just there's so much it's just words at the end of the day. It doesn't mean anything.
I mean, he he boasts a lot. He lies a lot. I mean but, also, it's not always an indication if it changed course. I think it's just, you know, sometimes he wants to do the signaling. Again, he has one stick, which is, I'll put maximum pressure, and then I'll get my deal.
So I'll threaten to destroy everything in Iran unless you take this deal, an off ramp. And then when they don't take it, what does it do? Because he knows the Iranians will go up that escalation ladder with him. So he's very difficult spot. And again, if I would advise Trump, I'm not sure exactly what I would say because he really boxed himself in here.
So I think this idea that you can only do minor changes, I don't think that's possible. I think, at best, you could have to hope for, a around the new security architecture for The Middle East. That is The US. It's a bit like the European system. The entire security structure built up an alliance system where the Gulf States are dependent on The US and thus, you know, obedient, while the while Iran is this adversary, which has to be perpetually weakened.
I think if it's if it's possible, you know, The US is not gonna be able to dominate, I think, like it did in the past. But I wouldn't advise necessarily for the Americans to hand over, you know, all the lead regional leadership to Iran either. So maybe, you know, it can meet halfway. That is, for The US to reduce its presence, but then have some kind of a, collective operation or, you know, security of the Strait Of Moose with the Gulf States. Because it doesn't have to be I mean, yes, there's some, bad blood at the moment.
But the reason why Iran has attacked the Gulf States is because they attacked Iran. So I think, if you could take a step back away from
Speaker 0: this you say did you say that Iran attacked the Gulf States because the Gulf States attacked Iran?
Speaker 1: No. I'm saying it. So I'm I'm thinking there could be a new if there was a possibility of ending this anti Iranian alliance or scaling it back, then the Iranians might be willing to compromise on some other things. Because I think at the core of it, they just want to make sure that the status quo, which kind of always escalated and now led to two wars against Iran, that this doesn't that it doesn't play out again. So I think if you can address the core security concerns of the Iranians, then it doesn't mean that all of Iran's demands have to be met.
But I think, you know
Speaker 0: Some of them do. I mean there has to be some fundamental shift. I agree. Some fundamental shift that assures assures Iran or not only Iran. Iran and the entire region just never happens again.
Kuwait, Bahrain, The UAE, they can't afford another war like this. Otherwise, their image is already tarnished heavily, will be tarnished even further. But there's also a lot of talk about a potential conflict between Gulf countries directly, maybe Saudi and more likely The UAE and Iran, especially when it comes to those disputed islands. I think that's highly improbable. I think we're looking more as a at an early end of the next few weeks.
But is there a possibility that we may still see grounds troops on the ground, or has that been completely discounted now?
Speaker 1: Well, it's hard to say. I mean, if Trump's giving the impression that there won't be any ground troops, then often it means that ground troops are coming. So it's it's a lot of deception. But but I'm doubt I'm doubting it because simply because it's a it seems like a suicide mission. I mean, even if you're able to get the troops in, then what?
There's no supply and support. You know, how are they gonna hold it? It's like Trump's idea. You just escort some tankers through the Strait Of Hormuz, then you declare victory. Now it's open.
It's like, no. The the Iranians can, at any time, from almost any destination in the country, strike this this straight. So it's it's gonna be possible. And so I I I I don't think so.
Speaker 0: How is but the another important question though is what happens to Israel if Trump off ramps? Because if Iran's gonna continue their attacks on Israel, because they need to deter Israel as well from doing this again because Israel's a lot more hawkish towards Iran than The US. So if if The US wants to end the war but then Iran continues striking Israel, do you think The US would be forced to get involved until the Iranian attacks on Israel stop? Or could we see something similar to the twelve day war where Israel's left to fend for itself and and The US just supplies it with with military equipment and maybe support with their defenses?
Speaker 1: Well, I think this is the problem. That is Israel essentially have a veto over The United States when it ends this war. Indeed, as Marco Rubio recognized, it also had a key role in deciding that The United States should go to should go to war. But I think only to a certain extent. I mean, if the core national security of The United States is under threat, it is possible that The US would make a decision and just tell the Israelis that they have to adjust.
It's not something that Americans have done well in the past, but it is possible. Because I keep making a point, there's no going back anymore to status quo. And people look at Iran, they're like, what what could they do here? They can strike the Gulf States here, and they can strike Israel. But they can do a lot of things.
The Iraqis have just pushed out the western troops. If the Iranians want to greenlight Iraq annexing Kuwait, why not? If they want to completely disrupt Bahrain and, and take it, I guess, out of the orbit of Saudi Arabia, they could. I mean, there's a lot of things that can happen. Borders can change.
Governments can be toppled. So so this
Speaker 0: We see a lot more dominoes. There's there's a possibility we see more dominoes fall from this before it ends.
Speaker 1: Look how much has happened. It's a very short period
Speaker 0: of time. From October 7 to where we are.
Speaker 1: It's quite wild. So, yeah, less than
Speaker 0: a month. Glenn, do you remember the days when you were covering October 7 and the aftermath of October 7? Did you have many guests warn that there's gonna be a war with I'm not talking to few mongers that always talk about it nonstop and talk about it for years. What was it genuine concern? Because when I was doing it, it was like, guys, there's like multiple red lines or multiple steps on the escalation letter and you've got October 7 and the war with first invasion of Gaza is number one.
Number two is occupation of Gaza and how deep will they go. Number three is will they strike Hezbollah? Will they enter Lebanese territory? Will they invade Lebanon? Will they strike the Houthis?
If there's something that we don't talk about, there's not gonna be a strike on mediators in Qatar and there's definitely gonna be a war directly with Israel and Iran. And now we've got this did you ever think in the early days that this will get to this domino? And also what, you know, what other dominoes are there? Are you talking about different, you know, borders changing, maybe conflicts in the in the in the region in The Gulf? But could this escalate even further than that?
Or we're considering Trump's stance on wanting to off ramp, that's become extremely unlikely now.
Speaker 1: No. I I I did not call it back on October 7 that we would end up here in this massive full out war with Iran. And part of the reason is it doesn't make any sense. It's not rational. And, again, this is why I thought it was also a strange move by The United States to go to war with Iran like this.
It didn't make sense. There was no you know, I didn't see how this could succeed, and I don't see a clear offer. But also, very importantly, I I I also assume that Iranians will will be cautious up to, of course, being attacked. And I think this is a key flow we see in the Western assessment of Iran. It's often presented as just being a bunch of crazy mullahs who wants to acquire nuclear weapons and just burn the world and kill all Jews.
I mean, Iran, in my opinion, is as quite a rational actor. They they they look after their own survival, and I think they play this very cautiously. I mean, if if you've been to Iran, the whole Palestinian issue is very much front and center in, you know, the national consciousness. So what happened in Gaza was quite important for them. However, the idea that they would go and, get directly involved, against United States and Israel, this is something that would cause devastation in Iran.
Like we're seeing today, they're taking a lot of punishment. Was This even the criticism when the Israelis went after Hezbollah. Why didn't Iran help them sufficiently? Well, you know, they're a rational actor. They realized if we could join in, a lot of destruction will come from Iran.
But once The US and Israel attacked Iran, now they face an existential threat. They what else can they do? Now they go all in. And so all of what they've been do been doing is quite rational. And based on this, I thought it was unlikely that would end end up where we are now because it does make sense for The US and it does make sense for Iran.
Speaker 0: Very good point. Very good point. Think the point you've made, no one's mentioned this yet in any of my interviews. Anyone that argues Iran wanted this war was an imminent threat. There was never a better time for Iran to join the war if they wanted to destroy Israel right after October 7 when Israel was most vulnerable or if they they were okay with the war with Israel if it meant protecting their proxies that would have gotten involved when Hezbollah was getting decimated.
Yet they stood back. They showed complete unwillingness to get directly involved not only with The US but also with Israel. So they obviously did not want this war and that's why I think they also want to end the war. And I don't think they'll they do want a better security infrastructure for them to ensure the the lawn is not mowed again, but I also don't think they'll wait long enough for their country to be destroyed, more bridges to be destroyed because their economy is already in tatters right now. And there's a a breaking piece of news, just sorry I quickly mentioned it.
Yep. Glenn, secretary of war p Hexath has ordered army chief of staff, Randy George, to step down and immediately retire. Heksef wishes to replace Randy with someone, quote, who will implement president Trump and Heksef's vision for the army according to CBS. How significant is it for a chief of staff to be be be ordered to step down?
Speaker 1: Well, it seems quite significant. But, again, I don't have any background from the US military, so I'm not sure exactly, yeah, what what motivated this and why why why they're making the switch. But but such a switch is seems quite significant. And no. I'm I'm not well, it would be great if you could elaborate a bit.
Well, Hexath, like, is on on exactly what what what the vision is for for for the military because, yeah, he's they're they're taking it in a very strange direction, of course.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I'm just trying to figure out what it is because they're talking. So Reuters reported just a few minutes before that Trump is set to unveil a $1,500,000,000,000 defense budget request for the next fiscal year on Friday, by far the largest year over year increase in defense spending in the post World War II era. So much for a president that's going to be against forever wars and more wars and focus on the ballooning American debt and the crisis this is going to cause if it's not addressed.
Speaker 1: That's why I think his his approach obviously changed because if you look at his first administration, he kind of followed through on this. No new wars.
Speaker 0: I mean I don't know what happened.
Speaker 1: He's the first president. But also in the second presidency now, he he partnered up with Elon Musk, and I thought, you know, their interest overlapped to a large extent because Elon Musk wanted some more fiscal responsibility. Again, very concerned about a pending bankruptcy. Know, getting out of all this expensive forever war seemed like a common goal. But now it appears that, you know, Trump still wants to be the man of peace.
But to have peace, he needs to be all powerful and dominant that is pumping more money into the military and then just projecting strength and having other countries essentially bow to the will of The United States simply because of this overwhelming power. But this is it's very hard to see how this differs from the neocons. That's essentially what they were going for as well.
Speaker 0: Well, the good thing is at least it's not we're not ending, Trump wants a short war. He came in expecting a a multi day war that lasts a few days. Now he's trying to end it as quickly as possible. It's very different to the mindset when The US entered the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. So that's a positive aspect of it.
Nothing. This one's more of a mistake rather than an intention to be bogged down this long. That is my guess. And you got the former
Speaker 1: That's a paper.
Speaker 0: The foreign minister, Arachi, just said the following in a post as we're speaking. A lot of news. I wish we're doing this live because a lot of a lot is happening as we're doing this. There's one striking difference between the present and the stone age. There was no oil or gas being pumped in The Middle East back then.
Our POTUS and Americans who put him in office show that they want to turn back the clock. This is the foreign minister essentially saying, you strike our infrastructure, we're gonna strike or eradicate the infrastructure of the entire region with us. And they've been doing that. That's why I'd be very shocked. If Trump decides to strike Iran's infrastructure, assuming he wasn't able to somehow The US and Israel weren't able to destroy Iran's capabilities to strike Israel on the Gulf, if they weren't able to eradicate that capability, Are they willing for Iran to do the same for The Gulf?
That is the question. It's not it's how much do they care for The Gulf? How much does Trump care for The Gulf? My guess would have been a lot especially with all the business they've done together and the visits. The the first visits I think he did as a president were to The Gulf and Israel.
So that's why I'd be very surprised if he goes if he if he if he follows through on his threats cause today just a couple hours ago Iran threatened to strike bridges across The Gulf including The UAE. Retaliation for the bridge that The US struck in Iran. It's like they've been doing it since the beginning of the war. So this is in a way you could say it's indirectly destroying the Gulf. Imagine you punch, you know those videos as cartoons we watch as kids, a cartoon character punches the other character and character and the other cartoon character punches another one.
It's like every time we do something to that cartoon he does it to someone else. It reminds me of that clip, like every time you strike around they strike your friend. Strike around they strike your friend. I'd be very surprised.
Speaker 1: But that makes Iran a very predictable actor then because you know exactly how they will react. That is if you escalate, go after their bridges, their desalination plants, their energy fields, they will do exactly the same against the Gulf States. So it's it should be easy not to make too many miscalculations. But in terms of Trump's calculation, I mean, he does seem mad because it's not you know, it doesn't have to have that much empathy for the Gulf States. But as you said, there's a lot of common business there.
The Gulf States are quite important in The US financial system. So overall, it doesn't really make much sense. But it's always worth knowing asking what is the alternative. Because as we said before, there's no going back to the old status quo. So if if they don't go after Iran in a big way, then if the alternative is for The US to be expelled from the region, then maybe they would be willing to risk the Gulf States.
I mean, it's a little bit the same problem for Iran. This is not a great time for them either. They're being, you know, they're being massacred. They're taking a lot of, hits, especially, you know, to their cities and their energy. So, you know, they're having a very hard time as well.
But what what is the alternative? Well, what are they gonna do? There's no going into a situation where they will have simply peace, stability, and no one will attack them anymore. And, you know, this is it. Either now, you you get rid of this threat at your gates or you will relive this over again.
So there is no there's no good alternative. So I think if Trump will sacrifice the Gulf States, it's it's not that it will be a great idea, but we have to look at what is the alternative. What else is on the table?
Speaker 0: Yeah. Another piece of, another quote which came out of Trump now. The timing of everything is like they're listening to us and making those statements. Iranians are tough and capable of enduring immense pain and I respect them for that but they are better negotiators than fighters. So this is I see this as Trump.
Every indicator I see, that's why I was surprised how oil markets reacted yesterday, every indicator points to Trump seeking an off ramp, and I think Iran will give it to him. The same way they did wanted to avoid this war, wanna they avoid the destruction of their country and Trump's threats and now the strike on the bridge is showing that he might actually follow through with his threats. He just dragged the Gulf into this war and continued the war despite the Gulf getting getting pummeled. So I think he I think the Iranians know that he probably will follow through if that's what it takes to end the war. There's always a possibility of him walking out and letting them do what they want with the Strait Of Hormuz and what they want to do with the Strait Of Hormuz, that's another story, is Tasnim News reported that Iran and Oman are developing a joint maritime protocol for safe passage through the Strait Of Hormuz in the post war period.
And that's according to Tasneem News Iranian Iranian IRGC linked news outlet. The context matters. Iran's senior security official said yesterday the strait will reopen for the world but not for Trump. Iran is simultaneously this is my team kinda expanding on it. Iran Iran is simultaneously building a toll framework at $2,000,000 per tanker, potentially generating 80,000,000 $80,000,000,000 annually.
But essentially what they're building is managed, monetized, and selective straight without freedom of navigation. Now not sure if that's gonna include a toll booth or that because they didn't say they're gonna charge a fee they said they're gonna monitor who comes in and out so it's having more control of the Strait Of Homeboys which is the complete opposite what I of what I think Trump would have wanted to achieve in the straight. But look, I'd respect Trump a lot if he agrees he the operation failed and just walks off. I mean, there's nothing more honorable than admitting a failure and not letting your ego stand in the way, and I think he will. I think he is.
But what do you what do you make of this announcement? Because the markets reacted very positively to this announcement, and then those gains were reversed relatively quickly throughout the day, probably because Trump said something.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Probably. Well, I think this is the main that this is the possible meeting point. I as I said before, it's not that The US will be able to control the Strait Of Hormuz. That won't happen.
The Iranians could assert dominance over it. But I think that if if you can strike a deal, the about some common management of it, I think, yeah, that that that would be a good solution. Of course, at the moment, the Iranians won't have any involvement from The United States. But again, The US have other things they can put on the table. They have a lot of sanctions against Iran.
I mean, as I said, is a rational actor. If there's a good deal on the table that allows it to prosper without sacrificing its security, why wouldn't they make a deal? So it's just so far, haven't heard a proper deal coming from Trump either. He's essentially asked for the capitulation of Iran. Or as it Marco Rubio said, we don't want Iran developing any more missiles and drones being used now.
I mean, this is literally his deterrent. This is why Iran is able to survive this attack, and their demand is for Iran to give up on it. So I think this is if I think this is what they have to do is first start to recognize Iran as a serious regional actor. Once you do this, then you can start to look at where the core interest of The United States and the core interest of Iran could actually meet and where the competition where where you can't harmonize how it could be managed. But I don't even think they're at that level yet.
They're still in this hegemonic mode where we use overwhelming pressure, and then the opponent will have to adjust to our demands. This is essentially what they're thinking, I think. But
Speaker 0: There's a statement there's a post that Rubio made this morning. President Trump delivered a powerful speech tonight. He was clear about our objectives in Iran. Destroy their weapons factories. Destroy their navy.
Destroy their air force. Destroy their chances of ever having a nuclear weapon. The the president's leadership sends a message to the world that The US will defend its people and its interests and uphold peace through strength. One thing that's missing from that list two things. Nothing about regime change as an objective and nothing about the reopening of the Strait Of Hormuz.
So do you do you I know I asked you very briefly, but do you think that he could walk away without opening the Straits? And how likely do you think it is?
Speaker 1: It is possible. Depends how painful it gets because that's the main thing that holds holds Trump back. That's why I thought it was also interesting. I was making this point in a speech that, you know, why doesn't France do it to the European states, South Korea, you know, Japan. They they should go do it.
You know, why is it up to us? I never wanted to do this at all. So, you know, that gives some reason to assume that he might be willing to walk away from this. Otherwise, he can declare victory. I mean, if if the goal was to, you know, have some regime change, he can say, killed most of their leadership.
If it was to degrade their military capabilities, you know, he certainly done done so. He bombed a lot of their military infrastructure. The Iranians spent a lot of their drones and their missiles. So he can declare victory if those are the objectives. Yeah.
But the main problem, what makes this a defeat, why he can't go home, is the Strait Of Hormuz. And so, again, if he's willing to cut himself off from this, then, yeah, Trump can go home.
Speaker 0: If And I last question, Glenn. I know you don't like that question is, but if I ask you to speculate what could happen next based on the information we have now, because I know changes could change by tonight, Trump would make a new statement. But from what we have right now, my assumption will be the war. Like I posted right after before Trump spoken and right after him I posted something along the lines. The war is ending soon.
And then after the speech I repeated. I repeat the war is ending soon even though the markets were not happy with the speech. Because I just feel like every indicator in the last few days has been nothing about ground troops and everything about Trump off ramping and as as I've said just before, I think Iran will give him that off ramp and eventually they'll agree on terms. When Trump wants a deal, he'll concede and he'll still call it a win. He's done that before.
And I think Iran is will do anything just to not have their country destroyed while having some sort of deterrence, which they kinda have already through the close of the Strait Of Hormuz. They have deterrence. They've proved it in this war. They could do it again. So that's why I think the war will end soon.
When I say soon, I mean in the next no. By April, by this month. What's your prediction?
Speaker 1: Well, no. I I think the war will continue. I hope I'm wrong. I really I do hope because this is going to have consequences far beyond the Middle East. But I'm I would suspect that, as you said, these comments about peace through strength, which is a good way of saying dominance or hegemonic peace, it's gonna put them in a not in a mood to make some compromises with sufficient compromises with Iranians.
I'd but I agree with you, I think both the Iranians and Americans want to put an end to this. It's just that their demands are so far apart. While what Trump asks of the Iranians is something that they they can't deliver on on the contrary, they they have very strong demands of their own. And they they can also punish, of course, the other side. They can also bring devastation to all of America's allies in the region.
So I don't see that they're ready for peace yet. And also, just that they're so far apart, I'm not sure what this peace would look like. But just to reiterate, I I hope that you're They don't You are right.
Speaker 0: Deal. Trump would literally just walk away. And I think he's just surprised me so many times. He'd surprise us again to say, guys, I won. It was a great war.
I killed their leaders. I destroyed their nuclear program. I destroyed their military capabilities. I destroyed the imminent threat. Cuba's gonna be next and then he walks completely stops attacks on on The US.
What The US does what Iran does with Israel, it's up to Iran. Let the gulf clean up the mess. Let other countries come in. I wouldn't be too surprised if he does that. I know people like to always say he's he's Israel's lapdog and they tell him what to do.
I just don't think so. I really don't.
Speaker 1: But Iran would come out of this war then very, very much strengthened because then the Iran could then essentially course or compel the Gulf States to kick out The US bases. They can make the stop trade in US dollars. They can kill the petrodollar. They could, you know, limit access to
Speaker 0: That will be I think if they start taking action like this, I think they'll just invite Trump back in. So I think Trump will be look, if we end it back to the status quo, you guys go back to rebuilding, you wanna create some sort of toll to the trader who doesn't make money off there, that's your reparations. That's the way for Trump saying, hey, pay your reparations will come out of other people's pocket because everyone else buys oil from this. Create some sort of tollbooth. The Gulf and the other countries will pay your reparations through that.
Good for you. We wanna attack again. The security guarantees there's not gonna be any guarantees but hey, you guys have deterrence. You've proved you have deterrence. I'm gonna call it a win.
Good luck and figure it out with Israel. It's possible. What's the other possibility though is you just bombs them to oblivion until they have no choice but to eventually fold when their country's been destroyed, the global economy's been decimated, and Gulf countries been hurt hard as well. That's the other alternative.
Speaker 1: Yeah. That's what I suspect is the path, though. The the the assumption that if you just put enough pressure on the Iranians, then at some point, they would bend. You know? And, again, this is what the Europeans are doing with the Russians.
It doesn't make any sense. It's not rational. It's not gonna be achievable. But but again, they they they can't swallow the defeat. So they just keep, you know, throwing more, you know, doubling down on foolish policies.
And I think also much like in Ukraine where we're fighting with Ukrainians, it's The Gulf States that will bear the main brunt of Trump's escalation. So I think he's he he might go the the path that you said, but I I I think he's still prepared to go a bit further up the escalation ladder.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: But, again, I don't have the facts. I don't like to look in my crystal ball because there's too many unknown variables.
Speaker 0: I know you hate doing it, I'm always grateful when you do it when I ask you. But I I and I always say it could also change. There's new factors in play on a daily basis so I think predictions change on a daily basis as well as new information comes in. And I look I think your your prediction is not too far off from what I think is very very possible as well and I'm always the optimist and so far the optimists have been the most strong in the last at least so far this year. Glenn, always a pleasure.
Thanks for coming on on your holiday.
Speaker 1: Thanks Mario. Have a good one.
reSee.it AI Summary
I warn this could be the biggest oil crisis in modern history, hitting oil, fertilizer, and key supply chains at once. Prices are rising and this pressure will spill into food, tech, and everyday costs. Even fast reopenings won’t reset supply chains overnight. The timing is awful—the global economy was already slowing. If it escalates, it could be far worse than 2008.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 THIS COULD BECOME THE WORST FINANCIAL CRISIS OF OUR LIFETIME Professor of applied economics at Johns Hopkins University Steve Hanke says this could be the biggest oil crisis in modern history, hitting oil, fertilizer, and key supply chains all at once. Prices are already rising, and that pressure will quickly spread into food, tech, and everyday costs. Even if things reopen fast, supply chains don’t reset overnight, the damage lingers. The bigger problem is timing. The global economy was already slowing before this started, so this crisis is hitting at the worst possible moment. And if this escalates, @steve_hanke warns it could be far worse than the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 00:01 - A Catastrophic Outlook: The Biggest Oil Crisis in History 00:13 - The Death of Sanctions: Economic Survival vs. Political Stance 00:22 - Why Escalation Favors Iran’s Strategic Position 00:36 - Unintended Consequences: The War’s Hit to the Global Economy 12:45 - Comparing the Current Collapse to the 2008 Financial Crisis 24:12 - The Strategic Advantage: How Russia Wins from an Elongated War 35:50 - Inflationary Pressures and the Death of the Consumer 41:18 - Energy Infrastructure Vulnerability and Market Panic 44:30 - The Inevitability of a Global Economic Realignment 47:21 - Final Assessment: Why We Are Entering a Decade of Chaos
Video Transcript AI Summary
Mario and the Professor discuss the scale and spread of the current oil and energy shock and its broad economic and geopolitical ripple effects.
- Severity and scope: The Professor calls the crisis “pretty catastrophic,” possibly the biggest oil crisis experienced, potentially surpassing the 1970s shocks. He notes a gap between Washington rhetoric and underlying economic reality and emphasizes the war’s effects beyond oil, including fertilizer and helium, all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz or related chokepoints.
- U.S. economic backdrop (before the war): The Professor provides a pre-war table:
- U.S. GDP growth in 2024 was 2.3%, 2025 about the same after a dip in 2024 to 2.2%.
- Jobs: 2024 added 2.2 million; 2025 added 185,000, with tariffs contributing to a manufacturing job loss of 108,000.
- Productivity declined from 3% to 2.1% in 2025.
- He argues the U.S. economy was already slowing and that the war exacerbates existing weaknesses rather than creating a boom.
- Immediate physical and downstream effects:
- The closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects more than oil: up to 20% of world oil, a third of fertilizer, and helium used in chip manufacturing (notably in Taiwan) pass through the strait.
- The closure’s ripple effects include fertilizer shortages and higher prices (fertilizer up about 50%), and broader supply chain dislocations as related infrastructure and inventories (oil, fertilizers, helium) become depleted and must be rebuilt.
- Relative impact by region: The U.S. is more insulated from physical shocks than many others, but financial markets (stocks and bonds) are hit, with higher interest rates and a rising 10- and 30-year bond yield. Europe and Asia face larger direct physical disruptions; India, Taiwan, and others bear notable hits due to fertilizer and helium supply constraints.
- Global energy and political dynamics:
- The U.S. remains a net importer of oil, though it is a net exporter of petroleum products; fertilizer reliance and pricing reflect broader global constraints.
- The professor highlights the political costs: protectionism (tariffs), militarism (increased defense spending and involvement), and interventionism (policy actions). He notes polling is negative on these directions, suggesting policy headwinds for the administration.
- The escalation and motivations for war:
- A theory discussed is that the war was driven by a belief in decapitating Iran’s leadership to force regime change, a strategy the professor says many experts have warned against. He cites New York Times reporting that Mossad and Netanyahu supported decapitation, but that former Mossad leadership and U.S. intelligence warned it would not work; the escalation suggests a divergence between theory and outcome.
- He acknowledges another view that controlling Hormuz could economically benefit the U.S., but ranks it as a lesser driver than regime-change objectives.
- Possible outcomes and scenarios:
- If the Houthis control the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and the Beber/Mendeb is blocked, the consequences would intensify; the professor describes a “freeway turned into a toll road” scenario in Hormuz and greater disruption in the Gulf, including potential attacks on desalination plants.
- The economic signaling would likely worsen: downward revisions to growth, higher import prices, and increased financial market strain; a prolonged closure would intensify these effects.
- The escalation ladder and endgame:
- The professor warns that escalating with boots on the ground would favor Iran and could trigger widespread disruption of Gulf infrastructure, desalination, and regional stability. He suggests Russia would be a clear beneficiary in such a scenario.
- He concludes with a stark warning: if Hormuz and the Beber/Mendeb remain closed, and desalination and critical infrastructure are attacked, the situation could resemble or exceed the scale of the 2008 financial crisis—“look like a birthday party” compared with what could unfold.
- Overall takeaway: The crisis is multi-faceted, with immediate physical shortages (oil, fertilizer, helium) and cascading financial and political costs. The duration and depth depend on how long chokepoints stay closed and whether escalation occurs, with the potential for severe global economic and geopolitical consequences.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: How bad is this? This is
Speaker 1: pretty catastrophic. Maybe the biggest oil crisis that we have experienced. This was just a huge collapse. We're going to start seeing appeal back of the sanctions.
Speaker 0: They're not being put in a dustbin because they don't work or we've changed our stance. We have no choice because this is how bad the economy is.
Speaker 1: Iran is favored by the escalation. It would make the two thousand eight great financial crisis look like a birthday party.
Speaker 0: What I'm really keen to understand now is the repercussions, the unintended consequences of this war, and that's really hitting the global economy. So maybe we start off with a a broad question, if you don't mind, is how bad is this?
Speaker 1: I I tend to agree with the director of the International Energy Agency in Paris that this this is pretty catastrophic. May maybe the maybe the biggest oil crisis that we have experienced. Now that would include the nineteen seventy three Yom Kippur war oil crisis as well as the OPEC blockage in 1979. So it's it's pretty big. And if we sit, I think, Mario, it's a good idea to kind of set the table a little bit, to to say where where we are when this thing started because there's a great deal of difference between the rhetoric that comes out of Washington and and and other places, and it's repeated in the press and reality.
There's there's a lot of spin when it comes to the economy. So let's let's talk about The US economy, of course, the largest economy in the world. And if you look at gross domestic product, in 2024, the the rate of growth was 2.3%. Then it actually dropped down last year. It was 2.2%.
But that's kind of a normal range. That's kind of the potential of The US economy. But it's not the hype you get in Washington where they say the boom is coming, AI is gonna revolutionize everything, and so forth and so on. The the the Silicon Valley types give a give us numbers that are, like, five or 6%. So it's it's nothing like that.
Forget the spin. We're we're kind of in a normal range. And this year, I should say last year, 2025, was about the same as 2024. Not not quite as good, but more or less the same. Then we move to the jobs picture in The United States.
And in 2024, 2,200,000 jobs were added to the labor force. And last year, 2025, there were only a 185,000. And and this this was just a huge collapse, mainly because of the tariffs that were being put being imposed by The United States. So and and and if we look at tariffs, remember, the tariffs being imposed were supposed to add the manufacturing jobs. Actually, last year, we lost a 108,000 manufacturing jobs.
So the tariffs didn't do their trick. They did what tariffs always do. They they destroyed jobs. Now the third thing to set the table, if we look at productivity in The United States, it dropped in 2025 from 3% per year to 2.1% per year in 2025. So so that's setting the table.
It it the war started, the the US Israeli war on Iran, things were slowing down. There there was some weakness that Forget the spin doctor. So that's another reason why I think the effect of the war and and the functional the closure of the Strait Of Hormuz is really what we're talking about specifically, will be tremendous. And it's not only the oil. The the the first headlines came out, and they said, well, 20% of the world's oil comes out of the Strait Of Hormuz.
This is gonna send the price of oil up, which it did, and it will send the price of all the derivative products that are produced by oil. It'll send those up, and and that was kind of the end of the story. And then they then they said, oh, we have about a third of the world's fertilizer comes through the Strait. Yeah. That was the next headline.
So so that will be very damaging because it's planting season in in in Northern Hemisphere, and you need fertilizer right now. Fertilizer's in short supply, and the price has gone up, by the way, about 50%. So it's a big hit for farmers. And then and then they said, oh, another thing. Helium comes through the straight.
And and helium is used to produce chips. So so there's a big hit, particularly in Taiwan where they produce a lot of chips. So the the the general thing, Mario, is when we set the table before the war, things were not really what the rhetoric was giving us. It it it it was it was slowing down and troubles were developing. There there were storm clouds on the horizon.
Let's put it that way. Then the war starts, and all of a sudden, you get all these things that are key coming through the straight, and they're not coming anymore. So the this is this is a a big negative on the economy because it'll ripple through the economy, and it it will ripple through even if the straight was opened up tomorrow, Mario. The these things would linger. They they just don't you it isn't like turning a switch on and a light on, off, on, off.
No. It it ripples through the economy and and and causes a lot of damage and consequences going forward. Now there is one good thing. One one good unintended consequence. Well, where where do you get oil?
And where do you get fertilizer? And where do you get helium? Well, you get it in Russia. And and and so what's happened is that an ill founded policy of sanctions on Russia, something that I'm totally against all sanctions, by the way, I'm I'm opposed to them. They they they they interfere with trade and create all kinds of cost and unintended consequences, and and they don't work, by the way.
We we know the history of sanctions. Sanctions almost never work and and create a lot of cost and a lot of blowback. But as a result of the war that's going on in in now in in Iran, it looks to me like we're going to start seeing appeal back of the sanctions, which is good. I mean, there's there's there are all these negative consequences, Mary, but there there are a few positives. And one thing in my book is that the sanctions look like they're going to be put in the dustbin, at least for a while.
Speaker 0: Yeah. First, the sanctions are being put in the dustbin, not for a good reason. They're not being put in the dustbin because they don't work, or we've changed our our stance on whether sanctions should be weaponized. They're being lifted or put in the in the in the dustbin because we have no choice because this is how bad the economy is. We've listed lifted sanctions not only off Russia, but also off Iranian oil.
And I I think you've you've you've mentioned two really two important points, professor. Number one is it's not just oil. It is oil. It is fertilizer. It is helium.
Helium's used for the chips manufactured in Taiwan that is essentially powering the boom that we've seen over the last few years mainly by beyond just AI. Everything we use, pretty much any device we have in mind has those microchips, and 30 to 33% of that helium comes out of the Strait Of Hormuz. And not only is the Strait closed, but the facilities, the infrastructure is being damaged through the attacks like what we saw in the gas field in in Iran, the gas fields in Qatar, the aluminum plant in in Abu Dhabi a couple of days ago, and the list goes on. Obviously, the oil infrastructure throughout the region as well. And the second thing which is important is that it's not very easy to switch on or off when you open the Strait Of Hormuz.
And I want you to explain that because when you damage a facility, it's understandable. It could take months, even years to rebuild it. But it's not only that. Just the opening of the Strait Of Hormuz and getting all of the production going again is not as easy as people would like it to be. And this is something this is why even if the war ends now, and I'd love to get your thoughts on this, the damage is already done.
The question is not if the damage will be reversed, it's how deep that damage will be.
Speaker 1: Well, yeah, you're exactly right, Mario. And and and the reason why, we're we're talking about the the physical world. All all these things are physical that we're talking about. And and you've just, all of a sudden, remove those physical objects from the supply chain, and there's kind of a gap there. And and even if things open up, well, you you've you've you've gotta refill the inventory.
Yeah. And and it and and it takes time to do that. So not only you have to accommodate, shall we say, normal demands that are in the system, but we're talking about refilling all kinds of inventories, the fertilizer inventory, the oil inventory, the helium inventory. They're inventories of these things, and those those have been depleted as a result of the closure.
Speaker 0: What's funny is that the biggest suppliers of oil, number one is The United States. The biggest supplier of helium, by far, number one is The United States. And the biggest suppliers of fertilizer are China, Russia, India, and The United States. But the most concerning ones right now are the oil and the helium. So it looks like the is it fair to say the The US economy could end up doing well after all this as more economies depend on American supply, especially in Europe?
And the countries that end up suffering are the ones that have depended on globalization for all these years to depend on other sources for their oil, for their healing, for their energy. That's Europe. That's Asia. American allies in Europe and Asia. Is that true?
Speaker 1: Well, when you look at the incidence of the damage, it it it and on these physical issues that you're talking about, the The US will be more insulated from the damage than will be many of the other countries. I mean, the big hits are obviously in Asia. India will take a big hit on fertilizer. Taiwan will take a big hit on helium. India will also take not there there are workarounds because although India has taken a hit on on oil, the the hit was originally because of sanctions and tariffs that were put on India by The United States.
Now that that reduced the reliance of importation from Russia, but now importation of Russia is is zoomed up again because the sanctions have been lifted for for oil in India. So it it it's a little bit of a complicated picture. It it hits everybody, but your your general point is correct. And that is the The US is more insulated than other countries. Now you have to be careful about oil, by the way.
A lot of the the rhetoric about oil is that The US is independent. It's it's exporting more oil than it's importing. That's not true. If you look at oil itself, we we are a net importer. We are importing oil net.
But if you look at petroleum products, the everything produced by oil and so forth, we're net net exporter. So so even even that gets a little bit tricky. But, anyway, your your general point is correct. The US the The US is going to suffer less on these physical things, but you you have to look at the financial things. If you if you start adding up money, where's the capital market of the world?
It's The United States, but but it's by far. And what's being hit? The stock market's being hit. So that's now it's not only Americans that own stocks that are traded in the New York Stock Exchange, for example. Foreigners obviously own a lot of the stocks too.
But those capital values are coming down. And last week, we saw the bond market, the bond vigilantes came out in full force and drove the price of bonds down, and that means the interest rate on bonds goes up. We we have the 30 bond area at at at 5% again. And and and the ten year bond, which is the the critical one that all prices are geared on, is is gone up to 4.4%. So that's the those are those are costs that are incurred too, not not just the the physical things.
By the way, you you said that The US is a net exporter of fertilizer, but we we we have big fertilizer problems in The United States. Because remember, even if you're exporting it and the the price has gone up. So if you're from Iowa, where I'm from, you're you're paying a lot more for fertilizer this planting season, assuming you didn't buy it ahead of time, which, by the way, most of the farmers didn't. They've been in a little bit of a tight squeeze. Often, buy input seed and fertilizer prior to a year year in advance of planting.
Well, this year, they they they didn't. So so they're buying it basically not forward, but buying it on the spot market. And the spot
Speaker 0: market of the is that because of the high prices?
Speaker 1: No. The it's
Speaker 0: because supply the or what?
Speaker 1: The the farmers that go this is setting the table again. Remember when we set the table with the GDP productivity and all that stuff? Setting the table on farmers is they they were in bad shape prior to the war financially. They they were getting squeezed. So as a result, they they didn't do what they often do, and that's buy their inputs forward, buy buy them a year in advance.
Speaker 0: Wow. So they did that. They did that even before the crisis we're facing right now.
Speaker 1: Yes. So that's that's the setting of the table thing that I think is very important for people to understand. You always have to see what the situation was before the event actually occurred, and the event is the war. And then you look at what well, what's happened after the event? Well, they the farmers started from a a, shall we say, a bad situation before the war, and now it's just being made worse.
Alright. So And and by the way, with the farmers, there is one thing we have to talk about, diesel. Diesel fuel. Diesel fuel is big big time. So you have two huge inputs in the planting season that is just right around the corner in in the Northern Hemisphere.
And the two two big inputs that have gone way up in price, diesel and fertilizer.
Speaker 0: So how long do you think it will be before the consumer feels the pain from this war?
Speaker 1: Well, I think the because I think
Speaker 0: that's an important indicator of how long this war will last, of how much when Trump will face enough pressure to be forced to concede.
Speaker 1: I I think the the there's kind of a a one two punch going on here. One are Trump's tariffs, and and they're starting to feel the effect of those. The February import prices came out at much higher than the consensus forecast, by the way. Those just came out last week. So import prices have already come up, and and and and now we have on top of that the war.
And and the war will elevate those even further because as I said, we we're actually a net importer of oil Yeah. By the way. And and so it it it's in the pipeline. It's coming it's coming down the track. And I think the the key thing here for for Trump is is a political cost.
We're talking about, first, these physical economic costs, fertilizer, oil, helium, and so forth. Then then we talked about the financial costs, the stock market going down, and and the bond market going down. And and now we we were talking about a third aspect, and that's the political cost of this. Yeah. That that's something that's very important that you just brought up.
And I think the political cost will be significant because if you look at agriculture, you've got those farm states, and and and they tend to be Trump supporters. They voted for Trump the last election and the Republicans. I I don't think things are looking good for the Republicans in the by election. We we have very negative readings, by the way, on Trump's tariffs, on the war, and and industrial policy in general and the intervention of Washington DC and the politicization of economic life. So so we have three three big three big things that the administration has embraced.
One is protectionism, and that's the tariffs. Okay? Two is militarism, and that's not only the war. But remember, Trump wants to increase he's he wants a supplemental budget increase for the war of 200,000,000,000 to 600,000,000,000, and he wants to increase the Department of Defense's budget from a little over 1,000,000,000,000 to 1,500,000,000,000.0. And three, we we have interventionism.
So we have protectionism, militarism, and then interventionism. Those are all things that are being embraced by the administration. But if you look at the polling numbers, they're they're all very negative on all three of those things. And and by the way, from an economic point of view, all three of those are are bad. Protectionism doesn't doesn't create a boom.
Militarism doesn't create a boom, and interventionism doesn't create a boom. They're all drags on the economy. So so, again, this this is the difference, I think, Mario, between rhetoric and spin and reality.
Speaker 0: I wanna ask you about a theory that I was discussing previously in an interview. I've been struggling to understand why. Why Trump got into this war, someone who's pride himself on being the peace president trying to end wars. How could how could that same president get The US into its biggest war in decades? One that might involve troops on the ground by the looks of it.
So one of the theories that was mentioned to me by a trader, he goes, Mario, the main reason is not only America's strategic benefit in terms of controlling the energy flowing to China, but also increasing global dependence on American energy, especially gas. And Europe is the best example. Europe was dependent on Russia. That got cut off. Well, it became dependent on the Strait Of Hormuz.
That got cut off now, and Asia is also dependent on the Strait Of Hormuz that is being cut off. Is that from an economic perspective, how much can The US benefit from this war through the energy exports, filling that gap that has been left by the closure of the straits?
Speaker 1: It it let let's put it this way. If if if I had a column of things listed, I'd put a plus behind that that item. That that that that row would get a would get a plus. But I I don't think that that's I don't think that is as much to do with why we entered the war. Why why we entered the war, as it turns out, is a very interesting thing.
And the New York Times actually covered this in quite some detail about ten days ago rough roughly ten days ago. And that is that the the Mossad in Israel and the the new chief of the Mossad convinced Netanyahu who's who's wanted to go to war for for a long time, but but he convinced the Mossad convinced Netanyahu and ultimately, obviously, Trump that a decapitation of the leadership in Iran would would bring Iran's regime down within several days or may maybe a week. That that it would create chaos. There'd be Iranians in the street, and and and and it it would be like 1979 when they got rid of the shah. So that that that's where it came from.
And and it was basically, it's proven to be a strategic error by the Mossad. They they should have read all the scholarly literature shows us that regime changes very rarely work. Lindsey O'Rourke, has published a a great book a few years ago. Cornell University Press published it on the the covert route regime changes. And there have been about 70 of those that have been used by The United States since World War two, and and almost none of them have ever amounted to a regime change itself.
And and the ones that have resulted in regime change have ended up being a complete disaster. I mean, just look at Libya. Look look look look at Iraq and so forth and so on. You just go down the list. So so that's where it came from.
And what's interesting is that the prior chief of Mossad has indicated that the Mossad was was against this. They they said it would never work. So this is this has been a recent change in the head of Mossad and the recommendations by Mossad. Now if you look at The United States, the deep state, the intelligence community, as well as the defense department were were recommending to Trump, this this is not gonna work. They they were they were exactly saying the same thing that the old Mossad chief was saying, that this was not gonna work.
Well, it turns out it it didn't work. And now we're on the escalation ladder. And and as you mentioned, Mario, this this this could be really very nasty. You get US troops on the ground, and this thing will go way up the escalation ladder.
Speaker 0: This is why I refuse to believe this is the reason. I just don't think Mossad could trick the US administration so easily. You know, I've been proven wrong many times before and I could be wrong here. But you've you've said something interesting when I first started speaking. You said you'd put a plus next to that theory.
So what you mean is that from an economic perspective, maybe not to get into the war as you've said, but maybe to prolong the war and do whatever it takes to get control of the Strait Of Hormuz even if it leads the straits to be closed for weeks or months, isn't America's interests in some ways in terms of energy exports and dependence on American energy or not?
Speaker 1: Well, in a very narrow sense perhaps, but you you said an interesting thing. You you you indicated that this would be successful, that we'd get control of the strayer Hermes. I think the probability of that's pro probably about 20%. What what what's going to happen, I think, we will see a freeway turned into a toll road in the Strait Of Hormuz. And and don't forget, we're not just talking about that.
There are other things that you have to look about. Look at look. The the Houthis de facto have control over the Red Sea entrance, and and and that means the Suez Canal. And and and it looks to me like the strategy of the Iranians is this Muhammad Ali rope a dub strategy. Remember, in Kinshasa, world champion, George Foreman, huge guy, who came in and beat the pants off of Muhammad Ali.
Ali stayed on the ropes and took the damage, took the punches until Foreman exhausted himself, and then he and then he Ali landed a knockout blow. And and we might be entering that kind of situation now because the Hooties have just opened up again. So we don't we don't know exactly what they're going to do. They've been very quiet for a couple months. Yeah.
But Yeah. They've just they've just announced 24 yesterday. There there are eight choke points in the world. There are eight key choke points for these physical commodities, and and two of them happen to be one, the Strait Of Hormuz that that is now controlled by Iran, and I think will remain controlled by Iran in all probability, and the Red Sea that's controlled by the Houthis that will, in all probability, remain in the control of the Hooties.
Speaker 0: Alright. So if we go down if we go down to the path that this will continue for the foreseeable future, and if it remains in the current status quo that we have right now with the straight Of Hormuz is practically closed, putting the Beb and Mendeb straight, so the Red Sea aside, just the Shreto Hormuz, if that alone remains closed for, let's say, another another month, what happens to the global economy?
Speaker 1: It it takes a a bigger hit. There's no question about it. The sharp pencil numbers, no one really knows. I mean, there are all kinds of estimates all over the place. But if if you're trading, for example, all you have to know, Mario, is whether something's gonna go up or go down.
And and as a as an old trader and as an economist, I can say that the the revisions and the projections about growth will be revising down. The longer this goes on, the revisions will be done. And, of course, the Iranians know that. And and remember, it's just not the economic cost. It's a political cost, Mario.
The longer this goes on, the the the the greater the cost will be on Trump and the republic.
Speaker 0: What what is why haven't they so why do you think so first, do you think that Trump is seeking an off ramp right now? Because all the economic indicators that Trump's administration also have access to access to, they're screaming for help. You've got the voter base. This was not popular within the voter base either, and things on the ground are not going well. Is there enough now for Trump to say, alright.
I'm done with this. Pack the bags. We've we've we've we've gave it a shot. It failed. Twist it into a a win for his audience, but just end the war?
Speaker 1: I I I I think he would love to do that. He he he he certainly knows he's boxed in a corner. He he has no good options. And I I think finding an exit ramp quickly and forgetting the escalation ladder is the way to go. He he he can say, we accomplished our objectives with with whatever they were.
No one knows, by the way, what the objectives are. They keep saying they're ahead of schedule, but no one knows what's on the schedule because no one knows what the objectives are. Because there was one objective, and the objective was given to Trump via via the Mossad in Israel, and that was decapitate and the thing will collapse in a few days. That that was the objective. Regime change was the objective.
And now they're scrambling around trying to make up new new objectives every day. Even even even when Trump talks in one speech, he can he can change objectives over and over again, many of them being inconsistent. So he's in a he's in a very bad spot. And and I think what you suggest, which I would agree, he he should just say, we won and and and walk away from it. But I I think he's in a corner, and it it appears like he's he's he's he's gonna throw a hail Mary pass.
And and some sometimes when people are in a corner, they throw a Hail Mary pass and and and he would go up the escalation ladder. And and by the way, the the best book that's ever been written on this has been written by an economist, a good friend of mine, William l Silber. I have it right here. That that's what people do when they're in a corner. And and it's and as Silber says, it's very dangerous with a with a very low probability of winning.
How many Hail Mary passes have you seen in a football game that ended up with a touchdown or a completion? Not not very many. They're they're low probability events, and it looks like Trump has has taken that approach. It it it looks like he's gonna climb up the escalation ladder and put boots on the ground. Now if that happens, by the way, it's very clear to me that the Iranians forget the height.
They have plenty of firepower left. And and what will they do? They'll probably knock out the desolonization plants in the Gulf, and and that and that's the end of The Gulf. That that that means when you when you say you you wanna know what the duration of this thing this this is a key question you're asking. You you wanna know the magnitude of the cost, the economic cost, the financial cost, the political cost.
What's the duration of all this stuff? Well, I'll tell you something. If you go up the escalation ladder and put boots on the ground, you are going to find out with with the fury that Iranians will attack The Gulf, and and and that will be main mainly Professor. Unprotected desolinization plants. And you have in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, you've got about 90% of all the water is desolonization.
Speaker 0: Exactly. But this is professor, this is why I'm struggling to understand. This is why it is not making sense. Like, there's obviously people dis some people dislike Trump. He's like, the guy's gone crazy.
He's lost his mind. No. I still think he's a very astute businessman even though he's about to turn 80. He's and more importantly, he's got very smart people around him. Okay?
People that hate the administration could criticize what I've just said, but I'm trying to be factual. So I think there should be a better explanation, either something we don't know or maybe economically something we don't know. Because every economist I've spoken to as well is just telling me, Murray, this is this is a crisis of epic proportions worse than the seventies oil crisis that we've seen already worse than the oil crisis we saw in the seventies. What we've gone through the numbers me and you now or what that you've gone through is the amount of helium, the amount of fertilizers, and obviously, the amount of oil, twenty, thirty, 30% that comes out of the Strait Of Hormuz. And then now we're talking about having ground troops, you've just talked about The Gulf, which pride themselves on security.
That's what they built their whole reputation on getting struck on a daily basis. And then if their desalination plants get struck, we're talking about a potentially existential threat. So then I look at all this professor, and, like, what is what is the end game here? Is there something are they playing, you know, four d chess? Is there something we may be missing?
Is there a benefit for The US in continuing the war? Maybe is there a higher likelihood to seize the Strait Of Hormuz, and what would that mean for the American economy in terms of leverage over Asia and China by controlling the Strait Of Hormuz? I I I don't know. I know I'm just trying to I mean, I'm fishing for something here, but I'm I'm it's a it's a war that's getting to me because I'm not able to make sense of it.
Speaker 1: Well, number one, you you you touched on a couple of things. Well, let me let me say when it comes to The Gulf, I I actually do know a little bit about it because I was on financial advisory council of the UAE for six years, and I I was also a board member an international board member of the National Bank of Kuwait. So I've been around there, and I have a fairly good idea of how things operate. I'd love your I'd
Speaker 0: love your insight there. I live in The UAE, so I'd love to know more about it.
Speaker 1: And and and and my friends in The UAE, by the way, tell me that this this has created literally almost a nightmare for them. And and and and these are industrialists. I mean, one just sent me a note a few days ago when when things were really just started. And he he said, I I've got 24 tons of material that I need on a ship, and I can't I can't find any place even in the in the Arabian Sea to land the thing. So he said Wow.
And his last sentence is, Steve, this is creating a nightmare for me. So so we haven't even talked about the logistical aspects of all of this. So if things would clarify and you flip the switch tomorrow, he my friend still I don't know where the 24 tons of material have been landed. Maybe they're in India or someplace. He's gonna have to fish those back to Dubai.
You see what I mean? There are just all these things going on. But but but but but back to the the the the the point about Trump and and and and the people
Speaker 0: around Sorry. Sorry, professor.
Speaker 1: What they have Sorry to interrupt you.
Speaker 0: I just ask you one more question about the The Emirates, the Gulf Region? I didn't know you've got that much experience and knowledge there. It For me, it just sounds so catastrophic for that region, which are, again, American allies. If this continues, what are those countries going to do? How are they going to survive this?
Speaker 1: Oh, it it it will be a complete a disaster. The the the it it it it will be a a a real negative hit for sure. Look look at the shopping malls in Dubai. The the the sales have collapsed. The sales have collapsed.
The these are just retail sales in shopping malls. So we're we we have industrial enterprises like like my friend. I I said the the 24 tons of material on a ship someplace. God only knows where it is. That's one aspect, but you you have a huge retail business with the the the malls and shopping centers and Dubai alone.
So those will take a big hit because tourism will take a big hit. And and what did tourists do? Well, they go to Dubai and spend a lot of money in the in the malls. So so that's that's them. But let let's come back to Trump and and and and the thinking behind things.
I think I think it's more simple and than you think because I I don't think they have a plan. I don't think they know what the word plan is. You mentioned chess. I I they certainly can't play chess, and and god only knows they can't play go for for sure. So I think they're lost.
They they're winging it. The the Trump is winging it, basically. And and forget about the advisers because the advisers the the intelligence community I indicated, they advised Trump. They said that this isn't gonna work. They they told him this isn't gonna work, but but he was listening to somebody else.
He was listening to what was coming out of the Mossad advisers in Israel and and and went ahead. It it didn't work. And now he he's fishing around for some some rationale to justify what he's doing. And and and it looks like what he's doing is he's going to escalate, which will which will clearly make the thing even worse. It'll it'll increase all the cost immensely because the escalation favors Iran.
Iran is favored by the escalation.
Speaker 0: Alright. So if we go through a scenario where the Houthis close the Babel Mendez the Mendeb Straits, how much worse would things get?
Speaker 1: A lot. Because that means the Suez Canal is closed. So you're just again, if you ask me, Mario, a number, I don't know a number. I haven't count I haven't even made an estimate. But, again, as a as a trader, I I just know it will get worse.
So my bets would be on shorting whatever is gonna get worse. And and by the way, we we did talk about oil. There is one important factor to bring in about the timing. This is your duration, your your interest in timing, which, of course, is the is the is the key $64,000 question. And that is that the the physical shortage of oil is is significant, and the price in the physical spot market is a lot higher than it is on the paper market, the futures market.
And so you've got the spot market up here much higher, by the way, than than the futures market. The futures market and paper market will be mugged by reality, and the reality is what's going on in the physical market. And when they are mugged, the price of those futures is gonna go up to match the physical. The the the gaps don't exist very long, but there's there's usually kind of a lag, and and that lag will be closing. And I think we'll be seeing some of that closure even next week.
Me meaning that the the the the prices we see and that they repeat all the time, those are from the futures market, the $100 oil, that kind of stuff. The and and that will that will be going up towards the physical. The physical has been trading, you know, gas, know, try trading at a 150, 160.
Speaker 0: So I know you see me pause. It's just so I'm just in shock that we're here. I feel like we've we've globalization as an experiment is being questioned right now when things like this happen, when some of the routes that allow this concept to to succeed have just been completely shut off for a reason that I'm still, know, struggling to fully understand. Where is there a level, professor, and I'll ask you to speculate a bit. Is there a level where if we if both straits, the Strait Of Beiber if things get really bad, let's say there's troops on the ground, the Beiber Mendeb Straits closes, the Houthis closed that, and the Shere Hamuz remains closed.
Is there a duration where look. If we get past, let's say, two weeks, three weeks, four weeks, one month, we're talking about an economic collapse or a global financial crisis. I know it's hard to put a number to it, but what would be like a red line for you that if I told you, professor, like, if we went back and chatted in a month in that period of time from now, you'd be in a very you know, a lot more concerned.
Speaker 1: Well, if you did the three things that you just talked about, Mario, we that is the the boot boots on the ground. And and for that that means probably e even even now, by the way, what's going on one thing that hasn't been reported, and this is important, is that, actually, who who who has benefited economically from the from the war in in in the sense of physicals and commerce? It's Iran because they're they're exporting more oil than they were exporting before. The price is a lot higher. The discounts are a lot lower.
So so that that comes into play. Because if you look at the the Iranian real, it's actually appreciated since the war started. It's it's been volatile, but it it's up about 13% against the US dollar since the war started. Now that that's because there there's money coming in because they're selling a lot more oil. Now if boots on the ground, Anner, and and and and mix things up, let's assume that's not gonna happen.
That that that exporting will will stop or be in in short, the strait will be more closed than it is now. I think that would have then you had another thing. You you said the the Red Sea, if that's closed. Well, we're we're getting and then if the counterattack, which will occur, happens with the Iranians knocking out desolonization, we'd we'd talk about a that's a catastrophe for The Gulf. The the desolonization plants is a a total catastrophe.
So so the escalation ladder, this is the Hail Mary pass thing in in Silber's book that I just held up. The the escalation ladder favors Iran, and it it imposes orders of magnitude greater cost on the combatants in in the in the West, the the enemies of Iran and and the rest of the world, by the way, even even friends of Iran or those who are neutral are gonna pay the cost. I I think the the only obvious unambiguous beneficiary would be Russia.
Speaker 0: Russia's yeah. This is a plus
Speaker 1: I mean, Russia just absolutely wins right across the board. There's there there are no negatives coming out. Some of the other countries, you get the columns and you a plus or plus minus and on and on and on. But Russia is just a a whole string of pluses.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: So they they they like Iran, they have every reason to want the duration of the war to continue and be elongated.
Speaker 0: So just one more time, I'll ask that and and make it a final question. Where would we be you know, I remember the February. I remember the panic. I I remember what it did to the world. I was very young back then, but I remember what it did to the world.
So I know it's not comparable to what we're going through now. But when would we be in a very similar place, from a significance perspective if this maintains the straights, both of them closed, you could put boots on the ground. Oh, it'd desalination places on.
Speaker 1: It it would it would make the two thousand eight great financial crisis look like a birthday party. It'd be it much more we're talking about something much, much worse than that.
reSee.it AI Summary
I see Malcolm Nance’s view: the U.S. is unprepared for a long Iran war, clinging to high‑tech wins while Iran builds a war of attrition with cheap drones and a potential ground insurgency. The asymmetry of tolerance favors Iran; destroying infrastructure won’t break them. Drones, automation, and attritional warfare could redefine combat, threaten Gulf allies, and strain the world economy, with no quick resolution.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨 🇺🇸 🇮🇷 WHY THE U.S. STRATEGY IN IRAN IS DOOMED How did Iran destroy over $1bn in aircraft in Saudi with drones worth tens of thousands of dollars? How are they keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed? Why are they still able to fire missiles and drones DAILY against Israel and the Gulf, with a higher hit rate? Malcolm Nance breaks down why the U.S. is so unprepared for this war, and learned nothing from the Ukraine Russia warfare He highlights a fundamental "asymmetry of tolerance": while the U.S. relies on expensive technology and has little appetite for high casualties, Iran has spent decades preparing for a war of attrition. From the massive inventory of low-cost Shaheed drones to the potential for a grueling ground insurgency, Nance warns that the U.S. lacks the depth to win a fight that will eventually come down to "rifles and knives." He suggests that Iran’s long-term play isn't just military survival, but a strategic realignment to turn Gulf allies against Washington and end American influence in the region for good. @MalcolmNance 01:00 - This war ends in blood, not strategy. 03:00 - Ukraine turned war into a real industry. 05:30 - One cheap drone can destroy billion-dollar assets. 08:30 - The battlefield just became fully automated. 13:00 - Drones vs drones is the new reality. 16:40 - The U.S. is completely unprepared for this war. 20:30 - America is still fighting the last war mindset. 25:30 - Future invasions could turn into total chaos instantly. 30:00 - This war could take years to recover from. 35:00 - Iran has no real reason to negotiate. 40:30 - Destroying infrastructure won’t break them. 45:30 - The world economy is hanging by a thread. 50:30 - This could spiral into something way bigger. 55:30 - Nobody is ready for how bad this can get.
Video Transcript AI Summary
Mario and Malcolm discuss the evolving drone warfare landscape and the strategic implications for the United States, Iran, Ukraine, and Gulf states.
Malcolm argues that Iran’s drone arsenal represents a persistent, low-cost threat with an 88,000 Shahid drone inventory at the lowest cost, and mass production estimated at 7,000. He notes Iran has destroyed roughly $5,000,000,000 of technology, underscoring the waste associated with high-value defenses. He contends the conflict “is gonna come down to rifles and knives and drones,” and suggests the U.S. and its allies have limited tolerance for the level of death this entails. He emphasizes the learning curve for anti-Shahid drones, estimating 35 to 45 days to train someone to fly such drones, and notes that combat veterans and Ukrainian international legionnaires could assist with training in Ukraine, Abu Dhabi, and beyond.
They discuss defense markets and training pipelines. Mario recalls speaking with a U.S.-based VC in Ukraine who might be tapped to bolster defense industry interests; Malcolm reiterates that Ukrainian-made, locally developed systems dominate, and that Western companies must avoid partnerships that involve theft of technology. He stresses that Ukrainians own the drone industry, and that the U.S. has historically relied on foreign-made drones for ISR rather than attack, contrasting Ukraine’s trajectory from reconnaissance to drones used for direct attack and artillery fusion.
Malcolm criticizes the U.S. approach to drones, arguing that the U.S. military has not adapted to modern drone warfare and that Ukraine’s battlefield experiences demonstrate rapid adaptation and innovating countermeasures, such as drone drop kits and improvised aerial bombs. He explains the progression: drones used for surveillance evolved into attack platforms, counter-drone tactics, and drone-enabled artillery. He provides detailed examples: using DJI drones for reconnaissance early on, then using drone-based bombing, counter-jamming techniques, and fiber-optic lines to guide munitions. He notes Ukrainian Sea Baby Magura drones and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) that attacked Russian ships, and describes a dramatic incident where a Ukrainian drone disabled a Russian submarine tail by docking behind it and flooding it with explosive force.
The conversation shifts to recent strikes on Gulf-based assets. Mario asks about Zelensky’s visits to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and why Gulf defense preparedness appeared slow. Malcolm suggests the U.S. misreads regional resilience and that Gulf states will adapt using homegrown drone capabilities, with examples such as Kuwait buying thousands of Ukrainian drones and the UAE potentially building domestic drone factories. He cautions against overreliance on “wonder weapons” and emphasizes practical measures like machine guns, shotguns, and ground-based defenses, noting that 50-caliber weapons and simple tactics can counter Shahid drones if properly deployed. He asserts that the Gulf states will need to supplement their arsenals with practical, scalable training and production rather than expensive foreign capabilities.
Malcolm discusses the strategic logic behind any potential concessions with Iran. He argues that Iran has geography, topography, history, and manpower advantages, and that Donald Trump’s threats to bomb Iran’s infrastructure are unlikely to force concessions. He claims Iran would not negotiate under U.S. pressure and that the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) would remain a focal point of conflict. He contends that Trump’s approach risks escalating toward broader conflict, and that Iran could respond by leveraging the Houthis or other regional proxies to disrupt shipping and Gulf economies, potentially closing the Red Sea and Suez Canal if alignments shift.
They touch on Russia’s role, noting Moscow’s financial and strategic interests in the region. Malcolm argues Putin benefits from the conflict and that Trump’s priorities are tied to accumulating frozen Russian assets and broader political maneuvering, sometimes at odds with the publicized goal of restraining Iran. He observes that Russia’s drones, weapons components, and intelligence could be flowing to Iran, influencing the Gulf theater.
The discussion closes with a broader warning: the war’s consequences will be felt for years or generations, with energy prices, inflation, and global economic disruption, and only a realignment of strategy—embracing distributed defenses, domestic production, and adaptable tactics—will shape outcomes. They acknowledge the difficulty of predicting concessions, the complexity of Gulf politics, and the precarious balance between deterrence and escalation.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: It seems to me that Trump is seeking enough wrap.
Speaker 1: Donald Trump has the pressures of the entire global economic order against him. We killed a million Vietnamese. They did not submit. They won the war. So did the Taliban.
They took every bomb we dropped on them. The Iranians have an 88,000 Shahid drone inventory at the lowest cost, and their mass production is 7,000. They've destroyed maybe an easy $5,000,000,000 of technology.
Speaker 0: Such a massive waste. I know we keep talking about these numbers, but they add up.
Speaker 1: This is gonna come down to rifles and knives and drones. You know why we're gonna fail at this? Because we have no tolerance for that level of death. And by the time this ends, more Americans are gonna die. It takes about thirty five to forty five days to learn to fly an anti Shahid drone.
It is not something they do in a week. So their guys are actually piloting on the Ukrainians. And if they're gonna build and contract, it's gonna take a lot of guys to train them how to fly. So combat veteran Ukrainian international legionnaires who were gonna we've formed a company, and I had a company in Dubai. I mean, in Abu Dhabi, a private security consulting company that we I worked there for ten years all over The Middle East.
And so we're gonna try to get them up and take over some of the training because they're gonna need it. They're gonna need a lot of it. Train everybody in New York?
Speaker 0: Military, I remember speaking to a VC. You might know her, Deborah, can't remember. And she's an American who's a American VC who lives in Ukraine, lived there for many years. Oh, yeah. And she'd be out I'll give her a call.
She'd probably be killing it now. Defense industry in Ukraine. Like, I surprised it took that long, but I would assume demand now would just skyrocket after Iran.
Speaker 1: Demand is different because unlike, like, Iraq and Afghanistan, all these places where you had billions of US defense contractors, You know, one of the biggest things that we saw when I first got to Ukraine and and went in the army, no very few US special forces or seal guys joined. You know, I could probably count them all on two hands in five years because there was no money to be made. No one was paying these guys 1,000 a day or as private bodyguards and things like that. It was $630 a month or nothing. Same thing with defense contractors that, you know, they would come over there and it's like, if it's not Ukrainian made and Ukrainians don't make it and develop it and invest it, there's no money for them.
They all want Ukrainian stuff now. That's the truth.
Speaker 0: Exactly. Exactly. Exactly. Exactly. That's what I'm saying.
Speaker 1: The suicide drone thing was sold by Zelensky himself. Like, Qatar, he demanded 12 Mirage 12 Mirage two thousands. You know? So those deals done there. At another level, it's going to be, you know, even the companies that are developing these people the Ukrainians are not gonna want partnerships where they're gonna steal their tech and then start selling it all over the world.
So they're gonna have to be really tight contracts. The Ukrainian government won't allow it, but there are several companies. I mean, I work with a company. It was their any drones were done by, Brits. You know?
And they're in Ukraine, we have people in Ukraine. It's the experience, though. You cannot buy it. You you just cannot buy it. You can say and there are no, you know, no Ukrainian man's allowed to leave the country.
No Ukrainian man's allowed to leave the country. And you gotta stay in the armed forces. So who has on these systems, you're allowed to leave because you're not a Ukrainian, then no one is gonna be offering those stuff. But suicide drone boats in the future, all sorts of things. You know?
Ukrainians own this industry. But the Americans steal it like the Lukas drone. That was a a Ukrainian shot down a shaheed. It landed almost whole. We gave The United States a sample, and they gave it to Eric Trump's company.
And they made a copy of it and are now selling it to the Department of Defense for almost $1,000,000,000. Ukrainians got nothing out of that.
Speaker 0: How, how significant do you think is Zelensky's visit to The UAE and and Saudi and, I think, Qatar? How big of a difference do you think it will make? I'm also surprised. Maybe another question is why did it take them so long? How did they not know?
I was talking to someone who's very supportive of the American military. You might see him on YouTube. He did a video. I forgot his name. He does great videos, and I had him on the show a couple days ago.
I'll tell you his name. I'm sure you'll know people know his YouTube channel as well. And where is he? Ryan Grimm. He's got a channel.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Ryan Grimm's an guy.
Speaker 0: Exactly. And he made a video. He's, like, he's talking about how the the aircrafts in the Saudi US Saudi base got struck by a drone and caused tens of billions of dollars of damage. He's so pissed off about it, he said, like, I don't know how they're just not prepared for this. Like, they've years to prepare, and they haven't prepared for it.
Why do you think that is?
Speaker 1: Yeah. Hundreds of millions of dollars. We they struck an e three Sentry, 300,000,000 for one aircraft. Then they damaged two two more aircraft, the e c one thirty Compass Call. That's our psychological warfare aircraft that can literally seize your television channel and your radio channels and rebroadcast what we want on your frequencies.
They were also badly damaged in that attack and k c one thirty five tanker aircraft. Here's the problem that I found with The United States. You know? I mean, I went into the Ukrainian army, you know, for and the only people who the only people who have a problem with that are the Russians. Right?
So went into Ukrainian army. I was in the Kharkiv front, you know, on the front lines, the zero line for, you know, the better part of a year, and we saw how adaptive Ukraine was. The average Ukrainian is a very adaptive, very fast thinker on their feet. And you could see how they were thinking about different tactics, techniques, and procedures based on what's in their face. The United States likes to go through a long bloodletting, then a lot of study, and then it goes to a think tank, you know, like, you know, Center for Naval Analysis or some other group.
And then people will write white papers, and then somebody will say, oh, a drone is a good thing. And they'll have that little r q five handheld drone, you know, which only does surveillance. We went away we when we started the war, as a matter of fact, I was intel intel officer for first battalion international legion, which is the infantry battalion. We used DJI drones. Okay?
Granted for surveillance. Just go out, try to look for the enemy, run the highways, see where obstacles were, see what the lay of the land was across our we had to we had a river that was separating us. The Russians took that one step further. They were using DJI.
Speaker 0: Oh, Drew, you're talking when you were with the Ukrainian military, just to be clear. That's new Ukrainian. Yeah. Exactly.
Speaker 1: No. It was in the Ukrainian army. Right? So the Russians, on the other hand, started flying the exact same DJI drones. Right?
These Mavic threes and and drones. Only they had fused and integrated three different things into their way of fighting. They were always very good at signals intelligence. As you guys can see over my shoulder, I worked at the National Security Agency. Signals intelligence was very important, listening to your enemy, getting enemy signals, identifying, cross referencing where they are through radio direction finding, and then integrating that with your artillery to bombard you.
The Russians were good at visual and signals intelligence, but drones brought in a new dimension, brought in something that could hover over them, literally look at the target, get the latitude and longitude, and then share the difference. Right? Make up the difference between the target and your location, pass that back through a radio. Right? The guy who's sitting there looking at the drone imagery, and they would put that into 01/2022 millimeter mortars.
We had two very regrettable incidents that cost people their lives. One was cell phone clustering. Guys were sitting there with their cell phones at night in their bivouac while guys were out on watch, and their cell phones were being intercepted. And the Russians, boom, blew up one of our houses. We had 16 guys in it, all wounded from cell phones that were not supposed to be on the battlefield.
The second was fusion of drone imagery, right, video surveillance into artillery counter battery fire. That was May, June, July 2022. Right? By August, it started to shift. The Ukrainians had started creating drone drop kits.
Right? I have one actually right here back in where I'm at in New York for my DJI drone. And what is what it was was was a little device that would if you press the lights button on your device, on your drone, it would send an electrical charge and release a little tab. And they gave us a whole bunch of hand grenade and 40 millimeter tail fins, and you would wire those up, especially the 40 millimeter, right, for American m two three twenty grenade launchers. Right?
You had to wire it so they would arm after dropping 40 feet, and then suddenly the drone became a bomber. Right? And I was my one of my buddies who was there was a British drone school pilot. This is all he did in England full time. His name was Macca, king of drones.
And he Macca rigged these things up, and you would fly them, and you could go 2,000, 3,000 feet. And for the first time, you could use your optics to actually fly over a target and release a bomb on it. Right? To the point where we start getting bigger drones and created bomber squadrons. And now this is just common.
The thing between 2002 and 2005 was drone lift. Right? How much capacity that drone could carry. They these octocopters got so big, they would carry two, sometimes three of these Russian tank mines, and they would rig them with a little detonator that would go off. And when they would drop away, it would pull a fuse and it would fall down into a bunker, and it would vaporize these things.
They would they're designed to blow up a 60 ton battle tank. These things were vaporizing Russian positions, and that's where you got to where we are now. Once we got drones up there, the Russians started running drones. Then electronic warfare started kicking in. We were jamming these things.
We had to get a counter jamming technique, and that was to put the drone on a a hair thin fiber optic cable to where you could know electronic warfare could stop you now. And the Russians had good electronic warfare. And it would fly out and you would still have your optical and, you know, your visual on your target, and then you could still drop bombs on top of them. Then the Russians started doing it. And so many of these fiber optic drones were flying by the thousands and thousands.
There's villages that are covered like cobweb with fiber optic cable. You can go Google it. Yeah. I've seen this.
Speaker 0: I've seen this. It's the same.
Speaker 1: So we are at the advent of how do you kill the fire fiber optic cable? How do you get the enemy's drone to, you know, nullify itself or explode? And now we're in the advent of drones carrying lasers. But the step now before you can get to that is drones killing drones, hunter killers. Right?
Going up and taking out Shahid drones, which are just, you know, mopeds with bombs on the front of them. And we have these vampire interceptor drones, which are high speed that'll go up and kill it. But we've also used regular ass drones to kill helicopters. We have killed propeller driven aircraft with them by just flying up and smashing into their wings. Or in one great instance, there was a a a propeller driven plane that was flying doing resupply on the the Kharkiv front.
The drone flew right into the aircraft, and you see the face of the crew chief guy who's there, and it goes over his shoulder and explodes. Right? They shoot down aircraft with optically guided drones now, fiber optic drones.
Speaker 0: So how long they shot that that drone I've seen that drone. It's it's it's incredible. Since this is recorded, we'll put the footage on top. Essentially, it's just a drone that kinda propels itself directly onto a Shahed drone interceptor. It's just a very cheap way of doing it.
Speaker 1: Yeah. But it doesn't go in a straight line. I mean, that drone is insanely maneuverable. We're talking about the vampire drones. Because it has four quads, and then it it can maneuver up, down, left, right, along, you know, all four of the gimbal axes.
Right? And the pilot can it's very fast. Right? It's a hundred, hundred and fifty miles per hour fast. You know?
That's like pushing 200 kilometers per hour in some of these counter drones. But as the Shahid comes, you have to it it's not all visual. Right? You have to have a radar. You have to have a visual identifier.
You could even have and this is what we were talking about with Iran. Right? Kids with cell phones. That's how the Somalis got us in, you know, in Somalia during the, you know, the Black Hawk Down incident. They use cell phones as acoustic detection systems.
And if you have 10 kids arrayed along a 90 degree arc, right, on a map and kid, you know, Mohammed Joe, you know, comes here and raises his phone, and he says, oh, I've got a helicopter. I've got a drone. I've got an airplane on this bearing. The Ukrainians developed this in the first year of the war. We had shifted by 2025 into creating a whole series of drones in Ukraine.
The one that surprised, I think, everyone the most was the Magura drones, what they call the Sea Baby. These were high speed craft that were out there attacking Russian ships directly in swarms. Two or three at a time, one would hit a target, the other would film the attack, and then go out and hit the target too. Then we start seeing modifications where the this the, you know, USVs or what we call them. Right?
The unmanned surface vessels were starting to become even more highly modified where they would carry they shot down a Russian helicopter, an m I 25 helicopter, using a surface to air missile that they had rigged onto the drone itself.
Speaker 0: That's crazy.
Speaker 1: The helicopter that came after them and shot it down. Then the drone went off to blow up a ship target. We had some of them are so low observable. The most amazing one is that, you know, the Ukrainian Navy has sunk a Russian submarine in harbor in in in a in one of the Black Sea fleet ports Black Sea fleet ports. And what it did, it came in at night and was so low observable, semi submerged, came into the harbor at, like, one or two knots, came behind the submarine's propeller, and anchored itself between the pier wall and the submarine behind its propeller and then blew up so that the pier wall actually, we call it tamping.
Tamp the explosive and pushed all the explosive force into the submarine. It blew the entire tail off that submarine. Alright? That right there, that's a, you know, a $100,000,000
Speaker 0: How how so what I'm just fascinated by is that Ukraine, from what I understand, did share all that intelligence with the with NATO, including the American army. So why is The US so unprepared, including the rest of the Gulf nations? Why is for such a massive war, they've had years to prepare and and the YouTuber I talked about, the the the former intelligence, he he Right. He was expressing that same concern. Like, there there was so much that could have been done to prevent the attack on that base in in Saudi that caused hundreds of millions of damage.
It just perplexes me.
Speaker 1: Well, principally because we're fighting the last war, and the last war was a an alternatively asymmetric war. That means The United States had so much overwhelming power that it in itself was sort of a a form of Judah. No one could ever stand up to you. And what that brings with you, and I talk about this all the time in my substack briefings every morning, we have and when I say we, this is the entirety of The United States, have a contempt for foreign cultures, foreign languages, other tactics, techniques, procedures, peoples that are different from us. And our own technically military superiority makes us blind to the other asymmetries.
That's where other people can use our strengths as a form of judo and flip us. We were in the I mean, in the Ukrainian army, again, I when I was can't even remember how old I was. In Desert Storm in 1991, when I moved from my ship that hit a seamine, the USS Tripoli, over to the USS Missouri, I was part of a team that was watching and identifying Iraqi positions with the first major real time drone The United States was using, which was called the Pioneer drone. It was an Israeli aircraft, twin booms. We'd launch it off the back of the battleship.
We would go out. We would look at targets, and the 16 inch guns would shoot at it, or we would identify positions that we wanna shoot at later. That in itself was harnessing, you know, an advanced technology for something using for guns from World War two. Right? So as time progressed, America got stuck in that rut of drones were for surveillance.
Our drones originally started as attack aircraft in World War two. As a matter of fact, you know, president John f Kennedy's brother was killed. Joseph Kennedy was killed piloting one of the first drones, a b 17 that was going to carry out an attack on Germany. He got out of the plane. He was supposed to parachute out of the plane and, you know, just let it take off.
Before he could get out of the plane, the plane blew up through some accident. But that was 1944. Now we've gone back to as the American mindset of drones being part of the ISR package, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. Whereas in Ukraine, it started out with intelligence and surveillance. It started out with reconnaissance and quickly moved to attack.
Right? Fusion between artillery and the drone. Then the drone itself became an independent bomber system. Right? Where we just tootle up to a guy, drop a Russian f one or an American m 67 grenade down on the guy, and watch him blow up.
Now it has replaced mortars and artillery as the number one killer on the battlefield. Because like the movie Terminator, they're we called them h k's. Right? Hunter killers. Droves that would go out and we would hunt for positions, and we blasted so many positions and tanks to the way that we completely transformed armor warfare, then it started going after the individual soldier one at a time.
The problem with the US army is they do not adapt. And in this current US army under Pete Hagsef, which I you know, it's like the, you know, the the triumph of the stupid. These are people who believe our absolute military supremacy can never be challenged on any level. But we all saw trouble coming during the anniversary US Army's anniversary parade, Trump's birthday parade in what was that? April when the US Army advanced ISR teams out there had a handheld drone, and it wouldn't allow him to fly it.
He stood there, walked down the parade route, holding it in his hand. I remember tweeting, this man will be the most ridiculed person in every army in the world. And by the next day, he was. I mean, everybody was saying this is America's vaunted drone defense and drone capability. Drones now are hand grenades, bro.
I mean, you you have a little FPV drone. You power it on. You put goggles on. You throw it. And then now you guide it to your enemy, and you kill somebody that may be twenty, thirty meters from you.
Right? Not forty, fifty kilometers. We have plenty of drones that can do that. So America has never adapted. And here's what I fear, Mario, because I know you've had a lot of pundits on this last few weeks who who all think they know it everything.
Right? But as I like to say to your to your audience, I have lived these experiences. Everything I give you is not projection. Okay? I've been attacked by drones.
I've been mortally terrified by having drones come over our position and not detect our position. You know, when you hear them, first thing you do is freeze. You start thinking about how to shoot it, then you realize you don't have a shotgun. Let me tell you. It's I I preferred being bombarded by Russian artillery and rockets because I could tell when they were coming, and I can tell whether they were gonna hit or not.
Right? Drones, you think it goes by, you and then you're like, okay. Move. And that thing's actually looking at you just waiting to turn around and come back to you. So it's more.
And you it's a jitter. It could be five, ten kilometers away, and you think you're safe. Alright? And then it comes back for you. So The United States has not adapted to this.
And if we go into ground warfare in in in in Iran, whether it's against the Rev Garg, the Basji, or whatever, I constantly say this. There are kids out there who are young, adaptive, and are already masters of flying drones for the Basaji or for the IRGC. We saw a photo of a position on Karg Island that was dug into the sand, which is good. Because when you're in the sand, they can't see your thermal signature. And he had two drones, an a k 47, and, like, you know, six magazines.
It was the two drones that are the most lethal thing that he has. Because you could send it up for ISR, right, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and sit back in this little fighting pit and send it up there and look around at the area. And if you you don't have to wait for soldiers to come on the ground. If a landing craft is coming or an LCAP, right, a a hovercraft is coming at you, you can do what we do in Ukraine. One of the tactic one of our favorite tactics, right, is where you wait on the road, ground loiter.
You land the drone in a fixed position, like, behind a bush or something, and you know it's on the road or in the middle of the road. And when the target comes, you just raise up a foot, and he runs into you and you explode, or you lay on the road and let it explode or take off and fly around and come back and strike him. I want you to visualize this. We use Osprey special operations helicopters flying from Jordan or someplace that take off like an helicopter, fly like an airplane, land like a helicopter. And they come in, and they're bringing rangers in for the assault on Karg Island, which is not a very big place.
It's only eight kilometers by four kilometers. Right? 60% of it is an oil facility, 20% a village, and the rest is, you know, formerly IRGC missile batteries and things like that. And you come in in your helicopter, fast ropes the first stick down, no problem, takes off. The second stick comes in.
The third helicopter comes in. And as you're approaching, Joseph Blow there in the pit has a drone that's been sitting and watching you one at a time. And they let the first group in, and the his drone takes off. And as you're approaching, it flies right into you. Or better yet, it flies in the door of the crew chief or up the rear of the ramp and blows up.
And now you've got that scene in Terminator. Right? No. And in what's the name of that movie? Aliens where the drop ship comes to rescue you, and it's now spiraling into the ground.
And then there's 50 more. Right? You cannot kill them. Say you have jamming. Okay?
Jamming. What if they sent fiber optic drones? What if the drones just wait there until the jamming subsides? And then as you're landing, they're taking off and they're bombarding you with these. At the same time, artillery is coming from the shore.
You know, Shahid drones are inbound 150 at a time. At the same time, any ship missiles are coming. At the same time, surface to air MANPADS are being launched from the village. This is a situation where we have not thought through the hard realities of how this could be. And our attitude is we kick ass, we train great, we have the best technology, this won't happen to us.
That is not a guarantee. Or worse, Mario, they let you land, and then it's just the drone festival hunting you down for the next ten hours.
Speaker 0: How so I've just got the numbers, by the way. So Iran claimed they used $30,000 drones to take out $1,300,000,000 according to drop site news of US aircraft in Saudi. That is insane. That includes how many how many aircraft is that? Let me just check here.
We've got Well So KC KC one g five thing is and let me just say, right.
Speaker 1: What they took out in radars. Right? The Kuwaiti not Kuwaiti. The Qataris bought a massive air search radar system that we have mounted on our ships. It looks in every direction, battlefield management from Afghanistan all the way over to Israel.
Right? It has three sides to this radar, this massive radar complex. They put one Shahid drone right down the middle of it. Dead center, like someone challenged them to put it down a bull's eye, and they destroyed a $1,100,000,000 radar. Then there were three more of the radars that control the theater high altitude air defense system, the THAAD system.
Those radars are worth 500,000,000 each. They destroyed three of them. One in Jordan, one in Abu Dhabi, and another in Saudi Arabia, if I'm not mistaken. Right? The one in Jordan was so critical that when they destroyed it, air warning for ballistic missiles to Israel went from ten minutes to three minutes, which means Israel was only getting warned as those radars were come as those missiles were coming in at the last second.
They had to fly our spares from South Korea out to that region. Eight those drones, by the way, aren't 30,000. At high at the lowest cost in their mass production are 7,000. And they've destroyed maybe an easy $5,000,000,000 of technology that cannot be replaced. It'd take years to replace those things.
Speaker 0: It hurts to hear those numbers. It hurts to see that's just such a waste, such a massive waste. I know we keep talking about these numbers but they add up. Now that same expert made the argument, I keep forgetting his name, great guy, but he made a video talking about how exactly, Ryan's made a video a few days ago now saying that this is not the right way to look at it It's because even though the air defense munitions cost so much, he was talking about the the THAAD and the Patriots, even though those missiles cost so much, there's just enough for them and the capacity to produce more that having a such higher cost, it is sustainable for the military. It's sustainable for the American military because they could keep producing more.
Know it takes long. But I just don't think that that argument really especially when you start putting these batteries or these radars that you've talked about, these aircraft that you've talked about, you put it all together, the damage will take years to replenish. Now those aircraft, I think the AWACS was was the last one was produced years ago, and there's only a handful of them. They're from the sevens. Exactly.
The billion dollar radars, only six of them around seven of them around the world, the one in Qatar, the fad batteries that had to take them from South Korea. No. I think the the repercussions of this war, I said this before, from a military and a political standpoint are gonna be felt for years if not generations to come. Well But then how quickly do you think you I'll let you comment on that, how quickly do you think Ukraine could fill that gap? Is it a quick fix or not really?
It'll take a long time?
Speaker 1: Well, it's a quick it's a relatively quick fix, and this is why I'm working with international legionnaires who have all combat experience, all drone pilots, right, to maybe help in that fix because the Ukrainians had to take 200 anti Shahid drone pilots off the line. These are experienced guys. Some guys have five, ten, 15 kills. Right? They're quadruple ace drone pilots off the line in the in Ukraine to come defend the Gulf States, and they technically can't afford those guys.
But now, you know, all these other states are gonna start building and they're buying. I know Kuwait bought, like, 3,000 Ukrainian drones. You can't just buy them. You gotta build a factory. Right?
And the drones are cheap. You know? And the real problem is is when you get US defense contractors come in and say, oh, you have to give us a build of that billion dollars. We'll build that factory for You can build that factory for a $100,000. You could hire every kid in, you know, in high school in Abu Dhabi on an internship to three d print the parts and then put all the parts together and then test fly them and put them through a forty five day school and turn those cadets from, you know, every high school in The United Arab Emirates into a anti Shahid drone corps that would be more effective than your regular army.
We have this belief that you have to spend a boatload of money. You know, when my wife worked in Abu Dhabi on multibillion dollar projects, they just believe that more money means better. The Ukrainians are teaching them better tactics means better. Here's one thing that they weren't doing. If I were if I were in charge of, you know, or adviser to, for example, The UAE's general staff, I would say, every BMP infantry fighting vehicle that you have, I want it on the beaches with a two kilometer separation.
And they'd like, well, wait. Those are infantry fighting vehicles. No. They're machine guns. You can shoot these drones down with machine guns.
People want to engage these targets without upsetting the norms. You're at war. 50 caliber machine guns should be everywhere, you know, for the Shaheed drones and for small drones, shotguns. Right? With number eight birdshot.
That's how we shoot these things down. You have to use all your resources. They started using Apache helicopters. One of your Apaches crashed, but then falling into the debris of the blast of a Shahid drone. Use proper tactics.
High altitude, get above the drone, cut back, use your guns, shoot backwards. It's the thing that everyone in the Ukrainian army knows, And that's what the Ukrainians are there teaching them. It for Iraq dollars, you can use tactics that work. Ukraine has had 55,000 shahids fired at it in five years. 55,000.
The UAE's had 2,000 fired at them in four weeks. Right? It'll be over 2,000 in in five weeks. The Iranians have an 88,000 Shahid drone inventory, And I we talked about this on one of our previous podcast. Let's assume that we destroyed 75% of them.
That leaves 20,000 Shahids. Right? Less to come get you. And they haven't even started firing coordinated in earnest. They're doing it in little dribs and drabs.
So, you know, the war could get much worse.
Speaker 0: Exactly. And and I wanna talk about Trump's post that I saw while I was on the flight today. What do you make of it? So I've I've got it here. There it is.
So he says The US is is in serious discussions with a new and more reasonable regime to end our military operation in Iran. Great progress has been made. So that's the good part. Great. Now there's a stick, so it's a characteristic, if for any reason a deal is not shortly reached, which it probably will be, and if the Hormuz trade is not immediately open for business, we will conclude our lovely stay in Iran by blowing up and completely obliterating all their electric generating plants, oil wells, and Karg Island, and possibly all desalinate the desalinization plants, which we have not which we have purposely not yet touched.
This will be in retribution for how many soldiers, etcetera, justifying. So it seems to me that Trump is seeking an off ramp. I don't know if your analysis is the same. Yeah. Do you think Iran will give it to him?
And what would happen if he does deliver on his threat?
Speaker 1: Of course, they won't give it to him. You know? I'm constantly lecturing people on and this is what makes my podcast, right, black men spy, Because I'm black like them. I'm brown like them. I'm a person of color.
I understand where they come from, and I respect it. He has no respect for the the multi, you know, cultural world that is Iran. He has no respect for the religion. He has no understanding. He doesn't care.
He it's like he thinks he's, you know, the the master of the universe that, you know, he can point down at you and things will happen. All American do can do is drop bombs. That's all you can do. And like we talked about Vietnam who is making our Nikes. Okay?
We killed a million Vietnamese. We dropped more bombs in World War two. They did not submit. They won the war. And despite what some people say wearing flip flops, so did the Taliban.
They took every bomb we dropped on them. Right? You people are trying to view these Trump's tweet from an American perspective. It does not work. But they don't want they put
Speaker 0: their mouths. They also don't want to see they don't wanna see their desalinization plants hit. They don't wanna see their electric power plants hit, their oil wells hit. They don't wanna hit Cargilland, which is which powers their economy. So they're also human.
I understand they don't wanna be talked down to, but if he starts bombing their infrastructure, there's gonna be a limit where they're like, alright. Maybe we should take a deal and accept some concessions, not give up our ballistic missile program. Of course not. That's just suicide.
Speaker 1: Married.
Speaker 0: But maybe it's really in
Speaker 1: me let me clarify this for you. What's your religious faith, if you don't mind my asking?
Speaker 0: Born Christian.
Speaker 1: Born Christian. Okay. Like me. Masihid. Right?
So but I've lived as a Muslim over there, both Shia and Sunnah. Right? You have to understand in their heart of hearts, their heart of hearts, everyone over there. There's not a Muslim that is not listening to this that will say, Malcolm is correct. The only thing that impacts their life is what god chooses for them.
Right? If god so wills, right, and the will of god says power plants must be destroyed. Allah's, they're destroyed. Right? And then you adapt and you work within the world that that Allah has given you.
That's how they believe, and they believe it deeply, deeper than any belief we in the West. Donald Trump believes this way with money. Okay? He does not believe it from a power that is higher than him. There is a billion people in this world who believe like this, and you cannot make it worse for them.
Right? You if you knock out the power plants, what's gonna happen? I've been in countries with zero power, okay, where power went down in in my my unit in Ukraine. When we lost power, we went to flashlights and woods wood burning stoves in the middle of winter. Okay?
If you people would go out and get their Honda generators. They would create generation zones to get everybody their telephones and their their flashlights working. People adapt. People are adaptive. There is very little you can do to them.
In Nazi Germany, in 1944, every day, we would fly a thousand bombers over someone's city and level it. So long as they could adapt to that, you cannot be their
Speaker 0: terms will. When will they end? When there's gonna they don't want war either. They've shown in the twelve day war, they did not want a war with the with The US. They've shown that beforehand on their strike to Iran.
Are you sure? Right. They
Speaker 1: didn't want war, but they didn't Yeah. Surrender. We, you know, said then walked away.
Speaker 0: I'm not saying they will they wanna surrender, but I'm saying they don't want a war. So what concession will they agree to? What will they not agree to?
Speaker 1: Mario, it's not that they don't want a war. Okay? This is like me sitting in your your you sitting in your house and 10 gang members kick through the door and start shooting everyone in your in your house in your neighborhood. You didn't choose it. It came to you.
The Iranians, let's be honest. Who started this? Okay? We attacked them on February 28. So let's be honest about where this came from.
I'm not on Iran's side. Alright? I've always been an opponent. They tried to kill me. I have killed some of them.
But let's be quite honest about this. They have no reason to negotiate with Donald Trump. They have geography on their side. They have topography on their side. They have history on their side.
They have manpower on their side. Donald Trump has the pressures of the entire global economic order against him. And that tweet, this truth, whatever you wanna call it, he put out was a sign of, to me, as a geopolitical analyst, that's a sign of utter desperation on Donald Trump's part. And he thinks and he also did it at 9AM on Monday morning in an attempt to manipulate the stock market. The oil prices no longer listen to Donald Trump.
West Texas intermediary was at a $101 last night. Okay? It was at 88 a few days ago when he made his announcement that war peace was at hand. So Trump's carrot stick for you know, carrot then stick does not work on these people because they understand that it's, one, all lies. Two, they're still bombing us.
Three, what can you offer us that we don't have already without you? You cannot take away Allah. You cannot take away their family and kids except to kill them, and then we are going to meet them eventually in a better place. This is the will of god, and the will of god is for you to lose when your soldiers land on our beaches and we fight you. And then your public won't take that pressure, and you'll leave anyway.
So I I don't see where there is an upside for The United States with Trump's comments. But if you attack his their power, I'm gonna tell you this right now. I've been in that region forty years, lived, slept, ate, got two kids named Malik named after me. They will take away all technology in the Arabian Gulf, on the Western side of the Persian Gulf. You that side of the Gulf will go back to 1965, except for the kind of cars you drive.
Speaker 0: So they'll just they'll just pummel the the golf, but what what is that why? So I understand this is their strategy for have the golf pressure The US and maybe reconsider The US American bases in those countries, But they've been doing that strategy for a while. Then what? What's the purpose of continuing to strike The Gulf at the
Speaker 1: Okay. We wanna step away from military politics and go to geopolitics here. Right? This is not about military bases. This is about the lines of money and influence between Washington and the Gulf State shakes.
Right? The people who are gonna break first look like it might even be the Al Fani's of of of Qatar. They're being pummeled. They're you're not just the Iranians by hitting Ras Laffan did not liquid power plant did not just take away their money for 3,000,000,000 $20,000,000,000 over the next five years. They're losing trillions here.
Also, the relationship between Washington and Donald Trump now and them is based on their losses, not on what they can gain. They do not gain anymore by having US central command there. I doubt very seriously at the end of this war that they will allow The US to remain in Qatar because Iraq is never going away unless some act of god happens and there's a popular uprising and they overthrow the, you know, the Islamic revolution, it's not going away. So they're gonna wanna they're gonna wanna deal with them. Same thing with Bahrain.
Same thing with Kuwait. United Arab Emirates is hardline. Saudi Arabia is hardline. But there is a way. There are painful pressure points that will make you walk away from The United States.
And one of those is them running a toll booth, right, between Kisham Island and Laraq Island and making sure nobody can get through the rest of the place. So what can you do to them that will make them not be able to pick dates off the palm tree, to be able to not have pomegranates and not have rice in their country? Starve them? 93,000,000 people? There's nothing you can do So long as the borders to Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Pakistan are open, trade will continue back and forth over time.
They can live a life without power for a very long time. But you can't
Speaker 0: be But there's one too. But the thing is there are regime. Might be but do they do the people, not the regime. The regime might be really pissed at The US. Might wanna cause much damage
Speaker 1: people also.
Speaker 0: No. But there's a lot of like, I was speaking to a journalist, Ali, I think his name is, yesterday from there, and he's a Lebanese journalist in in Iran. And I asked him, like, where do where the people stand? He's like, look. Some of them are supporting the regime and continue this war and many others are not, and they wanna see the war.
And so people are kinda split on this. There's some that wanna inflict damage. They understand the strategic value of deterrence, but also some of them wanna avenge the death of the supreme leader and others. But there's many others that wanna go back to normal life. So I'm just saying that maybe the I understand the regime the the the Iranian government can sustain this.
The the massive country, 93,000,000 people, they've got a lot of resources. They've got control of the Strait Of Hormuz. They can keep importing drones from Russia and China and manufacture them themselves, and they've got a a shit ton of missiles. But at the same time, I just really believe they have they have a limit too, and there might be a way where they can end the war war with concessions somewhere in the middle, meeting The US in the middle, allowing them to keep their pride, develop deterrence. And but that also depends on and this is my question as you comment on this.
What role do you think Russia will play? Because we're seeing, I wanna say, a convergence, but a lot of overlap between the Ukraine Russia war and what we see here in The Middle East. Zelenskyy visiting the region and reports of Russia sending drones to Iran as well. So I'd love to get your comments on my last statement, but also the overlap with that other war and and whether that could play a role.
Speaker 1: Well, first off, I again, I think you're overestimating how the average person on the street will take this. They'll they'll endure a lot, a lot. Right? Firebombings, things like that. You I I suspect you could even nuke a city over there, and, you know, it's the will of god.
They didn't choose that. The problem is we are viewing their tolerance through our lens and our inability to tolerate things that they can get by without. And the average person over there is is is inconvenienced by all of this. They all want to do trade. They all wanna They all wanna live a a a religious life, most people over there.
You know? But the Basjji is 800,000 volunteers who sworn their lives to the existence of the regime. The IRGC, 150,000. The regular army. Right?
Another 500,000, let's call it. There are 25,000,000 card carrying members of the Basji. That means, you know, the that you support the party even if you don't. Right? That tells you out of 93,000,000 people, including, we know, 40% of their countries under the age of of 20 you know, what is it?
Under the age of 30, okay, they are still Iranians. They still have pride. This is still their country being bombed by foreigners, and you're asking their leadership to give up things that they can't understand why they would give it up. Why would they give up access to the straighter one moves for a guy that wears orange makeup, right, and has a wig on.
Speaker 0: They won't they won't give it up. I agree. I don't think they'll give up. Giving up the Shreta Homuz with a ballistic missile program off the table.
Speaker 1: It's like me going to junior in in Lebanon. I'm sure you know that area. Right? Traditionally Christian forever in Lebanon. And just saying, you're gonna give it up.
You're give it up because I say it. You cannot bring enough overwhelming force there into that region to do that. But you know what they can do? They have mass of human empower. And I know you were talking to Larry Johnson the other day, and he's like, Malcolm's full of it, you know, about invading Gulf States.
Hey. It almost happened twice in the nineteen eighties. They fought a war with Iraq, and now this time Iraq would be on their side. So don't doubt that they have the ability to bring more pain. Every bit of pain they drop on the Gulf States, power plants, you know, you know, water desalinization plants, as we out escalate, America is bringing that pain onto them indirectly to the Gulf States.
And that translates into nothing coming out of The Gulf, higher medicines, higher gas prices, higher everything, higher plastics. The whole world now is at the whim of America's choice to have this to work.
Speaker 0: America, the I don't think the more economists I speak to, the global economy is so screwed if things don't change soon. It's not only about oil. It's not only about fertilizers. It's also helium. And if you add the bed we haven't even spoken about the Houthis joining, man.
Before that Oh, okay. Russia Russia Ukraine, what do you make of Putin sending more sending drones to drones or drone components allegedly to Iran and and Zelensky visiting the region?
Speaker 1: Putin's making bank off of this war. Let me tell you something. I know people out there said, you know, I've written four New York Times bestsellers about Donald Trump and his relationship with Moscow. He is madly in love with Moscow. That's been said by world officials who have spoken to him and watched him and Zelensky watched him and Putin together.
If it's good for Putin, it's good for Trump. Even though Iran is be getting weapons and components and intelligence that may and may have already killed Americans, Trump doesn't care. He is looking at the $2,000,000,000,000 of frozen Russian money that was done under sanctions. And as soon as he can raise those sanctions legally to get it, that that's his only interest. He doesn't care whether I mean, if if he really cared about sanctions, explain to me why he handed Iran $14,000,000,000 to fight America by lifting the sanctions on the oil because the economy choice.
No. The economists you talked to are telling you he had no choice because but Trump did. Crack the global economic system and keep the sanctions on, blow up Karg Island, and drop the you know, push oil to $200 a barrel. The man doesn't know what he's doing from one minute to the other.
Speaker 0: No. But what do mean? Like, what do mean is it a good idea?
Speaker 1: Why would
Speaker 0: to Hold on.
Speaker 1: Doomed
Speaker 0: out. Why would he do that? Why would why do you think he'd do that? Like, you're talking about crushing the global economy and with the stock market, energy prices, the gas pump. But that goes against everything he stood for.
It's not about What's the
Speaker 1: quote he had with the Financial Times this morning? This is my briefing book.
Speaker 0: Oh, thought, hey. I I saw it. Saw it on first day.
Speaker 1: Seized Iran's oil? Yeah. America very special
Speaker 0: people. Against it. I'm against it, but it's America first.
Speaker 1: How the hell do you see something that is underground in another country?
Speaker 0: That's that's that's not for me. I don't know that. The answer to that one, how he's gonna achieve it. I don't have the intel how he's gonna achieve it. How he's gonna seize the oil.
My guess is he wants to seize maybe or if I had to guess based on what we're seeing right now, seize Carg Island and negotiate with Iran to get a cut out of everything they export. A lot feasible. I'm trying to guess.
Speaker 1: Sometimes. Last time we spoke, I explained, Karg Island has the Darius oil field or the Fanun oil field Fazul oil field underneath it. Right? But the oil Karg is a hub. No.
I know. I know. I know. They can shut it
Speaker 0: back from around. I understand.
Speaker 1: That's right. I understand. You have
Speaker 0: But I'm saying just like I say makes a deal with him. He makes a deal with him where they would oh, because they need the money too. Again, I know it sounds pretty far fetched. I'm trying to see what he means by it. I know it's not from what I spoke with you and others as well.
No one agrees this is a good idea, but maybe it is or maybe seizing those you know, the two islands you talked about that Iran that Iran was using to to create like a toll booth at the Shreve Hormuz. Seizing those two islands, you we've talked about in-depth how it's militarily very difficult to say the least. That I understand. But that is a way to make money off Iran's oil.
Speaker 1: How? Okay. To make money, you gotta get through alive. Ships are gonna move. No oil company in the world.
None. It's 18 kilometers from Bandur or Bostol Hormuz, 18 kilometers from Kishem to Larek, a three area sector that where they're using their little toll booth. No ship is gonna move if there's warfare going on out there. It's about insurance companies. Oh, come on.
I know you really, really, really think that there could be a possibility out of this.
Speaker 0: They have to they have to sorry. That also, I was I agree with your point. They also have to sail slowly. It's not only very narrow. It's all but this kinda turns around, so ships have to sail slowly slowly.
There's no way they could stop Iran from striking those ships. So I agree with you. I don't know how they could do it unless they have some what's that new weapon they use in Venezuela? Maybe there's some new weapon we don't know about.
Speaker 1: No. You're talking about the LRAD, right, which is the low out yeah. There was a
Speaker 0: name for it. He called the s he know
Speaker 1: He called made a statement. He called it the the bamboozler or something stupid like a discombobulator. Yeah. Okay. Look.
What's up? Wonder weapons do not stop a bullet through your head. Okay? Wonder weapons cannot help you here. We're talking geography, topography, terrain.
18 kilometers, you can shoot mortars from that range and hit them. And then you're sitting there with your little wonder weapon, your microwave l rad. Okay? And it gets hit by a mortar. Now you don't have it.
Or you come ashore and it hits an IED or a landmine. Now you don't have it. This is gonna come down to, at some point, to rifles and knives and drones, little manny handheld drones. And you know why we're gonna fail at this? Because we have no tolerance for that level of death.
Alright? You don't have tolerance for levels of death from World War two, then we're certainly not gonna have tolerance. I mean, we in Black Hawk Down, we lost what? You know? Like, 12 guys.
And and you saw what happened in Afghanistan. We had suicide bombers hit us every day for twenty years. And on the last day, 13 marines were killed. God bless them. And people acted like there had never been a death in that country before when we had lost almost 3,900 soldiers prior to those 13.
And all they talked about is those 13. We have a short memory. If this thing goes off, the Iranians have a vote. That's all I'm telling you as the listening audience. Do not think, rah rah, America, we have b two bombers.
You know, famous quote from the movie Gardens of Stone. You know, we're gonna beat these people because they're using bows and arrows against a f four Phantom jet. And the old grizzle sergeant major, James Conn, who's like me, says, how do you beat a people that are willing to use a bow and arrow against the Phantom jet? Mindset. Right?
And sometimes those bows hit. So as much as we would like this to come out in a positive way, the only thing that can happen here is Trump is gonna have to off ramp and declare victory at some point. The only way the Strait Of Hormuz is going to open, this is based on forty years experience, decades in the Persian Gulf, in combat with Iran, hit mines, shot at by missiles, ran after small boats. Right? The only way it's gonna happen is is if the Strait Of Hormuz is set back to what it was on February 28.
Right? No toll booths, freedom of navigation of all ships between there because we have had enough. But the key factor here that has set all of this off is the stick of dynamite called Donald Trump, and I don't think he cares what happens to the people on both sides of the Gulf. Until he gets the pressure that hits his pocketbook, he would rather sacrifice people than than to realize he put he put the world in this situation. It's gonna take the world to to to defornicate him, so to speak.
Speaker 0: No. Good to see you. A big fan of Trump, Malcolm. No. I'm just Hold on.
Speaker 1: Hold on. I'm not a fan of Trump. I'm a fan of goddamn comments using the intelligence that was given to you by 19 agencies and understanding that this stuff has consequences, and we are now in a world of consequences. My gas has gone up. My food is go percent of the
Speaker 0: gone.
Speaker 1: I have a nephew who's still in the navy. I don't know where he is right now. I don't care. I don't want this to go bad for anybody. If I go to Dubai to report on this in the next weeks, what I don't want is the start of a third world war.
It's not gonna be a third world war, but The United States goes into Iran with 3,000, 5,000 paratroops. You're gonna see bad things happen here.
Speaker 0: Let me know if you go to Dubai. I'd love to do a sit down with you. How significant is the Houthi the Houthis joining then? That's the last thing we haven't spoken about yet.
Speaker 1: Oh, jeez. You know? There are things we shouldn't speak about. Look. The Iranians' position to Houthis so well over the last thirty years is just really incredible.
They have turned them into a military power. They defeated Saudi Arabia. They defeated The United Arab Emirates and the Arab coalition that went there to to defeat them.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: They dominate the Bab El Mandab Waterway, and it's snap of a finger to close it. If Trump does something stupid, right, and I think seizing Larek Island is stupid. I think trying to take the Strait Of Hormuz Islands and force Iran into that will just perpetuate warfare for months, if not a year, where the Gulf will not open. The SOH will not open. Okay?
Because it's just too risky. A 138 ships a day are not gonna resume. We're going through, like, one or two now, and they're going through Iran's wars. So that happens, you can be dang sure that they're gonna ask the Houthis to jump in both feet. And that means the pipeline that is now moving things from Aka'ik, right, the Jubail to Yanbu, which is now moving a third of Saudi Arabia's oil.
That was an emergency pipeline that they built for this reason. The Houthis will blow it up. Okay? And god knows. We talk about the religious aspects of this.
God knows. They may march on Mecca. There's 350,000 of them. They seem pretty bloodthirsty. They could sink every ship in the Red Sea or try it.
And at that point, the Red Sea SOH is closed. Suez Canal closed. Everything goes the world economy cracks because, I'm sorry, it was Donald Trump's decision to do this with Benjamin Netanyahu to attack Iran and now pushing them to the point where they break the rest of the world order is just not worth the effort?
Speaker 0: Yeah. I just got a report, by the way, now there's a ballistic missile. They're very small waves that were launched by Iran and Israel and another report of a direct impact. It's happening on a daily basis. I'm worried that Israel is running out of air defense munitions as well.
Speaker 1: Well, you know, I don't think they're running out air defense missions. I just think that they're now starting to see a different class of missile that may have a warhead that you know, the cluster warheads are almost impossible to defeat. But they're harassment weapons now, what we call HNI. Right? Harassment and interdiction.
And, you know, the big stuff, they're not gonna waste on Israel, I don't think anymore. I think they're keeping their powder dry for The Gulf States and The United States forces. Certainly, the short range ballistic missiles, we talked about the Yazid ballistic missile underground under mountain complex. That may be one of the objectives for these these airborne raid, to go down there and try to stop their ballistic missiles. But the story changes every day, Matt.
Yep. And I'm you know, and there's some guys who are thinking, Malcolm, you really hate your country. No. I'm the intelligence person that gives you the right data so that you make the right decisions. And what's happening is we're giving good data.
Trump does not believe in intelligence at all. He doesn't believe it. And so when I say, hey. You know, you do x. You gotta expect y, z, and alpha.
And they were like, no. I don't have to listen to you. You're full of shit. I'm Donald Trump. They're making a statue of me.
See, that that's mental illness disguised as foreign policy.
Speaker 0: I mean, well, hopefully let's hope Iran accept some of the concessions, and, you know, Trump is seeking, you know, frontless.
Speaker 1: Yeah. They're not gonna accept any of those 15 concessions.
Speaker 0: What they of them. They'll accept nuclear program, they'll accept. Like, they'll accept the nuclear program. They've already accepted it before the negotiations. They might accept some business deals with The US or the Trump can call it a win.
They make some money. Something symbolic.
Speaker 1: Any business that does deals with Iran in The United States is gonna be called a traitor. I mean, we just went to war with these. And by the time this ends, more Americans are gonna die. So I think that Iran that Trump the Iranian platform of proposal, the six points or whatever it was, is better. But Donald Trump will not be able to say he controls the Strait Of Hormuz.
That's madness. Okay? Mental illness right there. Iran controls the SOH, and they can have agreements with Oman and The Emirates and neutralize all maybe even Iran lets Abu Dhabi have Abu Musa Island back. It's possible.
Right? Small concessions. Those people have all sold camels to each other over the millennium.
Speaker 0: That is that is a big but that is a big concession. That island is very important. I mean, that will be a pretty big concession.
Speaker 1: Not That will be the way we're
Speaker 0: gaining back to we're gaining back The UAE as as an ally. So the goal is around to turn this region these regional countries against The US. That'll be their strategy long term.
Speaker 1: They have a better chance of doing that because, again, they have literally sold camels and dates to each other for millennia, thousands of years. We come jump in here and think that we're gonna start pointing our finger and demanding they could end The United Arab Emirates as it exists right now as a modern nation. They've Right? They knew most of those missiles would be intercepted, but they haven't even done the full push. We shall see.
Let's hope it never gets to that because, one, I like going down to Jumeirah Beach Residence and having a coffee after a run Okay. Or going to Mall Of The Emirates.
Speaker 0: Alright, man. Well, always always a pleasure to have you, Malcolm. Thanks for jumping on again.
Speaker 1: Alright. Take care.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇾🇪🇮🇱 How the Houthis hit Israel from a thousand miles away The Palestine II missile skips along the edge of the atmosphere at up to Mach 16, zigzagging mid-flight in ways that Arrow, David's Sling, and Iron Dome were never designed to track. It's not a traditional ballistic arc. It's a glide vehicle that changes course unpredictably at hypersonic speed. A non-state actor in sandals just deployed technology that was supposed to be reserved for superpowers. The rules of missile defense just got rewritten from Yemen. Source: Ai Telly
Video Transcript AI Summary
The Huthis’ attack on Israel was conducted with a mix of Iranian-engineered ballistic and semi-hypersonic missiles, using a skip trajectory to bypass Israel’s Iron Dome and Arrow defense networks. The key factor enabling interception evasion was maneuverability: unlike traditional ballistic missiles that arc predictably, these weapons zigzag midflight, shifting trajectory at extreme speeds to confuse interceptor radars down to impact. The Palestine Two missile, a hypersonic ballistic weapon, reportedly reaches speeds up to Mach 16 and traveled from Yemen to Israel in minutes, leaving defenders little time to react. It appears to employ a skip gliding mechanism, allowing midflight trajectory changes that complicate interception. Experts believe it is not purely hypersonic but has semi-hypersonic characteristics that enable sharp maneuvers during flight.
This capability likely involved a glide vehicle that detaches and enables the missile to maneuver and glide at speeds between Mach 5 and 16, potentially following a lower-than-usual flight path to evade radar coverage. The strike demonstrated vulnerabilities even within highly defended airspace, revealing how non-state actors can access advanced weaponry once thought exclusive to major powers. The Palestine Two is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle to maneuver and evade aero missiles defenses such as Israel’s, and travels around 1,500 kilometers, only slightly more than its Palestine One predecessor (Fatah One).
Iran’s missile program, including Shahab-3 variants, provides the underlying technology. The Shahab-3 is the foundation for Iran’s medium-range missiles, using liquid propellant and capable of carrying a warhead between 760 and 1,200 kilograms. The typical sequence involves launching at a 90-degree angle, a trajectory that travels near or into space, warhead separation from the rocket, and re-entry to target. Warheads may be single or multiple, depending on the variant. The circular error probable for older weapons is about 300 to 450 meters, meaning 50% of missiles would land within that radius.
Israel’s air defense comprises three tiers: the long-range Arrow system designed to intercept missiles outside the atmosphere, the David’s Sling system for missiles and drones, and the Iron Dome for short-range rocket attacks. The Arrow system includes the Arrow launcher, Green Pine radar, and the Arrow missile. The Arrow three kill vehicle uses a solid-propellant rocket with a thrust-vectoring nozzle and a seeker capable of pivoting to track targets. THAAD employs divert attitude control thrusters and has different burn characteristics and radar data requirements. The deterrent success of these defenses depends on precise targeting data from radars and seekers, as interceptor missiles must adjust trajectories based on updated flight information to intercept intercontinental ballistic trajectories.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: How did the Vughtis manage to strike Israel from over a thousand miles away? Well, they did it by deploying a mix of Iranian engineered ballistic and semi hypersonic missiles, utilizing a flight path known as a skip trajectory. But that brings up a massive question. How did these weapons bypass Israel's cutting edge Iron Dome and Arrow Defense Networks? The secret is maneuverability.
Unlike conventional ballistic missiles that follow predictable, arching curve, these newer weapons can actually zigzag mid flight. They constantly shift their trajectory at extreme speeds, completely confusing the interceptor radars all the way down to the target. It was a startling moment in the ongoing regional tensions when the Huti launched what they called the Palestine two missile, a hypersonic ballistic weapon reportedly capable of reaching speeds as high as Mach 16. At such blistering velocity, the missile was able to travel from Yemen to Israel in mere minutes, giving Israeli and allied defense systems very little time to react. What made this strike even more concerning was the missile's apparent ability to change course mid flight, a capability likely achieved through a sophisticated skip gliding mechanism.
This means that rather than following a traditional predictable arc, the missile could bounce along the edge of the atmosphere, shifting its trajectory in a way that complicates interception. Experts believe the missile wasn't purely hypersonic in the conventional sense but had characteristics of what some call a semi hypersonic design. This would still allow for sharp maneuvers during flight, far beyond what older ballistic models could manage. These kinds of mid air changes wreak havoc on systems like Israel's Arrow-three and The U. S.-developed THAAD, which are built to predict and intercept based on expected flight paths.
Additionally, there's speculation that the missile may have taken a lower than usual flight route, potentially slipping under the radar coverage that usually defends against high altitude threats. This is the Houthi Palestine two, it was used for the first time based on Iran's advanced missile systems. Inside this missile is a hypersonic glide vehicle, which detaches and allows the missile to maneuver and glide at speeds between Mach five and sixteen. The missile has a range of around 1,500 kilometers, only slightly more than its predecessor, the Palestine-one missile, or Fatah-one. What sets it apart from other ballistic missiles is its ability to accelerate outside the Earth's atmosphere, while its aerodynamic control surfaces enable steering to evades the famous aero missiles defense system made by Israel.
The combination of extreme speed, sudden course changes, and possible stealth capabilities revealed a major vulnerability, even in one of the most heavily defended airspaces in the world. What this incident really drives home is that non state actors are now gaining access to highly advanced weaponry that was once thought to be the domain of major powers. Yemen Houthi militant possessing a hypersonic missile represents a significant threat to both Israel and the United States Navy ships. To understand how the Houthi hypersonic missile works, we need to examine the functioning of Iran's missile technology and Israel's aero defense system. Let's study how the Houthi follows the same strategy as Iran when it hit Israel with almost 180 number of ballistic missiles.
These missiles traveled more than 1,000 miles from this valley to reach Israel's most populated city and military sites. Iran used variants of the Shahab-three ballistic missile in its latest attack on Israel. The Shahab-three is the foundation for all of Iran's medium range ballistic missiles and uses liquid propellant. It can carry a warhead weighing between seven sixty and twelve hundred kilograms, which translates to sixteen seventy five and two thousand six hundred and forty five pounds. How it works: Step one: The missile is positioned at a 90 degree angle and then fired.
Step two: The ballistic missile's trajectory takes it outside or near the edge of Earth's atmosphere. Step three: The warhead payload separates from the rocket that carried it aloft and re enters the atmosphere, descending towards its target. Step four: The missile can carry a single or multiple warheads, depending on the variant. The warhead separates from the single stage rocket after it has traveled about more than half the distance to its target. The most prolific Scud variants had a circular error probable of 300 to four fifty meters.
This means that 50% of the missiles fired at a target would land within a circle of that diameter. As you watch this, data brokers may be collecting and selling your personal information, your home address, phone number, online searches, and even financial details. This data doesn't just result in spam calls and scam attempts. It can also affect your personal credit score, as scammers may manipulate your data, potentially leading to a loan denial. It also performs regular scans to prevent data brokers from sneaking your information back into circulation, all while providing you with a clear, real time dashboard to track your data.
So take your personal data back with Incogni, use code AITELLI with the link below incogni.com aitelly and get 60% off on an annual plan. Now let's take a look how the Israeli Defense System works. The Israeli Defense System consists of three tiers. First up is the long range Aero Missile Defense System, which was designed specifically with Iranian missiles in mind. Each of these system rockets cost a few million dollars, and they can intercept missiles outside the Earth's atmosphere, resulting in enhanced protection.
The second layer of defense is the so called David's Sling system, designed for taking out missiles and drones. Finally, the Iron Dome stops most short range rocket attacks in Israel. Let's take a look at why the Iron Dome failed to intercept the Iranian ballistic missiles. Apart from discussing the multilayered missile defense system, the Iron Dome itself has a range of around 40 miles, while the David's Sling can intercept ballistic missiles up to a range of 180 miles. The top tier aero anti ballistic missile systems can target threats up to 1,500 miles away.
According to reports, 180 ballistic missiles, which are possibly hypersonic as claimed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, were launched. Although the aero missile defense system successfully intercepted many missiles before they reached Israel, many still got through. The main problem behind the failure to intercept was after the detachment of the Glide Vehicle from the launcher. The Glide Vehicle can change its trajectory multiple times, which confused the Arrow missiles. This maneuver also bypassed the David's Sling and finally the Iron Dome system, which is not designed to counter hypersonic missiles like the Fatah two model.
Let's examine the cost implications of a single day of missile attacks. Iran expended over $200,000,000 by launching ballistic missiles along with drones, whereas the IDF spent $1,000,000,000 to defend itself. This includes the Arrow missile, which costs around $2,500,000 The David Sling costs around $1,000,000 to produce, while the Iron Dome costs around 20,000 to $100,000 for a single missile, depending on inflation. By contrast, Iranian ballistic missiles cost around $200,000 each and its drones only $20,000 to $50,000 each. The Arrow missile defense system consists of three basic parts: the missile launcher unit, the Green Pine radar antenna, and the Arrow missile.
The missile launcher unit is composed of six erector launcher tubes housing ready to fire missiles. Positioned at the rear of a two axle trailer, each launcher, when fully loaded with six launch tubes carrying ready to fire missiles, weighs 35 tons. The Green Pine radar serves as the warning and fire control radar for the Arrow three anti ballistic air defense missile system. It plays a crucial role in target detection and guidance. The Arrow operates as a two stage missile.
Let's look inside this engineering technology. This is the solid propellant booster and sustainer rocket motors. At the rocket's peak sits the ignition chamber, triggering the combustion of the solid propellant when activated. This propellant isn't just any substance, it's a meticulously crafted blend of fuel and oxidizer poured into a casing and then cured. Encasing this blend is a protective shell called the motor case.
At the core of the rocket lies the propellant burning zone. Here, the solid fuel and oxidizer react, producing incredibly high temperature combustion gases, which helps to launch the rocket at incredible speed above the Earth's surface. Moving further to the front, the most important part of the missile is the kill vehicle, which can be divided into three basic parts. The second stage is the propulsion system with a thrust vectoring nozzle. Just above it is the warhead, a directed high explosive fragmentation weighing 150 kilograms, which translates to three thirty pounds.
The third stage is the Seeker, capable of pivoting itself to track its target. But what's the big deal about this long range anti ballistic missile system? Let's start with a propulsion system, the famous THAAD, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense uses a divert attitude control thrusters. In comparison to the Arrow three kill vehicle, which utilizes a thrust vectoring nozzle with a solid fuel rocket, it has a shorter and more limited burn time. It has a few advantages, one of them being the ability to compensate for a lack of radar accuracy.
When the radar sends the interceptor to an inaccurate target location, the Arrow three kill vehicle can adjust its trajectory. Since intercontinental ballistic missiles travel at very high speeds, the kill vehicle must change its trajectory based on newer, more accurate radar data from its seeker. A failure to fully divert the course to the new target would result in a failure to intercept. We make original videos from scratch and animated by humans, so please subscribe to not miss a beat.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷🇾🇪 Could the Houthis flip the war? Iran is taking heavy losses after 4 weeks of war. Houthis still have real autonomy and power in western Yemen. They’ve built a serious arsenal: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones & sea drones. Their last Red Sea campaign already cost global trade over $1 trillion. The Houthis can hit Saudi oil sites, Qatar LNG, and shut down Bab el-Mandeb, which would stack on top of Iran’s Hormuz disruption. Combined effect: massive oil & shipping crisis worldwide. Economic pain could force everyone to the table faster than bombs alone. One rebel group with cheap weapons could make this conflict economically unbearable for the world. Source: WarFronts YT
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 Insane that the 2026 Iran War just caused the biggest oil supply shock in history, 16% of global supply, taken offline. - Bigger than the 1973 embargo. - Bigger than the Gulf Wars. - Bigger than the Libyan Civil War - and even bigger than the Ukraine war If Russia https://t.co/AZHTfPU6Oo
reSee.it AI Summary
I trace how the Middle East slipped into a worst-case regional war, arguing the United States was steered into a hot conflict with Iran by an Israeli strategy for regional dominion. Israeli intelligence and lobbying sold Washington on an easy regime change while sabotaging diplomatic pauses to keep U.S. power on the front lines. I map Netanyahu’s long-term push, Gulf dependencies, and the push toward a new regional architecture.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨 🇮🇱 🇺🇸 🇮🇷 THE LAST 10 YARDS: HOW THE U.S. WAS PULLED INTO REGIONAL WAR Daniel Levy analyzes how the Middle East reached this "worst-case scenario" of total regional conflict. He argues that while the U.S. has its own geopolitical interests, the final push into a hot war with Iran was driven by an ambitious Israeli strategy to assert regional dominion. Levy details how Israeli intelligence and political lobbying sold the White House on a "bill of goods", the promise of an easy regime change, while simultaneously sabotaging diplomatic pauses to ensure American power remains committed to the front lines. 00:01 – The Worst-Case Scenario: How We Got Here 03:19 – The Role of Israel and Netanyahu’s Strategy 05:54 – American Agency vs. Israeli Points of Access 07:24 – Netanyahu’s Long-Term Play for Trump 09:39 – Selling the "Easy" Iranian Revolution to the White House 11:18 – The Disconnect Between Israeli and U.S. Objectives 14:46 – Greater Israel and the Quest for Regional Dominion 17:13 – Gulf State Dependencies and the Pipeline Strategy 18:37 – The GCC’s Dilemma: Insecurity Under the U.S. Umbrella 22:08 – The Hexagon Alliance: Israel’s New Regional Architecture 25:59 – Reconsidering the Saudi-Iran Rapprochement 32:36 – Turkey as the Next Strategic Focus 34:52 – The Abandonment of Political and Diplomatic Paths 38:56 – Lebanon: Displacement and the Logic of Zero-Sum War 44:54 – Sabotaging Negotiations: Strikes on Energy and Nuclear Sites 48:32 – "Use It or Lose It": Exploiting Declining American Power
Video Transcript AI Summary
Mario: Daniel, after decades of diplomacy, the Middle East is now at war. Early on you suggested Hormuz and economic leverage; as the conflict evolved, US ground invasion talk, targeted Iranian leadership, and new developments—like JD Vance’s reaction to US intel and Israel striking energy infrastructure in Iran—have shaped concerns that Israel wields outsized influence. Broad question: how did we get here and why?
Daniel: There’s a long history of American and Israeli influence in play. There is American agency and a geopolitical logic tying chokepoints like Hormuz to broader aims, such as reasserting US primacy vis-à-vis China. But this doesn’t fully explain how the last 10 yards into war were crossed. Netanyahu’s long effort to shape a strategic environment culminated when he found a president open to using American power in the region. Israel’s strategy appears to be to assert greater regional dominion by leveraging US military power and creating dependencies with Gulf states. Netanyahu reportedly offered the president an actionable plan, including on-the-ground assets, to decapitate Iran’s leadership and spark a broader upheaval, which helped push the White House toward a twelve-day war in June. Israel also presented a narrative of rapid US escalation to secure its aims, while the American interagency process—though deteriorated in recent years—had to interpret unusually aggressive, yet selective, Israeli intelligence and objectives. The result is a complex dynamic where US rhetoric and decisions are deeply entangled with Israeli designs for regional hegemony, an outcome that was not broadly anticipated by many regional partners.
Mario: If the US administration had not fully understood Israel’s project, how did this come to pass? And how does Mossad factor in?
Daniel: Israel has tremendous access to influence over an American administration through lobbying, media echo chambers, and political finance, which Netanyahu exploited to drive a course toward major confrontation with Iran. Before Trump’s term, Netanyahu was nervous about a president who could pivot against allies; he devised a strategy that culminated in Operation Midnight Hammer and subsequent US-Israeli collaboration, reinforced by the possibility of rapid decapitation of Iran’s leadership. There are reports (and debates) about Mossad presenting on-the-ground assets and the possibility of instigating a street revolution in Iran, which may not have been fully believed by Washington but was persuasive enough to shape policy. The question remains how much of Israeli intelligence makes it to Trump and his inner circle, especially given concerns about cognitive ability and decision-making in the White House at that time. Netanyahu’s aim, according to Daniel, was not simply to topple Iran but to maximize Israel’s regional leverage by using American power while reducing other regional peers’ influence.
Mario: What about Gulf states and broader regional realignments? How did the Gulf respond, and what does this mean for their security calculus?
Daniel: The Gulf states face a stark dilemma. They fear Iran's retaliatory capabilities but also distrust America’s consistency and question whether US support will be cost-effective. Iran’s strikes into the Gulf have forced Gulf capitals to reassess their reliance on US protection and Israel’s influence, particularly given Israel’s aggressive posture and expanded regional footprint—Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza—with potential implications for the Gulf’s own security and economic interests. Some Gulf actors worry about over-dependence on American security assurances while Israel intensifies operational reach. The GCC’s calculus is shifting: they confront a choice between continuing alignment with the US-Israel bloc or seeking more independent security arrangements. The possibility of a broader Gulf-Israel axis, or at least closer coordination, is tempered by concerns over long-term regional stability, public opinion, and the risk of escalation.
Mario: How has this affected perceptions of Iran, Israel, and the broader regional order? Has the Gulf’s stance shifted?
Daniel: The region’s balance has been unsettled. Iran’s actions have damaged Gulf trust in its neighbors’ security guarantees, while Israel’s aggressive posture and reliance on US power have complicated Gulf states’ calculations. Turkey’s role is pivotal as it balances concerns about Iran and Israel, while also watching how the region realigns. The possibility of a future where Iran’s power is weakened is weighed against the risk of destabilization and long-term security costs. Negotiations between the US, Iran, and regional actors—stoked by Turkish diplomacy and shifting Gulf positions—are ongoing, with Turkey signaling that diplomacy remains important, even as Gulf states reassess their security dependencies.
Mario: What about Lebanon and Hezbollah, and the potential for broader spillover?
Daniel: Lebanon faces severe consequences: displacement, civilian harm, and a domestic political paralysis that complicates relations with Israel. Hezbollah remains a factor, with ongoing tensions in Lebanon and the South. Israel’s goal of establishing security-control in Lebanon risks reigniting long-standing conflicts, while Lebanon’s government seeks a balance that could prevent further escalation, if possible. The broader picture is that Israel’s approach—driven by a perceived need to neutralize Iran and all potential threats—could provoke wider regional blowback, complicating already fragile domestic politics across the Levant.
Mario: Final thoughts as the war unfolds?
Daniel: Israel’s strategic ambitions appear to extend beyond countering Iran to shaping a broader order in which it remains the dominant regional power, aided by US military leverage. Gulf states face a difficult reorientation, reassessing longstanding alliances in light of perceptions of US reliability. The coming months will reveal whether regional actors can recalibrate toward diplomatic resolutions or wind up in a deeper, more protracted conflict. The question remains whether a political path could replace military escalation, and whether external powers can deter further aggression and stabilize the region without allowing a broader conflagration.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Daniel, absolute pleasure to speak to you for the first time. You've spent a lifetime advocating for diplomacy and trying to avoid wars. Yet here we are the entire Middle East, the region itself is in war which was the worst case scenario a very fringe group of people were talking about after October 7 and those fringe doomsayers ended up being the right ones. My first question to you is why? Because for me when the war first started, I'm like, you know, this has to be because of the Strait Of Hormuz.
For for economic reasons, Trump wants more control of The Strait similar to what he did in Venezuela to have more leverage over China. But as this war progressed and as I saw The US talk about a ground invasion, as I saw Israel kill some of the some of the successors that The US had in mind for the supreme leader. Then as I saw the developments today, reports that JD Vance was shouting or was upset with the Tatayahu because The US got false intelligence about the ease of a of a regime change in Iran. And then we also saw today Israel struck the energy infrastructure in Iran as well and the steel plants as well At a time when Trump promised a ceasefire against striking energy infrastructure for the negotiations, I start to worry that Israel has a lot more influence than I initially thought. So my first question to you is a more broad question.
How did we get here? Why?
Speaker 1: Yeah. And, yeah, there's a long backstory to how America could maneuver itself into a position where this was even a a possible thing Israel could pull it into. Right? And I do think that there is American agency. I don't wanna suggest that America has no capacity to think independently of Israel, that there weren't Americans pushing for this, or that you can't make an American geopolitical strategic logic for what it's doing.
And you began to hint at it with what you said, Mario, in terms of, you know, choke points, the relevance of Hormuz, coming after Venezuela. Maybe Trump was partly convinced this is how you reassert American primacy or American preponderance vis a vis China by getting this stranglehold on the global energy markets. You can make that case. I don't think that explains how America was pulled into this. There is a history of both Democrat and Republican administrations having this kind of Manichean view of Iran, not something they could really grapple with as how do we organize a regional security with the existing governance structures in Iran.
It was it was something that they they never really moved towards. But you can only explain to my mind how we moved those last 10 yards from everything that had gone before into an intense war with all the knock on effects, and those were broadcast in advance. Right? Trump constantly tells us, who could have known? Who could have seen that they were gonna attack the Gulf States?
Kind of everyone, by the way. That's exactly what Iran said would happen, and that is what has happened. The Israelis would have known that was gonna happen. The Gulf States had that concern. I don't think they were pushing for this war.
We can maybe come back to that. You could only explain how the president was led that last 10 yards into doing this. If you throw into the mix the role of Israel, the role of Netanyahu, after decades of trying, finally finding his man in the White House who was willing to do this, and if you throw into the mix what Israel's strategy is. And Israel's strategy, I would suggest, is very far reaching, and it's an attempt to assert what I would call a greater Israel dominion in the region.
Speaker 0: How did they manage to achieve it? How did they manage to achieve a president that forced Netanyahu to apologize to Qatar? A president that forced Israel and Iran to end a twelve day war? A president that's that prides himself on ending wars? A president that's not running again.
This is his second term, so his donors delivering on his promise doesn't matter as much. A president that does a lot of business and has great relations with The Gulf and that prides himself on these relations as well. How did they get someone like this to not only decide to attack Iran, but decide to do it now and to that to that extent where we're talking about ground troops?
Speaker 1: So I've been asking myself the same question, Mario. And some of the answer almost rights itself. Okay? Breaking news. Israel has tremendous points of access in any US administration.
Israel has a lobby that is very good as our other lobbies, but this one's particularly good at deploying all that American campaigns finance laws allow you to deploy on that front. Israel has a media echo chamber, Netanyahu, who recently boasted. You know, I've got Larry Ellison buying American TikTok. We've got CBS, you know, things like that. All of that is in play, and it's an insufficient answer for me.
And so I think that if I if I wanna properly grapple with that question, I have to address the other things you raised because Netanyahu was nervous at the beginning of the Trump administration. If we cast our minds back, before Trump takes office, he sends this new envoy, Steve Witkoff. Witkoff is quite demanding on the Gaza front. And actually on the eve of Trump's inauguration, there is a short lived ceasefire in Gaza that Netanyahu had been resisting. And I think Netanyahu was dead worried that what other American allies are experiencing, which is a president who can turn on them in a dime.
You see, whether it's in Europe or in Asia or even in Canada, they're all grappling with, a quite hostile American president. Netanyahu did not wanna end up in that camp, and he didn't wanna end up playing second fiddle to precisely what you said, playing second fiddle in the region to these Gulf leaders who Trump you know, Trump talked about tall, attractive Arab men after in his first overseas visit. He went to The Gulf. He went to Saudi, Qatar, UAE. He skipped over Israel.
Didn't go there. That financial influence was perhaps begetting geopolitical influence, and Netanyahu had to come up with a strategy. And he came up with a strategy. And on February 28, we saw just how ambitious and effective it was. And what was that strategy?
I've got to offer the president something. And he managed to pull the president into that twelve day war with operation midnight hammer against Iran in June. Apparently, Trump saw what Israel is doing and thought, I wanna be on this winning side. And since then, Trump has had this narrative. After three thousand years, I'm bringing peace to The Middle East.
You've heard him say it as as as as have we all. And more than that, Trump apparently got a little excited about playing with his military toys. There was an unbelievable spectacle last week, I think it was, in the Oval Office where Trump actually asked one of his aides to hand him the toy model of a b two bomber. And he calls it gorgeous, and he physically hugs it. And he talks, and his his eyes light up when he talks about being in that situation room and watching the bombing.
And after Iran, the question everyone was after Iran in June, after that bombing, the question everyone was asking themselves was, was that one and done, or was that the appetizer for something bigger? And Netanyahu worked this. He worked this hard. And, apparently, he found a president who ran on an antiwar platform but got rather excited about using American military power. We saw it used in Venezuela after that.
And what's more, he decided that what Israel can offer is not sovereign wealth funds that can invest in things. Israel can offer a respected military, a plan, a respected intelligence agency, and what those took to the White House. And there's been revelations in the last days on some of this stuff, and and you referenced it, Mario. They came in and they said, mister president, we can do this relatively quickly, relatively easy. There's a unique opportunity to take out the Ayatollah.
He tried to kill you. Remember, mister president? We have assets on the ground. This is what the New York Times has told us the Mossad chief, David Barnea, took to the Americans. We have assets on the ground.
If we decapitate them, we can lead a revolution on the streets of Iran. We can maybe send in Kurdish fighters to start to dismantle the Iranian central governing authority by taking geographic areas. And they sold the the let's face it, a White House that is probably a bit of an information bubble that's not getting the best of advice. It's it's hardly the a team. They sold them on a version of events that I doubt the Israelis really believed, but they wanted to pull America into this war.
And we now have these reports. I can't speak to their accuracy, that JD Vance apparently said to the Israeli premier, you sold us a bill of rights that really wasn't how this has played out. By the way, there is, a blame game going on inside Israel about how come this isn't going as well as we expected. So that for me is how I close the gap between everything you said, a president not predisposed to this, a geopolitical argument that I think was weak to begin with in terms of why this is an American interest and I think has been proven even weaker as this war has played out and how we got to this moment, Netanyahu, what Israel brought to the table, the claims they made, and the project Israel is trying to pursue, which is different to what they're telling the Americans. All that I think is crucial to explaining how we got here, Maria.
Speaker 0: You said the project that Israel is trying to pursue, which is different to what they've told the Americans. You're saying the the US administration, the CIA don't have don't know what Israel's project is. So we talked about Mossad, how they've infiltrated American politics, global politics, and they know a lot more. They know a lot. Some people even claiming that they have dirt on some American politicians.
But it's it's impossible to believe that the world's biggest intelligence agency doesn't have the same information on the Israelis and knows what Israel's objectives are, which I'm assuming you're referring to the to either you're referring to the destruction of Israel as a threat or beyond that, expanding Israel beyond the current current borders beyond Palestine.
Speaker 1: So at first, I say you you don't even need the the what do they have on Trump. Maybe they do, maybe they don't. I can't speak to that. You know, people who live down the rabbit hole of the Epstein files can can share their findings with us. I know that's how a lot of people see this.
I'm saying I don't know, and you don't even need that because enough of this is out in the public domain, and I'll come to that in a second. But when you say to me because, of course, that's absolutely right. Hey. Anything that Mossad knows, the CIA must know. They must.
And it's true. My question is different. How much of that is making its way to Trump? How much of that can Trump? How much of that is shared with Trump?
How much of that can he process? How much of that can his leadership team process? How serious is Peter Heckseth? How serious are these guys? We know that for all the mistakes America made in the past, there were certain checks and balances, and there was a certain interagency process.
And we know that has largely been gutted, torn apart. We've even read in the last couple of days that apparently the military are sharing the and the intel agencies are sharing with the president a daily two minute video update of the war, which is basically images according to the reports in NBC of blowing stuff up. So and when you hear the president speak, we just I think we just have to be honest with ourselves. There was a collective mea culpa at the end of the Biden administration. We should have been more honest about the the faculties of a man clearly aging and no no longer up to the job.
And I think when you hear Trump, we have to acknowledge that this does not sound like the the the person in charge really knows what he's doing or what he's saying. He rants and raves at his allies. He makes a claim and then says exactly the opposite, and it's not a strategy. So would the CIA have had have been able to correct some of what it was told? If the proper analysts were asked, then, yes, how many of those analysts are still around, and how much of that information was making its way up the chain?
And then the question is, well, what is Israel trying to achieve? And and if I can speak to that, I I am convinced that there is a a a strategy with significant clarity being attempted here. This isn't there's a simplistic version of greater Israel. Right? You hear some Israeli politicians talk about it.
We're gonna extend our sovereignty and our settlements, not just the eradication, the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians. We're gonna take part in Lebanon. We're gonna settle that. Some senior ministers have talked in those terms in the last couple of days. Sometimes they present maps of a greater Israel that extends into Syria or even into into Arabia.
I don't think that's really what where Netanyahu is at. I think he's a smarter strategist than that even though the country has got more fundamentalist and more ideological. I think what Netanyahu has in mind is that while we're in this moment of huge geopolitical fluidity, tectonic plates shifting, eventually, that's gonna settle down. It's gonna recrystallize. There'll be restraints imposed again.
But while everything is up for grabs, he wants to see how much control, how much domination Israel can exert by making sure it's the last significant player standing and that others develop dependencies on it, and he is using American power in order to do that. So you have a zone of control in Syria, an expanding zone of control in Lebanon. Israel is conducting its most extensive military operations in the West Bank since 1967. Israel is still killing Palestinians daily in Gaza and controlling directly 60% of that. But if you want to make sure you have nothing even approaching a peer competitor in the region, you have to collapse Iran as a state structure.
You need America in order to be able to do that. And you you want the I think what's happening to the Gulf States, to the GCC states, is not an unfortunate unintended consequence of this. I think Israel knew that they would be attacked as virtually everyone else did, and this is a way of bringing them down a peg or two so they create dependencies on Israel. Netanyahu said just a few days ago, you know what? I'll tell you how you how you resolve the problem of Hormuz and of Bab El Mandeb.
Build the pipelines. Transport the oil over to Israel's ports. You're gonna be dependent on us. That's he has a strategy, and that's what he's trying to achieve.
Speaker 0: That's crazy statement. I remember seeing it. I was just watching that sound like, if if you wanna pour salt on on the wound that the Gulf nations currently still licking, that is the way to do it. Gulf nations are pissed at Israel. They're pissed.
The UAE is pissed that the Jerusalem Post claimed a few weeks ago that The UAE is joining the war oh, no. That The UAE struck an Iranian desalination plant, if you remember that report. They were not happy at all. They believe and they the Al Haptur letter blamed Israel for for for dragging Trump and the world and The Gulf into this war. But that is a scary story.
On that? And that is also very, yeah. Of course.
Speaker 1: So no. Just just on on this point, look. The GCC states right now are on the horn of a really acute dilemma. Right? Iran is attacking those areas.
They thought America offered security of America offers more insecurity than security. They're furious at Iran, but they also are looking at the relationship with The US, the investments, the closeness. And yet, when it came to a question of their existential interest, they looked at how much influence they have on The US, and they looked at how much The US listened to Israel. And that mismatch, dismissing Gulf concerns, going along with what Israel pushed for, that will sit with them for an awfully long time. Right now, it's Yeah.
You know, some of them may think, you know, finish the job. I don't think the job can be can be done. Others will be saying, we have no good options now. But can we really trust America to to to keep doing this at a cost that we can absorb? Probably not.
So they face a terrible dilemma, but I think they I think they know now where they stand with The US compared to Israel, and they're probably getting a clearer sense of of of what Israel is up to.
Speaker 0: I agree. I think that's a very important observation. Everyone's talking about how The Gulf are turning on Iran. Iran's gamble in striking The Gulf to pressure them, to pressure Trump to end the war. It's backfiring and The Gulf is siding with The US and they might join an operation against Iran.
I think that's shortsighted. It's not inaccurate. Could be true. And the Gulf nations are not angels. No country is an angel.
There's no good and bad. The gulf nations may not want this war. But if there is this war, while we're at it, let's defang Iran. Let's weaken our rival. Maybe we get some territory as well.
There's these islands that are disputed between Iran and The UAE. I'm not saying that's gonna be the case. I'm saying these are possibilities. But this does not mean that the gulf countries are not gonna reconsider American bases in the region. They're gonna reconsider their alliance or relationship with The US, not just Trump, but The US as a whole.
The trust in in American consistency, has been shattered. American consistency means offering security to these Gulf nations, not dragging them into this war. So I think long term, the repercussions of this war, it's not an overstatement, are gonna be felt for many years to come, and they could have
Speaker 1: Agreed.
Speaker 0: Impact on the decades to come as well. American base is pulling out of the region. They're not gonna come back anytime soon. It's these such decisions are not reversed. Now I'm assuming this happens.
It might not happen. I could be totally wrong, but I am sure these conversations are at least happening, and that's already dangerous enough in my mind.
Speaker 1: I I think that is absolutely what's going on. And and if we just reverse time and go back to the immediate lead up to this war, one of the things that was going on was that having seen what Israel did in Gaza, and I'm not saying that that the leadership in any of these states wake up every morning concerned about the Palestinians, but they do wake up worried about what their pop and and and some of them deeply care. I don't wanna suggest that's not the case. But they do wake up concerned, what are what are our populations seeing on their social media feeds? Two years of watching a genocide in Gaza, the glorification of violence, the the the religious extremism coming out of Israel, the all the references to Amalek, two years of their populations watching that, the destabilizing impact of it.
And then after that, the Israeli strike in Doha when the Hamas negotiating team were meeting. The fact that just before this war, if we'd have been talking about the region a little over a month ago, we probably would have been talking about the the this heightened tension between The UAE and Saudi. Right? That was the storyline in the, in the beginning of this year. And and you had Israel then goes ahead and recognizes Somaliland.
And that's like, what's going on here? What what is Israel is is and partly in the relationship with The UAE, is is is using this to play an ever greater role in our backyard. And you started to see and I'm not saying it was going anywhere dramatic fast, but it was a new thing when you started to see the Turks and the Saudis and Pakistan and, Egypt and Qatar and even Somalia after that recognition talking and saying, do we have to start thinking about getting our security act together? Because, yes, we've spoken for a long time about Iran, but there's this Israel thing that's a really destabilizing factor. And so, all of those things were happening.
And then in the days before, literally in the days before this war, prime minister Modi of India is in Israel. And Netanyahu makes a speech where he talks about a hexagon alliance with Israel as its center, with The Gulf, with Ethiopia, a strong Israel ally in East Africa, with India, with Greece, in Europe, and and basically, Netanyahu is setting out this vision. And he has subsequently now said, Israel's not only a regional power. It's becoming a global superpower. By the way, I think this is ridiculous overreach for for for a country with the limitations of Israel, and and there are things the Israeli chief of staff of the army has said in the last days, which are relevant here as well.
But, anyway, Israel seemed to be on a tilt towards a regional power projection, and then it pulls America into this war. And now things look very different. So I think The Gulf is has some really hard questions with no easy answers that that are gonna be asked at the back end of this, depending, of course, on on the circumstances when this ends.
Speaker 0: I remember in the early days of the war, I was talking about how the strike in Qatar not early days of this war. Sorry. Early days of this year. I've been talking about how the strike in Qatar is probably gonna shift regional alliances, and Iran is gonna be see, I think Iran and Gulf nations, if I remember correctly, they came together in in in condemning that strike. And for me, the I saw that as the beginning of a of a shift, a regional shift, where these countries get back to becoming closer, and the Gulf countries, including Saudi, the nemesis to Iran, seizes Iran Iran as a potential as a not potential.
As a as a potential deterrent against Israel in the long term. So Iran is no longer is is a rival, but my enemies enemies, you know, what is it? My enemies enemies, my friend or whatever the statement is. Essentially, because of Israel, Iran and Saudi could get closer. However, I don't know what to think of this anymore because now maybe Israel just played their hands so well.
Because now we're in a position where instead of Iran and Saudi getting closer and potentially, forming an alliance eventually forming an alliance or some sort of understanding to improve relations, continue on the deal that China negotiated years ago in improving their relations as well as The UAE and other Gulf countries and focusing more on another threat which is Israel from that possibility a few months ago to now discussing, now talking about Iran bombing Saudi and other Gulf countries including Oman and Qatar and Bahrain, everything's been flipped on its head. I just don't know so like my next question is has the has the position of the Gulf countries changed? Would they prefer to see Iran defanged so that security risk is taken off the table? Because now the image of security in in The UAE and Qatar and etcetera, Bahrain, that image of security has been shattered. The image of security that allowed the world's billionaires and millionaires to come live in those countries, again, I live in The UAE, has been harmed, significantly harmed.
Will it return to how it was? Possibly. But would it require Iran to be a lot weaker for that image to be returned? That is the question I'm starting to ask myself. Because right now, as we're speaking, Turkish foreign minister said that negotiations between The US and Iran have started.
So what I'm trying to understand is how these negotiations would look like and what role, if any, would The Gulf play in this?
Speaker 1: Let me try and unpack some of that because as you remember, China brokered this Saudi Iran rapprochement just a few years ago, and that that brought out into the open a change that was taking place in the region. There became a a relative frequency of interaction. You know, The UAE had always maintained its relations with with Iran. A lot of the business ran through The UAE. Qatar had always maintained its relations The the the you started seeing relatively frequent high level mutual visits, military chiefs of staff between Iran and Saudi.
That was something new. And in the lead up to this, Iran was sitting more often with the GCC, and and partly it was saying, you do you do know that if this goes south, if this if this goes into a hot war that America and Israel launch, you're the home to the bases that are gonna be used for this. You don't want that. Yeah. Now some are looking at it and saying precisely what a genius move by Israel.
It having for years tried to use the the bogeyman thread of Iran as a way of trying to pull countries closer to it. Having seen that that was receding as countries were were were appalled by what they saw in Gaza and what was that doing to their public opinion. And they were in the process of of of of a rapprochement with Iran. It's pulled those it's it's pulled the the ability to define Iran as the common enemy right back to center stage. And of course, what Iran is doing is unjustifiable, is painful when it comes to some of the things that are going on with the Gulf States.
It's certainly not winning any friends. And it has posed this painful question for The Gulf Of should we now be all in with this American Israeli effort? Because geography is everything. And for the Gulf States, Iran is next door. And if it's shown that it can do this, then that supersedes any other consideration.
Geography is also everything because that's what makes it, in some ways, so difficult to, for the American military to achieve an Israeli, what they hope to in Iran. The terrain there doesn't lend itself to this. The ease with which the Hormuz is closed. The Hormuz Strait Of Hormuz is closed. And, of course, Israel is that much further away.
America is even further. America is surrounded by Canadians, Mexicans, and fish. So the the the problem for, the Gulf States is they now have these two terrible options as they see it. That either Iran comes out of this having shown that if it targets them, that's its way of creating deterrence, or they have to actually abandon the American military relationship with nothing obvious to take its place. It's not like China is saying we're gonna be a hard powered global military hegemon.
That that's not the offer on the table because China looks at these things differently, I think, thankfully. Or the other option is, you know what? We just have to hope that America and Israel can finish the job. However and it there are there are reports that that, you know, that's the message that some Gulf states are sending to The US. None of them have actually joined the military effort yet, which tells you something as well.
But if any of them think that that is the answer, they have to contend with the following question. Given everything you've seen so far in terms of American coherence and competence, do you trust the Americans to get enough of this job done for you at a cost acceptable to you? If you've been set back, how much further are you going to be set back? How much worse could it get for you if America gets this wrong and America's got so much of this wrong that I think for most of The Gulf, despite all the anger, the preference is still finish this, and we live to fight another day. Because until now, as they saw an Israel more ambitious, more dangerous, more destabilizing, they didn't wanna see a strong Iran, but they didn't wanna see Iran too weakened.
And this is Yeah. And this is this is now this is now the the the the reality we are in. By the way, Turkey really matters here. For Turkey also, Turkish uranium relations are are prickly. Okay?
They're good, but they're prickly. But for each, the other offers some strategic depth when it comes to Israel, for instance. And I don't think Turkiye wants to see the Gulf move into Israel's, sphere of influence on mass. That only happened with a couple of Gulf states in the Abraham Accords. It doesn't want to see an Iran that is removed from the regional equation because the Turks are playing very close attention to something that that people may not have picked up on, which is what is coming out of Israel in terms of what next after Iran.
And the Israeli system and Israeli political leaders are openly saying, next is Turkiye. Once we're done with Iran, the next question we have to address to ensure regional dominance is Turkiye. So that is also part of a a Turkish effort, and the Turks have been very active diplomatically to say, you know, we understand your anger in The Gulf. We're with you, but let's not lose sight of how we're all gonna have to live together tomorrow. You can't change your geography.
Iran's still gonna be there. If Iran is a mess afterwards, you'll have the chaos. What if there are armed groups in a decentralized state? So you you have to think long and hard about a future neighborly relationship despite everything that's happening right now. And Turkey, for its own interest, doesn't want a a collapsed Iran.
Speaker 0: By the way, in thirteen minutes, Solitia, as we wrap up this interview, the Houthis will be releasing their statements. What do you think that statement would be? There was no point speculating because we're not doing this live. We're gonna be posting it later. So I'll let you
Speaker 1: know what it is.
Speaker 0: Is Israel really a threat? Is Israel, though, a threat to Turkey, genuinely a threat? Because the whole what's next, why is it why does they have to be next? Why? So,
Speaker 1: really, I think that's that's the perfect question because the the thing that that most I don't know whether it upsets or pains or just has me fuming is the absolute abandonment by Israel of anything that be could be construed as a realistic political path. I think what they're trying to achieve is deeply unrealistic, is going to blow back against them very significantly. And you've got political options. Say to the you know, the Americans could have resolved this with Iran if you had a serious negotiating position, and if you had serious negotiators, by the way, without going to war. The Lebanese government has done something unprecedented.
It had meetings directly with the Americans in the room, with Israel. There were options here. Israel rejected all the political options. Syria under Ashara had direct talks with Israel. It was it was ready to reach something that may not have been so popular at home.
An understanding, apparently, nonaggression pact in which the Golan illegally seized and occupied by Israel wouldn't be precondition for a non aggression pact. Israel rejected all of these things. Of course, Israel has rejected any any political path with the Palestinians. So what you have is is a country that, at the moment at least, is high on impunity, thinks it can get away with anything, thinks it can bring American power to to the equation, therefore tilting any balance. And if it looks around the region and says where might the the stop signs be put out, Turkey has to be taken seriously.
I mean, if Israeli officials are now saying Turkey is developing a missile capacity. They're talking about Turkey in the same language they talked about Iran twenty, thirty years ago. Now I'd like to believe that this is a passing phase of that there'll be some kind of realism and pragmatism come into play in Israeli decision making circles. I wish it was just about Netanyahu. It goes way deeper.
The opposition is fully supportive, the Zionist political opposition. The representatives of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel take a different position. But the the the there is a Zionist consensus over this full war, over what was done in Gaza, over Turkiye. And the only way I can understand that is that the outside world has treated this as normal, and therefore, Israelis haven't had to ask themselves hard questions. And maybe they'll have to ask themselves hard questions in the end because of military shortcomings, which is perhaps the most likely thing.
But it it it is avoidable, but not with the trajectory Israel is on. By the way, you have the chief of staff of the Israeli army, which I kind of passingly referenced earlier yesterday telling the government, we just don't have the troops. If you want to carry on full tilt on everything you're doing, there is a domestic issue in Israel about the enlistment of the ultra orthodox. So that's one of the questions. But they're saying, give us more budget, give us more reservists, extend military service, and bring all these people into the military arm who aren't serving.
So one of the things going on is a kind of blame game. And when you're already doing a blame game in the middle of a war, that normally tells you things aren't going so peachy.
Speaker 0: What happens to that Are
Speaker 1: you listening to the Houthis there? Sorry.
Speaker 0: No. No. Not yet. I I said no. Sorry.
I said what happens to Lebanon?
Speaker 1: No. I'm sure you're following this very closely. As you know, there is no consensus in Lebanon on Hezbollah. Hezbollah has plenty of Lebanese who are irate, if not more, his bolas contribution. But Israel, in what it does to ordinary Lebanese people, always ends up making sure that there is a justification for resistance and that that situation is paralyzed.
So what you see now is 1,000,000 people displaced. Israel moving into Lebanese territory, declaring entire areas need to be fully evacuated, targeting not just areas known as Hezbollah strongholds. And by the way, just because it's known as a Hezbollah neighborhood, you know, bomb and destroy the whole neighborhood, but going well beyond that in the areas of Beirut, and beyond that are being targeted. And it seems that that Israel is set set to try and establish a a security controlled zone in Lebanon again. Remember, Israel was there from 1982 to 2000.
It created a a paramilitary force that worked with the Israelis, the South Lebanese Army. So there is serious consideration apparently being given to that. You have Israeli ministers who are saying, well, that's not enough. We need to put Jewish settlement in Lebanon. Lebanon should be permanently annexed.
That's not yet government policy. I'm not sure it will become government policy. And the other part of the story is Israel again has apparently overestimated, the ease with which it can achieve objectives through military means and underestimated what it faces because this has been a bit of a rude awakening. After Israel considered Hezbollah to be a spent force, you see that Hezbollah is not only sending missiles into Israel at a relatively frequent rate, but you also see Israel facing significant resistance on the ground, in the ground operations it's conducting, a whole load of tanks taken out just in the last twenty four, thirty six hours. So why Lebanon has bleed again when there is, you know, there is absolute this is so unnecessary.
It you had a really shitty ceasefire since after the exchange between Israel and and Hezbollah. A ceasefire was in place. Israel was still violating Lebanese sovereign airspace every day. Israel was still maintaining outposts even inside Lebanon. The Lebanese government
Speaker 0: But Hezbollah was also speaking Hezbollah was also violating and still building in in is still mobilizing in the South, rebuilding their presence in the South as well as we've seen they fired rockets from the South at the beginning of this war.
Speaker 1: Right. But what you had was a Lebanese government, which was trying to build a consensus domestically that would make that activity from Hezbollah more and more difficult. Because, ultimately, what you need is a Lebanon that that has a domestic political arrangement that can live with Israel. But for that, you need an Israel that can accept that it can't just dictate to countries. It's a bit like what Trump's trying to do now.
You dictate terms of surrender, but you can only dictate terms of surrender when you vanquished someone. And vanquishing is is a is a very bloody uncertain activity. And so what you wanna create is win wins. And Israel is in the business of zero sums, not win wins. So even when you had a Lebanese government that was trying to create the conditions of greater predictability, in the South Of Lebanon in terms of what Israel on a reasonable day would say was necessary in security terms, Israel wasn't interested.
It was interested in bludgeoning a zero sum, impossible to achieve within any kind of Lebanese domestic political balance outcome. And as soon as it had half the opportunity, it it was inevitable when this war started that it would hit Lebanon, but it shouldn't it shouldn't impact Lebanon in this way. There shouldn't be a million people displaced. That's just again, that is just impunity on steroids. You should not be allowed to get away with that.
Speaker 0: The last thing I wanna ask you about, Daniel, was, going back to Iran. I put out a post today. Let me see if I find there it is. Essentially, I I got a bit pissed off today because I want the war to end. I just it it's a war that really upsets me.
It's a war that I find too so unnecessary. So I put out a pause. I said, I'm pissed. Trump gave Iran a pause on strikes against their energy infrastructure until April 6. So what did Israel do?
They bombed all three of Iran's largest steel plants simultaneously, which are crucial to the Iranian economy. And if that wasn't enough, they also struck Iran's heavy water reactor facility in Kondab as well as uranium production and uranium conversion sites, all on the same day that was yesterday. Why did Israel do this, and was it in coordination with The US? If it's in coordination, it means Trump lied to Iran. If not, then Israel is lying about coordinating with The US.
And if you take into account the reports by JD Vance that we talked about earlier, him being upset with Netanyahu, the report that came out today that he was, I think, yelling on Netanyahu on the phone or upset with him. I think he's yelling at him earlier in the week. I said the following, the conclusion at the end, Israel seems to be trying to sabotage these negotiations, and it serves their interests to do so. Is that a fair deduction? Is it in Israel's interest to sabotage these negotiations so Iran continues to get bombed and weakened?
Or is it in Israel's interest for this war to end as well? Because Israel's getting attacked on a daily basis. You know, a missile barrage of missiles, I don't know how many missiles, probably not many, was fired by Iran on Israel again as we're speaking, and it's happening. You know, it was, like, 12 barrages yesterday, I think it was.
Speaker 1: Look. If you ask me, Israel's interest would be to, desist from running a regime of occupation and apartheid against the Palestinians to to, you know, have a whole different approach to the region when you're a small a small state. You know, I would desist from being a a state based on on on on the ethno ethno supremacist premises. So I don't think the whole approach is serves the well-being of the Israeli Jewish community or Jews around the world. But in terms of how Israel is pursuing this, how Netanyahu and the current establishment and and the logic of Zionism defines that interest, then, yes, it wants America to stay in this war.
It wants America to weaken Iran. And, unfortunately, what we have seen consistently, including in getting this war started in the first place, is an Israeli influence, an American unwillingness to use its leverage. So this idea that the the the vice president of The United States Of America on whom Israel is absolutely dependent and you yell at the Israeli prime minister, It's like the same BS that we heard when Biden was president, and he was frustrated. They kept leaking to the press. The president was frustrated over what was going on in Gaza.
You know what? Screw your frustration. You're giving them the weapons, the political, diplomatic, economic support without which this couldn't go on. There's no such thing as frustration. And what Israel tends to do is it acts first.
It doesn't ask for permission. It just takes the minor slap on the wrist. And what we have seen on several occasions is either rank American negligence that it has allowed these things to go on, or they're playing tag team and America is in on it, but it's it's pretending to send one signal while it's making sure Israel is doing the opposite. Because on several occasions, Israel has raced us up the escalatory ladder. So in terms of who's been you mentioned some of it.
In terms of who's been assassinated, in terms of the first strikes on Iranian oil depots, which were responded to in the Gulf States, in terms of attacking the South Pass gas field where as everyone who's followed anything would know that was gonna be met with a response on Qatari LNG facilities and now these latest attacks. So it is unfortunately not surprising, but
Speaker 0: you know,
Speaker 1: that is why the question is, can Israel be contained, deterred, held accountable? And it begins with The US. And by the way, one of the things that's happening here, which which I think is particularly high risk by Netanyahu, is he he either thinks that, you know what, Tucker Carlson, our unpopularity, the Democrats already wanna distance themselves. So many don't wanna publicly take APAC money. The MAGA base is saying this is Israel first, not America first.
You know what? It's fine. We've got this. We know how to play American politics. Either they are nonchalantly thinking that to themselves or Netanyahu is several steps ahead of the game, and Netanyahu is saying, you know what?
I'm probably losing America. And you know what? America's not the America it used to be. America is a declining there there is not unipolarity. America will not be able to assert its power in this way.
So as far as I'm concerned, I don't really care about America's future. As far as I'm concerned, it's use it or lose it. So I'm gonna use American power for my interest even if I accelerate American decline while I still can, and that strikes me as a likely interpretation of what's going on.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Agree. And the the well, some people link this to the meeting with Modi, inviting Modi to Israel's Israel's beginning of diversifying their dependence on other countries, other superpowers beyond Iran and preparing for a multipolar world. Israel's Israel's been able to to outclass most other countries with their foreign policy and the ability to just, you know, make the most out of American foreign policy and advance their interests at the expense of The US at the world's biggest military, biggest democracy. That's at least how it seems like.
And they could continue doing that. They've been really good when it comes to intelligence, and they've been really good when it comes to foreign policy. I just hope it changes for because the the approval rating for Israel is dropping not only in The US but around the world. India less so than others surprisingly, but in most other countries it's fallen off a cliff. And I'm seeing more and more politician distance themselves from Israel, at least from Netanyahu.
But all it takes is one leader that's more moderate, and we see a massive shift in Israeli foreign policy that will be a better shift for the entire region. But time will tell. But, Daniel, absolute pleasure to speak to you. Thank you for the work you do. Thank you for coming on the show, and I would love to do this again as this war progresses.
Speaker 1: Hopefully, we do it after the war, but but if if if that's the reality we're living in, then, yes, that's the reality. Good to speak to you, Mario.
Speaker 0: Thank you, Daniel.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 The Pentagon is planning weeks of ground operations while the White House says the war is almost over... Trump: "I'm not putting troops anywhere." Rubio: "We can achieve all objectives without ground troops." Meanwhile, the Pentagon is war-gaming raids on Kharg Island and coastal weapons sites that officials say would take "weeks, not months." One source even said "a couple of months." 62% of Americans strongly oppose ground troops in Iran. Republican congressmen who are Navy SEALs are saying no. And Lindsey Graham compared seizing Kharg to Iwo Jima, a battle that killed 6,800 Marines. The most honest quote came from a former defense official: "Seizing it is not difficult. Protecting your guys once they are there is." Every expert says the same thing. You can take the islands. You just can't hold them without becoming a target practice range for Iranian drones and missiles. And 62% of the country doesn't even want you to try. Source: Washington Post Media: @visionergeo
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
If you're still not convinced the reason Trump attacked Iran is energy and China, here's Dick Cheney explaining it in detail 8 years ago in his biographical film 'Vice' Can't make this up https://t.co/xNKJFKunyc
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 THIS WAR STARTED WITH A MAJOR INTELLIGENCE FAILURE Alastair Crooke, former British diplomat, says the U.S. misread Iran from the beginning. He says the expected collapse never came.
Video Transcript AI Summary
- The discussion reassesses how the Iran-focused conflict has progressed since it began, contrasting current dynamics with earlier expectations about an exit ramp or rapid change in Iran.
- Speaker 1 argues that it was unlikely Trump would off-ramp; instead, major mistakes were made in understanding Iran and the war’s nature. He attributes false assurances to Israel’s Mossad, notably David Barnea, who allegedly pressed Washington that Iran was on the verge of a revolution and that a “house of cards” would collapse after a short spark.
- He outlines three U.S. attempts at decapitation-style moves:
1) June 13: the first decapitation strike,
2) January: protests hoped to topple the government by destabilizing the rial and bazaars,
3) February 24: another decapitation strike targeting the supreme leader and others.
He cites Israeli press as saying these were intelligence errors and that there is no sign of Iran’s collapse.
- Israeli public sentiment, per the Hebrew press, is shifting from earlier regime-change aims to pressing Trump to take “Cargilland” (i.e., a new approach or frontline) as the key to the future, implying a pivot in expectations from Israel.
- Trump is described as still seeking an exit ramp, motivated by looming midterm elections and an improving political position, but his chances depend on actions within weeks. Iran has rejected his ceasefire proposals, echoing past patterns where Western talks (notably Wittkopf and Kushner) talked of ceasefires without addressing Iranian demands or broader regional security architecture.
- The speaker notes a recurring pattern: repeated ceasefire discussions that don’t resolve phase two or underlying security concerns, with Iran consistently saying no to proposed ceasefires or terms.
- The situation is set against a broader political backdrop: Netanyahu’s government has reportedly given up on regime change and is considering boots on the ground, with a focus on whether Trump can sustain casualties.
- Military developments cited include:
- An expeditionary military unit expected to arrive soon, two MEUs, and the 82nd Airborne Division, with staging locations uncertain (Jordan or elsewhere).
- The war widening rapidly and becoming more dangerous in the region.
- Regional reactions and potential escalations include:
- U.S. airstrikes on Iraqi forces prompting Iraqi factions, including Ashad al-Hashabi, to threaten attacks on the U.S. and Iran.
- Reports of Iraqi troops massing near Kuwait, raising concerns of a broader sectarian conflict.
- The Houthis (and Hezbollah) indicating willingness to join if attacks escalate, with both already signaling involvement on the periphery.
- The overall trajectory described suggests a move toward a wider, sectarian conflict involving Iraq, Iran-aligned groups, and regional actors, with ongoing disagreements over ceasefires and strategic aims.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: We haven't spoken for a while. So before we get into the latest developments today, I'd love to get your reaction to how the war has progressed so far, and maybe you can compare it to what your expectations were when the war first kicked off. Because I remember in our early discussion, the main narrative was when when is Trump gonna off ramp? How long will this last? Will that will that last more than a week, two weeks, and now we're at day 27?
So we'd love to get your general thoughts on how the war's progressed so far.
Speaker 1: Well, I don't think it was me saying he was going to be able to off ramp. I was probably suggesting the opposite. Yeah. I was suggesting that it was unlikely and that, you know, that there had been major mistakes made in the understanding of Iran and the nature of the war that was being prepared. Particularly, I think we've seen that the Israeli Mossad has put a lot of effort into persuading Trump and Washington that Iran was on the verge of a revolution, and it was a house of cards, and a simple puff of the wind, and it would be all blown down.
David Barnea was virtually living in the White House during this period, selling this version of events. So we've had three tries at this by The United States. The first one was on Friday, June 13, when there was the first decapitation strike, if you like, then. And, it was assumed that would lead to it. Then, in January, we had a second attempt at this.
There were going to be protests, and the protests were going to bring down the government after they collapsed the value of the real to cause disquiet in in the bazaar. And then, now we had then Trump's own effort, this February 24, where he tried to, if you like, have another decapitation strike. The supreme leader was killed, and various other people have been assassinated. Well, those seem to have been major errors of intelligence, because there is no sign, and there has been no sign, and it's not me saying that, but the Israeli press are talking now very clearly that this was a mistake made by David Barnaire and Mossad in their judgment. And they don't believe that there is going to be a collapse in Iran.
And, that there's not going to be, if you like, a toppling of the cards. And so, they are now arguing. And, I'm talking really here quoting the Hebrew press, which we follow very carefully because it tends to be often more frank about how they think. And, the headlines there are that Jerusalem is shifting towards a demand that Trump should take Cargilland, and that this is the key to the future it sees. So there's that's how Israel is looking to it.
They've given up on those those propositions that they advanced to begin with, and are now looking looking to to that. Trump, on the other hand, of course, is is, I think, still hoping that he can find an exit ramp from this. I think the reason for that is that my understanding from the American, my American colleagues, is that really the midterms start really getting serious, sort of, by early summer. People start making up their mind which party they're going to vote for, candidates, right there. It's really starting.
So, he has a few weeks left in which, if he's going to try and recover his position, his political position, because his approval rating is very low at the moment, if he's going to improve it, he's got to do it in the next few weeks, really. And that's why I think he's set a date and said he hopes to have this done by, you know, an exit run by me. However, as I suggested, I think, when we last spoke, Iran has said no, you know, to this idea of a ceasefire. It's not the first time Trump has tried this. It was essentially, you know, what was being done to Russia in the Ukraine context.
If all the talks about cease fire, there were meetings, endless meetings between the Europeans and Witkoff and Kushner for a cease fire and the peacekeeping force who would come after it. But there was no discussion with Russia about it. It was a sort of negotiation amongst themselves. I mean, the West was negotiating. And, of course, it didn't address what Russia wanted, was a change in the security architecture in in the region.
Then we had that with the Palestinian issue too. You recall, I'm sure, the great plan that was instituted by Wittkopf and Kushner again for a ceasefire, And that, of course, what was pretty plain was it was a ceasefire going to be put into effect, and phase two hadn't been designated, hadn't really been thought about. It was just, you know, kick the can down the road to further discussions and negotiations between the mediators and Hamas at that proposal. And now we have the third one, a ceasefire being proposed, you know, maybe a month ceasefire that would take place, and demands being issued, 15 demands by Kushner and Wittkopf, again, being set out on a piece of paper. And, again, with most of those issues being sort of, again, can kicked down to discussions later on.
Predictably, Iran has said no to that. And so, we have to see where Trump will go now. He they're looking at the press, and I'm sure you've been following it very closely because of where you are. But looking at the press, he's saying, well, you know, something big is going to happen. And, by the way, we're still talking to the Iranians, which is not true.
But what does he do now? How does he get out of this? I think he's in a very tight situation indeed. And, as I was hinting there, he may talk about wanting to declare a ceasefire and getting out of it, but out of this conflict. But actually, Netanyahu and Israel has a vote on this issue too.
And it's quite clear from the Hebrew press, they are much more blunt about it, that they have given up on regime change and now think there has to be boots on the ground. And they say, the only question is, can Trump sustain the losses, the casualties or not? Is he capable of sustaining casualties that will inevitably result from one of the several plans that seem to be afoot or being mooted? And don't forget, what are we today? Thursday.
Well, the first military expeditionary unit is due to arrive, I think, in your area tomorrow. I'm not sure the dates of the other parts of it. And then there is also so there are two MEUs, as the Americans call them, and then there is the eighty second Airborne Division. But where that is going to stage, I don't know. Whether it will be in Jordan or somewhere else, I don't know.
But meanwhile, the the war is widening, widening very rapidly and dangerously, particularly in your area because we've had the attacks, the bombings by The US of the Iraqi army. And this has persuaded Sudanese to, say, give a green light to Ashad al Shaabi now to attack America and to attack Iran. And the reports I hear, maybe you have them or have had them denied, but Iraqi troops are are actually massing at the edge of Kuwait at the moment. So what is gonna happen? It it has a sort of feel that we're moving towards almost a sectarian conflict that is becoming much wider.
The Houthis have said they intend to join in if there's any attack. Hezbollah is already engaged in it. So we have Iraq, Hizbullah, the Houthis already, if you like, not in the war yet, but on on the on the edges of it.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇭🇺 EXCLUSIVE w/ PM VIKTOR ORBAN ON THE IRAN WAR If there’s ever a person who can give us insight into Trump’s thinking, and what could and should happen next in Iran, it’s Prime Minister Orban He’s Europe’s longest serving Prime Minister, gone through the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Ukraine, he’s a friend of Trump who also gave him advice before the war, and he’s one of EU’s most respected and powerful voices. I sat down again with the PM to get his thoughts on the current war, NATO’s potential involvement, and whether Trump is prepared for a prolonged conflict. He was brutally honest with me, explaining why he believes NATO should support Trump, and why the war should end soon before it becomes a crisis for Iran, the U.S., and the entire world It’s a delicate line between a success and failure, and we are at that crossroads now We also discuss the future of the EU in a world dominated by the U.S. and China, the impact of the Iran war on Ukraine/Russia, and the repercussions of a prolonged conflict on Europe and the world. The decisions being made right now will shape the next decade. This conversation with @PM_ViktorOrban explains why. 02:10 Destroying Iran’s capabilities could bring peace… or trigger a much bigger war. 03:40 In that region, going in is easy. Getting out is almost impossible. 05:10 You cannot control that region from the air. It doesn’t work. 07:20 My first question is never global. It’s always: what does this do to Hungary? 08:30 Migration from Iran could hit Europe fast… and countries won’t be able to handle it. 09:40 If oil prices rise again, Hungary will take a direct economic hit. 11:20 Europe made a huge mistake by mocking Trump… and destroyed its relationship with the U.S. 12:40 Sanctioning cheap Russian energy was politically crazy. 14:50 Sooner or later, Europe will have to go back to Russia for energy. 16:00 Europe is becoming irrelevant because it’s trying to act like an empire. 18:10 Europe misread the global shift and is now falling behind the U.S. and China. 20:30 The Western elite became tired, boring, and out of ideas. 22:40 If this war ends fast, it will look like a success. If not, it becomes a disaster. 25:00 Thinking anyone can beat China is a mistake. China is unbeatable. 26:20 There won’t be just one global power. There will be at least two controlling the world. 30:10 Europe lost its identity and now doesn’t know what it stands for. 32:20 Central Europe is mentally stronger and ready to rise. 36:10 Mixing civilizations is too risky. We won’t take that risk. 45:20 Russia will reach its war goals by any means. The question is how we respond.
reSee.it AI Summary
I note that a war with Iran could destabilize the South Caucasus, with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey nearby and Russia to the north. Narek Karapetyan warns Iran’s collapse would be four times worse than Syria, bringing more ethnic tensions, refugees, and a shattered supply chain. Trump’s Armenia corridor bypassing Iran suddenly fits this moment. Meanwhile Armenia’s PM jails opposition and targets the church as crime climbs. The interview covers Iran, history, and the corridor.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇦🇲🇮🇷 THE COUNTRY MOST LIKELY TO BE SWALLOWED BY THE IRAN WAR IS ONE NOBODY IS TALKING ABOUT... Armenia is right on Iran's border. So is Azerbaijan. So is Turkey. And Russia is just north. If this war destabilizes Iran, the South Caucasus becomes the next crisis zone overnight. Narek Karapetyan is the Armenian opposition leader (also ahead in the polls) who says what most diplomats won't. Iran falling apart wouldn't look like Iraq. It would be four times worse. More ethnic minorities, more separatist movements, more refugees, and a shattered supply chain stretching from Central Asia to Europe. Trump quietly brokered a trade corridor through Armenia that bypasses Iran entirely. A deal that made little sense six months ago now looks like it was designed for exactly this moment. And in the middle of all this, Armenia's own PM is jailing opposition leaders and attacking the church while drug crime climbs five times over. Narek expects to be arrested within a month. The most strategically important country you're not paying attention to is the one sitting right on the edge of the blast zone. Full interview with Narek Karapetyan below 00:25 Iran Collapse Would Be Worse Than Syria 10:25 Why The Iran War Started 16:01 Armenia's 2500 Year History With Iran 24:36 Stalin Gave Armenian Territory To Azerbaijan 30:36 Armenian Genocide: Every Family Has An Orphan 35:12 Trump's Corridor Deal As Iran Alternative 44:16 Prime Minister Offered To Show Penis To Priest 49:01 Billionaire Jailed For Defending The Church 53:05 Uncle In Jail Told Family "Change Your Tie" 1:01:03 We Expect An Arrest Within A Month
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation centers on the volatile security dynamics in the South Caucasus, Armenia’s strategic importance, and the domestic political tensions surrounding Armenia’s leadership.
- Iran’s regional posture is described as volatile, with reports that Iran struck all its neighbors and Azerbaijan. Narek says there is video and information suggesting rising tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan, but emphasizes that Iran’s current priority is stabilizing its own regime after losing many leaders, and that a military expansion into Azerbaijan would bring a broader regional war with Turkey and a long, bloody confrontation. He argues that a ground invasion of Iran by Azerbaijan is unlikely, noting that such action would provoke a large-scale conflict and destabilize the region.
- Armenia’s geopolitical significance is framed around its role as a buffer between Iran, Turkey, and Russia, and its location on a potential land route between China and Europe. Narek explains that Armenia is the shortest land route from China to Europe, and that the South Caucasus acts as a balancing buffer among major powers.
- The region’s external influence includes the EU, the US (including Trump’s peace-broker role), Israel’s involvement tied to Azerbaijan’s oil and weapons; and Russia’s waning influence. Trump’s mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is described as bringing land and corridor arrangements that are economically beneficial and reduce the risk of forceful redrawing of borders, though Narek notes Armenia needs stronger security guarantees to ensure lasting peace.
- Nagorno-Karabakh history is summarized: Stalin’s border decision placed Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan, which led to a war as Armenian-populated areas resisted Azerbaijani control. After the conflict, many Armenians relocated to Armenia, with only a handful of Armenians remaining in Karabakh, and those who stayed ultimately left. The peace brokered by Trump involved a road within Armenian territory used for economic purposes, with Azerbaijan gaining a road corridor but not sovereignty over Armenian lands; the arrangement is presented as a regional stabilization mechanism that avoids armed conflict for now, yet requires security guarantees to prevent future disputes.
- Israel’s role is described as an influential arms supplier to Azerbaijan, shaping the regional map, while Israel could also help with regional development and technology transfer if the South Caucasus moves toward a broader economic partnership. Narek envisions turning the region into a crossroad for logistics, with Israel contributing technologically to reduce poverty and support economic growth.
- The discussion then shifts to Armenia’s internal politics. The host highlights concerns about centralized power in Armenia and suggests a parallel to other global trends toward autocracy or heavy-handed governance. The focus is on the PM’s strategy to centralize power, including moving to control the church and major national institutions.
- The PM’s actions are described in detail: using government influence to target the Armenian Apostolic Church, insulting church leadership, and pressuring clergy. Four archbishops were jailed; Samuel Karapetian, Armenia’s leading philanthropist and opposition figure, was arrested for six months in a KGB-style basement jail with harsh conditions. The PM is accused of attempting to purge or weaken opposition parties before elections, including arrests of party members on charges that are later dropped.
- Samuel Karapetian’s statements and behavior are discussed: he publicly warned against the PM’s assault on the church and pledged to defend Armenian values, vowing to participate in politics and to resist attempts to curb democratic processes. The host notes that Karapetian’s family, including Narek’s father, might be targeted similarly, and discusses the risk of lawfare being used to disqualify or jail political opponents.
- The interview covers Armenia’s electoral environment: elections are described as free and fair so far, but pre-election oppression is a concern, with opposition leaders potentially targeted ahead of polls. Narek says their party is leading in polls and that there is a risk of arrests to suppress it, but the public is broadly opposed to the PM’s centralization of power.
- On solutions and future relations, the participants emphasize the need for a two-term limit and for institutions to govern beyond any single leader, arguing that a system above individuals safeguards democracy. Narek asserts that a true democratic leadership would avoid lawfare as a routine tool against political rivals and would seek peaceful, institutional transitions of power.
- The conversation ends with a hopeful note on Armenia’s potential as a regional hub for investment and a peaceful, prosperous South Caucasus, as long as democracy, checks and balances, and international partnerships—especially with the United States and Israel’s technology sector—are leveraged to sustain regional stability. The host expresses a desire for continued dialogue with Armenia’s leaders to advance peaceful solutions and investment opportunities, and to ensure democracy prevails.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Iran struck all their neighbors, reportedly also struck Azerbaijan.
Speaker 1: I don't think that Azerbaijan's priority for Iran the first priority is government structure to make it continuously stable because they have lost most of leaders. There's concerns that
Speaker 0: Azerbaijan could be one of the places that troops could amass and enter Iran.
Speaker 1: Attacking Azerbaijan, Iran will get enemy like Turkey, and it will be ground long term war with much more bloody region needs peace.
Speaker 0: Narek, absolute pleasure to to meet you, to speak to you, to be here in Armenia. And, you know, just kind of give the audience a bit of an overview about Armenia. It's a country that doesn't get talked about much except, you know, history, you know, dark history that it's had with the genocide. But it's a country that's so geopolitically important. Iran is just on the border where the war is ongoing.
Azerbaijan is on the other border that you guys have had wars over many years with. Turkey's on the other border. Russia's up north.
Speaker 1: Yes.
Speaker 0: So you and obviously, Trump brokered a peace deal in the region, which we're going to talk about as well. So Armenia is a very important country. And also, you guys, your politics is fascinating, but also very concerning that we're gonna talk about because there's there's a battle between freedom, liberty, conservative values, and me kind of label it as the elites or Brussels. That's how I see it. That I'd love to get your thoughts on.
But Narek, let me start by asking you a question about why is Armenia so geopolitically important in the world?
Speaker 1: Thank you very much Mario for giving me such an opportunity for our country. Our country is one of the ancient countries of the world. The first documentary registered mentioning about our countries starting like 25 centuries ago from 25 centuries like 2,500. And we are in the region that is buffer between these three big powers. The South Caucasus is a buffer between like Iran, Turkey and Russian Federation.
And that's why it's important because Armenia is the shortest way from China to Europe by land or avoiding the south and north logistic trips, logistics ways that are under danger now, under war now. That's why logistically, Armenia is very important for making a very short term short term logistic from China to Europe and from Europe to China, the first thing. The second thing is the balancing buffer in the middle of Russian Federation, Turkey, and Iran. Mhmm. And that's why it's important area for do these two geopolitical issues.
Speaker 0: And you've also got the EU. The EU is trying to get more influence here. I think the the current prime minister is trying to lean more towards Europe as well. So there's all these different powers that are trying to get a foothold here as well as The US. Again, we said that Trump was he brokering a deal that includes a lot of business deals as well that we'll discuss.
I don't envy you guys in the position you're in, very strategically important. But let's talk about what's happening down south and that's the war in Iran. Iran has struck all their neighbors, reportedly also struck Azerbaijan. I wanna get your thoughts whether you think that's true. Do you think Iran struck Azerbaijan?
Speaker 1: We got some information about this. We got video. We know that there are some videos, and we think that it will be more and more bigger tensions. Between the two countries. Between the two countries.
But we hope that it will be peace between them because peace in this region doesn't have any alternative. Even through though we have such a bad history with Azerbaijan, we want them to be in peace with Iran, with us, with neighbors.
Speaker 0: But so you said you have information. What type of information? Information to show that Iran actually attacked Azerbaijan or that some people are saying it's a false flag attack because Iran doesn't have an incentive to attack Azerbaijan?
Speaker 1: I don't think that now Azerbaijan's direction is priority for Iran. Now the first priority is to stay stay stable the of the structure, government structure to make it continuously stable, being stable because they have lost most of leaders of the country and every day they are losing them. That's why the priority for Iran now is to keep the structure of the country to not let the country
Speaker 0: Collapse. You're talking about Iran?
Speaker 1: The regime.
Speaker 0: Yes. The regime we heard today, the commander one of the commanders got killed, Larjani. Larjani? Yeah. He got killed today.
So they're they seem like they're on the brink. But going back to Azerbaijan. So there's and I know this is your neighbor and you guys have a really dark history with Azerbaijan we're gonna get into. But number one, there's a lot of Israeli influence and deals with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan exports a lot of oil to Israel.
So Israel depends on Azerbaijani Yes. Azerbaijan for energy. And Azerbaijan depends on Israel for weapons and technology, which played a role in your war with Azerbaijan. We're gonna talk about. So that's one reason why Iran may strike Azerbaijan, kind of a warning to make sure they don't get involved or they don't keep supporting Israel.
And and this is me speculating. I wanna get your thoughts because you obviously have more intel than me. And the other one, which is a bit more extreme speculation but important nonetheless, is if there's going to be a full ground invasion of Iran, I don't think it's the case but you never know these days, there's concerns that it will be Azerbaijan could be one of the places that troops could amass and enter Iran. So Iran could be warning Azerbaijan not to allow US troops or foreign troops on their territory. What are your thoughts on these two theories?
And do you think one of them is the reason Iran struck Azerbaijan?
Speaker 1: Today's war, that Iran is facing and all the region is facing, it's not war on the ground. It's war mostly like air attacks, etcetera. But attacking Azerbaijan, Iran will get enemy like Azerbaijan or the counterpart like Azerbaijan, counterpart like an ally of Azerbaijan Turkey, and the war will go another way. It will go more, more, more in traditional way it will be.
Speaker 0: So you mean more troops?
Speaker 1: Yes. More troop and more ground forces
Speaker 0: If Iran involves Azerbaijan, then Iran may be facing a new type of warfare which involves troops.
Speaker 1: Yes. I am sure Iran will not do that. Iran will keep the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and will not do that even if it will be some problems, but not not any military troops on other countries. Because Azerbaijan has an ally of Turkey and it will be ground war, long term war with much more bloody. For you to understand, I want to show the difference that Iran war and the collapse of Iran system can bring to all of this region.
Iran has 90,000,000 population. It's four times bigger than Syria. Iran has more religious population than Syria had. Syria was a little bit secular country like at the time war started there. Iran has ethnic more minorities than Syria has.
And four times bigger population, 90,000,000 people. And if instability will be there, long term war will be there, it will all of our region, all of region will face this treat of uncontrolled migration, poverty and groups as well. Yes. Supply chains interruption. It will bring a big damage to Central Asia, to South Caucasus, to Middle East.
Who benefits? I guess no one because
Speaker 0: Except in the region no one. Israel would benefit having a weaker Iran I guess?
Speaker 1: I'm not sure because the now the system in Iran is negotiable. Mhmm. In future when it will be risk of unnegotiable small groups, it will cause a huge problem for any actors. It's not Syria. Syrian crisis, all European we have we see that in European Union there were many, the crisis of migration, the other crisis is that affects and that came from Syrian crisis.
Iranian case will be worse. That's why region needs peace. That's why region needs diplomacy.
Speaker 0: Why do you think we don't have peace? Why do you think we're talking about boots on the ground? What is the reason for all this? What is the reason for the war? I think people are debating that.
I think, obviously, there's one argument that Israel's the reason that they dragged The US into this war. I think that has some truth to it. I also see the strategic value of the Strait Of Hormuz for The US to choke off Chinese oil between that big rivalry between China and The US, which I know Armenia's caught in the middle as well. Why do you think the war started, and what do you think is the objective now?
Speaker 1: The foundation of the war of this war is one thing, the guarantees of security for Iran and guarantees security for Israel. Both countries needs guarantee. Iran needs a guarantee, needs Iran elite so that they need these weapons for making or or they don't say it actually, but they work on it because they need some guarantees for their You mean
Speaker 0: nuclear weapons as a deterrent for any attacks?
Speaker 1: Yes. Israel needs guarantees for this guarantee that has Iran. That's why the only way to go non bloody, to not make this region, to be a big big big mess with like do you remember in Central Europe in seventeenth century it was thirty years war. When war was thirty years it was religious war. And in the end of this war everyone came and diplomacy solved the problem in Westphalia.
We call it Westphalian world. Now we need a new Westphalian agreement, but before the war, before the war is starting to burn all over the region.
Speaker 0: Become more regional than it is now? Yes. You see that's a risk as well?
Speaker 1: The demographic potential of Iran is very high. It's very dangerous.
Speaker 0: How how would it The world how could it become so it's already a regional war. Iran is striking the Gulf. Iran, we just talked about potential strikes in Azerbaijan and even Turkey, and they get missiles to Turkey. So if that's this this does become a regional war, who picks which side? China and Russia will obviously support Iran, a way to weaken The US.
What will Turkish role be? And I know we're talking about a worst case scenario. We both would want diplomacy to prevail, I'm a proponent of diplomacy. I'm a pacifist. But if this does spread, how would it look like, and what is Turkey's role in this?
Because Turkey is a big superpower that people are not talking enough about that has a lot of influence in the region, including your neighbor, Azerbaijan. You have a bloody history with with Turkey as well. And Turkey has a rivalry with Israel, and Turkey's a NATO member. So what would the regional war if it escalates look like, and what would be Turkey's role in this?
Speaker 1: If the war will be will continue, we will have a Persian Gulf logistic chain interrupt. We'll have a Bab El Mande part of the logistic chain of Suez interrupt because Yemen and Yemen is Shias are there and we'll have a long term crisis of logistics all over the Eurasia. It will affect oil. It will affect Chinese trade. It even will affect the Chinese trade through South Caucasus if we don't solve the problem now.
It it will bring a big big inflation for these regions.
Speaker 0: And for the world as well.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Inflation. Is disrupted. Inflation for the world when the economy in emerging markets it will increase the prices, it will increase the poverty, the oil will be higher, the price of oil will be higher. It's a huge depression for the world economy And involving the new powers in it, it will be not directly, it will be indirectly Proxy.
Proxy, yes. It will make it more bloody. That's why to avoid all of this all of parts of the this conflict must start from foundation, from security guarantees. If they have security guarantees, if they solve the issue with security guarantees, we will have peace. Now we will face a long term structure like taking an Iranian government structure under risk, long term attacks on Iran Iranian government pyramid.
If it succeeds it will succeed, Iran will face a problem of, you know, state integrity, the integrity of territory. It will face
Speaker 0: You will have the Kurdish group, the Kurds, the Azeris, Belugi, Belugi, Lurie. Essentially seek their own country, their own state, and that would lead to the worst case scenario, which is the balkanization of Iran, which will be heartbreaking because that would be like similar to what we're seeing in Syria and Iraq.
Speaker 1: Yes. And for my nation, for our nation, despite the all of political systems that were here, that were there, we first, we start to contact with Iranian nation, with Iranian people like 2,500 ago. The first documentary information about Armenian nation is when the king of Iran, Kyrush, came here and deal with Armenian king.
Speaker 0: So you guys have a really long history.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Really long. And we want them to be in peace because of this history. This history has 95% of peace, 5% of not peace, but we have a huge history and with Iranian people we have a friend friendly history. That's why we see we want to support all of this peace.
But we see that the processes is going worse and worse.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Yeah. Israel's role in all this though is really tricky. And the reason I'm bringing up Israel is because you guys had a war, more than one war, with your neighbor Azerbaijan. And the world knows about Armenia other than your history.
They see it in the news with the clash with Azerbaijan and Trump priding himself on being able to achieve peace between the two countries. Also, Putin, who was meant to be a supporter of Russia, who's meant to be a supporter of Armenia, stepped out of this war for various reasons, did not play the, you know, the the broker it previously played. So we have a reality now where Russian influence in the region seems to have wavered. Turkish influence, they're of filling that void, but not on the Armenian side, on the Azeri side, on the Azerbaijan side. Trump coming in, The US now having a piece of the business that's happening here, I'll let you explain on why Trump is involved, and Israel because of the Azerbaijan oil.
I know Armenia doesn't have that amount that oil, any oil really. So Azerbaijan has that advantage and they leverage that advantage to make a deal with Israel. So I wanna start with Israel before going to the other powers. How big of a role is Israel now playing in the region? Does that concern you?
And what do you make of Israel's relationship with Azerbaijan? Because that played a role in Armenia militarily, not achieving what it plan what it hoped to achieve in the war recently in 2023.
Speaker 1: Israel has a big role of supplying Azerbaijan and selling to Azerbaijan some weapons, equipment. And Israel has a role in this region as a main power that is creating the geopolitical map of this region. Yeah. Now. And what we can do in future, what South Caucasus can do.
Peaceful future that we see for South Caucasus is like peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And what can Israel give to this region is the technologies, is the education, and the transformation of Israel's, you know, support, not support Israel's export for this region, not just military issues, not just the issues about attacking or about fighting or about war. It it must be changed to a more economic partnership relationship between Technological. And technological. Yes.
The only country in the in this region that has a big technological potential that can be shared with all of the all of our countries and can be used for solving a poverty problem, economic problem. If we look on the problems in this region with the view of opportunity, perspective of opportunity, not of conflict will gain huge benefits. With Israel we had a story about supplying equipment to Azerbaijan. But we feel that technology and this achievement that this small country could have will help the regional power countries to solve the economic problems, some poverty problems. About our region, it's as I mentioned Russian Federation, Turkey, Iran, they are here.
And
Speaker 0: Scary really. Yes. Israel, Iran, Israel, Turkey, this Trump came in. So I was like everyone, China does a lot of business here and they have the corridor as well. So all these different hands in the region.
Speaker 1: Here and it will help us in another way. I think we think it will help us to become a crossroad for logistics from south to north, from east to west. We will be being a safe buffer in this unsafe region.
Speaker 0: And
Speaker 1: if we solve problem, when we solve problem with Azerbaijan, the South Caucasus will become the only stable zone of this region in worst case. Russian processes in North broke the balance in South Caucasus and it brought war.
Speaker 0: The Russian the Russian influence in the region led to more war, you mean?
Speaker 1: Russian processes with Ukraine. Ah, okay. The war with Ukraine caused decreasing of balancing role of Russia understand. Because there are three powers here. And one of the powers with was one of the balancers
Speaker 0: had an their way to focus on Ukraine.
Speaker 1: Priority? Yeah. Had had
Speaker 0: So who filled that void? Turkey?
Speaker 1: And and Israel. After after, like, one year, start a new war. The new war started here because Turkey's role increased. We need the balance on this region. And Trump's trip project is that the balance can bring which can bring long term peace for our region.
The only thing that we must work on it, it's from to increase the role of US from from weakness to a more guarantor role of the peace. It will bring peace for all this logistic chain and this crossroad that will be most safest crossroad in this unstable region.
Speaker 0: So let's go back to your history with Azerbaijan. Yes. So that one is is again, Armenia has a really complex history. A very old state, a very old country. I think the first country as you said earlier to to adopt Christianity as a state religion or whatever 300 BC.
Now, there's an area, a region called Nagorno Karabakh and that region is technically most of the world recognizes it as part of Azerbaijan. But it does have a very large portion of the population that's, you know, Armenian, Christian, and they've been prosecuted. I think there's videos that went out of people being prosecuted, being murdered, being executed, being tortured. So what Azerbaijan's been what, sorry, Armenia has been trying to do, by the way correct me if I get anything wrong, I'm trying to oversimplify it here from what I understand, has been trying to support this group to be able to decide their own fate if they want to be part of Azerbaijan or wanna be a separate state. And that didn't go as planned.
And with the support of Israel and Turkey and with Russia stepping away, Azerbaijan was able to to to gain a lot of territory in that region in the last war two years ago, and then Trump came in and brokered the peace. So this is my oversimplified understanding of what happened. Did I get it right? And can you add more context to it on the history of this war, but more importantly, what makes it so significant and why how was Trump able to reach a peace deal? And is it over now?
Is that the end of it?
Speaker 1: Territory of Nagorno Karabakh was given to Azerbaijan by a person whose name is Joseph Stalin, with a beautiful mustache but with not beautiful deals, know. And this person gave the Armenian populated territory from Armenian part Armenia to Azerbaijan. There are some there were some differences, cultural differences between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, religious differences. There were Muslim, Shia Muslim people and we were Christians. There were another approach to women rights, and we had another approach to women rights.
I don't want to say who has better, who has more liberal or not liberal or not, but we had another approach to the world, know. And region of Nagorno Karabakh was highly educated. The population was highly educated. And it was given to Azerbaijan and for people to have a high education in Nagorno Karaba, you didn't have chance to have Armenian high education in Nagorno Karaba. You didn't have chance for your religion freedom and the the people of Armenia, Armenian people who were living in Nagorno Karabakh, they were fair for the processes that Armenian nation faced before in Ottoman Turkey time
Speaker 0: Mhmm.
Speaker 1: At genocide time.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: That's why at the part at the time when Soviet Union start to collapse, nationalistic some powers came to power in Azerbaijan, started to came to power in Azerbaijan. The people of Nagorno Karabakh, Christian people of Nagorno Karabakh who had other values than the their neighbors who had good values, guess, but other different values, started to protect themselves from the oppression. And it caused from one week, second week, one month, second month, it caused a big war, Balkan style war. But the end of war was with peace when the Armenian population remained there, they were living there, they organized the structure of a democratic state structure where they changed three presidents. They have four presidents.
At that time Azerbaijan last fifty years, like forty five years from fifty years, two family members are controlling this country. The father and the son of Aliyah.
Speaker 0: Azerbaijan is a country, yeah?
Speaker 1: Azerbaijan is a country.
Speaker 0: You mean is a democracy, not a perfect democracy, but a democracy? Yes. Azerbaijan is autocracy.
Speaker 1: Yes. Armenia has like four leaders. Azerbaijan last fifty years. There is an exception, like five years other people, but forty five years one family is controlling this country. And next twenty years they don't have, I think they don't have any other plans, you know.
They want to continue. There there is structural differences. There is values differences between two these countries. Yeah. And it caused wars.
Speaker 0: Because of whose support? Turkey? Initially Turkey and then Israel or
Speaker 1: I think the structure of the country, the democratic country, priority in our country is the medicine quality, is the education quality, is the solving the poverty problem, economic problem. Priority for them is military dominance in region, military dominance in Karabakh. And a leader who is there last twenty five years, who is leading this country. And our leader that our leaders that are changing because it's democratic country And this is clash of two two like approach to political systems in the world. First is centralized military dominance, one leader.
The second is democratic, more focused on internal problems.
Speaker 0: It's like Europe and Russia kind of a loose example. Russia is very focused on its military, more so now because of Ukraine. Europe is probably too little focus on their military to an extreme where they focus on too much red tape but also the well-being of the country, the state, the medical programs they have. And so you're saying that, I know it's not the best example so I apologize but you're saying that Azerbaijan was really heavily focused for a very long time on building a strong military And that helped them achieve a win, a strategic win or military win when it comes to Nagorno Karabakh. I do wanna ask you about something kinda important as part of the context because the historical part is important, is the dark history of Armenia.
Because we mentioned Turkey a few times Yes. And Turkey supporting Azerbaijan. Now there is everyone knows about the Armenian genocide. They might not know the full story which is a heart breaking story. It was after the World War, the Ottoman Empire essentially killed a lot of Armenians.
Think killed the men and then forced the women and the children to walk
Speaker 1: Yes. Through
Speaker 0: And knowing they're gonna die and the majority of them died just walking in the desert. Can you just tell me more about the Armenian genocide? What happened?
Speaker 1: We as every country who is starting to be weaker, the dark powers in this country, the, you know, the regressive, the most, you know, negatively conservative part of the Ottoman establishment starting to find internal enemy. Because after losing war, when they saw that they are starting to lose war with antanta
Speaker 0: Mhmm.
Speaker 1: They start to look for enemy. They found enemies by Christian minority. They named Christian they appointed Christian minorities to be enemies, internal enemies. Because they said that Christian minority made Ottoman Empire to lose the battles.
Speaker 0: Okay.
Speaker 1: And they started to persecution of the Christian in all over the Ottoman Empire and the most of them Armenian Christians. My ancestors, my grandfathers, and all of like 70% of Armenian peoples that are living in Armenia has one of the grandfather or grandmother who was at genocide time in the Turkey territory, now the Turkey territory. Wow. They came
Speaker 0: The Rimba
Speaker 1: one? Yes. They came here like an orphans. It's a nation of an, you know, where everyone has one grandfather or grandmother that was orphaned after genocide.
Speaker 0: Wow. Reminds me of Rwanda. Rwanda has every single person in Rwanda has a a family member that was impacted or killed Yes. In the in the Rwandan genocide. Yes.
Which is crazy. It's just a it's a country healing, country that's scarred and I feel like Armenia, even though genocide is much older as during World War one, Turkey sorry, Rwanda was in the nineties. It feels like that scar is still there that every person in Armenia has some family member that was orphan orphaned back then. Because so what happening so I got it right. So essentially the men were executed and the women and children were forced to walk in the desert.
Speaker 1: Yes. And the children, they were like dealers of children who sell Armenian children to Armenian soldiers and Armenian soldiers buy these children to bring them to church. And in Hmiazim, it's in the center of Armenia, our church organized a big camp for these orphans. And hundreds of thousands orphans were there. You know all these children who were saved with this this you know process, after all this horrible process, they started a new renew our nation.
Nation. We started from zero. That's why many of them even they don't remember from which part of Ottoman Empire are they from. Many of them like there are stories that one of them was living in Los Angeles, one of the sisters, the other was living in Yerevan. And they met after sixty years.
They didn't know that each of them are alive.
Speaker 0: We've talked about just now the history of Armenia and I think that history is very important to put it into context because that plays a role to this day in why Turkey supporting Azerbaijan, your relationship with Turkey, your neighbor, your relationship with Azerbaijan. It all, you know, the historical context plays an important role even Israel's involvement and Israel's recognition of the Armenian genocide. Now, we've talked about what's happening in Iran, which is really important. And before that, we also talked about the strategic and geopolitical importance of Armenia and and the South Caucasus with Azerbaijan and Georgia as a corridor between the East and the West and even the South. So and lastly, we've talked about the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Now in the war, it led to a peace deal, and Trump was involved in brokering that deal. Why? And how did he do it? What was what was the business benefit for The US?
Speaker 1: After ethnic cleansing of Nagorno Karabakh, when every Armenian were like left Nagorno Karabakh and they How many were they? 150,000 people. Yeah. And all they are in Armenia now without houses. Don't have houses, they don't have jobs here.
Speaker 0: And Azerbaijan doesn't allow them to go back?
Speaker 1: You know, there were 10 Armenians that were in Azerbaijan that decided to Stay. This not this like they stayed there. And after two three years all of them came here too because they couldn't live there. It's like classic ethnic cleansing.
Speaker 0: Ten ten thousand you mean? 10.
Speaker 1: 10 people just from 150,000 people. No. Just 10 people left there. 10 people. Left there and from 10 people all of them came back, came here.
Speaker 0: 10 people out of a 100 and something thousand? Yes. If you want a definition
Speaker 1: of In that, twenty first then this century. Is
Speaker 0: is insane. Yes. The world doesn't talk enough about this.
Speaker 1: Yes. And they are here with, they are highly educated people, they are well disciplined. And you know the crime is very low. You know Yeah.
Speaker 0: Is very peaceful country.
Speaker 1: Yeah. One of the most lowest In
Speaker 0: the world. But this is like you guys just had a Gaza like ethnic cleansing without the massive bombing. So in Gaza everyone's concerned, and me too, that Israel wants to get all the Palestinians out and to take to an exile territory. I'm worried about that as well. Well that literally happened in Nagorno Karabakh.
Speaker 1: Yes. Yes. And they are they are here. We can meet thousands of them. That is crazy.
Yes. And they are, you know, it's very hard for them to start life. They do.
Speaker 0: So what happens to the house? It's gone.
Speaker 1: It's gone. That's it? Yes. And you know, it's not it wasn't a poor region. It it was a prosperous region.
It was one of the prosperous regions in South Caucasus. These people were highly educated and they are here and they start from zero their life without anything.
Speaker 0: Did they coexist with the Azeris in that region or no?
Speaker 1: That part of 10 people were like tried. Yes.
Speaker 0: So Trump came in and brokered that peace deal, which is not the best deal for Armenia. What was in it? Is it that corridor? There's a south there's a corridor in the Yeah.
Speaker 1: Trip, it's not corridor, it's road. Like, it's road in Armenian sovereign territory. And Azerbaijan wanted it to become a corridor, to be to have a non Armenian sovereign territory, like to exclude it from Armenian sovereign territory. And many times Azerbaijani president said that they will take control over this road by force.
Speaker 0: Which is that's a road that's not in Nagorno Karabakh, San Antonio?
Speaker 1: No no no, it's Armenian territory. It's like no one no one. Even he is saying that it's Armenian territory, but we will take control over it. And Because it's important economically for Azerbaijan. Because they like it, you know.
And Because they like it.
Speaker 0: Okay. So how did Trump solve that?
Speaker 1: Trump Trump started to negotiate and he brought to a better condition than negotiations. We can say that it's a big opportunity for Armenia, but we need to have a guarantees, more guarantees for peace. But he brought Azerbaijan to not to use force for this road. And there is written that it's Armenian territory. So it's it's good for Armenia, it's good for region, and they can use the road but it's economically economic project.
And it will be bring peace, but we need guarantees.
Speaker 0: Mhmm.
Speaker 1: Because like after ten years, we can face new new new problems from the Azerbaijani part when they will say that they like another territory, you know.
Speaker 0: Yeah. So you need some security guarantees to make sure this aggression stops. I'm looking at pictures of Nagorno Karabakh. Yes. It's a big city.
Yes. Okay. So essentially now The US has interests in that in that region, that corridor. And because of those interests, you get guarantees that The US will make ensure that Azerbaijan does not and Azerbaijan now you've got a deal with Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan's allowed to use it as well. So all parties there's a deal that all parties are mildly happy with at least.
Speaker 1: It's one of the shortest way from China to Europe. And with this with peace in this region
Speaker 0: It doesn't include Iran.
Speaker 1: It doesn't include Iran. It's coming like throughout Central Asia to Caspian Sea and here. It will be short way, it will be more secure way and that's why for US it's important too to have an alternative logistic chains because the old logistic chains will face problem after this regional wars.
Speaker 0: The It a bit feels like it was all planned in advance. Let's build that corridor. Let's have a deal with that corridor because we know eventually we're gonna have a war with Iran. I know people I'm sure talking about that because the the irony is that we secured that corridor as an alternative to Iran and then we went and now we're fighting Iran and that corridor has now become strategically more important.
Speaker 1: I think I think we came to a conclusion that it's as a political party party member member for of Armenia is not like I can't say it, but we come to a conclusion that is close to reality. Yeah.
Speaker 0: I said it for you.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Thank you.
Speaker 0: Now we've talked about you being a leader of a political party. There's another story that's happened in Armenia. Yes. It's something I've covered from so many years. And now I'm a I'm a big believer in democracy.
I'm a big believer in free freedom and freedom of speech. And I'm critical of centralization of power especially when it starts these lead to to censorship. And we saw that in Europe, you know, I've been very vocal about the European Union consolidating a lot of power and I've been very vocal about it among others, know, JD Vance gave a speech about it. Elon's extremely vocal about it. I've interviewed people from Alice Weidl from Germany, Orban, etcetera that are also critics of that feature, Prime Minister feature.
And I've also covered this in Brazil where it's a take goes up to another level where it's now about more fair. I covered that in The US with Trump. In Brazil, Bolsonaro is in jail. The former president is in jail and the current president along with the justice, supreme court justice, has consolidated power, censored a lot of opponents, and that's something I've been very critical of as well. Pakistan is another level as well.
I've had him on the show, his family, his kids and he's in jail as well. And I fear from the outside looking at what's happening in Armenia, it feels like the same playbook is being used and that's worrying to me. What I've seen is that your uncle, which is one of the wealthiest people in Armenia, maybe the wealthiest, and someone that's loved by the people. I've seen the videos of people protesting when he was being arrested. He made a statement and I'm I'm gonna read out the statement and I'll let you kind of expand on it.
He made a statement in support of the church here Yes. In Armenia because there's a bit of a struggle or disagreements between the church which should have nothing to do with politics, and the current prime minister and his party. And in that power struggle, your uncle, who's now in house arrest, he made a statement after I think meeting church members. He said, a small group having forgotten the history of the Armenian people and the millennia old legacy of the Armenian church has launched an assault on our church and our nation. As someone who has always stood by the Armenian church and people, I will directly I will be directly involved.
If the politicians fail, we will take part in our own way. And that statement has been used heavily against your uncles, gotten arrested for like half a year. I think he's gotten you in custody as well and other of your party members. And I wanna understand that better. So let me take a few steps back and understand what is that power?
What is happening between the government and the church and why? Because the Armenian church not only is it historically so important for the country, it's also very loved by the people. So what's happening? Why?
Speaker 1: In Armenia church is the main one of the main foundations of our identity because of the Christian tradition that kept us to be Armenian. And now 93% of our population are the members of Armenian Apostolic Church. From the like first trimester of last year, like our prime minister started a process, our new we have a prime minister that is he's a fourth fourth leader of our country last thirty years. And as I mentioned, we have a democratic tradition. He started to process to take control over the church.
And he started to insulting insulting the head of Armenian church, the church that has 93% support in our country. Head of our church and many archbishops and many priests. Insulting how? I've seen some of the quotes. It is wild.
Speaker 0: The things I've read, I'll read out some of them and let me know if they're right. One of them he says, don't know the context. He said, taste the government and state in your mouth. The taste of the state will remain in your mouths. Yes.
He also said he will show his penis to the head of church. I'm not making this up. He told a bishop, go back to banging your uncle's wife. He also accused clergy of having bentleys, three wives, four mistresses and a child in every country. His wife called the clergy, quote, the country's main pedophiles and maniacal perverts hiding in perversions in store rooms and closets.
Speaker 1: Know, he's not
Speaker 0: Is that right, first?
Speaker 1: He's not most balanced guy in this world. That's why That is crazy. It's crazy.
Speaker 0: Is But why?
Speaker 1: He What is going proposed to show his genitals to one of our priests. One
Speaker 0: of your priests, priests.
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, priests. Yeah.
Speaker 0: He's the
Speaker 1: leader of the country. He's the prime minister. And after all of this we didn't have any argument, you know, that political leader can do an argument why he's doing everything like this.
Speaker 0: No one could explain the reasoning why. Yes. Because it's like it's so funny. I love dark humor. So for me it's like funny but also just so concerning and crazy.
Because funny because like who says to a priest I wanna show it's like something you I expect to watch in a comedy skit. So Something like Dave Chappelle
Speaker 1: posted it it on Facebook.
Speaker 0: And that's a leader
Speaker 1: read it, you know. It was twenty days, it was shock for everyone and nobody was talking about this.
Speaker 0: Why?
Speaker 1: No any authority, no any Why? Why? Why? They they were afraid of oppression. And Samuel Carapitan, my uncle started started to talk about this.
He said that it's unacceptable. He said that the Prime Minister must stop. You read the text and after that when he said this, I don't know was he was our Prime Minister balanced at that moment or not, but he had three Facebook posts, very insulting posts, and he sent special forces to my uncle's house.
Speaker 0: Yeah. He said, this is one he said to Samuel. He says So this is the quote. He says, so Samuel says, this is the prime minister saying it. He says he will intervene in our own way because that's the quote Samuel Now your uncle I will intervene with you in my own way you scoundrel.
You scoundrel or rather in you. I think from what I read that means I'm gonna fuck you.
Speaker 1: No. No. No. How does that
Speaker 0: what does that mean?
Speaker 1: He say it. I don't know what mental.
Speaker 0: That is mental. I can't believe I'm reading this from a prime minister.
Speaker 1: You know, he's a he has some very interesting quotes too, other quotes too. He sent special forces to a house, but as Samuel Karapitian was the biggest Armenian philanthropist, thousands of demonstrators came to his house. And when they asked special forces do they have order for arresting Samuel Krappitian, the special forces guy said oh no, sorry, we don't have order for arresting him. And after ten hours they
Speaker 0: Is that when there's like thousands of protesters came and blocked the police?
Speaker 1: Yes, yes, yes. And it was like after ten hours they had order, and after ten hours from that they arrested Samuel Krappetian. Oh.
Speaker 0: Yeah. And he was jailed for six months in a really the country's biggest philanthropist, one of the wealthiest people in the he the wealthiest or one of the wealthiest? He's the wealthiest. The wealthy. So the wealthiest person in the country.
He's very relatable. People like him because he's he's wealthy, but when you see him walking on the street, he doesn't act like it. He acts the opposite. And I've met you. I've met his son and
Speaker 1: Yes.
Speaker 0: It's part of your family. You guys are just so casual and chill. And as I said, the biggest philanthropist in the country. Don't know if we can mention this but we can cut it out if not, but you told me earlier the house of the prime minister was actually built.
Speaker 1: Yes. You can tell.
Speaker 0: So the guy that the prime minister jailed that was defending the church actually built the house that the prime minister currently lives in which is just across from my window here.
Speaker 1: Yes.
Speaker 0: Do you understand this is like a comedy show movie and a dark drama series as well?
Speaker 1: You know, he's now he decided to create a like jazz band and he's everyday doing a music show, a live music show, our prime minister, and we have to watch it. Then yeah, he's very interesting leader of country.
Speaker 0: Holy crap. So again, there's a funny sign to it like the jazz one and the house being built. Yeah. And then there's this dark one because your uncle spent six months in a jail. In a jail where I was told the chair is like stuck to ground.
It's like a very it's like a KGB type jail.
Speaker 1: It's KGB basement that was built at the time of Joseph Stalin.
Speaker 0: Holy crap.
Speaker 1: And the the there it looks like the time of Joseph Stalin, you know. And he's he's in a very very small room. He's there is no heating system and etcetera working there like just two months in one year the heating system is working there. They don't have rights to have contact with family members. They have rights just once a month or five minute call a day.
Speaker 0: I gotta talk about this because again, if something we're not allowed to put you can crop out, but your son told me about this meeting he had with his father because you guys are pretty crazy too but in a better way. Can you tell me more what the son spoke to his father about your uncle about? So he had one call and how long? One call.
Speaker 1: Five minute. A five minute call?
Speaker 0: No. Yes. The total meeting between them was how long?
Speaker 1: It was like three hours meeting. One one meeting of four hours. Over how long? Every how long? Every week?
Every month? Every month.
Speaker 0: Every month? One meeting for four hours? Yes. Okay. What what did they talk about?
Speaker 1: After after he was arrested
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: We have made like the all of people from the cities came and it was a big demonstration in Yerevan in our capital. And many people, we were all full of emotions and we were waiting like I was full of emotions too, all of my compatriots. And that day I called, my brother called him and say what do you want us to do to Samuel.
Speaker 0: Samuel is the philanthropist, famous person, the leader of the political
Speaker 1: Who in jail, who is a small room in jail, in worst jail in the country. And we I At that day I told a speech about him emotions and we called him, what you want us to do? And he said, change your tie.
Speaker 0: Change your tie? Yeah. And also I heard that when he was meeting with his son. Yes. They were talking the four hour meeting every month.
You do wanna talk about strategy Yeah. Legal strategy, how to fight this in court, what the political party should do Yeah. Because he's the voice of the political party, what the plan is. I was told they spoke about football for like an hour.
Speaker 1: Yeah. They are talking about like three hours about football. One hour they are like or half an hour there are some jokes and etcetera because
Speaker 0: So how much business do they talk?
Speaker 1: Like twenty minutes about all of these issues. You know why? Because we are sure we are sure we are in right way. We are sure that it's for our values. We are doing it for our values.
But we don't feel, you know, we don't feel that we are oppressed. They they do oppression, but we don't feel oppressed because of
Speaker 0: support of people. But but what worries me, and sorry to be the kind of the pessimist here, is I had a similar conversation to Imran Khan about this and his family. And he's in jail right now, not seeing his family or kids, not getting medical treatment. And I've also had a similar conversation to Harib Bolsonaro. Same situation he's in as well, he's in jail.
So and I'm guessing you guys were offered a deal, like your uncle would have, I'm guessing, been offered a deal. Get out of politics and you'll be fine, you'll do your business, etcetera. And if you stay in politics, you might stay in jail. We'll continue suggested something
Speaker 1: like this too?
Speaker 0: Of course they did. Wow. And this is same. Yeah. They they with the others they did they did with him as well.
Yeah? I'm I'm assuming maybe. Yes. I don't know if you could talk. I'm assuming that that's what happened because that's what happens in other cases because the reason they want your uncle in jail, the reason they're probably targeting his businesses from what I've read as well, this is what lawfare looks like, is because they want to get rid of a political opponent.
And your father I'm assuming in the polls is doing extremely well. Am I right or wrong? My uncle. Your uncle. Yeah.
Is he doing right or wrong? Is he doing sorry. Am right?
Speaker 1: So as we feel they want him to go out from politics. They want him not to defend the church. They want him to leave them do whatever they want with church. But he said no. And he he was in jail, now he's on house arrest.
So but he's are in our way and we continue to say no to them. We must stop all of this process. We must totally stop it because it will bring, it will take under risk our democracy. It will make our country to look like a neighboring country. We don't want to look like them.
Speaker 0: Like an autocracy like Azerbaijan. Yes. So he's centralizing power. That's why he's targeting the church. Because the church could be seen as a as a rival.
Speaker 1: There are two there are two tasks as I The first is to send that he's taking control over the church like in communist way. He's looking like communist leader, you know. He's communist leader but with other geopolitical view. He's taking control over the church. He's taking control over the businesses with his party members.
So biggest businesses post of Armenia, Armenian post, the leader, the director of Armenian post is the member of his party.
Speaker 0: Of the prime minister?
Speaker 1: Prime minister party. The director of the electric network of Armenia is the member of prime minister party.
Speaker 0: So this is a perfect playbook to centralize power?
Speaker 1: Centralize yes. But we didn't have something like this in our history, you know? This like This is
Speaker 0: a threat to the democratic system in Armenia. Yes. Is exactly what's happened in other countries. And your your father, I'm your uncle, I'm assuming, is so he's so there's an election soon, and you have a party. I don't know how you're doing in the polls, but if you guys win, then the person they're trying to jail and trying to get him to fold, your uncle, could end up being the prime minister as well.
Correct?
Speaker 1: Yeah. Is he
Speaker 0: is he running for that?
Speaker 1: He's running for prime minister by polls.
Speaker 0: Now it's starting to make sense.
Speaker 1: By polls, we are leading. The opposition is leading now, and the government is knows about this. The prime minister knows about this.
Speaker 0: So what is he gonna do next? Is he gonna continue targeting you guys? Because you were arrested too, no?
Speaker 1: They came to my house, they wanted to arrest me, and they were in my house with special forces. And after like five, six hours, they released me. Yes.
Speaker 0: I heard a story that when they were at your house to arrest you Yeah. They had to wait like an hour because your wife needed to prepare?
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. It's it's an interesting story. We are our nation is very peaceful, very respectful. And when the special forces came to my house, my wife was in 2nd Floor, and they said that we must we must, like, take control over the house and start to do investigation, etcetera.
And I said that she's preparing and these special forces guys with this all this Musks. Yeah. Yeah. Musks and and and machine guns. They said, okay.
We'll wait. And they were waiting like twenty minutes and they said sorry, can you ask her to finish? I said you can ask and they said no, we can't because she's shouting at us.
Speaker 0: I love your country.
Speaker 1: Yeah yeah yeah. Gentlemen is gentlemen everywhere.
Speaker 0: That's not how they arrest you, that's not what they did to other leaders you know. Arrested Imran Khan in a very horrible way of dragging him public. That's why a lot of people went to protest very heavily. They dragged him in very he was the prime minister of the country, very well respected and very loved, and they kind of dragged him on the street, and then people went out on the streets and and massive protests. So then then but how do you plan to fight this if he's centralizing power and he's not following the the country's law?
Aren't you worried that even though you're winning in the polls, they find a way, a loophole, something they did to you what they did to Trump and others. Either arrest him again, your your uncle, uncle, arrest you again, or find any other way to disqualify you. Is that a worry that you have?
Speaker 1: They can arrest me. They can arrest everyone from our party, but the our population, our people, they don't want him to be a prime minister. They want a new leadership. They want a economic based leadership that will solve the problem of peace for long term, that the new leadership must solve the problem to bring peace to our region, to bring prosperity, new new new contacts with new countries and this is our main goal and our our society is ready for that, is waiting for that. Now we see that this leader is the time that he must decide.
He is going to 100% autocracy that will end, I don't know how, but with known government, known population, known society support, he will not be long term leader in our country. Or he will let us to take part on election, he will be take part on election and do like change the Transition of power. Transition of of power. Because it's institutions. This is we need these institutions to be a prosperous country.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Which path do you think he will take?
Speaker 1: I hope he will take the second path.
Speaker 0: Which one do you think he will take?
Speaker 1: I think he will try the first but at the end he will understand and he will go to second.
Speaker 0: And I'm reading some of the people David Hambarduzumzian Yeah. Who's a candidate who's in jail. Yeah. There is Seiran, Ohanian, Artvik and Arthur indicted as well for what people saying are political reasons.
Speaker 1: For you to understand, the four archbishops were in jail. In our He jailed the archbishops. Four archbishops were in jail. In Armenia, look you have a situation. In your country the drug crimes increased in eight years five times.
Drug crimes in our country increased five times. What to do? Like you have a police, what would you act? How would you act? You will send your police to investigate issues about drug?
Yes, it's a good idea. Do know what he have done? He send them to church. The policeman to church.
Speaker 0: So he's moving instead of focusing on the drug problem, he's
Speaker 1: focusing on centralizing power? Yes. Five time through through the period of his governance, five times increased the drug problem. And he's fighting with priests. The priests that are very modest, humble people, they are like when you talk with them, they are the most kind people in this world, know.
And I don't know why he's going this way.
Speaker 0: Sounded like get me worried I'm even in this country considering how aggressive he is. That's concerning man. I really considering how important Armenia is for global peace, the South Caucasus, how big of a role it plays linking the South, the East and the West and the North, you know, the entire world kind of through that big corridor. And the importance of it as an alternative if Iran continues to become to continues to destabilize. Also adding your dark history as well and what Armenia has been through historically, And how incredible you are as a people.
The fact that you're even though poverty is pretty high in the country, you're in the top 10 most peaceful countries in the world. And seeing you guys, and I've never met the prime minister, I'd love to sit down with him. He seems like a crazy guy and I'd love to have a conversation with him. But having conversation with you guys is very, very down to earth people, and your uncle seems even more down to earth. And I've heard stories of jokes he's made, etcetera.
Think his lawyer told me that, you know, the lawyer is usually meant to be the person that calms the client. And the lawyer is like, angry, what's happening? What's going on? What are we gonna do? And then your uncle, someone's like, don't worry, it's gonna be okay.
So he's just that type of person which is As beautiful to an outsider, as someone observing obviously, I really hope the best for Armenia. I really I'm a believer in democracy and I really hope this prevails in the country and the people get to choose what they want. But Narek, I really enjoyed this conversation.
Speaker 1: You've Thanks, been so
Speaker 0: hospitable my visit here and you know, was so nice to learn more about the country and hopefully next time we meet, that will be under better circumstances. Maybe we can sit down be you and the prime minister.
Speaker 1: Next time, we'll discuss investments from US and Armenia.
Speaker 0: That will be
Speaker 1: much
Speaker 0: And
Speaker 1: I think our friends like your friends, our friends will be part of all of these investments in our country because it will be a country of business, it will be country of opportunity.
Speaker 0: The Singapore, Dubai of the South Caucus.
Speaker 1: Yes. Yes.
Speaker 0: Potential. Dubai positioned itself Singapore before as a place where Yes. Russia, Russians, Ukrainians, Americans, Chinese all come in one place like a melting pot. Excellent. And this is what you wanna what Armenia would like to be.
Yes. It'd be beautiful to see that. Narek, absolute pleasure. Thank you so much for your time.
Speaker 1: Thank you, Mario. Thank you very much for giving me such an opportunity.
Speaker 0: Narek, we we just finished the interview, and your lawyer said something shocking to me, but you you guys are just so used to it, that I'm like, we should say this on camera. Can you repeat or actually, let me repeat what he said. He goes to me. He's like, I'm like, I hope you guys don't get arrested as a joke because you guys are such kind people. And then your lawyer said, no.
Narek will probably we know he'll be arrested in a month. I'm like, what do you what do you mean you know that? Can you explain what that statement means?
Speaker 1: In our country, usually the political actors who is who is making our prime minister to be nervous, they are going to jail. And by polls, they saw that our party is going to win the election. That's why there are some information, and we know that they are preparing to arrest some of the members of our party to not to let us to take part on free election, to take part of elect a pre election period like processes. Including you? Including me.
Speaker 0: You're the leader of the party?
Speaker 1: Samuel Karapitan is the leader of the party. Yes. I I am one of the members of the party and one of the leaders. Yeah.
Speaker 0: The vocal ones Yes. While the uncles and house arrest.
Speaker 1: Yes. Yes.
Speaker 0: So But what charges? When you say arrest you, based on what charges?
Speaker 1: You know, they can charge is not so important because as as we saw, they they are taken to jail. Three, four months is going the process, and then they say that there is no any charges, but you are in jail. So they make you to be far from your processes, from your mission, from your house, from your family, but nobody has any Sorry. One more time. Yeah.
Can I can I repeat?
Speaker 0: You can repeat it or if you just say the word, it's fine. Yes. If we see translation, it's fine. But yeah, go ahead, can repeat it, of course.
Speaker 1: Usually usually, they take people to jail. And after four or five months, they say that there is no any charge.
Speaker 0: The legal system allows you to jail someone for a period of time without charges.
Speaker 1: Yes. There is a charge, and they said that the charge
Speaker 0: Will be dropped. Yes. Okay. So that's their strategy. You think they'll do that before the elections to get you in jail before the election?
Speaker 1: Yes. Yes. We think that it will be like
Speaker 0: What's your solution to that if that happens?
Speaker 1: We are ready for it.
Speaker 0: So you have enough members where someone else will just
Speaker 1: take Yes.
Speaker 0: Yes. They can't jail everybody.
Speaker 1: Because can't jail all our society because most of our members of our society is against the prime minister's politics.
Speaker 0: And the elections are free and fair in Armenia? Are you worried
Speaker 1: about election interference? Are free. Elections are free in Armenia till this day. We had the free elections.
Speaker 0: So no no worries about election interference like we see in
Speaker 1: No. No. No. We can have a pre election a pre election oppression. Many of local leaders who is opposition minded.
They can be taken to jail, but the election period is fair. It was fair till this election.
Speaker 0: What would so if you or your uncle if you guys gain power and you become prime minister, your uncle becomes prime minister, what happens then? How well do you know the prime minister Nikol Pashinyan? How well do you know him? Is there I'm always a naive person that always wants people to kinda meet and find a diplomatic solution to everything. You know, I remember saying the same thing about Pakistan.
Like, I just meet, find some sort of deal that might not be perfect. Have you guys discussed some sort of deal with Nicole Pashinyan, and what would things look like if you guys gained power?
Speaker 1: The strength of politician is to be to to see far from his nose, far to be up from his head, let's say something.
Speaker 0: You mean to be above vengeance? Yes. Okay.
Speaker 1: You if you want to have a country, to have a state that has an institutional fund foundation, not your will, my will, not every state leader be jailed in future, you must not do what he has done.
Speaker 0: So you're saying that the law fair that you're facing is something that you will not be doing when you're in power?
Speaker 1: Will not do that. It's a strength of a true politician not to do that for creating a real long term sustainable democratic country with institutions that are like changing changing heads of government and institutions that are working beside the name of the governor, beside the name of the prime minister. Systems above people? Yes, sir.
Speaker 0: Okay. And also as part of your values as a Christian as well.
Speaker 1: Yes. We think that if you are doing this, you are you are opening a door when there is no end, you know. Every time, every next leader will take to jail previous leader.
Speaker 0: Yeah. So you then You you make it the norm where lawfare becomes part of what makes the country, and that's what leads to autocracy, to keep it
Speaker 1: as a democracy. And what is very important for us too, we want to set the two terms period in Armenia.
Speaker 0: What's the term of the prime minister now?
Speaker 1: There there is, like, he can't be prime minister till the end of his life. Oh, there's no term limit? Like, no term limit.
Speaker 0: He is Like, in The US, you can only be for two terms?
Speaker 1: Yes.
Speaker 0: Each term, how long does the term be? Four years? Five years.
Speaker 1: Five years. Yeah. And here, this is a big problem. We need to make a two terms period because for democracy, for sustainable democracy country, democratic country, we need two terms.
Speaker 0: I share a hundred percent two term limit. I share your value so much. You're literally talking about the things I talk about publicly all the time. I'm a believer in democracies. I believe in term limits.
I believe in systems above people. Even if the leader is really good I've always said this. If a country has a really good leader, perfect. But what happens when the leader either gets corrupted, you know, power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely. Yes.
Or the leader is replaced by someone, you know, Marcus Aurelius was a great leader. His son was a horrific, brutal, horrible leader, destroyed the empire, that's the problem of autocracy. When you have systems, it's checks and balances, so no human with their imperfections as a human has power. I share your values, absolutely share your values.
Speaker 1: And as you told the greatest Roman emperors like before, Marcus Aurelius, were like Tiberius, and the other emperors that gave the the next emperors were not from their family, they knew people, the best from senate. Mhmm. And it was like the history named them four brilliant emperors. This period ended with Marcus Aurelius and his because his son was inherited the throne.
Speaker 0: Very good point. That's a very good lesson from history. When leaders were chosen based on a meritocracy who's best at being the leader
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 0: The the empire flourished. When a leader gave the authority to his son, an epitism, the empire collapsed.
Speaker 1: Yes.
Speaker 0: That's a really good example. I will my as an observer, as a foreigner who loves Armenia, who loves democracies, you know, again, I hope you don't go to jail next month. That's number one. You're such a kind person pulling politics aside. I hope Thank you very much.
No one in your party members go to jail. I hope, you know, Nicole Prime Minister Nicole Bashinyan, some some deal is reached, some agreement to allow democracy to prevail peacefully and now again I'm an observer so I'd love to sit with him and have a talk with him the same way we had a discussion because I really would love Armenia to become the divine of the South Caucasus. Think it has that potential. But again, thank you for coming back to doing that little clip because I really don't want you to go to jail in a month. I really don't want you to.
Speaker 1: Thank you very
Speaker 0: much. Absolute pleasure. Thank you. Thanks.