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reSee.it AI Summary
I’m following Aaron Maté’s argument that Trump signed two documents in one month that cancel each other out. Clause one of the MOU calls for a cessation of hostilities “including in Lebanon,” yet a later US-brokered Israel-Lebanon deal excludes Hezbollah and lets Israel operate until disarmament is “finished.” Maté sees the same pattern in the Omani corridor and predicts Washington may ultimately walk away, conceding only the strait.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷🇺🇸 Trump signed two deals in the same month that cancel each other out, and the ceasefire may keep collapsing for exactly that reason Aaron Maté called it in writing the day the MOU landed: this was a pause. His case rests on the paper itself. Clause one commits both sides to a cessation of hostilities "including in Lebanon." Weeks later, Washington brokered a separate Israel-Lebanon deal that excludes Hezbollah entirely and lets Israel keep operating until it judges the disarmament finished. Two American-backed documents, he argues, in direct contradiction, and the strait fits the same pattern: nothing in the MOU gives the US a role in Hormuz, so every push down the Omani corridor reads in Tehran as a grab at the one lever keeping it safe. His endgame map has three exits. Full war, which he doubts before the midterms. A genuine peace deal, which he can't see this Washington signing. Or the likeliest: Trump walks away, conceding only the strait. And his math on that concession turned my head. After hundreds of billions in damage, Iran mostly wants to rebuild and be left alone, and the toll revenue funds exactly that. The detail that lingered: at the NATO summit, Trump sat beside Syria's president, whose old nom de guerre honored his family's roots in the Golan, and touted having recognized Israel's hold on that very ground. @aaronjmate
Video Transcript AI Summary
Debate focused on ongoing uncertainty around Iran, the status of any ceasefire, and the MOU’s ability to withstand clashes. One speaker said the situation is less about Israel than about Trump “dragging himself into war,” arguing the MOU was designed to fail because Trump negotiated a “pause to the war, it’s not peace.” They pointed to contradictions between MOU language and subsequent actions in Lebanon, and described how Iran’s leverage centers on control of the Strait of Hormuz to limit global shipping and impact the economy. The speaker said the MOU’s text assigns responsibility to Iran to set up a mechanism, yet the U.S. chose to send ships through the Omani-controlled part of the strait, leading Iran to fire at those ships to assert control. They then said Trump used the attack as an excuse to declare the ceasefire over, reimposing sanctions on Iranian oil exports and threatening additional strikes on Iranian infrastructure.
The conversation also addressed who bombed Iran the previous day. One participant suggested Bahrain and Kuwait, while noting the information is publicly available but unclear and reportedly kept discreet; they also floated the possibility of involvement by the Americas.
Turning to Syria and Hezbollah, the discussion asked whether Trump might move against Hezbollah and whether Trump, Erdogan, and F-35s are connected. The speaker argued that, even if Al-Sharaa is in power partly due to Israel, Al-Sharaa has reasons not to help against Hezbollah, including Israel’s prior bombing and destruction of Syria’s military assets. They also described an alleged humiliation involving Trump bragging at a NATO summit in Turkey, including references to recognizing Israel’s theft of the Golan, which the speaker said is personally humiliating for Al-Sharaa given Al-Sharaa’s name and origins.
The debate shifted to terminology such as “terrorist” and “terrorist groups,” with one speaker referencing a historical State Department document that described Syria cooperating with the U.S. against Al-Qaeda while a “problem” was that Assad did not take action against Hezbollah and Palestinian groups fighting Israeli occupation. They connected regime change spending to installing a former Al-Qaeda leader.
Regarding the MOU, one participant argued it may not be dead and that the current situation could be “bickering” over a key clause related to Iran not controlling the Strait of Hormuz versus American efforts to extract a concession. They said escalation risks exist, but argued the U.S. and Trump cannot afford a full-blown war. The other speaker outlined three options: full-blown war (unlikely), a U.S.-Iran peace deal (not seen as likely under Trump), or Trump walking away—requiring an eventual concession related to Hormuz. They added that each week brings flare-ups and threats to civilian infrastructure, while Iran’s missile capacity could target Gulf state infrastructure.
A CNN report was cited claiming satellite images show Iran rebuilding the Talekhan II nuclear site in Parchin, with the roof’s holes allegedly fixed after being previously covered with sand by Iranian military engineers. The speaker tied this to the MOU’s nuclear language, quoting: “Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program,” and described the clause as vague.
Finally, the discussion covered the NATO summit in Ankara and whether Trump’s closeness to Erdogan relates to F-35 approvals amid Israel-Turkey tensions. One speaker argued Israel needs enemies, suggested Israeli political rhetoric may be bluster, and said if Trump wants F-35 sales to Turkey, Israel would not be able to block it. The conversation ended with Lebanon, where one speaker said Lebanon is “pretty screwed” and linked the outcome to occupation and land theft policies, arguing Hezbollah’s support in Lebanon will persist because it has a sizable parliamentary bloc and a strong base of support, despite the population paying a huge cost.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: What the hell is going on? War, no war, ceasefire, no ceasefire. Yesterday, someone was bombing Iran. No one knows who it is. Strait of Hormuz closed, not closed. Less ships are going through. Oil is still low. What is going on? Are you still worried Israel could drag the US back into war? It's the most specific question. And do you think that the MOU will be able to survive the clashes that we're seeing right now?
Speaker 0: Forget Israel, I'm worried Trump will drag himself into war. He set himself up to fail. I mean, he negotiated this MOU, and when he did that, I immediately wrote an article saying that this was a pause to the war, it's not peace. And the reasons were obvious that, you know, for Trump really to make this a peace deal, he'd have to discard not only his own policy, but decades of US policy towards Iran, recognizing its sovereignty, letting it have an economy, giving it a chance. lifting all these crippling sanctions. And the US won't do that as long as Iran retains its posture of supporting groups in the region that resist Israeli aggression, which Iran is not going to give that up. And so therefore, the US is not going to give up its traditional confrontation towards Iran. So this was designed to fail. And just to cement that, so Trump signs this MOU. And I know you and your guests have talked about this. But he signs this MOU. The first clause says, a cessation to all hostilities, including in Lebanon. And then what does he do? He pushes through a deal in Lebanon that's at direct odds with the first paragraph of the MOU, because his deal in Lebanon excludes Hezbollah. It's between the Israeli government and the Lebanese government. And it basically says that Israel can do whatever it wants inside Lebanon until it decides to leave, until it decides that Hezbollah is disarmed. So he signs two deals, Trump does, that are directly at odds. And then you have the state of Hormuz, where Iran has realized that the only way for it to get the U.S. and Israel to stop attacking it is if it can control the state of Hormuz. That's its main point of leverage because it can do serious damage to the global economy by limiting the passage of ships. So you have the MOU addressing that. And if you read the text, I mean, this depends how you interpret the text. There's certainly nothing in there about the U.S. having a role in the Strait of Hormuz. It talks about Iran being responsible and setting up a mechanism. And what does the U.S. decide to do? They decide to send ships through the Omani-controlled part of the Strait. And so predictably, Iran, knowing that this is the only form of leverage it has, and if it loses that, it's going to make itself vulnerable to continued Israeli-U.S. attacks, it fires at these ships try to assert the control over Hormuz that thought it had under the MOU. And what does Trump do? He then uses that as an excuse to say that the ceasefire is over. He's going to reimpose the sanctions he had briefly paused on Iranian oil exports and threatening to bomb more of Iran's infrastructure. So Trump has set himself up to fail here. So it's no surprise that we're back in this situation.
Speaker 1: Who do you think bombed Iran yesterday? Do you think it was Bahrain and Kuwait? Have you been keeping up with those developments?
Speaker 0: Not my forte. I mean, what do you think?
Speaker 1: I think it's Bahrain and Kuwait. But it's just such a, I'm not, I haven't had a chance to check, talk to anyone because it's just doing so many interviews. But just from the publicly available information, or it could be the Americas, but why would they keep it so discreet and deny it? It's a bizarre thing. It's a very, very bizarre event. But let's go back to something, your forte. Al-Sharaa. Please tell me you don't think that he might actually go on against Hezbollah. Because there's a lot of people connecting Trump, Erdogan, F-35s. And one of the things that Erdogan will do for Trump is to do what Trump has been advocating for for a while and even said that al-Shara'a agreed. But al-Shara'a said to the Lebanese he won't do, and that is to the Syrian president going into Lebanon to fight Hezbollah, which means the destruction of Lebanon and the destruction of Syria through another massive civil war in both countries.
Speaker 0: Well, funnily enough, You know, even though I think al-Shara is in power, in part because of Israel, because the dirty war that installed al-Shara in power, it was waged to weaken the acts of resistance, to, you know, take out Syria, which is part of the acts of resistance, and to bleed Syria's allies, Hezbollah and Iran. Hezbollah especially, which entered the Syria war and, you know, took a lot of hits and made itself more vulnerable as a result of being in Syria. So the irony, so even though al-Shara, I think, is in power in thanks partly to Israel. And in fact, after Assad fled, Benjamin Netanyahu went into Syria and said, we deserve credit for regime change. Now, though, al-Shara can say, or he can actually blame Israel if he wants an excuse to not go after Hezbollah. Because what did Israel do after Assad fled? It went on another bombing spree of Syria and wiped out all of its military assets. which now gives Alshara the excuse to say to Trump, listen, I'm sorry, I'd love to help you out against Hezbollah, but I can't because Israel, your ally, destroyed all of our military infrastructure. And that's because Israel can't tolerate any neighbors having any military power. It wants everyone to be weak and divided. And that's why it fueled the Syria war. You know, it didn't care about Assad or Alshara or any faction one way or the other. It just wanted chaos everywhere. And it got that. And then it rewarded Alshara, even though it helped him get into power by blowing up so many of his military assets. So, no, I don't think Syria is in a position, even though it might want to settle the score with Hezbollah, because, you know, al-Shara's al-Qaeda forces were opponents of Hezbollah during the Syria war. They're not in a position to. And it's just humiliating for al-Shara to sit there and listen to Trump talk about them as if they're his proxies, saying, you know, they should go in and fight Hezbollah for him and for Israel. And he also insulted al-Shara. by bragging in front of him. This was at the NATO summit in Turkey this week. They're sitting there together, and Trump is bragging about how much he's done for Israel, including recognizing Israel's theft of the Golan. And for Alshara, that's a particular humiliation, because what was his name before he was named Alshara? He called himself Muhammad Al-Jalani, which means from the Golan. It's a tribute to his family being from the Golan Heights, which Israel stole. Oh, shit. I didn't know that. Trump there sits next to him and brags about how he gave alshara's family namesake the golan heights to israel but that's what happens when you take the side of the us in a dirty war i mean alshara came to power they ousted assad who they really hated but the price of that was now being insulted by trump uh and being deemed to be a proxy to the point where trump can talk about how he wants you to go in and do his dirty work for him in israel yeah it was a pretty small cost for someone that was leading a group a terrorist group to now being on the international stage
Speaker 1: with the president of the United States. So I think he's gone a long way.
Speaker 0: And by the way, you know, the irony here, you know, this week, what did Trump do for Al-Shara? He removed Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. And it's just the irony of you're going to install a guy who's the founding leader of Al-Qaeda in Syria and a former deputy leader of ISIS. And after he comes in, you're not going to remove Syria from the list of countries that sponsor terrorism. terrorist groups when it's led by a guy who formerly led the Al-Qaeda franchise of Syria and was a part of ISIS when it was in Iraq fighting and killing U.S. troops. It shows how meaningless the term terrorist is.
Speaker 1: Terrorist, exactly, exactly. Like what bothers me from this, my learning lesson is not removing Syria from a terrorist group or, you know, saying al-Sharaf shouldn't be president. We'll see. Let's see what he does next. I think we should dictate his actions, not his past, even though we could be very skeptical. my concern when we see things like this is the word the use of the term terror group or terrorist i just think it's been something that applies as isis being the perfect example but it's just been weaponized so much it's become meaningless just like when when israel calls someone anti-semite yeah well yeah i mean what it means now is that syria is no longer in the camp that resists u.s israeli aggression so therefore they're no longer terrorists hezbollah which resists israeli aggression they're terrorists because they resist they're fighting for
Speaker 0: national liberation. In fact, I recently read about this. There was a State Department document from a few decades ago in the early years of Assad's rule, and it pointed out that Assad was cooperating with the U.S. against Al-Qaeda and even helping to stop Al-Qaeda forces from crossing the border from Syria into Iraq. So it said that Syria under Assad was providing beneficial cooperation against terrorism. But there was a complaint. Assad was not taking action against Hezbollah and Palestinian groups fighting Israeli occupation. And that was a problem. And that's why he had to be a regime change. And that explains why the US then spent billions of dollars on the sturdy war and they won. They just happened to help install former Al-Qaeda leader into power.
Speaker 1: The irony. Let's go back to Iran. don't know i'm i'm not as optimistic as i was before but i was pretty confident that what we're seeing right now is not the death of the mou or the end of the ceasefire which is what trump trump said both these things that the mou is dead the ceasefire is over um but i think this is trump being trump again and we should never you know ignore what he says and look what he does there's negotiations that will happen in a few days the strikes happen for two three days to try to force around to stop controlling the shadow home was um i feel like this is Just them bickering, and that's how geopolitics works, especially after war, them bickering about a very important clause, Iran not trying to control the Strait of Hormuz. We know they control it, but wanting to charge a fee at the Strait of Hormuz, and the Americans trying to get that concession from them, because that would be beyond humiliating for them. And I'm sure American allies are pressuring Trump not to allow them. So I think if this is the case, eventually one of them will blink, and that will be the end of it. One would hope, because there's always the possibility for the escalation trap. But I think, I know the MOU is just a framework. It's not really an agreement. It's very vague and that causes a lot of issues. But I still think what's more likely than not is an agreement, not an agreement, either an agreement or just Trump walking away, but an end of full-blown war because just very simple terms, reality is reality. Trump cannot afford it. The US cannot afford it. Munitions, oil, economy, the allies won't like it. The military stretched thin. Iran, you can't beat them militarily. The list goes on and on.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I mean, there's three options as I see them. As you just said, a full-blown war, which I strongly doubt will happen. I mean, maybe after the midterms when Trump doesn't have to worry anymore about election chances. Maybe then. But I want to be optimistic and say that a full-blown war is not going to happen because Trump tried that. It didn't work. And Iran has shown it can exert its leverage on the state of Hormuz. So hopefully that's not even an option. So then that leaves a peace deal between the U.S. and Iran, which... i just don't see happening i don't see happening under trump i mean um trump would core up the jcpoa and went to war twice against iran and calls its leadership scum as he did this week i just don't see that and he's surrounded by hawks who hate iran who want regime change the idea of them you know signing an agreement with iran recognizing its sovereignty letting it have an economy that that can meet the needs of its people uh i don't see that so I think the third option is most likely, which is just walking away. Trump walks away and he'll have to give up on the city of Hormuz. That's the one concession he'll have to make. But if you think about it, it's not that much of a concession. He caused hundreds of billions of dollars worth of damage to Iran. They're in trouble. They're going to be weak for a while. They're going to be struggling at least for a long time. So in terms of like Iran being powerful, he doesn't have to worry about that. He has to just worry, you know, like what they want to do is to rebuild and be left alone. And they're not going to give up the Soto Formos because A, that helps them raise money for reconstruction. And B, it helps ensure that they're not attacked anymore. So that is the one he'll have to give up on and walk away from. And even that, I mean, he's showing right now he's not willing to do that. But how long can he keep this up for? Every single week you have these flare-ups, these bombings. He's threatening civilian infrastructure. Like this week he threatened the water... desalination plants, but he knows what happens if he does that. Iran still has significant missile capacity and they will target the civilian infrastructure of the surrounding Gulf states. And can Trump really sell them out more than he already has? He's already put them in a terrible position, but they have leverage over him. I mean, they've invested a lot of money in Trump Inc. So I just don't see him selling them out to that degree.
Speaker 1: Funny enough, a report just came in now. CNN has released exclusive satellite images. Let me send it to you, Stephanie. You can show it to the audience as well. Showing that Iran has already started rebuilding the Talek Khan II nuclear site in Parchin. Talek Khan II is a heavily fortified, high-explosive testing chamber suspected to have played an important part during Iran's covert Ahmad nuclear weapons program in the early 2000s. It was rapidly expanded before the recent war. So this is a pretty big, this site was buried with sand by Iranian military engineers shortly before the attacks, attempting to protect the internal structure from severe damage. It seems all three holes in that roof have now been fixed. That's a big middle finger when you're building a nuclear weapons, when there's, one of the concessions we accept the Iranians to do is to give up some nuclear concessions. Like the only thing the Iranians could do and would do would be willing to do some nuclear concessions for the right concessions from the U.S. in terms of sanctions and the unfreezing of assets. And I think part of the MOU as well, doesn't it say that the nuclear facilities will remain as they are? I asked people to fact check this, but I thought that was part of the MOU. Not sure if it's part of the final draft. Let me check. So that, but that's, I know the U.S. already breached like half of the MOU as well. But I think the... The MOU, I'm just trying to find it now. Yeah, it doesn't say no. Oh, no, there it is. Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program. So it's very vague. This is a problem with the MOU, which you've been talking about. It is very vague. Anyway, let's go back to another topic I want to ask you about is the Turkey visit, the NATO summit in Ankara. We talked about him humiliating Alshara, but what about him getting closer and closer to Erdogan considering the approval of F-35s while Smotrich talks about imminent war between Israel and Turkey and Netanyahu goes on a press tour saying how Turkey cannot have F-35s. How meaningful is that if Trump does end up giving F-35s to Turkey, which is looking more and more likely?
Speaker 0: Well, Israel just always needs an enemy, no matter what. I mean, they're incapable of being a normal functioning state. So
Speaker 1: David Plylar, Jr.: Even if Netanyahu is no longer Prime Minister?
Speaker 0: David Plylar, Jr.: Even if Netanyahu, yeah. I mean, one of his opponents, Naftali Bennett, he's also vowed to go after Turkey. They're just incapable of living in peace. To justify their existence as an occupier, you know, constantly engaged in aggression. They have to treat everyone as an enemy. Now, the part I understand is Turkey has still, tacitly supported Israel in some ways. They still ship energy to Israel through its ports. And they were allies in Syria, basically. So I've always wondered if this tough talk between them is a bit of a front for both sides. Domestically, in Turkey, it plays very well. The public hates Israel, understandably so. And it lets Erdogan pose as a protector of the Palestinians, even though I think his record on that is mixed. And then for Israel, they just need enemies constantly to justify their existence. They're incapable of making peace. So I don't know to what extent a lot of this blow up between Turkey and Israel is just bluster. But to the extent that it is sincere, to me, it's Israel just not being capable of tolerating any countervailing military power in this region. And Turkey is a big country and they can fight actually. And so theoretically down the line, they could be a threat to Israel. So maybe this is Israel thinking about that. Who do we have to worry about in the future who might come and try to challenge our government?
Speaker 1: But if you're going to think like that, you're just going to create enemies. Imagine the U.S. starting to look at some European countries becoming enemies in 50 years' time or Latin American countries becoming enemies. It's just that no other country thinks in those terms. And also Smotrich says the same way we dealt with Iran, we're going to deal with Turkey, something along those lines a few days ago. It's just a bizarre – bizarre way of approaching foreign policy. But what I'm more interested in is what you make of Trump and what he's doing with Erdogan in the F-35s.
Speaker 0: Well, he likes Erdogan. He likes him personally. I think he admires the fact that he's a strong man and he's always had a soft spot for him. But whether or not the F-35 sale, because these things take a while, whether or not Trump can push that through and once he leaves office, whether that will still be favored in Washington. I'm not sure. I mean, Turkey is interesting. They they play they try to make nice with everybody. And, you know, I'm not super intimately familiar with their foreign policy. But yeah, look, ultimately, whenever there's a clash between the US and Israel, Israel has to stand down. Israel didn't want Syria, for example, removed from the state sponsor of terror because it wants to keep Syria weak. But, you know, like Lindsey Graham said that even said this week, sorry, Israel, like Syria's cooperated with us against Iran, so they get a pass. And I suspect if Trump really wants to sell F-35s to Israel, to Turkey, sorry, then Israel won't be able to stand in the way. And again, and just on the point of Israel saber rattling, like they've been offered for decades now normalization by the entire region. The Arab League made a peace offer 2002 saying, you grant palestinians self-determination their own tiny little state is 22 percent of historic palestine will all recognize you iran even supported this at some point uh but israel won't accept it so therefore to justify being constantly in the state of belligerence you have to create new enemies and that's what i think they're doing with turkey the last thing i want to ask you about is lebanon uh there's that new deal made between israel and lebanon
Speaker 1: What happens with that country, that little country that's in the middle of everything?
Speaker 0: Pretty screwed. Yeah, they are screwed. I've said this before. The main answer to me is Israel becoming a normal state and respecting the sovereignty of its neighbors and ending the occupation of Palestinians. If they did that, they would reduce tensions with everybody and make it easier, actually, for Hezbollah to integrate more into Lebanese society rather than being this army within a state. But as long as Israel insists on its current policies of land theft and occupation, genocide, Hezbollah will maintain a strong base of support. I know it's not the whole country, but it's a sizable amount of the country, and they are part of a major parliamentary bloc in the Lebanese parliament. And what the U.S. and Israel are basically saying to Lebanon is they have to be wiped out. And they're essentially calling for a major segment of Lebanese society to be wiped out. And as we're seeing, that's just not going to happen. People are going to resist. Hezbollah has the base of support to resist, even though it's coming a huge cost to the population. So, yeah, Lebanon, it's not looking pretty. I agree.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m watching the U.S. bond market, not just the Iran war. I argue the real crisis is confidence in government debt breaking down. If it does, the Fed may have to create more money to support bonds. Investors are already shifting quietly toward gold, oil, commodities, and agriculture. The risk is the belief that Treasuries are always the world’s safest asset.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Technical Analyst and Market Strategist Michael Oliver says everyone is watching the Iran war, but the real crisis is already forming inside the U.S. bond market, and when it breaks, it could hit everything. For decades, investors have treated U.S. government bonds as the safest asset on Earth. Michael says that assumption is beginning to crack. He argues the real crisis isn't inflation, it isn't recession, it isn't even the Middle East. It's the growing possibility that confidence in government debt starts to break down. If that happens, the Federal Reserve will have to create even more money to support the bond market. And he believes investors are already starting to prepare for that shift by quietly moving into real assets: gold, oil, industrial commodities, and agriculture. Assets that can't simply be created with another round of monetary expansion. He also pointed to something that rarely gets discussed. The biggest bubble is the belief that government debt will always remain the world's safest investment. If that confidence disappears, the consequences won't stay inside the bond market; it will ripple through virtually every corner of the financial system. Most of the world is focused on the next missile strike on Iran, but he's watching the next Treasury auction. Because in his view, history won't remember the Iran war as the event that changed the markets. It'll remember it as the distraction that kept everyone looking in the wrong direction while the real crisis was gathering underneath their feet. @Oliver_MSA
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on why oil prices dropped quickly despite a wartime energy choke point and ongoing supply constraints, alongside a broader explanation of how fiat currency degradation and monetary excess influence asset pricing.
The first speaker notes that during the war, many people discussed oil at $150–$200, but oil prices then fell rapidly. The speaker adds that even after the ceasefire, ships coming out of the Strait of Hormuz have remained significantly less than before the war. A guest discussion referenced the “crack spread,” arguing that paper spot prices differ from the price of oil actually coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. The speaker asks Michael for analysis of the current oil price and why it dropped, questioning claims that “something just doesn’t add up.”
Michael argues that focusing on transitory news events is an error. He says larger, long-term repricing factors are underway across asset classes, especially the degradation of money units (dollars, euro, yen)—the unit used to measure asset value. He explains that his approach turned bullish on oil in January based on “long-term momentum technicals.” He describes oil as having risen from around the mid-50s (West Texas) to about 65 by the January close, and he characterized this as the start of a bull market, even though he did not anticipate the war.
Michael states that “headline chasers” drove oil higher too fast when the war began, leading to an upside surge. He claims oil reached about $117 during the initial surge in March (after the war began late February), but then “they puked it back up,” causing oil to fall too low—almost back to the original buy point (around 67–68). He emphasizes that this drop reflected “technical excess” and the rejection of excess buyers who entered at higher levels, triggering selling that “had nothing to do with whether the war’s actually ending.”
When pressed on the apparent mismatch between supply constraints and prices falling into the 60s, Michael reiterates that speculative war-driven price action likely created a mini-bubble that later corrected. He says the choking situation is “likely to be transitory” and that markets may be pricing broader factors rather than only the war headline.
Michael then expands the framework: asset prices are measured in fiat money that constantly degrades, influenced by money supply dynamics. He argues this affects commodities, stocks, and other assets, and he describes a belief that investors eventually move money when certain assets become over-loved or overvalued. He cites long-term historical comparisons using the Bloomberg Commodity Index: 240 in 2008, under 60 in 2020, then rising to about 140 after investors returned, with a pullback during the Ukraine war and a later reacceleration, yet still below 2008 levels. He concludes that commodities remain historically underpriced versus their own history and other assets, and that a broader shift in money flow toward commodities is a prime driver.
The conversation connects this to government bond and banking stress. Michael discusses a potential shift away from the “60-40” allocation framework (stocks/bonds) toward a 60-20-20 structure including gold, and he links this to eroding trust in government bonds. He references Fed actions such as buying Treasury bonds and says that yields and bond price charts show problems despite interventions. He suggests that if long-dated bonds break key lows, it could become headline-driven, force stronger monetary responses (“fire hoses”), and impact financial institutions broadly, pushing attention away from sectors like AI and semiconductors toward debt-market issues.
On systemic risk, Michael compares global market behavior to earlier waves, saying China and Japan move similarly to broader market pivots and implying that a government/financial crisis could trigger market-wide “wave effects.” He also says the banking sector appears anemic versus the stock market and cites technical vulnerability signals in areas including large banks and credit-card companies.
Finally, on China’s economy, Michael says he has no opinion on China’s economy, but he discusses the Chinese stock market as linked to long-term momentum metrics and suggests topping dynamics that could appear in both Shanghai and the U.S. He adds that he expects stock market rollovers to occur in ways that may coincide with bond-market stress, potentially after the war headline abates.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: In the midst of the war, which many argue has not really ended, what Trump says, the ceasefire has ended. So Trump says the war is still ongoing, if you want to listen to what he's saying. But a lot of people during the war, Michael, were talking about $150, $200 oil. And then oil prices dropped so quickly, even though the ships coming out of the Strait of Hormuz are still, and have been, since the ceasefire, significantly less than they were before the war. So from a supply demand perspective, a lot of people are looking at it and just saying, it doesn't make sense. I had one of my guests talk about the crack spread and his argument is that the price, the spot price on the markets, the paper price is not the same. It's very, very different to the price of the oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. That's the crack spread there that they were talking about. So I'd actually would love to get your analysis, Michael, of the current price of oil. Why did it drop so quickly? And what's your analysis? What's your answer to all the people saying something just doesn't add up?
Speaker 1: Well, I think looking at transitory news events that seem to shape the world is an error. There are bigger things underway in asset class pricing or repricing or underpricing and overpricing, regardless of whether you talk about stock market, oil prices, commodity prices in general, price of monetary metals, etc. The bigger long-term fundamental factors, primarily the ongoing degradation in the money units, that which we buy oil with, dollars, euro, yen, whatever. It's our unit of measure, how we measure the value of something. And if you look at oil, we turned bullish on oil based on our own unique long-term momentum technicals back in January. And oil, frankly, then was already just turning up from lows in the 55 area, I'm talking West Texas, and got up to 65 at the January close. And we said, that's it, bull market commencing. We didn't provide reasons. We certainly didn't anticipate the war, which occurred, you know, a month later. But our technical said, this guy is turning up after a very long protracted pullback. Remember back in 2022, oil was 130. So it not only had been cut in half, it had been cut to like a third to $55. So the question then is, well, isn't this asset maybe just underpriced relative to everything, relative to commodities, relative to its own history, relative to the stock market. Oil was cheap as hell at that point. So in January, we put out a buy signal. We expected the uptrend to last probably for several years. But unfortunately, we had the headline chasers. the guys who came in based on Iran, like that's the only thing that mattered. And yes, it certainly mattered because it constrained, you know, oil shipments, but they overdid it as they usually do on war news. It's like, that's the only thing that matters is the war, okay? How about that oil is just cheap as hell, off the page cheap, historically speaking, by its own metrics measured versus any other asset. And the thing we measured by pieces of paper, are changing in value. The oil in 2022 was 130 and now it's 65 in January. So we said buy it. It broke out and we, unfortunately, they came in where? March 3rd was the first, I think, trading day after the war began at the end of February. Oil goosed, got up to $117 a couple of times in that surge in the next month or so. What it meant was that, yeah, we were right, it was going up, but we didn't expect this reason. There's bigger, broader reasons. you had an orgy of news chasing traders. And we argued at that time that we're bullish on oil. And we think, yes, you could go to 250, 300 or even higher in the next several years for longer term reasons. But we knew that when these kind of guys come in, they get dumped on. It's very rare when war chasers make money sustained. So sure enough, they collapse the oil back down. And we got down to a low, I think of 67 the other day or 68. Right now it's in the low 70s. It came back to our buy point. And I think now it's refreshed enough to where it can go up on its own reasons, regardless of the Iran war. So I bet when that war finally goes out of the picture, however, however that happens, the oil is still going to go up. And that's, so I think the Iran war is a transitory and confusing event.
Speaker 0: But why, okay, so why did it drop so much? Simple question. If you've got the world's biggest energy choke point closed up and not enough ships coming out, isn't it basic supply and demand the price should be higher? I understand if you want to say $120 is too high, people projecting $150 to $200 is too high. But 60s, back to 60s when the strategic petroleum reserves are still being drawn down and ships are barely coming out?
Speaker 1: I think the reason for that was simply the technical bubble created by headline chasers who, one, created excess on the upside by taking the market from 65 in January. And when you open March, I think we were trading in the 70s. And boom, we ran up to 115, 117. And just like they drove it too far, too fast on the upside, when they puked it back up, it went down too low probably as well. Went almost all the way back to our original buy point. So it's a technical excess. It's not saying that no oil should be valued at 70. You puked out a lot of people who bought oil at 100, 110, and they just got stopped out. Therefore, a lot of selling hit. Had nothing to do with whether the war's actually ending or not. Had to do with Excess buyers got rejected, paid their dues.
Speaker 0: But for buyers to be rejected to that level, to the 60s, doesn't that sound a bit bizarre? Yes, it does. Because there is a genuine supply constraint, a major supply constraint, the biggest constraint in many, many decades.
Speaker 1: Yes, yes. You would think it would. And I think it will. But I think that was a speculative bubble, in effect, a little mini bubble. where they drove it too far, too fast on headline news that could be transitory. Maybe we win the war, or maybe somehow the Iranian government isn't in control anymore. These are all speculative events. We don't know the answer. And yes, it is a choking situation, but it's likely to be transitory. And I think maybe the market knows that. But there are far bigger reasons why oil should go up that are not specifically tied to a headline.
Speaker 0: What are those reasons?
Speaker 1: The reasons are that asset prices move. Generally speaking, we live in a world where the thing you use to measure asset prices is fiat money, unbacked paper money that degrades in value constantly. And therefore, if an asset sold, if oil was 120 back in March of 2022, yeah, 130. and it collapsed too far it's still the the measure the money unit we measure by is degraded in value even since 2022 due to the the best way to answer that is get an m2 chart a money supply chart and you'll see an upward parabolic curve well this is true with the euro the yen etc where the money is degrading and therefore the price that is attached to this or that asset is affected by the degradation in the money unit. We don't live in a stable world because our money unit, our unit of measure is totally unreliable, unpredictable, and we're not factoring that into the pricing of oil. So if oil was 140 a decade ago and it's now 70 or something, that's half its price. But if you factor in the money supply issue, it's probably cheaper than that even.
Speaker 0: But wouldn't that apply? Yeah, I do. Of course. Wouldn't that apply to all other commodities, though?
Speaker 1: Yes, it would. Yes, it would. It would apply to stock prices. It would apply to commodity prices. And over time, we'll see if you look back 50 or 100 years at stock market movements and commodity asset movements, they don't always move in sync. Quite often, investors will finally decide that after enough years of stock market buying and overpricing the stock market dot com bubble for example or the real estate bubble uh that they'll move the money somewhere else and the money flow continues because the governments keep printing money for this cause or that cause mainly to sustain their their budgets uh and right now we have a potential for a massive increase in monetary excess and that potential is not a potential it's a likelihood the degradation in the government bond market. This time we have the biggest potential fire that we've ever had that needs to be put out. The Japanese have been dealing with it by what? Print, print, print, to quote the prime minister of Japan. And we know that our president wants rates lower and the Fed will come in, even though it's not a mandate, they will have to print to defend the U.S. government bond market. In fact, they've been buying T-bonds since November. And if you look at a T-bond price chart, futures, for example, they've been going down since November, meaning yields up. They've not been able to stop the decline. That is a crisis that's so big that will spark even more monetary excess. Hence, further degradation in the thing we use to price assets. Therefore, once investors get sour on something they've loved for a decade, in our case, 16, 17 years, the US stock market. And it starts to wobble, starts to create doubt, uncertainty. We already know that's begun, especially among some big asset managers. The money starts to move elsewhere. Everything doesn't go down when the stock market goes down. Gold always goes up in stock market bear trends. Go back to the 1929 to 32. Gold miners exploded, stock market went down 80%. Anyway, the point being that when these asset class shifts, that money flow, which is ongoing, now about to accelerate, will move somewhere else. And when you measure commodities as an asset category, such as take the Bloomberg Commodity Index, for example, go back to 2008, the Bloomberg was 240. Right now, the Bloomberg Index, made a bear low in 2020 below 60. Commodities were worth 240 Bloomberg Index in 2008 and in 2020 were worth under 60. What, are they going to be free? Well, finally investors came in, drove up to 140. Then the war began in Ukraine. Commodities pulled back during that war. So did oil, by the way, even though it was a war. And now a firm back up and there are 125 right now on the Bloomberg. We're still half the price what commodities were in 2008. So obviously the money flow that's been created, visible in money supply charts from Japan, US, Europe, et cetera, hasn't been going into commodities. They've been vastly underpriced relative to their own history, relative to other key assets like the stock market. And once you get an asset or an asset category in this case, is so vastly underpriced by any way you want to measure it is it going to go free no it's going to finally reassert itself that is a subjective decision often made by investors asset managers who say okay this one this category has been great but i'm getting out i'm going to go somewhere else well where did they used to go government bonds remember the 60 40 rule Well, several months ago, we've seen some CIOs of various major firms on Wall Street say, uh-uh, 60-40 is out the window. It's now 60-20-20, gold, which is finally an acceptance that monetary metals have value and that maybe our notion that government bonds are safe is eroding. They're going out the window. The Japanese were one situation. Now, suddenly, if the US becomes the next situation, Wow. What does that do to that asset category in terms of generating fear, pricing changes in other asset categories? A lot. And I think that's where we are. I think that's probably one of the prime drivers of commodities.
Speaker 0: Someone told me today that Germany struggled on their bond sale. I think it was half only subscribed. Half of it was subscribed this week. Not sure if you know what he's referring to. You mentioned it to me earlier today. They were doing a
Speaker 1: on selling on the uh the demand just wasn't there yeah well that's that's interesting it's just another piece of the overall puzzle that's coming apart here and you can't have that occur because if the investment public if pension funds if governments won't buy our bonds then that creates a crisis that's far bigger than anything you can imagine in the stock market because it's bigger than the stock market And if these guys are right, the CIO, if I think it was Morgan Stanley, I think was the first one, who said, no, the 60-40 is 60-20-20 now, he was aware of something going on there. And our technical work argues that we're at a point now in history, market history, where this next phase, this new asset class shift will disfavor the bloated paper assets that have been boosted by monetary expansion over the recent decades. And we had free interest rates 10 years out of the last 15 almost in the US. We're talking the short-term rates. So it created a flow of money into an asset category that's now, we argue, technically well overdone. And when that shifts, that money's going somewhere. And we already see the evidence that it's moving into the commodity categories. We measure it technically. And the Bloomberg, by our metrics, turned up long-term bullish again in October of last year. well before the oil surge. And price then of Bloomberg was 106.50. It's now 122, 125. So it's, you know, it's... 126. Yeah, it's a good appreciation without headlines because oil really didn't contribute to this. It was the broad commodity complex.
Speaker 0: By the way, I checked, I tried to find the German bond sale news. I couldn't find anything on it. So maybe my guess was mistaken there. essentially what you're saying is that the trust in government bonds is eroding because trust in the as you called it at the beginning of the conversation the ongoing because the ongoing degradation of the money units used to price commodities the the us dollar and other currencies as well and there is no alternative safer alternative to the us dollar so where that money is going instead is commodities and that's why you're bullish on the commodity index call which includes oil
Speaker 1: And likely the dollar will demise as well. We turn bearish on the dollar in 2025 at a price of 104.50. Right now it's trading around 100 and 101, primarily because weakness in the yen, which is one of the major factors in the dollar index. Euro and the yen constitute 70% of the dollar index. The euro has been strong over the last couple of years, but the yen has been conspicuously weak because of the bond crisis. But that could change as well. And I think the dollar is in, state of technical demise that likely is to go a lot lower in the dollar index remember that's merely measuring one piece of fiat versus another it's not measuring true value it's relative of one fiat to another all losing value constantly but i think that's another factor that could come into play and be noticed by investors and asset managers uh that will further probably hurt the t-bonds as well well the t-bonds are hurting the dollar either way uh A major change is occurring underneath the surface here, and it's not going to be ultimately looked back upon as, oh, that's because of Iran or oh, that's because of this. It's going to be because of these very broad glacial events that are underway. And expressing themselves in different ways where money is going to move out of what used to be fully respected, the US dollar, for example, or the stock market. And we are a bubble, by the way. China, for example, has since 2009 bear low doubled in a half in price, the Shanghai. We've gone up 20 something fold on the NASDAQ. So while they've moved up with us and most global stock markets will move with us, they're not a bubble, we are. And when that bubble breaks and now we're also facing our government bond crisis, we've got a nuclear event here And I think it's only at the initial phases of acknowledgement. The Fed obviously acknowledges it because they've been buying T-bonds. Supposedly, according to Williams, the head of the New York Fed back in November, who said we're going to start buying bonds, just to provide just liquidity to the market. Right. They're trying to support it. And it hasn't worked. And we think via our technicals that what's about to happen in the bond market could become sudden headline. And when it becomes sudden headline, it'll impact financial institutions even more so than it already has. Debt markets, not just US government, but private and corporate debt. We know that it's at dangerous levels. And therefore a lot of investor perception about where should I be? And I think one of those categories that will be acknowledged, especially once the Iran thing sort of gets out of the way is, Why are commodities still going up? And there'll be a recognition that maybe, well, they're just historically cheap. It's a good, safe investment bet and they're not gonna clobber it anymore. It's done going down. The issue is now what speed does it go up? And we think for over several years, you could have a major investment grade asset class rise, including in stocks that are related to the commodities. such as grain related stocks or base metal related stocks, oil related. They can all appreciate due to the general rise in commodity asset prices, not because of just the Iran thing.
Speaker 0: And the Iran thing could just exasperate it. A long term trend that's going to happen for fundamental reasons you've explained. But the Iran war could accelerate it or make it harsh.
Speaker 1: Or it could dissipate or You know, I don't see how it could get worse. I mean, you know, if you've cut off the oil, the question is can that really last? And, you know, I don't want to get too involved in that subject matter because we don't like to when we consider it frankly transitory and not the real factor underlying the commodity asset class rise or oil rise even. But I cannot see it continuing forever. We already know Iran is in economic troubles domestically, and therefore that puts pressure on the government. But, you know, I don't know how it's going to end up and I don't want to get involved in that. I have some ideas, but it's what are my ideas are good as the next guys. I don't think it's a permanent event. And I think once it passes and people then realize, well, how come oil is going up again? How come it's reasserting itself? That's when you'll get finally an acknowledgment by investors. There's some bigger reason here why oil's going up. It's dirt cheap.
Speaker 0: Looking at the Treasury yields, what do you expect it to get up to? Because I've had a lot of my guests wonder, 5% mark is pretty concerning.
Speaker 1: I'm not sure on that. We don't have a target on T-bond, especially T-bond, long-dated bonds, 20-, 30-year bonds. We simply say we're at a technical point now in T-bonds. Forget the short end of the market that the Fed can control. They can up down rates there and it won't necessarily impact at all the 30-year bonds. You look at a chart and make that point. The 30-year bonds at price, they had a price collapse starting from 2020 when I'll give you some prices here. T-bond futures were at 190. Yields were low. T-bonds collapsed between late 2020 to late 2022 down to 117. about 190 to 117 yields went up but since october it was in 2022 you can draw a line sideways on a t-bond price chart and it's comatose dead we've had multiple rallies in bonds meaning attempts to drop yields and and then renewed drops in price but there's been a floor on the price chart of the bonds that we're now back sitting on meaning yields are pressing at the multi-year highs So whatever the Fed has tried to do to help abate that, nothing has helped. And we're at a technical point now where it's even evident on the price of the bonds that, oops, they plunged through those lows. Where are we going? You could have a crisis type news event if the bonds break that low. And we think they are because momentum is already saying they're going to bust that low, meaning new high in yields, new lows in price. That's when you'll start to hear headlines from financial TV channels that don't discuss this very much, that suddenly this is a big issue and the Fed will have to come in. And when it's noticed that the Fed comes in with fire hoses, which they have to do, they can't let the house burn, even if it's not a mandate and it's not an unemployment issue, it's not an inflation issue, it's saved the government debt market issue. If they come in with big fire hoses, like the Japanese, the BOJ has done, There's going to be an increased acknowledgement, probably very fast, panic-type acknowledgement. Uh-oh, something's underway here. And it impacts every other asset out there, including the stock market, because we have a lot of credit problems we know in the financial sector. And when that hits, suddenly all the discussion of what is AI doing, what are the semiconductors doing, will take second place to what's going on in the T-bomb market. Are we like the VOJ again? Oh, gosh, we've joined that club. So the whole world could be upended. And because of a sudden perception that, my God, the monetary excess is going to begin real big this time, because they have to print the money to save the bonds. That's, if I were to fundamentally summarize what I think is a driving force right now, I think that is the driving force.
Speaker 0: there a level where or do you worry this could get to a level where it's no longer just kind of a a commodity super cycle but it comes something a lot more concerning a lot more uh what was the term used during the o8 financial crisis uh system system systemic yes yes the systemic risk for the for the world economy yeah yeah uh we are a world economy after all and that's we pointed this out in a report on the shanghai recently comparing it to the s p well
Speaker 1: The S&P has gone up a dozen, 15-fold. The NASDAQ has gone up 20, 22-fold. They've only doubled in half. But their moves in the Shanghai are pretty much coincident with our moves, the up and down moves, the pivotal highs, the pivotal lows. So it is a world market. China is part of it, obviously. And so if we go down, the world market will go down. Japan wasn't enough, apparently. But we join in with Japan, suddenly it's a global financial crisis, government financial crisis. And no doubt that will cause a lot of trembling in the stock market bubbles out there, especially ours. Japan is also a technical bubble, the Nikkei. Europe is not so much a bubble in terms of the multiple gains it's seen since 2009, but it'll break too. But all these things are tied together. And I think, yes, you'll have systemic wave effects. that will suddenly people say, well, this is connected to that. And why did this bank go? You can't have a bad headline about a big bank right now. We very closely are watching the banking sector. And a lot of people were happy because the banks have firmed up recently. But if you look where the banking sector is right now versus where it was in 2022, remember S&P back then made a high at about 40, I think it was 4,800. Well, look, we're now 7,500. The banking sector is about 10 to 15% higher than it was in 2022. It was only marginally higher than it was four years ago. So it's very anemic when you compare it to the stock market. And we see a lot of also negative starting to show up technically in the financial sector broadly. Last October, for example, we put out a report saying, watch out, the credit card companies look technically vulnerable. And if you look at Visa or MasterCard since last October, no, there's no crashing effect. But they've just been steadily going down, down, down, as if they're not even part of the stock market. And we also see some extreme vulnerability potentials in some of the major banks, not the regionals. Regionals were headlines a couple years ago, but everybody, yeah, it's okay, just regional. Talking about the big name banks. don't have much tolerance on the downside price if they do they're going to trigger some long-term momentum breakage that could spark a pretty significant price decline so we notice these things going on and we think that the driving force ultimately is that potential debt crisis which we're already in but it's just not acknowledged yet and so yes major wave effects
Speaker 0: Last thing I want to ask you about, Michael, is the Chinese economy. Depends who I speak to. They have a different story. What's your thoughts on how they're doing?
Speaker 1: I don't have an opinion on their economy. I don't have any opinion on that. As far as their stock market goes, their stock market is right now dancing at levels that you probably don't want to close the month out any month during this quarter where you're trading right now because it will break some of our long term momentum metrics. whenever that occurs in shanghai or it occurs in the us the similar thing will happen in shanghai and vice versa so we think that the u.s stock market is also in a topping process and there are key levels below not visible so much on price but on our momentum metrics long term that if you sneeze a bit and ooze back down not in a crash type way just you know ratchet you way back down below certain levels that aren't far below our recent lows, which we were at 7,300 on the S&P, for example. You don't want to go there because you're going to start to break some long-term momentum technicals that argue, uh-oh, you've topped. And we're flexible on that, by the way. We've been thinking the stock market would peak over the last couple of years. And when we had that war sell off, remember S&P also sold off during the war while oil went up. we we decried that anybody selling the stock market here is going to get hurt because you're not going to have a bear market with a bear headline like that anybody shorting the u.s stock market you're going to new highs guys and sure enough they turned on that march low and exploded to a new high even though i still think we're topping out now i think it's more likely that the best time for the stock market to roll over is when the war abates and everybody says oh great party time we don't have any problems anymore that's the way markets move and so our suspicion is probably when the stock market does roll over and break certain technicals that we think are critical you'll have a blue sky above and then you'll get hit with the t-bond action and then suddenly it'll get dark again anyway
reSee.it AI Summary
I see Washington reportedly giving Iran until tomorrow to declare the Strait of Hormuz open and toll-free, admit the ship attacks were a mistake, or face consequences. The Axios framing, plus Larry Johnson’s “no way/no way in hell” compliance odds, clashes with Trump’s posts about Iran seeking continued talks. Talks are reported for multiple venues while Iran denies them, redeployments keep getting reversed, and Johnson expects strikes within 24 hours.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 🇺🇸 Washington reportedly gave Iran until tomorrow to declare Hormuz open and toll-free, and to admit the ship attacks were a mistake That's the Axios framing: a public statement by Saturday, every channel open, no fees, plus an acknowledgment that "they screwed up," with one official warning it won't be a great day for Tehran otherwise. Larry Johnson rated the odds of compliance in two flavors: no way, and no way in hell. The surrounding picture is pure contradiction. Trump posts that Iran asked to keep talking and the ceasefire is over, in the same breath. Talks are reported for Islamabad, Switzerland, AND Jordan simultaneously while Iran's side denies any of it. And per Larry's sourcing, redeployment orders keep getting countermanded, units sent home now told to stay, someone randomly pulling levers in the control booth. He expects strikes within 24 hours. The political ceiling in Tehran was set by Khomeini's own grandson this week: anyone negotiating peace with America is a traitor, because the killing planted an enmity that never goes away. One detail says how seriously the threat reports landed: per the WSJ, Trump flew home from Ankara on the OLD Air Force One, because the Qatari-donated jet lacks the defenses for an elevated-risk flight. @NewSonof
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation centers on fast-moving developments involving Iran, the Strait of Hormuz/Homs, U.S. military posture in the region, and competing reports about talks and potential strikes.
According to Axios and CBS, a U.S. official said Iranians reached out to the administration after two days of skirmishes earlier in the week to seek further talks to resolve the dispute. The Iranians allegedly returned to negotiations saying, “we screwed up” and “let’s keep talking.” Axios also reported that a second U.S. official warned of harsh consequences if Iran refuses to commit to cease firing on commercial vessels in the Strait of Homs.
The discussion then shifts to satellite/force posture claims. The number of U.S. Air Force aircraft parked at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia reportedly fell to its lowest level since the buildup began in early February. The last three AWACS left early this week, leaving a single E-11 and nine tankers, and mediators/analysts argue this suggests critical assets have left the theater while the conversation includes the idea that assets may be brought back if strikes are expected.
Israel’s military posture is also referenced. At an Israeli Air Force pilots graduation ceremony, IDF Chief of Staff Ayal Zamir reportedly said “major operations” are expected against Iran, that the air force remained on standby for a major operation on June 8, and that the alert remains high, adding that if they need to return, they will return with even greater force.
On negotiations, competing claims are highlighted. Iranian Fars News reportedly denied that a new Iran–U.S. round in Islamabad next week is happening, saying preparations have not been finalized and technical discussions are false and baseless, and that developments will be announced only through official Iranian channels. Axios is cited saying the next round of talks is expected in Switzerland. CNN claims intensive diplomacy is underway behind the scenes, with the U.S. prioritizing negotiations over further military action and adopting a “striking and then pausing” approach to avoid escalation. Reuters is cited saying Qatari negotiators are in Iran to de-escalate and create conditions for talks focused on implementing the MOU and stopping clashes in Hormuz.
Shipping and activity levels are treated as signals. The Strait of Homs reportedly saw only 22 verifying transits logged on Thursday (according to Kepler), far below recent weeks and pre-war daily averages. Some ships are said to have switched off transponders, implying tracking data may undercount real activity. A Chinese heavy load carrier reportedly transited.
The U.S. demand side is also detailed. An Axios summary says U.S. officials are demanding that Iran, on Saturday, issue a public statement acknowledging the Strait is open and committing to stop firing on commercial ships—while also explicitly or implicitly acknowledging errors related to recent attacks. The discussion describes additional demands including that every channel on the strait will be open and “toll-free,” plus expectations of an apology.
One key claim is that no strikes occurred that day. There is emphasis on “not many ships” transiting, and multiple mediators supposedly trying to restart talks.
The transcript also covers alleged assassination-plot reporting. CNN says U.S. intelligence detected reporting of a possible Iranian plot to assassinate Trump, while stating the Israeli warning remains unclear and has not been independently verified. A Barak Ravid report is cited as saying Israeli intelligence did not share a specific organized detailed plan, describing Iranian figures discussing the matter without a concrete plan. The New York Post is cited as saying Trump left instructions for “a devastating response” if Iran assassinated him. The discussion includes an argument about U.S. constitutional/legal effect if the president is incapacitated.
A story from the Wall Street Journal is cited about Trump returning from Turkey and changing aircraft (older Air Force One and later switching back to a newer Qatari-donated aircraft), tied to U.S. officials receiving Israeli intelligence about an elevated-risk mission lacking certain defensive capabilities. The transcript notes uncertainty about timing and stresses the reports’ emphasis on threat information and aircraft defensive differences.
For Israel and Lebanon/Southern Lebanon, the transcript claims the U.S. asked Israel to refrain from sensitive military operations in southern Lebanon, and that Israel froze sensitive IDF operations while strikes continued at a lower level. The Financial Times is cited as saying a U.S. team was sent to Beirut to ensure a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, alongside references to Israel’s mixed messaging and shifting operational posture.
Turkey/Syria/Lebanon becomes another thread. Israel’s Energy Minister Eli Cohen is quoted saying Turkey must not establish itself militarily in Syria, with a cabinet statement that if Turkey establishes bases in Syria, Israel will establish bases there as well. Turkish influence and related plans (including pipeline discussions involving Syria and a pipeline proposal between Israel and Cyprus mentioned as “plan” rather than concrete construction) are referenced. The transcript also discusses reports about Turkey seeking Russian S-400 air defenses and how that interacts with potential U.S. F-35 access, including a stated U.S. rationale about preventing compromise of F-35 stealth via S-400 data.
On Ukraine, Zeluzhny is discussed. The transcript cites his Telegraph opinion piece warning against a Western narrative that Russia has effectively lost, describing the war as attritional and saying victory depends on which side can sustain economic, military, and psychological burdens longer with consistent international support. Reuters is then cited as saying Putin is rejecting calls for peace with Ukraine despite Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries and ports, with sources describing increased resolve to continue the war and references to Donbas.
The transcript concludes with a broad recap of its central “Strait of Hormuz” framing: carrot-and-stick sanctions/lifting dynamics, mediator pressure for de-escalation, and continued attention to whether attacks resume. It notes “no strikes today,” but emphasizes ongoing risk of escalation and continuing uncertainty about whether Iran will stop charging a fee in the Strait of Hormuz or accept terms in return. The speakers also mention threats discussed in the context of major escalations and hope for “cooler heads prevail” and a pause in escalation.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: And how, how is my favorite young journalist tonight?
Speaker 1: He has a lot of surprises for you. Oh, good. It's going to be a very entertaining day.
Speaker 0: I can see you devilish, you know, that devilish grin.
Speaker 1: You're going to love this. All right. So let me start with this one. You ready? Yeah. All right. So this is, um, I fact check this. I can confirm it's true. So, um, According to Axios, a U.S. official said Iranians reached out to the administration after two days of skirmishes earlier this week and sought further talks to resolve the dispute. The official claimed that the Iranians told them, quote, CBS claims as well. And they said that the Iranians came back to the table and said, they came back to the table and said, we screwed up. We made a mistake. Let's keep talking. So that came from Axios and CBS. I don't know what the original source is. Complete other nonsense. Axios also reported, a second US official stressed that there will be harsh consequences if Iran refuses to commit to cease firing on commercial vessels in the Strait of Homs. Quote, if that is not their position tomorrow, it is not going to be a great day for them.
Speaker 0: Tough talk. You know, I mean, Mario, these are just bullshit stories from the West trying to create a narrative that will justify. Look, the United States, you remember all that infrastructure I told you about that has to be in place for attacks to start happening? They've been countermanding the orders, okay? So... The United States is now turning around. Units that were ordered to be withdrawn are now being ordered to stay. Of course, one of my friends basically described it as, he says, it's like watching a monkey try to fuck a football.
Speaker 1: I've never seen a monkey try to fuck a football, so let me see how that would look like. It doesn't look good. It looks like a mess.
Speaker 0: Yeah, it is. It's not children-friendly, number one. But it's a mess.
Speaker 1: So I've got some of these for you. I don't know how recent they are. So Khan U says, the United States, and I had a footage of it. I'll try to find it. I'll play it in a bit. I had it saved somewhere. The United States has evacuated its F-22 Raptor stealth fighter squadron from the Avda airbase in Israel, returning the 12 jets to the US after five months of deployment. So I don't know whether that happened a few days ago in the last couple of days. That was...
Speaker 0: That was part of that initial redeployment order that HECS has signed off on now two weeks ago.
Speaker 1: Okay. Stephanie, can you show the first image as well in the meantime? There's also another one here. The number of U.S. Air Force... Oh, this is aligned with the graph I'm going to show you. The number of U.S. Air Force aircraft parked today at the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia has fallen to its lowest level since the buildup began back in early February. The last three AWACS left early this week, a single E-11 and nine tankers remain. As the U.S. military appears to put back pressure on Iran, many of its critical assets to conduct large-scale operations have left the theater. And what you're saying now is they're starting to bring them back.
Speaker 0: Ben-Gurion as well. Yeah, at least they're going to redeploy to like Ben-Gurion. I don't think, I frankly don't think the Saudis and Qataris, well, I don't think they'll allow it, but if they do, then they're setting themselves up that they will be targets of attack by Iran when the United States launches these new strikes. I imagine within 24 hours, the United States is going to be launching the attacks. Okay.
Speaker 1: You think they will be attacking?
Speaker 0: Yes.
Speaker 1: right so the bangurian airport as well the satellite images that came out um i don't know if the date will show on them that came out today but i don't know the date of the images just showing the american aircraft leaving in the last few days but uh so what you're saying now is this is being reversed now there is can you go back to the original image so that's the i prepared these for our discussion because i know this is something you watch closely go back to the first version of this one there so this shows the military aircraft in the prince al-sultan air base so the blue part is on the main tarmac And the red part is the other location around the base. So as you can see in the buildup, they had them all, see the blue lines are the long ones for the Yorges. So they had all their aircraft on the main tarmac. As the war started, they started the red part, they started scattering them around. So the red part where the aircraft were in other location in the base started increasing and the blue one getting smaller. And then if you look at the last bar in that graph, that's the lowest level it's been since the war started so this is what larry's been talking about in the last few days about military aircraft moving away from the region so that's another indication of it now what you're saying is that military aircraft stand to be deployed into the region obviously that will be a a bad sign um well i'll give you the the pieces and use hinting towards war trump posted the islamic hotels in the morning the islamic republic of iran has asked us to continue talks he puts it in inverted commas we have agreed you could remove the images stephanie thank you we have agreed to do so but the united states has stated to them in no uncertain terms that the ceasefire is over thank you for your attention to the matter and then there's another report here yesterday at the uh israeli air force pilot oh this is an important one at the israeli air force um pilots graduation ceremony in israel the idf chief of staff ayal zamir that was yesterday stated that major operations are expected to be carried out on iran during his speech quote on the drawing board are new plans major operations are still expected to lie ahead of us be prepared zamir also reiterated the fact that the israeli air force was on standby to take off for a major operation on iran on june the 8th and the state of alert remains high He said the IDF is prepared for resumption of the campaign in Iran. Quote, if we need to return, we will return with even greater force. Now, again, him making a statement publicly doesn't make it reality. He could be sending a message to Iran. He could be rallying the pilots. And also Trump saying the ceasefire is over is, you know, anything Trump says I really almost ignore. But I would love to kind of give you a dump of news, statements from Trump, the Israeli Air Force leader,
Speaker 0: um whether sorry the idf chief of staff um as well as the reports from access that came in in the last 30 minutes which i know they're pretty pretty silly reports um so what do you think is going on uh it's it's chaos on the on the part of the united states uh they've been told to uh deactivate no reactivate no deactivate um so i was told that redeployments were getting turned off and on and off again. So in other words, redeployments that were not supposed to happen, then were supposed to happen, now they're not supposed to happen. Now, what this is doing to the logistics chain, and you've got to understand that you put a combat jet out there, well, it's got to have fuel. Where's that fuel coming from? Have they stored up the fuel? So then they had to go out and find the fuel, get it forward. What about the radar? So if they redeployed the AWACS, the only thing left in theater because of all the other radars that were taken down at Bahrain and Al Udeid, primarily some in Kuwait, all those key radar systems that provided information about where threats were originating, launching ballistic missiles, Those were being compensated for by flying AWACS, which could pick up the slack a little bit. Well, they're now out of theater. Now they've got to turn around and go, oh, wait, wait, we need you back. Actually, someone described it to me. He says, you'd think there was a monkey in the control booth just randomly pulling levers.
Speaker 1: And trying to fuck the ball as well, the soccer balls and the football.
Speaker 0: Yeah, yeah. I tried to put it in FIFA terms. Okay. FIFA fever. It is campeonato mundial time. World Cup time. Come on, man. Try to stay relevant. You know, Spain beat Belgium.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I saw that. All right, so I've got some more information here on the negotiation side of it. So, Iranian Fars News reported a source close to Iran's negotiating team has denied reports by Al Arabi and Fox News. So Al Arabi and Fox News claimed that there's a new round of Iran-U.S. talks in Islamabad next week, the one you were talking about a couple of days ago. So Fars is saying these talks are not happening or no longer happening. The source said reports that preparations have been finalized and that technical discussions will continue next week are false and baseless, adding that any developments regarding negotiations will only be announced through official Iranian channels. Axios said the next round of U.S.-Iran talks is expected to take place in Switzerland. Oh, Switzerland next week. I didn't see that. As regional mediators work to revive negotiations following several days of military escalation, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi have been working to de-escalate tensions between Washington and Tehran. were the talks expected to focus on restarting nuclear negotiations and reducing the risk of further conflicts in the Straits?
Speaker 0: Yeah, not going to happen.
Speaker 1: Which one, the Swiss one, the Pakistan, or neither right now?
Speaker 0: Neither. I mean, I know the Pakistanis, they're really keen. If you talk to the Pakistanis, oh yeah, the talks are on track, we've got this wired, it's going to work. Iran, the public, you've got to take into account the... what the public opinion is in Iran. The Iranians want revenge. They don't want negotiations. They want the United States to pay a price. They want to force the United States out of the region. And, you know, what is the United States doing to calm the situation down? Nothing. They're re-imposing sanctions against the MOU. They're threatening violence, again, against the MOU. They've laid a deadline on Iran. So what's going to happen, at least for the foreseeable future, is Iran is going to allow ships that are headed to China, to Asia, whatever they're carrying, they can go to Asia. They're going to, you know, if they're going to... South America to countries that are not aligned with the United States, they'll get to go there. If they're going to Africa to countries not aligned with the United States, they'll get to go there. All other ships that want to go to the United States or to Europe, they're going to stay in the Persian Gulf. Iran's not going to let them out. And Iran's going to hold that position until the United States comes begging again for talks as they have every single time in the last 13 months. There's never one instance where Iran went and said, oh, please, Mr. Trump, come talk to us. We can't stand the pain. It's been Trump all the time begging.
Speaker 1: Yeah. There's another story that came out, and I just remembered it now. I'm lucky I found it. Axios also reported about two hours ago, an hour and a half, the Trump administration is demanding that Iran issues on Saturday, so tomorrow, a public statement acknowledging the Strait of Hormuz is open and committing to stop firing on commercial ships, according to U.S. officials, briefing reporters.
Speaker 0: Well, there are two ways that will happen. First way is no way, and the second way is no way in hell. Okay? Okay, okay.
Speaker 1: I was expecting some analytical answer explaining to me how that could happen. I'm like, oh. What does he mean? How is that going to happen? How is that going to convince them?
Speaker 0: Yeah. I mean this is – they're just playing games. I mean the United States has committed itself to strike. And notice all this threatening bullshit came out after the markets were closed. So Trump will launch the strikes. They'll do it on Saturday. Then on Sunday, oh, the Iranians have called. We're ready to meet in Switzerland or wherever. And come Monday morning, the markets open and prices, you know, it's just more market manipulation. Same shit, different day. Oh, man, absolutely.
Speaker 1: This is Groundhog Day. Same shit, different monkey.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: All right, so we've got two more reports on the negotiations. CNN says the following. intensive diplomacy is underway right now behind the scenes to ease tensions between the us and iran with washington currently prioritizing negotiations over further military action just for the audience has been no attacks today the us has deliberately adopted a strategy of striking and then pausing to avoid escalation while allowing diplomacy to work maintaining a list of potential targets as leverage multiple officials told cnn that the us preparations were made for possible u.s strikes tonight if required So that's now as we speak, but diplomacy is currently taking the lead. And there was no strike. So either this was a bluff or negotiations or diplomacy is going well. And last point on the negotiations, according to Reuters, Qatari negotiators are in Iran right now for talks with Iranian officials aimed at de-escalating and creating conditions for talks. The talks are expected to focus on implementing the MOU, blah, blah, blah. and stopping the clashes in Hormuz. So lots of different reports from various outlets, essentially saying that all the mediators are trying to activate talks again. The US saying talks are planned either in Pakistan or Switzerland. That's not officially saying this, that's media outlets reporting that. The Iranians through Fars saying there are no negotiations. And also there's been cases where the Iranians say there's no negotiations, but there's talks, but there's like a low level delegation And obviously there's many cases where the Americans say there's something and it ends up not being true. And we ended up waiting for the Iranian media to know exactly what's happening. On a positive note, at least, we can say there's no strikes today by either side. So that must be, no ship was struck by Iran, but barely any ships are going through the Strait of Homs, by the way.
Speaker 0: That's the point, yeah.
Speaker 1: There's a Chinese ship.
Speaker 0: A Chinese ship has gone through. The Xi'an, I think it's called. So it's gone through making its way.
Speaker 1: So while everyone was watching the World Cup, Larry was watching the Xi'an.
Speaker 0: Yeah, Rui Shan. The Rui Shan is a heavy load carrier destination, Xinjiang, China. Tianjin, Xinjiang, China. So that's going through. Zhang Jing. X-I-N-G-A-N-G. How do you pronounce that? Do you know? X-I-N? Yep. So I say that's Xin Gang. Xin Gang.
Speaker 1: How do you say it? X-I-N? What's the rest of it?
Speaker 0: G-A-N-G. I say Xin Gang.
Speaker 1: Xin Gang, I think it is. I learned Mandarin when I was in university, so 15 years ago. So I'm close. i'm close now there's people speaking mandarin listening to us saying these guys just disgrace to the language pathetic pathetic yeah that's japanese so okay um so in terms of homos shipping activities through the strata homos has fallen sharply with only 22 verifying transits logged on Thursday, so that's yesterday, according to Kepler. Just one vessel used the Omani channel and the remainder transited via Iran's designated shipping lane. The figure marks a steep decline from the 40 to 50 weekly transits recorded in recent weeks daily transit should be the 40 to 50 daily transit recorded in recent weeks and a fraction of pre-war daily average exceeding 100. some ships are switching off transponders entirely suggesting real traffic volume may exceed what trafficking what tracking data captures also another report as well there was some ships going through the omani side i think today or yesterday turning around going back through the iranian side i think that was yesterday But the only question is, in terms of ships turning off their transponders, that's the only one that's difficult to track on any of those websites.
Speaker 0: Right. But Iran can still see them. If the transponders are off, they've still got radar.
Speaker 1: Iran can, yeah. Well, assuming they weren't struck. But from everyone I spoke to, including yourself, it's not difficult for Iran to be able to spot those ships. The Strait of Homs is very, very narrow. Yeah. But I'm not an expert. I want to read one more report that will make you happy, since you seem in a good mood. According to Axios, mediators believe the recent Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Homs were orchestrated by elements within the Iranian government. I told you that yesterday already, and you got angry at it already. By elements within the Iranian government opposed to the MOU and seeking to undermine it.
Speaker 0: I'm simply saying, what was the established written policy of Iran? The written policy was ship must register, provide all the information that we discussed yesterday, name of ship, destination, country of origin, et cetera, crew member identity, submit it, get approval, no problem. If you don't get approval, Iran's going to use force against you. So how is following that protocol being a rogue element? Would you explain that to me?
Speaker 1: Because I don't get it. I cannot explain it.
Speaker 0: You're putting me in difficult positions there, Larry. Yeah. So that's what I'm saying. This is just more Western propaganda to try to create a narrative in the West that justifies that Iran's the bad guys. We're the good guys. We've got to stop the evil.
Speaker 1: And this one claims there's a split in Iran. Someone also said Reuters reported that Iran claimed that the reason they attacked the ships was because of a malfunction, but I couldn't confirm that anywhere on Reuters. You can mute and speak to them. It's fine. But yeah, so someone said Reuters claimed that Iran said that a malfunction led them to strike the ships. But I saw that just before we were coming online. I looked everywhere. I couldn't find it on Reuters. So people could check it, but I've asked the team to check it. They couldn't find it. But there is a certain narrative. Okay, there's another report now. narrative being created there's another report that just came in now from abc a u.s official has told abc news that the iran u.s talks will be held tomorrow guess where islamabad no two more guesses let's do switzerland no one more guess oh washington dc israel tel aviv um in georgia oh yeah that yeah that
Speaker 0: Monkeys are going to fly out of my ass before that happens.
Speaker 1: So I'll read out the rest of the report from ABC. The Iranians came back to us and asked for more talks to try to settle some issues. So ABC is claiming the same thing as other outlets.
Speaker 0: So what they're doing with this narrative is saying, oh, Iran, and then when Iran doesn't show, they're going to say, see, the Iranians aren't serious. Therefore, we're going to have to show them. And how are we going to show them, oh, my God, we're going to bomb the hell out of them.
Speaker 1: So tomorrow we have talks in Pakistan, Switzerland, and Jordan. All three locations tomorrow simultaneously.
Speaker 0: Good Lord.
Speaker 1: All right. So that's on the Strait of Hormuz, on the negotiations. No strikes today. Not many ships. About half of what there were before the clash has recently gone through the Strait of Hormuz, unless there's more that turned off AIS transponders. But that's from what we could track. Then you've got the negotiations that are being held but not being held. You've got the military equipment, the military assets that have been moving out of the region in the last few days, potentially moving back if strikes are expected. We've got Trump talking about the ceasefire being dead. Two days ago, he said the MOU is dead, the ceasefire, sorry, being over. In a post this morning, Eyal Zamir, IDF chief, saying that they're expecting major operations against Iran, but that's, you know, Israel makes statements like this all the time. So that's kind of an overview of where we're at so far. There's more reports on negotiation. I'm just going to stop reading them in the last few hours, different outlets reporting different things. So then there's the story of the Trump assassination plot, which we talked about yesterday. There's updates on that one. Now, obviously, you took this report very seriously yesterday, started getting very concerned. So it all started with a report from, I think, CNN. US intelligence had detected a steady stream of reporting in recent weeks about possible Iranian plot to assassinate Trump. But the warning from Israel was new and referred to a more specific plot, according to CNN. So I think there was an initial one reported by Axios, and CNN reported it as well. But CNN is saying the plot remains unclear and American intelligence agencies have not independently verified the Israeli information. Then Barak Ravid puts out a report this morning citing two senior U.S. officials. He reports that Israeli intelligence did not share a specific organized detailed plan by Iran to assassinate Trump. The report consisted of Iranian figures merely discussing the matter. So essentially what they're saying is just a loose... Just Iranian leaders just having a discussion about it. So they've kind of walked down the report of an assassination plot. The New York Post then reported, Trump stated that he left instructions for a devastating response should Iran succeed in assassinating him. I've left instructions if anything happens to just literally bomb them at levels they've never seen before. I've been number one for a long time, and it's the way of life, or it's the way life is, as Trump is saying he's number one on their list. Now, I mentioned this to Alex Jones earlier today, and he said, Mario, this is the third time to his memory that Trump says something like this, where if I get killed, there's instructions left for U.S. officials or the Pentagon or whoever to bomb the hell out of Iran. But he told me that, Mario, based on American law, the Constitution, If the president is incapacitated, then any orders he's already given before becoming incapacitated or assassinated would become void. So him claiming that there's orders there because something happens to him is pretty useless.
Speaker 0: For heaven's sakes, why get tied up about what's legal or not? Oh, my God. He can do whatever he wants. He is God. Sorry. Alex is right. He's absolutely right. I'm just making fun of it.
Speaker 1: Yeah, he praised you. He mentioned you in the interview, I just remembered. But Alex's thoughts on this whole assassination thing, because that was the main topic I brought up to him, and then he digressed into many different topics. But his theory is that these are being leaked, or it is being leaked by Israel. That's according to Axios. But his worry, not theory, but his worry is that Israel is considering potentially assassinating Trump and then putting the blame on Iran to then force the US into war with Iran. But then the reason they're not doing it is because J.D. Vance will become president. And that's a bad thing for them because J.D. Vance is critical of Israel. He's not saying it's going to happen. He believes this is more likely than Iran assassinating Trump.
Speaker 0: Well, look. Number one, if it did happen to Trump, it would be called karma. He's responsible for the assassination of Soleimani and Khamenei. So it's like what goes around comes around. You can make that case. But look. this mythology, I'll call it the mythology of Iran assassinating characters. You know, I mentioned to you, I think yesterday, and I went back and looked up the details. I published it on sonar21.com. I think it was November 2nd of 2024. So there was this guy who was an Afghan national who had come to the United States as like an eight or nine year old back in 78. And he, when he became a teenager, late teens, like 18, 19, he got in trouble. He was guilty of robbery, criminal act, got convicted, sent to prison for 14 years. So it wasn't some minor offense.
Speaker 1: In which country? United States, New Jersey, New York. But he's a national, sorry, he's a national from Pakistan or Afghanistan?
Speaker 0: From Afghanistan. So he came from Afghanistan, but he got naturalized as a U.S. citizen. Or I guess he didn't get naturalized. So when he gets out of prison, they deport him. It's not clear where he got deported to, but the next we hear from him, he's in Sri Lanka. I had mistakenly said Singapore, Sri Lanka. And in Sri Lanka, he's caught up in a heroin deal. gets arrested by the local police. DEA shows up, makes a deal with him. CIA gets in on the deal. He walks, he gets out of prison. Next stop, Iran. He's working in an Iranian oil field. And then as the FBI story goes, the IRGC contacts him and says, oh, we want you to carry out some assassinations in the United States. So do you have some people that can do that? So he gets on the phone with some of his old prison buddies that are still living in the New York City area and gets them all, provides them money and this whole dramatic plot, but it is interrupted by the FBI. Dramatically, they saved the day. So this whole thing was staged. It was a complete setup. It was not an Iranian initiative, but that's how the story is being told. So this is just one more example of that.
Speaker 1: So obviously, I hope that the Iranians or the Israelis or nobody ends up killing Trump or no one kills any leader. I'd be surprised if the Iranians or the Iranian leadership are actually contemplating that option because it just makes no sense. And they made pragmatic decisions the same way Trump killing Ali Khamenei makes no sense whatsoever. And we've seen the consequences of that. It's just backfired miserably. And there's no benefit for the Iranians to go and kill President Trump. Now, I'm sure some of them are vengeful. There was actually a statement by, this is actually a good time to read the statement by Ali Khamenei's grandson. Let me see if I can find it. He was just kind of shows you the anger.
Speaker 0: Oh, yeah, I've seen it.
Speaker 1: Go ahead. Khamenei's grandson, Sayyid Ali Khamenei. Was it Khomeini?
Speaker 0: Okay, okay.
Speaker 1: Khomeini, yeah, Khomeini's grandson. So Khomeini is the former Supreme Leader, the one that died of natural causes in 1989, the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, the founder of it. And he died in 1989 before Ali Khamenei became Supreme Leader and he got killed earlier this year by Trump, by the US. He says the following, anyone who wants to negotiate in order to achieve peace with America is a traitor. And anyone who sends the messages of friendship has a foul and impure mouth. Our problem with America isn't an issue of today or yesterday. It started decades ago when they committed a coup against Iran. But with what they've done recently, killing Khamenei, they've planted a seed of enmity that will never go away. So this gives you an idea of the sentiment right now in Iran. And I wouldn't be surprised that you do get maybe an Iranian rogue actor. So enmity... is just just deep deep hatred just in case anyone like me just had to look up the exact definition so the a rogue actor a rogue commander a rogue soldier that does try to take trump's life you you would expect that if you go kill the religious leader of an entire religious sect of course there's going to be some hardliners or some people that are really angry with it or they find it to be like their religious uh mission to avenge the death of their leader Um, you know, I'm not deep into Shia Islam, you know, a lot more than I do about it, but, um, it's not far fetched to, I'm sure there are people coordinating potential assassination attempts against Trump because of that exact reason, because of Trump's assassination of Ali Khamenei. But I would, I would definitely not be in the camp where the, the, the, the Iranian government or the, um, IRGC would be planning something like that.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Yeah. No, it's look, this is all about create a narrative. that will then justify a US attack on Iran, renewing the combat. And what's going to happen out of that is no ships will be coming out of the Persian Gulf going to the United States. The United States absolutely needs the Persian Gulf crude, because there is not enough of that heavy crude or the sour crude as it's called, sour because it's high sulfur content that's needed in those refineries in order to produce diesel and aircraft and aviation fuel. So that means there are going to be shortages. And those shortages, those are going to start becoming severe in the next week or two.
Speaker 1: Well, the report of Axios that, we'll get back to that in a sec, because that goes back to what we were discussing earlier about the negotiations. More details on the report where they're asking Iran for guarantees they won't strike ships. Just one last thing on the assassination story of Iranians talking about assassinating Trump. Trump heard about the report. That's why he mentioned it in Ankara. And he flew home from Turkey aboard the old Air Force One. after U.S. officials received Israeli intelligence about a possible Iranian plot to assassinate him, according to the Wall Street Journal. Although the reported threat was not considered fully credible, officials determined that Trump's newly overhauled Qatari-donated aircraft lacked some of the defensive capabilities required for an elevated risk mission. Trump flew the older Air Force One from Turkey to the U.K. before switching back to the newer aircraft for the final leg to Washington.
Speaker 0: Okay, so they've had... They've had this threat information for more than a week and a half, right?
Speaker 1: I don't know.
Speaker 0: So he...
Speaker 1: Wait a second.
Speaker 0: I mean, he flew... Did he fly over on the old presidential jet?
Speaker 1: I think he did. I think he flew on the Qatari one.
Speaker 0: Well, apparently not. I could be wrong. Let me check. I think what they're saying is, you know, that's why he flew the old jet.
Speaker 1: No, he flew the old jet on his way back from Ankara to the UK. That's when he flew the old jet. I think, if I saw the reports correctly, he came to Ankara with the Qatari one. I'll let people fact-check me. But then flew back on the older one and then flew the UK to the US on the Qatari one. I'll check now in a second on Grok just to make sure I'm accurate on that point because I know where you're going with this, so I'll check it for you. But let me read out the access report that just came in. So I'll read out the exact quote. You know how I said earlier, the Americans were...
Speaker 0: Excuse me for a second. Is it our friend Barak?
Speaker 1: This one, no, it's just Axios, not Barak Ravid.
Speaker 0: Well, it doesn't say who the author is.
Speaker 1: It doesn't say. Usually, if it's Barak, they always write Barak. I'm not looking at Axios' website. I'm looking at those websites that share things. Whenever it's Barack, they mention his name. But no, this is a story I read earlier that I'm just reading the whole full context out of it. They said, we want Iran to publicly say they will stop shooting at ships and explicitly or at least implicitly acknowledge that they screwed up. So they're asking for an apology. We are working on that now, one U.S. official said. We expect the Iranians to say that every channel on the strait will be open and that it will be toll-free. A second U.S. official said there will be harsh consequences if Iran refuses. So this is kind of the full story where the Americans are asking Iran to officially announce the Strait of Homs is open both the Omani and Iranian side and will be toll-free. Both sides will be open and toll-free. And also they want an apology that the strikes where the Iranians screwed up with those strikes. So pretty big demand.
Speaker 0: And I bet they want to... striped unicorn for Christmas.
Speaker 1: That's not included in the article. I'm sure the unicorn would be easier, I guess.
Speaker 0: Yeah, yeah, yeah. You know, this is, again, this is all just kabuki theater. They're trying to do their own version of putting Iran into a corner and Iran's not playing. You know, I found out that in preparation for possible negotiations, a U.S. deconfliction cell went to Dubai. I believe it was either Doha or Dubai. And they were supposed to meet with the IRGC. IRGC, you know, didn't show up. When was that, before or recent? Two days ago, three days ago.
Speaker 1: was very different to the reporting or the narrative yeah well the iranians said that there's no plans to negotiate as i read earlier according to first news but we've seen that in previous negotiations we've seen that a lot where the americans like oh we're meeting them remember that day when i think it was in pakistan and the iranians decided not to go jd vance and krishna were meant to go and then trump said oh i cancelled jd vance and krishna from going to pakistan it was after the iranians said they're not going arachi was going to pakistan and he said oh i have nothing on my calendar to meet kushner and whitcoff and then trump then made it seem like he cancelled kushner whitcoff but it was because arachi didn't want to see them so we've seen this player the whole time trying to control the narrative um let's move on to israel so some stories here so cnn reports that the trump administration does not want israel involved And one source told CNN that Netanyahu would really want to join the U.S. strikes. But the U.S. made it clear that Israel's participation is unwanted. Another story is that the, I didn't save it. Actually, I did here. Also, another report here from Car News. The U.S. asked Israel to refrain from carrying out sensitive, so they use the word sensitive, military operations in southern Lebanon. prompting Israel's political leadership to freeze all IDF operations in Lebanon. So just two reports here that the Americans are like, hey, we don't want you to join on these strikes in Iran. Also, we don't want you to do anything sensitive in Lebanon. And we've seen that massive de-escalation in Lebanon, but not a ceasefire. There's daily strikes, including today. There was one a couple of hours ago. Very small strikes. There was one drone strike on a vehicle in the morning, I think, and one strike in Nabatiyeh, Fakwa, that place they always strike. three hours ago, two hours ago. So it's not a ceasefire, but definitely a big de-escalation. Now, this is where I want to get your thoughts on it. This comes to Turkey. Israeli Minister of Energy Eli Cohen, quote, we have to make sure Turkey does not establish itself militarily in Syria. I said in the cabinet, if Turkey wants to establish military bases in Syria, then we will establish bases there as well. So it's getting dangerous and that comes literally today. Also Turkey was, they had an official, a foreign minister or someone in Lebanon meeting the Lebanese prime minister. Um, so Turkey seems to be expanding or they have been for a while, their influence. In what they consider their sphere of influence, which includes Syria and now Lebanon. And you've got Israel's energy minister. I don't know what the energy minister has to do with these discussions, but that's well, because, because
Speaker 0: Israel is dependent upon Turkey for its supply of oil. That's why. Yeah, good point. Does that make sense?
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah. So that's one. And there's also talks about, because we're talking about Syria here, there's the reports that we spoke about it, I think. There's plans to develop. Macron was in Syria talking about building a pipeline from the Gulf through Syria to the Mediterranean. So Macron talked about it yesterday.
Speaker 0: there's yeah and we did and we discussed that yesterday as well we did yeah yeah you know that's uh that that you you know you'll probably be a 65 year old guy before that happens if if it happens and then i'll be like when i was 60 i told that larry me and larry talked about this 30 years ago who's larry Uncle Larry, check on YouTube.
Speaker 1: Check on YouTube. What's YouTube?
Speaker 0: Yeah. Some crazy old coot, you know, just ignore him. He's just an angry old man. That's all he is.
Speaker 1: And then he says the following. We must work with the United States to prevent Turkey from obtaining advanced weapons. We must insist that our greatest ally, the U.S., preserve Israel's quantitative military edge. The pipeline, and then he says the pipeline between Israel and Cyprus will be built. We know how to defend ourselves and no one can dictate terms to us. We have proven over the past two and a half years that those who threatened the state of Israel do not end well. Um, did we talk about, so this is, um, a pipeline that Israel wants to build. Do you know about it between Israel and Cyprus?
Speaker 0: I hadn't heard about that.
Speaker 1: I can't remember the details of it either, but it's not being built. It's just a plan. There's nothing concrete yet. blue sky but um did we talk about the s-400s turkey wanting to sell the s-400s to a gulf country we didn't talk about it yesterday did we did they want to sell them Yeah, so they wanted to be able to get the F-35s. They want to sell them. They're speculating it's the UAE that's buying them. And Peskov, I think, made a statement saying this is a sensitive matter. We are discussing it with the Turks. Because I think if they sell it to any country, the Russians have to approve that country getting them. And this is all part of the process, I guess, for Turkey to get the F-35s, which I know you're a fan of.
Speaker 0: Yeah, this is... Well, actually, I could see Israel supporting, actually secretly supporting Turkey getting the F-35s. as opposed to getting like a fifth-generation fighter or even fourth-generation fighter from Russia or China. Because if they get the F-35, Israel knows that out of any 10 F-35s, Turkey's only going to be able to put two or three in the air. The other seven or eight will be sitting in a hangar somewhere broken. Whereas if they get a Russian or Chinese version, 10 of those, Eight out of ten of those will be ready to go. And they'll be actually cheaper, too. Less expensive. Not cheaper in the sense of less quality.
Speaker 1: But the F-35 is a fifth generation, isn't it? I could be wrong.
Speaker 0: No, I think it's fifth generation. So, you know, Russia, China could sell fifth generation to Turkey. You think you like theirs better? Oh, heavens, yes. Hey, they're cheaper. less cost per hour to maintain and they're just as good. It's one thing to pay $100 million a plane, vice $60 million a plane.
Speaker 1: Why wouldn't the Turks buy them though if they have the S-400s? They've been trying to get the F-35s for years.
Speaker 0: They're like the ugly kid in high school that wanted to date the cheerleader. You know, please, I'll do anything to date the cheerleader. Please, okay, sell your soul. Okay. Yeah, that's ridiculous. The Turks have lost. They got no self-respect left. No insult to my Turkish friends, but by God, folks, what's going on with Erdogan and his the way he just grovels. Oh my God. He's like Steppenfetchit. Steppenfetchit was back in like the 30s or 40s. He was this caricature black. He was a black American. But man, they made him appear dumb and shiftless and just, you know, it was the most racist portrayal Now, the guy that played Step and Fetch It, he laughed his ass off to the bank. I mean, he became a millionaire. So, you know, he didn't mind humiliating himself. But yeah, there he is, you know. And, you know, he'd walk over, yes, master, what do you want me to do? What you want me to do? You know, so he wouldn't even talk proper English. So again, it was the most racist character, and Hollywood thought it was entertaining. at the time. Not anymore.
Speaker 1: I'm just looking him up. He's from the 1930s. That's the best example you can come up with. Come up with Dumb and Dumber.
Speaker 0: That's one everyone could relate to. Yeah. It doesn't fit the description. Let's put Erdogan's face on that. Oh, man.
Speaker 1: You're going to get me in trouble. If I want to try, we're discussing trying to get you.
Speaker 0: It's not you. It's me. Have them get mad at me. Okay, okay.
Speaker 1: That was Larry Johnson that suggested that. All right. So there's one more thing on the – okay, interesting. The Israeli estimates suggest the U.S. and Iran are returning to the diplomatic path. Okay. That's Israel. Holy shit. So when does Israel estimate diplomacy? Israeli estimates – estimates – Israel estimates or Israeli estimates suggest that the U.S. and Iran are returning to the diplomatic path, Channel 13. Okay. Channel 11, following a U.S. request, a political echelon has ordered the Israeli military to freeze all operations considered sensitive in southern Lebanon. I mentioned that already. And the Financial Times just said the U.S. has sent a team to Beirut to ensure a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. Of course. One day it's horrible, the world's coming to an end. The next day everything looks better and everything's over.
Speaker 0: So you are sending mixed messages, huh? So I actually, if they really have sent a team to Beirut to tell the Israelis, stand the hell down, stop it, then that would suggest the U.S. is doing what it can to try to make up to the Iranians. So they're putting out all this bold talk. They're threatening Iran. And then they'll tell the story, oh, Iran caved to our threats. Iran did no such thing. But the Turks... the Turks, I imagine, and particularly the Pakistanis, Qataris to an extent, they're begging and pleading with Iran, please, please don't throw this away. We've got to get this straight back open. But, you know, you can't ignore the political pressure that is now on the government in Iran. After 45 million people in the streets chanting, revenge, revenge, revenge. Not... Not, you know, bend over and let the United States sodomize you.
Speaker 1: Well, this quote from Khomeini's grandson, I think it's really important. And I think something is just being underestimated by all these different think tanks. But with what they've done recently, killing Khamenei, they've planted a seed of deep hatred, enmity, that will never go away. The U.S. planted a seed of hatred, of deep hatred, that will never go away. That's what the U.S. has done with Iran. I'd say that's right.
Speaker 0: You can't do that many assassinations and then expect everybody to come back and say, hey, why can't we be friends? Well, because you're a bunch of murdering bastards. That's why.
Speaker 1: On the Israeli front, Smotrich, of course, said something stupid as always. There is one thing, in a sense, that hurts the enemy. Land. Whoever gets involved with us will lose land forever. And then Smotrich says that Witkoff told him privately, according to Matzov, I will not let 2 million Nazis live next to your children along the border fence. According to Smotrich, Witkoff made the remark after being shown footage and intelligence from Gaza, saying the visit changed his understanding of the security situation. Witkoff didn't comment on this. But they're putting this statement out as Witkoff implying that they will not let 2 million Nazis, so the Palestinians, the 2 million Palestinians in Gaza to live in Gaza. So that's how Smatrich is interpreting that statement that Witkoff made in private and Witkoff hasn't commented on it. So it could be BS. Let's hope it's BS. But yeah, that's your daily update. We've talked about, that's your daily update on the Israeli front, mainly rhetoric around Erdogan, around Turkey, talking about Lebanon, Sorry, yeah, talking about Lebanon, they have a lot of limitations, restrictions on what they could do in Lebanon. We've talked about Turkey's potentially selling the S-400 air defense systems, according to the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg, in an effort to clear the way for purchasing the F-35 fighters. The proposal came months after Erdogan suggested returning the S-400 systems to Russia. an idea that gained little support. Ankara also proposed keeping the S-400s while allowing U.S. oversight of its operations to address concerns that the systems could compromise the F-35 stealth capabilities. So just for the audience, the S-400s are the, I think, the most advanced air defense systems from Russia, one of the most advanced.
Speaker 0: They are a step down from the S-500 and the S-550, but they are the most effective air defense system in the world. They outperform Patriot, Thad, David Sling, Iron Dome, all of that. They don't even compare.
Speaker 1: Yeah, so the reason that countries can't have the S-400 and the F-35, which is a law that the U.S. has, is to avoid the air defense systems of another country being able to... So to not compromise the stealth capabilities of the F-35. Because if a country has the S-400 and the F-35, then the S-400 will be able to get data from the F-35 operating in the same vicinity.
Speaker 0: Yeah, yeah. It'll be able to reverse engineer it. Conflict of interest, yeah. So that's the law.
Speaker 1: That's why there's talks of...
Speaker 0: But for the life of me, I don't understand why Turkey's so eager to get the F-35. I mean, Turkey's getting the Turkey.
Speaker 1: That's it. We can talk Ukraine. I'll save it for tomorrow.
Speaker 0: You know what you forgot to cover? What General Zeluzny said in the Telegraph yesterday. What did he say? Well, if you don't know, I guess I can't tell you. It must be classified. No, Zeluzny said, zaluzhny went on the attack against all these people who were saying that russia was losing the war he said that's crazy that's irresponsible and it's dangerous so he said he who said i didn't understand okay let me hang on let me find it so zaluzhny is the ukrainian general correct uh so Here's what he said. In an opinion, Zelushny was the head, he was the commander in chief of the Ukrainian army. He's now the Ukraine's ambassador to the UK. And he just published an opinion piece in the Telegraph, which appeared two days ago, July 8th. And in it, he cautioned against the growing Western narrative that Russia has effectively lost the war. He described such claims as a dangerous misreading of the war. While acknowledging Ukraine's had some tactical successes, such as deep strikes on Russian oil infrastructure and logistics, he argued these should not be over-interpreted as strategic victory. The war has become a war of attrition where success is measured in small gains at high cost, and the outcome will depend on which side can sustain the economic, military, and psychological burden longer. along with consistent international support. He warned that Russia retains significant advantages in manpower, industrial capacity, and resilience, and that assuming defeat could lead to complacency in the West. Huh. And you know what? I agree with him 110%.
Speaker 1: I've got another story on the Ukrainian front since we're talking about Ukraine as well. I'll put that in the mix so we can mix them all together. According to Reuters, Putin is rejecting calls to negotiate peace with Ukraine with recent Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries and ports, strengthening his resolve to continue the war, according to three sources close to the Kremlin. Putin is instead likely to escalate the conflict in the coming months, with one source describing a high probability of further escalation. One source familiar with Putin's thinking said the Russian leader has dug in his heels on capturing the remainder of Ukraine's Donbas region and recently rebuked advisors who proposed a ceasefire along the current front lines. Another source said Putin believes Russian forces will soon secure the rest of the Donbas. So according to this Reuters report, the strikes by Ukraine on the oil refineries inside Russia, instead of pressuring Putin to want to end the war earlier, it's strengthening his resolve to actually continue the war and not rejecting calls to negotiate peace. That's according to Reuters as well. Yeah, yeah.
Speaker 0: No, Peskov said it twice this week. This is no longer a special military operation. This is war. You know, hello. You know, I can understand Russian translated into English. All you got to do, you know, my old friend Ray McGovern, you know, he always said, and he is a genuine Russia. I don't present myself as a Russian expert. I know Russians. I know some history. But, you know, Ray's a bona fide expert. As he said, listen to what the Russians say. They mean what they say. They're not the type that sit there and blow smoke up people's ass.
Speaker 1: Well, there's one more story here. This one I don't think you'll agree with. Zelensky said China warned Russia against using nuclear weapons in response to Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory. He learned of Beijing's intervention from European leaders at the NATO summit in Ankara, where they discussed China's role in ending the war. Quote, Zelensky said that when Russia... When Russian media raised the possibility of nuclear response, it seems to me that this was the first time China directly responded in an ultimatum-like form, that there can be no thought whatsoever of using nuclear weapons. There's been a report like this for a while.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I'm sure the Chinese called up Zelensky and told him, here's what we're telling Putin.
Speaker 1: Now, according to Zelensky, NATO told him that at the NATO summit.
Speaker 0: yeah i'm sure nato's they're they're so chinese love to talk to nato i mean my god you know they're they're like really close no that's nato that's nato's incredible intelligence larry they have uh jinping's uh home bugged yeah so you know it's just you know we're gonna watch uh i fully anticipate that uh uh us is gonna strike iran within the next 24 hours And then Iran's going to be on a retaliatory strike. But what they said is, you know, basically, if that happens, they said they're going to close the strait, you know, Bab al-Mandab in the Red Sea, and they're going to withdraw from the NPT. Those are the two threats on the table. So we'll see. Those threats may prevent the United States from following through on, you know, what appears to be
Speaker 1: uh efforts underway to re you know to attack iran some more yeah well hopefully um hopefully cooler heads prevail and we don't see that we get a bit of a break this week well that would be nice so you can watch the we can all watch the world cup while you watch tanker trackers oh yeah well tomorrow i'll be hosting
Speaker 0: You know, my friend whose birthday is on the 4th of July, he was unable to make it because he had to be at the bedside of an old friend that was dying. So we're doing the party tomorrow. Oh, nice. That's good. Well deserved. Hopefully there's no strikes. Yeah. So if there are, it doesn't affect me.
Speaker 1: I'm glad. Larry, thank you so much as always.
Speaker 0: All right, my friend. Uh, we'll see you probably on Sunday then.
Speaker 1: I'll see you on Sunday.
Speaker 0: Okay. Take care.
Speaker 1: Bye-bye. Take care, Larry. Um, all right guys. So this is it. Um, a recap of the news, just so you're in the loop. Um, it seems to me that, you know, my theory has been that this is all a fight about the straight of homos. This is not, the U S did not want to start the war when the bombings were happening. I was pretty confident that this is the U S trying to, using the stick against Iran to convince them to stop pursuing a fee of the Strait of Hormuz, stop trying to control the Strait of Hormuz and blocking the Omani side. And the Iranis did not retaliate aggressively because they don't need to. All the Iranis need to do is just close the Strait of Hormuz or keep controlling the Strait of Hormuz. So the Americans are pretty adamant to make sure that Iran does not charge a fee. And if you've heard many of my guests, including former military personnel from the U.S., One of the common themes was a lot of them would say is that there is no circumstances in which the US would accept a fee at the Strait of Hormuz. But then the counter argument to this is what can the Americans do? And we're seeing that unfold right now. We're seeing what the Americans can do and we're gonna see exactly whether it works or not in the next few weeks and months. Now, remember there's a carrot and stick A week ago, if you remember, the US was giving the carrot to the Iranians. They were offering them, according to reports from Axios, they were saying, hey, we'll lift a lot of sanctions. You can make a lot more money if we lift the sanctions. Then you can make charging a fee at the Strait of Hormuz. We can unfreeze a lot of assets. So that was the carrot, trying to convince Iran not to charge a fee. The Omanis are stuck in the middle. On one day, they say they're not going to charge a fee like they did yesterday. And two days before that, we get reports that they've offered a proposal to the Americans, which includes a fee. So there's Oman stuck in the middle. There's the Iranians saying there's no circumstances in which we won't charge a fee. And there's the Americans saying there's no circumstances in which we will allow you to charge a fee. So we will, in my view, we will continue seeing this back and forth strikes. It got a lot more aggressive than I expected a couple of days ago, three days ago. I didn't expect it to get to that level. But we don't know what they were striking. So we don't know how extensive they were because we don't know what the targets were. But there was a lot of ordnance dropped, the biggest since the ceasefire started. So that gives you an idea of what we're seeing right now. That's why I keep saying the war is not over. I posted a few days ago, the MOU is not dead. Yesterday, actually, or two days ago, the MOU is not dead because I just see that as a power struggle between the two. Now, is it possible this could get out of control? Yes, this is what the escalation trap is all about. This is what Professor Pape tells me about all the time when I have him on. So these are the things that concern him and anyone watching this. So that's on the shadow homos. Then we have the other sticking point that we've talked about, which is Lebanon. And on that front, it's been looking pretty positive. I know a lot of people want Israel to get out of Lebanon. I've always said this would be very, very difficult, very difficult to achieve. I hold the belief, I'm flexible on that belief, but I do think Iran may give up their demand for Israel to pull out of Lebanon. Because for them, this is less important than Hezbollah. You guys, I've said this before, so you know exactly what I mean. Iran want to make sure Hezbollah remains strong. But for Iranian interests, Israel remaining in South Lebanon or taking their time and pulling out of South Lebanon... it does not work against Iranian interests. So this is not a big priority for them. The biggest priority for the Iranians right now is to get their economy going. And I think the Strait of Hormuz has always been and will continue to be the main sticking point. I think we will see negotiations in the next couple of days. I don't expect strikes, but I could be completely wrong. It's impossible to predict those things. I just don't know. I'm optimistic short-term. I'm pretty concerned medium to long-term. but my biggest concern remains proxy wars we've talked about you know turkey's in lebanon right now was there today and there's macon was in syria there was this terrorist attack that the explosion there and macon was in syria a couple days ago trump was meeting al-shara the israelis keep talking about syria turkey keeps talking about syria um al-shara was in ankara and he had a private meeting with erdogan um so syria is going to be um um one of the the important flash points in this proxy war between iran and the us and israel and the gulf yemen is another big one so i'll prob we'll probably see a lot of instability in those two countries we'll likely see the same thing in lebanon but i don't expect full-blown war in israel the us or iran based on where we are right now um but i i i'm not in trump's head i don't know how far the us is willing to go to ensure iran does not control the strata hummus And I also don't know how far Iran is willing to go to ensure they charge a fee at the Strait of Homs. And whether there is anything the Iranians will accept in return for giving up control of the Strait of Homs. If I had to guess, pure speculation, I would, that's a really tough one. This is a 50-50 guess, okay? This is probably something I would usually avoid saying. But I wouldn't be too surprised if the Iranians don't end up charging a fee. they get significant sanctions lifted but i also won't be surprised if they do end up getting charging a fee i'm literally 50 50 on this i have no idea it's very very tough to see what's going to happen whether what will happen with the strata almost but i'm still confident the war has not restarted and i hope we won't see many skirmishes like we saw in the last three days um all right guys i hope that overview um has been beneficial i hope you enjoyed today's conversations And I will see you tomorrow. Let me see my schedule for tomorrow. Tomorrow, we have Mima Rostami, who has his own YouTube channel. We have Vladimir Brovkin. We have Robert O'Neill. Isn't Robert O'Neill the former SEAL that killed Osama bin Laden? It is, yeah. So Robert O'Neill will be on. Brendan Wykert will be on. And we'll see who else they'll add to my calendar. Hope you enjoyed today's coverage. Thanks, everyone. I'll go through the comments now. Bye-bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m hearing analyst Tom Luongo argue that Trump isn’t “fighting Iran” for the Strait of Hormuz; he’s using it to weaken Europe’s ability to finance the Ukraine war. He says energy costs constrain European borrowing and industrial competitiveness, limiting funding for Ukraine. He adds that many leaders backed Ukraine expecting access to Russia’s resources to repay debts—if that fails, they’re stuck.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Market Analyst Tom Luongo says Trump isn't fighting Iran to control the Strait of Hormuz; he's using the Strait to break Europe's ability to finance the Ukraine war. Most people see Iran and Ukraine as two separate conflicts, but Tom thinks they're the same war being fought on different fronts. His argument is that oil is the collateral that underpins the modern economy. The more expensive and uncertain energy becomes, the harder it is for European governments to borrow cheaply, keep their industries competitive, and continue funding Ukraine at the current pace. That's why he thinks the Strait of Hormuz matters so much, because whoever controls the world's most important energy chokepoint also influences the financial foundations that wars are fought on. Trump can't simply announce the end of the Ukraine war, even if he wants to, because too many powerful interests are invested in keeping the conflict going. So instead of attacking the war directly, Tom believes Trump is attacking the economic conditions that make the war possible. He also made one of the interview's boldest claims: Europe has poured so much money into Ukraine because many European leaders expected the war to eventually open the door to Russia's vast natural resources, providing the cash flows needed to justify years of borrowing and military spending. If that never happens, they're left with enormous debts and very few ways to pay them back. Most people think the shortest route to ending the war in Ukraine runs through Kyiv, but Tom thinks it runs through the Strait of Hormuz. And if he's right, we've been looking at the wrong map all along. @TFL1728
Video Transcript AI Summary
Mario asks Tom for an overall analysis of the current situation and where it is headed, citing rising instability around Iran and key shipping routes. He notes that, after Trump posted that Iran asked him to continue talks and that the parties had agreed, the ceasefire was declared over following U.S. bombing of Iran over two days (described as the heaviest since the ceasefire), with a third day of bombing attributed to “most likely Bahrain and Kuwait.” He adds that Iran retaliated against Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, and fired one strike at Qatar “looks like a warning strike.” According to Kepler data, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz/Homs area collapsed, with only 22 ships passing since yesterday—mostly on the Iranian side rather than the normal 40–50—while some military assets moved slightly out of the region.
Tom says he takes a “third way,” arguing Iran has never been the real target of the broader war framework. He describes Ukraine, Lebanon, and Israel as not fully sovereign in his view, and frames Iran similarly—as connected to networks of larger powers. He argues Trump’s actions are part of a larger strategic picture targeting global trade “choke points,” including the Strait of Hormuz, and that escalation is a response pattern to “poking” major pressure points and triggering reactions. He links the current pattern to prior episodes he mentions involving Ukraine in 2022, and other Trump moves he says crossed “big red lines,” producing reactions.
Tom explains his central connection: by pressuring oil flows out of Hormuz, Europe cannot afford energy (“the collateral on which the money moves”), making it difficult for Europe to keep resupplying Ukraine with personnel, logistics, and support. He adds details about a nearly failed German bond auction, where $6 billion (6 billion euros) in bonds were offered but only $3.9 billion sold, forcing pricing “at five basis points” over the prior issue. He claims oil prices and energy access matter for Europe’s ability to sustain the Ukraine war effort.
He further argues that Trump and “emergent civilian leadership in Iran” are distinct from the IRGC in his framing, and that ceasefires and agreements repeatedly fail. He says he sees a cycle: when negotiators sign agreements that cross a red line, the IRGC forces a reaction, then the U.S. responds, assets are expended, and hostilities resume—until civilian leadership gains enough power to restrain the IRGC. He also says the recent three-day bombing campaign feels “very different,” implying escalation into “real siege warfare.”
Mario asks about an Axios report stating that mediators believe recent Iranian attacks on commercial vessels were orchestrated by elements within Iran’s government opposed to the MOU and seeking to undermine it. Tom agrees he was on a similar track, adding that the larger aim is to “flip Iran out of the camp of the chaos regime” and constrain control of oil choke points that he says support leverage over Ukraine and China.
Tom then argues the objective for Europe is not cheap energy but degradation of Europe’s ability to fund Ukraine: Europe needs energy and collateral for funding flows, yet Trump’s actions remove collateral. He also says Trump is constrained by domestic U.S. politics and that he cannot end supply “because he has a political problem at home” and must “play the game.” He argues Putin hedges because policy may change and says intelligence assets and conflict infrastructure must be destroyed to prevent restarting conflict later.
As the discussion narrows, Tom says he does not believe Trump must control the Strait of Hormuz directly; instead, he wants an Iran “not a failed state,” with a more friendly government, and frames the desired end state as bringing Iran into the “community of nations.” He says the conflict is tied to institutions and “lines not crossed,” and envisions Gulf/Arab governments managing themselves through new regional frameworks similar to what he calls a “Gaza Board of Peace.”
In the final question about scheduled talks in Switzerland next week amid reports of explosions in Iran (including a fire in Lorestan province at a refinery), Tom says he expects escalation to continue “for a few more months” in an “off on again” cycle, and advises watching the Iranian negotiators to see what they agree on and where differences emerge. He says permanent resolution is unlikely until after U.S. midterms, because Trump lacks “political stability” to build durable outcomes, and then legal processes move slower than political and market time.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Tom, pleasure to speak to you. How are you? I'm good, Mario. It's good to actually try and make this one work as opposed to what happened the last time. So I'm looking forward to it.
Speaker 1: So we have, as we were coming online, Trump posted that Iran has asked him to continue the talks. We have agreed to do so, blah, blah, blah. But then he says the ceasefire is over. That comes after a few days of bombing where the U.S., three days of the, no, two days of the U.S. bombing Iran. the heaviest bombing since the ceasefire. And then a third day where no one knows who bombed Iran, not sure if you saw that yesterday, most likely Bahrain and Kuwait. And then Iran retaliating against Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and one strike against Qatar, looks like a warning strike. And then the traffic through the Strait of Homs collapsed. According to Kepler, since the fighting began, only 22, so since yesterday, only 22 ships have gone through. just one vessel on the Mani channel and all the others on the Iranian side, which is much less than the 40 to 50 that we're going through in recent weeks since the ceasefire. That's the reality we're going through right now. All this is happening while military equipment, military assets in the last few days have moved, not too much, but moving out of the region, some military assets. But, Tom, before we get into oil prices, the Strait of Hormuz closure, pretty low oil prices. This is the first time we chat, so I want to kind of get your general analysis of the state of affairs right now, and more importantly, where you think this is headed, because everyone is split. Some people think the war is over and this is just clashes because of disagreements on the Strait of Hormuz. Others think because of Lebanon, because of Hormuz, or because the US has an objective that has not been achieved of controlling the Strait of Hormuz or causing regime change, that they will continue the war until that objective is achieved. I'd love to ask an open-ended question because I kind of would love a brain dump from you.
Speaker 0: Sure. So I'm going to take a third way on this because, of course, this is kind of what I do, right, which is to say this war is really – Iran has never really been the target of this war because I don't really see Iran the same way I've never saw Ukraine or Lebanon or even Israel and others as sovereign nations. I see them as – I hate to use the word like satrap. honestly, but they are playthings of vaster powers. In Ukraine's case, it's NATO and the European Union and previous US administrations. In Iran, what we've learned over the last couple of years, especially since Trump's come back to office, is that they were really just like all the Gulf states. Everybody was kind of like... Just in bed with that same kind of architecture, what you would call city of London or, you know, whatever, however you want to phrase it. So to me, I'm looking at Trump in a much more bigger strategic picture than Iran itself. Iran looks to me like a poke, like you poke the snake in the heart of their heart. of their you know of their nest and then see what reaction you get and the reaction we've gotten is very very similar to the same reaction we got with ukraine for example when putin had to move in ukraine in 2022 or every time trump tries to do something domestically that crosses a big red line and then you see a big ab reaction from either domestic you know the the domestic policy front something like the la riots last year he poked um the the the NGOs and the cartels and that created, you know, race riots and, you know, and a response. So all of these things are to me, they're all kind of the same thing. And just each time he's done this, it's a bigger and bigger state. So he starts with a laundromat in L.A. and then he moves to trying to solve the war in Ukraine. And then he like takes takes out Maduro in Venezuela, again, poking a part of that network that exists. And now Iran is kind of like the final chapter of that. Because Iran, in my way of thinking, is a linchpin to solving Ukraine, to solving Israel, to solving Turkey, to solving all of these things, because there are old relationships all the way across the board with European, old colonial powers of Europe, some of whom are British, some of whom are French. The interests are everywhere, Dutch, all of it. And at the end of the day, the big question is, is Trump trying to rewire the world's global trade away from these geographical choke points that the Strait of Hormuz represents, that the Straits of Florida vis-a-vis Cuba represents, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore represent, that Gibraltar and all the others. And so when you take a step back and get away from the microcosm and you take a look at the big board, like, quote, you know, George C. Scott from Dr. Strange, let's look at the big board, you get a different strategic picture. Because who's really in the crosshairs here? How do you solve Ukraine? My friend Joaquin Flores made the point the other day, he was on with Crypto Rich, and he said, Trump's, you know, putting, continuing to put pressure on oil flows out of Hormuz makes it very difficult for the warmongers in NATO and the EU to continue supplying Ukraine to fight Russia. So solving... Iran in many ways is solving Ukraine. You asked the open ended question there, Mario, and you're going to get the open ended Tom Luongo answer. I'm going to go on for 20 minutes about this.
Speaker 1: I love it. So how would that pull back Ukraine? Can you just make that connection again?
Speaker 0: Sure. Well, just think of it this way. At the end of the day, the Europeans have to have enough energy, diesel, fuel, gasoline, this, that, and everything else. Now we're getting just on the raw military logistics stuff. How do they continually resupply the Ukrainian front? with men, material, personnel, logistics, support and everything else, if they can't afford to pay for oil and they can't continue to also float debt at low interest rates based on low energy prices. Like this is an interesting thing. I was like, we're doing this in the morning after a nearly failed German bond auction. So again, this is kind of, to me, none of these things, none of these things are by Germany. It wasn't failed, but it wasn't a particularly good one. They offered up $6 billion worth of bonds, or 6 billion euros worth of bonds, and they only sold 3.9 billion. And they had to sell them at 5... at five basis points over the one issued, which, if you know anything about bond auctions, is a horribly tailing auction. If that was a similar auction here in America, everybody would be like, oh, my God, the world is going to end, right?
Speaker 1: Exactly. Exactly. Okay. So essentially getting that oil, that energy oil and gas, but mainly oil out of the shadow for Europe is necessary so Europe could keep affording the war in Ukraine.
Speaker 0: can keep supporting Ukraine's war effort. Again, it's multifaceted. We could take 20 minutes and kind of go through a lot of the things. But just in general, like they need oil is collateral, right? We all focus on money and price and this and everything else. But oil is the collateral on which the money moves, right? It's really important to separate money from collateral. And, you know, what Trump is doing here is this is why I I'm going to back up for a couple of seconds and say, look, I think that Trump and the emergent civilian leadership in Iran, not the IRGC, I make a separation, not the IRGC, not the theocracy or what's left of the theocracy. I see those as two separate factions and I see them as actually in many ways serving separate masters or serving separate agendas or purposes. So when I watch multiple ceasefires, MOUs, this, that, everything else. And I see them fail over and over and over again. It's similar to, will we make a deal? Will we not make a deal with Zelensky? We walk Zelensky up to the line to make a deal with Putin, and then he backs away at the last second, and we see a bombing of a Russian apartment complex, right? It's a similar situation. What I've noticed, and correct me if I'm wrong here, but this is what I've noticed, is that every time Trump and the negotiators get together, Iranian negotiators get together, they sign some kind of agreement which crosses some red line, the IRGC and then by extension, I would argue, London European old moneyed interest who have, I think, an agenda to continue to keep the chaos because they make a premium off the chaos. Lloyds of London makes a premium off the insurance contracts, all of that stuff. So when you look at it that way, They cross the red line. That forces a reaction, just like poking a laundromat that's laundering money for the cartels in L.A. They then turn around and create a Mexican race riot, but you've got to light up all those. You've got to move money. You've got to light up all those previously dark bank accounts and funding networks and everything else. So now you're mapping all that. It's the same thing that's been happening with the U.S. and Iran since the war started. Every time you do this, you The model is really simple. Cross a red line, force a reaction. You move a pawn, and then you force them to move a bishop. And this is, again, I don't like to think of Trump as a chess player. I like to think of him as a poker player. But you watch that, and then boom. Then we have more hostilities. And that has to light up new IRGC assets that were playing possum, to use an American phrase, playing dead. And then they light up. And then they shoot something off and then they expend an asset and then we go and blow them up. And then we come back to the table and we do it again. And why there's no more. And there's no, what I'm getting at here is like the end game is at some point, the emergent civilian, uh, leadership in iran will get to a point where they have enough power to be able to put a tamp on the irgc that was the strategy i don't know if we're at that point because it feels like this bombing campaign of the last three days feels like something very different meaning trump has been forced to go to the to the state that he doesn't want to which is to effectively start the real siege warfare against the iranian people which i don't i don't think he ever wanted to do okay
Speaker 1: Okay, so I'm going to mention a report from Axios and then let you know what I understand from what you said to make sure I'm still understanding it well. So Axios put out a report that aligns with what you said. Mediators, according to Axios, you can believe it or not, mediators believe the recent Iranian attacks on commercial vessels on the Strait of Homs were orchestrated by elements within the Iranian government opposed to the MOU and seeking to undermine it. That's from Axios.
Speaker 0: That's interesting that it is from Axios, who's usually a mouthpiece for the forces that are behind the conflict. Like, I read Axios, Politico, and whatnot as, you know, effectively, you know, what I would call Davosian.
Speaker 1: America's... American neocons, whatever you want to call them. Yeah, so Iran has Fars News, the US has Axios and Politico. So what this report is claiming is that... So what you're saying first is that the americans are doing is that constantly poking the bear and the bear responds and then america bombs them and the end goal is to lead to the factions within the government that are opposed to the irgc to be emboldened enough and maybe have enough support to then rise up against the irgc with the end goal in mind Still remaining regime change because the control of the oil choke point is so important for the Ukraine war and even its leverage over China that they're not going to give it up so easily.
Speaker 0: Am I on the right track? What I would say is to bring Iran into the country, the new Iran into the country, into the fold. And what I'm getting at is the European side of this is that you're trying to flip Iran out of the camp of the chaos regime. purveyors, for lack of a better term. I have multiple names for them. Davos, City of London, this one. You can call them whatever you want. I'm not, at a certain point, everybody has their version of that cabal conspiracy, whatever you want to call it. It's very clearly, I kind of like to use the phrase, the high table from John Wick, because it's the unseen or the mostly unseen web of organized crime and supranational governmental structure, super governmental structures that exist. And we know they exist. We know they're out there. So the bigger question here is, can Trump flip them to his end of the high table? And I think he's working with Putin and Xi in many ways to, because it's in Russia's best interest to end all this stuff. It's in China's best interest to end all this stuff. Because really all Trump wants is for China to pay retail for oil. He doesn't care where they get it from. He just doesn't want them getting it through China. you know, where he was, they were getting a wholesale prices from Venezuela and Iran because of sanctions. So, you know, again, sanctions that's Trump put on them, but that's because there's other activity that are, that are orthogonal or adjacent to the oil trade that he wanted to also solve the drug trade, the human trafficking trade and all the other stuff. So like, so the, the, the, the, the, the understanding here is that, look, if you're not going to submit Davos, then we're going to keep punishing your pets until you do submit or you run out of runway. Because Putin's strategy... Who submits? Putin's strategy in Ukraine has been attrition. Like, keep destroying the Ukrainian army over and over and over again with European money. They have to keep doing the sunk cost fallacy of dumping more money in to raise another army, to keep fighting the Russians. Meanwhile, Trump is now trying to take away their energy and their and their access to collateral. Again, it's part of the same strategy, but it doesn't look like... So they are coordinating, but it doesn't look like they're coordinating because they've got political issues in both countries and the domestic front where they can't look like they're actually in cahoots with one another. They can't do that because it would just... I know the situation here in the United States is still that if you think that Congress would be opposing Trump today forget it if he was actually out there you know organized with putin to to try and end all this stuff it's clear that he can't do that it's clear that also there are assets around the region and he can't blow up directly like that he has to allow other people to blow up for him and that's another side just to understand that one but that one i missed it so you're saying that so what trump is um doing is taking the collateral away from europe
Speaker 1: To force them to end the war?
Speaker 0: Yeah. In effect, again, you have to continue to degrade their ability to continue funding Ukraine because the United States isn't really funding Ukraine anymore. We have a Congress that wants the parts of Congress that want to fund Ukraine, but clearly Trump doesn't. But you definitely have that from the European side. NATO, like they're pledging another $170 billion or whatever it is that they're going to dump into Ukraine. They have a couple of reasons they have to do that, not the least of which is they need the war to continue because they pledged all these loans and the future cash flows over getting control of Russia to pay these loans back, and they're not getting them. So they have a real problem from that perspective. you so it's the Europeans do. And so now the big question is like on everybody's mind is what happens when we can all do the macroeconomics of Europe, they're terrible. Germany's de industrializing France is a mess. The UK is nothing but a you know, is nothing but city of London's Forex and insurance industry at this point, like that all of it is bad, right? So at some point, global investors The only thing keeping Europe afloat from a global investor perspective is the perceived chaos politically in the United States. So the minute Trump puts any real solid geopolitical wins on the board, which get him over the line in the midterms and everything else, forget it. All the capital is going to flow out of Europe. And they're not going to be able to continue funding their operations at 3% to 4%, or more appropriately, at lower interest rates than the United States is currently borrowing at.
Speaker 1: So Tom, just so there's one part where I didn't get. So when with the US controlling the collateral, the oil coming out or the energy coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. So I initially thought what you meant by this is that the objective of it is to offer Europe cheap energy so they can maintain the war with Russia. But what you're saying is no, they want to control it. to take it away from Europe because Trump wants the war with Russia to end. And he's working with Russia to get it to end. But Europe needs it to continue because they've got all the loans that were used to be able to fund the war and to be able to pay back these loans. They need to get some assets away from Russia.
Speaker 0: Well, yeah. Well, they've always wanted to take over. The Europeans want the asset pile in Russia, the coal, the timber, the oil, the gas, all of it, the uranium, all of it. There's $75 or $100 trillion worth of assets there that they can colonize. take control of the Russian government, the Russian SOEs, the state-owned enterprises, and all the rest of it, and then pull cash flow off of that in perpetuity to pay all this stuff back. And then the other side of this, of course, is that because they've done this before, the Europeans have, which is that they've repudiated their old debt, issued perpetual debt, and then they use the cash flow from the latest round of colonization to pay the the people that they stole their initial investments from, meaning when you buy a bond, right? You're supposed to get, you give the government $10,000 in a bond and you're supposed to pull 4% off of it. And at the end of the bonds, the money comes back to you. But the Europeans have done this many times. And George Soros has talked about the concept of consuls many, many times saying this is what we should do, which is the debt pile is too big. So we need to just repudiate the debt, issue consuls, which are perpetual debt, you know, at a lower interest rate in perpetuity. And we're going to pay you not 4% for 10 years. We're going to pay you 2% forever. Right? And the Brits have done this before. The French have not. Everybody's done it.
Speaker 1: So I'll accept the United States. If Trump wants to end the war in Ukraine, can't he just stop supplying the weapons they need? Isn't it that simple?
Speaker 0: Is he really? It is. It is. kind of that simple remember he has a political problem at the end at home which is he's got a congress that wants the war so if he wants to get other things done he unfortunately kind of has to play the game yeah and then there's there's also there's also the real factor there's a i mean i think there's a minor issue with putin which is that It's not like anybody trusts each other here. Like there's been some nascent deals and behind the scenes done. I think a lot of the architecture for what we're seeing now was discussed in August of last year in Alaska between Trump and Putin. But at the end of the day, Putin has to hedge his bets as to whether or not Trump's gonna be able to pull anything off. He knows full well having served under as Russia's president under four different presidents that were five, well, four, at least four. one, two, three, yeah, four presidents that, you know, policy changes every four years. He talks about this all the time. So Putin has to make, he may want to do this deal with Trump, but Trump doesn't necessarily want to, there's a lot going on. Moreover, and this is one of the things that I need to put in people's heads, which is that there are intelligence assets everywhere around the world. There are these terrorist groups or these, you know, they're everywhere. They're embedded all over the place. Some of them are CIA. Some of them are Mossad. Some of them are MI6. Some of them are French intelligence. And some of them are CSIS. And they have to be destroyed. That infrastructure has to be destroyed. Their ability to continue to spin this back up, this conflict back up two years from now has to be dealt with as well. So when I look at the headlines of Iran was able to bombed some bases around the Middle East, U.S. bases around the Middle East. They got their hits in. They're getting destroyed. Well, Trump wants out of the Middle East. He's made this abundantly clear. He wants out of Europe. He's been pulling troops out of Latvia. He's been moving armor out of Poland and into Greece. He's pulled troops out of Syria. He wants out of the region. He wants out of all these conflicts, but you can't leave the materiel and the bases and the infrastructure behind to fight everything. That's why he was so angry with Biden. When we pulled out of Afghanistan, because Biden left all the infrastructure behind to continue the war by other means with other people, just not with armies, just not with the U S army with, with the private army. And so, um, that is a subplot in all of this. And so it's my, in my estimation, in my read on this, Trump has to also hedge his bets that he could, that he could lose the midterms that. We could get president AOC in 2029. Okay. And we have to make it too expensive. He has to make it too expensive for anybody in the 2030s to restart this, to rebuild that infrastructure and rebuild and restart it. So it's, again, it's, this is, we have to think multilaterally and overall strategically, what's your goal. Your goal is to, to de-emphasize these physical choke points, maybe build some pipelines as opposed to the maritime sea trade. Like rewire the world's expectations about how things are going to flow. He's already done that. And I think that that means that we were looking at a foreign oil between 70 and $75 a barrel, as opposed to on Brent crude, as opposed to $60 a barrel. Because look, the shipping routes are now more expensive, right?
Speaker 1: And that just- It's going to be permanently higher price.
Speaker 0: Right, and somebody has to pay those logistics, right? And we're going to pay it, right?
Speaker 1: So based on that strategic thinking, so just to go back to the Iran war, you don't think Trump can pull out. He needs to eventually control the Strait of Hormuz. It will take a lot for him to decide to pull out. Is that what you're saying?
Speaker 0: I don't know that he necessarily needs to control it. I think in the long run, what he's going to do is hope that he can get an Iran that is not – a failed state. He doesn't want a failed state in Iran.
Speaker 1: He just wants a friendly government.
Speaker 0: He wants something similar to what he's been able to pull off with Venezuela. Venezuela, yeah. Again, when you look at domestic politics, Mario, we all sit around like, I'm American and I'm frustrated about everything I see and I'm like, why don't you just roll into Minneapolis and just put everybody on buses and get rid of them all? You can't because if you If he turns into a dictator, right, he's weakening the internal institutions of the United States as a body politic, as a society. It's the same kind of thing he's trying to do with Iran, the same thing he's trying to do with Venezuela, which is these, we're all at a low ebb in terms of our civilizational impulse as cohesive units. What institutional infrastructure exists needs to be supported and the lines not crossed. And of course that line that he doesn't wanna cross is of course the one that I think his European enemies are constantly telling the IRGC to cross. And that's why the conflict continues. So it's not that Trump wants to control the straight. It's that he actually wants the Arab governments to manage themselves with the, kind of like the Gaza Board of Peace is in effect a new institution. and a new institutional framework to negotiate conflicts. And they don't have to be global. They can be overall a single-issue thing, which is how are we going to rebuild Gaza, right? And then the same thing is what are we going to do in the Straits of Hormuz and blah, blah, blah.
Speaker 1: So the Gulf countries to be able to, or the Arab world to all control the shadow Hormuz, to run it all themselves, to have a new government in Iran, but one that is more friendly or more adaptable U.S. policy rather than…
Speaker 0: you can frame you could frame it that way if you want the way i would frame it as uh you know again i would frame it slightly differently which is just to say like you want an iran that is not trying to become a new hermit kingdom like north korea we want to bring them into the community of nations as equals and as partners so the same thing that he's trying to do in venezuela to be i mean to be honest with you it's really it's quite sad that the timing of that massive earthquake in caracas happened when it did right because we were just just getting started trying to help rebuild Venezuela, right? You know, a lot of people in this life don't like Donald Trump, but, you know, he doesn't control earthquakes. So, you know what I mean?
Speaker 1: So, based on this thinking, so based on this thinking, Tom, is the final question, because we're getting reports here that there's talks scheduled for next week in Switzerland. Meanwhile, we're getting reports of explosions in Iran. No confirmation that there's an attack, but there's reports of explosions right now um including a fire in uh in loristan province in a refinery um so this all happened while we're talking so everything's on edge with with this mindset with what you've just explained what do you expect to happen how do you expect things to unfold um i'm not surprised that there are talks scheduled for next week i've already kind of laid out that every time we do this like they cross another red line we have another escalation that we move to the next stage when we move to the next stage i think that there's a um
Speaker 0: I think that this can't end until after it may, this may have to go on for a few more months. Unfortunately, this kind of off on again, off again thing, but watch the Iranian interlocutors, the negotiators, watch them carefully and look at what some in substance of where they agree next and what the differences are and how they agree next. Don't that's the, the big one. This is international relations. We're not here to, to, to press our morality. My personal morality on this is 180 from where this is, right? What we've all discussed today. It's not about that at all. This is about... Trump has made it abundantly clear what he wants here. He's trying to solve about five or six problems all at once. It's why it feels scattershot. I don't know that we can get any kind of permanent resolution to this until after the midterms in the United States because Trump doesn't have the political... stability, the foundation on which to build anything permanent. So now it's going to be important for him, I think, to then shift domestically and start that process of really locking down the people's support. And that means that he's going to have to really start up in the ante on putting certain people in jail and moving the indictments forward and everything else. And unfortunately, as Alexander Mercurius likes to remind everybody, legal time moves far slower than political time and market time. And that's the big friction point, ultimately.
Speaker 1: Tom, really enjoyed this. I had to really focus. I'm glad I just had my cup of coffee. You've done a great job explaining it. I really, really enjoyed how it connected everything. So thank you for doing this. I'd love to do this again, man.
Speaker 0: Of course. Ping this, reach out whenever you're ready, and I'll do my thing. Thank you. Thank you, Tom. Have a good weekend. Bye-bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
Economist Hussein Askary says the latest U.S. strikes targeted more than an Iranian railway; they hit China’s New Silk Road artery linking China to Central Asia and the wider Middle East. He views it as a symbolic warning to Belt and Road backers, and argues the real issue is who shapes Eurasia’s next economic map as railways, ports, and investment deepen integration.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Economist Hussein Askary says the latest U.S strikes didn't just hit an Iranian railway, they struck China's New Silk Road. He said that specific railway is one of the key arteries linking China to Central Asia, Iran, and, ultimately, the wider Middle East. A modern version of the ancient Silk Road, the physical backbone of China's vision for the region. Hussein believes the strike was symbolic: a warning that countries betting their future on China's Belt and Road Initiative should understand there may be a price for doing so. And what he thinks comes after it is even more concerning. Trump promised to end America's endless wars, but Washington still has no vision for what peace actually looks like, whereas China does. Railways, ports, industrial zones, manufacturing, energy projects, technology transfers, and long-term investment. While the U.S is trying to shape the region through military power, China understands economic integration is a much stronger force. Hussein pointed to China's role in helping bring Saudi and Iran back to the negotiating table, the rapid expansion of industrial cooperation across the Gulf, and the growing network of transport corridors connecting the region to Asia. In his view, those projects are changing the Middle East far more profoundly than most headlines suggest. That's also why he thinks this war is about far more than Iran; it's about who gets to shape the next economic map of Eurasia. His argument is that the old model, export oil, import everything else, and depend on American military protection, is steadily giving way to something different. Countries across the region are trying to build industries instead of simply exporting raw materials. And they're increasingly looking to the east as well as the west.
Video Transcript AI Summary
Hussein meets with a podcast host to recap rapidly changing events involving the US, Iran, and regional spillovers, after planning to discuss how Iraqi oil sale proceeds move through a US bank system.
The host describes a sharp escalation in the past 24–48 hours: Iran struck three ships near the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz/Strait of Homs, the US retaliated heavily (one update cited as striking 170 Iranian military targets, another figure described as about 14 times the size of late-June retaliation), and Iran responded by striking targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar (with Jordan also struck today). The host notes reports that the White House is bracing for a fight over the strait lasting weeks or longer. Additional claims include Iran exporting about 10 million barrels of crude and fuel in one night to anticipate a possible blockade, Iran placing armed forces on the highest alert, and deploying thousands of special forces on the border with Iraqi Kurdistan. The host adds that an IRGC warning told Kurds to stay out of it, with an Iranian field commander saying that if Kurdish groups infringe on Iranian sovereignty, Iran would push them back and establish a security zone of several kilometers. The host frames this as a shift away from earlier hopes for an off-ramp and toward renewed war, citing conflicting statements that a ceasefire/MOU ended or was temporarily on hold. The host also emphasizes that Iran has not closed the Strait of Homs and that it is unclear whether US strikes continue today.
In response, Hussein says this is a major setback for the MOU/so-called ceasefire but not the end of it. He argues the core problem is lack of trust and that Iran wants movements of ships in the Strait of Hormuz coordinated with Iran; he says analysts viewed US efforts to use the Omani/southern corridor to encourage ship movement without coordination, while Iran treats this as crossing a red line and wants to “pay a price.” He also states that the US and Iran dispute MOU points, including that fighting was not stopped on all fronts (including Lebanon) and that frozen assets were not released or sanctions discussed. Hussein previously said the MOU “looked too good to be true,” suggesting it might be aimed at buying time for the US and reloading capability. He notes JD Vance said the MOU time would be used to refill oil reserves, and he links the escalation to damaged trust and a broader regional atmosphere shift that began improving around the funeral processions in Tehran.
Hussein argues the MOU’s underlying purpose is ending outright war, despite skirmishes. He claims the short-term US interest is to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, lower oil prices, and achieve political advantage before elections, while Iran frames issues as a long-term package including sanctions relief, withdrawal from Lebanon, and other regional concerns. He says Iran does not want to give the US advantage by signing before US elections, and also argues that Arab Gulf relations were improving (he references normalization efforts and “behind the scenes” steps that would make attacks on the UAE unlikely unless Iran faced an existential threat). He adds that Iran’s retaliation has so far targeted American bases rather than attempting broader Gulf attacks, and that Iran controlling the strait is the key objective.
Turning to Kurdish-region claims, the host asks whether Iran is worried Kurds could be used to bring down the regime. Hussein says the concern is infiltration by intelligence operators and assassins to cause disturbances inside Iran, not an outright invasion or regime change. He says Kurdish areas are mountainous and difficult to control, functioning as a possible infiltration route, and mentions coordination by some Kurdish groups with Israeli and other Western interests, while Iraq is careful to avoid direct confrontation with Iran.
The host then asks about a railway strike in Iran near Turkmenistan and whether it relates to a Belt and Road corridor. Hussein connects the attack to the Mashhad Saras Railway and describes it as part of the China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor (extending from China through Central Asia and Iran toward Iraq and onward). He says he wrote about the railway in 1996, calling it a “reopens the Silk Road” signal, and argues the strike carries symbolic and military implications: it warns Iran and Central Asia that working with China on Belt and Road could bring trouble, including showing the ability to reach far interior regions even beyond coastal distances.
Hussein elaborates on Belt and Road rail and connectivity plans, describing existing and planned links between Iran, Central Asia, and the Gulf, including routes that he says connect to Mashhad, Bandar Abbas, and Central Asia, and extensions toward Turkey and toward Iraq (Basra and Shalamcha border crossing). He also describes the broader regional industrial and logistics integration he attributes to Chinese engagement, citing normalization efforts involving Saudi Arabia and Iran and Chinese cooperation with GCC members. He frames the broader geopolitical conflict as a contest over shifting global economic and technological power, portraying Belt and Road connectivity as undermining US and European hegemony by offering developing nations an alternative development model.
When pressed on the specific “message” of the railway strike, Hussein says the warning is symbolic and also includes a military dimension—demonstrating reach and arguing that US/European powers cannot offer equivalent infrastructure. He says the central warning is that Belt and Road work with China could “bring you trouble,” while the US cannot provide an alternative rail and bridge model.
The conversation ends with the host thanking Hussein, noting appreciation for the railway strike discussion and comparing corridor dynamics to historical patterns around World War I, before Hussein offers to share an article he wrote in 1996 about the railway.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Hussein, it's a pleasure to meet you. How are you? Thank you very much. I'm fine. Thank you for inviting me to your podcast.
Speaker 1: Our pleasure is mine. I'm just going through the updates today and it's kind of to recap what's happened. So we planned this conversation after I spoke to your colleague to talk about the way the money is being handled in Iraq and the sale of oil in Iraq goes into a bank in the US. And I wanted to really understand that dynamic, which is a conversation that we will have. But then you know, while we're, you know, in the lead up to this discussion, things got pretty bad between the US and Iran. So Iran struck three ships in the last few days, going through the Omani side of the Strait of Homs, the US retaliated very heavily. I saw an update earlier, they've struck 170 Iranian military targets, according to the New York Times. There's another report that said this attack was about like 80 times bigger than previous attacks. I think it's 80 times, which is a massive number. So no, sorry, not 80, 14 times. So the figure is roughly 14 times the number of targets hit during the most recent two-day retaliation strikes in late June. So we saw similar strikes by the US whenever Iran struck ships, the US retaliated. And this one was 14 times bigger. And Iran responded by striking various targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, which is a new target that hasn't been struck before, but not the Emirates yet. So Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan. Today, Jordan was struck. Just kind of a very brief overview of what we've seen in the last 24, 48 hours. There's been a lot of movements as well. There was a report that came in by Axios that the White House is bracing for a fight over the strait that could last weeks or longer. So this is gonna be a prolonged, potentially a prolonged conflict between the two sides. Iran has exported a lot of oil in the last 48 hours, 10 million barrels of crude oil and fuel in one night was just shipped out of the Strait of Hormuz in anticipation of a possible blockade. And also the Iranian armed forces are in the highest state of alert, but also a lot of the special forces were sent on the border with Kurdistan in case the Kurds decide to attack Iran. And also even a warning by the IRGC against the Kurds telling them to stay out of it. So Iran deployed thousands of special forces on the border with Iraqi Kurdistan. And the field commander on Iranian media said, if the Kurdish groups with backing of the US and Israel try to infringe on Iranian sovereignty, we will not only push them back, we will establish a security zone of several kilometers. So this is a warning to the Kurds. A lot has changed from a week ago when it seemed Trump wanted to off ramp, everything was heading in the right direction. in the right direction, diplomatic discussions, disagreements, diplomatic disagreements, to now talks of a resumption of the war. Yesterday, Trump saying the ceasefire is over, a US official telling the CNN the ceasefire, so no, Trump said the MOU is over, and a US official told CNN that the ceasefire is temporarily on hold or something like that. The Strait of Homs is not closed by the Iranians. That's a positive sign there. We don't know if the American strikes will continue today. So we'll see what happens. Trump hasn't posted and has been pretty quiet today, which I hope is a good sign. So that's kind of a quick recap of what we've seen in the last 72 hours or so, even three to five days as the funeral processions end today. I think today is when the burial is, if maybe it's already passed. So I'd love to get your analysis of what we're seeing, Hussein. Is this the end of the negotiations? Is this a resumption of the war? Was this planned all along or is this simply a disagreement on one of the clauses?
Speaker 0: Well, I think this is a big setback for the MOU, the so-called ceasefire, but it's not the end of it in a sense. We got to get used to Donald Trump's way of doing things, but also how the Iranians react to things. The Iranians want to set certain things on, you know, put it on the table, certain red lines that all movement of ships in the Strait of Hormuz should be coordinated with Iran. And according to some analysts I've seen is that the Americans try to use what is called now the southern corridor or the Omani side of the corridor to that ships will move there, encouraging them to move there without coordination with Iran. And the Iranians say, well, we told you this is a red line. Everything, even if you want to do these things, Omani, it should be coordinated with Iran. And therefore, they want to set the red line and pay a price for that. But I don't think they believe, and I don't think Trump believes that ending the MOU will serve any purposes, but also for the Iranians themselves. Now we will end up arguments and counter arguments. The Iranians said, you know, the Iranians are saying the United States did not respect the MOU because the 0.5 says that the fighting should stop on all fronts, including in Lebanon. That did not happen. Our frozen assets have not been released and there is no discussion of the sanctions and so on and so forth. So it becomes like a back and forth arguing and counter arguing about this, but it's the big problem here is this, the lack of trust. The two parties don't trust each other and they are preparing for the worst case scenario. Now, when I saw the MOU and was reading with my colleagues and somebody looked at me and said, Hussein, you don't look happy. Although we have much for ending this war and getting things back to normal in the whole region.
Speaker 1: When the MOU first came out, when you were reading it. Yes, yes.
Speaker 0: And I said, yeah, I said, well, I'm worried that this looks too good to be true. It's too good for Iran and it's quite humiliating for Trump and the American side. And I wonder if this is just a, an attempt to buy time, to reload the guns, so to speak, to recharge everything. And Vice President J.D. Vance said, you know, we will use the time of the OMOU to refill the oil reserves, and let's see what happens after that. So this creates a situation where there's total absence of trust. The only good thing which is there still is that Pakistan Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, all these countries are still insisting on having a peaceful solution to this and the end of the military operations by both sides. And this is, I think, is the biggest damage will be done to that process, which was very, very important. And also the prospects of a new security and economic architecture in the region where Iran is a, trusted more by the Gulf countries or at least by Saudi Arabia, for example, but also Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan can play a more positive role. I mean, I mentioned this on Pakistani television when the MOU was announced, you know, I called it the Mohammed Accords because there's necessity for all the nations of this region to work together and end this policy of divide and conquer and reach certain agreements because there are differences in the region. There are differences. Also, distrust among the Gulf countries and Iran. They need guarantees from Iran. And also, Iran is also involved in some proxy wars in the region. And we have a certain divide in the region, which should be filled. The gap should be filled and get back to normal. Now, you mentioned the question of the Kurdish region, which is Iraqi Kurdish region, which has been used, and everyone knows that. But the Iranians effectively, you know, ended that operation at the beginning of the war in February. And the Iraqi side is also very, very careful not to get involved in a direct confrontation with Iran. And therefore, this is, probably this is some sort of psychological warfare that there will be a destabilization of Iran if the Iranians don't behave. But all in all, this is a very, very, bad development, but I don't think it's the end of the MOU.
Speaker 1: I'm glad you're optimistic about the MOU. Talk about the Kurds, because that was a surprise to me. For Iran to send special forces there to give a warning to the Kurds and to be bombing them almost daily since the ceasefire, are they genuinely worried that the Kurds could be used as part of an operation to bring down the regime? And do you think that worry is warranted? Because that's That's a pretty freaking wild idea if the Kurds are going to be used against Iran. And I just don't think it has any chance of working.
Speaker 0: No, the only thing they are worried about is that infiltration by intelligence operators, by assassins, by people who would plan certain disturbances inside Iran. I don't think there could be like an outright invasion in that region. We know that there are certain Kurdish groups, Iranian Kurdish groups who are based in Iraqi Kurdistan, And traditionally, the Kurds have been also coordinating with Israeli interests, but also American, British, and others to use the Iraqi Kurdistan as a launching pad for destabilization operations, because the rest of the border between Iraq and Iran is well guarded and, you know, it's safe. The Iraqis are guaranteeing that there will be no infiltration from the southern part of Iraq. But the Kurdish region is more difficult to control. It's a mountain area, and it's very, very difficult for any power I mean, it's like in Afghanistan, you cannot control these areas because these are mountain areas. But there's a worry that the Kurdish region could be used for infiltration operations, but not regime change operations. That's too far, and it's a far-fetched.
Speaker 1: Okay, so I want to ask you something you said at the beginning. You said when you read the MOU at the beginning, you were concerned, you were on Pakistani TV, and you were concerned that it looked too good to be true, too good for the Iranians, too humiliating for the Americans. Which is a valid concern, and I agree with you. A lot of people are calling to get a surrender document. But then now, so what I understood from you saying this is that you don't think the MOU will hold. And now you're saying that you don't think the MOU is dead. This is just, from what I understand, you're saying this is just a disagreement. Can you just tell me how both of these two fit? Are you saying that your worry, which is similar to mine, is that the MOU is so vague, it allows for these disagreements and these disagreements end up in clashes like we're seeing now. And maybe you can also answer on why you don't think the MOU is dead. I agree with you, by the way. Not many people do. I get a lot of criticism for it. I don't think the MOU is dead, even though Trump said it's dead. I don't think it is. But I want to get your thoughts on why you don't think it is.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I think the main purpose of the MOU, which I think is not dead yet, is to end the outright war. There will be these skirmishes. There will be attacks and counterattacks and stuff like this. But the real issue here was, first of all, you have the incredible economic consequences of the closing of the Strait of Hormuz. That needed to be ended. Otherwise, under Trump, he said it, I don't want to be another Herbert Hoover, that the world economy will collapse and we will have a depression in the United States and it will be called the Trump Depression. So this was one, you know, one goal behind this. But I think about the other points, that the sanctions will be lifted, that Iran will get back its money, that Lebanon will, Israel will withdraw from Lebanon, all these things I don't, I didn't think it's realistic, but that there will be a pause in the fighting, and then give a chance for negotiations to reach a nuclear agreement, which will be called, it will be the same as the Obama agreement, JCPOA, but this time it will be called the Trump agreement. That's the only difference. And this is with the jealousy of Trump on this issue. But I think the Iranians now are betting on the fact that they don't want to give that advantage to Trump. Maybe the agreement will not be signed before the US elections. And this tension and this economic destruction, which the Iranians themselves are paying also a high price for, but the world is paying even a higher price, will continue. And it will be very, very damaging for Trump. And therefore, you know, all these points in the MOU, they look very good. But I don't think, I didn't think that many of these things will happen. Just because, you know, the goals for especially the Trump administration is short-term. The Iranians want a long-term solution for all the problems in the region. That includes the Palestinian issue, the Lebanon issue. It would deal with the You know, Iranian sanctions, of course, to be lifted forever. You know, but also the question of the existence of American bases in the region. You know, all these things, the Iranians are thinking about this as one package. They're not thinking about like piecemeal advantages. Okay, we get part of the frozen money, then we can sell some oil, and then this and that. And the Trump administration, they want short-term gains. And that the Hormuz Strait will be open. This is a great victory. Oil prices will go down. This is another victory. The fertilizers will reach the American farmers. It's a great victory. And so on and so on. And then there will be the final thing. There will be an agreement preventing Iran from having a nuclear weapon, which was never in, you know, in existence before. But anyway, that this will be the ultimate victory for President Trump before the elections. Therefore, I mean, the Iranians say, well, we are not in a hurry if we don't get all these other items in the MOU. And Trump says, well, these are things we put there to buy some time. And this is really where the problem comes in. But the problem is that the whole region is paying a price for that. The people in Iran are paying a heavy price because they attack the infrastructure in Iran. You know, the ones who will suffer is the people of Iran. and also the retaliation by Iran, and so far it has been against American bases in the Gulf countries, but it's also that these two ships, one was Qatari, one was Saudi, destroyed a lot of the trust which existed, the normalization we saw in the funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei in Tehran, all these Arab delegations coming there. This was a very, very important sign that, you know, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, of course, is a friend of Iran, you know, in a certain way. But this created a completely new atmosphere in the region. But now that's being spoiled. So this is... Exactly.
Speaker 1: This is where... But this gives the US an advantage. I've been saying this for the last few days, is there's been a lot of work done over the last few weeks to improve Iranian relations with the Gulf. So... You know, a lot of people are wondering why didn't Iran attack the UAE, for example, which was one of the prime targets. That's because of those efforts happening behind the scenes, the aircraft that were sent to Iran, financial support deals that were signed, you know, a lot of agreements to mend the damage done to those relations. For Iran to strike those countries right now would go back, you know, set back those improvements significantly. So that's why Iran is a bit, I wouldn't say hands tied behind its back, but it doesn't, It would take a lot for Iran to start striking the Gulf like it did before. It would take an existential threat to the government, the Iranian government, before they react to that extent. So that's why I think Trump feels like he has a certain kind of leeway to cause damage to Iran, pressure them to stop their control of the state of Hormuz, knowing that Iran will likely not strike the Gulf like they did before, won't strike Israel because they don't want to drag Israel into it. All they could do is strike American bases. And a lot of people are wondering, and some pro-Iranian accounts were upset, like, why didn't Iran do more? Why are they just attacking Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, same as they did before? That's because they don't need to do more. The Iranians, all they need to do is just keep their control of the Strait of Homs. Now, the next level of that escalation would be Iran closing the Strait of Homs, which is still a possibility. We didn't get there yet. But maybe that's a question I have for you because we're in agreement that this is the MOU is not dead. But the question is, how is this going to end? If the Iranians are not going to give up their control of the Strait of Hormuz, Trump is making it clear that the U.S. would not stop until Iran gives up the control of the Strait of Hormuz. What are we going to see? Continuous escalation until Iran is like, you know what? Screw this. And they escalate. across the red line that Trump is like, all right, cool. That's going to hurt. The economy is going to hurt me politically and deescalates again. If that happens all over again, we're seeing the same playbook again. Trump escalates, escalates. Iran goes too far. Trump realizes it's not worth it. Deescalates again. It just becomes a bit silly. It's like you're doing the same thing again and again, expecting a different result.
Speaker 0: Yeah. No, that's exactly where things stand. I mean, things have been silly for a long time now. I mean, Trump says, you know, the MOU is dead for me, but I will let Jared Kushner and Witkoff decide if they want to continue to negotiate. This is a bit weird in a certain sense. But, you know, concerning that Iran attacked those countries, I mean, it has to be qualified. Iran is attacking American bases in those countries. This is what the Iranians are saying. And therefore there is an understanding in those countries, but also I wish that this nightmare would end and then find a way to figure out, you know, if these bases are a protection or a source of risk.
Speaker 1: Just a question. Why don't they, why don't these countries just tell the U S right now, stop using our bases? I'm just, it seems like the U S can't attack if they don't allow the bases. Do they worry about the consequences of it? Maybe the U S.
Speaker 0: No, the thing is that the United States, the latest attacks, I guess some military analysts said these were launched from the sea, from American aircraft carriers, from B-52 bases in Britain and other places which are far from the region. But Iran has no way of reaching those targets to retaliate, and therefore it's targeting the same American bases in this region. I mean, also there is a lot of logistic and probably radar and intelligence support to these bases in the region are giving the American, you know, those who do the targeting. But this is not really the issue. The countries in the region are caught between, you know, a problem and a hard place because on the one hand, they wish this situation ends and And I think this is one of the reasons I believe that those countries wish to have a new security architecture where American bases would be unnecessary. But in the middle of a war going on and this escalation, it's very difficult for them to ask the United States to leave. Also, there's some lingering distrust of Iran, how Iran would be emboldened to you know, do other things other than, you know, seek reconciliation with those countries. I mean, we do know there are these ideological, religious and all kinds of issues involved here. So it's not so easy for those countries just simply to ask the United States to leave. And then we have, of course, the case of Israel, Israel's aggression against the Palestinian people, but also against its neighbors. If that problem is not solved, nothing else would be solved in this region. So these countries are kept into a conflict and proxy wars where Iran is on one side, Saudi Arabia is on the other side of the Emirates. And it's exhausting and depleting the resources of these nations. But it's a catch-22. Therefore, there should be some sober minds who can intervene and say, look, this situation cannot continue. We cannot have this perpetual war. Trump promised that he will end all these perpetual wars, but he does not have an alternative for peacetime. China has an alternative for peacetime, which is based on the Belt and Road Initiative, cooperating with those countries. The Chinese made enormous, you know, efforts to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And their philosophy is say, look, you should unite and prosper rather than this old imperialist policy of divide and conquer. But of course, the intricate details of the situation of these countries are not so easy to resolve. And therefore, the Trump administration has no alternative for peacetime, and there is no discussion about, you know, what will replace the situation. Unfortunately, we saw, you know, Trump was emboldened in the NATO summit where he was, you know, It's like some sort of a reconciliation with other members, but you saw how the Secretary General of the NATO, Rutte, was, you know, completely subservient to Trump, supportive to Trump, and saying, look, we have been on this fight together. European and NATO bases were used, you know, hundreds of times in this war, and we are on the U.S. side in this war, and so on and so forth. So this creates a completely different atmosphere instead rational thinking, instead of thinking about peace, we have people who say, look, we need more war to solve these problems. And it's the same situation in Ukraine. We need to get more war in order to reach peace. And this is really a bit insane way of looking at things. And I think there should be an alternative to this whole thing unless we want the world to go down in a new global war or nuclear war.
Speaker 1: Yeah. So last thing I want to ask you, have you looked into the railway that was struck by the Americans as well yesterday? That's a bizarre one. There's one in Turkmenistan. Have you looked into that? So we're getting different reports of it. I don't know if you have more information on it. So from what I noticed, let me just quickly tell you the information that I have here. So it's a railway along the targets the US hit last night was a transit bridge and railway line in Akkala. which is the Golestan province of Iran, which is up northeast near Turkmenistan. It's unclear what type of weapon was used. It doesn't look like a cruise missile. That's an OSINT analysis. And from where it was launched, a couple of theories currently exist. It was launched from Turkmenistan, because where was it launched? It was all the way up north. Or it was sabotaged by saboteurs. Axios did say that the bridge was attacked, so Axios did confirm it yesterday. I remember seeing it last night before going to bed. And also the Iranians, I think, so far as you said, the US struck a key railway bridge in the Iran-China Turkmenistan-Iran rail corridor, because you're talking about the Belt and Road Initiative. Do you know much about that railway that was struck?
Speaker 0: Well, in 1996, the first article I ever wrote, it was in American Magazine Executive Intelligence Review. It was about the inauguration by President Hashemi Rafsanjani of that railway, which connects Iran to Turkmenistan. And I wrote at the time, yeah, I wrote at the time that this is, this reopens the Silk Road. This is the new Silk Road being rebuilt. And I think much of the war, I mean, I did many of these analysis before, also in my recent book, if you allow me, it's called Extending the New Silk Road to West Asia and Africa. It's published by the Schiller Institute. When I was in China in April to present the, if you want to see the close up. I was in China in April to present the Chinese version, a translation of this book. And I was telling people, you know, that the war in Iran, if it ends, we will have a completely new situation in the region where all nations will join the, well, all nations have already joined the Belt and Road Initiative, but that there will be more cooperation between the two sides of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, Iraq, with Iran. And that, so this railway was part of, you know, an extension of this railway goes to Turkmenistan, Central Asia, and then the whole old Soviet network into China, which is now connected to Kazakhstan. and soon will be connected to Uzbekistan. And so I said, you know, one of the targets of these wars or this recent war last June is actually the fact that there is a new situation in this region where you have all these nations attempting to use their resources, their idea, because even the Gulf countries, they want to industrialize, they want to get rid of their dependency on oil as the sole source of income because the oil prices have collapsed many, many times before. and drag those nations into trouble. So they want to diversify their economic resources. And Saudi Arabia has been industrializing, the UAE, Qatar. I mean, people talk about the urea for this fertilizer coming from Qatar or the helium for the semiconductor industry. Now suddenly people realize that those countries are getting away from the old model of exporting oil and buying luxury goods. That didn't work. Now these nations want to invest in their infrastructure, you know, this whole Belt and Road project to integrate the logistics, the supply chains of the whole region, but also bring industries into this region. And the Belt and Road Initiative has been crucial because China has been offering those nations, especially since President Xi Jinping visited Riyadh in 2022 in December, and he had summit with the Saudi King. He had a summit with all the GCC countries. and all the Arab countries, three days, three summits. And in the GCC summit, everybody should read, it's available, his speech to the GCC in December 2022. He offered incredible advantages for cooperation with China besides infrastructure, industrial development, AI, telecommunications, space technology, but also nuclear technology, civilian nuclear technology. But also he offered to buy oil from this region in the Shanghai Petroleum Exchange. So this railway symbolically, which was bombed in this recent attack, is actually a signal in a certain way that this is an attack on this idea of connectivity among these nations, but also civilian infrastructure. I mean, the Trump administration, they said they will cripple the whole Iranian economy, including all the infrastructure. The other thing is that this railway goes to Mashhad, and where you will have the final funeral, you know, the burial of Ayatollah Khamenei. And the trip from the rest of Iran to Mashhad is very, very long, and therefore this railway actually is very important for people to travel to Mashhad. So this is really both as an irony, a symbolic thing, but also it has real implications. for the nation of Iran, but also for the region. And it's very easy to repair these railways. It's not a big deal. It's not like destroying a power plant. You will need to rebuild it from the ground. It takes like two years to rebuild such a thing. But railways is very simple to repair. We remember some railway bridges were also bombed after the February attacks, and the Iranians repaired them very quickly. But there's a symbolic aspect of this, which is, As I mentioned, the attack on the idea of the new Silk Road, the Belt and Road, but also threatening to cripple the whole Iranian economy and the Iranian nation.
Speaker 1: Interesting. Can you show that image, Lisa, that image you showed me, if that's the railway you're talking about? And you're saying that because the damage was limited. I saw the images of the damage to that railway, and it wasn't that significant. As you said, this is easily repairable. So you're saying this strike is more of a warning to Iran, Is it a warning to Iran or to China of the Belt and Road Initiative or the railway lines, the corridors being built?
Speaker 0: No, I mean, it's very difficult to threaten Iran, but it's a symbol, symbolic thing, you know, to tell. Is this the one? Yeah, that's the way at the corner there in the northeast of Iran. It's called the Mashhad Saras Railway. And it's part of the Belt and Road Sixth Corridor, which is called the China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor. which extends from China to Central Asia through Iran to Iraq, the Gulf countries, Syria, and all these other countries in West Asia. West Asia is the real name for Middle East. Middle East is an old colonialist idea. So, but it's difficult to threaten China, but also it's a way to tell the Iranians that this is a no-no. Actually, a few weeks before the June attack on Iran, in May 2025, the first train arrived from Iran through this line to Iran, to Tehran, from China. So just a couple of weeks after that, the war, you know, broke against Iran. But the general context for this war, and I think this is the analysis we have had in the Schiller Institute for many years, is that we have a shift in the global economic power. economic, technological, industrial power, which is moving further to the east and the global south with China's rise. We have a transatlantic financial and economic system which is collapsing. It's held alive by money printing, by quantitative easing, and now by attempts to revive the economy through military industries. That's in the United States, but also in Europe. But the irony is that even the military industries of the United States and Europe now depend on a lot of input from China. So this is a very, very futile attempt to bring back the unipolar world in a time when it's impossible to go on that road.
Speaker 1: OK, interesting, interesting, interesting. OK, this is really interesting. That sentence you just said now, can we start it again? I want to really understand it. So there's this railway line that we were just showing. Lisa, if you can show it again, please. There's that railway line that goes that corridor. That's one of many. It's all part of the Belt and Road Initiative, which you know very well and you've read about. It goes all the way from China, goes through all of Central Asia, all the way through Iran, goes down south and ends in Egypt, based on the image I was just looking at. Actually, let me see. I've got it here. Yeah, it goes to Iran and then ends in Iraq. Sorry, not Egypt. Sorry, Iraq. Yeah. I don't know how it's gonna get to Egypt without sounding.
Speaker 0: Well, in our maps in our we have made maps of the Belt and Road and it goes to Egypt. You know, it's very, very simple. Yeah. Okay, but it's not built yet. These are the parts which exist now.
Speaker 1: This is the part the one in the image, the one in the image is the one that exists, correct?
Speaker 0: Yes, but the one from Tehran to the Gulf goes actually, there is one goes south from Tehran to Esfahan. but also to Bafk and then Bandar Abbas. I wrote about that also in 1996 because the Iranians connected to Central Asia. They also connected Central Asia to the Gulf countries because Central Asian nations are landlocked. They have no access to the seas. So the Mashhad, Bafk, Bandar Abbas railway became very, very crucial for trade between the world and Central Asia. And it became electrified and double tracked by the Iranians. And a lot of trade from Dubai, especially from the Jabal Ali port, would go from the global markets to Dubai and then transshipment to Bandar Abbas, and then from Bandar Abbas goes north to Mashhad and Central Asia. This became a very, very important artery for those nations. But extending to the west from Tehran, There was also, I also wrote about it at the time, that one year after that, the Iranians built a railway which goes all the way to the border with Turkey, and then to the Lake Van, which connects now the Central Asia and China to Europe. So the Iranians are also building a connection to Iraq. That's the, which is in the picture. It's not there yet. It goes from southern Iran to Basra, to the Shalamcha border crossing. But the total idea of the Belt and Road is to connect all the nations in the Gulf, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, the Palestinian territories, even Israel, if there's peace, and Egypt to this whole network. So this is something which we have been advocating. That's why I said in my book, we have a blueprint for connecting all these nations and industrializing those nations. It's not simply about- Is China leading those efforts? China is leading those efforts. As I said, in 2022, President Xi Jinping came to Saudi Arabia and signed a strategic comprehensive economic agreement with Saudi Arabia. And then two months after that, signed a similar agreement with President Raisi who visited Beijing in February, 2023. Also a 25 year plan. Now everybody's saying $400 billion deal between China and Iran. Iran would simply exchange oil exports for technology, for infrastructure. But then, one month after Raisi's visit to Beijing in March 2023, the Chinese brought the Saudis and Iranians to normalize relations. This was a very big breakthrough for the region. And therefore, the cooperation with China accelerated around both connectivity, but also around industrial projects. There are many industrial projects by China in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, especially in the petrochemical area, but also in other industries. For example, last year, Lenovo, the laptop producer in China, signed an agreement with the Saudi Public Investment Fund for $2.5 billion to build a plant in Saudi Arabia in the industrial zone near Riyadh to produce laptops and other electronics in Saudi Arabia. So this kind of, we have the whole Jizan industrial complex on the Red Sea. This is enormous petrochemical and chemical industries and logistics center on the Red Sea built with- Which one? Which one? Jizan, it's called, or Jaza. Jizan, it's on the Red Sea south of, almost close to Yemen. you have the whole Suez Canal area is now overpopulated by Chinese companies, industrial companies producing home appliances, now even cars.
Speaker 1: You're talking about Jizan in Saudi Arabia, correct?
Speaker 0: Yes, yes. There are some use the name Jizan industrial zone or economic zone. This is almost exclusively Saudi Chinese industrial zone.
Speaker 1: It's a port. Is that linked to the whole corridor? Does it go all the way down to Jizan?
Speaker 0: Yeah, the Saudis have what is called the land bridge, the Saudi land bridge, which will go from Dahran in the Gulf through Riyadh to the west coast of Saudi Arabia, to Jeddah, but also to Jizan. The Saudis have very advanced plans to connect this whole the Arabian Peninsula, but also make Saudi Arabia, as Mohammed bin Salman said, a major logistics hub.
Speaker 1: So there's all these things, all these corridors being built, and China's leading those efforts to kind of build those corridors that go all the way from China through Central Asia, all the way to the Gulf. And what you're saying is that this is obviously a threat to the unipolarity of the US. So the US has seen this as a threat. I've had other guests in the early days of the war talk about this. Not many, by the way. And this is something you specialize in, which made it really interesting. And what you're saying is that strike on the railway line was a symbolic strike, a warning shot to the region to not depend too much on these corridors, the Belt and Road Initiative by China, which kind of goes back to my initial theory of the war, that this war, a big reason for this war There's obviously Israel, there's maybe nuclear weapons, whatever. But the main reason is China and Chinese influence, whether it's through China's control of the Strait of Hormuz through Iran or the Belt and Road Initiative that China's building that goes through Iran. And that strike on the railway, whether it's a direct strike through a missile or a sabotage operation, which could be pretty easily repaired, it's not that major of a strike, is a warning shot in that regard. You seem to be nodding. So what I'm saying is accurate so far. Am I understanding it correctly?
Speaker 0: Yeah, I guess that's the reason. I mean, Joe Biden, I mean, this is a longstanding American policy. You know, this geopolitics in Central Asia. It goes all the way back to Halfard Mackinder. But let me just answer the question on the Americans see this. President Biden, when he visited Riyadh in 2022, July 2022, that was about five months before Xi Jinping came there. He told the Saudis, quote, we will not leave a vacuum in this region to be filled by Russia and China. End of quote. This is a quote from the press release by the White House. I still have a copy just in case it disappears. So this was a direct. Can you say the quote again? He said, we will not leave a vacuum in this region to be filled by Russia and China. Biden was very upset by Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed because when the war broke out in Ukraine, they refused to break cooperation with Russia. Actually, they enhanced cooperation with Russia. And according to some reports, they even refused to answer phone calls from Joe Biden. And you remember.
Speaker 1: When did Joe Biden say the quote? Sorry to interrupt you a few times. When did he say this quote? I'm taking these notes because that's really interesting.
Speaker 0: Joe Biden July 2022 when he visited Riyadh. And that was supposed to be the, to ease the tension because you remember before that, Biden when he was running in the elections, he called Saudi Arabia a pariah state because of the Khashoggi, Jamal Khashoggi case.
Speaker 1: And he said they will punish. The Saudi American journalist that was killed in the Saudi embassy in Turkey chopped up.
Speaker 0: And the United States, a whole part of the establishment wanted to punish Saudi Arabia for that. And there are many theories that there was even attempts to do a palace coup or whatever. And the Ritz-Carlton Hotel thing could have been a way to block that. Anyway, so the United States makes no secret of it does not want those nations on the heartland, which Halfard Mackinder, the British geopolitician, before World War I said, you know, that the heartland, which is from Central Asia, the Eurasian landmass, it should be divided. those who control central asia and the heartland will control the world island and those who control the world island will control the world so the british empire all the time made sure certain things don't happen that germany and russia never become allies and this is one reason we have world war one also the berlin baghdad railway and the hijaz railway which the germans and the Ottomans were building to connect the hard land, the land bridge to outflank the maritime British Empire, that this was, according to a friend of mine who wrote a book about it, this was the cause of World War I, because they never allow Germany or Russia get closer to the warm waters. And therefore, the other maxim of the British Empire is that, and then later adopted by Henry Kissinger, is that, Russia and China should never be allies. Okay? So this, the United States must do everything possible that China and Russia will be rivals forever. This has failed. And actually, I was reading Zbigniew Brzezinski's book, The Grand Chessboard, because I wanted to pick a quote. He says in this book in 1997, not only China and Russia should never be allies, He said the worst-case scenario, which he thought it will never happen, is that China, Russia, and Iran will become allies. So the idea that the U.S. That is a worst-case scenario. It's materializing. This happened. The China and Russia are now very close allies. Iran is being integrated into a China-Russia some sort of strategic alliance. But also the whole thing is going through the Belt and Road. It's economic development. It's economic relations. And this is really the basis for what we are discussing in our book is that the United States and Europe cannot stop China. They cannot stop the Belt and Road because the Belt and Road has shown developing nations in the global south that this is the best model, that they could get the technologies, will pull them out of poverty. They don't need to be satrapies. They don't need to be, you know, dependent on everything coming from the West, including food. You know, Egypt for many, many years, they would borrow money to buy food from outside. Now Egypt is producing its own food. You have the same thing, the Gulf countries. And I said this, there are two models which failed in the Gulf. And that's why I say there will be a new model. The first model was that the Gulf countries would sell oil to buy what they need. and live a luxurious life. This ended in 2014. Because from 2014 to 2022, the oil price went below the break-even line of $60 and stayed there. Some years, it went below $30. During the COVID, it was even negative. So this was a disaster for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. And therefore, they decided that we need a new model. And the new model means that you have to diversify your oil, your income, not depend on exporting oil. So they need to industrialize. They take the oil and make other products out of the oil. Plastics, paints, cosmetics, all kinds of things you can do from oil. Natural gas is fertilizer and other things. I was in a factory in China in a plant. They use natural gas to produce even clothing, you know, polyester stuff. So the Gulf countries, now even in Saudi Arabia, but also in Egypt, now they will be producing cars, Chinese cars. So this is how this whole idea of the Belt and Road is transforming the mindset of nations in the global south and said, oh, this old model we had doesn't work. This is a much better model. But also the idea that the Saudi, not only the South, the Gulf countries would use part of their money To buy American and British weapons and get American security protection, that also has failed. I mean, Kissinger said, to be an enemy of the United States is dangerous, but to be a friend of the United States is fatal. Why? Because the United States will drag you into all kinds of dangerous adventures. And this is why those countries now are hoping that this thing will end with the United States bases leaving the region. Because this has become a liability. It's a source of danger. It's not a source of security. Because the Iranians have developed certain weapons, and before that the Houthis in Yemen, that they can actually outflank the most advanced military powers in the world. systems don't really work against these new asymmetrical weapons. So our point is that we need a new architecture based on economic development. The United States and Europe should participate in that. It's enormously... And not fight it. Not fight it. This is great for... Look here in Europe, people are complaining about immigration from West Asia and Africa. Well, You have contributed to regime changes in the whole region, including in Libya, and that's why you have floods of immigrants. But also, the last 70 years, you did nothing for the development of Africa so Africans can stay at home. This is what the Chinese are saying. You want to deal with the immigration problem? Give African youth something meaningful to do in Africa. Nobody wants to leave their home if they can secure a good life in their country.
Speaker 1: This is a different point of view. And that strike on the railway is just to as a final question, who's saying that strike on the railway is a warning of what exactly because the strike if you can show the images, Lisa, the strike didn't cause that much damage is repairable. So it's a warning for what for these countries to stop these projects to stop investing in these projects to shift to American projects. What's the exact warning? What's the message?
Speaker 0: Abdulaziz M Alhamdan, Yeah, well, there are no American projects. I told you, the United States cannot build railways and bridges anymore, and Europe soon will not be able.
Speaker 1: Abdulaziz M Alhamdan, What's the warning?
Speaker 0: Abdulaziz M Alhamdan, No, it's a signal that working with China, working on this new Silk Road will bring you trouble. This is the symbolic meaning. But there is also a military aspect of this, that the United States can reach, the military can reach even further into the areas in West Iran, which are, very far from the sea, very far from, you know, the American bases and the Gulf, very far from Europe. So they can also say if you have missile systems, you are hiding in that far area, we can reach it too. But I think symbolically this is very, very important as a warning to Iran and Central Asia and all these nations that working with China on the Belt and Road could be dangerous for you. The problem is that the United States cannot offer an alternative. The United States is not building railways or bridges. I mean, it's just completely absurd situation. And I think there should be a new architecture, as I said, in the Mohammed Accords. There should be, as the Chinese also say, the security of this region should be guaranteed by the people of the region themselves. But then we have like Pakistan and nuclear power. Turkey is a major military power. Egypt is another military power. They can guarantee the security of the Gulf countries. They don't need to place weapons and stuff over there, although that could become necessary if you want to replace American bases with Egyptian or Turkish or Pakistani bases. I mean, that would look very awkward. But the security of these nations should be guaranteed by those nations. At the same time, there should be economic cooperation as the bridge to build trust among those nations. And therefore, the nations of this region are sick and tired of it. And then you have the whole Palestinian-Israeli situation. This needs to be dealt with immediately. You cannot have this absurd, murderous situation in Palestine and believe that you can still have some sort of normalcy in the region. That's why I say the Abraham Accords never work. They will never work. Because they were not meant to establish peace.
Speaker 1: Exactly. The core issue is not resolved. It's putting a bandaid on a wound.
Speaker 0: No, it was meant to dilute the Palestinians. That the Palestinians will not exist. I mean, you look at the Benjamin Netanyahu speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2023. That was before Hamas attack. And he showed the map of the region and There were nations in green who were allegedly friends of Israel, or they will enter the Abraham Accords, and then the rest are the enemies of Israel. So the, but then the map of Palestine, there is no Palestine. There's only Israel. And this is the Israeli right-wing faction greater israel ideologues who say there are no palestinian people they just happen to be here when we came they can go somewhere else yeah and this is the uh an ideology deep deep ideological thing in israel which has to be dealt with internally but also through pressure from the united states that you cannot hold those dreams of greater israel and imagine you can live in peace among all these nations you know imagine that You know, how many hundreds of millions of Arabs and Muslims are in this region? And those nations are advancing very quickly, even in military terms. Look, Egypt is preparing itself for a potential war. And they are diversifying their arms imports so they don't depend on the United States alone. They have brought in Russian and Chinese weapon systems because they fear that one day they will get the same treatment as Syria or Iran. Turkey now being threatened by Israeli ministers and even Netanyahu, you know. So it's a really incredible, insane idea that you think you can destroy all those nations and live in peace like an oasis or a garden in the middle of a jungle. Just forget about it. Those nations will advance very fast. The economic and demographics of this region will change so rapidly the Chinese model is followed, Israel even technologically will look very, very small compared to those nations because technological progress now is very cheap and affordable and accessible thanks to China's efforts. Before, only the elites and the friends of the United States and Europe will get these technologies. Now China says technology is free for all. You want some? Here. 10th of the price you get from the United States. And it's much better quality. So the Israelis have to wake up and not, you know, become a source of their own. I agree, I agree.
Speaker 1: Hussein, I am, just because we've got my next guest, Anna Kasparian is joining the studio. But I really enjoyed this conversation. I think we started off, you know, trying to get to know each other. Then you went really deep and gave us a, a peek into what you've been studying and covering for so many years. And I'm glad I brought up the railway strike.
Speaker 0: I will send you the article I wrote in 1996 about that railway.
Speaker 1: Yes, of course, send it through. And also I'd love to do a sit down on this as well, because it's part of a broader discussion. I had one of my guests, I can't remember the name. maybe it's like a month, a month and a half ago now, who was explaining to me the comparisons to World War I, the corridor that was being built by the Russian and German empires, I think goes through all the way to the Ottoman Empire, and how that was one of the reasons that caused the British Empire that wanted to maintain hegemony, to see this as a threat. And that was one of the core issues that eventually led to World War I. And we could be seeing something similar here with Iran, China, the Belt and Road Initiative and the hegemony. united states seeing this as a threat so i really enjoyed the uh um the explanation but hussein it's been a pleasure to meet you thank you so much for your time thank you very much
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m told Trump has talked about taking Kharg Island since the late 1980s. In a recent quote, he warned not to touch the oil, saying it could mean taking the island. Karen Kwiatkowski traces it to older TV interviews, doubts he’s ever been there, and says the idea predates the war. She also contrasts this with Washington’s stated plan to pull back from the Middle East.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷🇺🇸 Trump has reportedly talked about taking Kharg Island since the 1980s. Whether that's a plan or a decades-old fixation may decide what happens next "We attacked Kharg Island last night," Trump told reporters. "I said, don't touch the oil, because maybe we'll take over Kharg Island." Karen Kwiatkowski traced that line back further than people realize, to television interviews from the late eighties where he floated the same idea about the same island. Whether he's ever set foot there, she doubts it. he fixation, she says, predates the war by decades. Her read on the military reality is blunt: the island would be brutal to seize and worse to hold, and hitting it outright might be the more honest option than trying to run it. Iranian territory, Iranian defenses, and a very short list of allies willing to help occupy it. What struck her more was the contrast with Washington's own strategy document, the one that talked about pulling back from the Middle East entirely. Ships already committed, she thinks, don't come home easily once they're committed to something. That gap between the stated plan and the moment-to-moment decisions is where she sees the real risk. @karen4the6th, @WeTheBrandon
Video Transcript AI Summary
Brandon Weikert begins by referencing a quote attributed to Donald Trump: “We attacked Carg Island last night. I said, don’t touch the oil because maybe we’ll take over Carg Island.” Weikert questions whether Trump is misunderstanding the feasibility of military action against “Carg Island” and suggests the comment may reflect verbal excess. Karen Katowski says she did not see the quote, but argues Trump has long been fixated on “Carg Island” dating back to the late 1980s and that the military is right: taking the island would be extremely difficult and impossible to hold. She adds that Trump is prone to repeated verbal errors and that his decision-making capability is diminished because he processes everything personally; she contrasts this with how leadership requires respecting and motivating people rather than creating fear.
The conversation then turns to how Trump communicates about Iran and diplomacy. Weikert and Katowski discuss Trump calling the Iranian leadership “scum,” framing it as an unusual and disruptive diplomatic tactic. Katowski says Trump takes personally the large international attendance at Iran-related ceremonies following an assassination and compares Trump’s tendency to center himself in every event. They further discuss internal U.S. assessments, suggesting military capacity to fight “a distant war” may diminish over time, making immediate action seem like a “last gasp,” while noting the U.S. has systems that cost too much, too few assets, and delays in adapting to modern warfare such as drones.
Katowski references the November national security strategy, saying it seemed easy to understand and included an intention to pull back from the Middle East. She argues that even if the strategy points toward withdrawal, the problem is that no effective “something else” is put in its place, and she says the Pentagon is poorly balanced and cannot sustain expeditionary wars or defend the United States effectively. She claims that simply adding large sums (1.5 trillion) to the same system would waste money without paradigm change.
Weikert asks about Pete Hegseth and whether Pentagon personnel respect him, given his earlier comments about hypersonic weapons and acquisition reform. Katowski says many within the system hold contempt for him and that the military-industrial complex and Pentagon bureaucracy are structured with networks and plans that outlast any single Secretary of Defense. She illustrates this with a story from her Pentagon time involving an elderly civil servant employee who was allowed to remain despite not producing work, emphasizing that entrenched systems can resist change.
They then discuss Section 219 (and related legislation) and claim it functions as a cover rather than a practical procurement merger, suggesting Israel’s interest may be access to intelligence and data. Katowski describes a broader pattern of influence inside U.S. institutions and says that if such legislation moves forward, Israel would likely learn who reacts negatively and potentially target compromises within the system.
Weikert shifts to ongoing war dynamics, asking about a plan to arm Iraqi Kurds as a front against Iran. Katowski says she lacks inside information beyond Trump’s statements on social media, where he said the U.S. gave arms to the Kurds north of Iran that they took. She argues the Kurds do not trust the United States due to repeated “shafting,” including during Trump’s prior term.
They debate where Iraqi oil revenue flows and connect it to an executive-order framework from 2003 associated with moving Iraqi oil sales to be tied to the dollar and routed through institutions in New York, with the claim that this arrangement affects sovereignty and political outcomes. Katowski argues the system has effectively persisted since 2003 and that it reduces Iraqi control over oil revenues.
The conversation expands into Syria and Lebanon, discussing HTS/Jolani and whether HTS elements could be deployed in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah. Katowski says she does not have special contacts confirming this, but calls it dangerous and notes concerns about Jolani’s history and brutality. They also discuss shifting alliances and the idea that NATO leadership and some Middle East partners are strategically ineffective.
Weikert asks specifically about Israeli Defense Force struggles against Hezbollah and Katowski answers by saying the IDF is struggling in Gaza and highlights what she portrays as poor training and leadership, pointing to a former retired special forces officer’s critiques. Katowski argues Israel’s mandatory service system can resemble a “camp,” contributing to dysfunction across multiple fronts (Gaza, Hezbollah, Yemen/Houthis, and Iran), along with high suicide and alcohol abuse rates and harsh treatment of others upon return.
In closing, Weikert asks whether the direction of events with Iran points toward de-escalation. Katowski says she doubts the U.S. has staying power, implying low remaining weapon stocks, worn-out personnel, and shipyard delays affecting readiness. She suggests Trump may be seeking a diversion and that Israel may be more willing to escalate. She ends by saying she expects some sort of MOU or ceasefire arrangement, while expressing concern that Israel would prefer chaos, which she says Israel can exploit.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: All right. Well, I am one of the regular guests for Mario. And today I'm going to be the slightly better looking version of Mario filling in for him while he gets ready for the next show. It's very good to be here with you all. As some of you may know, I'm Brandon Weikert. I am joined now by retired Lieutenant Colonel, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Karen Katowski. Uh, Karen, uh, Stephanie, can we pull up that graphic? I sent you the quote of what Trump said yesterday. I don't know if you saw this, uh, uh, Karen. Um, but it's not up there. Ah, there it is. Uh, Trump was talking yesterday to the press and he made this classic offhanded comment. We attacked Carg Island last night. I said, don't touch the oil because maybe we'll take over Carg Island. End quote. Now, A lot of people I talk to, I talk to a lot of dinosaurs and they're, you know, from the military and they're all saying, ah, it's just vamping. We can't militarily do it. I keep telling them, I don't think Trump understands this. And I think he's going to try something like a Marine amphibious landing on card. Do you think that's accurate? Do you think this is just sort of, you know, verbal diarrhea from a president who has loose lips? What do you think's going on here?
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, I don't know. And I didn't see I didn't see that particular quote. But, you know, I always hearken back to the one he made in like 1988 or 1987 when he was on television. He talked about Carg Island and how they had all this oil and we should get that oil. So he's kind of had for 40 years in his brain or over 40, 45 years, 46 years. You know, he anyway, he's... you know, got this idea that this is, well, first off, that the world is his oyster and he can take whatever he wants from anybody he wants. And now that he's president, of course, who can stop him? But he's got this thing about Carg Island in his mind. And I don't think he's ever been there or anything like that. I don't think so. You know, I mean, he's probably traveled widely, but I just don't think he's ever been. I think it's the idea of Carg Island that he likes. And no, the military is right. This would be extremely difficult to take and impossible to hold. So this is what you're left with. I'm sure the military is telling him, sir, you know, we would be better off just exploding the whole island and obliterating it. Because if you want to take it and operate it, you know, and export American oil like we're doing in Venezuela, then, you know, I mean, Venezuelan oil that we've stolen, that we're exporting, you know, then maybe we can plan for that. But it's not going to be possible. It's Iranian property. They can defend it. They can make our life quite miserable. In fact, He's he's really the verbal diarrhea thing is real. That is real with Trump. You know, he also said and I didn't see this. Well, I did watch it. I saw it on repeated by someone else before. But I'm talking about the Islamic Republic of Japan. And he said it twice in the same paragraph, in the same set of sentences. He said that twice. So he didn't I mean, a lot of people. do, I mean, I misspeak, everybody misspeaks sometimes, you know, but usually you catch it and you go, oh, wait, you know, first off, you usually catch it right away. And if you don't, you usually catch it with the second or third sentence. And Trump repeated it twice. So he's not catching his errors. He's got, I think maybe he's overstimulated for what he can handle. You know, he's at that NATO meeting. He's just, he's trying to do everything. He's trying to be the sole integration of all knowledge and first off he's not qualified to do that but no one is you know i mean it's not even that if he was you know he's he has this idea that you know i'm the big dog i'm the boss i'm the decision so everything comes to him and he will process it but his processing capabilities um are diminished well they're they're diminished it And even on its best day, he could never do it because nobody can do it. That's not how you lead a country. And it's really not how you lead an organization. You know, Trump talks a lot about his business, you know, running businesses and getting good people around him. But he is very obviously he needs to be flattered. He needs his employees scared of being fired. Right. And that's not you don't ever want that. You don't. You know, you do not want that. If you want the best of the best around you, you have to respect them and you have to you don't want them scared of you. You want them, you know, motivated as opposed to fearful. And Trump Trump doesn't really do that. He's. Yeah, do that.
Speaker 0: Yeah, you're right. And I'm reminded of that, which the late great Lou Holtz once said, which is that as a head coach, you have to know which players to give a kick in the ass to and which ones to give a pat on the ass to. You know, it's it's it's not you know, it's it's not one size fits all.
Speaker 1: So respect people. And Trump really doesn't respect people. He respects the idea of people like in the sense of, you know, when he was doing his campaign and he was handing out McDonald's burgers at the drive-through and, you know, he's posing as a man of the people, a working class, like I understand a working class. And that's an act for him, which I didn't realize at first. I thought he actually, you know, dumb me. I thought he actually cared about people. But he really doesn't. He objectifies everything around him and it's something to be used. And I think this is part of his transactional, you know, He's now he loves his family members. He's capable of respecting people. But in his world, you're either for him and you're flattering him or I'm going to take you out and destroy you and humiliate you.
Speaker 0: And that's true. Yes, that's true. And I think we're we're seeing that play out. I mean, he called the Iranian scum two days ago. You know, it's you know, even if you hate the regime and I'm certainly not a fan of the regime, that's definitely a weird diplomacy thing. tactic to employ.
Speaker 1: He took personally the fact that pretty much the whole world, including the people that watch the world in the United States, he was insulted by the fact that 9, 10, 15 million Iranians and Iraqi Shia showed up He was insulted by the fact that 80 countries' heads of state representatives, at least.
Speaker 0: Including Putin, or his envoy, at least.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that they showed up, that they bowed their heads and kind of shared in this painful departure of a guy who was assassinated by Trump, okay? But Trump's insulted that more people showed up there. He said, oh, yeah, I draw that many people at one of my rallies, which you'll never have again. But that's just, it's all about Trump. He can't see past his, you know, he's quite a limited person, really. And the use of the word scum kind of tells you that. It's one thing for us to use that word in conversation. It's another thing for the president to say that about a country that not only is in mourning, but is basically shocking the whole entire world by the degree of the mourning and the the popularity of this guy that we were told the West was told, Oh, he's a terrible dictator. He, he holds everybody back. Everybody hates him. If we just knock him off, they'll rise up against him. And so he's been proven wrong so many times. So obviously, and I think he's mad about it. So he calls him scum, but the rest of the world is looking at Iran and, and most of the rest of the world, actually 95% of the planet is looking at Iran and they're impressed with their resilience. They're impressed with their, um, moral character in terms of withstanding this assault, which the rest of the world understands was an illegal war. Aside the fact that Israel talked us into it, what was Israel's reason? Nobody had a reason. It was just like, well, we want to do this. Can we do this now? Can we do it tomorrow? When can we do this?
Speaker 0: Well, I think the reason is because the Israelis assessed that popular opinion was turning against them in the United States.
Speaker 1: Better get going quick. Better get going quick before.
Speaker 0: Yeah. You know, it's funny. I talked to somebody who supposedly was informed of some kind of a briefing that happened with Trump and certain elements of the intelligence community where they basically ran through an assessment which found if trends continued, U.S. military was basically our capacity to wage war
Speaker 1: a distant war was going to diminish precipitously over the next decade and if we didn't hit iran now we might never be able to now that actually makes sense because it's already clearly diminished we've been humiliated by the way we've performed and we have no choice because we can't do any better we're doing the best we can i think the military is doing everything it possibly can and i think they're straining their own timbers really in doing that. But that's the best we have. We have systems that cost too much. We have too few of them. They're not really adapted to modern warfare. We're late on the stage with drones, certainly defending against them and then using them. We're not the leader anymore. So we've shown our weakness, but yeah, the people inside the system and probably observers, you could see that our military is not keeping up. All you have to do is look at China and Russia And you can clearly see that we're not keeping up at all. Haven't been for some time. So maybe, yeah, it does make sense that this was his last gasp and, and you know, the, the national security strategy, which I actually liked it because it was short. I did too.
Speaker 0: The NSS from last November. Yeah.
Speaker 1: I thought it was more, I thought it was more easy to understand, more straightforward, had a lot less gobbledygook in it. It was shorter. And I also liked it because it said hemispheric. We're going to pull back. I saw pulling back in there. We're not going to worry about the Middle East so much. Russia will be like, we can handle Russia. And then ultimately we'll see what China has. Maybe we want China, maybe we don't. But pulling back was good. And I thought that was reflected in that NSS. And so maybe, but then he's doing this thing in Middle East. Maybe he's like, well, we got the ships over there. Let's use them up. Then we'll bring back home and and figure out something else. But the problem is they're not figuring out the something else. You know, there's no, you know, our military is trashed and it's not well designed or balanced. It's not capable. It certainly can't defend the United States and it can't do expeditionary wars anymore. That's obvious. But 1.5 trillion thrown at the same system is going to waste that money. Just like you got a permanently flushing toilet, just shovel the money in it because you're not going to get anything different unless we have people who And ideas that are, you know, really a paradigm change. And I don't see that happening. I don't see that happening. You think Hegseth is going to come up with something? That guy, I mean, seriously, he doesn't even know what I'm talking about.
Speaker 0: So it's interesting because, you know, when Hegseth was doing the rounds before he was officially nominated, he made certain comments. And I know... who gave him those comments to make. He made certain comments about hypersonic weapons and about the need for acquisitions reform. And where it was like, okay, this guy isn't just a talking head. He actually kind of got it. And he, I thought, was initially very good for recruitment. I think a lot of the rank and file, he's running with them. He's pulling up a lot.
Speaker 1: Sure, there's that, yeah.
Speaker 0: But at that sort of grand strategic level, at the kind of higher-end enterprise level of the Pentagon, you used to be involved with the Pentagon at pretty high levels. Do you think those people actually respect him and actually think what he's doing? No.
Speaker 1: In fact, I actually forgot that some of the ground troops and the lower-ranking folks away from the Pentagon do like this, did see this as a fresh thing. I forgot about that because what I know and what I – perceived today is that they have complete contempt for him. And it's pretty well earned. He has contempt. Well, it's mutual. He also has contempt for the bureaucrats and the generals and uniformed officers that are part of that bureaucracy there. So it's mutual contempt. But the thing is, they have a system, the military industrial complex and the Pentagon itself is the civilians, the generals who have promised jobs, colonels and majors, all the people that recycle into the defense industry. These guys have a plan, and they have friends, they have a network, and they will outlive any Secretary of Defense. They don't care about this. They know how to slow roll like anything. And this is unrelated, but it's a story I like to tell. I haven't told it that much, really. But when I worked at the Pentagon, there was around the corner, I don't know, there's so many corners, but it wasn't too far from our office, there was a lady And she she was the oldest civil servant employee in the Pentagon. And I don't know if it was ever or or at that time. She was like in her 90s. I mean, early 90s. And she was a civil servant. And the reason I found out about it is had to deliver something to the office. And I walked in and she had a desk at the front. She sound asleep. You know, I mean, sound asleep. And she's got white hair and she little tiny lady and sound asleep. And so I walked back and gave my document. I said, what's up with that? what's happening there? What is that? You know, cause I mean, I'm not saying people don't sleep at their office, but it was just weird. And they said, oh yeah, yeah, she's, she's been here. She's like the oldest, she's a celebrity almost. And yet they could not, they couldn't get rid of her. Somebody was paying her salary benefits for decades. And we weren't getting anything. We weren't getting anything, but she chose not to retire and, And I don't think being her, her generation is 20 years ago. She's 90 years old. She was probably not part of the litiginous society that we may assume we have today where she would have sued them for, you know, elderly prejudice or something. She was, she didn't want to leave and they were fine having her there. And, but none of it relates to the needs of the taxpayer. None of it relates to the needs of a defense establishment. What it relates to is she needs a job and, I don't mind. And who cares? I need a job too. So we'll just go with the flow. They will outlast anybody. They believe they have the power. There's a very arrogant mindset at the top of the Pentagon and at the course of military industrial establishment, which is populated by the same people. It's just like big pharma and the FDA, right? You just go back and forth. So it's an organization that They're not intimidated by headset. They're not afraid of him. They simply have to adjust the speed that they operate with while he's there until they get somebody else that they like. So what I'm saying is if you want to fix the Pentagon, you're going to break that whole thing up. And who's going to do that? Trump's not going to do it because he has no idea. If someone flatters him and whispers sweet nothings into his ear, he's good to go. He does not have, he's not, you need somebody who, like you who sees it. You know, there's a lot of people that look at the system. You know, we got POGO. There's all kinds of organizations that understand the real deep flaws in our acquisition system. They understand the military congressional industrial complex, really, that put the Congress in there, and that's part of the problem. And, of course, you know, the fact that we have concentrated our systems acquisitions to produce the most profit for the least amount of delivery. That's right. And you have a system like that. And that would be fine if everybody else did it like that. But Russia doesn't do it like that. China doesn't do it like that. India doesn't do it like that. Iran doesn't do it like that. Honestly, honestly, even Israel doesn't do it.
Speaker 0: That's right.
Speaker 1: That's right. But don't, but I'm not advocating the merger.
Speaker 0: No, of course not. No, no, no. But it is interesting though, because I mean, this is why I've just to that last point, This is why I've never believed for a second that the real purpose of, I guess it's now Section 219. It used to be 219. They changed it.
Speaker 1: Very coy.
Speaker 0: I've always thought that was a cover because I don't really think the Israelis actually want to emulate the way we procure weapons because it's just not practical. I think they want access, though, to the data. And I think they want access to the intel. And they're using this idea that we're going to jointly merge defense bases as some kind of propaganda tool. Oh, it's mutually beneficial.
Speaker 1: Oh, no, no. There's much bigger benefits. And the money will flow unseen and, you know, examined. And that's another plus. But that's not the biggest plus. biggest plus is being there and you know john kiryaku has uh he has a little clip where he says um you know somebody's asking if israel spies on us and whatever of course yes and he says they already have 90 we give them like 99 of what we have very little that we keep from israel in terms of intelligence technology but that one percent is is really a thorn in they're obsessed with getting 100 and this way they'll know they'll know they're getting 100 they'll be right into every And again, we can't, it can't work. There's no way it can work. You know, I remember so many years ago, I was probably, I was probably a captain at the time, but it was, I think during the Yugoslavia thing, when we were bombing the first NATO humanitarian war. And there were a lot of issues with the UN and would we be, would Americans be, would American troops be under UN? And of course we weren't going to be, we'd have our own general and everything. But that was a big issue. We said, oh, my God, we're not going to we're not going to be under UN control. But what will be OK with being under Israeli control? Our intelligence will be fine if a Mossad officer clears what they produce. Is that what they are OK with? I don't think so. And I think maybe, you know, they can break the system if they pass this thing. They're going to break the system. They're not they have no idea. The ramifications, not so much that what Israel would do, but the reactions of Americans when Israelis boardroom. OK, it's not going to happen. There's going to be incidents. There's going to be issues. And they'll say, oh, it's anti-Semitism. And we don't care. We don't work with Israelis. This is American technology.
Speaker 0: We don't trust it. We're already seeing that pushback from certain factions within the intelligence community, aren't we? Yes. You know, with the related Intelligence Authorization Act out of the Senate, we're there. I'm forgetting. I always forget the number. It's section... 622, I think, where they're basically elevating Israel from a transactional intelligence sharing partner to a full-blown trusted partner on the same level with Five Eyes. Now, I know there are groups out of CIA, DIA, labeling them a counterintelligence threat, number one. That came 48 hours after the Senate got through the, you know. So there are factions already that are arraying against Israel.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's right. That's that release of that document. The biggest spying threat is Israel. Yeah, like we already know that. But of course, the timing is important because they're right. And, you know, this I hate to be all like conspiratorial or or just totally negative about this. But it's very it's very possible that part of this is to smoke out the opposition for the Israelis to smoke them out. Because, you know, just like they deal with politicians and they're peccadilloes and their little crimes they commit on the side, you know, or, or you can put your honey pot over there and get some good stuff. And then you manage your, your, your politician better because you've got something on him. That's, that's the whole thing.
Speaker 0: In some cases they marry the handler and become Senate majority leader, but you know, that's another story for another time.
Speaker 1: This is actually, I'm just joking. This is, this is how it's always worked with spine, right? I mean, this is, You know, you want to get leverage every way you can. So Israel's good at that. We know that they manage quite a few people in the political realm. They have less ability to manage bureaucrats inside the system and particularly military people. You know, they're not, you know, when military people, it's a tight community. You know, if you're married to a, I don't care who it is from another country, we know that you're married. Your neighborhood knows what country they came from. it's, you know, if that country is an enemy or some people consider it untrustworthy, that is something that's there. So maybe when they, this merger legislation to move it through, I mean, hopefully it won't succeed, but if it does happen, then they're going to know who's reacting negatively to it in the system and they'll know who they need to compromise. So maybe the whole Israel compromise situation, the program, the Hasbara program, maybe it has a wing that calls, you know, the honeypot wing or the let's get dirt on this military guy or that career civilian. Because we need that well-placed person to fire this other guy who is opposed to us. So I wouldn't put it past them.
Speaker 0: It sounds like a grand scheme, but it's really just little bits and pieces that... Well, if you're a small country like Israel, though, who's punching above its weight in these areas, you have to behave that way. And they have such good...
Speaker 1: Yes, and they're good at it. They're good at it.
Speaker 0: They're very good at it. Yes.
Speaker 1: And so when you're good at something and you're a small country punching above its weight, then you need to... keep doing what you're good at. They're extremely good at controlling politicians. They're extremely good at compromising major influencers. They're good at that. So why wouldn't they want to extend that into the military industrial complex even more than it already is? Because I think if you look at some of the major companies and subcontractors, you know, we have tons of Israeli subcontractors and contractors to the Pentagon. They're already in there working with people. But what they don't have is inside the Pentagon as well in the uniformed crowd they don't have.
Speaker 0: And this was actually an issue. If you remember during the 12 day war, I was told on more than one occasion there were almost fistfights breaking out in these briefing rooms at the Pentagon because Israeli officers would come barreling into classified Pentagon briefings about the war, demanding to know what they aren't being told.
Speaker 1: That's right. That's right. But also, if an individual stands up against that, we do remove them. They're getting fired. Because they have a great... The Zionists, I don't consider them very religious people, but they have a great comeback to any type of criticism, and that is you're an anti-Semite. Well, we can't have that, and we shouldn't have that. People should not hate other people based on ethnicity or religion. That is true. I share that value system. But If you're going to, you know, if it was communists, you know, Trump's all big about communism now for some reason, like, oh, the communists are coming. Maybe it's too late. But anyway, he's got the communists coming. And, you know, if we had if we don't when a communist comes, you know, it's like an ideology. Clearly understand that, you know, you could have Christian, Islamic, Jewish communists. any type of religion or atheists could all be communists, right? Communism doesn't have a certain religion associated with it or a certain ethnicity. Communism opened everybody. It's an idea that you might want to follow. So, but Zionism is exactly in the same category. It's a governing, it's really national socialism with a, you know, kind of a a twist, a Zionist twist to it. And that's just an idea. Anybody can be a Zionist, Christian Zionist. We have plenty of them.
Speaker 0: There's more Christian Zionists, I think, in the world than there are actual Jewish Zionists at this point.
Speaker 1: Well, that is true. That is actually speaking, you know, that's an actual fact. And so, so, you know, this, this idea that if you don't like Zionism or the behavior of a particular Zionist, when he's acting in the capacity of promoting the Zionist state of Israel in your Pentagon or wherever, well, you shouldn't be able to, just you can be called a racist or a anti-Semite for that. That makes no sense because it's an ideology that can be freely chosen. It can be rejected. It can be adopted. And, you know, actually over half of Jews in the diaspora are not Zionists. They oppose Zionism. So, I mean, the whole thing's just a game. And I think it's getting old. I think people are seeing through it. And maybe that's also why they need to be inside because I think it's a very effective way What they've done to Congress with money donations, tracking their crimes, and they have many crimes that they commit. Well, actually, there was a guy who wrote a book, Three Felonies a Day, about 25 years ago, about all the crimes that we all commit every day. We drive in front of a flock camera and we weren't looking at the road. I don't know. I mean, we commit these crimes. But, you know, they're good at doing it with Congress. Congress is controlled very well. Most of them are not believing Zionists. They support Israel because their alternatives are very bleak if they don't. Right.
Speaker 0: Well, they're paid to or they're blackmailed or both.
Speaker 1: That's right. So maybe they want to expand the blackmail regime inside. But anyway, I don't know how we are going to let this pass in the legislation, but they're not debating it.
Speaker 0: No, purposely. I mean, Ro Khanna tried to bring it up. God bless Ro. Ro Khanna is one of the last, you know, he gets a lot of flack for other reasons, but I said he's one of the last true Americans, regardless of his party. I mean, that was... one of the most honorable things I've seen. Uh, and, and I'd be saying this if they were doing it about any country that was trying to gain influence, uh, in the United States, the way that the Israelis are, but kind of tried it and they shot his own parties, you know, that's what's sort of crazy because, um, you know, uh,
Speaker 1: I noticed him when he stood up with Massey on the Epstein Files and other things. But he is a guy like Massey, like Ron Paul used to be when he was in Congress, and like many of them, who is willing to say, well, if you and I agree on this one project and it's a good project, we should work together. And we don't care.
Speaker 0: And that's how it should be.
Speaker 1: Yeah, of course it should be. That's how we work in our neighborhoods. You think we look at our neighbors and go, well, you don't keep your grass at three inches high, so therefore I will never work with you. No. You say, you know, he mows his grass weird and he puts tomatoes in his backyard. That's okay. I don't do that. I don't like that. But I like this other thing. We're going to work together on this other thing that we agree on. And leave the disagreements aside. That's how it should be done. And Roe got shut down by his own Democrats because they're all compromised by Israel.
Speaker 0: So that's right.
Speaker 1: Very, very sad, very.
Speaker 0: And this, and this, and Lieutenant Curl, this, this does lead into what we started with, which is the war, because all of those things that we're talking about, I mean, this is why we're in the war we're in right now is this kind of influence. Something that I'm, I'm hearing is that the, the plan, which is another one of those crackpot plans, I think that this administration gloms onto is, that they're moving forward with trying to arm the Iraqi Kurds to be used as a front against Iran. Are you hearing anything more about this? What do you know about that wing of the pantomime of the absurd that we're living in?
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, I don't have any inside information on what we're doing, other than what Trump has told me. personally, through his social postings.
Speaker 0: That's right.
Speaker 1: He said that we gave a bunch of arms to the Kurds north of Iran and they were supposed to help, but they took the guns.
Speaker 0: Classic Kurds.
Speaker 1: I don't blame them.
Speaker 0: Who wants to go to war for us? Good God. How many times have we screwed the Kurds over?
Speaker 1: And Trump probably doesn't remember this because he wasn't president or he was president, but he didn't know. We shafted the Kurds so many times that any self-respecting Kurd, whether they're a separatist Kurd or they're happy to live in Turkey or they're happy to live where they are and they don't want to fight wars, if they are self-respecting, they do not trust the United States of America. They cannot because we have shafted them so many times.
Speaker 0: Trump himself shafted them in his first term. That's what I thought. Yeah, remember that. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Yeah. So so but he probably didn't see it that way or nobody.
Speaker 0: He was just doing the air to want a solid because that's his homie.
Speaker 1: You know, there you go. So so they don't trust us. And if we gave him more guns, I would encourage him to hold on to those two. But but I will say, you know, and this is I saw an interview of somebody saying something I've talked about. Other people have, but it's not really well known. And this the woman, I forget her name. Well known. pointed out that it wasn't well-known. And that is what happens to Iraq's oil revenues. So you know where they go, right? Iraq's oil revenues.
Speaker 0: Well, I thought part of them are going through the Turkish pipeline and that the Israelis are reaping some of that.
Speaker 1: That could be. But the stuff they're selling above the board, like open market sales and not smuggled stuff or side deals.
Speaker 0: Why don't you inform the audience?
Speaker 1: Well, it is left over from 2003 – George W. Bush executive order, which took all of Iraq's oil when we got rid of Sodom, put it on the dollar, because that was partly why we had to go and hit Sodom the second time because he had gone off the dollar with his oil sales. So we took all the Iraqi oil sales, the state, because it's the state industry, took the state oil sales, put them on, on the dollar and to ensure that they would stay on the dollar and that we would know everything that's happening. They go to New York, to the New York fed.
Speaker 0: Oh yeah. You're talking about the national. I thought you were talking about Iraqi Kurdistan. Sorry. Yeah. Yeah. Go ahead.
Speaker 1: No, not Iraqi Kurdistan, but obviously they have some oil that, you know, they're benefiting. Yeah.
Speaker 0: Cause Gary Vogler talks about what's going on with Iraqi Kurdistan, but I'm sorry. I don't mean to cut you off. Keep going.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, anyways, Maine, not Kurdistan, but, main iraqi oil sales which um now that they're not being bombed you know those those oil sales are are getting bigger not so much going through the straight right now but their cap their capacity and capability is bigger but that money that profit the sales money goes to the new york fed And the New York Fed has an account run by probably Besant or somebody like that who certainly has visibility into it. And then we dole it back to them, which is how we got the current president. Remember, they were going to do Maliki. And Maliki's been the president before, but they didn't like him. He's too close to Iran. So they said, no, you can't. Your parliament cannot choose Maliki. We're not going to let you do that. And they said, we are going to do that. And they said, no, we're not. And finally, they said, you're not getting your oil money if you don't pick the guy we approve. And guess what? They folded and gave the other guy. So... That should not be happening, first off. OK, what sovereignty is that when your state oil sales go to a foreign bank and then that foreign bank writes checks back to you as they see fit? Who would who would agree to that? And plus, this has been in place since 2003, since May of 2003. That's when the executive order was passed and rescinded. OK, so Trump's a thief. But so is every president since George W. Bush. They they well.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I would say, really, I think this originated from America's first prime minister, which was Dick Cheney. I think that was all his... Oh, absolutely.
Speaker 1: I'm sure Dick Cheney had that one written ready to go, because as soon as they had control of Baghdad, it was the first, going back to the dollar, was the very first executive order they signed after we went in there. And it's never been rescinded or modified. It's not right. We're running a rack, like a like a colonial master in terms of their money.
Speaker 0: Not a particularly good colonial master either. I mean, I think the British were probably far more competent at running a colony than the United States ever been.
Speaker 1: Oh, for sure. Because I mean, the green zone gets overrun periodically. It's just like, okay, well, you better hide in the basement. But seriously, this is outdated. We're not good at it. As you said, we're not good at it. It's not part of our value system. It's not an American value system. It might be the government's preferred way of doing business, but we don't value it. And we don't respect it. Most Americans don't know we're doing it because when they hear this, they don't understand. Wait a minute. I thought that was all over with. What do you mean this is our relationship with Iraq? Anyway, major oil producer, too. I think it's number three in OPEC.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: Something like that. I mean, it is a major provider. So we leverage that to get our way. It's, again, empire out of control. We don't do it very well. It's failing. But the thing is, maybe some of that money, I could see Trump giving it to the Kurds. I'm sure he, yes, and especially... And he might already be doing that, but I could see them saying, you know, if we need to turn the spigot on, we'll just, they're Iraqis. I mean, they play word games all the time, like the red card thing. Remember the red card Trump got involved with in Fontana?
Speaker 0: Yeah, the FIFA thing or the fight game.
Speaker 1: He goes, oh, we can just let that start after the next game. We'll have a, or whatever. You can't do that. But this is how Trump thinks. And so he thinks the Kurds, well, maybe we'll turn those guys on. Maybe we didn't give them enough guns. Maybe they wanted more money. Okay, let's switch the account we returned the money to instead of to Baghdad. Let's give it to our Kurdish friends. I could see him doing that. Of course, total disregard for sovereignty, total immorality in how you would manage other people's money. I mean, if you took, honestly, if you manage money like a U.S. government does, Anybody who touched U.S. government money and managed it would all be in jail. The SEC, everybody would be after them. It goes beyond the Ponzi scheme. It's way worse than that. It's like highly developed fraud.
Speaker 0: It's highly developed fraud is exactly what it is.
Speaker 1: A little guy or a guy with just $100 million to his name, just that kind of little guy, he'll go to jail for that. but our president can play these games. And I think it, I think people are getting a glimpse of it.
Speaker 0: If Trump had done this when he was running the Trump organization, he'd be in prison right now, but because he's the president of the United States of America, it's okay. It's, it's all acceptable.
Speaker 1: He may still end up.
Speaker 0: I mean, this is, I think that might be why he doesn't want to leave.
Speaker 1: Yeah. But you know, he's, he is behaving in a way that is illegal. I mean, we, and you know, I honestly did think Biden was, was a crooked piece of crap. I honestly thought Biden was bad compared to what he's doing now. That's right. And I thought his little cokehead son was a problem. And now, and now I see Trump and all the Trump juniors, whoever they are, his sons, his family members, his Kushner. I mean, Jared Kushner by himself is an icon of corruption. It's just crazy.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Yeah. Well, and, and, and that, and you know, I, I'm watching the Iraqi situation very closely because it, I think that thing is going to pop open real soon. And I think that Trump has it in his head that he can get the Kurds to do this. And then also another sort of backdoor way for escalation. What are you hearing about this, this so-called plan that Trump sort of let out about using Jelani to In Syria to be fair. And I said this to Mario last week. I said, look, this wouldn't be the first time Jelani has allowed himself to be used as a shock troop by the U S and whoever else against, you know, one of our common enemies. Are you hearing anything serious about the HTS elements being deployed into Southern Lebanon to go fight Hezbollah on behalf of.
Speaker 1: I, I don't have any special contacts that tell me. Okay. but except Jelani says that he doesn't want to do that. But, um, you know, the, it looks like the band's getting back together.
Speaker 0: It does.
Speaker 1: It gets back together. They're going to do concerts, you know, and people will show up. So this, yeah, I, I think it's very dangerous. And, and I will say too, um, I, I mean, Jelani, obviously his history speaks for itself. You know, the guy is, uh, uh, Well, there was a reason he had $10 million on his head, and it shouldn't have been taken off, most likely.
Speaker 0: Now he's playing basketball with CENTCOM's commander. I know. I know.
Speaker 1: And then, you know, you could say, well, does that reflect our own corruption? Or has Jelani left it behind? And I don't think he has left it behind because of the way he's governed Syria so far. He has been brutal. And they, you know, the issue of... Assad, you know, Assad kills, does this and that. But Assad was an ophthalmologist and he was not that brutal. He might not have been the best manager of his military, but he was not brutal. This guy knows how to kill and he has no qualms about it. I don't know what his religion is because I'm not, I think a guy that murders that much is not probably putting God first in their life. You know, I don't care if he prays five times a day.
Speaker 0: Definition of God. That's right.
Speaker 1: So, so he, but he's brutal and he is, Very transactional. I mean, the way he dresses tells you everything.
Speaker 0: He's pulling an air fat, right? I mean, it's, you know, now he's suddenly wearing the $3,000 suits and whatnot.
Speaker 1: He is a way smarter criminal than Zelensky.
Speaker 0: Oh, for sure.
Speaker 1: Because Zelensky's a smart criminal. He's enriched himself.
Speaker 0: But Zelensky... Zelensky's also a hostage too, though, I think. Is he? I think Zelensky's also a hostage of the Banderites. who will kill him and his family if he gets out of line. Well, he's useful, right? I mean, look, hey, you know, he's, you know, can you call him a Nazi? As in he descended from Jews, you know, Jewish Ukrainians. So it's harder, you know, he gets along better with Western leaders, I think, than the Banderites would. The Banderites are nuts. They're Nazis, you know, I mean, they're literal Nazis. I don't mean to distract you, but please continue.
Speaker 1: The Polish people are like, had it. They've had it. The Polish government said, what are you doing?
Speaker 0: I think he put out, I think one of those Ukrainian kill lists was updated to include this Polish MP, the woman who led the movement to revoke that title to Zelensky because of the whole Nazi thing.
Speaker 1: Is this the Markovits one or whatever?
Speaker 0: Yeah, I think so. It was a woman.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 0: Brunette woman. I don't I don't know. Yeah. But this morning I read that.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 0: So, you know, with friends like that, I mean, but this is, you know, this is the world we're living in now. And these are the people that we're supposedly trusting to do our bidding. That's scary.
Speaker 1: It is. And it's also a sign of weakness that we can't get better. You know, and I think about the NATO suck up fest they had. Yes. A couple of days ago in Ankara. I guess Istanbul, wherever it was. Yeah. The NATO leadership, you know, very weak, very...
Speaker 0: They're poodles. They're pet poodles.
Speaker 1: They're pet poodles. Except the poodles is one of the smartest dog breeds. And so I wouldn't call them poodles. They're like the pugs. They're like pugs. Pugs are very smart. So they're more like pugs than poodles. Or maybe they have a poodle body with a poodle face. But these guys are useless to their own countries. They're useless to the defense of their own countries. They're useless to the advancement of NATO. They have no sense whatsoever of strategic balance. They don't understand anything that you would expect NATO leaders who are speaking for a military organization of that stature... that is just terrible. And NATO has big problems. I mean, massive, massive problems. They're not solving any of those. They got the same problem we do in our acquisition system.
Speaker 0: You know, we, we have, well, they're modeled on us. I mean, this is, they're replicating our worst.
Speaker 1: Nobody's got a paradigm change. Nobody can, you know, they see drone swarms from other countries and they go, what do we do? And they see the China, Chinese producing literally, you know, hundreds and hundreds of ships that are more capable than any ship we have. And certainly any ship that NATO has, because they command so few ships. But they can't get out of their box. They can't figure it out. So those friends are useless. The most psychophantic ones are the most useless. And yet Trump seems to like them. And then you look at our friends in the Middle East. Of course, Israel, not a friend. Not sure who pulls whose chain. Maybe we take turns. I don't know. But If you look at our Arab friends, you know, we're friends with all these kingdoms, these autocrats who are hanging on to power in some of the Gulf states because of past history. We've got, you know, I think I know I'm not going to pick on Lebanon, but the elected leader or the parliamentary, you know, President Ayoun of Lebanon. What a, I mean, seriously, the guy, you know, total puppet of US, total puppet of Israel, totally out of touch with his people. Maybe he's got rich friends. Maybe he's rich. I don't know. I don't understand him.
Speaker 0: Do you buy that the Lebanese people are generally turning against Hezbollah or do you think that is that?
Speaker 1: Yeah, I don't think so. Look, look, here's the thing. It would be nice in a perfect world that if you had militias and or a defense organization that was not from the state, it was not your state. You know, you had an army. It wasn't very good. Wasn't very well led. one didn't have much to say for itself. And then you had these guys running around that were actually fighting and they're pretty scary. And you're a little bit scared of them because obviously if they're next door and somebody hits them, you could get, okay. So there's, there's anxiety on, on both parts of this, but after what Israel does, who fights, who defense, who responds, who channels your personal rage as a, your anxiety, your disgust and, as an individual Lebanese person or as a Lebanese family who lost somebody because Israel decided, oh, I'm going to blow you up because you need to be taught a lesson or I don't like the depth of my security barrier. And I think you all are a bunch of useless things anyway. You're animals.
Speaker 0: You're in the way.
Speaker 1: You're in the way. And so when those shots are fired, when those incidents happen and people individually lose something, well, a million of them lost their houses. So, you know, a house is something, right? An apartment, a place that you have stuff in. That's all blown up now. And then you say to your state, your government, President Ayun, tell our generals to make this go away. We want to go back and rebuild or we want to go get my stuff out of my house. And I'd like my kids to be brought back to life. But I guess you can't do that. But do something. And he does nothing. And Hezbollah does something. It clears day where they're going to side. And also. I don't know what the demographics really are in Lebanon. I mean, there's, it's a complicated thing, but I think the young people would be far more likely to want to get involved with Hezbollah than they would getting involved with the Lebanese army.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: It doesn't have, it's just like a, it's kind of like what we're talking about with headset. You know, he came in and he said, the military is fat, which is so funny. He brings all the generals in, you know, and a target reach environment. I'm sure he brings him in. And he says, you're too fat. You're lazy. You can't run a mile. Well, you know, he didn't respect him. But Hentz had a point. He said people don't want to be, a lot of parents don't want their kids to go in a military that is filled with DEI, that is strange. If you get your people from conservative parts of the United States, you want to send your kid into an organization that you as a parent respect. Well, if the parent doesn't respect it, they're not going to let their kid go in it. And then the kid goes in it and says, well, I want to be stronger and better. And they go, well, you can't be better than her and you can't be better than her and him or whoever it is because you might hurt their feelings. Well, there's no place for that in the military. I mean, you need to. It's just like, well, it's like professional sports or any other type of sport. You know, it's I'm sorry, you can't be a first. You're not going to be on team one. If we're winning by three points, then we'll put you in the second half late, the second half late five minutes. Even little kids understand that. So you have to perform. So in the military, kids come in and want to perform, and it has to change. Hedges was right about that, in a sense. It was poor recruiting to have a DEI military filled with, I should say, fat people, because they're obviously not fat, but you know, he's kind of making a point. We need to have a fit military and kids, parents, everybody wants to be in a fit military. Nobody wants to join the fat military, the fat sloppy military that can't win a war. And again, Hedgeseth cannot fix this because we can't win a war. That's also the other big problem, which is why people don't want to go in. But anyway, I think Hezbollah is playing that recruitment game far better just by being competent, just by getting their hits in against a major power. And the Lebanese military isn't doing that. Anyway, I don't know.
Speaker 0: So I actually, I want to follow up because, you know, something that I've been banging on about is, objectively speaking, whether you are, you know, pro-Israel or not, the Israeli Defense Force, contrary to what their propaganda is saying, the Israeli Defense Force has struggled in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah. Is that what you're seeing too?
Speaker 1: They're struggling in Gaza.
Speaker 0: Well, of course they struggle in Gaza as well.
Speaker 1: Nobody's shooting at him in Gaza. Well, yeah, right. There's major, major problems with that. First, you know, I go back to, oh, who was, I can't remember his name. He's running for Congress in North Carolina. He worked for the... He he's retired army guy, special forces. And he took a job with the Gaza foundation.
Speaker 0: Oh yeah. Was it? Yeah.
Speaker 1: So Colonel Aguilar, Tony Aguilar. When he first, the very first thing he wrote or said interviews when he left that organization beyond telling the story of, of the kid that I heard that one, but he also said he, that the, Things could be done better because he was brought in and they were herding them down through these channels and then shooting them and doing weird stuff. And he said the IDF is poorly trained. He said the IDF is poorly led. And that caught my eye because, you know, that's not what we hear. We say, oh, they're great. You know, they're wonderful. World's best military and the most moral military. Of course, we knew that wasn't true.
Speaker 0: Only Ben Shapiro and Mark Levin believe that.
Speaker 1: Yeah. It's nuts. But the fact that he noticed that they were poorly trained, and then it makes sense. You think about the youth. It's a mandatory service. It's like anything. You know, it's almost like college. So many people go to college in the United States that it became a rite of passage rather than something you would just do to pursue an interest and get a job and whatever. It's something, well, you got to go to college. You don't know what you're going to do, but go to college. You'll figure it out. And college became... a place where nobody learned anything, pretty much. I mean, our U.S. colleges are not what the universities in America are. They're horrible. We lost our reputation there. And that's kind of the military when you draft every kid and women, men and women, everybody has to serve in the IDF in some capacity for two or three years. It becomes something, well, you just got to do it, you know, so let's make the best of it. So if that means I need to party, I need to have a good time, just get through, keep my head down or do whatever I want. Maybe I'll like it. Maybe I want to stay in, whatever. That is not a winning military. That's a camp. That's a frickin summer camp. OK, it's not going to do it. But that's what they have created for themselves with their idea of with the government, you know, the idea of security. Everybody has to be trained. But they forgot, you know, they forgot to maybe check it along the way to see, are we training? What are we accomplishing? And so now they're fighting on seven fronts. Obviously, Gaza is a shooting fish in a barrel, targeting kids, taking turns having fun with the degradation that is Gaza. So that's got to disturb some of them. The more sane among the IDF are disturbed by that. Then you've got Hezbollah, which are kicking their butts. You've got Yemen, which they have a tough time with the Houthis.
Speaker 0: They've given up on the Houthis. It sounds like they've given up trying to like we did, like we did.
Speaker 1: And then you have Iran, which clearly can get through their, their iron dome, which is antique really at this, at this stage. So people feel vulnerable. They feel like they're not getting security. Then they talk to their kids in the military and they're going, well, how did that help us? And then the suicide rate's high. Alcohol abuse rate is high. They say people are coming back from tours, IDF tours, where they're smacking people around. Maybe they're serving in the torture prisons that they have. And they're treating people really badly. And then they come home and they treat their wife and kids badly. And they go, well, why are you yelling at me? Why are you pushing me around? I'm not. So it's a societal problem because everybody has to go in the military.
Speaker 0: Well, and it sounds like the the. Post-1968 U.S. Army that was full of draftees, and by that point in the Vietnam War, that contingent that was there at the beginning was getting out, and they were handing it off to people who did not want to be there. And that's what it sounds a lot like to me.
Speaker 1: That's right. And this is why we'll never have a draft in this country, not anytime soon.
Speaker 0: Well, I don't know. Caroline Leavitt keeps bringing it up every time.
Speaker 1: Her kids will be 18 and 20 when they get a draft, the one she just had. It's going to be that, and I don't think they'll get it then because can you imagine being a training officer or a sergeant or NCO or an officer leading a bunch of 18-year-olds that came out of high school able to read at the fourth grade level, maybe, addicted to their phones to the point that You can't break that addiction. We don't even know how to. And then you try to reform them in your image. You shave their heads and make them run laps. That's not going to work. Half of them are going to die.
Speaker 0: I mean, the rot is too deep.
Speaker 1: Yes. And and we have raised multiple generations, not just one, but multiple generations where their needs come first. Their wishes are our commands. You know, that's not raising people to serve in a military. The way you get people to serve in a military is they have a motivation because probably they've been attacked. Well, we haven't been attacked.
Speaker 0: So all we do is- We're the attackers.
Speaker 1: We're the attackers, that's right. And so, but we haven't been attacked. And if we're not attacked, it's good, peace. We don't, people don't need to be warriors all the time, but that warrior spirit can be stimulated under the right, you know, circumstances. say you're in danger and you have to defend your family or whatever but uh we're fighting overseas they're talking about raising a draft what so we can go do something to somebody else that we don't even know that is very unpopular i mean the iraq the iran war none of these have been super popular but the iran war usually after the firing starts and the beginning you know 27th of february and we got hit hard actually they lied about how the damages were but people knew and um you know, we, we were, uh, usually those words get popular. They go, Oh my God, they, they, they shot American. They blew up on AWACS. We all saw the pictures. We're like, Oh, I mean, military people like, Holy crap. I'd never seen that before. But America is like, dude, put it in the wrong place. We're not, that doesn't support your war anymore. And they didn't, the war's more unpopular today than it was. Um, and Trump is so unfair.
Speaker 0: out of touch, you know, with, Oh, he's completely, he's done. I mean, politically it's over whatever the Republicans are clinging on to, unless they've got some secret rigging plan for the election. It's, it's over, um, in our last minute or two, cause I know we got to move on. Cause I know Mario's going to be doing the next show in our next, in our last minute, based on everything you're seeing, um, what do you think, where do you think this is going with Iran? Do you think ultimately we're going to deescalate or do you think Trump is like, uh, you know, is he captain Queeg? Somebody stolen his strawberries and he's not going to drop it.
Speaker 1: Yeah, no, I mean, he is like, I think we get a little bit, but, um, but not, I think, I don't think we have the staying power. Um, I think, I don't think we've had any chance to, uh, rebuild or replenish our stocks. I think they are low. Most people are, most of the people that look at the numbers of weapons we have remaining, they're low. Uh, our people are worn out. I mean, these same ships, I think the Lincoln's been over there for quite a while. We've got, we've got two years of repairs on the Gerald Ford just because it's going to be longer than that because the shipyards can't keep the shipyards can't keep up. Oh my gosh. See, so, so we don't have the capability. So I think he's messing with them. I think he's mad that big crowds showed up for common day. I think he's mad that the, uh, Iranians are respected around the world. He's not, he's, he's a laughing stock increasingly. I think he senses that he doesn't like it. Um, he needs a diversion. Epstein's still out there. There was something else that came up. Uh, uh, there's something else in the, the, the, was really, he was ordered to release something that president Trump.
Speaker 0: Oh, I thought it was the Seth rich thing, but they're not doing that. Yeah.
Speaker 1: But there's all kinds of things, you know, the, the, a lot of these cases are rolling slowly. Um, none of it looks good for Trump or the establishment in any case. So I think he's going to, I don't think we have staying power. So I think it will go back to some sort of a MOU and, and Trump is so not believed anymore. You know, he goes from morning, noon and night back and forth, says this and that I hate the MOU, they're scum. And then he goes, Oh, they're very good people. What are you talking about? Which what's true here? So I don't think we have the staying power. I think if we had the capability to, To do it, that's fine. And I don't think Trump wants to go nuclear. So I think Israel does. That's my only concern. Israel would love it. They're debating.
Speaker 0: They've got nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on those dolphin-class subs. And they're tipping off the coast of the world.
Speaker 1: And they have a very different view of what's moral. And they love to have chaos. Chaos is an opportunity for them. They plan for chaos. They love it. They create it. they get us to create it for them, which we happy to do. So, but I don't think we ourselves have staying power. And, you know, I honestly, I still harbor the thought that Netanyahu's visit to Trump will either not happen, be delayed, or he'll come and Trump will treat him like scum. Speaking of scum.
Speaker 0: We will see. We will see. We'll see.
Speaker 1: I'm looking to see how that goes, but yeah, I, I, I'm not happy that it went hot again, but I think, I just don't think we have staying power. And I know that Iran does.
Speaker 0: Well, this is what I keep hearing, but I keep saying, I don't think this is a rational act anymore, but we'll see. Chaz Freeman calls this a ceasefire with Israeli characteristics. So, so, On that note, I'm going to have to end it here. Colonel, it was wonderful meeting you. Thanks for being my first guest. Maybe they'll have me back. I don't know. Mario is taking over in like a minute. So I will let you go. I follow you on, do you have a Twitter?
Speaker 1: Substack. I do have a Twitter. I don't tweet out that much. It's just Karen Katowski, substack.com. I think something like that. It's easy to find.
Speaker 0: Everybody should give her a subscribe. Thank you so much. And we'll meet again. I'm Brandon Weikert. Check me out at the Weikert Brief on Substack. That's where all of my stuff's going up now. And 1945.com as well. So thank you very much.
reSee.it AI Summary
I reached for the precedent within minutes: after losing World War One, Turkey still kept the straits, then just raised Bosphorus fees 15 percent with no debate. Iran, I say flatly, keeps the Gulf the same way—no negotiation over tolls or anything, no document ends it until the last missile flies or the bond market breaks.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 🇹🇷 Turkey lost World War One and still kept control of the straits. The same history may be writing itself in the Persian Gulf Douglas Macgregor reached for that precedent within minutes. The Turks held the Dardanelles after defeat, just raised Bosphorus fees 15 PERCENT, and nobody debates it. Iran, he says flatly, keeps the Gulf the same way, and there will be no negotiation over tolls. His harder claim: no negotiation over anything. Nobody signs a document ending this. It runs until the last missile flies or the bond market breaks, and the experts he trusts call 5 percent on the ten-year financial Armageddon. It's climbing. Great powers, he reminded me, always end this way. Romans in Britain, the British everywhere: everything mortgaged to vanity, then gone overnight because staying became unaffordable. On tonight's mystery blasts, reported across Iran's coast then DENIED by everyone, he offered a rule from 1991, when his green troops mistook A-10 chaff for a bombardment: the first report is always wrong. And the thread nobody's watching: he reads the F-35 offer to Erdogan as payment to keep Turkey out of this war, while Smotrich publicly talks of preparing for military action against Ankara. @DougAMacgregor
Video Transcript AI Summary
Reports of explosions in Iran began about an hour after the discussion started, with Iranian media citing strikes in Shabahar, Bandar Abbas, Qanarak, Ahvaz, and Bashir—locations reported struck in the previous two rounds. Early speculation treated the events as “wave three” of American strikes against Iran. An Axios report said the US was not striking Iran, shifting speculation toward Israel. The speakers said that if it were Israel, evidence like cruise missiles and reports of Israeli fighter jets would usually appear, but Israeli media also said it was not Israel. That left speculation about Gulf actors, with Bahrain and Kuwait seen as the remaining possibilities after noting Saudi was reportedly attacked and the UAE was not.
The speakers described a further turn: in the minutes before they discussed it, Iranian media began denying that the reported explosions across those cities were true, creating confusion about whether the Gulf attacked or whether air defenses were active. One speaker said there were no reports of ship missiles launching from Iran, while another said air defenses were active and that Iranian media “jumped to conclusions” because everyone was on edge. They acknowledged they lacked conclusive information and were relying on scattered reports. They asked whether it would be surprising if a Gulf country participated in an attack on Iran, with the response emphasizing that such participation would be very surprising, and expressing that it made little sense for tiny states like Bahrain or Kuwait to initiate action that could invite retaliation. The speakers also contrasted this with Qatar, which they said had not been struck by Iran (except for what was described as a single warning shot yesterday).
A new Iranian-media claim (IRNA, citing a deputy political and security governor) reported that an Iranian military headquarters on the outskirts of Bashir was hit by a “projectile from the American Zionist enemy,” with no casualties. The speakers discussed the uncertainty of the term “projectile” and offered a war anecdote about a mistaken assumption that friendly equipment effects (chaff) meant soldiers were being attacked. They concluded that early battlefield reports are often wrong and that multiple parties involved (Saudi/UAE, Iran, the US, Israel, the Houthis) make interpretation especially confusing.
Switching to a different subject, they discussed a US truck strike on the Akkala Khan Railway Bridge in Golestan (near the Turkmenistan border), describing it as a node connecting China’s Xi’an to Tehran along Belt and Road routes running through Iran. One speaker suggested it appeared to be a warning shot and tied it to broader Belt and Road significance in Eurasia, arguing it was meant to signal to Iran and potentially to China that Washington could isolate Iran. The other speaker connected it to historical precedent, including the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway and British concerns before World War I, and relayed speculation that the strike signaled threats to US hegemony and might also relate to possible delivery of air defense batteries via the railway.
On escalation over the prior 48 hours, one speaker said Iran attacked three ships passing the Omani side, after which the US “went ballistic.” They cited claims that the US attacked 14 times as much as in previous retaliation cycles and framed two schools of thought: the ceasefire/MOUs being dead and war continuing, or a long power struggle to control the Strait of Hormuz, with Iran purportedly maintaining control rather than escalating broadly. Another speaker said Iran appeared to be on a full war footing and argued that the US was not mobilized similarly, noting a US Navy admission of having more missile launchers/tubes than available missiles. They said the US lacks a coherent military-political strategy and asked what the objective is if regime change is not the goal, while asserting that Israel’s objective is the destruction of Iran.
They also discussed economic and political constraints, including oil, inflation, strategic petroleum reserve replenishment, interest rates, and the bond market. One speaker said Iranian armed forces entered the highest state of alert and moved to wartime conditions, including reports of special forces moving to Iraqi Kurdistan to worry about infiltration. Another claimed that tanker trackers showed Tehran shipped out 10 million barrels of crude oil and fuel overnight in preparation for possible blockade or continued war. The speakers cited Axios reporting that the White House braced for a weeks-long fight with Iran. They considered whether the US was using a “carrot and stick” approach—unfreezing assets and easing sanctions in exchange for Iran not charging tolls in the Strait of Hormuz—while Iran refused to yield.
The discussion then expanded to Turkey and Israel. They said Trump and Netanyahu coordinated closely on regional issues, and that Netanyahu raised Erdogan’s “increasingly hostile rhetoric” toward Israel and the importance of Israeli security zones. They recounted Israeli Finance Minister Smotrich’s statements that Israel must prepare for every scenario involving military action against Turkey and that Erdogan is a significant threat to Israel. They also said Trump praised Erdogan and considered approving F-35 sales to Turkey despite Netanyahu’s opposition. One speaker suggested this was effectively a bribe aimed at keeping Turkey on the sidelines and claimed Erdogan would later face pressures to act. The other speaker described a worrying theory that Trump might condition F-35s on Erdogan convincing Syria’s al-Shara to fight Hezbollah in Lebanon, though they said this idea seemed unlikely and that Syria’s situation would make such an action difficult.
Finally, they discussed the broader pattern of US commitments and great-power decline, arguing financial/economic pressures would ultimately limit escalation. They also debated US policy toward Ukraine, describing Trump’s support for deeper strikes into Russia and licensing Patriot missiles to Ukraine, while arguing the timelines and Russian retaliation could undermine the effect. The conversation concluded with reflections comparing US and Russian/Chinese diplomatic behavior as professional and interest-focused, then ended with thanks and farewell.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: It started off about an hour ago. Yeah, exactly an hour ago. So we got reports of explosions in Iran. Immediately, all of us assumed it's wave three of the American attacks. Iranian media was reporting explosions and strikes in Shabahar, Bandar Abbas, Qanarak, Ahvaz, Bashir. Sorry, Ahvaz, Bashir. So the same places that were struck the last two times. So everyone immediately assumed it was the Americans on the third round of strikes, the third wave. also cash in Syria, just all the same places. And then Axios put out a report saying no, the US is not striking Iran. So everyone's like, Alright, that must be Israel. But usually, if it's Israel, you'd see the cruise missiles, like we saw before, you'd get all sent reporting, the fighter jets, the Israeli fighter jets. And then you got Israeli media saying it's not Israel. So then who's left? It's the Gulf. It's not going to be the UAE won't be them because they weren't attacked. Saudi was an attack, so it only left Bahrain and Kuwait. And then Israeli media started claiming that Bahrain and Kuwait were behind the attack. And then, so that's what everyone was speculating. Bahrain and Kuwait was trying to create deterrence by striking Iran, saying, look, this is between you and the U.S. Stop striking U.S. bases in our country. And then in the last few minutes, as you were coming on, Iranian media started denying the report, saying, no, the reports of explosions in all these cities we reported in the last hour are all untrue. So I don't know. I told you it's going to be confusing. I don't know whether the Gulf did attack Iran. Some Gulf countries, maybe Kuwait, Bahrain and Iran didn't want to escalate. So they didn't want to make a big deal out of it. I don't know whether the air defenses were active or maybe And the ship missiles launched from Iran, but there's no reports of that. But air defenses were active and the Iranian media jumped to conclusions because everyone's on edge. So I don't really have anything conclusive for you, Colonel, that we can go off, but except these scattered information from different sources. But maybe I can start with this question. Would you be surprised if any Gulf country participated in an attack on Iran today?
Speaker 0: Absolutely. Very definitely. The only thing that sprung to my mind it seems like a remote possibility, but that an Israeli strike was flown from a position along the Gulf. You know, that's not impossible, but it doesn't sound as though we have any real clarity. And there's confusion as to whether or not anything really happened. So, you know, but the last thing I would do if I were in Qatar right now or Bahrain is launch a strike against Iran. What's to stop Iran from flattening the place? It doesn't make a lot of sense to me.
Speaker 1: I agree, especially Bahrain, tiny little Bahrain or Kuwait. I would be surprised if Qatar participated in it because Qatar was not struck by Iran, except it seems one strike yesterday, one missile, more of a warning shot. There was one new report that just came in now, according to Iranian media, a military headquarters, Iranian military headquarters on the outskirts of Bashir was hit by a projectile from the American Zionist enemy, according to IRNA, so Iranian media, citing the deputy political and security governor, of Bashir. The deputy says the attack resulted in no casualties. So that might have been a very, you know, the air defense is a touch on everyone's on edge responding to that little attack. But I would agree with you as well. I understand Bahrain and Kuwait would want to maybe consider building deterrence, but they're too small to build deterrence, like a chihuahua barking at a lion.
Speaker 0: Exactly. Doesn't make any sense. I also don't know what to make of the word projectile. uh you know what is this a lawn dark you know thrown from a ship or something i don't know it doesn't make any sense but you know these things happen in war you know when i was in 91 this is actually before we had begun the offensive on the ground we had some soldiers troops that were very far forward right on the border with saudi arabia and of course you have to understand that these soldiers had never seen combat they were all green at this point So everything was fascinating and interesting and scary. And we got this report. I was awakened at, I think, something like 2 in the morning. Sir, we have a report that so-and-so in G Troop is under bombardment. So, you know, I got up. I said, all right, let's go there and find out. Walked over to the Tactical Operations Center, this vehicle that we'd set up. I walked in there and said, what's going on? so-and-so report such and such. I said, did this come through the exec? No, no, no. Who the hell sent this report? So get them on the phone. So who's sending this report up and what do they say? They said the report they said, sir, where we have air to ground bombs at our location. What the hell else are there other than air to ground bombs? And I mean, are we, do we have any gravity bombs and people are throwing things into the air? This is the dumbest thing I've ever heard. So then I said, wait a minute. Get somebody else over there. Go up there. Find out what the hell's going on. Call me back. Well, it turned out they were watching A-10s. They were flying over us. We had an A-10 squadron that ultimately flew over us for much of our offensive. And they, as they were pulling out, they were engaged by so many aircraft weapons or missiles. And so they had chaff that came out that looked like fireworks. And the chaff was designed to divert the missile. But these soldiers had never seen that before, and so they were convinced the chaff was meant for them and that they were under attack. So, you know, anything is possible in war. And the first report you get is always wrong. Just remember that.
Speaker 1: Especially with... With so many parties involved in this war, you've got, remember we had the reports earlier of Saudi and the UAE attacking Iran during the war. You've got Iran striking the Gulf. You've got the US and Iran being the two main players. You've got Israel jumping in whenever necessary. Then you've got the Houthis that might pop in here and there. So there is a lot of parties involved in this war. It makes it very confusing. How about those Balookis? Exactly, exactly. You saw the strike. Did you see the strike on the railway yesterday? Have you had a chance to look at that?
Speaker 0: Are you talking about the one that connects to the Chinese and the Russians?
Speaker 1: Yeah, the one next to the Turkmenistan border.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: That's interesting.
Speaker 0: To me, that's very significant.
Speaker 1: That's worth talking about. Exactly. Well, I did save it to mention it to you. So the U.S. truck hit the Akteke Khan Railway Bridge in Golestan. So that's a bridge. It's the node connecting Xi'an to Tehran, so Xi'an in China. in 10 to 15 days over land, China's Belt and Road running straight through Iran. So it's, Lisa, if you can, oh, Stephanie now, the producer. Stephanie, I don't know if you can find the images. Lisa had them earlier to show them for the audience. But that was a railway line in Akkala that, you know, very close to Turkmenistan. But I don't know where it was attacked from. And also the damage is not that significant. So it seems more of a warning shot by the Americans. But it's...
Speaker 0: it's interesting it's very different to everything else we've seen I'd love to get your thoughts on it well it's interesting to see the photographs I did not have the photographs when I received the report and the report said that they thought they would have this repaired in 24 hours now maybe that's possible but looking at the damage it looks like it may take a little longer than that and this of course also highlights something else that the Belton Road which is enormously important to everybody in Eurasia uh is new is is new and not all of the rail lines are completed and there has been some discussion and debate about where you can send the rail lines the chinese would like to have sent rail lines down through pakistan in greater numbers and greater volume that hasn't happened because the chinese are not confident of security along the railways now that may change But this one is important because it tells me that someone in Washington said, well, we'll do some damage to this and try to signal that we can isolate Iran. And also as a message to the Chinese, since we tend to treat the Belt and Road as a threat to us. I don't subscribe to that view, but then again, I'm not a China threat hawk. but I see the Belt and Road as the alternative to the United States Navy, which does represent a serious threat to China. We can shut down the whole Chinese coastline with our submarine fleet. Chinese know that. They've been through this before. Remember the Imperial Japanese Navy before the Imperial Japanese Navy, the Royal Navy. So they don't want to be cut off. And so it becomes very important to build these overland routes. Now, as you can see from what you're showing up there right now, This is not going to change the game fundamentally. They'll repair the railway, and I think you'll see redundant railways show up in the near future. There are other ways to get into Iran as well across the Caspian. So it's not a strategic game changer, but I think you're making a valid point. It's a pretty serious message. I don't think it's a smart thing to do. I don't think it's going to change anything of consequence. But I think that there are people in the White House that probably thought in those terms. We've been down this road before. Well, hit so-and-so out there, that'll signal to them. You know, we did this sort of thing in Vietnam along the border with China. We did it during the Korean War along the border with China. You know, it didn't make any difference.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it is interesting. Like, I looked at it as a warning, but I'm, like, warning of what exactly? Like... what does it really signal? One of my guests who's part of the Belt and Road Institute and he's been studying this for decades. He was on earlier today for the first time on the show and he was explaining to me how how significant this is, how this is a threat to US hegemony. And you've studied history and you always reference history, Colonel. He started referencing how the corridors that were being built, I think, from Russia to the Ottoman Empire were seen as a threat by the British Empire before World War One. And that played a role in what eventually led to World War One. So that shows the significance of this Belt and Road Initiative by China as a threat, or at least the US would perceive it as a threat to the hegemony and the hegemony in the region. mentioned a quote, he said this quote always stuck with him, a quote by Biden in 2022. He went to Saudi at the time in Riyadh in July 2022, so it's before October 7th, and he said during the Ukraine war, he said, we will not leave a vacuum in this region, the Gulf, to be filled by Russia and China. So that was a statement that Biden made. So he referenced that statement as what this strike on the railway could include is the Americans sending a warning to Iran, another country's part of the initiative. So that's some of my speculation or his speculation.
Speaker 0: Well, the railway that you referred to before the First World War was the Berlin to Baghdad Railway.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 0: And that was taken as a threat by the British Empire who wanted a monopoly of control over the sea lanes. And they also didn't want oil and anything else for that matter of significance transported over land. They wanted to make sure that whatever was moved out of the Middle East, particularly with oil, would be at the mercy of the Royal Navy. And the Kaiser, you know, who wasted a lot of money trying to build a German surface fleet, did have some strategic thinkers. And they said, look, we don't need a big fleet. You know, we don't need, frankly, Bismarck was always opposed to colonies. So the Berlin to Baghdad railway came up and that of course ran through the Ottoman Empire of which Baghdad and Iraq, most of Northern Iraq, in fact, all of Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire at that stage. This time around, I don't think it's quite that significant. And I think there are people in Washington, as I said before, who are hopeful that this will be significant. In other words, they hope this frightens the Chinese or the Russians or something. It won't. It won't make any damn difference at all. We don't live in 1910. We're in a very different world today. And you have all of these countries and states across Central Asia who have an interest in participating in this. Belt and Road Project. They all stand to profit in some way. It's kind of an annoyance for the Chinese. We could do it much more easily across North America because we all speak the same language. We all have one law from the Atlantic to the Pacific. I wish we would do something similar to what the Chinese have done in Eurasia on the North American continent. I've written about that. I published about that. It's on my website. People can see it. It's called the Golden Spike Program. And it basically goes back to our railroad connectivity across the continent. So bottom line is, yes, that was the one strike that popped out when I looked at the list as being significant. I know no doubt they'll repair it. It's not going to dampen Chinese enthusiasm for supporting Iran. Come on, wake up. They have a very good relationship with the Iranians on the basis of the petroleum. and a number of other products. So do the Indians. So the notion that you're going to do something like this, and this is going to warn everybody that things can get worse, it's not going to help our position at all. But there are some, we have a sort of late 20th century military establishment, and we have an early 20th century thinking establishment, if you want to dignify it with that word in Washington, D.C. That's our problem.
Speaker 1: Yeah, and also it could be, there might be some intelligence that we obviously don't know about. Maybe some, the Americans know some air defense batteries are being delivered through that railway in the next couple of days or on their way, and they struck it as a warning for the Chinese or for Iran not to import them. I'm just saying there could be more to it as well than something.
Speaker 0: Air and missile defense capability and radars and so forth, even missiles themselves have been flown in by the Chinese.
Speaker 1: Oh, okay.
Speaker 0: Yeah, yeah.
Speaker 1: A very important one.
Speaker 0: airlift on the scale of only something that we historically have been able to do chinese can do it now so i you know the point the bottom line is somebody's trying to say something about the chinese or to the chinese in connection with iran we got that it's not going to change anything that's my point yeah um since we're talking about the strikes and there's no information on the strikes today everything's quiet now on the explosions we heard earlier
Speaker 1: It's just very bizarre. Very, very bizarre. I'm sure we'll get reports of it. Similar to the attacks by Saudi and the UAE, we only got reports about it weeks later after the ceasefire. We'll probably hear about this in a few days. We'll start hearing leaks come out. But I haven't asked you yet your thoughts on the escalations in the last 48 hours. So you had Iran attack those three ships going through the Omani side and the US just went ballistic. They've attacked the last two days it was 14 times the level of attacks we saw the last two times they retaliated against the strikes on the uh on the um the iran on the and the ships going through the omani side so the iranian strikes beforehand in the last couple of weeks so it's significantly more according to the new york times about 14 times more um there's kind of two schools of thought here one of them is the ceasefire that is or the mou's dead as trump has said and this is the beginning of a continuation of the war and the other one which i'm in that camp at least for now is that this is just the two sides, a bit of a power struggle between the both. Iran saying, we're going to control the Strait of Homs, and the U.S. trying to break that, trying everything they can to break that. And the Iranians' retaliation kind of confirms that, because they're not escalating. They're like, we're going to strike Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, and keep our control of the Strait of Homs. And today, the ships are going through the Iranian side, so they seem to be playing the long game there. What's your analysis of this escalation, and how worrying is it?
Speaker 0: I think perhaps the first observation is that Iran has gone to a full war footing. In other words, they are now mobilized for war, total war against us. Are we mobilized for total war against them? No. We have a fraction of our military capability. Now, most of the fleet is currently involved in this. And there's something interesting that should be brought up and that is that the United States Navy is now officially admitted that they have more launchers and more launch tubes for missiles than they have missiles to fire so what are we doing I don't know but I suspect that we're pulling assets missiles from other locations other theaters and concentrating them in the Indian Ocean and potentially the Mediterranean But I think that's an important point to keep in mind. Iran is in a total war mode, full war footing. Russia is very close to a full war footing and could go to a total war mobilization state very rapidly. Both of them are mobilizing their scientific industrial base, their population, everything. We are not. And Trump has failed miserably to extract more performance from our so-called five major defense industries. So I guess, I think it's an important observation because the most important question is not what are we doing because I can tell you we don't know what we're doing. We have no coherent military strategy because we have no attainable military political objective. We're back to the problem we began with. We have 93 million people living in an area the size of Western Europe, surrounded on three sides by mountains, and on one side by impassable desert. Everything of real importance is a long, long flight for U.S. aircraft or for missiles. So what are we trying to achieve? We've given up on regime change, you know. We've decided that the most that we can do is insult and offend the people of Iran and everyone who happens to be a Shiite Muslim by attacking during the funeral of the leader of Shia Islam who is being laid to rest near Mashhad, right? Dumb idea. We should have waited. We should have demonstrated some sort of sensitivity. Instead, we chose to insult everyone. This is hard opposition to us. So what's your objective? If you can't bring the regime down, what are you bombing to get? You think the more bombs you drop, the more likely the Iranians are to jump into little rubber boats with white flags and say, We're through, we're finished. You can have the Persian Gulf. That's not likely. So why are we attacking Bushehr? Because there's a nuclear power station there? Is that designed to endear us to the Iranians or do we want a large nuclear accident and poisonous radioactivity all over the region? I mean, what are we doing? No one has explained it. What the hell is the objective? Well, I know what the Israeli objective is, and I'm afraid that's the objective that we're pursuing. The total destruction of Iran. I said that to you months ago. What do the Israelis want? The destruction of Iran. End of story. We have no interest in that. Never have. So what are we doing? We're trying to destroy Iran. Why would some man stand up who is in charge in the United States and say, I'm going to destroy a civilization in one night? sheer unadulterated lunacy we saw a glimpse of rationality with donald trump when he was in versailles in paris and what did he say he said we've got to get this war over with this could send the world into a global depression that's why i signed the mou well well done mr president thank you that was the most intelligent action he's taken since this nonsense began what's happened then what's changed Have we decided, oh, the hell with the world. Send the world into a global depression. Can we do that? Well, what are the three things we ought to be focused on? Number one is oil. I don't know what the price is right now. A few hours ago, it was $78 a barrel. What is it now? Is it above 78? I think it'll go to 120 and 150 in the next few weeks. What about this business of restoring or resupplying the strategic petroleum reserve remember vice president vance well you gotta understand this is just a pause we just want to refill everybody's oil reserves and get everybody healthy and then we'll go back to war well what's happened there we've thrown that out you know what about this thing called inflation inflation in the united states is getting worse it's getting worse across the western world wars breed inflation this is only going to make matters worse And then finally, it's time to look at the United States bond market. Look at the interest rates for the 10-year bond. That's the bellwether. Everybody who's an expert in the area told me to say, Doug, if we hit 5%, it's financial Armageddon we go under. And it's climbing. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Yeah, we did a deep dive. I think you did a piece on it as well. We did a deep dive on it in our last discussion. I've got some information to just, because you started off by Iran is preparing for war. And there's indications of that. So the Iranian armed forces, as of yesterday, entered the highest rate of alert, highest state of alert and moved to wartime conditions. Also, there's reports of special forces moving to the Kurdistan, Iraqi Kurdistan region as well, worried about potential infiltration from there, which is bizarre to me. The Kurds can't do much in Iran. But then the more important one is yesterday, Tehran, according to the tanker trackers, they shipped out 10 million barrels of crude oil and fuel overnight. Massive amount of oil shipped out in case there is an American blockade or a continuation of the war. Similar to what we saw before this war. Remember the floating reserves had all these ships out there. So I saw those reports this morning and I had someone close to me say, look, is it looking bad? Because I'm I've been more on the optimistic side for a while. And I said, look, it wasn't great in the last 48 hours, but these indications are not good. But I want to give you a theory and let me know if you... By the way, Axios also put out a report that the White House is bracing for a weeks-long fight with Iran. So this is not the end of it. Is it possible this is... But this is... not a plan to continue a full blown war. And the reason I don't think the US wants to continue wars for the reasons that we've talked about, depleted munitions, bond market, the economy, inflation, oil, strategic petroleum reserves, political suicide for Trump, allies being upset. All these different reasons make it, if you're looking at this from a pragmatic lens, just makes it such a stupid idea to continue the war. So could this be just literally the US trying to force Iran with a carrot and stick approach not to charge a fee in the Strait of Hormuz, saying, hey, we'll lift the sanctions, we'll unfreeze the assets, like Axios reported a few days ago. Just don't charge a fee in the Strait of Hormuz. But if you don't accept, we'll bomb you. And Iran's just saying, we're going to charge a fee. You can do whatever you want. We're not budging. Could we just see that power dynamic playing out or just more likely something more significant?
Speaker 0: The Turks just raised the fees for the Bosporus passage through the Dardanelles by 15%. And what happened after World War I, in which the Turks were defeated, or at least they were on the losing side, they retained control of the Dardanelles. Persia or Iran is going to retain control of the Gulf. End of discussion. Forget it. You know, why did they hit all these bases again in these last targets? They blasted the living daylights out of bases they've hit previously, only made the damage much worse. Why? What's the message? We're not coming back. It's over. Our role in this region is at an end. Our hegemony over the region is at an end. No, there will be no negotiation over tolls or anything else in connection with the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Forget it. It's done. And you gotta go back to the big issue again. What compels us to quit? That's where we are. The Iranians take the position, we're gonna hold what we've got. We're gonna defend ourselves. We'll use every missile at our disposal. We are in a war to the last missile. So we'll use whatever we have until we don't have any, number one. Number two, we're in this war until the financial crisis at home is so bad we can't continue. That's how this thing ends. There will be no agreement. I don't think anybody's going to sign anything. I think all of a sudden, people are going to say, look, this is a stinker. Eventually, you're going to have people from the Senate, from the House, from industry who crowd into the Oval Office and say, listen, Donald, it's time to end this. It's not going to work. Pull the plug on this. If you don't pull the plug on it, you're not going to last. because we can't tolerate this. Now, when does that happen? I don't know, but I think it's coming between now and the end of the year. He'll be lucky to survive. I said before, if he stops the war after this last round, before we began the new one, I said he can survive. All he has to do is sort of quietly withdraw, you know, postpone any serious negotiations on big issues. get the straight open, demonstrate our sensitivity to the needs of our friends, allies around the world, forget the rest of it. Then he could stay in office. He's now backed out of that. He's in the hell with the world, the hell with everybody. I'm going to break Iran. I'm going to win this. That's where he is. It's back to this problem that he has with the parent-child relationship. With him, everyone's a child and he's in charge. Remember, I went over Roy Cohn's rules. That's an inevitable outcome. So he says, well, I told them, you know, they could, you know, they have to do this or there's no deal. Oh, they called me last night. They're desperate for a deal. Yeah, okay. Smoke some more crack. They're not desperate for a deal. You're desperate for a deal and everybody knows it. So what can he do? Can he stand up and be the man we know he's not? Take responsibility for this thing and end it? No. he's just going to hammer away and hammer away and hammer away and eventually the other factors that you and i have been discussing will descend they'll all converge on him and compel us to leave and i don't think he'll make it i think he'll be booted from office yeah he told me that last time um oh trump and netanyahu spoke this evening and they've agreed to continue close coordination between israel and the us on multiple regional issues
Speaker 1: Trump briefed Bibi on recent US operations in the Gulf. During the conversation, Bibi raised what his office described as... Okay, this is what I wanted to ask you about. Perfect. So Netanyahu raised what his office described as Turkish President Erdogan's increasingly hostile rhetoric towards Israel and stressed the importance of maintaining Israeli security zones along its borders. And that goes to my next question. We've talked about Turkey before. And the rhetoric on the Israeli side just keeps getting, you know, more and more hostile towards Turkey. And our friend Smotrich, probably one of the worst voices in Israel, went all the way to say to prepare for war with Turkey. Let me see if I can find, there it is. He said, Erdogan is a very dangerous man. Fine. Turkey as it stands today is a very significant threat to the state of Israel. Stupid, but fine. They've said this before. We are conducting very intensive discussions with the president, Erdogan, and with the administration, Trump. And we are working very hard, both publicly and behind the scenes, to try to prevent the sale of the F-35s to Turkey, which we've spoken about. Erdogan must not be given access to game-changing weapons. So this is not, okay, this is not the crazy scenario. There's another one where he's talking about, oh, this is it. We are preparing for every scenario, including military action. That's Smotrich, so Israeli... Finance Minister about Turkey. We understand that there is a threat and we will not allow Turkey to threaten Israel's existence just as we have not allowed and will not allow the Iranian regime to do so. So he's talking about preparing for the military action against Turkey and comparing Turkey to Iran, which was just bombed for the second time in war last year and this year by Israel. That's pretty extreme. But Trump doesn't seem to give a damn, Colonel. He went to Turkey. He kept praising Erdogan time and time again and said he's considering approving the F-35s.
Speaker 0: Well, why would President Trump do that? Why would he praise President Erdogan and why would he lift the sanctions and sell F-35s to Erdogan? It's called a bribe. We are bribed. President Erdogan and the Turks to stay out of the war with Israel. We want them to sit on the sidelines. We don't want to bring them into the fight. Have you been to Turkey recently or Turkey? Yeah, four months ago. Everybody here loves Israel, right?
Speaker 1: The population is overwhelmingly supportive of the Israelis, right? Israeli flags everywhere. Yeah, that's right.
Speaker 0: So our friend Erdogan is the master fence straddler. You know, he says, well, Donald, okay, you know, what are you going to give me? Well, you know.
Speaker 1: This is the godfather now. This is the godfather.
Speaker 0: I'll give you some F-35s, you know, you got to play ball with us. Okay, you give me the F-35s, there'll be peace. What do you think you're dealing with? That's the level of discourse right now. The only thing is that our friend Erdogan is much smarter than Donald. Because just because Erdogan says, fine, we'll sit on the sidelines. You know, we won't involve ourselves. But I have to talk to the population. I have to be on the right side of the issue. But we won't do anything, at least until he feels he has to or wants to. And that's coming. And the Israelis know that. When I was in Israel in 2013, I think it was 2013, was the anniversary of the 73 War. And I gave a presentation. You can find it on the internet. You can Google it. And it was a good conference. I learned a lot about things. I was trying to write about a chapter in my book about the 73 War, the Egyptian front. And I told them, and at the time people said, oh, come on, don't be ridiculous. I had a, I had a slide. I said, I know all of you are worried about Iran. You're concerned about Iran, but you know, historically Iran is not a state with whom you have to have hostilities. In fact, the opposite is the case. Iran is the most inclined to cooperate with the West. And you and Iran share similar interests and some of the same opponents." So I said, I think you should start to look carefully at the one true potential existential threat to Israel that exists in the region, and that is the Turkish state. And everyone looked at me as though I was crazy. And I said, now, you and the Iranians can lob missiles and bombs at each other, but the Iranians can't invade Israel. The Turks can invade Israel. And you are living on territory that the Ottomans governed for hundreds of years. Don't you remember? And you could have heard a pin drop in the audience, but ultimately after it was over, several people came up and said, you know, you're making a good point. They were depending upon, oh, somebody found it. They were depending upon, see, you can find the slide that shows you on Turkey. That's what's most interesting. They were very dependent upon the, what I would call the legacy of, oh gosh, oh goodness, my brain has just gone into vapor lock.
Speaker 1: That's okay. I'm watching the younger you give a presentation.
Speaker 0: I know, I know.
Speaker 1: Look at all that hair.
Speaker 0: Exactly, exactly. Anyway, you know, Ataturk, you know, they were looking at, Turkey through the lens of Ataturk. And I was trying to tell him, you know, Ataturk is still revered. He's respected. But this is not Ataturk's Turkey anymore. The Turks have made a choice. They know who they are. They're not Europeans. They're Turks. Their roots are in the Middle East, in Islam, and in Central Asia, not in Europe. So this whole NATO thing, this whole facade of NATO is very flimsy. The Turks are not going to march out of it voluntarily. But they're not going to pay a great deal of attention to it if it's not in their interest to do so. And I think we need to understand that. And I think the Israelis have figured it out. Now, threatening to attack Turkey is a dumb idea. I don't know why they're talking publicly that way, except that they're suffering from what appears to be a sense of racial prejudice, racial supremacy, cultural supremacy, and extreme arrogance on a scale that I don't think I've ever seen in my life. I don't know what's brought this on, but I think it's control of us. They feel that they have such complete control of us that they can say or do anything they want. I think that President Trump was doing two things. He was saying, come on, Erdogan, stick with us, stay out of this war, and we'll do this. And on the other hand, he was saying to the Israelis, don't push the Turks. They're friends. Don't get involved. He's not dumb. In this sense, he's being very smart. I just don't think it's going to work because I think Islam as an entity is coalescing. Forget the rich fat cat elites in the Arabian Peninsula. I'm talking about Muslims. There's a greater coalescence of people inside the house of Islam than we've seen for hundreds of years.
Speaker 1: There's another, and by the way, you asked me if I've ever been to Turkey. I was meant to be there for an important interview during the NATO summit in Ankara. So I could have been doing this from Turkey, but it had to be rescheduled because the war broke out. But I have one theory that is worrying me. A few people are floating around, is that Trump is giving the F-35s to Erdogan, conditional on Erdogan convincing the Syrian president, al-Shara, to actually fight Hezbollah in Lebanon. Now, I dismiss that as a just completely stupid idea. I don't know if we briefly mentioned it in our last interview, but very briefly, because it just sounds ridiculously stupid. But Trump keeps talking about it, and it's starting to get a bit worrying. Is that possible? Do you think al-Shara is a puppet of Erdogan, or does he have agency where he decides? Because al-Shara said he doesn't want to attack Hezbollah, and it makes sense. Syria barely has a military to fight Hezbollah. They've got Israel on the border.
Speaker 0: If you're Erdogan, you listen and say, well, you know, I'll talk to him.
Speaker 1: We'll see what we can do.
Speaker 0: I'm sure he made no promises. And I know that the Syrian leadership right now is very focused on the border with Israel and the Kurds.
Speaker 1: Exactly.
Speaker 0: They have their hands full. I don't see them disengaging and rushing up to northern Lebanon. And I think Erdogan knows that. And Erdogan would rather have the Islamist radicals that are in charge in Syria right now in Damascus than Israelis.
Speaker 1: Yeah. What do you make of... I haven't asked you about this, actually. You've seen J.D. Vance and Trump criticize Israel nonstop. We talked about it last week when we spoke. But now after Trump... considering the F-35s and warming up to Erdogan despite Netanyahu's opposition. They're going to be meeting in a few days, so we'll see if that changes anything. Is it possible we are seeing maybe a decoupling between the US and Israel? Are we seeing more indications of this or I'm getting way ahead of myself?
Speaker 0: Yes, you're way ahead of yourself.
Speaker 1: I got optimistic when you said yes. I'm like, you agreed with the first point. So nothing to nothing to be happy about yet.
Speaker 0: I think until we are in serious financial economic trouble, that's that's key. We're not going to make any sudden moves in any particular direction. And this is the history of all great powers. They they tend to be more aggressive at the end than at any point in their history. And then all of a sudden it stops and they're gone. In other words, everything happens quickly. The Brits were there and then they were bang, gone because they couldn't afford to stay. The Romans, 400 years in Britain, boom, they left. What happened? They couldn't afford to stay. I mean, we could just go down the list. All great powers go through this sort of thing. You write it off, you leave. Everything's mortgaged to vanity at the end because by the time you reach the end of the imperial period, you're broke. I mean, this is Paul Kennedy's book. You know, the decline of the great powers, open it up and read it. We have been, he calls them frontiers of insecurity. We've created new frontiers of insecurity all over the world to justify 750 bases and hundreds of thousands of troops, airmen, Marines, sailors, all over the world. And all of a sudden it's going to collapse like a bag. It'll just deflate because we can't afford to do it anymore. And Trump is playing against that adversary. The adversary is financial Armageddon. He's trying to outpace it. He's trying to keep it under control. He and his friends on Wall Street have done everything they could to manage the decline, to manage the problem of interest rates, to manage the oil problem, to manage the precious metals problem. All of these things. It's not going to work. It's going to fall apart. But it's not going to happen because Somebody sat down and negotiated an end to anything.
Speaker 1: So we have kind of a gradually but suddenly. So what we'll see is that all this build up and suddenly under a future administration, we'll see everything unravel, the bases closed, the US moving away from the entire world and moving towards its sphere of influence, all these things happening within a couple of years.
Speaker 0: I think it will happen under this administration. Whether or not Trump is still the president, I don't know. I can't answer that. That depends on what he does next. What he's doing right now, as you rightly pointed out, is very stupid. He's harming himself. He's harming our country. He's harming our interests. And you would think if he were such a brilliant businessman, you know when to cut your losses and pull out. That's what he should have done months ago. But he can't because he's not a free agent. He's under duress. And I think we understand that. I don't know what that duress is. I have not figured it out. But somebody's got something on him. And I think it's our friends that are in the Israeli lobby. And you got to take something else into consideration. Somebody said to me, well, Doug, you know, we could lose the midterms. I said, okay. And he said that Trump can't afford that. I said, why not? He said, well, if he loses midterms, then they'll try to impeach him. You know, people in his own party hate him. I said, okay, well then you have to make a choice. And if you're Donald Trump, you say, who do I want on my side when they come for me to impeach me? The answer is I want the Israel lobby. I want all those billionaires with all their money, their control of finance, control of the media, They're the ones in control of the government, effectively. They're the ones I want on my side. Because if I don't have them, I'm done. I'm out. They're the reason I'm here to begin with. Do you understand? He thinks that. So if you tell him, well, you're going to lose the midterms. Well, I may lose the midterms, but if I continue with the war, I do what my backers and supporters want. My donors, as they say. what the lobby demands, they'll prevent me from going under.
Speaker 1: Stephen Winick, Jr.: So self-preservation. David Rubenstein, Jr.: Yeah, I think so.
Speaker 0: And that's not, you know, I'm not saying that's right or wrong. That's not me. I'm not that kind of person. But he's been in this business of business for a long, long time. Nobody knows how to self-promote better than Donald Trump, and nobody knows the financial realities better than he does. So I think that's going to keep him and keep us fighting. Unless you get to the last missile and you can't afford to stay. That's when we bug out.
Speaker 1: Well, as we wrap up, there's another front that would have been a whole other discussion within itself if we didn't have these strikes in the last couple of days, and that's the comments by Trump on the war in Ukraine. Yes. Talking about supporting Zelensky's strategy of striking deeper into Russia, striking Russian refineries. and approving, I think he's been approved or he said he will approve the licensing of the Patriot missiles to Ukraine. I thought the positive side is the production capacity of Ukraine, but the negative side is first, it will take a long time to set up and Russia will just bomb it whenever they set up a factory to develop Patriot missiles. But it'll take too long from what I understand, my limited knowledge, it would take too long for the Ukrainians to even build those facilities in the first place to make a difference.
Speaker 0: Would you say that we in the United States underestimated Iran's military potential and capability? Yes. Yes. Would you say that we have consistently underestimated Russian military power and its capabilities? Yes, I think so. Now, why? We've never understood the war, frankly. because we don't want to. We're not interested in understanding the war. For Russia, Ukraine is an existential question. Who rules, who occupies it, who controls it can be a friend or can be an enemy. And there's not much in between. It was obvious that we were building an enemy force designed to do one thing to destroy Russia in Ukraine. That led to the intervention and it's led to the war. But for the last four years, Putin has absolutely consistently always wanted to avoid a war with NATO and especially with us. And if you go back to Anchorage where the Russians were fooled into thinking that Donald Trump was serious and wanted a better relationship with Russia and wanted to do business with Russia, they've now figured out that was nonsense. The Russians have been incredibly naive in ways that I would never have imagined, but they really have been. They were naive over the Minsk Accords. They were naive about us as a nation, as a people. They've been naive about Donald Trump. They listened to his words. They didn't look carefully at his actions. What has Donald Trump changed with regard to Russia since he came to power? Nothing. So now all of a sudden, at a point in time where he privately has concluded Zelensky is a loser, Ukraine is a loss, it's not going to win, all of a sudden, He does a 180-degree turn, similar to the F-35s to Erdogan. He's now decided, oh, let's give more money to the little man in Kiev that he can steal or waste so that he can kill more Russians, hopefully, and how many of his own people die is of no consequence. And the Europeans are delighted because the Europeans have one goal. It's the same goal the Israelis have. Israel's goal is to drag us into war with Iran and anybody else they don't like, because without us, they can't win. With us, they probably can't win, but that's another story. And the Europeans have decided, and I say Europeans, I'm not talking about the average European citizen who's completely disinterested. I'm talking about the globalist leaders, these governments that are seething with anger, hatred, and hostility for Russia. because Russia is a real national state with a national identity, a national culture, a foundation in Orthodox Christianity. Oh my God, these people are serious. They've got to go away. We've got to destroy them so they can become globalists, nihilists, atheists, Marxists. So they're happy now for the moment because they think they've talked Donald Trump into confrontation with Russia. Donald Trump was foolish enough to state right after Rubio pointed out, oh yes, we think this is a new phase striking deep into Russia is good. And then Donald Trump says, yes, I know it's escalatory, but I think that's the path to negotiation and peace. That's like saying, you know, I got a pain in my left hand. I'm cutting my wrist and enough blood flows out. The pain will go away and I'll pass out and die. It's stupid. But he's fallen for it. Now, why would he do that? Well, he probably says, you know, it's too much trouble to deal with Congress. That's what the Senate wants. That's what the Congress wants. They're all making money from this. I've made money. So what difference does it make? I mean, I've seen this thing before. FDR, when he left the Potsdam Conference, Admiral Leahy was his senior military advisor. And Admiral Leahy said to him, Mr. President, do you really think the Soviets are going to abide by any of these things? They're going to honor their obligations? Are they going to do the things they've promised? And he said, you know, I don't know, but I'm just too tired to fight anymore. He died, what, a month later. This kind of thing goes on. These are the perils of democracy. Democracy sounds great in theory, but in practice, it's got real problems.
Speaker 1: Yeah, far from perfect.
Speaker 0: It depends on the people that you appoint, the people that are elected. And, you know, the great historian Macaulay said, this will work very well in the United States until they run out of high quality people in office, then everything will fall apart. I think we've run out for a long, for quite a while. So, you know, all you have to do is sit there and take a listen, just listen to the foreign minister of China. Listen to the foreign minister of Russia. Listen to these men speak. Look at how they behave. Are there any fits of emotion? Any snide remarks? Any off-color remarks?
Speaker 1: No.
Speaker 0: They're extremely professional. They're focused like lasers on interests. the interests of their country and understanding the interests of other countries and when they speak everything they say reflects that mentality and understanding they're called diplomats we don't have any colonel it's a pleasure and uh i love the impersonations today it's a record number of impersonations it was a good conversation
Speaker 1: It's a good conversation.
Speaker 0: You have to laugh a little bit, right?
Speaker 1: You do, you do.
Speaker 0: Thank you for your time, Colonel.
Speaker 1: Appreciate it.
Speaker 0: Bye-bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I say Israel has already lost the one war it can never afford to lose: America. Not the White House or Congress, but the American people. After three years, no censorship, algorithm tricks, PR, or antisemitism accusations can erase what people have seen. Polling shows growing criticism, including among American Jews, and the public vs. Congress gap keeps widening.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Ana Kasparian says Israel has already lost the one war it can never afford to lose: America. Not the White House, not Congress; the American people. No matter what happened in the Middle East, U.S support for Israel remained constant. Ana thinks that era is over. She says no amount of censorship, algorithm manipulation, PR campaigns, or accusations of antisemitism can undo what people have watched unfold with their own eyes over the past three years. The images are already out there, and the opinions have already changed. She pointed to polling showing growing criticism of Israel, including among American Jews. Younger generations simply aren't accepting the old narratives anymore, and politicians haven't caught up yet. Congress continues backing policies that growing numbers of Americans reject, and the gap between public opinion and political decision-making keeps getting wider. While Israel's current strategy may be winning individual military victories, she argues it's simultaneously making Israel less secure over the long term. Every new conflict and escalation creates more resistance abroad while eroding support in the one country Israel has depended on more than any other. That's why she thinks this isn't just another foreign policy debate, it's a political realignment. The old assumptions that protected Israel in Washington are beginning to break down, and once public opinion changes, politicians eventually have to decide whether to change with it or fight against it. And Ana thinks that battle has already turned against Israel. @AnaKasparian
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on social media visibility, censorship, and the political and military implications of the conflicts discussed, especially Israel’s role and U.S. policy.
Speaker 2 says Kushner follows them so they are not blocked and asks whether Netanyahu blocked them. Speaker 0 responds that Netanyahu cannot stand even minor “jabs,” implying a need for “all or nothing” treatment. Speaker 2 then describes a post: Netanyahu shared a video greeting “Happy 4th of July” and “Happy 250th Independence Day,” and Anna replied “fuck you,” which drew about twice the engagement of Netanyahu’s post. Speaker 0 says they pinned the reply and emphasizes that replies gaining more engagement than the original tweet is “very rare.”
Speaker 0 argues that Israel cannot reverse its public-relations damage and claims Israel and supporters rely on bans, algorithm control, and influencing AI so the public will “forget.” They argue that, even where people have been favorable to Israel, international views are shifting and that the ongoing war against Iran began “specifically on behalf of Israel.” They also connect continued kinetic action with potential global economic depression if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, predicting that people will redirect anger toward Israel due to shared suffering. Speaker 0 contrasts the spending on bots and social media manipulation with what they say is “everyone knows” about underlying responsibility.
Speaker 2 asks whether censoring critical voices could affect younger generations. Speaker 0 says young people are “too savvy,” and points to Nick Fuentes being banned on most platforms but continuing to build a “pretty significant audience” on at least one remaining platform, arguing that bans can create “forbidden fruit” appeal. Speaker 0 adds that calling people anti-Semites previously worked but has become less effective because it is now applied broadly, “including Jews.” They claim that this conflation of the Jewish population with the Zionist project has harmed Jewish people and insist Zionism is “a political ideology” rather than a religion, ethnicity, or identity.
The conversation shifts to YouTube and algorithms. Speaker 0 says YouTube is “pretty good,” but argues the algorithm rewards repeating the same topics and punishes deviation; they describe their channel as heavy on foreign policy and say domestic coverage performs worse. They also claim algorithm incentives can push audiences toward more extreme thought.
Speaker 2 asks whether public perception has changed since earlier discussions about censorship. Speaker 0 says public opinion against Israel continues to grow and cites Associated Press and NORC polling, including that 30% of American Jews say Israel has carried out a genocide in Gaza. Speaker 0 also discusses a “disconnect” between populations and political leadership in Western countries and Gulf countries, and warns that systems not representing constituents can lead to unrest, uprisings, or civil war amid economic strain and concentrated wealth.
They then focus on U.S. legislative action. Speaker 0 discusses “Section 219” in the National Defense Authorization Act, claiming it would merge the U.S. military with the IDF, calling it problematic and saying the House Armed Services Committee gatekeeps whether a full House vote occurs. They criticize committee assignment processes and the Senate parliamentarian system and legislative filibuster as mechanisms that prevent bills from passing.
Speaker 2 asks about who is talking about Section 219. Speaker 2 references Massey and Ro Khanna (and others) raising attention, plus Trita Parsi’s Quincy Institute analyzing it first. Speaker 0 says voters should pressure committee members by contacting their offices “incessantly,” naming them, and warning of political consequences if they “sell our country out” to Israel. Speaker 0 states the provision “has to be stripped out.”
The conversation then turns to NATO allies, Turkey, and U.S.-Israeli dynamics. Speaker 2 describes escalating rhetoric about a possible Turkey conflict, noting statements attributed to Smotrich and Netanyahu, and contrasts that with Trump praising Erdogan, considering F-35 approval, and removing CAT sanctions. Speaker 0 says details may be unknown, speculates Trump might have personal business motives, and adds an alternative explanation: Turkey is described as an important component for European/NATO preparation for a face-off with Russia. They argue the U.S. may eventually have to choose between Israeli ambitions and NATO plans involving Turkey, with Israel wanting war with Turkey.
Speaker 0 also mentions internal Israeli politics, stating that Ben-Gvir is reportedly favored in Israel polls and interpreting that as reflecting Israel’s cultural and political direction. They say they do not expect Israel to pull back and describe Israel as “lashing out.”
Speaker 2 discusses the shifting U.S. posture, arguing that if unconditional support changes, Israel would have to adapt. Speaker 0 says they see public sentiment shifting in the U.S. and describes formerly “forbidden” topics becoming discussable. Speaker 0 argues Israel is bombarded with a 24-hour news cycle intended to terrify Israelis and create a sense that “the whole globe hates them,” distinguishing what they call propaganda aimed at the Israeli public from what they describe as bad-faith behavior by Israeli politicians and media figures.
They debate the rationale for actions against Hezbollah and describe Hezbollah as a resistance group formed after Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon. Speaker 0 argues that disarming neighboring countries is “ridiculous” and that engaging in behavior that creates “reasons to resist” perpetuates resistance.
In the middle of the transcript, Speaker 2 shares emotional examples from Gaza. They mention Palestinians watching World Cup matches amid rubble and describe an organizer, Mohamed El Wahidi, who helped set up giant screens for families to watch Egypt vs. Argentina but was killed in an Israeli airstrike before kickoff, with two brothers aged 8 and 10 also killed. They ask how anyone could respond without being upset and say Gaza is being forgotten.
Finally, Speaker 2 returns to “strikes back and forth” between the U.S. and Iran. Speaker 0 says Israel did not play a role in “the latest developments,” but maintains the war is “because of Israel.” They argue the conflict should be called “war,” criticizing attempts to downplay it as not war or as a “special military operation.” Speaker 0 claims U.S. actions are provoking Iran, that diplomatic solutions for transiting vessels through the Strait are the only option, and that continued hostilities deplete weaponry, fertilizer supply, and strategic petroleum reserves.
Full Transcript
Speaker 2: Oh, Kushner follows me as well, so I'm not blocked. Let me see if Netanyahu blocked me. I doubt it.
Speaker 0: Why would Netanyahu block you? You're so needlessly, overly fair to Israel. But, you know, to be fair to them, the reality is they can't even stand a little jab. Like, you have to be all or nothing with the Israelis.
Speaker 2: Exactly, yeah. Let me find that... Because I posted what he did. Did you pin it? Your reply? There it is.
Speaker 0: I did. I did. I pinned it.
Speaker 2: I swear that is hilarious. Lisa, I'll send you something now to show to the audience. So what Anna did is so I loved it. I loved so much that day. So he posted a video saying, happy 4th of July, America. Happy 250th Independence Day. And Anna just replies, fuck you. And then Anna gets about twice as much engagement as Benjamin himself. And I said, I posted a screenshot on this. This is the embodiment of the sentiment right now in the US or something along those lines.
Speaker 0: Yes, I saw that. Oh, you saw that. You're correct. Yeah, you're correct.
Speaker 2: But that was epic. It's not only your reply. It's the fact that your reply got more engagement. It's very rare for a reply to get more engagement than the tweet. So this is it. I swear this is epic.
Speaker 0: I swear I did not expect the kind of... reaction or response that i got but um i will allow it i love it yeah i love it there's nothing israel can do at this point to reverse the pr damage that they've done to themselves they're under the impression that if they just get people banned if they take control of the algorithms if they influence ai you know somehow we're all going to forget everything that we've been experiencing and seeing with our own two eyes over the last nearly three years and you know aside from the genocide in gaza aside from the you know barbarism that's being carried out against the lebanese people as we speak you can't forget the fact that even if you're a country or a citizenry that's been very favorable to israel you've had favorable views Everyone knows that this ongoing war against Iran started specifically on behalf of Israel. And as the global economy starts to suffer, we haven't really borne the real brunt of it yet. But if the kinetic action continues and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, we are barreling toward a global depression. And everyone knows that the heart of that issue, what started all of this, is Israel. People are going to draw... They're going to direct their ire toward Israel because of the pain they themselves are suffering, pain that has been inflicted on them for a war that's being fought for the Israelis. So it's just, it doesn't matter how many hundreds of millions of dollars they spend on Hasbro. It doesn't matter how many bots they buy on social media. Everyone knows the truth. So it is what it is.
Speaker 2: Do you not worry on the algorithm side, especially the younger generation? So if they start censoring voices critical of Israel, if they start censoring voices like yours and Cenk's, how do you know the younger generation that are absorbing all this information right now would realize what you know, what we know?
Speaker 0: I think young people are just too savvy. And as much as the algorithms on major platforms might be controlled or changed to the favor of the Israelis, the fact of the matter is there's so many other opportunities for ideas, and certain viewpoints to thrive. So I'll give you a specific example. Nick Fuentes was banned on every platform except one. And so he continued doing his thing, I think on Rumble, I'm not entirely sure, but there was some other platform where he was spreading his message and his perspectives. Regardless of how you might feel about it, he garnered a pretty significant audience. And in fact, I do believe that him being a target for these bans made him that forbidden fruit for a lot of young men. And so it's so counterproductive to engage in censorious behavior, but the Israelis can't help themselves. And honestly, to be fair to them, I don't think they've ever been accustomed to the kind of backlash that they're receiving. A lot of people internationally have always been so afraid to call out the Israelis because everyone knows that their only retort is, you are an anti-Semite. And for the longest time, that label would destroy your life. But they've now called everyone an anti-Semite, so. Including Jews. Exactly. So I think they've actually done a lot of harm to Jewish people across the globe. for selfish reasons. And they have intentionally conflated the worldwide Jewish population with the Zionist project. And Zionism, as I've said a billion times before, is a political ideology. It's not a religion. It's not an ethnicity. It's not an identity. It's a political ideology.
Speaker 2: Before we talk about the latest developments and especially the visit to Turkey and what happened there, I was talking to Cenk about it yesterday. I was thinking just as you're speaking, we're talking about the algorithms and all that. The Young Turks... You guys are one of the biggest channels on YouTube. I remember watching you when I was much, much younger. YouTube seems to be pretty fair, or do they censor as well?
Speaker 0: I actually agree with you. I think YouTube is pretty good. I do have one complaint, and it's not about censorship. It's just about how I believe the algorithm is modeled right now, and it's obviously subject to change. But it's obvious to me that right now you have to constantly cover the same subject matter. And when you deviate even a little bit from that subject matter, the algorithm punishes you. So right now, our channel is very heavy on foreign policy, but obviously I wanna cover domestic policy as well. When we tend to cover domestic issues, it doesn't perform as well because what gets rewarded in the algorithm is to continue giving your audience the same content over and over and over again. And that's a problem, it really is. And it honestly is more conducive to pushing people to more extreme thought, if that makes any sense.
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah. Again, one more question from our last discussion. I remember in our last chat or maybe two chats ago, we talked about the censorship. You've been facing depression. Our first conversation we had a few months ago. Has anything changed since? Has the Iran war changed anything? Because you talked about how calling people anti-Semite doesn't work as well anymore. People are waking up. People are accepting. It's become, you know, actually one of my guests explained it really well. There's a difference between everyone knowing something and then everyone knowing that everyone knows something. I'm not sure if that makes sense. Everyone knew about, you know, the censorship on any voices critical of Israel beforehand. But now, and you know, Israel's influence in the US. But now I think we crossed a chasm where we're at a stage where everyone knows that everyone knows. And that's really difficult to reverse. Have you sensed any change? Because you've been covering it for so long. Have you sensed any change now?
Speaker 0: I mean, the only change that I've noticed is that public opinion continues to grow against Israel. So in fact, the latest Associated Press and NORC polling shows that a growing percentage of Jewish Americans are turning on Israel, the Zionist project. In fact, 30% of American Jews say that Israel has carried out a genocide in Gaza, which is a pretty big deal. And so that has changed. But Mario, what I've noticed has always been a major disconnect in, I think, Western countries is you have actually, I think with the Gulf countries as well, you have the populace, like you have the people and what the people believe and what the people want is very different from what they're getting from their political leadership. And so, you know, UAE leaders might be willing- That's not sustainable. It's not sustainable. And in fact, what I'm really worried about, I think it's not gonna happen anytime soon, but it's building up and I'm starting to hear whispers of it. When you live under a government that doesn't represent you, doesn't care what you think, and you feel like there's no other choice, more and more people are gonna turn to potentially violence, right? I mean, when your government isn't listening to you, when you're struggling, especially economically, and this war, if it continues, and it looks like it's going to, it's going to cause a lot of economic pain and suffering for people across the globe, Americans are certainly not shielded from it. And so you're living under a system that doesn't give a damn about you. You're seeing these billionaires now become trillionaires in the case of Elon Musk. While more and more wealth is concentrated at the top, more and more people in the middle class are getting booted into poverty. All of this is like a dangerous cocktail for uprisings, for potentially civil war. I think there's going to be a lot of unrest in the country unless our government wakes the hell up and realizes, oh, it turns out we need to take care of our own constituents. And if we don't, there will be consequences. And I don't want those consequences. I don't want violence. I don't want some big violent revolution to happen. But I do agree with people who say that our political system is just inherently broken at this point. We have corruption baked into it. Congress is like useless, the most useless group of people imaginable. And it's by design, Mario, it's by design. So for instance, the effort, Section 219, to merge the US military with the IDF, a genocidal terrorist organization, that is very likely just gonna barrel through in the National Defense Authorization Act because the very committee, the House Armed Services Committee, which gets to decide whether or not an amendment that would basically strip that provision from the NDAA, that amendment will never be allowed, or for now, is not being allowed for a floor vote, a full House floor vote, because the committee gets to decide whether or not that amendment gets a vote to begin with. And that's a big problem, because you shouldn't allow for those types of gatekeepers to exist. You should allow... for democracy to play out the way that it's supposed to play out. And the way that it's supposed to play out is allow the full House to vote on that amendment and actually represent the people. The whole committee assignment thing, I think, is incredibly shady, as is the parliamentarian system. I'm sorry, the Senate parliamentarian and the legislative filibuster in the Senate, which is, in my opinion, put in place in order to prevent bills from passing.
Speaker 2: Yeah. I'm not sure if you can see me. There's a bit of a technical issue, but you can hear me. Yeah. I know.
Speaker 0: I can hear you. Yeah. I don't see you though.
Speaker 2: Oh, perfect. Yeah. They're sorting it out. But as long as you could hear me, um, for me, that section is, is wild, but the, um, what about the other option of the politicians adapting to this new reality? So you've got Trump criticizing Israel, JD Vance criticizing Israel, but now going to Turkey and considering the approval of F-35, which would drive Israel nuts. So do you think that we could actually see politicians change before people seek other ways of forcing that change?
Speaker 0: No, politicians are, Mario, you have to understand, our political system, I believe, incentivizes the biggest scumbags to run for public office. And that's not just a comment about Trump, although I do believe Trump falls under that category. When we have a system that allows for insider trading, I mean, look at how much money Donald Trump and his family have personally made off of his presidency in the second term. Billions and billions of dollars off crypto schemes and all sorts of things like that. there is no incentive for them to change. And in fact, our system incentivizes the worst among us to wanna run for public office. So I have no faith in these politicians becoming more clear-minded about the policies that they're championing and carrying out. I think that we are incentivizing self-enrichment and corruption, and that's what we're gonna continue to get unless we change that system. I do think though that politicians at the end of the day are subject to pressure campaigns and more often than not tend to change their position if they feel their political aspirations are being jeopardized thanks to the views they hold and the fact that their constituents don't agree with them. So we'll see what happens with Section 219 because I think that if there would be enough pressure by the American people toward these politicians, especially those on the House Armed Services Committee, they will allow a full House vote. And I think the House of Representatives is fully aware of how the American people feel about that section, that provision in the National Defense Authorization Act. We don't want it. We shouldn't merge with a foreign country's military. That's insane.
Speaker 2: Is anyone talking about it? Because I remember Massey and Ro Khanna and a few others, I think I could be getting their name. I think it was them that started bringing attention to it. I think it was the people that brought the attention to it is Trita Parsi's Quincy Institute. They were the first one to do an analysis into this. And you guys spoke about it. I did interviews about it because it just sounded so freaking wild and from people that don't know, it literally merges the US military and the Israeli military. And I think one, Senator Cotton is trying to do the same thing with Mossad and the CIA. and make it irreversible. How fricking wild is that? But then it went silent. Everyone got distracted. That's what's crazy about the news cycle. Everyone moves on to the next thing. And now we've got the world around potentially restarting. So everyone's forgetting everything else. Do you think this is gonna pass from what you're seeing?
Speaker 0: It better not. It better not. I mean, I'll do everything in my power to prevent it from passing. And look, the voters need to keep their boot on the necks of these committee members. We know their names and I'll go ahead and repeat them on the show again today if I need to. But they need to be. I'm not saying they need to be harassed, but I think that their offices need to be called and contacted incessantly. They need to know through their own constituents that they don't have any shot of getting reelected if they go ahead and sell our country out to a genocidal terrorist state like Israel. Like we've had enough. And there needs to be a come to Jesus moment for these politicians. They need to understand that there will be political consequences if they go against the will of their own constituents, which they excel at, there's no question. But the thing is, a lot of stuff flies under the radar because we have pathetic legacy media, corporate owned media, increasingly Zionist owned media. And so most Americans might not be aware of it, but we're gonna continue talking about it to ensure that we defeat that provision. It's got to be stripped out of the bill.
Speaker 2: I swear, if that passes, it'd be... I just don't know. I could say it would be too far, but I think that we've already crossed the too far stage. But I just wouldn't know what to say. It's just such a crazy thing to do.
Speaker 0: I mean, and look, the Israelis, along with their supporters here in the United States, people like Rahm Emanuel, who's pretending like he's like wagging his finger at Israel and like, oh, you don't need our military aid. Same with Netanyahu. Oh, we don't need your military aid. They think we're stupid. And that's the thing that really gets under my skin, Mario. They think we don't know about the provision in the NDAA that would merge Israel. the IDF with our military. They think we don't know about Tom Cotton's proposal to merge Mossad with the CIA, which by the way, seems like a redundant thing to do. I mean, isn't it basically the same agency at this point anyway? Come on.
Speaker 2: But anyway, I'm definitely- But didn't, hold on, the CIA, didn't the US intelligence label Israeli intelligence as a critical threat? Is that still the case? Has anything happened on that front?
Speaker 0: Not the CIA. was a different intelligence agent remember we had like dozens of intelligence agencies so it was a different agency that uh determined that the cia like excuse my language uh i try to be a lady but i'm when we talk about israel it's very difficult um i think the cia you just you just you just said you didn't attend yahoo i think we've crossed I'm actually, like, shockingly going to pull back a little bit. No, but the CIA does the dirty work of Israel. Like, I don't think the CIA is an agency that has any real interest in protecting the national security of the United States. Remember, the CIA was formed a few years after the establishment of Israel. And people like Epstein worked for Mossad and the CIA. They have very similar objectives, very similar agenda items. So...
Speaker 2: Great. By the way, a few of my guests mentioned the speech that Rahm Emanuel gave. It's just a perfect indicator of the turning point that the US is going through. Because this is someone that's pro-Israel, has been pro-Israel throughout the entire administration. So it meant a lot for him to critique. Do you believe the same thing, that actually he's sincere about it?
Speaker 0: No, are you kidding me? No, he's not. His father was a terrorist with the Irgun terror group. Rahm Emanuel himself served in the IDF. He's a massive loyalist to Israel. He wants to run for president in 2028, and he knows that Democratic voters overwhelmingly are against Israel, so he's positioning himself for a presidential run, which I find hilarious. He has no chance in hell.
Speaker 2: Okay, I didn't know he was running for president.
Speaker 0: Yeah, he can go ahead and play these cute little games though. It's amusing and entertaining.
Speaker 2: All right, so before we look at the latest developments, because that's obviously the elephant in the room now is the restart of the strikes between the US and Iran. I want to ask you about the trip that Trump made to Turkey. I spoke to Cenk about it yesterday. Is that, because we've seen the talk, the rhetoric in the last few weeks between JD Vance and Trump criticizing Israel. But it seems that, at least to me, it seems that action has followed this rhetoric. This is the first action that has been taken that's been negative towards Israel. And Netanyahu was doing his press tour, criticizing any deal with Erdogan, criticizing Turkey. Smatric talking about a war with Turkey. He's actually talking about a war. Not Turkey is a threat. It's like we have to prepare for war with Turkey. Just freaking wild. But Trump didn't care. He keeps praising Erdogan and now talking about approving the F-35 and removing those sanctions. Not major sanctions, but I think it's called the CAT sanctions on Turkey. Is that yet another indicator that maybe things are changing? Maybe we are seeing a decoupling or too early to make a statement like this?
Speaker 0: I think there are details to the story that we're not privy to yet. And this is just my speculation. President Donald Trump will throw... anyone under the bus when there are opportunities for self-enrichment. So I'm curious whether there was some sort of secret deal made between Erdogan and Trump in regard to a personal business matter. So who knows? That's a possibility. I am speculating on that and kind of leaning in that direction because really Trump hasn't done anything to check Netanyahu. And going against him in this way, the only explanation I can think of is Trump did it because it's gonna benefit him personally in some way. I could be wrong, so let's wait and see. The other thing is, and I think this is probably a more, this is easier to confirm. Right now, and if you've been paying close attention to what our NATO allies have been whispering about, in some cases, even overtly saying, they appear to be ready or preparing for a face-off with Russia. So you hear European leaders, you know, kind of reference or hint at eventually coming together and attacking Russia. And they see Turkey, with its pretty powerful military, as an important puzzle piece in that effort. And so... It's a really interesting thing happening. We have Israel on one side, which tends to get everything they want, but then we have our European or Western allies who see Turkey as an incredibly important component of fighting Russia. So what do you do when you're in the United States and you're caught in the middle, right? So I think eventually there's gonna be a pretty significant face-off where the United States government, whether it's during the Trump administration or during the next administration, is gonna have to decide between the Israelis who want to go to war with freaking Turkey. I mean, can we just pause for a second and address how, like, these people are so bloodthirsty. Like, how about you don't go to war for once in your lives? How about Turkey isn't actually posing a threat to you? And maybe you don't need to be... Like, what you hear from Israelis about their real reason for wanting to go to war against Turkey, I mean, Netanyahu has said it multiple times, it's about the power balance in the region. And that arming Turkey with the F-35s, by the way, I don't like the Turkish government, okay, at all. But putting that aside entirely, he's arguing that if you give Turkey F-35s, that throws off the balance of power in the region, i.e., we want to be the dominant ones in the region. Well, sorry, you are a small, irrelevant country that sure knows how to do dirty tricks to get the United States to carry out your dirty deeds. at the end of the day no natural resources okay constantly creating enemies across the globe and certainly in the middle east can't stop themselves from attacking their neighbors i mean i just i don't understand these people how about you don't like try to provoke for more war but they can't help themselves they love it they can't get enough and you want to know why they can't get enough mario because the united states pays for their iron dome system so they get to attack with impunity, right? They don't have to worry about blowback the way other countries do. The fear of blowback is an important component in making decisions about questions of war and peace. And when Israel feels like we can do whatever we want and there are no consequences, they are going to become increasingly more belligerent, right? And they are, they're incredibly belligerent. Turkey is not posing a threat to them. So just stop, but they can't help themselves. But anyway, I think that face-off between the EU, not the EU, our NATO allies and Israel is coming because if they're really going to challenge Russia, which I think is, they should really rethink that. But if they are really planning on doing it, they would need Turkey in order to have a fighting chance. What are you looking up?
Speaker 2: No, nothing. I'm just thinking. I play with these little things so I can focus there, like just fiddling with them, just thinking about it, of how that would look like. Because I've always dismissed the risk of Israel and Turkey fighting. But when I see statements like what Smotrich said two days ago and what even Netanyahu has been saying the last few days, I'm like, man, am I really underplaying that risk between the two countries? Because it just continues to escalate and escalate. But what surprises me, though, is that it seems Israel bit off more than it could chew with Iran. You know how pissed off Trump is, how pissed off J.D. Vance is. Let's see what happens when Netanyahu visits the U.S. But it seems Iran might have been a step too far, and that might be breaking the U.S.-Israeli relationship. So what I would expect them to do in response is kind of take a step back. Do what the other candidate talks about. He's like, we stretch too thin. We're a small country. We should act like it. He's not a pacifist, but he has a different mindset to Netanyahu. We're a superpower. He says we're not a regional superpower. We're a global superpower. That's something he said a few weeks ago. So I would have expected Israeli policy to kind of go ahead, to take that path, but instead to be changing the rhetoric. You're not done with Iran. You lost the war with Iran, but now you're talking about Turkey. It's just bizarre to me.
Speaker 0: I was having a conversation with a journalist friend of mine last night, and he made reference, and I haven't double checked this, maybe you can look it up as I talk about it, but he had referenced that the latest polls out of Israel show that Ben-Gavir is the favorite among the Israelis. And I think that tells you a lot about the mental state and the current culture within Israel, if that's true. I mean, Ben-Gavir is not an unpopular person or politician in Israel, regardless of where he is in polling about elections. Fact of the matter is the people of Israel like him. And he's one of the people who not only spews disgusting genocidal rhetoric, he makes good on the promises he makes, his genocidal promises. So yeah, I would never in a million years expect modern day Israel to pull back They're lashing out. It seems like it's the only tactic they know how to carry out.
Speaker 2: I think it all depends on what the US does. And if they're starting to see, and Naftali Bennett, I had him on the show, I think two weeks ago now. And he said the biggest problem, what concerns him the most is the changing sentiment in the US around Israel. And he sees it, and he's someone that's, one would argue, even more hawkish than Netanyahu. He's like, we really need to reconsider our strategy in the region because of that. And Eisenkot is, from my limited research on him, I really need to spend the time looking into what his policies will be. But I think he's the favorite on betting platforms of being prime minister. Him and Netanyahu. Naftali Bennett, his odds collapsed in the last few days. I don't know why. But yeah, he talks about, he's a former IDF commander. I'm not sure if you know much about him. But he talks about how we're a small country. We can't be fighting a multi-front war. We could do, you know, quick, you know, short-term strikes to achieve a certain objective and pull back and that's it. We're just going to have a step in the, I want to say the right direction, but a more logical direction. I just don't think it's sustainable. These, they're not suicidal and they will have to adapt, but I could be wrong. You know, one of my guests a couple of days ago was talking about how a fascist country, how they act, and he's making comparisons to other fascist countries in history. And, you know, that example was worrying because those, those, those other examples historically did not go down any, any reassuring paths, but I don't know if the US changed. Yeah. He did. Yeah. It was a very good point. A very concerning way, the way he's explained it and he's explained it really well. But, um, if the US, if you guys really change your approach to Israel, I think it all starts there. If that protection, that unconditional support to Israel changes, Israel will have no choice but to adapt. But if you're going to offer that level of security for Israel, whatever they do, you're protected, it's justified, then they have no reason to stop. But I am in the belief that, as you've just explained, the sentiment is shifting and politicians will eventually have to adapt. And we are seeing indications of this, especially in the Democratic Party. More and more members of Congress and candidates are no longer accepting AIPAC money. So these are good signs, aren't they?
Speaker 0: There are good signs in terms of public sentiment here in the US. And I never thought throughout my entire career that this day would come where people are openly critical of Israel, questioning our alliance with Israel, questioning some of the narratives that we were fed in regard to the so-called global war on terror. There are certain topics that are being broached now that previously were So forbidden. I mean, the fact that under the Obama beginning, under the Obama administration, the U.S. government was funding Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists in Syria just to overthrow overthrow Bashar al-Assad. That used to be considered a crazy conspiracy theory. But now it's just it's demonstrably true. We have evidence of it. And Trump can't help himself every once in a while. You know, he slips up and he just says that Al-Shara was installed by Trump. or by the U.S. government.
Speaker 2: And he's trying to convince him to go fight Hezbollah. It's crazy. It's crazy. When he said that, it took me a while to digest it. And he said it again and again and again. I'm like, fuck. It's insane. At least he's being honest.
Speaker 0: Yes. At least he's being honest. Sometimes he's honest. Sometimes, I mean, not sometimes. A lot of times he's dishonest. But in that case, he's telling the truth. Yeah. But no, Mario, going back to Israel's behavior... Look, I don't hide the fact that I loathe the fact that the U.S. is aligned with that country. I think it's a stain on America's reputation. And at some point, it'll be a stain on our history. But to strawman, not to strawman, to steel man the Israeli perspective, let me be fair to the Israelis. They're in a lot of trouble right now. Now, it's their own doing. I don't think they needed to be in the kind of trouble that they're in right now. But what has happened is, You've got the Houthis in Yemen who were not defeated. Trump gave up on defeating them, which means that we couldn't defeat one of Iran's proxy groups. So that's a smaller threat, but still a threat. You have Hezbollah, which the IDF has failed to disarm. They're unable to disarm. And as we know, the Lebanese military or Lebanese army is so weak that it is a pipe dream to think that they would be able to disarm Hezbollah. So I get what the Israelis are trying to do in annexing land, and they wanna settle Gaza, even though they haven't defeated Hamas. Here's the thing, you can't defeat Hamas ideology or Hezbollah ideology when you continue engaging in the very behavior that gave birth to that ideology, and that's the ideology of resistance. If you want these resistance groups to no longer exist, then stop giving them a reason to resist you. Stop expanding your borders. So, you know, Israel's going to do what Israel does. They're going to build settlements. I'm sure they're going to try to settle southern Lebanon as well. But those people are going to live in fear because the resistance isn't just going to go away. It's not going to die off. And this idea of disarming... By the way, disarming every... neighboring country or every Middle Eastern country is ridiculous. Like, I love the idea that Israel gets to be the only country in that region that has a military and everyone else has to disarm. You know, Netanyahu has all these strong words to say about Hezbollah, and they're trying to get the Lebanese army to fight Hezbollah, right? But it's so funny because every once in a while, Homeboy slips up and he starts talking about how, ooh, but there are some terror elements in the Lebanese army, too.
Speaker 2: I mean, just... Just call him homeboy?
Speaker 0: Yeah, he... I shouldn't call him homeboy. He's cancer, okay? He is the cancer. But it's just... It's an ideology in Israel right now that's making them less safe. Do you get what I'm saying? What they are doing is making them less safe. And J.D. Vance was correct in noting that the U.S. is the only friend to Israel at this moment. And with increasing pressure by the American people to... abandon Israel, imagine we get there at some point in an environment where Israel has been made less safe thanks to these wars.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I remember speaking twice to a guy, Ishai Fleischer. He's very close to Ben-Gavir, and he's the closest person to Ben-Gavir I've spoken to because it's really hard to speak to people that openly support Ben-Gavir and some of the things he says, not everything. he's a he's a settler he lives in hebron he i showed him a video of he i showed him a video of um palestinian sorry a settler throwing rocks at palestinians in their homes etc he's like oh i know this palestinian so he's like that close to it and he's my neighbor i think he was this neighbor so he's he's the type of person i really want to speak to because i want to understand how they see things and i wanted to get it through to him is that their policies the israeli policy because one of the things he said to me on the first day how the israelis want to support the druze he's talking about why he hates al-shara which is fine a lot of people hate al-shara and they've got a lot of reasons to but his solution was arming the druze and i kept telling them like do you understand that this is what's causing the cycle of violence that backfires on israel and i gave him examples of there was a syrian militia militant group that was marching on israel that's not public knowledge and al-shara had to go and stop them because israel would then retaliate and they threatened to retaliate and strike them that would cause issues with with syria So I was trying to explain to him that this, you see that violence is the solution. But what I think a lot of people in Israel don't understand is that violence feeds the violence against them or the hate against them. The Hezbollah seeing Israel as a threat or not wanting to seek diplomatic solutions with Israel or recognize Israel is because of Israeli policies in the region against Palestine. The Iranians, when they yell death to Israel, honestly, if you speak to Iranians and I've spoken to professors in Iran, It's not about Israeli people. It's about what Israel is doing to the Palestinians, not Palestinian state, because they don't recognize the Palestinian state. And it's what Israel is, what they call the Zionist entity. So it's the Israeli policies. But I just wish more Israelis see that message. It's just hard to get to them. They live in a bubble. And it's not only them. Iranians live in their bubble. Every country lives in their bubble. But I wish they understand it. I wish they see things the right way.
Speaker 0: I think that the Israeli people, there's two different things happening. And I want to be fair to the Israeli people, even though they hold beliefs that I vehemently disagree with and find immoral. They are bombarded with a 24 hour news cycle that is intended to terrify them. OK, so they genuinely believe that the whole globe hates them and is out to get them and is looking to kill them. That is the messaging they get from their government and their media every single day. So propaganda is powerful, and I wanna be mindful of that because I don't ever wanna turn into what Israel is, right? I would never wanna turn into a US version of Ben-Gavir where I hate an entire group of people, in this case, like the Israeli population, because they're wrong. They're very wrong. But I understand why they're wrong and why they believe what they believe. I don't think they're inherently bad people. but I do think they've been propagandized to accept ideas and perspectives that actually makes them a lot less safe. Okay, now putting that aside, that's very different from the power structure, the politicians, and even media figures in Israel who I think are totally bad faith. They know exactly what they're doing. In fact, I know they know exactly what they're doing because they say it out loud. The politicians say it out loud. And I want... Israelis to maybe be a little more aware of that cognitive dissonance. Because on one hand, they're saying, we need to do this. We need to have our soldiers invade southern Lebanon for safety reasons, for a security buffer zone, right? But at the same time, you also hear the politicians talking about settling that land. So what is it really about? Is it really about a buffer zone for our own security? Or are you looking to annex and settle that land? And do you think is going to happen to the people who end up living in those settlements are they going to be safe because there will be resistance and i would i in no way would ever criticize that resistance their land was stolen from them okay mexico comes in and tries to expand their borders into southern california if we have a weak government or a corrupt government that's empowering that land theft you better believe I would join a militia of Americans to resist. That's what you do. You defend your country, you defend your borders, you defend your land. So Americans acting like they're shocked that there would be a Lebanese group, in this case, Hezbollah, that pushes back against Israel's barbaric behavior and attempts at land theft, which they've done again and again for many, many decades. That's the reason why Hezbollah formed in the 1980s. And Hezbollah was able to end an 18-year Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. That's what Hezbollah is. You might not like Hezbollah, and I totally understand that. You might not agree with their ideology. But at the core of what Hezbollah is, is a resistance group to Israeli aggression. It wouldn't have even existed had it not been for Israel constantly invading Lebanon.
Speaker 2: The number of times I say to myself, I'm so sick of talking about Israel because there's so many things to talk about. I really want to talk about Ukraine and what's happening there right now and the Chinese policy, the Belt and Road. There's just so many interesting things happening around the world. You talked about domestic politics, but then something constantly happens. Smatric talking about war with Turkey. Where did this come from? I never thought I'd be talking about a possible conflict between Turkey and And Israel and that being an actual threat. But then when you have Netanyahu talking about it and other politicians talking about it every day and to prepare for war with Turkey, how can you not talk about it? But when you're talking about the war in Lebanon, and also the point about what's happening in Lebanon, the argument of getting rid of Hezbollah, I was supporting that argument. I'm like, okay, Israel, you're right. Hezbollah is a threat. You don't fight them. That's your right. They attacked you. They fired rockets. It's fine. I understand the explanation. I'm not saying I agree, disagree. I understand it. But then when they say, okay, cuts, actually, not random politicians, 20% of the Lebanese people can't return home, even after the war ends. And they're demolishing villages on a daily basis. Now, is it Hezbollah infrastructure, entire villages? It's both. They are destroying tunnels. We've seen videos of them destroying tunnels, but they're also leveling homes with bulldozers. And then you've got a louder and louder minority talking about settling Lebanon.
Speaker 0: Yeah. And I mean, look, if people in the audience were more deferential toward Israel and its lies when it came to Gaza, all right, well, you got fooled. And I hope you accept that. But are you really going to get fooled again? Because they're doing the same thing in southern Lebanon. Literally the same thing. Literally the same thing. Same lies, same bullshit. OK, how are you going to argue that you're fighting Hezbollah? You're going after Hezbollah's infrastructure when you're leveling entire villages. Like, please, I just I need the global community who continues to buy into these lies to just wait. Please wake up. Please stop being played for a fool and stop supporting this. Like, I hate the fact that our government supports this because it makes it. the American people have blood on their hands, even though the vast majority of Americans are not in favor of what's going on. They want it to stop. But since our government represents us on the international stage, we all look like butchers. It's wrong, and it's totally immoral.
Speaker 2: Let me, like, today I woke up to this. So, Lisa, can you show the second link I sent first? So it's a nice story. Heartbreaking, but a warm story, but heartbreaking nonetheless. It was about... Palestinians and Gaza watching the World Cup. Not sure if you saw that video, the Egypt versus Argentina war. So first it was heartbreaking seeing, you'll see the video, you'll understand what I mean. So I saw that yesterday. That was on BBC. You can play the video, Lisa, if you don't mind. Just to show you. And then I'll tell you what I woke up to today. So this is, you can expand the video. So this is Palestinians watching football in Gaza. It's heartbreaking watching on the rubble. So that enough is a heartbreaking story to talk about how Gaza is being forgotten. Palestinians are being forgotten. Look at them, just how they're watching that game, trying to have some normalcy in their life. Okay, so that's enough. This is enough for us to talk about, okay? This is yesterday. They're watching the game. And then today, can you play the first thing I sent you, Lisa? I woke up to this news this morning. And then when you see things like this, How can you not be as upset as you were just now in this interview? You and Cenk are, I am as well, and many others are. When you see stories like this, I don't know if you saw this one, but it's pretty sad. Someone organized that FIFA, that World Cup to be played. Play it with the audio. Can you actually put the audio? Essentially, the story of the second video doesn't show much. But the person that organized this, his name is, that organized the World Cup, his name is Mohamed El Wahidi. He helped organize giant screens where families in Gaza could gather to watch Egypt and Argentina.
Speaker 1: Just before Egypt takes off against Argentina.
Speaker 2: So that's the guy they organized it.
Speaker 1: Hundreds of people in Gaza gathered to do something ordinary. to watch Egypt play against Argentina in the World Cup. But the man who made it possible was killed in an Israeli airstrike before kick-off. Mohammed al-Wahidi helped organize giant screens where families in Gaza could gather to watch Egypt's World Cup matches together. He was the director of the Egyptian committee in Gaza, which provides food, shelter, and other humanitarian assistance to Palestinians. But just before Egypt kicked off against Argentina, a strike hit a car in Gaza City's Sabra neighborhood. Al Wahidi, a driver, and two brothers aged 8 and 10 were killed, according to the director of Shifa Hospital. The Israeli military says Al Wahidi was not the target of the strike and that it was aiming for a Hamas militant. For many Palestinians in Gaza, Egypt's World Cup run has become about more than just soccer. Egypt shares a border with Gaza and the team's head coach, Hossam Hassan, has repeatedly...
Speaker 2: So when you see things like this, when I wake up to this news... How is someone meant to feel when they do this?
Speaker 0: I can't wait for the day Israel is fully alienated. And it's going to happen. It's going to happen. I would say I can't wait for the day that they finally wake up to it because I they're not going to they're not going to Mario Mario, they're not going to they're not going to listen to the way that they talk. The ideology in Israel right now is our lives are the most important lives everyone else. Who cares? disposable, useless, unimportant. They intended to kill that guy because he committed the crime of, first of all, dispersing humanitarian aid. I'm sure they didn't like that. But he committed the crime of providing a modicum of joy to the Palestinian people in a situation where they've had everything robbed from them, taken from them, including, for most of them, many members of their families. So I just... I don't understand people who still give the modern-day Israeli state the benefit of the doubt. They don't deserve it, and they haven't deserved it in a long time. They intended to kill that guy and the two children he was with. Disgusting. Just disgusting. Yeah.
Speaker 2: Final thing to get your thoughts on is the big news is the strikes back and forth. What do you and Cenk think about it? Obviously you now, because I know you guys talk about it on the Young Turks. Do you guys think that the war could restart? Do you think this is just a power struggle about the Strait of Hormuz? How worried are you that Trump will be dragged into it? And also, would you agree this time around it doesn't seem to be about Israel, this is about the Strait of Hormuz? Or do you think Israel plays a role in what we're seeing right now again?
Speaker 0: You know, I think in the latest developments, Israel didn't play a role. I want to be clear about that. The problem is we're in this war because of Israel. So the Israelis aren't dumb, and they certainly knew that Iran was going to take control of the Strait of Hormuz. They knew it. And once that happens, especially under the leadership of Donald Trump— That's it. We're stuck in this war because Trump isn't going. I mean, look at what's happening right now. So the we are at war. Like, let's be clear. Let's stop normalizing this BS of no, it's not war. I mean, like we're bombing the hell out of the country and they're retaliating by bombing military U.S. military bases in Gulf countries. But it's not war. It's not war. We're still what? We're still at a ceasefire. Like, what is this? Is this a special military operation? Is that what's happening? Like, we are at war. Like, let's accept it and let's stop. Because Mario, what we're doing is we're playing into what the gross warmongers want, which is the downplaying of what we're experiencing in reality. We're at war. This is war. Trump doesn't want to say he's at war because it's not a good look for him. But bitch, we're at war. And that was to Trump, not to you. But anyway...
Speaker 2: So, but anyway, going back- Just in one week, you say, fuck you, then it's a meow, call Trump a bitch. That's a hell of a week.
Speaker 0: He is a bitch. I mean, what else? He entered a war without really considering what the consequences, what the ramifications, what the strategy should be. He just did it. And he's making decisions on the fly, day by day, and it is hurting the global economy. It's hurting society. americans it's hurting his own base his own voters it's hurting the israelis too but you know they love war so they're too blind to see how disastrous this is for them nonetheless you know the strait of hormuz was open okay the vessels commercial vessels were sailing to and fro with no problem and so now our war aims went from complete surrender of the IRGC, which was laughable, I knew it wasn't gonna happen, but okay, to we're gonna try to take back control of the Strait of Hormuz, which I personally don't see a feasible military option there. I don't. So we'll see what happens. I mean, we're not really doing anything beneficial right now. We're needlessly keeping this war going when in reality, We should have stuck to the MOU. The US should not have done this provocative thing of encouraging vessels to travel through the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz, which of course was gonna provoke the Iranians. That's exactly what happened. If you want to prevent future tolls or future fees being charged for vessels transiting through the Strait, you have to find a diplomatic solution. I know that's difficult for Trump to do because he actually isn't a good deal maker. But that's the only real option. But that's not the route that the president has decided to go toward or take. And again, he understands what the consequences of this will be. He understands what the consequences of this have been. We are depleting not only our weaponry and our interceptors, we're dealing with a shortage of fertilizer, a third of which travels through the Strait of Hormuz. We are also... Strategic petroleum reserves. Depleting that. That's a big problem. So, I mean, he is quoted as saying, I don't want to be the next Herbert Hoover. He understands what his legacy will be if he continues with this war, yet... He's continuing with this war. Maybe he needs to focus a little bit more on the Islamic Republic of Japan, you know? Maybe a useful distraction would be good for him, but alas.
Speaker 2: An absolute pleasure. Thank you so much for coming on again.
Speaker 0: Lots of fun. I always love talking to you, Mario. Thank you.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m seeing Washington brace for weeks of fighting while the units meant to carry it are sent home. I track the “machinery”: the US–allied deconfliction cell is being pulled and the crisis action teams activated before Feb. 28 haven’t been reconstituted, so the path remains withdrawal. I also challenge “rogue elements” and “fresh plot” logic with published protocols and exports.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 🇺🇸 Washington says it's bracing for weeks of fighting. The units you'd actually stand up for that fight are being sent home instead Larry Johnson tracks the machinery behind the threats. Per his sourcing, the deconfliction cell that keeps US and allied aircraft untangled mid-operation is being pulled out of the region, and the crisis action teams activated before February 28 have never been reconstituted. Real operations run on that plumbing. Its absence, he argues, means the path is still withdrawal, whatever the podium says. He gave the "rogue elements" theory the same treatment. Axios reported mediators believe MOU opponents inside Iran struck those ships. Larry pulled up the published protocols: any vessel that skips Iran's application gets denied passage or fired on. Paragraph five enforcement, spelled out in black and white, requires no rogues. The bigger moment lands tomorrow. Tasnim says the new Supreme Leader will lead commemorative prayers at Qom, his first public appearance, with Israel's death threat still hanging in the air. And on the WSJ report of a fresh Iranian plot against Trump, Larry's logic ran opposite: a country working to push America out of the Gulf doesn't hand Washington a reason to return. The ledger underneath it all: 60 MILLION barrels exported in three weeks per Windward Intelligence, 10 million of them in a single night. @NewSonof
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation starts with Mario describing phases of backlash on X, which he says can spike with the Gaza war and due to changes in following behavior, such as Elon unfollowing and then refollowing him. He explains that his team warned him that a particular tweet would be “the most controversial thing” he had ever posted. He then shares the tweet’s content: “the refs did not rob Egypt,” and that the match was “not fixed nor rigged,” followed by text encouraging research and “bring on the hate,” while noting readers would click the image. He says his interactions after years on X left him with “no feelings left,” and he mentions a prior viral tweet about Khamenei’s funeral processions and his feelings “about Iran,” which he says went “crazy viral.”
He and Larry Johnson then discuss censorship and platform migration, with Larry saying his YouTube account removal “wiped out a lot of material” and that content has been backed up on BitChute. They also reference Larry’s “Transition Protocol” channel.
Turning to news, Mario says “today is genuinely bizarre.” He recounts early reports from Iranian media that multiple locations across Iran—including Shabahar, Bandar Abbas, Ahvaz, and others—were hit, with many people immediately concluding this was a new wave of U.S. airstrikes. He says the narrative became confused when Axios reported U.S. officials said the U.S. was not striking Iran and that radar showed no indications of American aircraft active. He then describes further shifting assumptions: some believed Israel had joined after Israel reportedly sought U.S. green light, while Israeli media denied Israel involvement and suggested Gulf countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait instead.
Mario describes a sequence where Iranian media initially denied explosion reports, then later reaffirmed that some attacks occurred. He cites IRNA reporting a projectile hit a military headquarters near Bashir, with no casualties reported early on, and Tasneem later reporting airstrikes on an Iranian Navy site in Qanarak “but they don’t know who.” He summarizes that multiple Iranian outlets gave conflicting details and that other claims included missiles allegedly launched from Kuwait and Saudi drones reported off the coast, making “it confusing.” He concludes that he can only speculate but “would guess Bahrain and Kuwait,” adding that it “definitely looks like there were strikes.”
Larry then shifts to what he describes as U.S. de-escalation: he says regional efforts deescalated the situation after the U.S. did not launch new strikes on Thursday, referencing a deconfliction cell that was reportedly redeployed home and crisis action teams not being reactivated. He says Iran retaliated against previous U.S. strikes by hitting Muwaffaq al-Salt air base among others, and he claims the U.S. responded by “quit while we’re ahead,” rather than further escalation.
Mario says he sees the conflict as a struggle over control of the Strait of Hormuz and suggests Iran would continue retaliating in limited ways rather than escalating into a full-blown war. He lists targets he says Iran struck: Muwaffaq al-Salt Air Base in Jordan; Ali al-Salam Air Base in Kuwait; and Bahrain’s Fifth Fleet Headquarters, plus an airfield tied to Sheikh Issa. He mentions that the New York Times said the American attack was “14 times larger” than earlier strikes and that someone involved in early targeting said it “didn’t even come close.”
The discussion then focuses on Strait of Hormuz control and war-resumption indicators. Larry says no ships attempted to go through the Omani Channel, and Mario says “Pretty hard to dispute… Iran,” while also saying the U.S. cannot break Iran’s control without incurring major losses. Mario reports indicators he says suggest Iran is preparing for potential resumption: tanker trackers showing “10 million barrels” shipped out overnight from the Strait of Hormuz; Iranian armed forces entering highest alert with “scatter orders”; and further estimates that Iran exported about “60 million barrels” over three weeks. He also mentions a claim that oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Homs is near standstill with only two tankers transiting, and that a statement attributed to the IRGC warns foreigners to get out while not ordering closure.
Mario adds that the Omanis told the UN IMO they do not support imposing transit fees and reaffirmed transit passage rights under international law, contradicting earlier reports. He also says another Axios report claims mediators believe Iranian attacks on commercial ships were initiated by elements inside the Iranian government opposed to the MOU, which Larry disputes by pointing to compliance protocols he says are “in black and white.”
They then discuss additional claims about Khamenei-related funeral and leadership attendance. Mario says reports changed regarding whether Khamenei would attend funeral prayers, with Tasnim saying he will attend a commemorative prayer at the shrine of Fatima Massoumi “tomorrow after Maghreb and Isha prayers.” Larry adds that the oldest son led prayers in Mashad. Mario then mentions ongoing concerns about whether Israel would target Khamenei and references an Israel-Washington warning described via the Wall Street Journal quoting Larry Johnson: Israel warned Washington of an Iranian plot to assassinate Trump, with Trump alluding to being on lists and with funeral banners reading “we will kill Trump.”
The conversation includes a dispute between Larry and Mario about whether Iran would consider assassinating Trump and what goals Iran has regarding keeping the U.S. out of the Persian Gulf. They also discuss claims that Pakistan and Qatar are working to bring the U.S. and Iran back to negotiations after recent escalations.
Finally, Mario mentions other regional developments he says include Iranian deployment of thousands of special forces to the border with Iraqi Kurdistan and warning that a security zone would be established if Kurdish groups backed by the U.S. and Israel attempt to infringe Iranian sovereignty. He also discusses a France-reported idea of alternative energy corridors, including Syria as a possible route for Gulf oil to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, and recalls prior Israeli discussions of a pipeline alternative.
The segment ends with plans for upcoming coverage, including interviews about sabotage of a railway line in Iran, further discussion of U.S.-Iran back-and-forth, and additional guests.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: This could be every period of time something happens and I get a lot of hate on X. It happens. It's normal. It's sometimes related to the Gaza war. Sometimes Elon unfollowed me, then refollowed me. That got a lot of engagement. So remove it. Just don't show it yet, Stephanie. So I've gone through my phases of like a hate campaign. But I came up with a tweet. I'm like, guys, I want to post this. What do you think? You know, before I tweet it, before we come on. They're like, Mario, they sent me a warning on my WhatsApp group. They're like, Mario, this will be the most controversial thing you've ever posted. And another one of my team members, I have like a group with all my writers. You want to start a civil war? Actually, a world war. All my team's like, Mario, you're going to get through a lot of shit. And this is the tweet. If you can show it now, Stephanie. I just posted it. So expect by the end of this interview, my Twitter feed is going to click bait.
Speaker 1: What did you do?
Speaker 0: You can consider it click bait. I said, no, the refs did not rob Egypt. The match was not fixed nor rigged. Feel free to do your research and come to your own conclusion. And then I wrote under it. As I post this, my team warned me. This might be the most controversial thing you've ever posted. So bring on the hate. And they click on the image under it, Stephanie. And then this is me and one of my team members. He says, just don't look at the comments because they're going to be trying to legitimately hurt your feelings. And then I reply after years on X, I have no feelings left.
Speaker 1: It burned off all your nerve endings.
Speaker 0: Oh, man, it's been a journey. But now we get billions of impressions. So sometimes I tweet something because I get like a thought. And then it ends up, you know, it goes well, sometimes backfires. Like two days ago when we were, just before we did an interview, I posted, what did I say? Something about the funeral. I said, where is it? After watching the size of Khamenei's funeral processions, I feel light too about Iran. Fair tweet, you know, because I just had that perception of Iran. And then that went like crazy viral, you know, two, three, I think.
Speaker 1: I thought you were a Mossad asset.
Speaker 0: I'm an asset of everybody. I just need to get paid. Mossad's not paying me. The Iranians are not paying me.
Speaker 1: I keep sending my invoices to Vladimir Putin and he doesn't pay them. Yeah.
Speaker 0: Oh, man, it's fun. You've been going through this for many more years than I have since your TV days, so you know exactly what I'm talking about.
Speaker 1: You've become a musician. Well, there's once in a while, somebody writes something that really pisses me off, and I want to start writing back, torture them. And then I'm going, why even give them the satisfaction? I just delete them. You're not even worth listening to, okay? Not even worth paying attention to.
Speaker 0: Have you ever been targeted? Oh, you've had your YouTube account removed. That's painful. That's like the worst when you get censored that way.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that was, I mean, that wiped out a lot of material. It was unfortunate, but, you know, but, you know, it's not the end of the world. So I started backing it. I started backing what I'm doing now. It gets backed up on BitChute.
Speaker 0: BitChute, yeah, that's good. Yeah, and you also have... You also have the channel with Pepe and the guy from Pakistan. Dr. Z. Yeah.
Speaker 1: What's the channel called?
Speaker 0: Transition Protocol.
Speaker 1: Pepe and I just did another transition protocol about two hours ago, three hours ago. Nice.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I've mentioned it on my show a few times, so it's good that you're rebuilding it. All right. So let's go through today's news. Today is a very bizarre day. So let's go through the biggest news. So it all started out. I've got my notes here.
Speaker 1: Every day has been a bizarre day. What are you talking about?
Speaker 0: Now, the others are like surprising, unusual. This one's genuinely bizarre. So we get initial reports from Iran, Iranian media, that Shabahar, Bandar Abbas, Qanarak, Ahvaz, Bushir were all targeted. There's explosions there. Kashim, Sirik, Jask. All these were being targeted. And everyone just immediately came to the conclusion, including people in Iran, that this is the new wave of airstrikes by the U.S. And then it all starts becoming bizarre when Axios reports that, no, there's no, the White House or whoever they spoke with, U.S. official, says that the U.S. is not striking Iran. So it was a bit bizarre. We saw no indications on all the radars of any American jets or aircraft that are active. So it was in the US and immediately everyone came to the conclusion that Israel has joined the fight because we were talking earlier today. We didn't talk about it yesterday because I think the news came in today that Israel requested a green light from the US or asked the US whether the US would like Israel to join. So immediately everyone assumed it was Israel. But then Israeli media say it was not Israel. The Iranians don't point to Israel either. And there were no, usually when it's Israel attacking, you'll see their fighter jets in the air on the radars, or you'll see their cruise missiles, just like that attack right before, right before the MOU was signed days beforehand, when Israel attacked without American involvement. And then Israeli media said it's Gulf countries hinting at Bahrain, Kuwait, and I think naming Bahrain, one of the outlets named Bahrain and Kuwait. And one would come to the conclusion that maybe Bahrain and Kuwait are doing what the UAE and Saudi did, which is retaliate against Iranian strikes as a way to deter future strikes. So Iran, whenever they want to retaliate against the US, they might attack US warships, but not US bases in those countries. So that was the new assumption. So while these reports were coming in, Iranian media started reversing or denying the reports of explosions, saying they were untrue. So they said the initial reports of explosions are not true. They did not happen. So that seemed like a cover-up. For me, I concluded this would be This made it seem more likely to be the Gulf countries, the Bahrain and Kuwait, but Iran not reporting about them because they don't want to escalate things from Bahrain and Kuwait. They got the message, doesn't mean they want to attack Bahrain and Kuwait, but they're like, we don't want to have things escalate between us and our Gulf neighbors. So that's why they've asked the media to kind of reverse those claims. And then afterwards, the Iranian media reaffirmed the claims that no, there were attacks, and it said the following. So it seems they came up with a narrative or a report was approved or whatever happened. One outlet said a military headquarters on the outskirts of Bashir was hit by a projectile from, quote, American Zionist enemy, according to IRNA, citing the Deputy Political Security Governor Bashir. The deputy says the attack resulted in no casualties. That was... in the early days, but then afterwards, so then they were denied, sorry. Then afterwards, Tasneem said Iranian Navy site at Qanarak. So this is the report where they confirmed it. The one I read earlier was before they denied them afterwards. Tasneem said that the Iranian Navy site in Qanarak was subjected to airstrikes, but they don't know who. And then the Qanarak governor says Iran's Navy military area was targeted by enemy fighter jets in two stages this evening, responsible agencies, rescue efforts, blah, blah, blah, are underway. It's unclear who attacked. And there's one more report, I didn't save it, by another Iranian media saying a projectile struck one of the locations. So in terms of who it was, depends who you want to trust. Israeli broadcast Khan, for example, is blaming the Arab countries, but then you want to take that with a grain of salt, because obviously Israel would like to see the Gulf and Iran fight. So it's always take that with a grain of salt. Naya, which I think is Iranian, saying that they were launched from Kuwait. The missiles were launched from Kuwait. Axios says it was in the US. So we've got all these. Naya also said there was activity by Saudi drones off the coast. But these are drones. Doesn't mean there were strikes. So this is why I said it's confusing. You've got all these different conflicting reports. I haven't spoken to anyone to get any information. I've just been doing interviews. So I don't really have anything to share. So I can only speculate. And based on what we've seen in this war, my guess, I really don't know. I would guess Bahrain and Kuwait. Obviously, there's always a possibility that there were no strikes, but it definitely looks like there were strikes, all the locations and reports.
Speaker 1: The U.S. is blinking and backing down. So there is a report, you know, on Naya, the French outlet, that may be tied to Iranian sources, but according to a U.S. official, the failure of the U.S. military to launch new strikes against Iran on Thursday was the result of regional efforts to deescalate the situation. That explains Trump's comment last night that, oh, Iran's begging, begging to start negotiations again. Iran is not begging. It is the United States. I have checked with a variety of sources which know what the US military is doing. One of my friends sent me word that he was in contact with one of his active duty buddies who is who's deployed right now in the region was involved what's called a deconfliction cell so the deconfliction cell its job is to make sure that u.s aircraft don't get tied up with israeli aircraft that there's no friendly fire that you don't have friendly forces shooting at each other uh that uh that neutral states aren't attacked, et cetera. He's being redeployed home, okay? Now, if the United States was going to conduct major combat operations, you would want that deconfliction cell still in place. So that's being deactivated. They're coming home. And there is still no evidence that the CATs, the Crisis Action Teams, which were set up a week before the war started on the 28th, that those have been reactivated. So the United States, despite all this chess, you know, beating and tough talk, and we're bombing this, and we're bombing that, the U.S. is still on the path to withdraw and to disengage. Now, Iran retaliated for that last round of American strikes, and it had Muwaffak al-Salt, the air base, among others. And I think it caused some significant damage. And the United States, instead of retaliating, is like, okay, let's go quit while we're ahead. They're not really ahead, but that's how they'll betray it.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I'm aligned. I don't see this escalating into a full blown war or a death. I know that Trump said the MOU is dead. I see it as a struggle between the US and Iran on who controls the Strait of Hormuz. And I think Iran, we've discussed yesterday they'll retaliate by striking the same locations they did strike qatar yesterday which i'll ask you about now um limited strike more of a warning shot it seems like very limited air force base yeah so that's a new one well no it's because there were kc-135s that uh uh showed up there and uh um you know the united
Speaker 1: The Iranians said, hey, if you're going to allow your airfields to be used by the U.S., we're going to bomb them and hit them with missiles, which they did.
Speaker 0: Yeah, or also telling the Gulf countries as well could be a message like, hey, if you don't work with us to make sure the Americans either don't use your base, don't keep attacking us, you're going to be dragged into it as well. So we've got these escalation ladders. The way I feel it happens every time is the Americans strike Iran sometimes escalate, as we've seen now, and Iran would escalate until it gets to a level where, as we said yesterday, the Americans would be like, all right, the cost is too high now, and kind of take steps back again. And we're seeing that happen again. But it's not going to change anything. That's what I've been saying for days. There's nothing that's going to change. And let me talk about what the Iranians have done. So they've struck, as we said, the Mufwaka, Muwaffaq Salty Air Base in Jordan. They've also struck the Ali al-Salam Air Base in Kuwait and the Bahrain Fifth Fleet Headquarters again in Bahrain.
Speaker 1: And the Alisa Airfield in Bahrain as well.
Speaker 0: So, Sheikh Issa, is it the Sheikh Issa one you mean?
Speaker 1: Yeah, Sheikh Issa.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Yeah, so they struck that as well. So Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, the American attack, according to New York Times, was 14 times larger than the ones a couple of weeks ago. So we've seen those back and forth about, whatever, two weeks ago or so? Yeah, yeah.
Speaker 1: Like June? Oh, it's so big and massive. All I can tell you is someone who was involved with the targeting and the attacks in the first weeks of the war said this didn't even come close.
Speaker 0: Two weeks.
Speaker 1: Could it be that the United States is lying, exaggerating? Oh, no, that couldn't be. That never happened. That's my sarcasm for today, to this point.
Speaker 0: It doesn't come close to the 14 times larger, doesn't come close to the pre-war ferocity of the strikes, the intensity of the wartime strikes.
Speaker 1: Yeah, look, right now what's happening, you gotta look, it's important to understand that when you carry out military operations, there is an infrastructure behind it. And the, if you will, the bigger the operation, the bigger the infrastructure. So if we saw that infrastructure getting built up, being expanded, or being basically turned on, turned back on to what it was on June 14th, before the MOU was signed, Then I'd say, yeah, it looks like the United States is, and then I'd give it up. That's not what happened, just the opposite. So, and what happened in the Strait of Hormuz today? Any ships attempt to go through the Omani Channel? Nope.
Speaker 0: No.
Speaker 1: Ah, so who's in control? Who's in control of the Strait of Hormuz?
Speaker 0: Pretty hard to dispute, though. Iran.
Speaker 1: You can say, come on, you can say it.
Speaker 0: Iran has always been in control.
Speaker 1: And can the United States break Iran's control? The answer is no. It can't. They might be able to do some significant damage if they're willing to incur some significant losses. And the losses would not just be on aircraft in that field, but the bases from which they operate will be decimated. They hit 10 ballistic missiles on Muwaffa. You're not going to see any damage reports right now coming out, but I guarantee you those strikes inflicted some casualties and probably destroyed some aircraft.
Speaker 0: So some indications of the war restarting. Now, as I said, I'm not in the belief it will restart, but just to share some of the reports. So Iran is preparing for a potential resumption of war and taking precautions. So the biggest one is the 10 million barrels, according to tanker trackers, 10 million barrels overnight were shipped out from the Strait of Homs by Iran of crude oil and fuel oil overnight. So I'm guessing last night or the night before. I'm guessing it's the night before in anticipation of potential war. Also, the Iranian armed forces have entered the highest state of alert and have moved to wartime conditions. Scatter orders are now in place. I'm assuming scatter orders is scatter, don't be all in one place, in case there's strikes, it's not significant casualties.
Speaker 1: Also, there was reports that... Before we go on there, you know those 10 million barrels of oil? Let's say the minimum price they were probably sold at was $100 a barrel. That's a billion dollars right there. That's for 10, but I actually heard the number was $30 million, right?
Speaker 0: Maybe over more. So this is one night. So maybe more if you include other nights.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I've heard the total number is $30 million. So Iran just pocketed another $3 billion in one week. That's not a bad payday.
Speaker 0: When they sell it, so they would use it. They would chip it out, sorry, they would chip it out into the sea, and then as the orders come in, the money will start coming in. But it's like, you know, similar to before the war, there was that floating storage we talked about in the early days of the war.
Speaker 1: Well, I can imagine they put it out to sea. They're going to sell it. Who wants to buy it? Who needs it? And there are a lot of countries that need it. And so they'll be putting in, hey, we'll take it. And Iran will probably require payment up front. And it's going to be payment not in dollars, Chinese yuan.
Speaker 0: So then there are other indicators of possible resumption of war. There's an Axios report that says the following. The White House, this is a summary of it. The White House is bracing for a fight over the Strait of Hormuz that could last weeks or longer. Per Axios, the administration is preparing for a potentially prolonged exchange of fire with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz. US officials say the escalation could run days, weeks, or longer, hinging entirely on whether Iran keeps attacking commercial ships. It follows. two record strike nights, Iran's forward-based retaliation claim, and sirens across four countries.
Speaker 1: That's not Barack Ravid, is it, by chance?
Speaker 0: It's Axios. I don't know who the exact author is.
Speaker 1: It's Barack Ravid. I'd be willing to make a minor wager on that. Dinner at your best restaurant in Dubai. Fly me to Dubai. And if I lose, I'll buy you dinner in Dubai.
Speaker 0: Well, if I'm going to fly you every time you're going to make you get some Barack Ravid, you're going to be eating every night.
Speaker 1: I'm on a diet. I can't afford that.
Speaker 0: You told me that. And then another report came in on that front. Trump prepared to depart the White House. So this is more context on what happened that day on what led Trump to decide on these strikes. I don't know. This is the Wall Street Journal. Trump prepared to depart the White House for Turkey on Monday evening. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Pete Hexeth briefed him on reports that Iran had launched cruise missiles and one-way attack drones at commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Homs, the Omani side, striking three ships, including an LNG tanker. Trump questioned whether Iran remained committed to reaching a final agreement and, after consulting with his senior national security advisors, concluded that it did not. The meeting marked a turning point, leading Trump to abandon the interim ceasefire framework, authorize a new military strikes against Iranian targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, revoke Iran's oil selling license and renew economic pressure. While he has not ordered the US Navy blockade to be reinstated, officials said American warships remain in position should he decide to do so. So that's an update on where they decided to strike.
Speaker 1: Where are they remaining in position? About 200 miles offshore, right?
Speaker 0: Yeah, we talked about it yesterday. I can't remember where they are exactly.
Speaker 1: Gee, why is that? They're afraid. Okay? The United States said, now we got this under control. We can kick Iranian ass whenever we want. Fine, guys, go sell. Sell into that Strait of Hormuz. Show what you can do. They're not stupid. You know, they... To the credit of the Navy commanders, they're not stupid. You know, they know that that would be a potential death sentence. So, you know, they're not interested in that. And as far, okay, what's the evidence of the United States is making preparations for a multi-week, multi-month fight with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz? What's the evidence? Because they say, making preparations. It's not just that you got planes out there on the ground. That goes back to what I was saying about they're setting up the CAT teams. The CATs are being reorganized. They're being put into place. You're keeping your deconfliction cell out in the area. But the opposite is happening. Deconfliction cells being withdrawn. CATs have stood down. Sorry, but that makes sense.
Speaker 0: Mr. Yeah, the only indication Just disclaimer, as you know, I've been saying the war is over for months. I don't think that's going to restart. But just going to give you an indication of something showing not preparation for a full-blown war. Centrum did say there's X number of warships still in the region patrolling. We've mentioned the number yesterday. I can't remember what that was. But there's military aircraft that came from the Ben Gurion Airport to the Gulf. But more importantly, from Europe, some of it came to the Gulf. Now, I'm not saying it's enough for a full-blown war. Just kind of... drawing my best answer to your question.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's not even close. And again, the United States, there's always infrastructure that's put in place. I was involved several times, like when there's a report of a hijacking, okay, we would stand up a counterterrorism cell that you'd activate immediately a task force, you'd bring all people in, you start working behind the scenes, you then, you know, JSOC would be alerted for deployment to a possible, for possible military action. They'd be tasked, hey, this is the scenario, or like we've got an embassy being overrun, they'd be alerted. There's all sorts of moving parts behind the scene before you get to the actual part about a plane taking off and dropping a bomb. And what I'm telling you is the things that ought to be happening, that they were really intent on doing this for multiple weeks and keeping the pressure on, is not happening. That's the key. That's why you have me here.
Speaker 0: I did get a piece of news that just came in now. I'm going to read it in a second. It's very interesting. I just want to talk or give you one more fact on the Strait of Hormuz because you mentioned the number of 30 million barrels. So the 10 million barrels that I mentioned earlier was according to tanker trackers. And that was just overnight. That was in one night. There's another report here from Windward Intelligence. Estimates Iran exported around 60 million barrels in total over the previous three weeks. So over three weeks before now, whenever this report came out today or yesterday, they've exported 60 million barrels. You could do your math there at $106 billion.
Speaker 1: Yeah, $6 billion plus another billion, $7 billion. That's, I said, you know, hey, I think that'll feed the widows and orphans for a couple of days.
Speaker 0: And then another report by Homewoods before I read the news that just came in. Oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Homewoods is at a near standstill, that's today and yesterday, with only two tankers transiting the waterway in the early hours of today. So that's today. The two vessels are the U.S. sanctioned crude supertanker Berg-1, which had loaded oil at Iran's Karg Island, and the Marshall Islands-flagged chemical tanker Well Sail. IRGC Navy said, quote, foreigners have no place in the Strait of Homs administration, and the Americans should get out while they still can. This is not an order to close the Strait of Homs, just a warning to the Americans, nothing significant. There is a report here that the Omanis told the United Nations International Maritime Organization that it does not support imposing transit fees on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz, reaffirming that the right of transit passage through the straits used for international navigation is guaranteed under international law. So they made a statement contradicting the initial reports by Bloomberg that the Omanis are going to be charging a fee and contradicting what the Iranian requests are. That's the statement they've made to the UN's International Maritime Organization, Could be symbolic. You could look at the wording. Maybe it was vague on purpose. So I'm not saying it's a massive development because Oman is in the middle between the two sides, the U.S. and other countries and Iran and any country that supports its attempt to charge a fee. I'll read this one afterwards. It's something about France and Syria. So the news that just came in, this is an interesting one. It came in as I was speaking. Mediators believe the recent Iranian attacks on commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz were initiated by elements inside the Iranian government that oppose the MOU and want to undermine it, according to Axios, according to Axios. So I just want to make sure you know who's reporting it. And then the person that sent me this said, go ahead.
Speaker 1: That's just nonsense. I mean, look, the protocols say what the protocols say. Any ship that does not follow the Iranian PGSA protocol protocol will be denied passage and or the use of force against it. That's not some bureaucrat somewhere said, well, I'm going to undermine the MOU. I mean, hell, the United States has broken every part of the MOU. What MOU?
Speaker 0: So that's what Axios is saying. So that's something that one of my guests said as well, that they It was one of the energy traders on my show. That was a while ago. That was when the Iranians were attacking ships early on in the MOU days. And when the first time the Americans retaliated was strikes on Iran. So the first strikes on Iranian territory after the MOU was signed. So it was late June, I guess. And he was speculating. He's like, Mario, what I would speculate is that maybe these are, so it's not based on any intel or anything, that rogue elements within the IRGC struck the ships. And what he says could, sorry.
Speaker 1: That is utter nonsense because the MOU, paragraph five, gives Iran the authority to control what goes in and out. And Iran, in tandem with that MOU, established PGSA protocols. And the protocols are there in black and white. They're not written in heavy lawyer language. Very simple. You want to come through, fill out the application with the IRGC. It's at the PGSA website. provide the name of the captain, the name of the ship, the ownership of the ship, what your destination is, what's the cargo that's on board, and the sixth element is, what are the nationalities of your sailors? Period. And they said, any ship that tried to not comply with this will be denied passage or use of force. That's not rogue elements. They're following their damn procedures. Jesus. why do these people go off on these stupid tangents that when they don't even they haven't even taken time to read the documents would you like to uh let you know the the theory from earlier you want to hear the rest of it so probably go ahead get my blood pressure up so he was uh he was um
Speaker 0: So he also said that what he believes could happen is the Iranian government or the ones in charge might. So these rogue elements might have struck the ships and the Iranian government coordinated with the Americans to say, hey, look, these are the rogue elements that attack the ships. Can you strike them? And so instead of the Iranians striking those rogue elements, which would be a bad look, you said you want me to tell you the rest of it? Instead of the Iranian military targeting those rogue elements which is a bad look and it shows instability or lack of cohesion within iran they could have coordinated with the americans saying these are the rogue elements can you target them so that was the theory but that was three weeks ago not not now but that i remembered that when i read this access report that just came in did you hear what the crowds and mashad were chanting with the crowds and com were chanting and the joff chanting uh intercom
Speaker 1: Intercom. Farsi for revenge. Revenge. And they're carrying the red flag. These are rogue elements. That is the majority of the feeling. You now had an estimated 45 million people came out to mourn the passage of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 45 million. million you've never had anything like that in the recorded history of the world okay so everybody in the west is in denial wake up people this government now has a level of support that it did not have on the 27th of february yeah i agree with that point um and to give a a hold on
Speaker 0: That's just came in as well. Interesting. Oh, wow. So sorry, let me read it out. This is a pretty keep it going on a suspense. The Supreme Leader so Ayatollah Sayyid Mustafa Khamenei will hold a common commemorative prayer for his late father at the shrine of Fatima Massoumi income tomorrow after Maghreb and Isha prayers. according to Tasneem Hughes.
Speaker 1: Well, and you saw who, you saw who led the prayers in Mashad.
Speaker 0: No, I did not.
Speaker 1: His son, his other son. His oldest, oldest son, not just other son, the oldest son. In Iranian Islamic tradition, it is the duty of the oldest son, not the younger son, even if he is the supreme leader. It was the duty of the oldest son to lead the prayers, which he did.
Speaker 0: Messaging a few people on this, because that's pretty significant. Everyone was worried whether the Israelis would target him, remember? Everyone's still worried.
Speaker 1: Well, they go ahead and target him and kill him. Do you think that is going to make the Iranians less willing to pursue the war against the United States and Israel? If the Israelis are that stupid, they deserve what they get.
Speaker 0: Do you remember the other report where the Israelis were considering or planning to strike the Arachi in Ghalibaf, mainly Ghalibaf, during the Islamabad negotiations? that report came out i think by the new york times yeah but that was uh that that was five week old news i mean peppy and i reported on it back when it was when it was happening yeah so that's um that's pretty concerning iran's supreme leader has been buried okay so that's that's coming from testing news that he's this is much about coming they will show That's pretty significant. That is very significant. Because Israel is saying very clearly that there's a target on his back, they will assassinate him. It cuts himself said that there's a target on his back. And he said that recently, a few days before the funeral. And there's a lot of people calling for strikes during the funeral, because a lot of the leaders and commanders are congregating in one place. Obviously, it'll be just putting the humanitarian aspects of it, the international legal aspects of it just strategically stupid.
Speaker 1: Just a reminder of what a rogue state Israel is. Do you hear Iran threatening to kill Netanyahu, threatening to kill Katz, threatening to kill Ben-Gavir? I mean, if I was in Iran, I'd come up with good reasons to kill them, but you don't see Iran doing that. Iran is behaving like a civilized nation, not like a group of uncivilized savages.
Speaker 0: A lot of news in this. We've got the Axis report about rogue elements, which obviously you disagree with, that I disagree with as well. But right after, we've got the report, a much bigger report, that Mustafa Kamenei will be at the funeral prayers. Oh, talking about assassinations. Another report as well came in. That was just before we went live, 30 minutes before we went live. I'm sure this one you'd believe 100%. So this one, I'm confident you will believe. And you might have been the one to leak it. I'm pretty confident as well. So this is Israel warned Washington. So this is according to Wall Street Journal quoting Larry Johnson. There it is. All right. Okay. Israel warned Washington of a fresh Iranian plot to assassinate Trump. Israel shared new intelligence with the U.S. indicating Iran was considering a new plan to kill the president. Trump alluded it himself in Ankara. Quote, they want to take out the U.S. leader. Me, I'm on every list so far. I guess I've been a little lucky. but that maybe doesn't last very long. So that was a member, he'd made statements in NATO summit that he's on Iran's list to be killed. Iran has vowed for years, according to the report, to avenge the Soleimani killing, and Khamenei's funeral featured a banner reading, we will kill Trump. The intel lands amid the frayed Trump-Netanyahu relationship with the two speaking today and agreeing to continue coordination. I'm reading my team's summary of the article. The sourcing deserves its own scrutiny. Israel delivering this intelligence right now serves as a documented interest. Netanyahu wants the war continued. Trump wants out. And nothing re-anchors an American president then to the fight like a credible plot against his life. The threat itself is completely plausible. Tehran's revenge vow is public and the funeral banners were literal. But the timing of the warning mid-rupture, mid-diplomacy from the ally most invested in keeping the bombs falling is a detail worth remembering. The source of the report was Wall Street Journal. The Wall Street Journal didn't put that commentary. That's just my team. But the report just says that Israel says they've got proof that Iran is planning a new plan to kill Trump.
Speaker 1: So do you know where the original intelligence came from about these plots to kill Trump and to carry out Iranian assassinations inside the United States? Do you remember where they came from?
Speaker 0: No, I spoke to Kent about it. I don't remember the details. Go ahead.
Speaker 1: So where it came from was there was an Afghan, Afghani, who was moved, sent out of the country. You know, he'd been a criminal, had time in prison, gets out of prison, hauled his ass off. He winds up, I think it was in Singapore, and he gets with one of his buddies, and they do a major drug deal. Oh, my God. They get busted in Singapore with a bunch of heroin. Now, can you name me the top five countries in the world that you don't want to get caught trying to traffic heroin? One of those countries would be Singapore. I mean, hell, they lock people up for chewing gum. All right? So this guy, he gets, you know, he's jailed. And then within a week or two, he's released. Huh, how does that happen? Well, it turns out DEA went in and met with him and said, hey, we got a deal for you. You become a cooperator with the United States and we'll help you out. We'll get you off the hook. And the CIA got involved with it too. And so where does this guy next go? He goes to Iran. He gets a job working in one of the oil fields. He then, out of the blue, decides to call up and claims the Iranian intelligence service came to him and said, hey, we want to use you, a guy that's convicted of drugs and who's on the watch list in the United States. We want to use you to set up an assassination in the United States. So he gets on the phone. with a couple of his former cellmates and convinces them to try to carry out this attack that was then thwarted. Yeah, there's no chance that that was a staged, manipulated operation involving the CIA and the DEA with the FBI pitching in to create a narrative. See, Iran's trying to carry out assassinations in the United States. Sorry, but that has the smell of horse manure all over it. So, you know, and now here's, here's what's coming. No, no, no, this time we really got the solid information. They're gonna kill you. So what you need to do is go bomb the shit out of them. Now, there's no chance that Israel's trying to manipulate Trump. Oh my God, heaven forbid. No, they're always going to give him the straight skinny.
Speaker 0: Oh, Lord. Do you think there's a possibility, though, that Iran would consider such a plan as being discussed? No.
Speaker 1: Zero. Zero. They don't need to do that. Their goal is to drive the United States out of the Persian Gulf. They don't want to give the United States another reason to come back and attack them. The revenge they're talking about is against U.S. forces that are doing the bombings and making sure that they don't come back to inhabit any of the bases that they've had to vacate in Kuwait and Qatar and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and the UAE.
Speaker 0: So why do you think they wouldn't consider assassinating Trump, whether now or later, considering he killed their supreme leader and he killed Soleimani? Because, as I just said... And killed thousands of Iranians as well.
Speaker 1: They don't want to give the United States a reason to come back and attack them. Their goal is to drive the United States out of the Persian Gulf, which they're doing. They've done it in a de facto session, and they're continuing right now to thwart any chance of the United States to regain control of the Strait of Hormuz. No, they're not going to assassinate Trump. Now, is the United States going to try to stage something to make it appear that it's an Iranian assassination? Oh, I fully believe that. I mean, hell, we've already had three unexplained assassination attempts on Trump, or two legitimately. The guy at the correspondence dinner, you know, that was a joke. But the butler, Pennsylvania... The FBI's covered that up. And then the guy down in West Palm, where he, you know, he was directly tied to the Ukrainians. He said the Ukrainians tried to whack Trump because he wasn't providing the aid. But no, not Iran.
Speaker 0: So in other news as well, there's a... So just an update as well, two hours ago, Pakistan and Qatar, according to CNN, are working to bring the U.S. and Iran back to the negotiating table following the recent escalations. That's expected. You'll have mediators involved whenever things escalate to try to calm things down. But this report came in from CNN.
Speaker 1: Well, that's true. I mean, Pepe and I just reported on that. Now about... Let's see, what is it, 7.30? We did it four hours ago on transition protocol. You want to get the skinny, go to transition protocol. You can hear the full explanation. Yes, Pakistan's doing that. Asim Muneer is heavily involved. And the Qataris, they keep playing both sides of the fence, but they've got more at stake. They'd much rather come out of this having some economic hope left.
Speaker 0: So we've covered the Iranian attacks. We've covered the American attacks yesterday and this morning, or outside of last night, but this morning, Iranian time, last night for you, the retaliation from Iran. We'll talk about the sabotage of the railway. We've got more information on that. On the Kurd front, Iran deployed thousands of special forces to the border with Iraqi Kurdistan. an Iranian field commander on Iranian media said, if the Kurdish groups with backing of the US and Israel try to infringe on Iranian sovereignty, we will not only push them back, we will establish a security zone of several kilometers. So warning by the Iranian field commander on the border with Iraqi Kurdistan against Kurds rising up against Iran or attacking Iran, which to me just I just don't see that happening unless there's a full regime change operation being planned with a full-blown war back on the table, which, as you know, is not a position that I hold, at least not at the moment. We've talked about the reports of the war restarting. I've gone through the various reports of the possibility of the war restarting. Then we started talking about the Strait of Hormuz, how Iran pumped out a lot of oil in case the war restarts, 10 million barrels in one night. And then the statement by the Omanis to the United Nations. And then there is one more piece of news there, France. So as we know, Macron was in Syria. And this report came in from TF1, a French news outlet. France is considering Syria as a possible alternative route for Gulf oil to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Speaking to TF1, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrault said, diversified energy corridors are needed to ensure stable supplies, to global markets. Quote, among all the efforts we've made since the start of the crisis, there is the idea of preparing alternative routes so that we are not dependent on blockages here or there. So there was talks about a pipeline going through Syria. I'm guessing that would go to the Mediterranean. Let me see if I've got the maps of it to show it to the audience. I'll show it to you later, but this is an alternative for the oil to come out of Iran. Israel has been talking about a similar pipeline to go through Israel Haifa, they put their Netanyahu mentioned that in the early days of the war as an alternative to the Strait of Homs that was money many months ago. Okay, I'm sure an idea.
Speaker 1: Just stop there. Where's that oil going to come from?
Speaker 0: The ones out of Syria? I'm guessing out of Iraq. And out of Saudi Iraq, Saudi out of the Gulf, you'd have it coming out of a graph, the Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi. So Gulf oil, Syria.
Speaker 1: But that means they're going to have to build a pipeline, right?
Speaker 0: Yeah, exactly. Land-based pipelines. So this is what would be targets for Iran in case war breaks out.
Speaker 1: So how many years off is that pipeline?
Speaker 0: Yeah, it's a long-term plan. Nothing short-term. Yeah, absolutely.
Speaker 1: If they're counting on oil coming out of Syria, Syria puts out about, right now, about 100,000 barrels per day. That's nothing.
Speaker 0: No, no, so this pipeline is for oil to, so this pipeline is for the Gulf to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. This is a long-term plan. There's multiple pipelines being discussed. This is the long-term plan so the Gulf no longer are as dependent on the Strait of Hormuz. So obviously the UAE have Fujairah, Saudi have the east-west pipeline, and there's talks of a new pipeline to go through Syria, go through the Mediterranean. Israel wants a pipeline to go all the way down to Israel to Haifa, which there's nothing serious being built there, and the Gulf won't accept it anyway after this war. But these are all talks about alternatives being built to the Strait of Hormuz. Just thought I'd mention it because it's in line with Macron's visit to Syria and what makes Syria strategically important. Interesting. So CNN earlier today reported that Mustafa Khamenei will not attend the funeral of his father. So I just saw that, I wrote it down. That was this morning. So as we know, Tasnim now reports that no, he will be attending the funeral. The funeral, the prayer is tomorrow. So that's on that front, and we have the funeral. Okay, we've got the Israeli front, and we're done for today's news. Israeli Prime Minister, this is a quote of him. He had a call with Trump, no information on what was discussed. He complained about Turkey, and they talked about the latest strikes on Iran. We don't have any more context. Sky News, Zorabia, was talking to Mark Rutte, If a conflict were to happen between... Oh, this is interesting. So Sky News asks Mark Reuter, NATO Secretary General, if a conflict were to happen between Turkey and Israel and Syria, for example, does that trigger Article 5? So they're trying to see if NATO would trigger Article 5 if Turkey is attacked. Mark says, Erdogan is an extremely wise president. He has been there for years in his role, and he will avoid getting into a situation that gets out of hand. The Sky News Arabia is trying to get an answer from him. in a click-baity answer. What if Mr. Netanyahu makes a conflict unavoidable? And Mark says, let's not speculate on what could happen because in the end, let's not forget what happened on October 7th, 2023, the terrible attack by Hamas on Israel. It started not with Israel.
Speaker 1: What a stupid answer.
Speaker 0: We're talking about, all right, will Article 5 be triggered if anyone attacks Turkey? No, no, it's all October 7th. It's October 7th. What the fuck are you talking about? I know you want to avoid a question. Just say, let's not speculate on what could happen and leave it there. Because at the end of the day, let's not forget on October 7th.
Speaker 1: Come on. I can give you the answer to that question. And the answer would be no. NATO would not act. debate Article 5, because as far as they're concerned, the Turks are just a bunch of ragheads that aren't real Europeans. They're racist and demeaning. As far as NATO is concerned, it's a one-way street. They expect Turkey to give, but they ain't giving back a damn thing to the Turks, which is one of the reasons why Turkey has never been allowed into the EU. So hopefully Erdogan and his group realizes that they're getting played by those boys in Brussels.
Speaker 0: I don't know much about the whole Turkey-EU saga and the Cyprus saga as well. I've never looked into it, never done a deep dive. But do you think they will accept him into the EU? Because I know that Erdogan spoke about it a few days ago. Do you think it will happen?
Speaker 1: No. Turkey's been trying, what is it, 25 years to get in? And EU keeps coming up with excuses not to let him in.
Speaker 0: And it is, again, so it's not genuinely about Cyprus. How big of an issue is the Cyprus matter?
Speaker 1: Well, for Greece, it's a big issue. But again, they're still part of NATO. But, you know, the EU, who is, you know, makes up the bulk of NATO, the overwhelming majority, they want to use Turkey. You know, if they get into a fight with the Russians, they want Turkey to come to their aid. But they're not going to do it. They're going to lift a damn finger to help the Turks or to bring the Turks into the economic union. Not at all.
Speaker 0: So before I ask you the most, I want to go back to the initial story we talked about. So there's an I-24 story saying the current assessment is that Iran has no interest in drawing Israel into the war. According to two senior officials, Israel would only consider joining the campaign if Iran directly attacks Israel or if Washington formally requests Israeli participation. Neither has occurred so far. And then other reports of Netanyahu asking the U.S. not to deliver F-35s or to deliver downgraded versions. People in Israel are telling the U.S. to deliver downgraded versions of the F-35. Now, the question I want to ask you, let's go back to the original story of the stream of the chat today. The bombing today, I should have asked you that earlier. So it seems someone bombed Iran. Iran talked about being bombed, then denied those reports. Then Akshay said it wasn't the U.S. No indications it was the U.S. Iran did not name the U.S. Then Israel, no indications it's Israel. Iran did not name Israel. And then Israeli media and I think Al Arabiya maybe, I can't remember. Oh, Fatouk, I think, which is Turkish, if I'm not mistaken, started talking about Gulf countries having attacked Iran, which are the last ones possible. Do you think it's possible Bahrain and Kuwait attacked Iran as a way to try to deter? You don't think so?
Speaker 1: Oh, well, but it's possible. Look, it's possible. I can't say, you know, absolutely not, but it didn't work. And right now the United States admitted it hasn't carried out any further attacks. So, and so we'll sit there and watch what happens with the Strait of Hormuz tomorrow. You know, ships will start moving again through the Iranian channel. And if any ships dare to go through the Omani channel without permission, Iran will hit him.
Speaker 0: You mean the rogue elements from Iran would hit him?
Speaker 1: Yeah, the rogue elements. That's right.
Speaker 0: I have to be factual here, Larry.
Speaker 1: I appreciate that.
Speaker 0: Yeah, and nothing else on that front. Yes, it's impossible. You have no other guesses on who it could be. It could be a Gulf coalition. There's no one else it could be. It's not the Israelis, not the Americans. There's only none left other than the Gulf coalition.
Speaker 1: Bahrain and Kuwait trying to deter Iran attacks on their territory, which... Well, again, the thing I look at, though, is, again, to get from where they were to carry out strikes there, they would have had to have air refueling. Who did the air refueling if that happened?
Speaker 0: If it was the Israelis? Because Bahrain and Kuwait could do it. They could fire from their own territory.
Speaker 1: Well, if they fired missiles, yes. But I think actually if they fired missiles, Iran would have seen that and Iran would have hit them back.
Speaker 0: Yeah, unless Iran doesn't want to escalate. Maybe the attacks were limited and Iran doesn't want conflict.
Speaker 1: Iran does want, they will escalate. If you hit them, they're going to hit you. They're not absorbing blows. You hit them, they're going to hit you. So this, you know, I don't know what's going on with the media there, but...
Speaker 0: Maybe it's those rogue elements, Larry, that were striking. Yes.
Speaker 1: Yeah, there you go.
Speaker 0: All right, man. Thanks for the chat. Always a pleasure.
Speaker 1: All right, brother. Hey, sorry to keep you up so late, but, you know, it is what it is. All right. See you, man. I'm sure we'll be talking again tomorrow. Same bad time, same bad station.
Speaker 0: Thank you, Larry. See you, man.
Speaker 1: Okay. Bye-bye.
Speaker 0: Bye-bye. All right, guys, this is it for today. We had interviews for you to check out. We had Colonel McGregor was the last one I did. I also spoke with Anna Kasparian from the Young Turks. And we had for the first time on the show, the gentleman from the Belt and Road Institute. focus up we didn't talk about it with larry but we'll do it tomorrow to focus on the strike that was my first interview of the day to focus on the strike on the railway line in iran up north because that was a very symbolic and important strike and we did a deep dive with hussein askari on that strike that was my first interview of the day and then we did a recap there on the back and forth between iran and the us then i had an interview with anna kasparian she was back on the show to talk about the um with the latest developments and Israel's involvement in all this, Trump's visit to Turkey. Then we had an interview with Artem Owaini, but he had internet issues, so we rescheduled. Colonel McGregor is back on the show, on our weekly show. Then Brendan Wyker, who is a regular on the show, he filled in for me and did an interview with Karen Kwiatkowski. He'll be filling in on more interviews from traveling on unavailable. And then we just did Larry Johnson now. So that was today's coverage. I hope you enjoyed it. And I'll be live again today if there's any strikes, which I don't think there will be. I think this is it. So I'll probably see you tomorrow. Same time as always. Let me see who we've got tomorrow. Tomorrow. Oh, nice. Tom Luongo, Ben Hodges, Michael Oliver. We've got Alex Jones is back on the show. So I've got an incredible lineup for you tomorrow, guys. See you then. Bye-bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I see why Larry Johnson seized on the sequencing. Yesterday’s package answered attacks on shipping, but today strikes hit coastal sites from Bushehr to Chabahar with no trigger in the water, and CNN says the ceasefire has temporarily ceased. He revisits the MOU: both sides must avoid even the threat of force. He argues Washington is in breach, while sour-crude reserves run out in days and the April 7 tanker date looks like a tell. Oil crack spreads jumped, and the strait ran on the Iranian side as the Omani corridor sat empty.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 Trump says the MOU is dead, and the strikes rolled into a second day even though not a single ship was touched in the strait today That sequencing is what Larry Johnson seized on. Yesterday's package answered attacks on shipping. Today a string of coastal sites from Bushehr to Chabahar got hit with no trigger in the water, and CNN quotes officials saying the ceasefire has "at least temporarily ceased." So Larry went back to the document. Paragraph one commits both sides to refrain from even the THREAT of force. By his count Washington now stands in breach of every clause it signed, and Iran, his word, would be crazy to stay in without a tangible American reversal upfront. Underneath it, the clock. His math has the reserve's sour-crude cover running out within DAYS, and refilling with sweet crude fixes nothing, because the refineries that make diesel and jet fuel can't run on it. He flagged a date, too: the last pre-war tankers docked around April 7, the same week Washington suddenly wanted a ceasefire. Coincidence, he asks. Two tells to close the night. The crack spread jumped $10 in a single day, and an oil trader he knows texted that the spreads have stopped pretending the paper price is real. And every ship in the strait today ran the Iranian side. The Omani corridor sat empty. @NewSonof
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on escalation between the United States and Iran after the U.S. lifted a sanctions waiver tied to the MOU on Iranian oil and petrochemicals, and after earlier talk suggested the strikes might end. Despite Iran not striking ships in the Strait of Hormuz on the day in question, the U.S. launched strikes on Iran again at multiple coastal locations, described as similar to targets previously hit, including Bushir, Bandar Kangan, Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lenge, Abu Musa Island, Kashim and Kashim Island, Sirik, Jask, Konarak, and Shabahar. The targets were said to include radar sites, missile launcher positions for anti-ship missiles, and small attack boats.
Trump’s remarks were highlighted as framing the MOU as dead, while CNN reported the ceasefire had at least temporarily ceased, with U.S. officials warning the situation remained highly fluid and additional strikes were possible. Attention then shifted to whether Iran would retaliate and how it might do so.
One recurring theme was that U.S. actions were violating the MOU, while Iranian enforcement of Strait of Hormuz routes was said to be in harmony with it. The debate also included a view that Iran’s biggest leverage is the Strait of Hormuz and that continuing to control traffic there could inflict more pain than attacking U.S. bases. Another counterpoint emphasized that Iran would want to both hit U.S. capabilities and maintain Strait of Hormuz pressure.
Military buildup and movement were discussed using satellite imagery and reporting: U.S. Air Force aerial refueling tankers reportedly redeployed from Ben Gurion, including to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, with references to around 47 tankers stationed at airports as of the prior day and a total of 32 departing Ben Gurion in the cited time window. The argument was that these aircraft could facilitate attacks on Iran. Additional notes included U.S. warships patrolling across the Middle East per CENTCOM and reports about aircraft movements toward Turkish airspace and potential fueling for strikes.
The conversation covered disputed interpretations of what counts as retaliation and how far escalation should go. On the Iranian side, the statements discussed included that retaliatory behavior would continue and that the Strait of Hormuz was not closed. The Iranian officials’ messaging included major MOU violations by the U.S., threats of further strikes, reinstated oil sanctions, and attacks on southern Iran, alongside claims that the “era of bullying and extortion is over.” The participants also discussed Khomeini’s funeral attendance claims from Iranian sources and timing questions about burial and processions.
Trump’s comments were extensively quoted as describing repeated, escalating strike logic tied to attacks on ships, including claims about hitting Iran “very hard,” a 20-to-1 ratio, and statements that the U.S. might strike without a deal. The transcript also references threats about destroying bridges, power generation, and desalination plants, and speculation about seizing the Iranian island of Kharg. At the same time, it cited Trump saying he did not think a wider war in Iran would restart and that any actions would happen “very fast” rather than long term.
Another segment focused on oil market implications. The discussion linked crack spreads and futures to costs and shortages, including claims that refined product prices were rising quickly relative to spot indicators. It described an argument that refineries face much higher costs for oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz, with “crack spreads” spiking alongside futures. The participants debated explanations including demand destruction and oversupply from prior purchasing ahead of the war. They also discussed the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve refilling, contrasting “sweet crude” versus “sour crude,” and argued about U.S. refinery capabilities for converting sour crude into diesel and aviation fuel.
Iranian military actions and U.S. counter-strikes were described as including anti-ship missiles and drones targeting U.S. facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, along with claims of drone shootdowns. OSINT-style references were made to U.S. strikes targeting communications towers at an IRGC Navy base in Sirik for a third time, a site north of Bandar Abbas Airport described as having been an S-200 SAM and surveillance radar location, and fire detected at coordinates inside Bandar Abbas fishing port. Trump’s treatment of the “111 missiles” claim was also discussed.
In parallel, regional diplomatic and political developments were mentioned: a meeting between Trump and Al-Shara was said to include talk of unifying Syria and removing Syria from the state-sponsored terrorism list, with reports that removal had been actioned or requested. Al-Shara’s alleged commitments regarding Hezbollah were framed as a key indicator for future regional outcomes. Additional mention included Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warning regional countries not to allow their territory to be used for U.S. strikes on Iran, and Oman condemning attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait without naming Iran.
Overall, the discussion concludes with repeated emphasis that the pattern is back-and-forth without a formal peace deal, uncertainty about how far retaliation will go, and a belief that the biggest risk is miscalculation leading to disproportionate escalation. The transcript also states that if Iran’s retaliation begins, it would most likely target Bahrain and Kuwait, while noting other possible targets such as the Emirates.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: It's worse today than yesterday. Remember, yesterday we were talking about they've lifted the sanctions. The US lifted the sanctions waiver that was part of the MOU on Iranian oil and petrochemicals. And we were wondering, would there be more strikes? Would that be the end of it? And then they struck Iran and then they struck him again today, despite Iran not striking ships today. So I thought today Iran did not strike any ships of the Strait of Homs. I'm like, okay, maybe the US would delay their strikes. But they did not. They struck Iran. They struck multiple locations. Stephanie, you could show that map we were showing earlier with all the locations, but included Bushir, Bandar Kangan, Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lenge, Abu Musa Island, the one that contested with the UAE, Kashim, Sirik, Kashim Island, Jask, Konarak, and Shabahar. All of it, as you can see, is on the coastline. All of them are similar targets they've struck before. Some of them are new since the ceasefire, but all targets that include the radars, the missile launchers for the anti-ship missiles, the ships, the small attack boats, et cetera. So all that happened while Trump also said that the MOU, according to him, is dead. And there's a report by CNN that, According to an official, the ceasefire with Iran has, quote, has at least temporarily ceased, according to U.S. officials speaking to CNN. So that's where we're at now. The attacks have stopped. Now all eyes are obviously on Iran to see how they'll retaliate. What's your initial reaction?
Speaker 1: Well, you know, the United States has violated the MOU, and I think the Iranians are goddamn crazy if they continue with it. simple they need they need to pull out of the mou and they need to begin an unrestrained missile bombardment of israel and u.s bases why would they strike israel though israel is not part of these attacks because of lebanon oh yeah because of lebanon and how do you know israel isn't part of these attacks how do you know that the the planes are not coming out of israel you don't possibly
Speaker 0: No, the Iranians haven't mentioned Israel either. They've just been blaming the U.S. The U.S. is there for only one reason, Israel.
Speaker 1: You've got to destroy the military capability. And the U.S. has got planes based in Israel, last I checked.
Speaker 0: By the way, in terms of planes in Israel, some of them have gone from Ben Gurion, just reminded me. I saw a report earlier today. Three of these planes went from Ben Gurion to, I don't know if it's the one in Bahrain. I'll have to check it. But some of their planes were going. I've saved it because I know we talk about it a lot, the military movements. Let me see if I can find it. I'll find it. But there were some of them that will move to. So some aircraft moved from Europe to the region. So there's been some military maneuvering done to prepare for potentially more strikes. Let me see if I can find it. I'll find it and mention it to you. But yeah, some of it came from Ben Gurion to the Gulf and closer to Iran. I think Qatar or Bahrain and some of it came from Europe into the Persian Gulf as well. So just a bit of a military build up. There's a lot of equipment still there, but it's worth mentioning.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah, no, I mean, Iran's got to figure out, it keeps getting played. I know there are a number of the Iranians on the ground and Americans on the ground, for that matter, in Iran for the funeral. You know, they're reporting the people, the people are chanting for revenge. So the, and there is quite a bit of, anger directed at Arachi and Ghalibaf for being too soft, too conciliatory to the United States and the West. So I think this thing's going to heat up.
Speaker 0: So this is, I found the source by the way, this is the satellite imagery to show the aircraft that moved from the six or three days ago. another 17 so if you click on the one under it click on the one under it first no take out of the image go out of the image um and click on the tweet under it click on the tweet not the image just a tweet uh there you go click on the tweet there just say yep so click on that okay so this one shows nearly 15 usa force aerial refueling aircraft have left bangurian airport in Central Israel and been redeployed to other regional bases, including Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Around 47 tankers are still stationed at the airports as of yesterday. So that was a while ago, by the way. So that was about two weeks ago. And if you go back, so this tweet is from a couple of weeks ago. And this one is new. So the one I showed you before is two weeks ago. This is another 17 US Air Force refueling tankers have left Ben Gurion Airport. So this one is yesterday. It was published yesterday from three days ago. The satellite images from three days ago. And went to Qatar as well, bringing the total number of U.S. Air Force tankers that have departed the airport to 32. There's 32 that are still left in Bangur in April. I just thought I'd show you that.
Speaker 1: I'm not sure whether... Go ahead. Those aircraft are facilitating the attacks on Iran. They need to be destroyed. From Iran's standpoint...
Speaker 0: So Iran could also just another strategy by Iran is, you know, just wait it out, because their biggest leverage is the Strait of Hormuz. And that's the biggest pain point they have. So if they keep the all this is, in my view, Trump lashing out because of Iran, striking ships going through the Omani side, so they control the Strait of Hormuz. So all Iran needs to do is just keep doing that. That's probably their biggest lever. Obviously, they can escalate, they can keep attacking American bases. But I think the Strait of Hormuz causes more damage than the strikes on the American bases that are already heavily damaged. Or strike the Gulf, which I don't think we're at that stage yet.
Speaker 1: Why is it either or? Why are you presenting that as an either or? You can do both at the same time. Take out their tankers and maintain control of the Strait of Hormuz. You've got to inflict the pain on the United States so it knows, no, you can't keep bombing us at will. You can't keep doing this. There is no justification for this. Everything Iran has been doing in terms of enforcing compliance with the routes traveled in the Strait of Hormuz is totally in harmony with the MOU. They have not, Iran has not violated the MOU.
Speaker 0: So, I mean, you know. Do you think they'll strike more than Bahrain and Kuwait today? Or will it be the same as yesterday, just Bahrain and Kuwait again?
Speaker 1: Well, I don't know. You know, if they do like yesterday, they're going to limit it. If they were doing what I'm thinking, it expanded. They should hit Qatar. If they're at Al Udeid, take out Al Udeid. Destroy those planes. You destroy those planes, you destroy the ability of the United States to attack you. That's what they want to do. Stop the attacks. Destroy the planes.
Speaker 0: What do you make of Trump's comments that the MOU is dead and the CNN report that the ceasefire is temporarily? What did they say is temporarily seized has at least temporarily seized according to US official warning that the situation remains highly fluid and that additional strikes have not been ruled out. But they say further offensive strikes remain possible depending on how the situation develops. So I think the way I view it is the US is kind of made it clear that there would be the rules of engagement that whenever ships are attacked in the Strait of Hormuz on the Omani side, the U.S. will strike Iran.
Speaker 1: That's not in the MOU. That has nothing to do... In the MOU, the United States has no right to strike Iran for enforcing who gets to come through the Strait of Hormuz. Paragraph 5 says very clearly it is Iran's responsibility to decide who comes through the Strait of Hormuz. It doesn't say only on the Iranian side. It says the Strait of Hormuz, entire. And so the United States has no justification whatsoever to launch those attacks, even though they're claiming, oh, we do, we're intervening because Iran was enforcing the protocols that were placed in there. And we're the ones that signed off. We, the United States, are the ones that signed off on the memo giving Iran that power. And now we're trying to take it back.
Speaker 0: Yeah, so I'm saying these are the new rules. I'm not saying right or wrong or justified or not. So what the U.S. is conveying right now to the Iranians, they said it pretty explicitly, whenever you attack ships, actually J.D. Vance said it himself. So J.D. Vance says, we made a deal with Iran, so the deal is very simple. If they shoot at ships, we're going to knock the hell out of them. And it's that simple. And that's the very basic way it's going to work.
Speaker 1: Bullshit. That's a lie. They did not make that agreement. Show me in the MOU.
Speaker 0: I'm not saying it's a two-way agreement.
Speaker 1: He just said, with Iran, we made an agreement with Iran.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I know he's lying. I understand he's lying about the deal, that this is the deal. But I'm just saying that the message that they're sending across, worded in their own way, that he then says, if Iran tries to close the Strait of Homs down, there's going to be a response from the American military. It's that simple. That's the deal. I know there's no deal that says that. But I think this is what the Americans are saying to the Iranians right now and delivering on those words is that whenever the Iranians strike ships, the Americans strike Iran. That's been happening for the last few weeks, but now they're going to be striking them more extensively. The Iranian response has been through these entire weeks up to today has been striking back to the American bases in Bahrain, Kuwait. So these are the rules of engagement we have so far.
Speaker 1: Not sure if that's going to change. forgetting one thing yesterday iran also launched the ship anti-ship missiles okay i guarantee you some of those missiles hit the ships that's why trump reacted the way he did today but i don't know if it's a 111 missile he said missiles but it could have been 111 projectiles because the reports would mean a projectile doesn't fly that far drone a drone 200 miles, that's probably a maximum range for an Iranian drone, most of the drones. No, they were described as anti-ship missiles. I take them at their word.
Speaker 0: But Trump, this is Trump's word. It's hard to take Trump at his word. No, well, no.
Speaker 1: Iran last night announced that it launched anti-ship missiles at U.S. missiles. So it wasn't just Trump's words.
Speaker 0: No, they did. I think they did it maybe just after we went live. I think it was during our live. But back then, I think the report was two or six. So it was a much smaller attack from these OSINT sources.
Speaker 1: They didn't say how many they launched.
Speaker 0: No, not Iran. I'm talking about the OSINT sources that were spotted missile launchers. But there was just a handful. If it's 111 actual missiles yet, that will be pretty damn significant. But I just don't, I don't know if Iran, I don't know how Iran would retaliate today and whether they're going to do it any differently than yesterday. And my worry is that if the US keeps this rules of engagement, this new back and forth, Iran strikes a ship, the US attacks Iran. My worry is that when, because Iran's been relatively restrained so far, will we get to a stage where Iran would respond in a disproportionate way and things change? Because they haven't, been a more significant attack more extensive attacks i think 80 something targets according to the iranians in bahrain and kuwait um but it's still bahrain in kuwait it's not the uae it's not soundy it's not any energy infrastructure but it's also not any energy infrastructure on the iranian side the americans are striking the the same targets they've always struck they didn't strike anything in tehran or deep into iran They didn't strike, as far as I know, none of the big underground facilities and none of the energy infrastructure as well. So I think it's more aggressive attacks, but similar targets.
Speaker 1: We don't know what they actually did. I mean, I wouldn't be so sure that they didn't strike any energy sites. I don't know. All we know is the geographic locations that they've struck. That's all we know.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I think the Iranians were talking about what was struck. I think there was eight, nine casualties yesterday. There was a small power outage in one of the cities that was struck today. And similar to what we saw yesterday, we saw power outages, I think cyber attack in Bahrain and Kuwait. But there was a power outage in one of the cities that was struck, but nothing too significant. So it might have been just some damage during the strikes. But there's a strike near Bushir, but then the video showed it was an air defense battery by the looks of it. I've got some Trump statements for you. Let's just quickly read them. They just came out now. He's speaking on Air Force One. He says on Iran, I'm number one on their list before you. But if I go, you go. So perhaps someday you want to change professions. I don't know what he means. If he goes, doesn't they kill him? Then he says, we just hit them very hard. And I say we hit them 20 to 1. Every time they hit us, we're going to hit them 20. When they hit, we hit back much harder." Then he says, "'We've already won militarily. They called a little while ago. They want to make a deal so badly. I just don't know if they're worthy of making a deal. I don't know if they're going to honor the deal. That's the problem.'" Then a reporter asks him, "'If Iran wants a deal, why do you think they attacked commercial vessels?' Trump says, "'Because they're sort of crazy, to be honest with you. They're a little bit out of control, but they want to make a deal badly.'" um and he criticizes spain talks about removing uh he's asked if he's going to remove more troops from europe he said he hasn't made a decision and he says a lot of it depends on greenland and he says we're going to make a very good deal on greenland so he's back to greenland by the way there's something pretty okay this is a bad one and he gets asked did president ahmed al-shara make any commitments to you on helping with hezbollah in lebanon Trump's answer, which I really hope he's bullshitting. Yeah, he did. He's done a great job. He's unified Syria. I'm not going to say what he said, but yeah, he was great today. So I don't know.
Speaker 1: Oh, he's unified Syria. Trump's delusional. He's absolutely not in touch with reality. You know, this is, you know, the... he's starting to back up, you know, when he said, oh, they were calling begging for a deal. No, he's projecting. He's the one now begging for the deal to get the deal back on. Because what happened to the stock market today? What happened to the oil market today? Stock market crashed, oil market soared.
Speaker 0: Yeah, but oil is still below $75.
Speaker 1: Mario, stop talking about the paper. The paper is bullshit. Talk about The price of oil coming off a ship that pulls into port, that's $110, $120, and likely to go up.
Speaker 0: Because you talked about oil prices going up. I thought you were assuming the futures. Well, the oil futures are going up again.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's what I thought you were referring to. If they go up, you know that the oil on the ships is going up.
Speaker 0: Yeah, exactly. So the prices, they went up by 8.5% in the last five days, the oil futures. I haven't looked at the stock market yet. And then he has President Trump on Iran. This is all about nuclear weapons, not allowing Iran to have nuclear weapons. Everybody should like that, even you. And then he says, he says, talks about settling eight wars, talks about India, Pakistan, etc., And then the rest is US political stuff. I should have won a Nobel Peace Prize more than anybody that ever received it. Nobody settled wars. I settled eight of them. The timing of that statement is wild. And there's another he report on the just came in on the according to Iranian sources that a lot of people are in Karbala right now for the Ayatollah Khomeini funeral. The total number of attendees Iran and Iraq has exceeded 25 million, according to Iranian sources. On the Iranian side, the statements have been relatively nothing too significant. They're saying they're going to retaliate. Let me see if I've got the statements here. So Ghalibaf said, major MOU violations by the US, violating Iranian adjustments in the Straits, persistent threats of further strikes, reinstating oil sanctions, which we talked about yesterday, attacks on southern Iran, continued Zionist aggression on Lebanon. The era of bullying and extortion is over. It leads nowhere. We don't fold. But there's no reports of the Strait of Hormuz closed. Arachi made a statement as well. Let me see if I can find it. Let me see if I can find it. Okay, maybe it's an older statement. I'll see if he made a new statement. But yeah, the Strait of Hormuz is not closed. They haven't retaliated yet today. So nothing too significant on the Iranian front yet, unless we see it tonight.
Speaker 1: Yeah, well, they will retaliate tonight. I mean, I don't think there's any doubt about that. Yeah, obviously. And how far they go with it. Well, and let's recognize Kabbalah, that's over. All the activities there are done because it's, let's see what it's 7.30 now. So that's, is it 2 a.m. or 3 a.m.?
Speaker 0: 3 a.m. Yeah, it's 3 a.m. in the morning. So 2.30 in Karbala, 2.30.
Speaker 1: Yeah, so actually the body is en route to Mashhad. Correct?
Speaker 0: Yeah, I think so. This is the burial place now. So I guess he's in Mashhad. Yeah, Karbala's in Iraq, isn't it?
Speaker 1: Karbala's in Iraq.
Speaker 0: So Karbala, Iraq is over. Yeah, so Karbala's over and now it's heading back to the... Today's July 9th is tomorrow. Tomorrow will be the burial, the last day of the... of the funeral processions, if I'm not mistaken.
Speaker 1: And Mashhad is probably at least 1,000 miles, 2,000 miles from Karbala. It's quite a distance.
Speaker 0: Yeah, so nothing else on that front on the statements. So we've just read Trump's statements. We've read about the attack, which was more significant than yesterday. So it seems that the breathing obviously depends on what you believe the oil prices are. But for some reason, the Americans have escalated pretty significantly since yesterday. We haven't seen any similar escalation from Iran. We'll see what happens tonight. But Iran's strategy is controlling the Strait of Hormuz. That is the main, probably the biggest lever they have, as we've talked about already.
Speaker 1: If you notice today, there was no significant activity going through the Omani side. All the traffic is going through the Iranian side. But if you come back to the MOU, what part of the MOU is the United States not violating?
Speaker 0: I don't have an answer.
Speaker 1: They're violating every single part of the MOU now. They're supposed to lift the oil sanctions. They've reimposed the oil sanctions.
Speaker 0: Well, according to Trump, the MOU is dead. He said it himself.
Speaker 1: Yeah. So, you know, I think Iran should get the message and proceed accordingly because it's going to be the United States that's going to come begging for the deal because of the oil situation with the high sulfur, the lack of high sulfur oil and the strains that are going to be put on the supply of diesel and aviation fuel.
Speaker 0: But if there is these strains, which, by the way, I spoke to Philip again today, which we've spoken about, and today's, the spread, I forgot what it's called, I forgot what the term, but the spread of the oil price that shows the cost of it coming out of the Strait of Hormuz confirms his theory that the cost of the oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz is $110, $115. The crack spread confirms it because the spread went up by, the so the 8% that went up in the futures price, the same spike happened, the crack spread, which shows that this means that there is the the reason there's that big spreads because the cost of the oil is much higher than what is shown on the futures market. But if it's awesome question, I'll ask you the same question. If we are seeing that, you know, the oil oil is short, there is no oil glut, there's still an oil shortage, the price of oil on the market that is being purchased by those refineries being so high. There are the shortages in the U.S. By the way, they've refilled. So Philip told me today they tiny bit of refill of the strategic reserves. So they started refilling it, but a very small amount.
Speaker 1: Wait, wait, wait. Okay, stop. With what oil? With sweet crude or with sour crude? I guarantee you they're not refilling it with sour crude. That's where the shortage is. That's where the problem is. Forget, you know, they can be pumping all the sweet crude they want. The problem is the refineries in the United States are not set up to convert the sweet crude into diesel and aviation fuel. The only refineries that carry that task out are set up to handle sour crude. So you've got, you can't just start talking about it like it's coffee. You know, one bean's the same as another. I want to maybe roast it a little. No, we're talking high sulfur content oil, vice virtual no sulfur, low sulfur content. And that's where the problem is. They can refill the whole damn SPR with sweet crude. It doesn't solve anything. the sour crude problem the United States faces because it's always been a net importer of that and it does not produce that. And so it needs the imports. And in the past, no problem because they imported from Russia, Persian Gulf, Venezuela, Mexico, and Canada. Two of those are gone now, Persian Gulf and Russia. And Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela do not make up the difference.
Speaker 0: So that reinforces, so I don't know, I haven't checked it myself. Philip told me that there was a bit of a refill today, very small amount, so nothing too significant, but I haven't fact-checked it or had a chance to look it up. But just the point, but you've made, what you've said kind of links to my question as well. Considering all these factors, then what will be the, because these are all factors on why Trump would just need to get the hell out of the Persian Gulf and not restart war and avoid escalating. and something we've said over the last few weeks is these are the reasons Trump wants to walk away, moving the military away. So why would we see, what do you think happened to lead him to escalate in the last 48 hours?
Speaker 1: He doesn't remember what he decided from earlier. Apparently, he's completely forgotten about he got a four-week supply left. And we're not talking about sweet crude. We're talking about sour crude. The four weeks, that was what was... So, you know, it's going to bite him in the ass.
Speaker 0: I'm still trying to struggle what the thinking was that led to this decision.
Speaker 1: This is why I love you, man. You think that these people are thinking this through? You're thinking that they're sitting down, weighing cost and benefit and what's rational and what's irrational? No. I've seen too many people. I mean, one guy... I will not mention him by name. He was the head of a major social media company. Now, he got fired from it because he was a clown. You know, they exited him. But, you know, he put out, I was on an email chain, he put out today, he said, Ukraine is winning the war. Now, we're not talking somebody who's mentally retarded. We're not talking somebody who's had a stroke and lost his brain capability. We're talking somebody who's well-educated. A sophisticated guy was considered competent enough to be in charge of a Forbes 100 company, and yet he's completely divorced from reality. So don't assume just because these guys sit in the White House and they've got these positions of power that they're smart and they know what they're doing. They are not.
Speaker 0: Yeah, so that's on that front, Larry. We've got the J.D. Vance. I've read his statements. There's more we're going to talk about. Obviously, today was the last day of the NATO summit as well. We'll talk about that. We could show this to Larry, if you don't mind, Stephanie. Anything I find on military equipment moving around, I save it for our discussion. Unusual U.S. Air Force movement kicking off right now. Two KC-135s tankers left the U.K. escorting unidentified aircraft while two more tankers launched from Souda Bay, Crete, heading straight towards Turkish airspace. Fighters, bombers, or long-range strikes getting fueled up. We saw just some military built up before the strikes.
Speaker 1: Well, what time did Turkey? Good point. Because... Because those planes could have been sent to escort his Air Force One.
Speaker 0: Yeah, definitely. That could have been it for sure. Or could have been for the strikes because the two happened simultaneously. Him departing and the strikes kicking off. So we've got the... You could remove it, Stephanie. Channel 14 reported about the strikes being imminent. And they said, Israeli Channel 14 said the confrontation with Iran is not over. But all these are a bit outdated now because we've seen the strikes by the U.S. Everyone's talking about whether the U.S. will attack again today. Obviously, we've seen them attack. Well, Trump said they'll attack, and he ended up not tackling from that one. CENTCOM put out a statement saying more than 20 U.S. Navy warships are patrolling waters across the Middle East as CENTCOM forces continue promoting regional security and stability. Just reading the statement there from CENTCOM. Trump said, we will strike Iran hard tonight. Then he started making threats. So the threats have escalated as well. He said, in one day, we can destroy every bridge in Iran, their power generation stations, where they produce electricity. We will destroy them if necessary. They have water desalination plants. We will destroy them if necessary. Obviously, as most people know now from our audience, that the water desalination plants in Iran are not existential for them. They've got a lot of freshwater access. But obviously for the Gulf, it is pretty existential. So it's not the smartest threat to make. And then he says, we might seize the Iranian island of Kharg. So he's going back to the same threats we saw during the war, during the full-blown kinetic war. So we are seeing very similar threats being made again. Some people are speculating this.
Speaker 1: Let me remind you of the language of the MOU. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and their allies in the current war by signing this memorandum, declare the immediate permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other. The U.S. clearly has violated that now at least three times and, four times now, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. Trump right there violated boom, boom, boom, boom. So the United States has violated paragraph one, paragraph 10, paragraph 11, you know, they violated the whole, the entirety of this MOU. And I guess that's why Trump said it's dead because the United States has not The United States is not a country of its word. You supposedly give your word, you put your name to something, and you're supposed to fulfill it. Note that Iran did not initiate any attack on the United States. It was always in response to the U.S. attack. And moreover, its ally, Hezbollah, has not initiated attacks against Hezbollah.
Speaker 0: Against Israel. Another thing Trump said about the deal, just another statement on the war restarting. We may just do it without a deal. It's easier. These people lie and cheat. Hexeth also canceled his flight. He had a trip planned for Israel. He canceled that earlier today. And there is some statements about, so not many people are talking about this. There are statements where he's showing indications that he does not want war to restart. He says, first, there's one statement where he says, this is not a war. It's the denuclearization of Iran. But a more relevant statement would be this one. Quote, I don't think the war in Iran will start again. Some people are arguing the war's already restarted. But he says this. I don't think the war in Iran will start again. When they hit, we hit 10 times harder. We may hit them tonight. Anything that's going to happen is going to happen very fast. We are not looking for long term. And then he also makes the threat of putting up the blockade again. And he says... He starts attacking the Iranians, calls them liars, cheats, sick people. He says there's something wrong with the Iranians. So you're not the...
Speaker 1: So one of my friends sent me this tweet from X from some guy named Mario Nafal. Oh, Nafal. Yeah, Mario. And it was interviewing Philip Pilkington. And what you tweeted was a number that should never move like a stock, just jump $10 in a single day. And it may prove the oil market is broken.
Speaker 0: Yeah, that's from the interview today, the crack spread. So that's the crack spread, the one we're talking about earlier. So there is the crack spread, which is the price in which the refined oil is being sold at is very, very high. And there's two reasons why it's so high. It's a know record numbers i'm using the word loosely record but it's very high numbers so the two reasons why the refined oil the refined crude oil is being sold at such high numbers could be either price gouging by the refineries which philip doesn't think is the case or the cost that the refineries are paying is much higher than the spot price the price on the markets the dated crude the day was it dated crude i think it's called um so these are the two possibilities and then today what we saw is that we saw the the the spread spike, it spiked as soon as the futures prices spiked. Now, if it was price gouging, the price shouldn't spike because they do have maneuverability. So the price would not rise as quickly as the spot prices rises. But it did spike as well, which shows that their actual cost is really high. And based on his calculation, and this is not something that could be provable, I'm using his words here, but for him, he's extremely convinced. And based on his calculations, the price that the refineries are paying for oil right now coming out of the Strait of Hormuz is $110, $115 a barrel. But his argument is that price of oil has been manipulated since COVID days. And he talks about how it's the manipulation through algorithmic trading, etc. He said, Mario, if this is true, this would be the biggest manipulation campaign of any asset class in history. And it's something like speaking to him, it's like if you've seen the movie, The Big Short, actually wanted to say this to him. If you see the movie, the big show, it was literally speaking to Michael Burry, just a more emotional version of Michael Burry, where he's just so convinced with something. And he's a quadrupling down on it. He's really upset at how reality is not the prices are not catching up to what he sees as the reality Michael Burry. So he's a this asset, this, this, this, this asset should be collapsing in price, because the real estate market is crashing. But it's not happening. If anything, the asset class is going up. The CFDs or whatever instrument Michael Burry was talking about was going opposite to how it should be. That instrument is represented as an instrument of a derivative of the real estate market. So if the real estate market is dropping in price, that's in 08, then that derivative should also drop in price. But what's happening is the real estate prices are dropping, but the derivative is going up in value. And he's just losing his mind. It just doesn't make sense. there's something weird going on and talking to philip today in my interview earlier today it was kind of reminded me of that scene because he's like looking at the price of the the spot price and the oil futures it's like it just doesn't make sense it does not it does it does not have any relation to reality supply and demand two plus three equals fish that was that was a quote that's remember that quote for the movie no i didn't it's from the big as well
Speaker 1: Oh, yeah. The two young guys that were working with Brad Pitt. At one point, they got Brad Pitt on the phone. They said, this doesn't make sense. And one of the actors says, this is like two plus three equals fish. So all I will tell you is a friend of mine who's an oil trader sent me that clip. And with just saying, he, referring to Pilkington, is dead on. He went on to say, crack spreads are saying, fuck you to the paper market.
Speaker 0: Exactly. That's exactly what Pilkington was telling me. And the audience loves him. Whenever I have him on, the people really enjoy it because he's really good at explaining it as well. And he gets pretty emotional. So people enjoy it. But he's a smart guy. I had someone else reflect a similar sentiment as well, another economist as well.
Speaker 1: Now, there's a counterargument as well. Sorry, go ahead. Okay, what's the counterargument?
Speaker 0: No, so there's other economists that tell me the reason they believe spot prices are so low is because demand is demand destruction. So another economist I was speaking to a couple of days ago, he says the oil prices are low because the economy, the global economy is doing a lot worse than people realize. And there's demand destruction across the West and across China. There's also the explanation that a lot of these factories and refineries bought so much oil because there was that military buildup by the US before the war started. So they purchased so much oil for the production, for the refining, et cetera, that that led to an oversupply of oil. So they've got a lot of oil. They were prepared for this war. And then if you add that with the drop in demand globally, that's leading to the lower prices. So it's like another explanation that's being given.
Speaker 1: They're not mutually exclusive. Yeah, true. Because the reality is the United States imported X amount of the sour crude. And now it's importing X minus Y amount. And it has no way to make up that difference, that delta between X, what they need, and then what they've actually been able to import. And up until, well, until maybe this Saturday or Sunday or next Monday, they've been able to make up that gap by drawing on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. That goes away. Then all of a sudden, you're left with what you have on hand. That's when the problem starts. It's just like, you know, I was guilty of this. At the start of the war, I guess in my mind, I envisioned that when they shut the Strait of Hormuz, it's like you've got a running tap of water and you just turn it off and stop. But the reality was, even if you shut off the handle, the tap was still running in terms of there were oil tankers on the high seas that had not yet delivered their products. So people that were anticipating receiving a shipment in the next 40 days, they were good. They had what they needed for those 40 days. But when those last ships arrived, which was around April 8th, April 7th, that's when the United States sought to cease fire with Iran. Coincidence? I don't think so. And then, because it was announced on March 11th by Energy Secretary Wright that the U.S. was going to start drawing down the Strategic Petroleum Reserve at 1.4 million barrels per day. And it wasn't just drawing out generic oil, they're drawing out the sour oil in order to produce diesel and
Speaker 0: aviation field but so but this is why i i'm trying to figure out you know goes back to my question i asked earlier um that you chuckled at about you know them thinking logically because you've just talked about how the the the the issues with the oil reserves and how much how many weeks left is the reason that trump was so keen for a ceasefire and signed an mou that's so bad for the us So they know the importance of oil prices in the markets. They're always watching it, and that is dictating a lot of their decisions. Some. Some. Some. Not all.
Speaker 1: Don't assume that they all know, and don't assume that Trump knows that or remembers it. Now, does Secretary of Energy Wright know it? Probably. He should. And are there other people in the administration who don't? Perhaps. But they're not the ones making the decision. And Trump decided... appearing tough with Iran was more important than protecting the oil.
Speaker 0: If I had to guess, my belief right now, based on the limited information we have, and by the way, the Secretary of Energy is with Trump, and he was, I think, on the call when Trump decided on the strikes. If I had to guess, I think those strikes is Trump betting that Iran would not escalate into a full-blown war. that the MOU is not dead, and he's trying his best to have Iran concede on their control of the Strait of Homs, which we know is what the U.S. has been trying for weeks. And this is what the U.S. is doing. Now, obviously, it could backfire. So either one option could work, and the Iranians eventually concede for whatever reason. Another one is it just doesn't work. The Iranians don't concede. third option is that actually backfires and iran is like you know what screw this and we're going to fight and we're going to walk away from the mou so this is why i think this gamble is a very dangerous gamble but my guess would be trump is trump is just trying to get a concession on the strait of hummus as one of the main sticking points we've talked about it for weeks one of the main sticking points in the uh in the mou to try to get iran to concede on controlling the strata was by giving them the carrot which is hey we'll lift we'll remove a lot of the sanctions unfreeze the assets as per the report in access, I think, and the stick where we'll just keep bombing you if you try to control the Strait of Hormuz. I'm guessing that's their strategy.
Speaker 1: Not gonna work.
Speaker 0: It's a good one. I think it's a good one.
Speaker 1: Yeah, not gonna not gonna work. Iran's not gonna remain in control of the Strait. They continue. You know, I think what Iran's gonna do right now, it looks like that ships of friendly countries, countries that are aligned with Iran, they get to go through. No problem. And Iran continues to abide by the MOU of not charging tolls yet. But come day 60, the tolls are going to go into effect.
Speaker 0: By the way, there's in the Golestan province, there's reports of some people are saying it's a it's a it's it's strike in a railway. But more reports are coming out. Show the images, please. Stephanie, so this is a railway bridge along the Golgan Railway near the Aklan in Iran's Golestan Province. Let me see where that is on the map. But this, if you could show in the meantime, the destruction that's being shown, because that's infrastructure. So we're destroying a railway line. Now, initial people were reporting that this could be, this just came out. That could have been one of the strikes by the US, but that's, would be pretty surprising because that's all the way up north, as in, you know, in the Golestan region, literally near the border with Turkmenistan, which would be very bizarre because all reports were the strikes were down south. But according to the reports, this seems more like internal saboteurs that could be behind it. So there should be some sort of sabotage, internal sabotage of an Iranian railway line. Not sure whether this is by US or Israeli intelligence or some anti government forces. No idea who it is. One could just speculate. but this just came out now. This one person analyzing it, an Iranian source. The scale of the damage and the province targeted strongly suggests that the US was not behind this attack. It was most likely carried out by local anti-government partisans. So it just came out now, so I thought it's worth mentioning. Nothing too significant.
Speaker 1: Golestan is southwest of Tehran. About 50, 75 miles southwest of Tehran.
Speaker 0: okay okay i got it wrong then hold on i thought it was on the turkmenistan border no no it's not it's on the turkmenistan borders just up north northeast um unless i got mine wrong the golestan province uh province okay yeah yeah the city the city of golestan is south southwest of tehran okay now i'm talking about the uh the uh the uh province um Yeah, there's more people reporting about it. The railway attacked in Akhlaala, Golestan region, northeast, as part of the Insher-Burun-Gorgan railway line that was opened in late 2013, early 2014. It serves as a final link of the new Eurasian land bridge that begins in Xi'an, eastern China, and ends in Tehran region. The bridge was struck with three projectiles, so it could be a drone attack. Interesting. Anyway, so we've got all the statements. Now let's go to something a bit, so you could remove it, please, Stephanie. Let's go to something else. So there was the meeting between Trump and Al-Shara. So he says, he talks about unifying the country, et cetera. Are you going to remove Syria from the state-sponsored terrorism list? He said, I think I will, yeah, and then he actioned it. So Syria is being removed. Those report came in. There it is. They took it... But there's a report that he's already actioned, he's already requested for Syria to be removed from the state sponsor of terrorism list. So that just came out as well. And then obviously, he said on the plane that he hinted that al-Shara accepted to help him deal with Hezbollah. Now, it's a broad statement. Someone told me on my show that al-Shara made a statement a few weeks ago that he will help through humanitarian means in the Hezbollah issue. So I think this is going to be a really important indicator what al-Shara does. Because if we obviously see al-Sharaa involved in any way militarily with the Hezbollah situation, it's a catastrophe for Syria, catastrophe for Lebanon, catastrophe for the region. So fingers crossed that this is not going to happen. And for me, I'll just indicate that al-Sharaa is 100% proxy of the US and or Turkey, because otherwise it makes no sense from a pragmatic perspective for al-Sharaa to attack Hezbollah. It's just a suicide mission when he has Israel down south to deal with.
Speaker 1: Well, apart from... If they really are the puppet of Turkey, Turkey wants to help out Israel now?
Speaker 0: Exactly, exactly. It depends what deal. Maybe they're involved in this. Someone was speculating on the show a couple of days ago that the F-35 deal between the U.S. and Turkey could be one of the things that Turkey does for the U.S. in return is get al-Shara to attack Hezbollah. So it's like all this political chess happening. I really hope it's not the case.
Speaker 1: You know what? You've got a better chance of me giving you a golden unicorn than Turkey does have ever seen an F-35 jet on its tarmac that it owns. Ain't going to happen.
Speaker 0: Is that because how long it'll take him to produce it, as you said earlier, or because of the S-400s?
Speaker 1: Well, first, how long it takes to produce it. Second, Congress is going to block it.
Speaker 0: Yeah, true. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Which is, this is another illustration of why Israel wants to get embedded in the Department of Defense budget, you know, Section 224, 244, as opposed to being part of this procurement process where now Turkey, even though Trump wants to do something, Turkey can, the Congress can tell Turkey, hell no, you're not going to get that.
Speaker 0: So another piece of news here, Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned regional countries, don't allow your territory to be used by US for strikes on Iran. This is more like, so that's the statement, this is it. So they're telling the Gulf, don't allow your bases to be used to strike us. I'm guessing this is aimed at Qatar, the Emirates and Saudi, because obviously they keep striking Bahrain and Kuwait. We've got Israel's Iran's central military command, the Qatai Mal Anbiya, said any support for the US military's aggression against the sovereignty and territory of Iran is a legitimate target for the Iranian armed forces. So multiple threats against the Gulf. And Oman put out a statement condemning the attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait. So obviously condemning the Iranian attack on Bahrain and Kuwait. But they didn't name Iran. There's some OSINT links. If you show these, please, Stephanie, let me send it to you on what was struck yesterday. And probably tomorrow we'll see what was struck, more information on what was struck today. But if you can show the link I've just sent you now and I'll go through them. So the first link, it shows the U.S. military appears to have struck the same communications tower at Iran's IRGC Navy base in Sirik for the third time in a month. We've looked at this before. I've seen the image of this tower many times before. So this is based on... the NASA fire map that confirmed it. So this is the first one. This is the tower. You can open up the image. The second one, another site, and they put the coordinates just north of Bandar Abbas Airport appears to have been targeted in US strikes. Can you go to the second link? The 2025 GE satellite image shows the location was used as an S-200 SAM site, surface air missile site, and hosted multiple surveillance radar. And then the third one, NASA fire map confirms active fire detected at coordinates inside Bandar Abbas fishing port. This is where we saw those small boats that were struck. Now, the Iranian attack on the U.S. We know that they launched missiles and drones targeting key military facilities, U.S. military facilities in Salman Port in Bahrain and the Ali al-Salam Air Base in Kuwait. And they also claimed to shoot down an MQ-9 drone yesterday. They said they shot one today as well. Trump said that Another reason not to take the 111 missile claim. Seriously, you can remove the image, Stephanie. Not to take it seriously, Larry. He literally said 111 missiles shot by the Islamic Republic of Japan and the Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier. It's hard to take it seriously.
Speaker 1: Well, it's a reminder. He's speaking and not listening to what he's saying.
Speaker 0: Now, let me read out the statement. for you, Larry, they asked for a timeout. They wanted to go to the funeral. And I said, give it to them. And they started shooting missiles. I mean, it was a crazy thing. Now we did kill him. So I guess you have to look at it that way talking about Ayatollah Khamenei. They also asked that we not kill them during the funeral. They were worried with kill them during the funeral. I mean, if you can believe it, what a crazy idea. Do you ever think I'd be doing this for a living? Maybe, maybe Pete Hexeth, but this wasn't supposed to be for me. Pete loved this stuff from day one. Shit, I haven't seen this comment. But they said to us, quote, please don't kill us during the funeral. We didn't do anything. In fact, we made it safe for them, actually. And what happens? They attack three ships. So that's Trump's statement.
Speaker 1: Right. Yeah. You concur? With him? No. Hell no. You know, he's refusing to take responsibility for the fact that he ordered the breaking of the MOU. He's violated the MOU. I think the MOU is dead. I think Iran would be crazy to keep it in place without any tangible upfront sacrifice, commitment, reversal by the United States. And I don't see Trump doing that.
Speaker 0: And one last piece of news, Larry, he did say something that again, I'll take with a massive, massive grain of salt. He says, he says the BB agreed to withdraw Netanyahu agreed to withdraw from Lebanon quote, Well, I talked to BB about that he was asked about the Israeli military during it withdrawing from southern Lebanon. He says, Well, I talked to BB about that. Yeah, I think they're going to I think they want to I think it's a question. I don't think it's a question of me. I think it's a question if they want to. They're getting along with Lebanon. They're signing deals with Lebanon first time ever. Marco, talk about that, Marco Rubio, if you would. And then Marco just says nothing significant about it. But Trump does say that. So Rubio just says we have a deal with Lebanon, et cetera. But Trump is saying that he believes Israel wants to withdraw from Lebanon. But he says it loosely. He just throws words around all the time. But yeah, that's the last piece of news. The rest of it is all about Ukraine, which I'm sure we'll talk about tomorrow. There's a lot on that front. the nato summit a lot of talk on ukraine very significant developers if that striking of iran did not did not happen they'd be breaking major breaking news in the developments and the statements made about ukraine which uh i've got them all saved for our discussion tomorrow all right my friend all right larry good chat thank you way to plow the field amount of you have to wade through i'm going to get you a pair of hip waders yeah all right have a good night bye you too all right guys and this is it for today i'll probably be live again as soon as the iranian retaliation against the us begins most likely against bahrain and kuwait who knows it could be more significant they could target where i am the emirates they could target other regions You know, my stance on all this, and this is mainly based, I haven't had time to have any calls, or talk to anyone privately, but based on the discussions I've had with the guests today, and based what I know about where things stand, I was actually, you know, disclaimer, I was actually meant to go to the NATO summit, there's going to be interviews I was meant to do, there's going to be meetings I was going to do, you know, probably would have given me a better idea of what's happening behind the scenes. I would have would have been able to meet people within the Trump administration as well. Obviously, I couldn't do it because of these strikes. Otherwise, I wouldn't be able to do the live coverage for you guys. And I was contemplating to I could be traveling in the next couple of days for a meeting and an interview regarding these things. And I think you'll probably see that interview soon and you'll understand why it would have given me better insight. But from what I'm seeing right now, it does. I'm still not that worried. I do still believe the war is over. Obviously, we're going to see back and forth. This is pretty standard when there's no actual peace deal, when there's a loose MOU with many unresolved issues in there. I am worried this could escalate and unravel and get out of control. But from the indications we're seeing so far, I am in the belief that Trump does not want this to escalate, does not want to see full-blown war because he cannot afford it, the munition depletion, the price of oil. I could skyrocket again. Politically, it would be very damaging. Economically, it would be very damaging. My biggest worry, though, is he would miscalculate the Iranian response. And the Iranian response would no longer be proportional. I think it would be. I think they've been very calculated, very strategic in their responses. And I think they will continue being so. But I do worry that if this continues, it will get out of control. I did not expect things to get that bad. want to be surprised if this happens again it's impossible to know how negotiations go um but i definitely don't think we'll see a full-blown war again and i've been saying this as you guys know since the um threats by trump about uh wiping out a civilization and i stand by that that trump does want to walk away and hopefully we'll see things come and we'll go back to the negotiating table and then we can move on and focus on ukraine because on that front it's uh it's not looking good I hope you enjoyed the coverage, guys, and I'll see you again tonight if Iran starts their attack. Otherwise, I'll see you tomorrow. Bye-bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I think Iran’s endgame in the strait could be a Suez-style toll corridor it legally controls. After seeing ships drift south with transponders off and losing grip, Tehran coordinated to make the northern route preferred through waters between Iranian islands—so tolls and pilot fees would stand. Retaliation mirrors this: limited drones/ballistic launches to preserve leverage, with escalation tripwires still untouched.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷🇺🇸 Iran's endgame in the strait may be a Suez Canal of its own: a tolled corridor running through waters it legally controls Stefano Ritondale spent his Army intel career wargaming exactly this fight, and his read cuts through the noise of the last 48 hours. The ship attacks began, he believes, because Tehran watched vessels drift to the southern route with transponders off and realized it was losing its grip on the strait. So it set out to make the northern passage the preferred one: coordinate with Iran, sail safe. And because that corridor threads Iranian territorial waters between two Iranian islands, tolls and pilot fees there wouldn't even violate maritime law. Day 60 arrives, and the tollbooth is legitimate. The retaliation fits the same logic. Drones on the same near-abandoned bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, ballistic launches held to a trickle. His explanation: the production lines are wrecked, Iran can't rebuild missiles the way Russia does, so every launcher spared is leverage kept. His tripwires for real escalation: Prince Sultan in Saudi, Al Dhafra in the UAE, or a tanker sunk on the Omani route. All untouched so far. The watch item is Netanyahu landing at the White House to argue the MOU failed. If that pitch sticks, he warns, regime change returns to the menu, and no air campaign has ever delivered one. @artoriastech
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on recent U.S. strikes and Iran’s retaliatory actions involving Kuwait, Bahrain, and sometimes Jordan, with emphasis on whether the exchanges are primarily symbolic or meant to cause deeper operational and economic damage, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz.
Stefano explains that the strikes have expanded geographically and in scale compared with earlier rounds. He notes that the targets have gone beyond the usual focus near the straits (Oman–Iran point-to-point areas) and include areas such as Sistan-Balochistan and railway bridges in the north. He frames the strikes as a demonstration of President Trump’s “extreme frustration” with the lack of progress in negotiations and also highlights a mismatch in expectations between the U.S. and Iran about how expansive a U.S. response would be. Stefano also argues that both sides may be miscalculating intent and the willingness to tolerate military pain.
Mario and Stefano discuss the pattern of prior tit-for-tat exchanges as largely symbolic, while the newer packages are portrayed as more expensive and intended to impose greater pain. They stress that, despite Trump’s statements about escalation, the Iranian response seen so far has been limited and has not demonstrated the ability to meaningfully impact U.S. operations. Mario asks what would worry Iran from its perspective if Iran’s retaliation goes “outside the tit for tat” pattern. Stefano says the two major targets he would watch to gauge whether Iran wants to “cause a dent” are Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia and Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, noting that U.S. air force activity and launches from those areas appear to be ongoing, even if it remains unclear what would be targeted.
They discuss why attacks have kept returning to Kuwait and Bahrain and not shifted as clearly to Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Stefano suggests possible reasons include negotiation dynamics with Gulf states and the idea that Iran may calculate that strikes in Kuwait and Bahrain can still deliver a symbolic message regardless of direct military effectiveness. Mario adds that they lack full visibility into behind-the-scenes developments, including possible changes in regional support and informal arrangements.
A major theme is the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s strategic objective. Stefano says Iran has an interest in keeping the northern route “open” for non-Iranian ships, which he links to revenue/tolls and the longer-term goal of making the northern passage the preferred route. He argues that pushing maritime vessels through Iranian territorial waters could allow Iran to charge tolls and pilot fees without violating UNCLOS, and he describes a longer-term vision of the straits operating “like a Suez Canal, but for Iran.”
Mario presses whether this creates a “free pass” for the U.S. to keep escalating without equivalent consequences. Stefano instead points to U.S. sanctions waiver removals as potentially more consequential for Iran’s economy than the military campaign alone. He explains that the risk for Iran is tied to how much sanctions and business uncertainty constrain commerce, noting concerns that waivers could be “flipped on and off” and that businesses may not rush back to Iran because they fear sudden changes.
They also discuss the economic dimension of strikes, including an attack on the Shabahar maritime tower/asset, which Stefano says was aimed at Iran’s ability to control and manage the port and would harm long-term economic development if ports are damaged.
Regarding next steps, Mario asks what the U.S. would do tomorrow and in the next few days. Stefano predicts another round of strikes is likely, citing historical patterns where bombings occurred over consecutive days and threats preceded or followed negotiation steps. He also notes President Trump’s public comments while in Air Force One and points to continued U.S.-Israeli coordination. If U.S. strikes do not resume, Stefano says that could indicate a shift back toward diplomacy.
The conversation shifts to Iran’s specific retaliation limits and the possible reasons behind those choices, including the type of weaponry used. They discuss whether recent attacks involved drones, cruise missiles, or ballistic missiles. Stefano compares cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in terms of detection/interception challenges: cruise missiles are harder to detect due to low flight and maneuverability but are slower and can be intercepted with various air defense systems; ballistic missiles are faster and have fewer interception options, typically relying on systems like Patriot/THAAD rather than SHORAD.
A separate topic covers Syria and statements about Al-Sharaa. Stefano says he does not see Al-Sharaa deploying Syrian forces into Lebanon, and he frames Al-Sharaa’s actions in Syria as cutting the land route to Hezbollah from Iran, which he connects to the U.S. and regional objectives of limiting Iran and Hezbollah’s free operational reach. He also discusses broader U.S. preferences regarding Syria’s internal governance—seeking a central government while accounting for Kurdish and Druze sensitivities and preventing Syria from becoming “Libya”-like chaos. On allegations of massacres of Alawites, Stefano says the situation could involve both an intent to respond harshly and ground-level commanders taking actions even harsher than intended, emphasizing that investigations would be needed to determine facts.
Finally, Stefano and Mario discuss the possibility of regime change in Iran. Stefano says that airstrikes alone (especially targeting oil/energy infrastructure) are unlikely to collapse a regime, and that regime change would require more than an air campaign, such as a ground component or severe internal fracture. He suggests Iran may be conserving ballistic missile capabilities because of losses, and Mario notes a CNN report claiming a large percentage of missiles remain operational. Stefano counters that ballistic missile capabilities are not interchangeable in the way some systems might be, and he links the observed choice of drones versus ballistic launches to preserving remaining capability.
The transcript ends with Mario stating that attacks appeared to have ended at the time of the discussion, with no escalation to mass casualty events or massive destruction comparable to earlier wartime periods, but with uncertainty about what happens next, including whether additional U.S. strikes occur or Iran changes its response pattern.
Full Transcript
Speaker 2: Stefano, what do you make of what we're seeing, man? It's Kuwait Bahrain Jordan. This is for people that don't know. You're an intel officer. One of the things that you focused on in your career in the army, as you told me in one of our shows, and that's nothing classified, is looking at Iran's ballistic missile capabilities and program and what they would do in retaliation against American bases. it gave you, you know, what is it gamifying or game theory? War game, you know, like war game. War game, there it is. War gaming, war gaming, how Iran would attack American bases, how the US could retaliate. Like you've literally spent years war gaming exactly what we're seeing right now. So what do you make of this? What do you think? So let me, I've got specific questions for you because this is an area of expertise for you. What is Trump doing? What is his plan? Is it just to gain leverage? Is it still to gain leverage over the Strait of Homs so Iran doesn't charge a fee? And how is he doing it? He struck the same targets. KK, if you can show that map we showed earlier, which I know you know, the same targets as we've seen before, but just more aggressively. What's your analysis?
Speaker 0: There was some expansion of the strikes, right? We did see the two bridges. I was going to get to that.
Speaker 2: Not the bridges, the railway, you mean.
Speaker 0: Well, you know, the rail rail bridges. Well, yeah, the rail rail. Then we got the Sistan-Balochistan.
Speaker 2: The one near Turkmenistan.
Speaker 0: Yeah, Sistan-Balochistan. I mean, so, I mean, you know, when we've done these spaces, right, when you look, generally, it's much more limited to where the straits actually is, right, the point to point from Oman to Iran. That's kind of the area. Kashim Island, Surak, et cetera, Bandar al-Bas. Here you can see that it's been much more expansive and even some of that a little bit outside. So Sistan-Balochistan and then all the way in the north, those two, Railroad bridges as well. So those are type of the areas that we've seen the strikes occur. I think these strikes are much more significant in the sense that yesterday was the quantity of it. Today I think is there's a quantity in a geographical expansion. What I think President Trump is trying to do is show and demonstrate and highlight his extreme frustration with the lack of progress, not only in the negotiations, but I think even the strikes that he saw against those oil tanker vessels during his summit in Turkey when he went there, right? And I think Iran, as we talked about this yesterday, was, in their perspective, I think they felt like they were losing the psychological and as best as possible military control over the Straits of Hormuz, and they felt they had to do an attack. I think the Iranians did not suspect that the United States would have done such an expansive military response to it yesterday and today. And so I think these are the areas where both sides might have miscalculated the intent of one or the other to kind of conduct operations and the willingness to tolerate pain in military response. I would say we got to see how today looks like. And how- I would guess this is the, ahead finish finish well i was going to say what i'm very interested is is how extensive the iranian response is because you know before you know i was on your space you know we were doing your your space and co-hosting it and one of the things we were talking about when is when when the strikes were going on the iranian retaliation was it's kuwait bahrain it's like okay there's only you're continuously to bomb the same targets over and over and over and at this point those bases first kuwait we still see the U.S. operate out of Kuwait and Bahrain in absent was abandoned a long time ago, right? So how often are you gonna hit these targets that are not having an effect on the United States? And so the question is, what was interesting with this, you can make the argument that the tit for tat prior to this latest round, the U.S. and Iran was largely symbolic. Maybe some of the strikes the U.S. did had some degradation and specific targets were hit. maybe one air defense asset would destroy it, but nothing significant in that sense. But the targets today were much more expensive, which much more, more than just send a message, but at least to show a little bit of pain to the Iranians. The question then is the Iranian response. So right now it continues to indicate that it's somewhat symbolic, even the launches against the ships that President Trump alluded to, hey, if you're going to do this again, we're going to hit you harder. They haven't had an any, ability to impact anything. So I'm very interested in the Iranian response to see if this kind of fits the mold of just a symbolic retaliation, or if it's really designed to cause some pain and suffering to the US military.
Speaker 2: Jordan, the sirens in Jordan as well, but we've seen Jordan be attacked in the last couple of weeks. Yeah, no, I am. I agree. I think this is a wouldn't call it miscalculation. This is just probing on both sides. The MOU is just such a weak, vague MOU that while these negotiations go on, considering how aggressive the war was, the 40-day war was, of course, you'd expect back and forth in this MOU as both sides probe one another. Everyone would love to see a peace deal that is complete cessation of hostilities. But hey, you can't go from wiping out a civilization, is Trump going to go berserk and use nuclear weapons and send ground troops and everyone's like, oh, the world, the region's going to come to an end, to suddenly it's an MOU, no one's allowed to touch each other whatsoever. You can't go from one extreme to another. Of course, if I told you four months ago, whatever it is, in the midst of the war in March, I told you, hey, by, what are we now, July already, by July, we'll be at a relative, we'll be in a situation where They might attack each other every few days. They'll only target these regions. And that will be it. Only Kuwait, Bahrain, and sometimes Jordan will be attacked. And the US will only attack these areas on the coast with that much of ordnance, much less than during the peak of the war, during the war. You'd be like, no way. That's too good to be true. So I just want to remind people that where we were and where we are and that things as they might seem pretty crazy in the middle of it, just seeing those sirens go off, seeing the fires go on in Iran. But we were just in a war that people were worried will become an Iraq 2.0.
Speaker 0: If I can, my counter to that comparison isn't where we were two to three months ago. The comparison is where we were in the sense I don't want to, I'm not trying to make the straight, but the sense of where we were two to three to 20 years ago, right? Pick your time. Fine. The, the, the issue we're running into right now, Mario, is that right now, all indications, again, there could be an agreement and peace and stability is reconstituted, but both sides feel very, very, very happy to use military might the United States against Iran, Israel against Iran, Iran against Israel, against the region.
Speaker 2: It's almost like this is the new normal.
Speaker 0: And this is all happening within the backdrop of negotiations. What was interesting, for example, if you look at the history of the Middle East, let's say before 2003, during the Gulf War, for the most part, even at the conclusion of the Gulf War, there were isolated instances of military operations, very limited, until 2003, that time period after Saddam Hussein. But for the most part, it was The agreements were in place. The no-fly zones were respected. Yes, there were some military. U.S. conducted some limited strikes against Iraq. You can count the amount of times the United States did that. What is very interesting now, though, with Iran is this is the new normal. that the United States feels very confident and very happy, and in many aspects, you might love it or hate it, to conduct strikes against Iran. And Iran is very happy to conduct retaliatory strikes against certain countries in the Middle East.
Speaker 2: But for how long? For how long is that sustainable? I don't think it's going to be normal. This is just for negotiations. But eventually, they'll have to... Trump, I don't know. I just don't think that's Trump's business plan.
Speaker 0: Let's look at 91.
Speaker 2: And Iran, they need their economy to flourish again. They need to get out of this mess, the economic mess. Both of them have enough incentives to sort this mess out. They're only disagreeing on the terms, two main terms, Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz. And I think the bigger one is the Strait of Hormuz. I think this is just a disagreement rather than a new normal.
Speaker 0: I mean, I wouldn't disagree with that. I think that's a good point. But what's very concerning in the aspect is generally when you have negotiations and a ceasefire in place, I mean, even specifically a ceasefire, right? I mean, how often have you and I, since 2023 or other times, even let's say before 2023, historically when you look at Israel-Gaza or even Israel-Lebanon, right, fighting would happen. And then the moment the ceasefire was agreed upon, that like, we would always see the last sables before the ceasefires came into effect. And then it was gun silence.
Speaker 2: Right? Not with this show. Not with this show on Gaza. Gun silence for a few days.
Speaker 0: 2006. You know, even when we're... Again, I think 2023, there was a separate...
Speaker 2: But what you mean, yeah. What you mean is genuine. Just to make your point. What you mean is genuine. When there's a ceasefire, you fucking ceasefire. This is not how ceasefires work. This is not a ceasefire. Can I ask you... Sorry, quick question.
Speaker 0: That's what we have to acknowledge in a new reality.
Speaker 2: There's a bit of a lag. So first, there's an all clear given in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan. Qatar, I don't know if it was attacked. There were sirens, but it has no proof that it was actually attacked. Sirens did go off.
Speaker 0: No, I think it was the missiles were launched. The missiles were launched, so Qatar is going to activate it, realize it's not the target, and then they're going to pull it out.
Speaker 2: Exactly. Exactly. There you go. Yeah, you've explained it. So in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, we're targeted. Kuwait, Bahrain, 100%. Jordan, most likely. Now, the question to you is... What would you, and we'll go back to the other point of how things would look like in the new reality if it's that, but what would worry you right now from the Iranian side first? What would Iran need to do in this retaliation and this response to be like, fuck, now I'm concerned. This is outside the tit for tat that we've been seeing in the last few weeks and months.
Speaker 0: You know, what I would go back to, what's interesting to me is, how limited Iranians tit for tats are. You know, I mean, at this point, I would say, I guess the two targets I would look at to see, okay, Iran really wants to cause a dent would be number one, Prince Sultan Air Base in the middle of Saudi Arabia, and number two, Al Dhafra Air Base in UAE. those would be the two is it possible is it possible that those two countries are not allowing their airspace or bases to be used by the americans i mean i mean technically the strikes that are happening are it looks like is being mostly led by the navy however comma aldafa air base and prince hometown air base we see regularly u.s air force you know tankers etc launch from those areas and operate you know willy-nilly we even seen cases of american air assets out of israel fly over into Saudi airspace.
Speaker 2: So, I mean, it's like, again, we don't know. Do you know if their airspace is being used, the Emirates and the Saudis right now? We don't know.
Speaker 0: Well, we do see U.S. Air Force activity over those countries. Now, are those Air Force assets being specifically used to target Iran? I mean, we won't know. That's behind closed doors and classified settings. We won't know. But at least what we look at, you can see these flight radars and you can see the tankers. and the drones are still launching from these areas. And so it's very interesting to get to your question, why is it that it's always Kuwait, Bahrain, Kuwait, Bahrain? The only thing that to me makes sense is that Iran, you can make the argument that maybe from the, oh, they don't want to, they're having advances in negotiations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, you know, that's what. The other one is I think that's from the, there's another argument to be made also is that from the Iranian perspective, especially considering how the United States has conducted much more expansive and extensive strikes in the last 48 hours that the Iranians either don't have the desire or maybe I wouldn't even say the capability, the desire to match that. And that for them conducting strikes against Kuwait and Bahrain gives them the wind that they need from a symbolic nature, regardless of its actual effectiveness. I'm just very surprised that even after two days of these expansive strikes, we have not seen strikes against UAE and we have not seen strikes against Saudi Arabia. I think that's what I would be looking at.
Speaker 2: And no Qatar.
Speaker 0: I mean, Qatar is Qatar, but yeah.
Speaker 2: So I do have, yeah, but one thing we don't know is the discussions that I had behind the scenes. There was reports of aircraft being donated by Saudi and UAE, but this is only the things we know about. I'm sure there's a lot of deals being done in the background, potentially funds, some reports of funds being unfrozen. There's things happening in the background that is leading to this. The UAE doesn't want its citizens to get the alarm again because it needs that sense of security. Saudi, to an extent, maybe not as much. But I think... we don't know what we don't know. And what we don't know is playing a big role in what's happening from from these strikes. I think this is something to take into consideration. But I think your point of other than striking Saudi and the UAE, fucking I'm burnt out, man. I don't know about you. But this, this was fucking draining. But other than striking the UAE and Saudis, anything else? sinking a vessel? A commercial vessel, not a warship.
Speaker 0: Yeah, that's all bets are off. No, no, no.
Speaker 2: Not all bets are off. A commercial vessel, not a warship, not a US Navy ship. Yeah.
Speaker 0: You know, if a commercial vessel is hit to the degree that it's sunk in the Southern Straits, yeah, I think that would be a very concerning aspect from the United States. And I think that would be a message from Iran that they're trying to reestablish control of the Strait of Hormuz. And to your point, that's the main sticking point for the negotiation. Iran sinking in a civilian vessel, specifically one that was using the southern straits, the southern portion of the Straits of Hormuz, maybe specifically it was an oil tanker, I think would force a very, it would indicate that Iran is trying to find that specific message, use a target, military target to send a message that I think would require President Trump to be even much more forceful than what we've seen so far.
Speaker 2: I just think Iran is being very strategic here. I'm thankful for that because it's very easy for them to just go gloves off and just fuck everything up and force Trump and fire three, four, five, 600 missiles and drones and to swarm a Navy ship or cause significant damage in the Gulf and then force Trump to have to retaliate. And then we get into the escalation trap. Another question I have for you. Why do you think Iran is not closing the Strait of Hormuz? And I don't mean... Closing the Omani side. I mean, closing the Iranian side for non-Iranian ships. Because right now, ships that are heading anywhere in the world can still go through the Iranian side.
Speaker 0: I think it's because they want the toll. I think they want the toll.
Speaker 2: No, they're not charging a toll. What do you mean? No, there's no toll right now. The toll, according to the MOU, the toll is after the MOU. So that's an interesting one.
Speaker 0: That is an excellent point. It could be because what they're trying to do is make the northern side the preferred side. Right.
Speaker 2: So so by design, that's strategic.
Speaker 0: Right. So if you if you say, look, everything is peaceful and hunky dory and great in the north and the south is war, terrible, atrocious. You inherently going to push maritime vessels to take the northern route. Now you've established a new normal. And I think that's why this all started, because I feel like the IRGC was realizing they were not achieving that. that even in maybe with AIS transponders turned off, with these convoys going on, in the shadows, in the background, more vessels were taking the southern route than the northern route, and Iran realized we have to do something to change that calculus. So you can even see the scenario where within the construct of these military operations with Iran saying, look, the northern route is safe, as long as you coordinate with us, you have free passage, you have good passage, you're safe. The United States has not reinstituted the naval blockade.
Speaker 2: But even the naval blockade, the American naval blockade, they were letting a lot of ships through that came out later on to keep oil prices low. I don't think the U.S. can afford a naval blockade just because he doesn't want energy prices up.
Speaker 0: I mean, I think, well, there's a lot of reporting. Look, I think this is...
Speaker 2: But we don't know about the state of the... We also don't know the state of the Iranian economy, so it's really tough to tell.
Speaker 0: I mean, I think what I would say is I think that the fact that the Iranians have the northern... open is it is their strategic objective right that is their end goal that is what they want if they can i think there's this aspect about the tolls which is one aspect but but from a strategic perspective is if they can make the northern route the preferred route they want and because by design the northern route the route they take is specifically if they go through question island between the two iranian islands you know my understanding is that would be considered iranian territorial waters If you force vessels to go through Iranian territorial waters, in that aspect, you can charge tolls. That's not illegal. That doesn't even violate UNCLOS, right? That doesn't violate. And if you're using somebody's territorial waters, you can charge whatever you see. And you can even charge pilot fees, right? Where you require pilots to get on the, to the merchant vessels to guide the ships to go through, right? And so the long-term goal can even be like, That would be Iran's desire. You're basically creating almost in a way, you're making the Straits of Hormuz a Suez Canal, but for Iran. And that can be one of the long-term objectives of Iran to do it.
Speaker 2: Ghalibaf just posted, America still hasn't learned that bullying and breaking promises are no longer cost-free. Let me put it plainly. If you strike, you'll get hit. Don't frail around pointlessly or you'll sink even deeper. The Strait of Hormuz will only open with Iranian arrangements, not American threats. So just number one, if you strike, you'll get hit. It's not cost free. Well, Gullibuff, this is cost free. The retaliation is very little. There's not much cost there on the Americans. But okay, so I have a question and a statement. So statement first is I think Iran is doing a good job, like saying, I'm assuming the American damage is not that significant. The Iranians are like, cool, we're happy to go through this damage, keep things as they are, but make sure we control the Strait of Homs and show the US and the world That whatever the Americans do, we will not give up on the Strait of Homs. And we'll just focus on that rather than strike the UAE, strike Saudi, strike Qatar and jeopardize deals we're doing with them. Let's just do the symbolic strikes on Kuwait and Bahrain, potentially Jordan, but I don't think it was struck. Let's strike Kuwait and Bahrain. Let the Americans strike us. We can sustain that damage unless they don't strike ABC, energy infrastructure being an example, or that it go to Tehran. They don't strike certain things that the Iranians have a red line on. maybe that's been communicated behind the scenes through mediators. So this is Iran sending the message that we will, our job is just to be patient and keep our control of the Strait of Hormuz. The question I have for you, though, is that, so this is where it makes sense for me. But then the question is, isn't this a kind of a free pass that the Iranians are giving the Americans saying, hey, you can keep striking us, you can keep escalating your strikes, and you will not face consequences from it?
Speaker 0: I mean, I think, I think, That's a risk that Iran has where they're normalizing this. But number two, I think that's why the United States, I think the U.S. understands there's only so much a military campaign can do against Iran outside of boots on the ground, right, and regime change operations, or as you identify targeting energy infrastructures, et cetera. But that's why yesterday, to me, which was much more significant, was the waivers were removed. Because that goes to the heart of the problem for the Iranian economy, right?
Speaker 2: But they could put it back in a week, as I said yesterday. Right. Just being removed is one thing. Removed and then be removed three months later is another.
Speaker 0: Well, right now, we don't know how long it's going to be removed for. But the second piece, right, it goes back to this issue of the business relationship. And this is like, look, if you're a country or a business or a company who's willing to violate U.S. sanctions and you don't care about that, then you're going to do it with or without sanctions. That doesn't change. But don't underestimate, there's a lot of businesses who would like to do business with Iran, but aren't, or a lot of countries who would like to do business with Iran, but aren't because of these sanctions. And now they see this, that caused a problem. And this is something that even the Iranians have said. Look, when the JCPOA was signed and agreed upon, and the waiver and sanctions were removed, a lot of businesses, businesses didn't rush to Iran. One, because the Iranian situation inside of Iran was problematic in and of itself from an economic perspective, a corruption perspective, all the problems inside of Iran. But you can make the argument that the main reason why they didn't rush is because it's like, well, what if something happens and the U.S. changes their mind? Now we're exposed. And that's the problem. This is literally what the Iranians continuously say, even about sanction waivers, that it's not enough. It's literally not enough for the Iranians because they've been here before. And when you do this, you're telling to the international community, you're backing up Iranians' concerns, which is, yeah, we can flip. It's like a switch. We can flip it on and off whenever we want. Businesses aren't going to look at that and say, oh, this is prime, because they can't flip on and off easily. So this is where I think it's more concerning for Iran. I do believe from a military campaign, they have a tolerance that they can accept. And obviously the strikes that are going on are not designed necessarily to challenge that. Maybe we have to be analyzing this from a military perspective, really at the tactical level, really right now in the aspects that we're seeing. But that's why I highlighted the oil aspect of it. And I would be very interested to see what was struck in Chabahar, because Chabahar is a very important Iranian port also from an economic perspective. It's a very important port. Because everybody, we talk about Karg Island. Shabahar Port as well is significantly important for the Iranian economy and their military.
Speaker 2: Did you see the footage coming out of Shabahar? Obviously, Trump posted that photo, which is fake. Correct.
Speaker 0: But they struck that maritime center, that tower. There was a maritime formation.
Speaker 2: The tower, yeah, yeah. The tower was struck. Let me, if you can show this on screen, KK. But those are very... It wasn't completely destroyed, but it was damaged. If you can show this on screen, KK, that was one of the things, the towers they struck, which shows that the Americans, similar to what we've said, they are striking Iran's ability to control the Strait of Homs.
Speaker 0: That's been, it seems that this has always been their objective. Yes, I don't disagree, but it's also, I do believe there was also an economic message there as well. Which, because again, this is a very important asset for the Iranian economy. I do believe as well that this was a strike also done to really hurt the Iranian economy and their ability to manage the port. So, like, let's say, you know, down the road, this is going to be a very, this is going to be, this could be a very significant problem for Iran's long-term economic development if their ports are significantly damaged because of this war.
Speaker 2: All right, so next question, you could remove this, KK. Our next question is the Americans. What would you expect Trump to do tomorrow and the next few days? Continue the same operation of strikes or this is the end of it? He did say, let me just tell you what he said. There was a statement coming out of CNN. A U.S. official told CNN that the ceasefire with Iran is, quote, at least temporarily seized. I just consider that just fluff. Like, okay, temporarily seized. Well, they're striking each other. It doesn't mean anything, but that's getting a lot of attention. Warning that the situation remains highly fluid, okay, and that additional strikes have not been ruled out. which to me indicates that they have not been planned either. So there's no plans for additional strikes. Yesterday, they were saying additional strikes are going to happen. Now they're saying they haven't been ruled out. So they've been keeping the door open and saying to Iran, hey, it depends on what you do. The latest strikes targeted missile drones and other capabilities that could threaten U.S. assets, blah, blah, blah. Further offensive strikes remain possible depending on how the situation develops. Again, Iran, how you respond, what you do in the Strait of Homs will determine how we respond. So assuming Iran doesn't strike any ships in the Strait of Homs, which I don't think, I think they will strike any ships going through Oman. Again, we'll see the same thing play out. But until then, do you think the US will continue these strikes or this round of strikes is done until Iran possibly strikes another ship?
Speaker 0: I mean, I think we would need some time. If I were to place a bet in the predictive markets, I would assess that we probably will see another round of strikes tomorrow. I do believe we will see another round of strikes tomorrow. Again, we have to wait until tomorrow. And when we say tomorrow, I'm an East Coast base in the United States, you know, so it would be, what day is today? Wednesday. So Thursday morning, what are the reports? What are the kind of the sentiments from the administration? What's kind of going out? It was very interesting that President Trump, while he was in Air Force One, said a statement basically saying, You know, the Iranians call, they're begging for a deal. Is that the escape that they're looking for? He even, though, disputed that and doubted that and said he doesn't, he's not, doesn't necessarily believe it. We've been in this situation before, Mario, if you remember, before the MOU was placed, we were here before. We can go back in the tapes and say there was two days of bombings that the U.S. did with the third and fourth day's threats of targeting the energy facilities, et cetera, and then the MOU was agreed upon The MOU was already agreed, and we're back at that. So does that indicate that we're going to see another round of strikes? Possibly. I think Benjamin Netanyahu should be meeting President Trump soon in the United States. That could be another indication of where this might be heading. Obviously, U.S.-Israeli military cooperation coordination continues. So I think tomorrow we'll probably see more strikes. I think we will. If we don't, then that's an indication that maybe we're back in the diplomatic route. But for now, I would say, you know, it is possible that the United States that they would resume strikes tomorrow as well.
Speaker 2: Yeah. And in terms of Iran's response, they haven't really created deterrence against strikes. The response has been limited, as we've seen before. So it's like giving leeway for the Americans to say, hey, you can strike us again, but also making it clear that they will they will. Keep control of the show and we'll strike you. You can yawn. It's okay.
Speaker 1: Sorry. Your lips shook. That was so cute. It's just your lips started shaking. No, you can yawn. Don't worry about it. It's late in the evening. It's 5.45 a.m. my time.
Speaker 2: You're doing this space early, so I know you're exhausted. So I don't blame you at all, man. We've got Karen Fiatowski coming as well, so I'm going to chat to her about this. Do you worry before, just before we go to Karen, Do you worry about what could happen after the meeting between Netanyahu and Trump?
Speaker 0: I mean, I'm not going to say the word worry. I just think that what I would say from my perspective is more, I mean, obviously the Israelis are going to continue to advocate for a harder stance approach.
Speaker 2: My team was fucking with me. They said to me, because they heard me say it's 5.45, I'm exhausted. So they sent me a message, hey, Karen's available. She's jumping on. So guys, just for the audience, Karen is not jumping on. My producer decided to have a sense of humor now, and they're going to let me sleep. I have a shitty sense of humor on my team. Yeah, man, let's go get some rest. I'm going to go to sleep. The attacks have stopped, just to be clear, why we're not continuing.
Speaker 0: Dude, I mean, you've got to agree. Just quickly, Mark, you've got to agree. I mean, if this is it, the Iranian response, it's... Something seems off within the Iranian retaliation caucus. Look, I'm not going to disagree with you. Is this the Iranians trying to... Two explanations.
Speaker 2: Two explanations. No, no, two explanations. Number one, the American strikes were actually much more limited, the targets. We don't know what they targeted. So it could be the American targeting was not that significant. Or we'll just wait to see tomorrow. Maybe they'll close the Strait of Homs. So that's a big one. That's probably their biggest lever. Or, yeah, you're right. There's something we don't know. Oh, there we go. There's renewed explosions of Bahrain. So it's not ended. What's going on? Yesterday, same thing happened.
Speaker 0: You know, I would just say, I mean, the strikes yesterday that Iran did were not as significant as most would assume. It would also be the other aspect that I would say is kind of going to this is it's very interesting kind of the strike packages that the Iranians are doing. I think there's something there. What could it be?
Speaker 2: What's your guess?
Speaker 0: Let me just address this quickly with Benjamin Netanyahu because you asked me that and I'm going to go to the last one. Keep an eye on Benjamin Netanyahu because I think if Benjamin Netanyahu is able to convince Trump to say, look, we've seen the failures of the negotiations, we've seen the failure of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, it's time to go back in hard. There is a distinct possibility that regime change is in the menu for that, right? If you're going to go for round two big, you're going to try to end this or really get this really hard. So there's a lot of things that then if that were to happen, I would be looking forward to see. Okay, you want to do regime change. You're not going to do it just by hitting the oil infrastructure and the energy infrastructure in Iran. All that's going to do is cause economic problems for Iran. It's not necessarily translate to, oh, the Iranian regime is going to collapse. So there would have to be other things I would be looking at. Like, are we going to see the Kurds again?
Speaker 2: You really think that's still on the table? Come on, man.
Speaker 0: Look, if you're telling me, if you want to do regime change in Iran, again, it's the argument is, Benjamin Netanyahu wants regime change. I think you and I agree with that, right? We're in agreement that if it's up to Benjamin Netanyahu, he wants regime change. You're not going to achieve it with just an air campaign. You're not going to, if you want it immediate, You're not going to achieve it by bombing the oil infrastructure. You're not going to achieve it by bombing the energy infrastructure. And you're not going to achieve it just with an air campaign. You need a ground component. Either the Iranian people, if they decide to rise up somehow, or you have to use the Kurds. You need something on the ground, or you need to create a situation inside of Iran of such a severe fracture. that it is conducive to at least a regime collapse. But at that scenario, you run to risk of a broader humanitarian crisis and civil war. But we're speculating there. I think Benjamin Netanyahu is not going to give up on his idea of a regime change in Iran, and I think he's going to advocate that. I think there's a lot of people within the administration who are not too favorable for that approach, regardless. So that's one piece. The second piece is the Iranian retaliation it is kind of significant that it's not to the degree that we think it is. It's just not. And so the question then can become, is Iran, my suspicion is, is because a lot of their ability to produce, specifically the ballistic missiles, have been destroyed, they don't have the ability to reconstitute and rebuild. They might be able to pull out equipment from underground facilities where the entrances were destroyed, that were trapped. Some of them, they can pull out, et cetera, right? So that capability they have.
Speaker 2: The CNN report said 70% to 80% of their missiles are still operating.
Speaker 0: Correct. Right. So let's say it's 70% to 80%, right? Okay, that they still have the missiles and then whatever the quantity of the launchers. But that's it, right? It's not like, okay, and then in a year, we can rebuild... It's not Russia, right? Russia launches ballistic missiles. They rebuild their ballistic missiles.
Speaker 2: They can get them delivered from Russia, from Caspian Sea, or get them delivered from China as well. And also you get depletion on China. Sorry, depletion on the American stockpiles too. No, no, no, no, no.
Speaker 0: The Russian ballistic missiles, the Russian ballistic missiles is the SS-20. They're not interchangeable. They're not interchangeable. Now, unless Russia decides to give Iran SS-26 and Iskanders, you know, look, it's not interchangeable. So when you're looking at this from the Iranian perspective, this is where I think the reason why they're not going so significant or why yesterday they only did drone strikes and they didn't launch ballistic missiles is because they're trying to conserve that because they need to.
Speaker 2: They didn't launch ballistic missiles at all yesterday?
Speaker 0: Not that I'm aware of, no. All we got reports were drones. I did not get a report of ballistic missile launch. We got reports of drones.
Speaker 2: Those were the anti-ship missiles. Right, right, right. What do you make of Trump's statement on 111 anti-ship missiles on the U.S. aircraft carrier? He said 111. No, he said 111. But this is Trump speaking, and it could have been nice. Let me get it. We did say he did call Iran, Japan. No, 111. There you go. Trump, 100. I told the story yesterday. We had 111 missiles shot by the Islamic Republic of Japan that were shot at the aircraft carrier.
Speaker 0: I think if he said 111, that to me is... They didn't launch 111. There is... They didn't launch 111 missiles at once during the war. I know.
Speaker 2: That's right. My guess would be this is 111 projectiles, drones, many, many drones as well.
Speaker 0: I don't know. We have never seen a report of that many against a ship. That's where I would have to look into it. I don't know if he misspoke. something we had to get reported.
Speaker 2: He did say he did. He did in that same state. We're gonna play the statement for you now. So you can hear it.
Speaker 0: But he didn't misspoke.
Speaker 2: He didn't speak. You know, I'm doubting. I'm doubting the 111 anti ship missiles as well.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I don't know. Yeah, we'll listen to it.
Speaker 1: I told the story yesterday, we had 111 missile shot by the Islamic Republic of Japan. They were shot at the aircraft carrier.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I don't know. 111 just seems like missiles. And if you're targeting the aircraft carrier, right, the aircraft carrier is in the Indian Ocean, right? Let's just assume, right? I mean, I would have to look at the last, like, publicly data, right, or the Gulf of Oman, right? It's not near. It's not close. So there's only... There's only certain type of missiles that the Iranians have that can make that distance, and they are not gonna launch 111 of them at one target.
Speaker 2: So there's one OSINT account saying that the current attacks are either UAVs, so drones, or cruise missile waves. It seems like UA, okay, low altitude. Yeah, low altitude deceptions. UA eventually said cruise missiles as well, but now they're saying, it seems this time it's drones, not ballistic missiles being fired. Cruise missiles versus ballistic missiles. What are the pros and cons of each?
Speaker 0: So the pros of the cruise missile is that you can have it fly low to the ground. It's harder to detect and it's more maneuverable. The problem is its speed. It's a lot slower. So you have more time to if you know where to look and you have assets available, you can detect it and then you can intercept it. And the Air Force, for example, you can use fighter jets to intercept a cruise missile. You can use a stinger. We've seen the Ukrainians We use SHORAD to even intercept cruise missiles, right, because it's a low altitude into speed. The ballistic missile, it's in high altitude, you know, it launches from a high altitude up to the atmosphere, etc., and then it goes in. So the strength of that is its speed, and there's very limited systems that can intercept a ballistic missile. You can't use SHORAD. You can't use an air force to intercept a ballistic missile. problem with the ballistic missile is once you have a system designed in place intercepted it's a it's a parabolic trajectory you can easily calculate a cruise missile because it's maneuverable you really unless you have second data england data it's emitting beforehand you really don't know what it's targeting until it gets to its objective unless it used pinpoint most of the times what they'll do is they'll do pinpoint so they go here and then here and then here and then you hit the target right that's how you try to calculate it's a lot harder A ballistic missile, once it's launched, you have a very clear understanding where it's going. At least a generic area where it's going. And so that's what it is. But the strength of the ballistic missile is limited resources to intercept it and its speed. It's minutes to target.
Speaker 2: Interceptions are happening in Bahrain. I don't know if there's any impact. Just another, since we're speaking, I want to ask you about the comments by Trump on Al-Sharaa. about al-Sharah. He said al-Sharah may help him. He was asked, will al-Sharah help you with Hezbollah? He said he might. And he kind of digresses, moves away. But is it possible that al-Sharah will actually fight Hezbollah? I'm finding it hard to compute this as a possibility. It just sounds so suicidal and stupid.
Speaker 0: I don't see al-Sharah deploying Syrian forces into Lebanon. And I think the last thing the Lebanese wants is not just the contract of Syrian forces back into the country, number one. And then number two, it's like you also want a formal al-Qaeda... commander regardless of now if he's moderate or not back in Lebanon. No, no, no. But I think the U.S. design is they don't want Syria to be obviously and it's not a proxy of Iran, a fiefdom of Iran. And so in the construct of what President al-Shara is basically doing, he's cut the land bridge to Hezbollah from Iran. The land bridge is gone. So the necessity of U.S. military forces, I mean, I remember when I was there during the counter-ISIS campaign in 2015 and 16, we were still having, we were having conversations back then about the concern of Hezbollah's activities inside of Syria, the land.
Speaker 2: Oh, you focused on Hezbollah in the army?
Speaker 0: Well, I mean, we, you know, broadly speaking, there was a concern, especially because Hezbollah was very active.
Speaker 2: Are you sharing classified information now, Stefano, accidentally?
Speaker 0: No, no. No, but I mean, think about it.
Speaker 2: This is live. This is recorded.
Speaker 0: Look, when Hezbollah sent fighters into Syria, that was a big concern. Because the idea was, one, now Bashar al-Assad is dependent on Hezbollah. And then he became dependent on Iran. If you have a dependency, you're going to do what they want. And what happened with Bashar al-Assad? Bashar al-Assad enabled Iran to operate inside of Syria as he seemed fit. I remember in 2016, that was a huge concern. The land route was a huge concern, you know, and all that. And this always goes back to the famous saying of King Abdullah of Jordan, where he said Iran is creating the Shia crescent in the Middle East. What President al-Shara has basically done is he shattered that Shia crescent. And I think that's what President Trump wants. He doesn't want Syria to be what it was before where Iran and Hezbollah had free reign.
Speaker 2: That is the- But I think he just doesn't want any country to have, yeah, I think he just doesn't want any, he doesn't want Israel, Syria, I'm hoping, he doesn't want Syria to be a proxy country, because what I'm worried about is he's actually a proxy of Erdogan now. Because we know Erdogan put him in power, and how much influence, and Trump says he helped put him in power. Maybe that's true. So the US and Turkey put al-Sahra in power. So the question is how much influence do they have over him? Because the theory right now is Trump is giving the F-35s to Turkey or trying to, obviously, if Congress passes it, in return for Turkey forcing al-Sharaa to go fight Hezbollah. I know it's going to 6D chess, but this is what people are theorizing.
Speaker 0: I don't see Erdogan necessarily doing that. And look, I mean, we've seen border clashes in the past. And I mean, Israel does not want a universal role. Al-Sharaa is the lead anti-Hezbollah fighter in Lebanon.
Speaker 2: You know, that's not the one.
Speaker 0: And look, I would be willing to pay some bet that I think Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli government would prefer the Lebanese government over the Syrian government to fight Hezbollah if they had to pick one, right? Look, where I think the situation with Turkey and Erdogan and President al-Assar in Syria, there's also much more internal Gulf dynamics in play there, right, with Saudi Arabia, even the UAE, Qatar, et cetera, that it kind of all balances each other out. And look, even though there were significant tensions with the offensive that the HDS and the Syrian transitional government launched against the Kurds and the SDF, at the end of the day, because of U.S. negotiations, it looks like now finally SDF hopefully reintegrates itself within the Syrian state. And there's an abroad agreement in how the Syrian state should look like. The Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurds.
Speaker 2: So these are the Kurds, yeah.
Speaker 0: Correct, right, right, right. What do you think is going to happen with the Druze?
Speaker 2: What do you think that the Druze is going to do? The Druze is still resisting their territory to merge into the Syrian government. Correct.
Speaker 0: Do they eventually revolt? Yeah, look, I know Israel is going to do a lot to try to prevent that. They're very concerned. I think the US acknowledges and recognizes that we can, that they do not want, they don't want Syria to end up as Libya. And if you look at actually, in the sense of like, now you have all these competing actors and weapons and arms and the chaos that that creates. If you look at Libya, one of the things right now is through Haftar's son, General Haftar in the east, his son is negotiating through Marco Rubin, the US Secretary of State in the State Department, with the internationally recognized government of Libya to try to create a one, you know, central government. And I think that's what President Trump and the United States wants in Syria. And they acknowledge you cannot have a central government if you have all these different ethnic groups have their own weapons. But they also understand the sensitivities of it. They can't abandon the Kurds. They can't abandon the Druze. And they understand the Druze's connections with Israel. Those are the lot of things that are going on. That's why. Where is this at?
Speaker 2: That's in Bahrain just now. That's a new impact in Bahrain.
Speaker 0: So those are ballistic missiles.
Speaker 2: That's me. Yeah. Sorry. There was a few minutes ago. They said there's ballistic missiles. Can you start it again, KK? Can you start it again? That's one impact. Boom. There's another one here. That's a lot of impacts, Stefano. That's one. That was one.
Speaker 0: There's a couple. Yeah, that's the thing. That's where we would need the numbers to see and what are the targets. Look, if they're continuing to target NAVSEN and Rifa Air Base, kind of like, you know, I mean, how often are you going to hit the same military bases over and over and over and over again when those military bases aren't being utilized anymore? I would also be interesting to see if Bahrain maybe is doing more in the background than we realize. There was some unconfirmed reports. heavy emphasis on unconfirmed, that Bahrain was participating in the strikes against Iran. Huge unconfirmed, though. But if Iran continues to hit Bahrain, I wouldn't be surprised. I wouldn't be surprised, and that's the reason why.
Speaker 2: This video had one interception and one impact, sorry. So in that video, one of them seems like a missile impact.
Speaker 0: the other one's a low altitude interception by a patriot system right yeah so that's the issue about ballistic missiles right uh there's only certain systems that can intercept it from the u.s side it would be the patriot and the thad those are the two systems you would not use a shore like an avenger or a stinger to intercept a ballistic missile so so you're limited in what you can use to intercept and generally how those systems would operate from a u.s perspective how the the patriots are what you would consider a point defense So you basically build the box of what you want defended, and then your Patriots are designed to defend that. If the ballistic missile is going to hit outside of the defended box, they're not going to intercept, right? So from a U.S. perspective, you're going to defend the base, but you're not going to necessarily defend the city per se. And that's how that would operate.
Speaker 2: This is another video of it there. So you can see one of them impacts. So this is the interception one. That's the- That's the interception, yeah. I can see that there, yeah. Yeah, exactly. That's the lot-altered one. And the impact was the first one, I think, was at the beginning. Okay.
Speaker 0: Well, those are two ballistic missiles. So the question is how many total were launched against Bahrain?
Speaker 2: Yeah, this seems like the end of the attack by the looks of it. We'll just give it a few more minutes, but I think it's the end of it. Yeah, it looks, all indications, that was the end of it. It was just like last couple of missiles launched and a few drones of Bahrain. But yeah, all indications show that this is the end of it. Just one question, let's see if there's anything else. On the Syrian side, so he's talked about the Jews most likely folding into the Syrian government. The massacres on the Alawites, this is something that I get conflicting stories. On one side, they say these are rogue elements of the US, of the Syrian army that went there, started seeking revenge and massacring Alawites. And then al-Sharro was trying to stop them. Some of them went to court, et cetera, but I don't think any of them eventually faced prison sentences. I don't know. And the other claim is that this was ordered by al-Sharah. I'm leaning on the former. I don't think al-Sharah ordered this. I think these were rogue elements. I've spoken to people on both sides, Alawites and non-Alawites, and these were just elements within the military because al-Sharah doesn't really have full control of the military. It's a very, very, very fractured country. I'm surprised the country is still operating, and he's even acting as the leader of the country. But what's your stance on this? Do you think he ordered the massacre of Alawites, or do you think these were rogue elements within the military?
Speaker 0: I mean, I think it could be. I don't think both are mutually exclusive in the sense that I think he wanted a harsh response, but maybe not too harsh.
Speaker 2: Let me rephrase that.
Speaker 0: I think he wanted a harsh response, and then elements within the ground took it significantly harder. Look, we don't know. We'd have to let an investigation happen to really determine the facts of the matter of what really went on. But clearly, when this all happened, specifically with the Alawites, and we saw former elements of the Assad regime kind of hunker down in the Alawites' heartland of Syria, and not Aqiyah and Tardis, President Alshara was very clear that he was not going to tolerate, and he took a very heavy-handed approach to do that. Did that then translate into the massacre of the Alawites? Regardless if that was his intent or not, I think that might've been much more realistic in the sense that he wanted a harsh response, not necessarily the massacre, but the situation on the ground and the commanders on the ground. Look, these aren't professional military forces. They're not. And if anything, they have a very lackluster track record. that then just can easily translate into a massacre and grave human rights violations, as we saw.
Speaker 2: What do you think of Trump requesting the removal of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism, as reported today?
Speaker 0: I mean, I don't, yeah. Look, I think we have to be very cognizant in acknowledging something, right? I mean, this is just something, like, people are going to make the argument, once Al-Qaeda commander, always Al-Qaeda. Once Al-Qaeda, always Al-Qaeda. Look. If that's the case, then we're never going to end the war. I mean, we literally have, look, am I saying President Ashara now is the most trustworthy man in the Middle East and we should trust everything he says? No, of course not. But if he's willing to meet, the fact that he's willing to meet with President Trump in and of itself, the fact that he's even, some elements of the Syrian government are open to having conversations with the state of Israel, you can't make the argument that they are like Al Qaeda. So you basically, if these guys who were, you know, yes, he was a former HCS commander. Yes, he formerly was aligned to Al-Qaeda. No dispute there. Nobody's denying it. Now, you know, trust but verify. But if he's willing to change that, if he's saying, I want to reincorporate Syria into the international community, I'm willing to renounce my previous ideology, then you won. Why, what are we going to do? Bomb Syria too until the end of time? Kill everybody in Syria who used to have an ideology of Islam?
Speaker 2: This is where- A new page needs to eventually be turned. A new page needs to eventually be turned as much as you hate someone. If the Taliban are in power and we moved on from Afghanistan.
Speaker 0: What I would say, like the irony of the situation in Afghanistan is a much more concerning development where clearly the Taliban have not really changed. I mean, we're negotiating. We still have treaties and we negotiate and we stuff like that. I would be much more understanding of a harsher response against the Taliban because of the support with Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban and the terrorist attacks and attacks that they've done against Pakistan. I can understand the argument to be a much more harsher response to the Taliban and against them because of that. But President al-Assar, I mean, he is changing now. There's still a significant concern. But if anything, talk to anybody within the administration right now. Talk with anybody within U.S. Central Command. What they would tell you is, as counterterrorism partners, they trust the Syrian government. They trust. They have open cooperation. Then that's what we need. Move on.
Speaker 2: That's the sense I've gotten. I've spoken to a lot of people that know him personally. I haven't spoken to him personally. But that is the exact sense I'm getting, which I never thought I'd be saying because I fucking hate HTS or hated HTS. I appreciate doing this so late at night. Thank you as always.
Speaker 0: Thanks, Mario. I'll see you soon.
Speaker 2: All right, guys. This is it for today. I'm completely freaking burnt out. The attack has ended. This is Iran's retaliation, similar retaliation as yesterday as I've expected. No escalation there. We'll see what happens tomorrow, whether the US will continue their attacks or whether this is the end of it. My position remains this is both sides trying to assert control of the Strait of Hormuz. This is the carrot and stick approach. I'm not a fan of it. But things are not out of control. We don't have a restart of the war. We don't have any mass casualty events, massive destruction, etc. All the things we saw during the war we're not experiencing right now. But fingers crossed this remains because this is how things could get into the escalation trap. This is how things could, you know, the law of unintended consequences could kick in and we get into an escalation spiral. So fingers crossed. I'll see you tomorrow as always with incredible coverage. And there's one interview I think you should check out. If you're interested on the price of oil and trying to make sense of it, we did a new recap, me and Philip, one of your favorite guys, Philip Perkington, that I think you'll enjoy. And I had Cenk from the Young Turks on the show again a few hours ago to talk about what's happening between the US, Turkey and the US and Israel and the dynamic there. It was a good conversation. I'm Bertat, guys. I hope you enjoyed the coverage. I'll see you tomorrow. And I'll go live again today if the attacks continue. If something happens today, I'll be live. Don't worry. Bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
Netanyahu, Cenk says, personally appealed to Trump not to arm Turkey’s air force, but the F-35 sale is still reportedly moving. What alarms him is the language: Smotrich says Israel is preparing for every scenario, including military action, like it once did for Iran. He argues a 9 million–person state threatening NATO’s second-largest army shows mindset more than plans. He finds the “knock the hell out of them” framing about shippingcontainable, but a full return to war would be different.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇹🇷 Netanyahu personally asked Trump not to arm Turkey's air force. The F-35 sale is reportedly moving ahead anyway... Axios detailed the appeal: complaints about Erdogan's rhetoric, a direct request to hold back the jets. Cenk Uygur's read is that Trump just climbed a wall that used to be unclimbable, because Israeli objections historically end these deals before they start. What alarms him is the language flying back. Smotrich declaring Israel is "preparing for every scenario, including military action" against Turkey, the same framing once reserved for Iran. A country of 9 million threatening NATO's second-largest army, Cenk argued, reveals a government's state of mind more than any war plan. He went further and used the word fascism, a label he stressed he doesn't reach for lightly. On the strikes, we found real common ground. The tit-for-tat is a genuine power struggle over the Omani route, and Vance's public framing backs that: "If they shoot at ships, we're going to knock the hell out of them. It's that simple." But Cenk's test stays binary. Bombing over shipping lanes is containable. A full return to war would have nothing to do with Hormuz, and in his words, only one country on Earth wants it. His negotiator's pitch: Iran takes the $300 BILLION Gulf rebuild or the strait. Not both. @cenkuygur
Video Transcript AI Summary
Cenk Uygur says Trump praising Erdogan and potentially approving Turkey’s purchase of F-35s shows partial decoupling between U.S. and Israeli preferences. He argues the S-400 issue is real, and that Trump overcame Israeli objections—a “wall” that is usually impossible to climb—because Trump is harder to predict and likely acts from his own interests. Uygur also claims Israel’s threats toward Turkey are “insane” and not seriously credible, framing the F-35 approval as a response to that perceived lack of seriousness.
Mario presses on whether Israel and Turkey could be headed toward direct or indirect war, citing statements by Israeli officials comparing Turkey to Iran and preparing for military action. Uygur responds that his concern is less about an actual Israel–Turkey war and more about the mindset of the Israeli government and population, describing Israel as out of control and analogizing its actions and justifications to past fascist rationales. He argues that repeated propaganda about Iran killing people in Israel is believed by some Americans and generates donations, while he says similar claims about Turkey wiping out Israel are not credible to “anywhere outside of a mental asylum.” He further asserts Israel has slipped into fascism, pointing to candidates he says have talked more aggressively about attacking Turkey and concluding that such aggression should be possible given that mindset.
Discussing U.S.–Israel and U.S.–Iran posturing, Mario references a report from Axios: Netanyahu allegedly complained to Trump about Erdogan escalating anti-Israeli rhetoric and asked who would meet Erdogan, and the Israeli requests included refraining from selling weapons systems that would modernize Turkey’s air force. Mario also brings up U.S. actions tied to a memorandum involving Lebanon, and asks about a “change of the posturing” by the U.S. Uygur frames the key question as whether the U.S. goes back into another war with Iran on Israel’s behalf. He says returning to war would be the third time the U.S. would be attacking Iran on Israel’s behalf, and he argues past attempts failed to achieve outcomes such as opening the Strait of Hormuz, regime change, or destroying Iran’s missile capabilities—while he claims the result would be economic calamity and massive destruction. Uygur argues that if the U.S. does not go back into war, it signals America is resisting Israeli pressure; if it does, he claims the U.S. becomes controlled by Israel.
Mario challenges Uygur’s blame, noting Strait of Hormuz impacts Asia, Europe, and the Gulf more than Israel. Uygur replies that the specific clause about the Strait of Hormuz is not the decisive issue; the core is whether peace is possible. He says Israel has refused to leave southern Lebanon despite U.S. requests and claims Israel will not comply with keeping southern Lebanon or halting strikes in Beirut and southern Lebanon. Uygur argues that negotiations would turn on peace rather than particular compliance disputes, and that if the U.S. wants peace it can pursue the “approved channels” through the Strait of Hormuz dispute. He insists only Israel wants the war to continue and claims the American people do not want it and that it would harm U.S. interests economically.
Mario then argues that the main sticking point is terms of peace involving Strait of Hormuz control and Iran charging a fee, and that J.D. Vance described a deal: if Iran shoots at ships, the U.S. will respond and knock them out. Uygur agrees that the dispute about routing and the Omani route is enough to cause “bombing back and forth,” even if it does not necessarily require full-scale war restarting due to the Strait of Hormuz itself. He says that if he were negotiating, he would present a choice: Iran could take $300 billion from Gulf rebuild funding or receive something tied to the Strait, but not both.
They also discuss Trump’s decision-making and statements. Mario asks whether worries about Trump’s mental state should increase. Uygur says he was not very concerned until Trump confused Iran with Japan, describing it as giving “heavy Joe Biden vibes,” and argues that lots of media attacks intensify when Trump disagrees with Israel.
Turning to U.S. domestic politics, Uygur says midterms look good for Democrats but that Democrats keep “punching themselves in the face,” driven by attacks orchestrated through what he calls the Israeli lobby and other donor classes. He emphasizes voter turnout as the deciding factor, asserting Republicans may have lower turnout because a portion of their base dislikes candidates they would still be asked to vote for.
Mario asks about Trump/Tucker supporting a third party and whether it could influence policy. Uygur says he is surprised but argues independents are larger than Republicans or Democrats, that establishment media dislikes discussing this, and that a third party could become a force if it builds money, infrastructure, and cross-ideological support—especially if it runs anti-war campaigns. He says joining such a third party is very unlikely but not impossible, depending on whether populists are pushed out of Democratic primaries and what kinds of credible candidates emerge.
Finally, Mario brings up a video of Jackson Hinkle in Iran chanting “Down with USA” during an event related to Ali Khamenei, along with claims that Randy Fine called for arrest for treason. Uygur reacts by arguing the chant is “super stupid,” says the chant does not help, and urges that American opponents of the war should not be treated as enemies. He argues the war’s driving force is Israel and that Americans are not the decision-makers, while noting the war has made organic political change in Iran harder by rallying people around the regime. Uygur also warns against using “treason” language casually, distinguishing it from lawful “treason” with severe consequences. He states his own political mission is to get a constitutional amendment to end money corruption in politics, describing his ambitions as instrumental to that goal rather than personal power.
Full Transcript
Speaker 2: Actually, it's good timing for us to speak because you've got, we always talk about Israel. Now we've got Trump praising Erdogan, potentially approving the sale of F-35s. Now we've seen all the talk and last time we chatted, it was during J.D. Vance and Trump, their period of doing the press tour, the Israel bashing press tour. But now we're seeing action follow through if they approve the F-35s. So what do you make of, before we go into the strikes yesterday, the likelihood of war restarting and a report that just came in a couple of minutes ago from Israel saying that we could see days of strikes by the US and Iran. Before we get into that mess, let's talk about that part because that could be a bit of a silver lining there. Am I interpreting it the right way? Is it more indications of decoupling between the US and Israel?
Speaker 0: Partially, for sure. So, first of all, on the F-35s, the fact that the Turks have the S-400s from the Russians is a real issue. It's not a made-up issue. Like, half the time, it's made up by, you know, AIPAC or something. But this one's real. But Trump got past it and is willing to sell him the F-35s. But importantly, to your point, he even got past the Israeli objections, which is usually a wall that is impossible to climb. So and by the way, a lot of people forget that Ben Shapiro and all the other guys were never Trumpers in the first place. That's why Bill Kristol, who was a neocon Israel first guy, actually helped us form the bulwark, which is now one of the top channels against Trump. Right. And so these the part of the reason why Israel first was against Trump all the way back in the day was because he's a wild card. And so he's harder to predict than a normal corporate politician. Corporate politicians are very transactional like Joe Biden, Kamala Harris, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz. You pay them and then they do exactly as you ordered them, right? And so Trump's a little bit different. So in the case of Turkey, he likes Erdogan. Why does he like Erdogan? They probably have a deal. They probably have a deal that helps Trump after he leaves office or maybe they don't even wait till he leaves office. And so usually Trump does things for his own interest. So he got past the Israelis there and is siding with the Turks. But probably there's one other element to that, which is that this Israel constantly threatening to attack Turkey is so insane. It's like what a deranged escape mental patient would say that it's hard to take seriously. So Trump and his team was probably like, what are they going to attack NATO allies? Are they going to attack France next? Right. So this is absurd. Let's just sell that 35 to the Turks because it's not a real thing between the Turks and Israel.
Speaker 2: Well, Smotrich, Smotrich, I know he's probably not the probably the freaking smartest guy, the most serious guy. But he did say the following. We are preparing for every single scenario that's today, including military action. He's talking about Turkey, including military action. We understand that there is a threat. and we will not allow Turkey to threaten Israel's existence, just as we had not allowed and will not allow the Iranian regime to do so. He's comparing Turkey to Iran. It's just such a stupid thing to say. And we've seen a lot more similar statements, especially in the last 48 hours by multiple Israeli officials. It's probably the most extreme one. None of them have talked about Turkey, a war with Turkey. They've talked about Turkey being potentially a threat. Erdogan hasn't minced his words when talking about Israel either. But is that a genuine concern? Do you worry that we could see a direct war or an indirect war between Israel and Turkey?
Speaker 0: So I'm concerned because the Israelis are out of control. So and this is actually just a symbolic of how out of control they are. So I'm more worried about the state of mind that the Israeli government and unfortunately, the Israeli population is in and all the ramifications and consequences of that. as opposed to the actual potential war between Israel and Turkey. But think about how crazy you have to be to threaten a NATO ally with war when you're a country of 9 million people and your main ally is the largest army in NATO and the people you're threatening is the second largest army in NATO, right? Like, it's so beyond the pale. And then think about this. Like, you know, they made up these lies about how Iran is trying to take over the Middle East and destroy Israel and kill everyone inside. And, you know, that's... Unfortunately, they've done so much of that propaganda throughout our lives. And the number one victim of it is Jewish Americans that a lot of people might that if they're Jewish Americans or they're in the establishment, they might believe that kind of lunatic talk about how Iran is going to kill everyone inside Israel. And that's very useful propaganda because it gets people in America to go, OK, I'm going to give you millions of dollars because otherwise all the Jews are going to die. Right. So they brainwash people with this kind of hysterical nonsense that when Israel has nukes, Iron Dome, and the best military in the Middle East, right? So now when it comes to Turkey, though, and they do the same kind of talk, people go, really? Turkey is going to kill everyone inside Israel and they're going to wipe out? No, they're not. No one that is anywhere outside of a mental asylum believes that, right? Like, you'd have to be full-blown, like, gone. Like, we can't. The psychiatrists give up on you kind of insane to think that the Turks are going to attack Israel, destroy it and kill everyone inside. Cuckoo for Cocoa Puffs. Right. None of that is within one percent of one percent of one percent of happening. So when they say stuff like that. you worry about their mental state like i think they're at a point where they're a fascist government and i don't say that lightly and i very very much mean it so what is what does it mean to be a fascist government one is you think you have unlimited unchecked power right so the germans thought they had unlimited unchecked power uh because their military was steamrolling everyone right and you have a this toxic And the Germans thought that they were the victims of World War I and they were abused afterwards, etc. By the way, the Turks, when they did the Armenian Genocide, same exact thing. The Turks were used to unlimited power for 500 years ruling this vast empire. And then as they were the sick man of Europe and they were getting attacked on all sides, they felt like they were the victims. And then they had the same exact excuse afterwards. a series of excuses that Israel has today about the Gaza genocide. So as I see this country that is clearly now stepped into fascism and is attacking all of their neighbors using the same excuses as every fascist country has ever used. And by the way, that also makes it super clear that it has nothing to do with religion or ethnic background, because look at that diversity of different countries that have been affected by fascism. The Germans who were Christians, the Turks who are Muslims, Israel, which claims to be a Jewish state. So what an incredible right. It's in us as human beings to be susceptible to this in this particular kind of geopolitical context and headspace. So they're in a headspace where they think they're invincible and they could attack any country and they have every right to attack every country and no other country has a right to defend themselves against And if they have the temerity to defend themselves, then they're anti-Semites and they need to all be destroyed and killed, right? So since they're in a lunatic state right now, I don't put it past Israel to do anything. So as insane as the idea of attacking Turkey is, apparently it's not impossible. Because as you point out, Mario, it's not just Ben Gavir or Smotrich saying it. The leading candidate is Naftali Bennett, and he's talked about attacking Turkey more than anybody has. So it's not like if you get rid of Netanyahu, you're going to be done with this problem. No, the country has slipped into a state of fascism.
Speaker 2: What about Eisenhower, the other candidate?
Speaker 0: Yeah, look, I'm not as familiar with that. And I, you know, only know about Israeli politics, what I see from the outside and who's leading and what the statements they're making, etc.,
Speaker 2: it doesn't appear that there are any candidates that are for peace it doesn't appear that there are any candidates for a two-state solution it doesn't appear that there's a single candidate i think isaac i think i looked it up i'm not an expert there either but i looked it up briefly i think he's one of the few that is open to a two-state solution and he's i think he's the leading candidate on on betting platforms he's not a candidate of peace he was a former idf commander or officer um but he is also a supporter of very of israel not stretching itself too thin and no more prolonged wars. So he might be, I'm not saying Israel's suddenly going to flip into a country of peace, but definitely if any candidate could kind of veer away from the path that Israel's on, he may be the one. I'm not an expert on that either. So that's just me speaking with limited influence.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, look, the only thing I can say about that is from your mouth to God's ears, right? So I'm opposed to the current uh israeli government and the state that israel is in right now i you know looking back in 48 i don't know if that's helpful or not helpful i don't know that it was a great idea now in hindsight but all that is irrelevant because they already exist as they're not going anywhere so what i'm desperate for is a two-state solution where we have an actual viable independent safe palestinian state and certainly a safe Israeli state. So if the Israelis go towards a candidate that's for a two-state solution and go towards peace, I will be ecstatic. I couldn't be happier about that. And if on top of that, they leave America alone and they stop demanding wars and hundreds of billions of dollars, oh my God, I would be beyond happy. And if it works for them and they're safe, Haven for Jews and they have a beautiful Israel where they're not getting attacked and not attacking anyone else. That's a giant win. I'd be thrilled with that. I would also be super surprised because right now it appears that the population itself is in a fascist state of mind.
Speaker 2: Yeah, you've got access reported yesterday. Netanyahu complained to Trump on Friday about Turkish President Erdogan escalating anti-Israeli rhetoric. According to U.S. officials, Netanyahu also asked Trump who will meet Erdogan. So that was before they met. a couple of days ago to refrain from selling weapons systems that would help Turkey modernize its air force. Trump didn't listen to those requests. This came in from Axios. Netanyahu made similar statements on TV, including Fox News, trying to reach the American audience. It doesn't seem Trump is listening to him. He didn't listen to him when it comes to Turkey. He didn't listen to him when it came to the MOU, which included Lebanon. He forced him to stop striking Beirut. He forced him to stop striking South Lebanon, putting aside the developments from yesterday, which I'll bring up right after this. What's your stance on what we discussed last time, the change of the posturing by the U.S. towards Israel?
Speaker 0: Yeah, so, Mario, that's a binary one and very clear at the end of the day. It's not clear today. It will be clear once Trump makes the decision. But you've heard me say before, including on this show, which is, look, going back into the Iran war is crazy. It's... Now this would be the third time, basically, that we're attacking Iran on behalf of Israel. But before, they made this preposterous argument that it would somehow help us. And that was entertained by Trump and the press. But even if you believe that back then, and that is incredibly naive to believe that, but okay, whatever, right? We're past it. At this point, after we already did the second war, we saw that we couldn't open up the strait of hormuz and we couldn't get regime change and we couldn't you know destroy every ballistic missile they have and end their ability to do their own foreign policy hence the proxies etc since we know that with absolute certainty and we know that if we go back into the war it is going to create economic calamity and massive physical destruction in the gulf and in iran and in the middle east and we all know with Again, we're about 100% certain that it's going to turn into a disaster for us. And it's not to say that it won't also be a disaster for Iran, but it will definitely be a disaster for America. And if we go back in, that means, indisputably, we are, you know, whether you want to call it 98% because we gave the Turks the F-35s or 100%, but in that ballpark, we're about 100% controlled by Israel. If we don't go back in, that's why I always say things ahead of time. Hey, look, we defy them on the F-35s. We defy them when they definitely want us to go back in. We defy them another time and another time. Then you go, oh, wait a minute. They're starting to lose control, right? So let's just base it on the fact.
Speaker 2: Why are you blaming? Are you surrounding me, by the way? My trainer today is a fan of yours. He's like, Mario, Cenk mentioned in his show, he's like, Mario, he said 98% or whatever it was, 95% of American members of Congress are controlled by Israel. Is that true? I'm like, no, it's partially true that probably he means they all get money from AIPAC, but then it doesn't mean they're controlled. Then it reminded me of the debate me and you had. Are they controlled? Are they not controlled? Are they influenced? But putting that aside, on the point you've just made right now, if Trump attacks Israel, sorry, attacks Iran now, why are you blaming Israel again? This is about the Strait of Homs, which Israel doesn't care about. Why is everything Israel's fault? The Strait of Homs impacts Asia, impacts Europe, impacts the Gulf. It doesn't really impact Israel directly.
Speaker 0: no no but mario that this straight up hormuz or any particular clause in these in this mou is not the important part so for example also in the mou uh israel is supposed to get out of lebanon and israel uh immediately was like no we're not going to do that ever we're going to keep southern trump trump is saying they will trump said it again today there's no chance there's a zero percent chance that israel is going to listen to trump on that every single cabinet official has said We're staying in southern Lebanon and basically intimating, if not outright saying we're keeping southern Lebanon.
Speaker 2: But they're not going to leave. They also said we'll keep striking Beirut and they're not striking Beirut.
Speaker 0: Well, they did. And then they stopped for a minute and then they'll go back to it any second.
Speaker 2: They haven't struck it in weeks. But I'm saying is that they would say things, but doesn't mean they eventually don't abide by Trump's requests.
Speaker 0: But brother, the jury's already in on that. We said they were going to keep Gaza. A bunch of idiots who are either Israeli sycophants and work for them or assets for Israel or incredibly naive. So, oh, no, they are doing self-defense. I bet they give Gaza back 100 percent to the Palestinians after it is safe and after we have the hostages back. And now Netanyahu is bragging about how we stole 70 percent of Gaza. So when they say they're keeping southern Lebanon, they're definitely going to try to keep southern Lebanon. do not delude yourself don't have fake debates about that no they're a fascist empire that is doing land expansion they're doing it in the west bank they're doing it everywhere they're doing it in syria that's super obvious so when you say oh well israel or america is not following the mou on lebanon iran is not following it on the strait of hormuz iran by the way turns around and says that's not true at all we are following it on the strait of hormuz you're not following the mou about the strait of hormuz It's not about that's the Strait or Lebanon. It's about are you going to get to peace or not? Because if you want to get to peace, it's super easy. Go through the approved channels in the Strait of Hormuz, you know, and their nuclear weapons program, which they don't even have. But that's fine. Let's pretend to end the thing that doesn't exist. And that's our only interest. Those are the only two interests we have. We get out of the war. If we go back into the war, it has nothing to do with any particular violation or so-called violation on that day. It's because Israel wants more war. And Mario, you know, there are two things that are absolutely positive, right? The American people do not want this war. Now it's about 80%. We do not want it. We couldn't be clearer. Number two, it will lead to economic calamity. So it will make the American interest way, way worse. So there is no like, oh, on Tuesday it was raining and I didn't like what outfit Iran was wearing. No, you either get to peace or you go to war. The only people for war is Israel, period, on the entire planet. Iran doesn't want it. America doesn't want it. The Gulf doesn't want it. The rest of the world doesn't want it. There's only one entity that wants the war to continue. That's Israel.
Speaker 2: Everything you said is accurate, but you're... And I think Trump doesn't want the war. It's pretty obvious he doesn't want the war. But he also in the US doesn't want Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz. Gulf countries don't want Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz. China said they don't want Iran charging a fee at the Strait of Hormuz. So there is a sticking point. They want peace, but it's the terms of the peace that they're disagreeing on. And I think what we're seeing right now, I don't think we'll see a resumption of the war. That's my position. Many, many, many people disagree with me. But the main sticking point is a term on what the peace would look like. And we're seeing a power struggle based on that. So I don't think this is the US finding an excuse to start the war again. They can start the war and Trump could make up an excuse as he did before. It just genuinely looks like a power struggle. J.D. Vance said it as we're going live. He said it himself a few minutes ago, or maybe half an hour ago. He said, we made a deal with Iran. So the deal is very simple. If they shoot at ships, we're going to knock the hell out of them. And it's that simple. And that's the basic way it's going to work. If Iran tries to close the Strait of Homs down, there's going to be a response for the American military. It's that simple. That's the deal. They can either follow it or they can have exactly what happened last night. It's just going to keep on happening until they open up that lane and stop shooting at ships, open up the Omani side. And I think he's being honest. I think this is the US trying to draw the line saying, hey, we're happy with all the terms. We'll try to make it work with Lebanon. I'm not saying they'll succeed. That's a different beast. Israel is a different beast. But they've said it many, many times. They don't want to budge off the straight of Homo as being controlled and Iran charging a fee. And Iran is saying the complete opposite, that they will charge a fee.
Speaker 0: I think you're right about all of that. And so I get that that's a real issue between America and Iran. It's not a big enough issue to go full scale back in a war. I agree. But it is enough of an issue that it causes this bombing back and forth, which is what we're seeing now, right?
Speaker 2: I agree.
Speaker 0: So I agree with you that the bombing back and forth is not necessarily perfectly germane to Israel restarting the war. Israel is thrilled that it's happening because it might restart the war. But, yes, there's a real dispute about the Omani route. And so – You know, if I was a negotiator for the U.S., I would say to the Iranians, because I would really, really want a deal, right? I would say, listen, guys, you're either going to get the $300 billion from the Gulf countries to rebuild, or you're going to get something in the Strait of Hormuz, right? But you're not going to get both. That's for sure, right? And so, look, people are pissed about the Strait of Hormuz. They don't want it. And it's not just us. It's our Gulf allies. It's the rest of the planet. So take the $300 billion and run, right? And that's a deal we can have. And I hope that's where they're like.
Speaker 2: I agree. So your point is saying is that if we're going to see just back and forth as we're seeing right now, this makes logical sense that the Strait of Homs is the reason this is them negotiating, trying to strong arm the other side. But if we see a resumption of full blown war, it is no way going to happen because of the Strait of Homs. And this is where you'd be blaming Israel. OK, makes sense. And this is why I don't think we'll see a resumption of the war. What do you make of Trump's decision-making and statements? A lot of people are worried about his mental state. I'm not as worried. He's getting old. Obviously, that's concerning. But I think he's still, I'm not saying he's making the right decisions, but he hasn't lost his marbles. People are pointing to mistakes he did. He called Zelensky Putin today. I think Biden did that a few years ago. People attacked him for that. He called Zelensky Putin. He called, what else did he say? He called Iran, Japan. He said Japan struck us with 110 missiles. Do these things worry you or not? Look, it's his age showing he's not working nonstop, maybe sleep deprivation.
Speaker 0: Yeah. So mixed bag here. So until today, I wasn't really that concerned about it. Like he says wild stuff all the time, right? I mean, he doesn't have to be senile to say crazy shit. That's Trump 101, right? Exactly. Yeah. So and then... And then, you know, look, our media in America is basically run by Israel. So when I see tons of attacks at the same time against anyone, whether it's Graham Platner or it's Trump, it usually means the Israeli lobby is pissed and they're planting stories left and right. And so you'll see, and you can track this, and we track it on The Young Turks, when he's... Aligned with Israel, there's generally more positive, not completely positive. Of course, I'm never with Trump, right? But generally more positive coverage, specifically from establishment media. When he gets to a point where he's disagreeing with Israel, all of a sudden you get stories about, has he lost his mind? Is he senile? Should we use the 25th Amendment? Should we get rid of Trump, right? So those conversations bubble up the minute he starts disagreeing with Israel. Now, having said all of that, today, he, no, that... The Zelensky and Putin thing, but more importantly, confusing Iran with Japan.
Speaker 2: It's like me calling you Ben Gavir by accident.
Speaker 0: Yeah, no, it was giving heavy Joe Biden vibes. When he said Japan, I was like, whoa, I got hit with a wave of Joe Biden energy, right? And he's 80. He's 80. So yeah, now... We start to get concerned about that. But to my friends on the left who are like, and we have a 25th Amendment shirt that we sell on shoptyt.com, so it's fun. Okay, but really, what difference does it make? Then you get J.D. Vance.
Speaker 2: Yeah. What are things like in the U.S. domestically? I haven't looked into domestic politics for a while, just looking at what's happening in Ukraine and Iran. How are things there? How are the midterms looking? How are the Democrats looking? I saw Kamala Harris is... Getting closer, I think, to Mamdani, aligning yourself with Mamdani. Also, I want to get your thoughts on all these. Also, the video, I have to get your thoughts on this. Do you see the video of Jackson Hinkle in Iran, the influencer on X? No, I didn't. I'll play this. I'm going to find you that video. But meanwhile, what's the state of affairs domestically in the U.S.?
Speaker 0: Yeah, so the midterms look good for the Democrats. The only issue with the Democrats is they continue to punch themselves in the face. And why, as usual, the Israeli lobby, right? So Graham Plattner had that seat locked up in Maine and was going to give us an excellent chance of winning the Senate. And the Israeli lobby came in and got the corporate Democrats to attack their own candidates. viciously viciously constantly doing oppo research and leaking it to the press oppo research and leak it to the press so now all of a sudden we might not win the senate scene in maine uh and so and they're now attacking abdul el saeed who was uh you know in excellent shape to win the senate seat in michigan But the Democrats attack their own when they're given orders by their disgustingly corrupt donor class. And it's not just Israel. It's the defense contractors, the crypto guys, the AI guys, the Wall Street guys. So Matt Stoller is a really smart progressive in D.C., a really thought leader, been around a long time. I trust him. And he had a really good point today about how The establishment Democrats in Maine are funded by like Reid Hoffman and David Ellison and like all of these huge Zionists. Right. And so they basically told them, take out your character assassination of your own candidate. So it's insanity. So Democrats are trying super hard to lose the midterms, which seems unlosable. But give them a little bit of space. You never know what the Democrats could lose. But the bottom line is the most important part of it, Mario, and the thing to keep your eye on is voter turnout. So the number one problem that the Republicans have is at least a quarter of their base is like, we hate these guys now. So you want me to go out on a Tuesday and and spend a couple of hours going to vote for a guy I know is a piece of crap and is going to represent a foreign government and corporations and screw me over and has absolutely no chance of representing me. No, I'm not going to do that. So since they're going to have my guess is they're going to have very low voter turnout and Democrats are going to have much higher voter turnout. And that should make all the difference. But you never know.
Speaker 2: What do you make of Trump? of Tucker announcing him supporting a third party. Could that, not saying the third party is going to win, but could that move the needle one way or another? Could he have more influence over policy?
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 2: And have you spoken to him about it as well?
Speaker 0: I haven't spoken to him specifically about that. Okay. But here's my sense of it overall. I'm a little surprised by it because I think if Tucker ran in the Republican primary, he would win it. Period. Period. um so i guess i should keep my mouth shut uh so i guess that's and tucker would be very hard to beat in a general election um and so uh now uh in terms of the third party normally in any other cycle i would tell you that's a pipe dream it takes too much money too much infrastructure too much lead time but in this case number one at this point uh the thing that's most unspoken in american politics is the size of independence independents are now much much larger than republicans or democrats but uh mainstream media hates that because both the unit party is so corrupt and our national media loves that corruption So they don't talk about how big independents are. They're like, get back into your camps and fight each other and hate each other, right? So the idea of a rise of independents, a rise of a third party is an anathema to the establishment, including establishment media. And so they will do overwhelming propaganda against it. But since independents are so large, since everyone is so furious at the unit party, both Democrats, Republicans, let alone the giant independent bloc, and they have enough lead time, And with Tucker and others, they might be able to raise plenty of money to do a real third party, including the infrastructure that you need. And they might be able to get some people from the left or the middle to join them. Then that becomes a huge force, a force to be reckoned with. And anyone who underestimates it will make a big mistake.
Speaker 2: If he does, if someone launches a third party or he launches a third party, would you consider joining it and supporting them?
Speaker 0: So I would say that is very unlikely, but I won't rule it out. And here's the one fact pattern where that enters the picture, right? So a progressive populist runs in the Democratic primary, somebody like Ro Khanna. And the Democrats start to shut them out. Right. And they do things that are out of bounds. They don't have a real primary. They cheat again to try to help like some bootage like corporate robot win. Right. And so basically what they've done in that fact pattern is actively push all the populist left out of the party. Right. Well, you know, I don't care. Like, I care about the Democratic Party because I think that they have better policies in theory. They never actually do them. But in theory, they have better policies. So I would love a Democrat that actually did those economically populist policies like increasing wages, getting universal health care, taking care of our cars.
Speaker 2: But you just said it. It's the same left or right, Democrat or Republican. You just see the same policies every four years. The new president repeat the same policies time and time again, especially when it comes to foreign policy. So why would you keep going through the same process again, knowing the end result, which you just mentioned?
Speaker 0: Yeah. So my point is that if you have someone like Ro Khanna that I trust to be honest about it, then I'm good. There's no need to switch from the Democratic Party. And look, my plan all along, back when we started Just Democrats and before that went awry, so I've been at this for a decade, is build a pirate ship, pull it up next to the Democratic aircraft carrier, board the ship, Everyone on board is weaklings and idiots who are just waiters and waitresses for the rich. So kick their ass off the ship and put in a Democrat that's an actual Democrat and for the first time in our lives is actually going to do the policies that I think the American people would love. So that's my plan A. And so – But if the Democrats say, no, we hate populists, we don't want them in our party, we're going to actively kick them out, that means we're not ever going to do our policies. We're giant liars. We're a weirdo corporate party. Then I have no interest in that party. My uncle isn't a Democrat. My dad's not. I don't care. I don't care. I care about the policies. So if I was convinced, again, this is very unlikely, that some sort of right wing, left wing, or formerly right, formerly left, formerly Republican, formerly Democrat, got together and had a real balanced ticket, balanced policy, and it could somehow be trusted, yeah, then for the first time ever, I'd be open to that.
Speaker 2: Imagine a world where Massey and Ro Khanna are the leading candidates, the nominees for each side. What an incredible United States that would be.
Speaker 0: I mean, look, that's the world that I love. Forget Massey and Khanna being on a joint third-party ticket. If Massey won the Republican nomination and Khanna won the Democratic. That's what I mean, yeah.
Speaker 2: If they were running against each other, that would be incredible.
Speaker 0: Yeah, no, I know. So your dream scenario, what I'm saying, is better, right? 100% better. Khanna running on the Democratic ticket.
Speaker 2: Yeah, but mine is not realistic, and you know that. Mine is not realistic. So that's why we're doing something similar to what RFK did. to building a third party that can move the needle when it comes to policy.
Speaker 0: But Mario, I don't think it's as unrealistic as you think it is, right? Because once you hit the primaries, both the Republican voters and the Democratic voters don't want war. So they might disagree on many other things, but there's a bunch of things we agree on that we really, really care about these days.
Speaker 2: But they didn't want war before this war. Look at us now.
Speaker 0: No, but 80% of the time. But remember, especially if we go further into the war, then the... War and Israel is going to, if you think that they're disliked or despised now, oh my God, it's going to go thermonuclear if the war continues. In which case, Massey and Khanna have an, I would move them to the favorites to win their primaries. Okay. And at this point, if you run an anti-war, anti-Israel campaign on the Republican side or the Democratic side, I think you're probably the favorite already.
Speaker 2: Hmm. Let me ask you a final thing, just get your thoughts on it. Crossed my mind earlier. So there's Stephanie, you can prepare the video. There's a gentleman, you know, Jackson Hinkle, he's an influencer on X, got a pretty big following. Don't play it yet. I'm glad you haven't seen it, see your reaction. So you know who he is, yeah? A little bit. Yeah, so he's a big influencer, big name on X, got what, 4 million followers, I think. And he's been a very vocal opponent of US foreign policy. I think he lives in Russia, I could be wrong. He's been critical of the Ukraine war. America supports Ukraine. He's visited the Houthis, visited Hezbollah. So he's gone down that rabbit hole and he always chases the shock factor. He did something two days ago. I'm laughing because I think he took it too far. I want to get your thoughts on this. This is him in Iran. You can play the video with audio, Stephanie.
Speaker 1: USA. Down with USA. Down with USA.
Speaker 2: This is Randy Fine is losing his shit. Randy Fine, I think he's calling for him to be deported or something. Can you go to the tweet? I want to see what Randy Fine said about it. You can remove the audio, Stephanie. What does the tweet say? Let me actually open it here.
Speaker 1: There's a tweet here.
Speaker 2: So Randy Fine says that probably she says should be arrested for treason. That's my guess. Let me see.
Speaker 1: But yeah, this is treason. Arrest a scumbag the second he lands back in America.
Speaker 2: But what do you make of this? Because obviously there's a lot of people in the US that are really upset with... You can remove it, Stephanie. That are really upset with this war. A lot of them that are empathizing with Iran a lot more than what we've seen during the Iraq war, the Afghanistan war. But Jackson obviously took it to the next level. Maybe just react to the video. What's your reaction to Jackson chanting down with the USA at an Iranian funeral of Ali Khamenei and then thousands of people repeating after him?
Speaker 0: Yeah. So at first, when we entered the video, it sounded like he was getting the crowd to chant USA, USA. I was like, wow, how the hell did he do that? uh so when i saw that it was down with the usa usa i'm like nah that's super stupid exactly yeah like so how does that help and the issue here isn't america and like if i had a chance to speak to the iranian people what i would say to them is no no remember 80 of the american people are against this war and it doesn't mean they're on iran's side but we are aligned and allied the people of Iran and the people of America in ending this disastrous war, right? So don't hate us. If you want to hate our politicians, I get it. But understand that this war has nothing, really almost, even though we're the ones conducting it, the force behind it is Israel. If Israel wanted us to attack Thailand, we'd be attacking Thailand right now. So, you know, we're not the decision making here, which is pathetic and embarrassing. Right. And so they have every right to be super mad at Trump and Rubio and Hegseth. And we killed, you know, 170 schoolgirls, let alone thousands of people overall in Iran, let alone all the damage we've done. But it's their anger should be directed at Israel rather than and definitely not American people.
Speaker 2: You should see, I hope, because I'm seeing all these chants in Iran and it's really disturbing because I think the U.S. is not calculating the impact, the reputational impact this is having on the U.S. A lot of Iranians would love the United States. They look at the U.S. in a very positive light. And this has changed. We haven't seen any polls recently, but this has changed a lot. So that's for me, that is one of the biggest costs other than the economic costs, etc., Is the cost, the damage this is having on America's image, the pinnacle of liberty and freedom and the American way of life, and now to have people chanting this on the streets of Iran, this is the law of unintended consequences at its worst.
Speaker 0: Yeah. So last two things on that, because this is an interesting point. You know, what they think of us has some effect. And, you know, I... Of course, I want every country to like America. I want us to earn that respect of the rest of the world. But more importantly, I don't want this regime in Iran to be in charge. I don't want to do it like the idiotic way that Israel wants, which is kill them all and do ground troops and then murder your way to regime change.
Speaker 1: No, no, no, no.
Speaker 0: I'm 100% against that. But I would love for... organic change in iran and and unfortunately this war has made that so much harder so you know that's more important than their view of america at this point as they it's made them rally around the flag it's entrenched the regime a thousand times more and it looks like they're about to kind of win a war against america and israel which is going to make them super popular so this has been the dumbest most counterproductive war you could imagine And then on the talk of treason, look, man, I think our politicians are traitors. I think our media, most of our media are traitors. Randy Fine is an obvious traitor. But we have to be careful when we use that language. What do we mean by it? And I try every time to say, look, it's my view of it. I'm not talking about the law. And I try to say I don't. I try to say traitor rather than treason because treason is a specific law and it has a very severe consequence, including all the way up to capital punishment. So we shouldn't be having conversations about treason when it comes to someone's opinion on a chant, right? And I wouldn't even go to treason on Randy Fine, who I think 100% serves Israel and borderline despises America and definitely sells us out. But I wouldn't go to a criminal... trial that no no no he's just generically a traitor okay so let's not make this ugly and weird and talk about you know taking criminal action against the other side kuma any political ambitions in a couple of years for me again oh no no no i i have massive political ambitions but not about me and not personally so like my ambition is uh has nothing to do with any of the things we, well, it has a lot to do with the things we talk about, but it isn't the topics we talk about. It isn't Israel. It isn't about gaining power for power's sake. It isn't about any, it isn't about aggrandizing the Democratic Party. No, no, I have one mission and all of this is in service of that mission, which is get a constitutional amendment to get money out of politics and the corruptions. If you end the corruption, you get your democracy back, then you don't serve foreign governments, you don't serve corporations, you just serve the American voters. So I'm on a mission sent by the Young Turks audience to end the corruption, get money out of politics. The only way to do that is to do it stable enough so that it sticks and it works is to get a constitutional amendment. So my political ambitions are to help a president win because a president can put a spotlight on that issue and and actually get the fix that saves the country. So all of this is in service of that.
Speaker 2: Respect. All right, man. Appreciate you coming on, Cenk. Thank you.
Speaker 0: All right. Thank you, brother. Appreciate it.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m watching Tehran’s paperwork as the missiles keep coming: night two of strikes on southern Iran looks bigger, and a U.S. official tells CNN the ceasefire has temporarily ceased. Reuters cites a package outscaling yesterday’s; an unconfirmed report flags Zahedan, and Al Arabiya says Bahrain joined. Trump warns retribution will get worse. Iran may exit the NPT—Barnes’ cue that signals a weapon—followed by harsher Bahrain hits, Beijing consulted on full closure, and, if China resists, the treaty door slams. Insurers won’t underwrite zero mines, drones, or missiles. One more: Eisenkot’s new party tops Likud.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇮🇷🇺🇸 Night two of strikes on southern Iran, bigger than the first, and a U.S. official tells CNN the ceasefire has "at least temporarily ceased" The same coastline kept lighting up, Kish, Bushehr, the Bandar ports, with Reuters told tonight's package would outscale yesterday's. An unconfirmed report points to an army base in Zahedan, which would be a first since June 17, and Al Arabiya reports Bahrain took part in the strikes. Trump posted his own framing: retribution for the ship attacks, and "if it happens again, it will get much worse." Robert Barnes has his eye on Tehran's paperwork above anything in the sky. Iran has threatened to terminate the MOU, seal the strait to all traffic, and, the one he flags hardest, walk out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. An NPT exit, he argues, is how a country announces a weapon. His expected sequence: Bahrain hit harder, Beijing consulted on a full closure, and if China balks, the treaty door slams. Bombing can't reopen the water anyway, in his read. Insurers decide that, and nobody can promise them zero mines, drones, or missiles. One more headline in the chaos: Gadi Eisenkot's new party just overtook Likud as Israel's largest, per a Channel 13 poll. @barnes_law
Video Transcript AI Summary
Robert and another guest discuss whether Trump is pursuing a “grand plan” or simply escalating in a way that is politically and economically destabilizing. They argue there is no coherent strategy and describe the actions as a repeated pattern of “rug pulls,” including sabotaging or undermining the memorandum of understanding (MOU) on Iran and abandoning peace efforts tied to Russia-Ukraine. They claim the oil-market manipulation explanation is more compelling than supply glut or demand destruction, pointing to Russia turning off diesel exports and China increasing refining capacity, and say a spike in oil prices could trigger an economic crash. They also cite Iran statements about withdrawing from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, terminating the MOU, and possibly closing other straits through the Houthis in Yemen—arguing Iran’s “true leverage” is economic rather than purely military.
A key theme is that insurers and shipping companies cannot be convinced there is no risk in the Strait of Hormuz (mining, underwater drones, automated boats, drone or missile threats), so the strait would remain effectively closed as long as the risk cannot be guaranteed. They argue Trump’s approach—bombarding, blocking, and “poison pill” attempts—cannot change that reality, and that it increases escalatory risk for global markets, security, domestic politics, and the global economy. They further warn of possible consequences such as Iran cutting undersea cables that support internet infrastructure in the region, and of broader attacks that could threaten gulf infrastructure.
The conversation highlights timing and retaliation risk. They claim strikes targeting Iran are ongoing across the same southern locations, and that press reporting suggests attacks are expected to be bigger than the previous day’s. They discuss Iran’s stated deterrence logic: escalating pain threshold to “educate” Trump, with Iran allegedly treating coercion as something to answer with increased force rather than backing down. They also emphasize danger from escalation traps: one mistake during strikes or retaliation could lead to a “collapse” dynamic and nonstop unraveling. They note Iran allegedly shot down a U.S. drone and continue to describe repeated targeting of the same areas.
Another major concern is Iran’s broader potential escalation beyond the Strait of Hormuz. They reference Trump’s threat to attack desalination plants and argue desalination would affect the Gulf more than Iran, potentially producing a refugee crisis. They also connect regional instability to economic disruptions including fuel, fertilizer, helium supplies for semiconductor production (linked to AI boom constraints), and downstream effects on consumer electronics prices.
On possible “bigger operation” motives, the guests argue there are practical constraints: they say the U.S. doesn’t have troop size to invade Iran, and fear hostages could create a “Jimmy Carter” style crisis. They claim resources have not been moved for a large operation, and that if Iran is pushed it could retaliate by striking gulf oil architecture, isolating and closing both straits, and potentially cutting undersea cables, with cover enabled by China and Russia. They also point to the allegedly unprecedented human gathering during funeral commemorations as “bad timing,” saying it encourages hardline elements and martyrdom-focused psychology.
Regarding negotiation possibilities and market behavior, one guest raises the idea that oil futures being relatively quiet could mean markets believe Trump wants to avoid war and is striking to prevent Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz further while easing the market and ensuring Iran cannot charge fees. Robert responds that he doubts any method to the madness, arguing that sticking with the early-April deal would have already flooded markets, and that sabotage removed incentives for Iran to open routes. He also argues kinetic conflict contradicts Trump’s earlier statements and that Iran would be motivated to lengthen conflict to maintain leverage and deterrence. They further argue Iran cannot trust U.S. promises on sanctions relief and that the U.S. repeatedly fails to deliver.
There is also discussion of evidence for escalation messaging: Robert and the other guest mention open-source activity where Trump reportedly quote-tweeted or posted an image from Shabahar claiming “retribution” for yesterday’s bombing of ships and threatening worse if it happens again. They also note reports that Bahrain participated in the strikes.
The group briefly shifts to Turkey and the Ankara meeting. Robert says he initially hoped for concessions like removing sanctions and supplying Turkey with F-35s, but that this offends Israel. They discuss potential decoupling between U.S. and Israel, but emphasize Trump’s mindset: prioritizing ego, wanting to be “the head macho guy,” and seeking deference, which they say leads to escalatory risk rather than stable outcomes. They also describe Trump’s praise for Erdogan despite criticisms elsewhere in NATO.
Finally, they discuss Russia-Ukraine strategy, with one guest suggesting Trump is supporting a plan of strikes deep into Russia targeting oil refineries to pressure negotiations. Robert argues Trump’s actions are inconsistent and rooted in hubris, claiming Russia may respond by escalating further, including potential strikes against Europe and potentially limited nuclear escalation discussions. He argues pinpricks enrage Russia and that leadership will treat Trump as an adversary rather than someone who can be negotiated with.
They conclude by returning to Iran’s likely next steps: imminent withdrawal from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and likely steps to close the Straits of Hormuz, potentially while seeking China’s permission regarding Strait closure and Houthis activation. They state their focus should be on whether Iran withdraws from the treaty next, and they anticipate retaliation tonight, potentially expanding beyond Bahrain or Kuwait.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: Robert, we need to understand what the hell Trump is thinking, man. Because everything seemed fine a couple of days ago. I was preparing a trip and then Trump was heading to Ankara. And then suddenly we've got, he decided to stop bombing Iran. What do you make of his statements? What's your analysis of everything and how far could this go? Is he just trying to control the state of Hormuz or... You know, other people that have been yelling that, hey, the war's not over. This is all part of the plan. They just want breathing space before they continue their operation to capture Khagan and whatever. Do you think, you know, this argument is gaining more weight?
Speaker 0: I don't think there is any grand plan. I think this is Trump rug pull number seven and maybe the final one for his own political tenure and for the short term, near term, midterm future of Vice President Vance. I think this needed to hold. And now that it hasn't, as you had Philip on earlier in the day, it was becoming more apparent that the oil market manipulation that you discussed with Chris before that is the better explanation than a supposed supply glut or demand destruction. That now that Russia is turning off its diesel exports, China is turning on its refining capacity. You look at that, it looks like what Trump admitted two weeks ago is likely just around the corner. which is the spike in the oil cost again, which is more likely to trigger a crash economically than anything else. Iran is now talking about withdrawal from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, talking about not only shutting down the Strait entirely. They said if Trump did this, they'd shut it down and they would completely terminate the memorandum of understanding. They haven't failed to deliver on anything they've said so far. that they're going to likely start to look at closing down the other strait through the Houthis in Yemen, and that that will be more consequential than the military escalation will be the economic escalation. That's Iran's true leverage. And whereas they would have been under pressure from China to keep the strait open, Trump has basically greenlit the Chinese to in turn greenlight Iran re-controlling and restricting the Strait of Hormuz. Trump wants to fantasize in his delusional world that he has escalatory dominance when it's been proven the opposite now for four months. And the fact that Vance couldn't hold this for even a month means that his political capital has been expended to the max, extended as far as it can go. And Trump rug pulls it. And he rug pulls it at the same time that he rug pulls any kind of peace negotiation on Ukraine and Russia, starts talking about escalation in the middle of all this, on the Russian side of the aisle, which is just plain insanity. Trump is going to turn out to combine the incompetence of Hoover, the corruption of LBJ, the arrogance of the Bushes, and the deceptions of the Clintons and the Obamas. he may go down as the worst president in American history. That's what he's on path for. And every time Vance gives him an opportunity to escape his own self-inflicted damage, he jumps back in the car and wants to go off the cliff and see how fast he can go while he does it. That's what I see. I don't see rationality. I see irrationality. I don't see logic. I see illogical behavior. I see behavior that doesn't make sense from any traditional Trumpian perspective of his career and his legacy and his history up to this point. I see suicidal, politically suicidal behavior and a delusional mindset and mentality that is going to be disastrous for the Republican Party. This accelerates the timetable of the midterm being a disaster and a debacle, and it increases the probability of impeachments. And probably the best hope right now for J.D. Vance and that wing of the Republican Party, the Republican Party in general, is that the Democrats see so many House and Senate seats that they actually remove President Trump before the 2028 elections in ways that maybe Vance could course correct before 2028 like Gerald Ford in 1976 almost did. But that's honestly the best hope. The best hope for the Republican Party right now is that Donald Trump is not president in 2028 because if he is, there'll be a Democratic sweep in 2028 of all three branches of government.
Speaker 1: Axios just said, sorry, Reuters, a US official tells Reuters that the ongoing strikes are expected to be bigger than the ones carried out yesterday. Fucking hell, man.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I mean, they have escalatory dominance.
Speaker 1: Why? Why? Why? What's the point of this? What's the point Iran did not attack any ships today. They sent the message clean message yesterday. And why they're pushing it to a level where I just I just don't think Trump can afford this politically. He cannot afford this economically. You heard the discussion with Philip earlier that you just reference cannot afford this economically. He can't keep screwing his allies in Asia, Europe, mainly the Gulf. I just don't see the argument of trying to force Iran to concede on the Strait of Hormuz as a fair argument. It's a logical argument. I understand. But Iran sustained war for all these weeks, massive bombardment on a daily basis. They're going to fold with these bombings. Now, the only explanation that I have is they're trying to degrade Iran's ability to close the Strait of Hormuz. But the risk that they're undertaking is what worries me. The risk they're undertaking is Iran's emboldened after these massive funeral processions are like, you know, screw this. We're walking away from the MOU. An MOU that Trump desperately needs. It's just not worth the risk.
Speaker 0: Not at all. And the problem is, as Larry's well explained, unless you remove all doubt in shippers and insurance companies, the strait stays closed as long as Iran wants it to stay closed. You need to convince them that they have no risk of any mining occurring in the strait. No risk of underwater drones in the strait. No risk of the automated boats in the strait. No risk of drones coming in from Iran. No risk of missiles coming in from Iran. They can't guarantee that. The U.S. can't guarantee that. And consequently, the strait will stay closed as long as insurers and shipping companies are not willing to take the risk. And they're not going to be willing to take the risk, at least not anytime soon. So this is just Trump's delusional thinking. He tried to undermine it, poison pill it, sabotage it, and rug pull it. He gets caught doing it. He's been doing this for months now in some form or fashion. And as soon as he gets caught doing it, Iran punishes him for doing it. And then he doubles down rather than backing off. It's incompetency on steroids. It's the art of the no deal, the Trump second term disaster. He's become the caricature. So many people thought of him that he never was before. And this is politically disastrous, economically a debacle. And what happens if they do, if Iran does cut the undersea cables that feed the internet around that part of the world?
Speaker 1: Exactly. That's the fire they're playing with. And what if they decide to start striking the Gulf? They're like, you know what? Screw all this. Like, why take the risk? Maybe they don't. Maybe the strategy works. Maybe they degrade Iran's ability enough where the carrot of like, hey, we'll unfreeze X number of assets and lift Y number of sanctions for you to not charge a fee to straight home was maybe it works. Fine, and that's a fair argument. I'm willing to concede that. But what if it doesn't? That's what my biggest worry is. And as you said, what if they strike the Gulf? Or what if they cut the undersea cables? There's so much they can do. Like, we just got some breather when it comes to oil prices. Trump is like, whew, okay, oil prices are down. Two, three days later, a few days later, bombing the hell out of Iran, risking the closure of the Bab al-Mandib Straits. And now, by the way, just to kind of update you, renewed attacks on Keshe Island, Bashir Island still being struck. Bandar Sirik, the same locations are still being struck. The bombing is ongoing right after Reuters reported the attacks today will be more significant than yesterday. Iran is claiming they shot down an American drone. So we're just seeing, and they claim they shot one down yesterday. We're seeing the repeat from yesterday, but that is the worry that I have. That is the worry that I have is just, you know, Robert Pape talks about the escalation trap. It's just all about the, uh, Just one mistake. One mistake in these attacks could lead to just a trap where we just get into the nonstop, everything just unraveling and collapsing.
Speaker 0: Well, just look at his idiotic threat to attack the desalination plants, which by the way in which he put it, by the way, is intent to commit a war crime. But put that part aside. The people who are at major risk of desalination plants is not Iran. Their water supply is very diversified. Very little of it depends on desalination plants. It's the Gulf that depends on desalination plants. So what happens if they take out those desalination plants? Then you have a refugee crisis on top of everything. And Israel is much more vulnerable than they want to pretend. They are. What if Iran really escalates against Israel in a wide range of ways? So there's so much risk economically, geopolitically, in terms of refugee, in terms of immigration, in terms of fuel, in terms of food, in terms of fertilizer, in terms of helium for semiconductor chips, which we already have a crisis in supply in because of the AI boom. Just ask any gamer looking at the cost of those things. So you aggregate these things. It's all a disaster. I mean, your laptops, your computers, those are going way up in price because of the limitation on semiconductors, part of which has been been triggered by the limitation on helium that's necessary for those semiconductors coming out of the Gulf. So we got multiple layers and levels of disaster and debacle that's incipient because Iran has always had the escalatory edge. They're willing to withstand more pain than we are, and they're capable of inflicting more pain than we can withstand. And Trump just keeps pretending and living in a fantasy world, in a delusional place. All you got to do is surround him by some neocons and some war whores, like what happened when he went to this NATO summit. And all of a sudden, he's not only doing this insanity against Iran. When Iran offered that second off ramp, said, we won't pull out of the MOU if you don't attack tonight. We won't escalate if you don't attack tonight. And then he goes and does it again. I mean, he's a toddler with his finger on the nuclear button. And that's just a sad reality. I say this as a person who defended Trump for more than a decade, not only in the court of law, but the court of public opinion. He's lost it. Larry and I talked about six months ago what Iran started to do to employ shrinks to deal with Trump. They understand that Trump only feels pain, so you have to keep escalating the pain threshold, escalate the fear. So every time we pinprick them, they're going to come back and hit us with a baseball bat. They understand it's the only way to educate Trump. But Trump is just out of control. And then the fact at the same time he's talking nonsense about Russia-Ukraine, about green lighting, further attacks there. I mean, is that a good idea? We're in the middle of an oil supply crisis to further enhance and inflame that issue? Not to mention that he promised to get us out of Ukraine war all the way back, and we're still there. So it's just another failed promise, another betrayal to his voters. I mean, how many of these is he going to compound? It's just incredible incompetency. There's no other... Anybody that still thinks Trump is playing 4D chess doesn't understand the old Thomas Massey lesson. Massey was sitting there talking with some folks, and he was like, this isn't 4D chess. It's maybe at best 2D checkers. And Massey's wife said, no, no, it's checkers where one of them is biting the black chip and the other one's biting the red chip, trying to figure out which one tastes better. That's what Trump is doing in the White House. Maybe the black chip, maybe the red chip. It's embarrassing what a debacle this second term has become.
Speaker 1: Just a report now of U.S. attack is unconfirmed on an army ground forces base in Zahedan. That's the first since the ceasefire. Senior military advisor to the Supreme Leader Mohsen Rezaei, who's a very senior person in Iran. So whoever transgresses against you, transgress against him in the same way as he transgressed against you. The transgressing enemy and his accomplices will be severely punished. Why the fricking grammar today, Lawson? Just another basic threat. But the question I have, are you worried that maybe this is all part of something bigger, that we're talking about the Strait of Hormuz, the US is trying to get Iran not to control the Strait of Hormuz and vice versa, et cetera. But putting all these, the political costs, the economic costs, do you think that maybe Trump is, like one of my guests told me earlier, he's already decided to go all out, and this is just the process of clearing the way for a much bigger operation?
Speaker 0: Yeah, the problem with that is just practicalities. We don't have the troop size to invade Iran. We just don't.
Speaker 1: And the logistics would be- But what if it's just Card Island, something smaller?
Speaker 0: Even that, there he is terrified of what Joe Kent warned, that he would end up with hostages and look like Jimmy Carter on a global stage. And so I think that fear is still too dominant. They haven't moved the, you know, you talk to Larry regularly, Larry will know, but they haven't moved the resources in place for something like that operation to really take place. And even if they did, you know, what does Iran do? They take out the Gulf States oil architecture. They isolate and take out both straits and close them both down. They probably do cut or consider cutting undersea cables because then they have the cover they need with China and Russia. And look at the timing of this. How dumb to do this right at the peak of the funeral commemorations where they're screaming for revenge in the streets of Iran, where they just had the largest human gathering at the same time in human history. That's when you do this? I mean, you're encouraging, incentivizing, motivating the hardest line elements and the hardest line parts of the personality of the leadership of Iran that, as Larry has pointed out repeatedly, all grew up in the Iran-Iraq war. And this is a Shia religious tradition that is built on sacrifice. built on martyrdom. I don't know if you saw one of the videos. I think you were actually showing it a day or two ago, yesterday, where we were hitting some of their port facilities. And you see these cars driving not far away. The cars don't budge. They don't stop and everybody gets out. They don't suddenly go fast everywhere. They just keep bubbling along like it's nothing. That's the mindset you can see in the whole Iranian population. This is tempting and teasing fate. This is repeating the mistake of Rome when they tried to go into the Persians. It's extraordinarily, it's hubris on steroids. And knowing the people that have talked to the president during this time period, it's sad to say there is no grand plan at all. Now, the good news is that means there's no grand plan to invade or to escalate or the rest. It's just instinct. He lacks an executive function. So it goes from thought to emotion and just skips everything else. and says, hammer him, hammer him, hammer him, that will discipline him, that will teach him, that will show him, even though the Iranians keep teaching him repeatedly that that costs Trump more than it costs them, that they will never respond to coercive threat of violence, that they will just double down and triple down, and they themselves will go up the escalatory ladder. What happens if they do, in fact, quickly develop nuclear weapons? I mean, why else would you be talking about withdrawing from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty unless your plan is to show off to the world you've got nuclear weapons in addition to control over the Strait of Hormuz? I mean, this could be the most embarrassing. What if Trump does send somebody into the islands and they get captured and they get kidnapped and held hostage? Then he's Jimmy Carter on steroids. I mean, those were just diplomats that were held before. This would be direct action of Trump that caused them to be held. So then he could have a kidnapping crisis, an energy crisis, an economy crisis, a geopolitical potential refugee crisis, and a nuclear escalation crisis all at once. It would be the dumbest decision maybe in the history of man, at least the history of modern age in terms of foreign policy. But that's what he's willing to gamble with because he's not in the right state of mind.
Speaker 1: Oil futures are relatively quiet. I don't know whether maybe – I'll give you a counterargument – What if oil futures are not going crazy and not spiking to above $80? Remember the numbers that we were seeing back during the war. It's like out of nowhere goes from 70 to 80, 82. Maybe oil prices are low because they do believe Trump doesn't want war. He did say, by the way, he doesn't want war. Despite all the statements in NATO, not enough people are paying attention to a statement he made. Well, to be honest, some people are not paying attention to any statement, but some people are ignoring the statement where he said, he said the MOU is over a troop, but he also said, I don't think the Iran war will start again. When they hit, we hit 10 times harder. We might hit them tonight. Anything's going to happen. It's going to happen very fast. We are not looking for long-term. So we're seeing this. And maybe the markets are seeing this as like, all right, cool. Trump is trying to open up the Strait of Hormuz further. He's striking Iran to make sure that they cannot close the Strait of Hormuz. And that's good for oil markets. So let's give him the benefit of the doubt. What if what he's doing right now is aimed at easing the markets while also making sure Iran doesn't charge a fee? And what if he's actually being very calculated? Let me put it out there. I know this is something that you're not going to be happy with. What if this decision, his advisors have decided, it's a calculated decision, say, we know based on interceptions of their communication, because of X, Y, Z, they have orders from Mustafa Khamenei to not retaliate against the Gulf, not to close Australia almost not to escalate to a new level unless we do ABC so that means we have a bit of leeway so let's just strike them cause them damage so they can't close Australia almost we can get more ships across we can flood the market with even more oil um just putting it out there what if there's a bit of method to the madness that we're seeing right now the hurdle with that was
Speaker 0: Yeah, one hurdle that I'm aware of, because I'm aware of the conversations inside the White House.
Speaker 1: Just so you're aware, the strikes are ongoing as we speak. They took a 10-minute break, and we are having bombing right now of Iran, just kind of for the audience to know, on all the same places as before. Nothing, no, everything's in southern Iran. So that goes to the point. So it goes to the point. Everything is in the south. Everything seems to be focused on Iran's ability to control the Strait of Hormuz. But go ahead, on the method to the madness.
Speaker 0: Yeah, so the problem with that, step problem one, is I know what conversations have occurred over the last six months, and it's just been madness, no method. But secondly, let's say that just kind of coincidentally it aligns with some sort of methodology as an interpretive filter on it. The difficulty with that is... If he would have just stuck with this deal that was cut in early April, we would have already had the markets flooded with oil. Right now, if he was stuck with this MOU and not try to sabotage it by creating a separate Omani route, Iran would have opened it up to more because that's not only what the MOU agreed to, that Iran would restore it back to pre-conflict traffic, but also it's what China wanted to have happen. So Iran was under massive pressure from China to go forward with this. It was one of the main reasons they did it through Pakistan. Now that incentive is now removed because China's not going to put pressure on Iran when Iran's under kinetic attack. And so the probabilities that the oil prices go down compared to going up as long as this continues, is not likely. Then you have the third level of analysis. It contradicts what Trump just said a few weeks ago, where he said we're on the precipice of a cliff. And given we're on the precipice of a cliff, the deal was better than kinetic conflict. He himself admitted, how does right now the kinetic conflict option improve his options? I don't see that as likely to occur. The Iran was agreeing to not charge a fee. They just wanted to control the traffic so they could have that future leverage available to them. We were the ones who were constantly sabotaging. And Trump has done this 100 ways that people don't even know about over the last three months, where something was close to getting done at some function and Trump would poison, pill it, poison, pill it, poison, pill it. He's like almost those psychologically ill people that can't handle happiness. So they sabotage, self-sabotage all the time, their own relationships. That's what Trump has done in the Iran war. Over and over again, he's mostly sabotaged Vance in particular, but he's self-sabotaged himself. That's why I find it very skeptical and doubtful. And then you just look at where Iran stands. Trump's out there saying, oh, I want this to be short. Okay, then what's Iran's motivation then? Make it long. They want there to be real deterrence. And on the sanctions part, How can they trust us? They already don't trust us because of what happened during the JCPOA where we promised a bunch of sanctions relief we never delivered. They complied. We didn't. There was a lot of confession through projection claiming that Iran never complies. It's frankly the U.S. that never complies. And then what does he do in the middle of this? He can't even stick to his no sanctions policy for longer than a week. He says, okay, we're going to release all your sanctions and you can get back the profit. No, no, I don't like it. I'm mad. I'm a toddler. I'm taking my bat and I'm going home. The... How can Iran trust the U.S. at all? They can't. Trump just proved he is deal incapable, which is what the Russians have been saying.
Speaker 1: What if it's just because the only reason he's breaching is not for no reason. It's Iran sticking their guns on wanting to charge a fee and Trump saying no. Maybe this is just not maybe it's just a disagreement. It's not like they have a deal. Everyone's happy with it. There's no disagreements in the U.S. decides to break it. There is a significant disagreement on both sides because we can't just completely ignore the fact that Iran did attack ships. Now, was it their right? Does the MOU allow them to attack ships if they don't follow their orders, etc.? The way I read it, it doesn't. You mentioned Larry a few times. He thinks it does. But either way, whatever the MOU says, Iran did attack ships, putting Lebanon aside. Lebanon is a different beast. There were some concessions there by Israel. But no one really expected Israel to pull out of Lebanon that quickly. And that was meant to be discussed. At least they're not attacking Beirut. And the strikes within southern Lebanon are extremely limited, down by 90%, 95%. But just going back to the disagreement, there is a disagreement. And this is a response to the disagreement. And Iran struck ships as well. So it's not like I just don't want to make it seem like everything's going smoothly. Everything's good. We know the MOE is going perfectly well. Holy shit, they're bombing Iran.
Speaker 0: Well, there's two problems. The first one is Trump doesn't really care about whether they charge a fee. He cares about them controlling the straight as ongoing leverage, that they could shut down traffic whenever they want. That's why Trump was bothered by it going through the Iranian path. Iran was creating protocols so that they could have the future leverage of shutting down the straight whenever they wanted. And Trump didn't like that. even though he signed off to that fund. I mean, that language, if he wanted different language in the MOU, he should have put in different language and got Iran to sign off on it. It says Iran will control how traffic goes through the Straits of Hormuz. And he signed it begrudgingly, but he's been doing this all the time. Like during the negotiations phrase, he'll agree to something. Iran will agree to it. They'll be like, no, no, I want a little more. No, no, I want a little more. Nope, I want a little more. He does it again and again and again and again and again and again. This will come out at some point, but some of that has leaked out from different places, from Iranian sources, but not from U.S. sources because Vance keeps things pretty close to the vest, at least publicly. The problem is it's ignoring reality. In other words, you can say I don't want Iran to have control of the Straits of Hormuz. The reality is the long Iranian coast and the diversity of weapons they have and the psychology of the insurance industry, which is risk averse by nature and by big shipping companies that went just through this disaster thinking it wouldn't happen, that got stuck there for three months with their mariners basically starving. Given that reality, you can't change it by bombing them. You can't change it by blockading them. And he's already experienced this repeatedly, but he refuses to acknowledge reality. It's the true definition of delusion. When you refuse to, you may want, you know, I may want to date Sidney Sweeney. Doesn't mean it's going to happen. But Donald Trump is up there thinking, I'm going to marry Sidney Sweeney next week. So that's what positive thinking on steroids without being tethered to objective realism, which is his current mentality and psychology, creates. He convinces himself, oh, no, this will work and it will be short. Right.
Speaker 1: He just posted now, by the way. This is his post. So this is Open Source Intel posting a photo. I thought that photo was not accurate. It's an old photo. Let me check if this is it. So this photo is not from tonight, even though... Yeah, I don't think this photo is from tonight, by the way. This is an old photo. Anyway, so Open Source Intel, oh, wow. Shabahar Iran posted that photo. And Trump quote tweets them or posts that screenshot on Truth Social. and says this is retribution for yesterday's bombing of ships by Iran. If it happens again, it will get much worse. So he's saying it pretty explicitly that this is a response for what happened yesterday. At least that's what he's saying. Is he lying? We don't know. Also, we do know that Al Arabiya is saying that Bahrain participated in tonight's strikes. Not to what the fuck that means. Bahrain doesn't really have much military capabilities, but they say Bahrain did participate in the strikes. But yeah, your thoughts on this?
Speaker 0: So, I mean, it shows where Trump's mindset is. Trump wants to be the head macho guy. He wants deference. He wants the Iran to recognize him as in control, that he dictates the terms, when Iran is never going to do that. It's not in their character. It's not in their self-interest to do so. So given this, all Trump does is trigger escalatory risk for us. risk for the global economy, global security, U.S. domestic politics, the U.S. domestic economy, the global economy. And he just refuses to stay with the same script for longer than a week or two. And once we get this deal in place, he blows it up. I'll ask you, I can't imagine we getting a long-term deal out of this. I think our best shot is if we just get withdrawals. But I cannot, I think Trump is currently deal incapable, at least in this context, in this conflict. I mean, look at his first two years. The art of the deal maker has failed to get a single deal through Congress. Not a single trade deal, not a single geopolitical deal, not a single peace deal, nothing, zero, zilch, zunca, nada. Now, apparently he's won this war 39 times, which I hear is a record. But other than that, he's achieved nothing in this. He's undermined his own political future and legacy and sabotaged the global economy and security in the process. Now, I think the only thing, what this emphasizes and highlights is the rest of the Gulf countries have got to escalate on their own independent path. If they would remove the U.S. military presence and order that from their countries, then they will not be continuous constant targets of Iran. And it even, to a certain degree, moots the efficacy of the Straits of Hormuz in that capacity. If they want security for themselves, they want peace for themselves, they want prosperity for themselves, the Gulf Coast needs to divorce the United States of America. Otherwise, this is going to continue to have higher risk than higher rewards, this marriage between the US and the Gulf States in terms of security.
Speaker 1: Yeah. I'm seeing if there's any more attacks. How do you think Obama's retaliation would respond? You've watched those. Those funerals were freaking massive, man. Holy shit. Holy shit.
Speaker 0: They set a record for human gathering for any central event in world history. That's why it was particularly bad timing. And that's why I'm saying this is not 4D chess. And there's no method to this madness. Just madness. So I think that the risk is, what I would pay attention to is not how Iran responds militarily, but does Iran withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty? Iran will announce that they're out of the memorandum of understanding. I think that's almost guaranteed now. But the next thing will be, and so that will leave all options open to them. They likely will start to close the Straits of Hormuz and tell ships you can't go through, period. And then they like that that's the one they've got to navigate with China on. But if they withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that means they can escalate quickly on the nuclear front in terms of showing nuclear – because right now, sadly, the lesson of the Middle East, the lesson of North Korea, the lesson of the world in the post-Cold War era has been develop nukes. If you don't develop nukes, we'll take you out whenever we want. We'll break our promises whenever we want. And it was a disastrous thing when we did it. And I suspect we're – if China tells Iran, do not close the straits – Then the next move for Iran is to say we're pulling out of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and show off that nuclear weapon they were threatening that they could have in weeks just a month ago or so.
Speaker 1: So how do you think Iran would retaliate now? What would be your guess?
Speaker 0: My guess would be the same hits, but probably harder on Bahrain. And they'll probably add militarily hitting Jordan. But they'll try to negotiate with China whether or not to close down the Straits of Hormuz and activate the Houthis and shutting down the other main... The one that's been helping is because they've escalated use of it during this conflict that's allowed some of the oil prices and oil supply to stay calmer than they otherwise would. But I think for that too, they'll want China's permission slip. And if they don't get it, then I think they withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and announce that to the world. And we know what's coming after that.
Speaker 1: What do you make of the Ankara meeting, by the way?
Speaker 0: You know, I was hopeful in the beginning, you know, because Trump was like, yeah, I'm going to provide Turkey what they want. I'm going to remove the sanctions, let them get the F-35.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's the Turkey. Maybe let's stick on that one. The F-35s and that, that's pissing off Israel. Smotrich is talking about a new war. He literally mentioned it as a war, a new war. with Turkey. We should prepare for war with fucking Turkey. This guy is mentally retarded. And Trump, despite Netanyahu doing the press tour, saying, Turkey's bad, Turkey's bad, not F-35s, Trump comes in, praises Erdogan nonstop while he criticizes everyone else in NATO, and says he's seriously considering the F-35s. So does that reaffirm the speculation that there could be a decoupling between the US and Israel, or was it too early to say that?
Speaker 0: I think it's a matter of it does provide confirmation or additional evidence on the side that some of us have been arguing that this is not Israel lobby dictated. That it's, you know, the Israel lobby is a big factor in it in terms of what Trump has done in Iran. But Trump sees this as about Trump and Trump being the head man in charge. I mean, I don't know if you saw the, you know, the regime change book where he was comparing himself to, you know, Attila the Hun and Genghis Khan and some people I wish he wasn't comparing himself to. I think in that context, It's more aligned with that, that this is about Trump wanting a 50-foot golden statue of him in his own presidential library, that it's about Trump's own ego. It's almost like a toddler-esque mentality. And for that, him being the king in charge, not Israel being the king in charge, is important. It does help bridge the gap of conflict. getting into the process of divorcing Israel, it doesn't solve the underlying problem of where Trump's mindset was because what I thought was initially a promising gesture turned in by the end of the NATO visit a disaster, especially when you add in some of the comments he was making on Ukraine and Russia. The...
Speaker 1: The technology to be able to manufacture Patriots is pretty big. I don't know if they'll be able to do it because if they create a factory to make the Patriots to start producing them, Russia will just keep bombing that factory time and time again. That factory will take months to build anyway. So it does seem more of a symbolic gesture, but he is doubling down on the support to Ukraine. Now, he is betting on Ukraine's strategy of striking deep into Russia and Russia's oil refineries. He's betting on... Okay, so let me just give you an update on Iran just two seconds before we go back to Russia. So the attacks have stopped about five minutes ago. So I think they're over. Someone told me they're over, but not a source connected to the Trump administration, just an analyst. CNN says a U.S. official told CNN that the ceasefire with Iran has at least temporarily ceased, warning that the situation remains highly fluid and that additional strikes have not been ruled out. In other words, strikes have been ruled out. That's how I look at it. I think this is it. But we'll strike them if they attack us, depending on what they do. The latest strikes targeted missiles, drones, and other capabilities that could threaten U.S. assets, including aircraft carriers, as well as military targets around the Strait of Hormuz that could endanger commercial shipping. This operation involved both U.S. Navy and land-based forces. I got a bit scared when they said both. I'm like, which other country? Further offensive strikes remain possible depending on how the situation develops here, how Iran retaliates, what they would do and what happens in Hormuz. So I think let's see what Iran does in Strait of Hormuz. But let's just go back to, we'll talk about that Strait of Hormuz and what could happen there. Let's go back to Russia-Ukraine because if there was no bombing of Iran today and yesterday, everyone would be talking about Ukraine because that was a pretty big day for the Russia-Ukraine war. Trump supporting Ukraine. Zelensky's strategy of striking deeper into Russia, striking their oil refineries, which is causing energy issues for Putin. Would that work strategically to force Putin to the negotiating table? Some people tell me yes, of course. Other people tell me it will backfire horribly. But Trump is supporting that strategy.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I mean, it doesn't surprise me. Trump's been all over the place. He cut a deal in Anchorage last summer, last August, that could have ended the war, ended the conflict on really very generous terms to Ukraine, relatively speaking to what Russia could do to Ukraine. And then Trump walked it back within about a month. Couldn't handle blowback or criticism from Europe or other sort of deep state interests in the West that are deeply, deeply attached to hating Russia. And have russophobia in their blood. But my fundamental broader view is that you're never going to conquer the civilizations of the Chinese panda, the Persian tiger, or the Russian bear. And that all those who have had fantasies of doing so have sooner or later suffered ignoble defeat. And it is pure hubris to think you can't. But Trump is tempted by that hubris. Much of his second term has been dominated by that hubris. And he's already met his nemesis in the Persian tiger. Ukraine and Europe and the West, and if he joins them, is going to meet their other nemesis in the Russian bear. Russia could escalate very easily. Russia has substantial escalatory dominance in terms of their troop size, in terms of their military capability, in terms of their intelligence aspects, in terms of their weapons in general. So I think it's a mistake, but it's reaffirming. The other problem with this, is Trump had lost the confidence of many of the leadership and people in Russia, especially after the attempted assassination of Putin, that many in Russian leadership blame not just on Ukraine, but on the CIA. And there were CIA stories that leaked the day of where Trump had given them the green light to do so while playing golf with Ratcliffe, saying what's great about this is it will be so deniable. And it's like, well, then why are you leaking it to the New York Times? Kind of kills the deniability part. But Russia's known all along, and they even showed the U.S. after the attack on Putin's residence that the drones that they were able to obtain in full form, because some they were able to knock down without destroying them, showed that it was targeting Putin's residence, and that could only come technologically from the satellites of the U.S., that Ukraine doesn't have that capacity. So the Ukraine I see is desperate. A lot of these efforts are kind of pinpricks, And all it does is enrage the Russian population. I mean, it wasn't covered much in the West, but when they hit that girls' school in that part of Luhansk, which is part of now the Russian part of Donbass, it enraged people in Russia. And Trump doing this at this point will further enrage them, and it will tell the leadership class, you can't trust Trump. Don't worry about trying to do deals with Trump. Don't worry about trying to do business with Trump. Treat him as an adversary in a delusional state of mind. Just try to babysit him like an out-of-control toddler. Try to keep him from blowing up the world that can negatively, adversely impact you. But otherwise, just march on. And I think now, what used to be just the four regions, I think by the end of this, Ukraine loses Odessa. Ukraine loses Sumy. Ukraine loses Kharkiv. Ukraine loses pretty much everything. east of the river and on the Black Sea. And you get stuck with rump Ukraine. Trump was talking about, I can't wait to get those minerals. Newsflash, those minerals are in the Donbass. They're now under Russian control. You ain't getting them, Trump. There's no chance of that. But he lives in his own fantasy land, and he had all these people cheerleading it, people wanting him to do a bunch more sanctions on Russia, like that would work. Sanctions package number 227 is somehow going to magically break Russia. This is hubris, and it's hubris at scale. And it's hubris that risks escalation in Russia may be worse than the escalatory risk from Iran. Because you've had some of the people on that are very significant people in Russia talking about now it's time to start hitting Europe. Now it's time to contemplate a limited nuclear strike. They weren't talking. There's a great description of Russia by Stanislav Kropovnik, who said that it's like a rubber band. We'll pull. You can pull us. You can pull us. You can pull us. And you'll think because we haven't hit back that we won't hit back. But what happens is when we do, it will be hard and fast. Or as the great German leader said, the Russians are slow to get on their horse, but they're fast to ride. And we're encouraging and incentivizing them to get on that horse and ride fast. And I don't think the world really wants to see what that looks like.
Speaker 1: In terms of, look, everyone a couple of months ago was talking about Trump using a nuclear weapon, Trump invading Iran. That was the big fear, Trump wiping out a civilization, Trump lost his mind. And I got a lot of slack when I was saying that, guys, I think the war is over. I got mocked like a mofo when that happened. Well, right now we're talking about Does Trump want to even restart the war? Trump attack, wants to control the straight of homos. And before these attacks, you know, before yesterday, everyone was telling me, or most guests were saying, Trump just wants out. That became the new narrative. And I think that narrative will go back in a few days when things come, if things come. Do you not give him credit for not getting trapped into the worst case scenario everyone was worried about? Everyone was talking about how Israel controls Trump. This whole war was because of Israel. I'm sure Israel influenced him. But they'll decide what happens next. Well, Trump just shat on Israel. J.D. Vance did the same thing. And then he went to Erdogan, praised the hell out of him a week after criticizing Israel, and now wants to give him F-35s. And when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine war, from Biden never even speaking to Putin to now Trump normalizing him and Putin speaking, meeting in person, And even talking about, oh no, he talked about going to Ukraine, not Russia. And still talking about the war, he's saying both sides want to end the war and trying to end the war. His rhetoric is, you know, we criticize him sometimes when he's supporting Ukraine rather than trying to end the war. But it's very different to where Biden was, where it's like anything Russia does, anything Putin says is evil and cannot be trusted. So, you know, I don't want to seem like I'm defending Trump because I'm really upset at this Iran war situation. and the Greenland, Epstein files, et cetera, but mainly the Iran war. But also all the worst case scenarios that people have been talking about are not materializing. In some cases, the opposite is happening. And maybe in two weeks from now, people almost moved away, moved on from Iran. At one stage, we started talking about other topics. There would be days where we talk about half of our interviews are about other topics because the narrative is shifting. There's no bombings. Everyone thought the war was over. Everyone moved on. And I was talking to people about the Emirates. It went back to business as usual. Other Gulf countries, very similar. Saudi is very similar. So it's like everyone's moved on. Even Iranians started, some of them started to move on and start thinking about, all right, let's rebuild. How was the future going to look like? So I just want to put that out there and get your thoughts on it about this other possibility.
Speaker 0: Well, it's like if you came home and your toddler had totally wrecked the house, but at least hadn't burned it down or killed anybody. You know, it's that sort of. And so it's like you're tempted to. I don't got to put him in a straitjacket. He's trying to be good. And then he escalates the next time you get back and you realize you can't he can't help himself. You got to put him in a straitjacket. I agree with you that Trump wants out of this war and that Trump doesn't. But Trump keeps thinking he can get everything. And sometimes you just got to accept what you can get. You've got to recognize the limits on your authority and your power and the tools in your toolkit. Not everything is a nail that requires a hammer. And it's the lesson he refuses to learn, which I just find baffling.
Speaker 1: What if he gets it, Robert? What if we're wrong? What if he gets it? What if we find out two weeks from now Iran conceded on the Strait of Hormuz? I don't think they will. I don't think they will. But I would give it at least a 30%, 35%, 40% probability. So one can argue, why not give it a shot? Why not give it a try for a couple of weeks, see how it goes, see if he can actually get them to concede. If they don't, then he'll walk away, which I think is what he will do.
Speaker 0: That's the problem, is this has been Trump's mindset going back to the beginning of the war. He says, well, what if we hit him here? What if we hit him there? What if we try an economic thing? What if we try a blockade? What if we try this? What if we try that? And every single time, Iran has responded by making it more costly for him to get a deal and not providing him the very thing that he wants to achieve by kinetic purposes because they want to prove to the world. Let me just put yourself in Iran's mind. How do they deter future military attacks? How do they deter future economic attacks? By proving to the world they can inflict more pain than that part of the world can absorb, and they can absorb more pain than their adversaries can absorb. And otherwise, what they learned from the JCPOA, what they've learned from dealing with Trump, is that if they reciprocate with any degree of deference, any degree of reaching out, any degree of diplomatic resolution. It is perceived, as Professor Mamdani pointed out, as Iranian weakness, Iranian vulnerability, Iranian softness. And so what they've learned is they have to be harder than their attacker. And that's what I'm baffled at is Trump convincing himself of something that hasn't worked for, what, 12 weeks straight, somehow magically is going to work now. He tried the diplomatic route. And there was more reason to keep going down that path, which had more possibility of progress. You know, a little bit more money here, a little bit more money here, a little bit more money here, so on and so forth. That could have worked, but he hasn't pursued that path. He keeps going back to the kinetic path, the conflict path. Even though Iran keeps teaching him, we're going to have to punish you even harsher to deter the future Trumps of the world from doing it in the future.
Speaker 1: But you are a lawyer yourself. The carrot and stick approach in general does work. I'd use it in business all the time. It human nature, it does work now too much carrot, too much stick. We could argue that Trump is using a bit too much carrot. He's already beat the shit out of Iran, probably ease up on the sticks and they're not in the right mindset right now to respond positively to sticks. By the way, I'm not advocating for the sticks. I would just prefer carrots diplomacy. And that's my way of, you know, uh, how I would like politics to be, but just thinking of it from his mindset. Maybe he's just using the stick and it does work.
Speaker 0: That's possible. It just hasn't worked as yet. And it's one of the core problems in all of this was Trump not... So if you're in legal negotiations, if you deal with cases, if you're in business negotiations, you really have to understand the other side. Because if you don't, you won't understand what motivates them. I've had a lot of cases where I've told the other side, my client has certain emotional, psychological commitments to this. If you push her in a certain way, you're going to get... more pushback rather than less. There will be no chance of a negotiated outcome rather than more chance. And some big corporate law firms that are used to pushing people around only know one speed. All they see are nails and all they find are hammers. And what they get themselves, they get themselves into far more trouble than they ever would have before had they simply followed that path. And I think Trump is stuck with the Trump used to be great at the carrot approach. He's become obsessed with the stick. And even when it doesn't work and it doesn't work repeatedly and the threats don't work and the threats don't work repeatedly. And yet he won't offer the carrots. He keeps going to the stick. And as long as he keeps doing that, he's going to it's the Persian. If you understood the combination of Shia sacrifice, Persian pride and Iranian nationalism and the realities of dealing with Trump in the West, then the you would know that Iran is always going to punish you for using the stick. They will reward you for using the carrot. They will punish you for using the stick. And Trump just won't internalize that lesson.
Speaker 1: By the way, Eisenkot's Yakar overtakes Netanyahu's Likud to become the largest party in Israel, according to Israeli Channel 13 poll.
Speaker 0: I mean, that's what's fascinating.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it is. Have you looked into Eisenkot?
Speaker 0: Do you know his policies compared to Bibi? Yeah, yeah. In fact, we discussed it a couple of weeks ago, that I was saying watch for him to surge, because if he surges, it shows that the Israelis themselves are realizing they need to walk away.
Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly.
Speaker 0: They're realizing the original Zionists were not a bunch of imperialists. That became a second generation Zionist Likud phenomenon. First generation, as Alistair Crook and others has documented, was we're too small to be going around trying to knock everybody off. Likud took it a whole different direction with the Greater Israel Project. Now they're seeing the consequences of that. Political marginalization around the world to be Israeli is to get booed. If you're an Olympian, if you're a soccer player, if you're just ordinary civilian, you get attacked solely because you're Israeli in public because people are so outraged and enraged. correctly and righteously about the Israel government's behavior. I mean, even South Park did a version of this, where the mother goes to find Bibi Netanyahu to lecture him on how he's destroying the reputation of Jews globally because of the association between Judaism and Israel. That's a mistaken association, in my view. So it's a great sign to see him rise, because that would mean, and there were people in the JD camp in the White House who wanted to see that happen. That they wanted to see him in particular, not Naftali Bennett, because Naftali Bennett is Bibi without the corruption. Him rise as a signal to the Israeli leadership and a signal back to Trump. And the Israel lobby here in the U.S., which is deeply aligned with the Likud camp or with the Bennett camp, not with this new camp, that the game is changing even in Israel, that Israel doesn't want this constant bombardment, this constant continuous conflict, having to look over their back all the time, having this public condemnation globally, a little underreported phenomenon. Israel has been losing population during this time period. I mean, the people who've been leaving Israel and not coming back, saying, I'm not here for all this. This isn't what I came for. I came to be a little tech economy on the Mediterranean with some ancestral and religious ties to the region. I didn't come to be part of some mini fake empire that wants to control the entire Gulf region and Middle East and wants to get into wars with everybody everywhere so that the cigar smoking, champagne swigging prime minister and his wife can continue in their full scale corruption without accountability. That's not what I'm here for. And I mean, I was the defender of Israel in the court of public opinion because my introduction to Israel was through the peace movement in the 1990s, the Israeli peace movement. That movement had faded out, but you're starting to see it resurrect as what they had originally said and what some of us had said. These wars are not in Israel's geopolitical best interest. If you really care about Israel, you should want them out of Lebanon. You should want them having a humane relationship with the Palestinians, ultimately adopting, I think, a two-state solution, which even Dershowitz has has acknowledged for a quarter century is going to be needed to be done and not bombing everybody in every place, everywhere in the world and not planning on let's go on Turkey. Bibi pitched that to Trump in February. He was like, by the way, next is Turkey. So, I mean, that's how nuts this was embedded into them. So it's a great promising hope. And that's why I wish Trump would be on that side of the aisle, because otherwise he has his window of opportunity to renegotiate, renavigate the entire middle, the Middle East and, in a way that's more stable and secure, more peaceful and prosperous long-term. And he keeps going off on the other weird direction, which I just thought it blows my mind.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Robert, um, appreciate you jumping on men.
Speaker 0: Happy to be here. Hopefully next time you can just discuss the world cup or something. So something nice and peaceful.
Speaker 1: I would have, I would have to talk about the world cup. Uh, we've got Malcolm. Malcolm is going to join us now. Um, actually I'm going to stop the stream and he's going to, we're going to join another one in a few seconds to talk with Malcolm, but he's, uh, knows every freaking town village and city in iran so i'm going to have him analyze every single strike what was struck and then probably while talking to malcolm we'll start seeing alerts go off in bahrain and kuwait that's how usually how how it goes no doubt all right all right guys we'll be going live in any second literally in five ten seconds i'm going to stop this live and start a new one with malcolm to go into details on what was struck in iran how Iran will retaliate. They're expected to retaliate tonight. Obviously, that's how it usually goes. They already said they'll retaliate. Will they just retaliate against Bahrain, Kuwait, or will we see an expansion? Today's attacks were more significant than yesterday's attacks, where me and Malcolm have gone deep. You guys know Malcolm, one of the best analysts on the matter. So we'll be going live in a few seconds with Malcolm Nance.
reSee.it AI Summary
I think Philip Pilkington argues Trump didn’t prevent an oil crisis—he hid it long enough to worsen it. He says the strain never left; it was masked in strategic reserves, China’s refinery policy, Russian diesel limits, and physical versus paper oil. Then China, Russia, and prices all moved together, revealing the same underlying stress.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Macroeconomist Philip Pilkington thinks Trump didn't prevent an oil crisis, he hid it long enough to make it worse. For weeks, we were told the Strait of Hormuz disruption wasn't really affecting global supply, and that the market had plenty of breathing room. Philip says almost all of it was fiction. His argument is that the real stress never disappeared; it was simply hidden in the parts of the market almost nobody was paying attention to: strategic petroleum reserves, Chinese refinery policy, Russian diesel restrictions, and physical oil versus paper oil. Then everything started moving at once. China lifted restrictions on its refiners, Russia tightened diesel exports, and oil prices jumped. That wasn't a new crisis beginning; it was the old one finally breaking through. Philip says the Trump administration became so focused on keeping oil prices low that it distorted the market instead of allowing it to adjust naturally. Policymakers chose to give the market cheap energy today by borrowing stability from tomorrow, and now the bill is starting to arrive. He also made a broader point that goes far beyond oil. Markets can absorb bad news, but what they struggle with is pretending reality has changed when it hasn't. Trump may think he bought the economy more time, but Philip thinks he simply delayed the reckoning. And if he's right, the real energy crisis is still waiting around the corner. @philippilk
Video Transcript AI Summary
The hosts recap two earlier discussions: one on why oil prices may be manipulated despite disruptions affecting the Strait of Hormuz, and another deep dive on how futures prices versus actual oil barrels from the Strait of Hormuz can signal manipulation or refinery price gouging.
In this third episode, Philip argues that the “oil glut” narrative is wrong and that the financial press’s explanation has been incorrect. He says the claim that conflict-related supply issues should not move prices “doesn’t add up,” arguing instead that there was never oil everywhere or full capacity through the Strait of Hormuz, with traffic reduced to roughly a fraction of pre-war levels. He links earlier price behavior to pauses in conflict activity around key events and says market narratives were shaped by geopolitical considerations rather than physical constraints alone.
The host provides an immediate market and political update. He notes that after a recent escalation, oil spiked from about $70 to the $78 range, but that prices have not reached wartime levels. He attributes the spike largely to forward-looking expectations—especially worries that the MOU is collapsing and that conflict could resume. He then lists Trump’s comments and reported posture: Trump saying the MOU is dead or could be done without, describing plans to hit Iran again “tonight,” and statements framing actions as denuclearization. He also cites CENTCOM reporting over 20 U.S. Navy warships in the region, and a claim from Iranian news that the “Islamabad agreement is dead” due to U.S. strikes and failure to implement MOU commitments.
Philip focuses on the refining “crack spread” as a key indicator. He argues that crack spreads are exploding in a way that does not look like normal financial pricing. He says this reflects physical costs tied to what refiners are paying for oil extracted from the Strait of Hormuz, rather than simple “price gouging” margins. He claims the crack spread has moved sharply in a day (from roughly the mid-$60s to around $78), and says this suggests the effective cost of oil from the Strait is far higher—on the order of $110–$115 per barrel—than the paper price around $60–$70. He presents this as confirmation of his theory that the cost relationship between physical oil and market benchmarks is being distorted.
He then connects several developments to crack spread behavior and demand. Philip says China has lifted an export ban for refiners, implying Chinese refineries can resume normal operations and that Chinese demand for crude and exports of refined products will increase. He also says Russia has implemented a diesel ban for reasons including Ukraine-related strikes and mounting up for an offensive, implying supply constraints. In addition, he claims the U.S. has refilled strategic petroleum reserves in recent actions around the escalation.
The host asks whether these dynamics imply Trump cannot “afford” to continue the war if Strait-of-Hormuz oil effectively costs much more. Philip replies that consequences will likely take weeks to show up in the broader economy and argues the broader situation is fragile. He says Trump’s behavior is not rational in economic terms and attributes it to emotional and institutional dynamics within the administration, including a “police boss” relationship where criticism or bad news is minimized.
Philip and the host discuss how intervention has consequences in energy markets. Philip argues that instead of letting price signals drive “demand destruction,” interventions and short-term actions have delayed necessary adjustments. He describes front-loading consumption—people consuming more earlier due to suppressed prices—followed by tighter availability later, analogizing it to eating all chocolates immediately and then finding none later.
The host challenges the logic of manipulation by arguing that if markets are being manipulated, escalating strikes further seems risky for a vulnerable position. Philip answers by describing how decision-making may be driven by internal dynamics and distorted information rather than accurate appreciation of economic gravity. He adds that whipsaw effects could occur when Chinese refineries import again, pressuring Brent and affecting SPR availability.
In the later exchange, both acknowledge uncertainty about whether Iran will actually close the Strait of Hormuz. The host says Iran has not fully closed it despite attacks, and that volatility increased without a complete shutoff. They consider the unknowns: Iran’s ability to close the Strait, the U.S.’ ability to prevent it, how many ships would be allowed through, and whether blockades would be selectively enforced.
The episode closes with the host reiterating that he remains optimistic the war will not restart, citing multiple reasons including energy affordability pressures, depleted munitions, and political constraints, while also planning follow-up discussion about likely Iranian responses.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: So we spoke last time, you know, we had, we've spoken twice so far in the first discussion, you were explaining why you believe the price of oil is manipulated. Cause everyone's trying to make sense of why oil prices are so low when the strata humus is still getting disrupted. Everyone's still on edge and the MOU is barely holding together. And then, so that was the first discussion. The second discussion, you did a deep dive on how you calculate it. And you explained on how the prices we see the futures prices versus the price of oil coming out of Strait of Hormuz, the actual barrel of oil, how much they're paying for that and the difference between the two. And you've explained how that difference will give us an indicator on whether the prices are being manipulated or whether there's price gouging by the refineries. That was a great episode we did, and I've spoken about it with a few of my guests. Today's the third episode where you actually, based on the tweet you sent me in the last few days, gave you a better indication on whether your theory that price oil prices are being manipulated um whether it stands so i'd love to get your thoughts your your your thoughts on whether prices of oil prices are being manipulated but also your thoughts on the movement in the last 24 hours the response to the uh to the escalation yesterday yeah so well first of all uh congratulations for beating the financial and economics press because they got it completely wrong
Speaker 0: and a few people on twitter a few people on twitter didn't get it wrong so interesting right it's like that uh that meme where i think it's deserved for all of us actually because you know the bloomberg and the financial times and the wall street journal were all saying one thing and you know not that many people on twitter were saying something different so i think it's now definitively shown that the oil glut theory if you can call it a theory i'd have just called it a lie um the oil glut theory was completely wrong it didn't take much for that oil price to snap back at all and the idea that the conflict in the in the straight was was over was completely ridiculous i mean just before we go into the manipulation and all that um i think i said last time i was on that um that there were a few things going on geopolitically here, guesswork, but it was important. First of all, they're waiting for the next Friday, I think, or on Friday, I should say. But they didn't. They clearly only really cared about the fact that there were a bunch of foreign dignitaries in Iran over the weekend. They seemed completely willing to strike ships, even if there are tens of millions of people in the streets still mourning. So there's that. The second thing that's happened that I did mention on the show before is that I thought China was giving the US some respite. I thought the Chinese were decreasing their imports of oil while the MOU was being attempted. The Chinese official position, and I think unofficial position too, is they'd like to see the crisis in the strait resolved. And so they were giving the Trump administration a grace period, probably of 60 days, to try
Speaker 1: i'll give the audience a quick update on the news while we figure out philip's internet connection so what philip is talking about so far is number one he's been saying that the oil glut the massive supply of oil that flooded the market he he he says it just doesn't add up the number of ships that are going through according to kepler according to maritime traffic the the tracking um uh a website they show about 30 ships a day going through, which is about a third of what it was before the war. So the numbers just don't add up for an oil glut to be there. And what he was just saying right now, it's a bit of a victory lap because the price of oil just spiked up because of the escalation yesterday. And I wanted to ask him, his internet cut out, but I want to tell him that, look, that spike went from $70 to $78. We're not at $80, $90, $100. So we're still way far off from the prices we saw during the war. So I want to get his thoughts on that particular point. And also the price of oil spiked because people are worried that the MOUs completely failed. So the price has spiked because of the expectations, the forward-looking indicators, the expectation that the war might resume. And I'll give you guys an update on why people think that. So as we know, yesterday, there was a pretty significant attack. But more importantly, today, Trump said, He said that the MOU is dead. Let me get all the statements for you to give you an idea of what he said. So he said, we may just do it without a deal. It's easier. These people lie and cheat. Hexath canceled his trip to Israel. Trump also said we hit him. He was meant to fly to Israel, I think, today. And he canceled that trip, which may indicate he's going to prepare for a resumption of war. um he trump also said we hit them iran very hard last night we hit them very very hard probably hit them hard again tonight i'll give them a little warning we're going to hit them hard so he's just talking about he's made other statements that he's going to attack them again today um he says this is not a war this is a denuclearization of iran and i'll say i'll probably probably hit them hard again tonight keep saying the fact that he's going to hit them hard so my question to you philip on the first point you made that what we saw just now was the price of oil to show there was no massive oil glut. But I don't know why you come to that conclusion because it didn't spike from 70 to $100. It went from 70 crude, went 70 to 78, which I know sounds like a pretty big spike, but that's a spike when Trump said the MOU is dead. That's a spike because people are worried the war could restart. So it's a justified spike for a forward-looking indicator. The price of oil is always based on the expectation of what could happen. The price of oil dropped before an MOU was reached as soon as there were indications of an MOU. And now the price is increasing because there's indications the MOU might be coming to an end.
Speaker 0: But we were told that there was an oil glut. If there's an oil glut, then there's oil everywhere. And we don't need more oil.
Speaker 1: But even if there's... Yeah, but oil glut doesn't mean there's oil enough for three to six months. And oil glut means there's a breathing room to get things back up to normal. But does it mean like if a war restarts, that means the Strait of Hormuz could be closed for another two to three months. So all these factors are taken into consideration by the market. So the price of oil might be taken into consideration that the Strait of Hormuz could be closed again for three months.
Speaker 0: But the Strait of Hormuz was partly closed. I mean, none of the narrative makes any sense here. Either there was an oil glut or there wasn't. Either the Strait of Hormuz was open or it wasn't. Either there was no risk of renewed conflict or there was risk. And if I, you know, I don't know if I made all those points on your show, but I've seen other guests come on. There was no oil glut. That was a lie. That was made up by the financial press and by the Trump administration. There was no full capacity moving through the Strait. It was at about... But at most a third, I think it was probably about 20% capacity, if even we could debate that. And was there no chance of the war starting? Are you kidding? And I said to you last time, I thought the conflict in the Strait had been paused basically because of the Ayatollah's funeral. I was too bullish. I was too bullish on the Strait. I thought that they stopped the strikes until Friday, until the Ayatollah was buried. So if I was too optimistic, then what can we say about the oil markets that are supposed to price these things?
Speaker 1: Yeah, I am. But the oil, what would you expect the oil price to do if now there's talks about the MOU collapsing and strikes resuming? Of course, the oil is going to go up. It doesn't mean there was no oil glut. So there was a massive oil glut before the war. A lot of ships around flooded the market with ships, those floating storage ships. They called them the floating storage all across the sea because they were expecting or anticipating the possibility of war. So there was an oil glut before the war started, yet the price of oil still spiked because of the war. So even if a lot of oil came out and gave breathing room for the market, but the price of oil went down not only because of the oil glut, but because they expected things to go back to normal, the Strait of Hormuz to open. And now when there's talks about a war resuming and a full closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Recently, it's been open, but just issues happening in a third or 20% or 40%, whoever you want to trust. But a small percentage of number of ships going through, but it's not a complete closure. So the price of oil going up now, even if there was an oil glut, if increased fears the war would resume, of course, prices are going to go up. And again, it hasn't gone up from like $70 to $100. $70 to $78, $78 is still a very cheap price.
Speaker 0: So yeah, so let's jump, let's jump on a time machine, I guess. Like, okay. So the actual communication that the Trump White House and the financial press were telling me a week ago or 10 days ago was there's an oil glut for like two days or something. And the straight is partly closed, but we think it's fully open. But everything we're saying about this oil glut and about the economist was wrong about oil prices. All of it was contingent on the MOU holding. I mean, okay, fine. I mean, maybe that's what they were saying. Like that's not saying oil is down and there's oil in the markets. And like, I think it was a giant, I think it was propaganda. I think it was war propaganda. And I think a bunch of the financial and economics press participated in a particularly virulent form of war propaganda. And I think their credibility is going to be hurt for it. But anyway, I suppose there's no point in relitigating the path. past in the past five years since covid we've been moving forward uh ever quicker and forgetting about what happened yesterday um but you know i think that they lied i think that they made a bunch of nonsense up um but today now obviously the whole thing's collapsed kind of spectacularly and i think that the americans knew it was going to collapse because you see some sbr build up last night i put the stats up on my twitter uh there's zero h posted them as well um so there were a actually pulled minor inventory build up last night of crude oil presumably at the lower prices that they'd manufactured just to get you know a day or two's worth before you're saying sorry you're saying hold on they've they've refilled the strategic reserves well they put in what they could you know I mean they were dumping dumping dumping and then we got the data this morning showing that they they tried to pull in a bit last night so the the response was planned But I think the key thing to understand here is that the Chinese have said no bueno today. This morning when I woke up to the strikes and I woke up to an announcement on behalf of half of the Chinese saying that they were stopping the export ban of refiners. And what that actually means is Chinese refineries are for business to go back up to normal. So again, this is what I thought was going to happen. I thought that the Chinese were giving the Americans a chance to implement the MOU. And once the MOU fell apart, the Chinese said, screw this. Basically, we're going to go back to normal business as usual. So oil demand from China is about to pick up. The Russians have just put in place a diesel ban because of the, well, multiple reasons, but partly due to the strikes by Ukraine, partly due to Um, they're probably mounting up for an offensive, frankly, in the Donbass, and you need a lot of diesel to do an offensive to, for tanks and so on. So they've implemented the diesel. Well, uh, consequences, consequences are coming. There's no free lunch in economics. And if you go meddling with markets for two weeks and you go kind of like kicking the candidate road, I'm asking to be bailout when you are not that motivated to make the MOU work. there'll be consequences for that and we're starting to see the consequences of that now not just in the oil price the crack spread has gone up the crack spread has absolutely exploded now why would the crack spread explode when the oil price explodes it looks like i was correct last time i was on the crack spread was not just uh the margin the crack spread was not just representative of what the oil uh refineries were charging it wasn't a price gouging situation It was baking in additional costs that we couldn't see in the paper roll market, whether that was the futures market or the spot market. And so the crack spread today, I think, is up to over $75 a barrel, which is shocking. Let me, Lisa, can you take a look at the spot?
Speaker 1: Yeah, Phil, we're going to continue doing this, Sam. just the team is going to take you up stage because you keep cutting in and out um just for the audience we'll i've wrote notes on what philip has said so far to break it down the russian diesel ban the export ban by china with the lifting of the export ban um also the america refilling its strategic reserves yesterday that's i didn't see that report and also the explosion of the crack spread which shows that the crack spread is not just the refineries are making a higher margin but it's actually the cost of the oil that they're getting out of the Strait of Hormuz. For that to explode means the price of oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz has exploded as well. So it's not them making a higher margin, which confirms the theory that Philip has spoken about in previous discussions. The price of oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz is significantly higher, and according to his calculation, it's about $115, $110, $115 a barrel, and not the $60, $70 a barrel we're seeing in the markets, the paper price of oil. That's a very important point because it means, well, it's a bizarre point because if this is true, then Trump cannot afford to continue this war. So I'll ask that question to Philip when he's back on. I'll just go back to some of the statements. So Trump has made all these different statements about war starting again. He says, I'm not sure I'm going to make a deal with them again. With Iran, we can play games, but I'm not sure I want to make a deal. Let's just finish the job as in bomb them again. As CENTCOM put out a statement about an hour ago today, more than 20 U.S. Navy warships are patrolling waters across the Middle East as CENTCOM forces continue promoting regional security and stability. Trump also answered about boots on the ground in Iran. He says, why would I go in now? I'd go in when they're completely either eliminated or whatever happened or an agreement's made. Tasnim, the Iranian news outlet, said the Islamabad agreement is dead following the latest U.S. strikes on Iran. arguing that Trump had effectively ended the MOU by failing to implement its core commitments and by authorizing military action against Iran. And they start talking about how the U.S. cannot be trusted, how they've abandoned the JCPOA, etc. And then everyone all eyes on what happens tonight. So Trump has said he'll strike Iran hard tonight. He's made threats about striking their infrastructure again and talking about seizing Karg Island. So we're back to the same rhetoric we had before the MOU and we had before the ceasefire, especially before the MOU. About the deal ended, he also talks about putting a blockade again. He calls the Iranians liars. He says we make a deal with them. Everyone agrees, no nuclear weapons. Then they go outside and talk to the press and say they've never talked about anything. So you're saying that the Iranians are lying. They talk one thing in the discussions, in the agreement, and another thing in the... publicly when they make statements. So he's pissed off about this. Philip, I've just explained on the crack spread, the increase. I want to go back to the, so the US has refilled the strategic reserves. So it's kind of preparing for something. Only a tiny bit, only like a tiny bit. So they started refilling the strategic reserves. You said there's a Chinese export ban has been lifted.
Speaker 0: Yeah, the export ban by China is lifted. Yeah, that means that import demand is going to go back up by China.
Speaker 1: Okay. Okay.
Speaker 0: So that's the Chinese... And the Russians have put a diesel plant in place. It'll probably be there for six weeks or so.
Speaker 1: Okay, so putting all this together and then the crack spread exploding, which indicates that the big difference in price between the margins and the crack spread is not because of the... because of the price gouging, but it's because of the higher cost of the oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. And you said when the crack spread exploded even further in the last 24 hours, it means their cost went up. So the price spike we saw in the last 24 hours has been reflected in the cost of the oil, confirming your theory that this is not price gouging, that the price of oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz is a lot more expensive than the paper price of the barrel. So putting all this together, so if your theory is accurate that the price of oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz is a lot more expensive, doesn't that mean that Trump cannot afford to continue the war? That's good news. Because the cheaper price of oil is, the more breathing room Trump has to be able to escalate and strike a run. But the higher the price of oil is, the tougher his position is and he has to concede. He cannot afford conceding. for the Strait of Homs being closed. Like if the Strait of Homs, the way it's partially opened right now and the price of oil is, as you say, 110, 115, 120 now a barrel. Again, that's the oil coming out of the Straits. That's what the Straits partially open. That means if it's completely closed, then Trump and the Western world and the US is completely screwed. So from a peace perspective, that's a positive thing. Do you know what I mean?
Speaker 0: I don't think so. I mean, in a rational world, that will be true. But we're not going to see the full consequences of this, you know, bleed into the economy or whatever for another couple of weeks, right? I don't want to put a date on it, but it's probably like September, October, we'll start to see inflation and so on kick in. We might see energy shortages too. I mean, I've always thought that was a possibility. And we'd see that pretty, you know, quicker, I guess. But No, I mean, Trump was at the NATO summit and he basically redeclared war on Iran. He said, like, I'm going to destroy you or whatever. This isn't a rational. These aren't rational behaviors anymore. What's happening is that Trump is operating on an emotional basis. I won't go into that. But, you know, there's some speculation. Well, he's become more emotional since in the second term. I was never one of these people who thought Trump was a lunatic or that he was a dictator, and I never bought any of that. I thought he was a pretty rational guy. You can't run a business and become as wealthy as Trump did while being a loony, right? But in the past couple of months, I don't think Trump's been the same Trump, if I were to be honest. I think he acts much more emotionally, and I think it might be a sign of him getting older, to be honest. I'm not the only one that says this. It's an ongoing rumor in DC. Um, there's no secret. If you talk to people who are around DC, people talk about this all the time. I don't think he's like seen all or anything like Biden was at the end of his term. But I think that, you know, as you get older, if you're, if you had a grandfather or anything like that, they can get a little bit more, um, angry. They can, they can lose control over their emotions a little bit. And I think that might be what's happening with Trump. The problem is look, it's not the first time you've had. Issues like that in the white house, famously Reagan Reagan was like that toward the NSO with Margaret Thatcher actually in Britain. The problem is that the administration seems to be accommodating basically everything. I mean, if I'm correct about the manipulation in the oil price market, this was the most stunning, and I don't mean stunning in a good way. I mean, this was the most shocking manipulation in a physical market in history. And it was so reckless and so short-termist and so dangerous. And we're going to see the consequences of it now. We're starting to see the consequences of it now. that no one should have ever done that unless you were in a life and death situation. But it wasn't a life and death situation. It was just to buy a couple more days. It was just this short-termist thinking. And I think it was basically aimed at getting Trump to smile, basically. I think it was to come in on Monday morning or on Wednesday morning and say to the boss, boss, the oil price is down. And he goes, yeah, good. I like that. You're a good guy. I think that's what was going on. And it's scary. Yeah, I mean, look, eventually there will be peace because the Western economy is going to like collapse or something like that, or it's going to scream at least. But I don't expect to see it anytime soon. I think we're entering a new phase of the Iran war. And I'm not saying that based on any speculation. I'm just saying that based on what the parties are saying. Also, look at the mood in Iran. Like, did you watch some of the speeches at the funeral celebrations? Like, those guys aren't like, yeah, the war's over. They're like, they killed my religious leader. Death to America. I mean, that's what they were saying. So they're mad. They're spun up. They've just had a couple of days of probably the biggest mass rallies the country's seen since the 1979 revolution. Very hostile to the Americans. Very hostile. And then the Americans have kind of restarted the war in a sense. We can lay blame there wherever we want, but somebody restarted the war and the Americans went in. And the oil price is now... Now it's getting dangerous. The Chinese are no longer willing to do the bailouts. They've shown that. The Russians are restricting diesel for different reasons, but maybe there was a mild agreement on that too to lay off the diesel restrictions. So the bailouts are gone. Strategic petroleum reserves have been run down massively in the past two, three weeks. There's only a few more weeks that they can get away with doing that. We discussed that on the show before. Crack spread has gone nuts, completely crazy. Crack spread plus a barrel of oil now must be nearly 150 a barrel, right? Prices at the pump are going to rise. They're going to rise very soon, I think. I think we're going to see those rises next week or the week after. I think, yeah, I think the consequences are going to be...
Speaker 1: So when you say crack spread is 150...
Speaker 0: Crack spread plus the barrel. Plus the barrel price. Sorry, that's what I mean.
Speaker 1: Can you, sorry, just explain that again?
Speaker 0: So the, the, the crack spread is the margin on top of it. So I take a barrel of oil, I refine the oil, I sell the products and that's the crack spread. So that's 75 bucks or something. It's still 75 bucks for the barrel of oil. So the total, total is that. Okay. Sorry. Yeah. I got that.
Speaker 1: I got that for the end product. Sorry. Sorry. For the end product. So, so, so the end product price is about one 55 now a barrel, something like that. The refined product price.
Speaker 0: yeah and then the chinese will come in right so when the chinese refineries come back online which is today this morning the chinese refineries will should actually put pressure on those crack spreads unless they've completely unless the americans have completely broken the market but they should put some are we sure that china lifting the import the export ban so they'll be starting to import more crude oil
Speaker 1: to refine it and export more refined product. Them lifting that ban, are we confident that this is the reason the demand in China's dropped? Because some people are saying China's using their strategic reserves or demand is genuinely dropped in China. And also I had a guest yesterday who was talking about the price of war and his biggest concern is the global economy. He's telling me, that the reason the price of oil, George Gammon, and the reason the price of oil, he's not an energy expert, but he's looking at the global economy. He's like, Mario, there's a genuine slowdown globally. So it's just a story of demand destruction that is leading to that price of oil.
Speaker 0: Well, we're about to find out, aren't we? Just like with the cracks. You see, what's really beautiful about this, look, I've been doing macro stuff for 15 years, okay? And the great thing or the bad thing about being a macro guy is you always get away with calls because they're so long term, right? You go like, oh, the Chinese economy is going to collapse. And it's like, check back in with me when by 2030, you're not going to want to talk to me. You're not going to know me, right? So it's really easy to get away with macro calls. What's really interesting about the current moment is people that are making calls based on stuff that's going to be falsifiable in like 10 days. So if it's true that that was, we're gonna see, we're literally gonna see in the next like week or two, what was true or what wasn't. So if the Chinese imports go back up and they go back to refining the product and exporting it, which is what I think will happen, well then there was no demand going down in China. We just won't know that. And I think that'll put pressure on the crack spread. So I think basically the Chinese, getting rid of the export ban will rebalance the oil between the crack spread and the oil price. So the crack spread will come down and the price of oil will go up, right? And so it'll rebalance. And that chart I showed last time with the scatterplot, that'll start to renormalize. I don't think that the Chinese thing was the only reason for that disconnect. I do actually think there's no strong evidence that refiners were paying more for oil than was advertised by the spot price.
Speaker 1: But I think some of it definitely is due to the fact that the Chinese refineries are purchased. So if all the refineries stocked up on all the oil, all the oil that was floating during the war. So they bought up all that oil just in case the war drags on for six to 12 months. Is the crack spread based on the oil they're buying right now? Could it be the oil that paid for a month or two during the war? Does my question make sense?
Speaker 0: Yeah, it must be right now because look what just happened. I mean, I don't have the chart here. I could pull it up, but we don't want to waste my time. The crack spread just exploded today. It went up from about $65 a barrel.
Speaker 1: That's the tweet that you sent me. Yeah.
Speaker 0: Yeah. It went up to like 78 or something like this was like, just, if you can get it on the screen, it will be fantastic. And it'll give the viewer the sense of like how fast this moved. Um, and just to prep the viewer for, for, for thinking about this. Oil prices can move very quickly, okay? Because they're paper market prices. They're like stock prices or crypto prices or something like that. They can move very quickly based on bid and ask spreads or whatever, right? But the crack spread is kind of a physical thing. It's the margins. It's the margins that the refineries are charging. Crack spreads shouldn't behave like stocks, cryptos, oil futures prices. But the chart today, the data today coming out of Bloomberg shows it going up by like 10 bucks or something like that in a day. Look at that. Like that's not normal. That's behaving like a market price. That's not a market. People got to understand this. This is the refining margin being charged by refineries. It's not like a crypto.
Speaker 1: How did that cost go up so quickly?
Speaker 0: They were looking at the spot price of oil. The spot price of oil moved like crazy. And the reason I think that proves what I'm saying is that the crack spread is massively reflecting the price of oil. It's just been misrepresenting it for two weeks, which is what we talked about the first time I came on the show. It was a hypothesis. And look, you can never fully prove things in these markets, but that's as good a proof as you're going to get. But look, something weird is going on and there's going to be consequences with this. Like if anyone's taken an economics 101 class, you'll go in and the, and the economist will tell you like, you can't mess around with markets too much. I'm not even the most free markets guy on the planet. I consider myself a Keynesian economist and I'm not even against like financial regulation or anything, but the level of intervention that's been undertaken in that oil market for the past week or two, like. It's so irresponsible. And we're starting to see the markets just crack up. I mean, not to put pun intended, right? But you just showed that chart. That's not normal. What's happening there is not normal. And we're gonna see whipsaw effects when the Chinese start importing again. There's gonna be huge pressure on the price of Brent spot more than there already is. And then SPR, what's gonna happen with SPR? The other thing I told you last time on the show, like the SPR has basically been subsidizing uh reserve building by the germans and the and the uh dutch i think we're doing it as well the germans i think it was the dutch and and so like if they continue hemorrhaging uh oil out of the spr in a sense that oil is going to china to be refined in chinese refineries not not literally but like it's all fungible so you're pouring it's like a bathtub right the us are pouring into the bathtub and the chinese are turning their tap on to take out of the bathtub And so they've created a dog's dinner, as we say in Britain and Ireland, like they've created a complete mess here. And I don't, I don't, I think they said in Australia too, right? They, they, this is a mass, this is a real mass that they've created and everything seems centered on the MOU holding. And I can tell you, knowing people in politics and DC and so on, everyone knew the MOU was a long shot. It was like 25% probability that thing was going to hold. And that's fine. Look, that's the way conflicts are. I wish the Iran conflict hadn't started. I know how hard it is to put a conflict to bed, but that market manipulation, like you can't do that. That has consequences. They should, what they should have been doing at the beginning of this process is allowing the price to rise and what's called demand destruction. Allowing the price to reach its normal level and allowing people to, to get rid of their consumption. Right. to bring down their consumption in line with the physical realities of the oil market. And what they've done is they've pushed the shortages down the road. So let's say that if they'd done it realistically in May and June, I'd have only got whatever, one barrel of oil as a person. Now what they've done is they've allowed me to get 1.2 barrels of oil in May and June. And then on the back end, you know, July, August, September, I'm only going to get like 0.6 instead of 0.9. So it's like consumption. It's like you're front-loading the consumption. It's like a box of chocolates, right? Like if there's a box of chocolates and I've only got one, I can eat all the chocolate tonight and then I won't have any chocolate tomorrow. Or I can eat half the chocolate tonight and then I'll have chocolate for tomorrow. And what they did was they allowed people through the price mechanism to eat all the chocolate. And now people are going to go, but I want a chocolate. And they're going to be like, sorry, there's no more chocolate. And there's a war. It's so bad, man. This is so wrong.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but where it just doesn't add up is Trump's actions in the last 24, 48 hours and the theory. Because based on your theory, if someone's manipulating the markets, they would be very careful not to screw everything up, not go there and jeopardize everything again. He could have held the MOU. He could have attacked Iran in a proportionate way, and then Iran would have retaliated, as we've seen before. So there's a term, don't throw a rock when you're in a glass house, something like that. You don't do these things if you're in a very vulnerable position. And based on what you're saying, Trump is an extremely vulnerable – or the U.S., is in an extremely vulnerable position. So why would he play around with the MOU as he is now? Why would he escalate yesterday and strike Iran to that extent and plan to strike them again today? That's where it just doesn't add up.
Speaker 0: I don't think he has an understanding of the gravity of the economic situation.
Speaker 1: I don't, I don't, I know people dismiss it. I don't think so. I know people, a lot of people say this. I just, I really don't think so. I really don't think so.
Speaker 0: You know, I'm not saying Trump is stupid. It's nothing to do with that. I was a Trump.
Speaker 1: I'm not even talking about Trump. I'm not going to talk about talking about the people around him as well.
Speaker 0: I think the people around them have gone into a position where it's a police boss dynamic. If anyone's ever worked in corporate before and a police to boss dynamic sets in, it can be very dangerous. Anyone who's worked in corporate and seen that dynamic has seen whole parts of companies being destroyed through that. If the boss is kind of worshipped a little bit as an idol and nobody will give them criticism, nobody will give them bad news. Yeah. I mean, I've seen that in my professional career. I know what it looks like. And I think that's what's happening in the Trump administration. I think that there's a huge inclination for for people in the administration to give Trump good news. I mean, you know, at the NATO summit today, um, it must've been, it was in Turkey. So it was only what an hour ahead of me or something. So it was at about, uh, 12 o'clock noon or something, maybe one o'clock Trump was saying the oil price is coming down. The oil price has been going up at that stage for 36 hours. So what's going on there? Why, why didn't anyone that shows that nobody like.
Speaker 1: texted trump and said the oil price has been going up trump talks shit all the time trump makes shit up all the time like this is this is this is kind of roy cohen thing like just lie enough where the the lie becomes a reality you create your own reality whatever it is this is This is Trump's MO, whether one likes it or not.
Speaker 0: Yeah, and create your own reality is also what you do when you manipulate market prices by screwing around with algorithms. I think that's exactly what was going on there as well. I told you, the first time I came on the show, I said that we were at the Mad Hatter's Tea Party. We're at the Mad Hatter's Tea Party and the white rabbit, you know, you chase the white rabbit down the hole and now there's a Mad Hatter and he's telling jokes or whatever and making nonsense statements. I mean, we're there. But the point is, like, look, it's all baked in now. There's no putting the next phase of the Iran conflict back in the box. I don't think it'll be as intense as the initial phase for what it's worth, but we're going to see now a couple of weeks of hostility and maybe they'll try and get the MOU back on track, but that's going to be a couple more weeks of clogged straight-of-form moves, et cetera, et cetera. And the actual realities of what I've said, like the Chinese are now saying, okay, no more bailouts for you. We're turning back on the import tap. And we're going to send refined product into the world. And, you know, that'll rebalance the markets to some extent. Sure. But it just, it'll drive up the price of oil, obviously. And I mean, I don't think we've talked about it on the show before, but if this keeps going, like we're going to have a depression or something. At the very least, we're going to have a massive recession of the size that we saw in 2008, 2009. I mean, I don't know if you've been following the AI tech market, right? So next layer of the conspiracy onion, part of the reason that they were trying to get those oil prices down so quick was because the AI sector, which is driving the entire NASDAQ basically, was fragile. It's become quite fragile. And it's become fragile for, as we say, endogenous reasons in economics. They've overspent on these data centers, right? They've built too many of them, basically. You've probably had other people on the show to talk about this before. It's a pretty standard view. I saw today it was announced that the Treasury, the US Treasury, has an internal report that was leaked saying that the AI could be in a bubble, right, due to these data center, overbuilding of data centers. Very reminiscent bubble of the 2000 bubble, the dot-com bubble, by the way. Very, very similar. And basically... So those stocks have already been coming down. I didn't check today, but I mean, they must be down four or 5% this week or something, the main, the max, max seven or whatever is left of the max seven. And, and so, you know, that whole thing, the building of data centers is basically driving the American economy right now. The reason the American economy is growing and not in stagnation like Europe is because of the building of these data centers that also explains what, by the way, why the surveys in America are so bad. because it's really uneven growth, right? So the average person is seeing stagnation in America, but GDP figures show growth because these enormous capital expenditures are going down building these data centers. So, you know, if we see a major, so for example, the way it would work is if we start to see prices go up, fuel prices go up, start to feed into inflation, possibly even fuel shortages that's a possibility and and we can talk about that if you want could a fuel rationing I mean that's that's completely possible to my mind and then the the inflation will start to go up in the and the Fed will start to Jack interest rates and there's been an all hands on deck approach to stop this happening the reason that Kevin Warsh was put in place and they put enormous pressure on Jerome Powell to quit was because they wanted a more compliant person at the helm of the treasury of the, of the fed. Right. But you can only do so much, you know, you're, you're chairman, you're not dictator. You have like a board, there's a board of federal reserve governors. And in fact, there's other, you know, there's other boards of federal reserve governors at the regional fed too. So you can't like, you can't hold back the tides. And if inflation really starts taking off and, and they raise the rates, um, that, that could put pressure on the, on the NASDAQ. And if the NASDAQ crashes, like it's game over basically. I mean, the Chinese put pressure on the NASDAQ before through their rare earth mineral sanctions. And basically that was targeted at collapsing the American economy through collapsing the AI firms. And I think the straight strategy by the Iranians is actually quite similar. I think they basically copied it from the Chinese. So we're in a really tough spot right now. Look, you don't want to make any predictions. You know, you always say like economists have predicted four out of the last two recessions and all that. I don't like making predictions. I don't like making predictions. Yeah, and it's true. But look, the situation now is really fragile.
Speaker 1: Yeah, you know how I told you that your theory just does not make sense if you put it in the context of what Trump is doing politically and militarily. I'm saying that if someone's looking at what happened yesterday, And genuinely believe, the people that genuinely believe the MOU is actually dead, we would see a resumption of the war. It's definitely possible. I would still be leaning to no. We are seeing the same tit for tat we saw over the last few weeks and months, weeks. And we're just seeing just a more aggressive version of it. I don't think the MOU is dead. This is just a power struggle on who's going to control the state of the world.
Speaker 0: Okay, so here's the question, but let's say you're right. Let's say you're right on the war.
Speaker 1: Which aligns with your theory, brother, which aligns with your theory. Because my theory is why would Trump start the war if he's manipulating the price of oil? He can't afford to restart the war. That's my question to you. But I don't think he's restarting the war. So therefore, that question wouldn't apply based on my belief.
Speaker 0: No, but I'm saying, so if you're right, and I don't know, it looks to me like he is, but I don't know any better than you do. We're guessing, right? But if you're right... Iran have clearly shown yesterday that they're willing to close the Omani witness trade, right? We agree on that? So that means that the oil price is still goose, man. It doesn't matter.
Speaker 1: Like, okay, maybe... Yeah, there is a power struggle. So they closed the... There's a lot of unknowns, unknown unknowns. So number one is... How capable are they to close the Omani side of the trade home? I think they're pretty capable, but there's people that disagree with me. They say, Mario, there's more ships.
Speaker 0: They hit five ships yesterday.
Speaker 1: I know, I know. There are three. I know that they are capable, unless they hit two more today. They hit three total in 24 hours.
Speaker 0: I saw reports that five were hit.
Speaker 1: It was five since the warning, because I saw that report was five, not in the 24 hours. It was five from over the last few days since they gave a warning. But anyway, I think they can. Now five, they hit three, but how many actually managed to get through? I don't have the exact number. I believe in the numbers you've mentioned. There's about a third based on Kepler's report, a third of what they were before the war. But question number one is how capable is the US in preventing Iran from closing the Strait of Homs? How capable is Iran to close it? Number two is how many ships would go through the Iranian side would the US allow them? The same way with the US blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, they were allowing a lot of Iranian ships to go through because they needed it for the markets, even though they were saying that there was a blockade going on. Could we see the same thing happen again? Could we see them allow a lot of ships to go through the Iranian side? Because Iran is not charging a fee, so there's no reason for ships not to go through the Iranian side, at least in the next few days till the MOU is over, the deadline for the deal is reached. So I just think that Yeah, there's just a lot of unknowns on what would happen next and whether Iran will close the Strait of Hormuz. Iran hasn't closed it. There's been rumors they would close it. They have not yet. Despite the attacks yesterday, they have not yet closed the Strait of Hormuz. Everything's right now, as of right now, everything's the same as it was a couple of days ago, just more volatile.
Speaker 0: And the oil price is going up and crack spreads are going up.
Speaker 1: Yeah, cracks. But the oil price is not that high. The oil price has gone up, but it's gone up, what, from $73? If I mentioned to you a price of $73 a barrel for WTI... It was a 75 a few minutes ago.
Speaker 0: I think it's 78. I think it's 78 today. Maybe it's gone down.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's gone down. West Texas Intermediate is at 73. Okay. Let me see what the... But anyway, and that's what I mean. That's a pretty low number if I mentioned that to you two months ago. So it's gone up from 60, whatever it was, 60 before the 69. I think it was 69 before the whole back and forth. Yeah, 68.5 to now 73.5. $5 up. What's Brent?
Speaker 0: What's Brent? Brent has got to go a lot more than that.
Speaker 1: Let me check for you. It's at 78, I think.
Speaker 0: 78.2, yeah. Yeah, but it was all the way up to... That's 10 bucks in a day, man. It's rate of change. Look, the shorts are still in place. There's a good tweet up by that guy, Dario, that shows these kind of step-wide... increases in the oil price. And the shorts are still there putting pressure on the thing. They're the algorithm.
Speaker 1: It was at 72 and now it's at 78. $6 up.
Speaker 0: But it was at 68, I think, yesterday or two days ago. But look, it's gone up a lot.
Speaker 1: It was a week ago. Five days ago, it was at 70. So it's gone up.
Speaker 0: I think they're going to continue to go up. I think we're going back up to 90.
Speaker 1: It depends. It just depends on Trump. I think if Trump is just... doing what Trump does best. He just talks a lot of shit, but then acts something completely different. It just reminds me now, I want to remind people, when Trump was talking about wiping out a civilization and people were up in arms, will he use a nuke? Is he going to invade Iran? And my guys, look, this is just him seeking an off-ramp. And everyone was just losing their shit and he's become genocidal. He's lost his mind. And then right after he declares another... I remember the day. He... So I get a message saying, Mario, there's a ceasefire from someone involved in the negotiations. I post it. I'm like, guys, I just got this. So I was the first one to break the ceasefire about an hour, 50 minutes before it became public. I posted it. But even I was very optimistic that the war was going to end. But I did not expect a ceasefire. I thought, you mean he's going to delay the deadline? Remember, he put a deadline. I'm going to wipe out a civilization. And then instead of delaying the deadline, he did a ceasefire on that day. So from wiping out a civilization... to a best case scenario that even I wasn't expecting. That's Trump. So now he's talking about the MOU is dead. All we know, tomorrow he's talking about a permanent deal has been reached. This is the uncertainty. And this is where people is like kind of debating, did he lose his mind? Did he lose his marbles? Or this is the madman theory at its best.
Speaker 0: You know, everyone has to- Well, for what it's worth, on the bold case of the war is not going to restart, like they don't have that many munitions left to fire.
Speaker 1: Exactly. But this is what I mean.
Speaker 0: Exactly.
Speaker 1: No, I mean, they can't afford an oil price. He can't afford it politically. He doesn't have the munitions. Gulf countries will be so pissed. Allies will be pissed. He's got Ukraine. There's so many reasons not to, that unless the only explanation for him to restart it is twofold. Number one, he's lost his mind or, you know, everyone pleasing the boss. He doesn't have access to the right information. That's explanation number one. Or explanation number two is the, The ROI or the objective is so strategically important for the U.S., controlling the shadow Hormuz regime change, that it's worth the cost of it. And the cost will be tremendous. Global economy, U.S. economy, Trump's legacy, economic costs, munition depletion, the list goes on and on.
Speaker 0: There's one more possibility that I'm just going to throw out there. That there's not just manipulation in the oil price, but there's manipulation over this whole process. And so if I wanted Trump to get back involved in the war after he'd clearly got sick of it, how would I do it? I'd come up with some limited objective that sounded really good. So for example, I'd say, sir, all the MOU is fine. We can give them the money. We can do X, Y, and Z, but we can't let them control the straight. And I keep hammering that until Trump said, okay, we can't let them control the straight. Then I'd bring a so-called option to the president and say, well, what we can do is run the ships through the Omani corridor. And he goes, well, can we do that? Do we have the power? Yes, sir, we have the power. And then I'd go and I'd run those ships through the Omani corridor while, oh, I don't know, Iran is having a funeral for its religious leader. And then when the Iranians got pissed off and they struck those ships, I'd go to the president and I'd go, you can't deal with these people. And then the president would go out in a NATO form and call them vermin. And then I'd have manipulated the president into another round of the war. So that's a possibility.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Then it's a pretty fucked up world we live in, if that's the case.
Speaker 0: That changes everything. But I think, as you say, it'll be temporary. There's only, like, they don't have the weapons to continue the war. Everything you've said is true. Everything you've said is true. I'm not debating any of it. But what I am saying is I think energy markets are screwed no matter what happens now. I think we really have screwed the pooch on these energy markets. I don't think there's any walking back from this now. And so, you know, what do I say to people? I'm not giving trading advice, but buy a bicycle. I don't know.
Speaker 1: I don't know what to tell people anymore.
Speaker 0: Make sure your car is full at all times and buy a bicycle or a scooter.
Speaker 1: I don't know what to say. All right, man. Well, enjoyed the conversation as always. Thanks for your time.
Speaker 0: All right. Thanks for having me, Mario. See you.
Speaker 1: Take care, man. um all right guys i'll be live again in uh in a minute the the guest is in the other studio but uh just on the point and that last point between me and philip when you guys hear me you know be optimistic any kind of you know you always think i'm just being optimistic for the sake of it no there's very logical reasons if you're if you're expecting the president to be making decisions if you think he's making decisions based on logic and sound advice There are so many reasons for the war to end and very little reasons for the war to continue. And we've just gone through them. The price of oil, especially Philip is right in the price of oil is being manipulated. That's even more reason to not restart the war and be optimistic that the war won't restart, which by the way, I still hold that position, even though it's shaky. Munition stockpiles being depleted. The fact that militarily, it just hasn't worked. And we've seen that happen. Gulf countries don't wanna see the war continue. Europe, Asia don't wanna see the war continue. What else did I miss? Politically, very damaging for Trump. Legacy, going to be very damaging for him. There's just so many reasons, I've just named seven, for Trump not to restart the war. So that is the reason I've been optimistic since, you know, Trump is talking about wiping out a civilization, everyone's losing their mind. And that's why I'm still optimistic now, because these reasons haven't changed. The US cannot afford to continue the war. But we'll be speaking again in a minute or two to get the, I'll be speaking with Professor Behrouz, Iranian professor, and he knows the Iranian government very well. I want to ask him about what they're thinking right now, how they would respond to Trump and his threats, because we're talking about Trump, what he will do, whether he's serious about his threats, but we're not really giving enough... enough importance to what the Iranians are going to do in response to this. So far, they haven't closed the Strait of Hormuz. There's been no attacks today, no preemptive attacks, despite Trump saying he's planning to attack Iran again today. Nothing from the Iranian side and the Strait of Hormuz remains in the same situation it was before the strikes yesterday. So I think that says a lot, but we'll see. I'll see you guys in a couple of minutes.
reSee.it AI Summary
I read about night two of the strikes, stretching Bushehr to Chabahar, and the unanswered question in Washington: to what end. Malcolm Nance notes jets and carrier air wings now running the full target list—radars, ports, IRGC piers—yet the “men with binoculars” get replaced by kids on donkeys. If 40 days and every weapon didn’t break them, what does one more night buy? He forecasts zero for tonight.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 Night two of the strikes stretched 500 nautical miles of coastline, Bushehr to Chabahar, and the question nobody in Washington has answered: to what end... Malcolm Nance walked the escalation ladder: six jets a week ago, a broad package yesterday, now both carrier air wings running the full target table. Radars, ports, IRGC piers, Abu Musa island to blind the men with binoculars. His problem is the men with binoculars get replaced by kids on donkeys. You cannot degrade 93 million people, and the IRGC can mobilize 650,000 MORE. His tell for when it turns serious: hundreds of hits concentrated on Qeshm, Hormuz and Sirik islands, with heavy bombers carpeting the beaches. That's amphibious prep, Iwo Jima style. Anything less is a punishment matrix that looks impressive at the end of a war you're losing Trump said aboard Air Force One that Iran calls him wanting a deal badly, and that every hit gets answered 20 to 1. Malcolm's reality check: the first 40 days used every weapon and every target set America had. If that didn't break them, what does one more night buy? Malcolm's counted 41 ships through the strait yesterday. His forecast for tonight: ZERO. @MalcolmNance
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion covers a pattern and expansion in U.S. strike operations targeting Iranian coastal and IRGC-related sites across the Strait of Hormuz region, including Bandar Abbas, Shabahar, Karnarok, Bushehr, Sirik, and Abu Musa Island. One speaker notes that Abu Musa had not been struck “in a while,” and suggests strikes have been broadening in both scale and geographic range after earlier “pinpick” attacks focused on radars, boats, and smaller packages.
The strikes are described as evolving through three types: small attacks against specific targets (like radar sites and limited boat targets), then larger strike packages that attack broader infrastructure supporting facilities and resources. The speakers argue that some key facilities and naval infrastructure should have been destroyed earlier in the war but have not been, citing Bashir’s naval barracks as an example. They also focus on why particular locations may be targeted, including Chabahar’s two sides: the civilian port and IRGC sites across the bay, as well as conorac/Konarok near where a warship was previously sunk.
The speakers connect this to U.S. carrier strike capacity, describing two carriers—George Herbert Walker Bush and the Abraham Lincoln—as available and arguing the Bush air wing has not been tested as extensively as the Abraham Lincoln’s. They suggest pressure from senior U.S. leadership to “use all the strike capacity” could explain the expanded strike approach. They also discuss Abu Musa Island as a coveted asset for the UAE and connect it to an alleged U.S. objective of removing IRGC presence that could support surveillance and targeting.
A central question raised is the “end state” of the strikes: whether the intention is to establish full control of the Strait of Hormuz. The speakers argue U.S. degradation of systems is unlikely to reliably eliminate Iranian ability to track ships and cue attacks, describing how Iran could maintain tracking using course/speed/direction knowledge and long-standing surveillance methods rather than relying solely on more advanced technology.
They also discuss potential future escalation, including the idea of expanding strikes farther east and west (from Chabahar to Bushehr and potentially beyond toward Bandar Khomeini), and the possibility of targeting radar again at Karg Island. The speakers argue the strike “matrix” appears designed to be casualty-less, with limited Iranian personnel effects relative to ordnance levels, and they point to Iran’s continued replacement capacity and mobility of air defenses.
In their assessment of Iranian retaliation, they state Iran has been “very restrained” and could maintain a “relatively cool hand” because it understands perceived U.S. desperation and the global impact on shipping. They reference reported shipping flows through the Strait of Hormuz and claim that IRGC forces could place ships “in your sights,” with options for longer-term cost escalation by rapidly rebuilding and increasing replacement costs for what the U.S. destroys.
The conversation then turns to possible Iranian “rule change” scenarios. One speaker says Iran could attempt to overwhelm specific surveillance or base infrastructure such as Sheikh Issa, describing the U.S. and allies flying maritime surveillance from Sheikh Issa (Poseidon and Triton aircraft). They propose alternative pressure points like attacking Kuwait, including knocking out “water desalinization plants,” as a “warning shot.” They also mention the potential to target merchant ships or tankers, suggesting “tanker tax” style punishment of international assets.
A separate segment addresses a report about a Bahrain power outage and attributes it to cyber activity, describing simultaneous outages affecting major substations in both Kuwait and Bahrain. The discussion also references a claim by Trump about commitments related to helping Hezbollah in Lebanon and a possible Syrian political effort (described as al-Shara and a “Syrian Peace Party”-type movement) attempting to create armed conflict against Hezbollah’s rear. The speakers argue such a conflict would be dangerous and likely unfavorable to Syria, describing Hezbollah’s entrenched capabilities and potential to fight toward Damascus.
Finally, the transcript includes Trump’s stated messaging on the scale of retaliation (“hit them 20 to 1,” and “every time they hit us, we’re going to hit them”), followed by a concluding argument that after the first 40 days of the war’s heavy targeting, something will “break”—with the claim that the U.S. could be the one to break and that Iran could respond by “just… close the SOH,” effectively testing how long Trump can endure the standoff.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: So the Lanscale USA strikes targeting Bandar Abbas, Shabahar, Karnarok, Bushehr, Sirik. Abu Musa was struck.
Speaker 1: Abu Musa, yeah.
Speaker 0: But they haven't struck Abu Musa in a while.
Speaker 1: Well, they haven't struck a lot of things in a while. Now they're expanding the range of their strike profile. And this was expected because yesterday the small – look. There's three types of strikes that they've been doing, right? These little pinpick attacks where they go after a radar, they go after a couple of boats, like we saw last week from the Abraham Lincoln, six aircraft only. Then they increase it like we saw yesterday, right? The strike package is much larger. It starts taking over a lot of the infrastructure. Whoops, sorry about that. It starts taking over a lot of the, sorry about that, I had a, got to blank this thing out, the infrastructure that supports facilities and resources, you and I would have thought were destroyed in the first 40 days of the war. How Bashir's naval barracks has not been destroyed is beyond me. I mean, that's day one, week one basic work, right? If you're going to destroy facilities, you level them all the way across workshops, machinery spaces, office buildings. barracks and you make everybody stay at their mother-in-law's houses so um that being said they've expanded those strikes and now on the second day as i said yesterday they're going to expand east and west and i knew charbahar was overdue there's two sides of charbahar there's the civilian port charbahar there's the irgc sites over there on the other side of the bay you have conorac right where we sank a warship uh early in the war against the pier and all of the infrastructure and anything that's been repaired since the end of the 40-day war, that is what they would have struck at. Now, don't forget, they have two aircraft carriers, right? George Herbert Walker Bush and the Abraham Lincoln is still there, still on the station. This is one of those things where you get the chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the Chief of Naval Operations or Admiral Cooper at Central Command saying, hey, We need to use all the strike capacity. And to be honest, the George Herbert Walker Bush has not had, their air wing has not been tested the way the Abraham Lincoln was. The Abraham Lincoln was there before the war and then struck all the way through the war. They're racking up air metals. They're racking up all sorts of combat time over around. This sort of stupid stuff actually does exist. And they would say, hey, we want to use the Bush's air wing as the lead strike element on these things to get you know, experience and go out and start dropping live ordnance. So it does not, I'm a little surprised that they, if it's not just Abu Musa Island. Abu Musa, you know, is on the western side of the, what we call the , the southwest Persian Gulf patrol area for the IRGC. It is also an asset that is coveted by the United Arab Emirates. It was taken from them, I believe, in 1971, 1972 by the Shah of Iran. And the Emirates have always wanted it back, Abu Musa Island. But that now is so that the United States could get rid of reporting entities or IRGC soldiers on those islands who could be doing visual or could be flying drones or could be conducting radar surveillance of ships that are coming up into the channel south of Kisham Island. That's to be expected, but this all goes to one question. To what end is the intention of the United States here to exercise full control of the Strait of Hormuz? And if that's their intent, and it appears to me to be a sort of a slow rolling of their strategic aims, by, as we've said many times on this show, every time they're struck down there, that they're trying to degrade the systems that are down there faster than they can be replaced, faster than they can actually reconstitute. But that's a fool's folly. I mean, that's just pure folly. You can't replace guys with binoculars. You can't replace a guy who's flying a drone with a thermal imager out there. You can't replace the fact that they could see from dows, boats in the Strait of Hormuz and can actually track them using rudimentary basic tracking course speed direction and know on a paper plot, paper, or you see like in World War II, right, those chalk plots, on what we call plot boards, they'll know where that ship is. It can only move 10 knots. It can only move 15 knots. You're going to know where it is every hour that it transits through the Strait of Hormuz. And you can put a drone down that bearing to activate where that thing should come on, and it will hit that target. So this is a very, it appears to me that it is almost as if they never thought about this. And in this entire post-war, know last uh what is it almost 70 some odd days it's just sort of like they're ad hoc building up to what they should have been thinking about and done in the first 40 days of this war i mean you hearing talk now of you know wanting to seize karg island again trump himself admitted that she's in karg island would be a turkey shoot it would just be a fishbowl where people could just you know bombard the rangers or the 82nd airborne or marines or whatever don't forget the uss boxer has just arrived into the theater after not going to the war for almost three months so yeah you've got maybe 5 000 marines that you could put down there but the intensity of the attacks would have to be at the same level or bigger as the highest levels of the war to reduce everything down there. And when you get there and you think that you've blown up everything on Kashem Island and you find out that it's IRGC Iwo Jima because there are guys who are dug into the ground and a couple of hundred defenders start inflicting really horrible, right, like Osprey helicopters coming in for final, you know, getting ready to dust off down there, and a SAM blasted out of the sky, and there's a live feed on YouTube coming out. And before you can say, hey, we got to recover the bodies, they've got a goddamn Lego video playing. So what is the end state here? If I were on senior intelligence staff, right, and we were getting right down to it, and we're getting orders from Washington And they say, you know, there's always a moment where the senior staff, if you have good admiral, you have a good senior officer, you know, chief of intelligence out there would likely be a captain, right? He would say, hey, listen, guys, real talk here. What are the real risks here? What should we be pushing back on? And the question I would ask is, the fuck are we doing, right? What are we doing here? If it is just consistent buildup degradation of Iranians, capability well great you know there's 93 million people right the irgc alone has if you think wow we can whittle down 150 000 full-time active combatants they're going to mobilize the basti 650 000 men right and kids with their goats on the mountainside overlooking the strait of hormuz and they will go old school if you knock down every microwave tower up there they will put kids on donkeys, who will go to a man with a scooter, who will go to a guy with a car. And even though it's slow, it's reliable. The point of this is, Donald, I think Donald Trump is just flexing. I think he's, you know, we said this June 17th, he reached the point of desperation. They're all, everyone who's watching the show is like, Malcolm, you said this a hundred times. Yes, because until it bleeds through, you need to understand the risk here. Donald Trump spelled out the risk on June 17th at the G7. We were four weeks from potentially tank bottom, the start of an economic catastrophe and a total shortage of oil in the West, including aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline in the United States. But he has taken every bit of bait the Iranians have. The Iranians, this does not hurt them. blockading them in the way we think. It does not hurt them. It does not stop food or bread or dates or tea from coming into that country. They're surrounded with countries that will fill it full of that. Trump has a misimpression that has been put there by someone that he trusts that Iran is on the verge of economic catastrophe and that his blockade has gotten the ayatollahs to believe that they are ready to surrender at any minute, but Trump and his striking them is the only thing they can't take. When he says that he believes the Iranians are begging him for a deal, begging him, calling him up, he believes that madness, right? Straight up, it's not happening. These people can go one year, two years with full blockade, and it is a white, Western mentality of ignorant people who have never been there, who have never met people like that, who have never seen a goat herder sustain his family on nothing but subsistence farming and subsistence herding or families coming together in entire extended clans and supporting each other with only Allah, their God, as their principal support because you don't understand how people work. And these people are mega rich billionaires who don't understand they have sustained everything we've thrown at them in this war. And what do you think you're doing now? Oh, just one more ounce of pressure. One more ounce of pressure. They'll kick our ass this way. And they're kicking our ass by surviving for the next year. They could crack the global economic order. They could crack it. They could just, we haven't gotten to the part where they've just decided, you know, Shahid, right? IRGC guys going out and suicide boat bombing, mass attacks. They haven't even played their cards for leverage because they know Trump's going to hit that oil wall where the U.S. Petroleum, Strategic Petroleum Reserve gets to where he has to make a decision to cut off all civilians or give up all of our war fighting oil. And then he's going to come running to them. Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff are going to give Iran everything they wanted. Blow up a barracks in Bashir. These guys are going to get luxury deluxe underground barracks built over the next two years with the money. The United States is going to have the Gulf states guarantee them. This is how this, you know, people say, hey, you know, from the intelligence perspective, how does this all play out both up and down the chain of command? Anybody can put bombs on target. Any fool can put bombs on target. But if your bombs have no effect on the will of your enemy, then all you're doing is creating a bomb expenditure matrix that looks cool at the end of the war that you are about to lose.
Speaker 0: How do you think Iran would respond? Kuwait, Bahrain again like yesterday? Or something more significant considering today's strikes were more significant than yesterday? I think they've been very restrained. Exactly. My worry is that could that change? We've been looking always at Trump. What is Trump going to do? What is he going to say? What's his next plan? Is he going to stop the attacks? We always take it for granted that Iran would always retaliate tit for tat and never initiate attacks. And I'm worried that this could change if we continue down this path.
Speaker 1: I think the Iranians are still going to play a relatively cool hand here. Because they know how desperate Trump is. They know how desperate he is. They know how desperate a lot of people in the world are. And as I bring up every time, there is now a giant chasm between oil experts and market traders. And oil experts are like, oh, we are about to go through something horrible. you know, the free market traders are out there like, woohoo, this is awesome. But Lloyds of London, there were 41 ships passed through the Strait of Hormuz yesterday. Now it's going to go to zero tonight. It's going to go to zero. And ships that do try to pass, the IRGC is going to have you in your sights. So the Iranians have the option of playing long ball. And like I said to you yesterday, they could add Every double of every dollar of infrastructure that's destroyed yesterday and today. Bingo. That's 75 high-speed boats at a cost of $5,000 each. We're going to charge $10,000 for them. And they go to the Qataris and they go, it's not $300 billion now. Now it's $310 billion. And every day that the Americans destroy something, we're going to double the cost of replacing it. And you're going to pay us because we... now they could make a point. Yesterday, my projection was they would absolutely hit Bahrain. They would absolutely hit Kuwait. And every target I chose, they hit, right? Sheikh Issa Airport to kill those P-3 Poseidons and Ali al-Salam Air Base. But now they're required to ratchet up. I thought maybe they'd make a point by sinking a ship. Still on the table. Not a U.S. warship, a merchant ship.
Speaker 0: But that's... Oh, yeah, exactly. Just to be clear. And that will be a pretty big warning. But just to be clear, that a U.S. warship changes everything, sinking a U.S. warship. No, we go straight back to war. We go straight back to war.
Speaker 1: But if Mustafa al-Khamenei says, I'm done with this, OK, a full court press on one of those ships, everything. Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, high-speed boats.
Speaker 0: It's possible. Trump said 111 missiles by Japan, by Iran against one of the ships, against the U.S. Navy. I think he means 111 projectiles. It must be drones as well. And even that, 111 is too big.
Speaker 1: No. Okay. Yeah. Okay. God, we have our own little problem. No, those weapons were actually expended. but the question is what were they expended at he said that they were fired at the aircraft carriers the aircraft carrier battle group and early on in the war i wrote i wrote a sub stack in our sub stack the carriers can be struck carriers can be detected but you would have to shoot 500 ballistic missiles into that grid and you would have to have outstanding real-time intelligence Sure, because we have in our air defense screen these Aegis-class guided missile destroyers. There's usually two on that carrier. What you want is you want overwhelming probability of kill, right? Your PK must be extremely high, your probability of kill. And you want to box a grid, right? And you've seen how the Houthis have used these ballistic missiles and have struck merchant men. But if you're going to do it, you do it right. right you make a full court press that you say my objective as the supreme ayatollah is i want an aircraft carrier burning and a dow will go out there we sank a dow early on in the war war that we thought was surveilling the u.s carrier fleet a dow will go out there once they get datum datum is the last positive identification of that vessel not a radar return you get a visual and somebody goes calls on his phone and he goes you know latitude longitude real time course blah blah blah speed blah blah blah now you have a datum your missiles would need to already be ready to fire prep not prepped not not we'll do that in an hour because every hour that passes your datum grows in a circle around you called your circle error of probability, your CEP. And you would have to like walk ballistic missiles into a grid like that. I'm sure the Iranians have thought about that, but they just thought it'd be a lot more fun to throw them at Abu Dhabi or throw them at, you know, Dhafra Air Base and make your allies expend all of their own shields while you get left alone. So I think it was a good trade-off, but The question is, how many missiles do the Iranians have in their inventory? Are they going to total war? Would the value of making an aircraft carrier burn? Because let me tell you, the point defenses of the aircraft carrier, the aircraft carrier has nothing that will stop a ballistic missile. Nothing, right? We have these short-range air-to-air missile, surface-to-air missiles, point defense missiles, Gatling guns. all of the defenses of the carrier on the Aegis destroyers, the two Aegis-class guided missile destroyers that are with them, and 500 missiles, you're going Winchester. You will expend every surface-to-air missile that you have. And at that point, at some point, if they do it, I'm not giving the Iranians any pointers, by the way. They've been waiting for this for 47 years. But if they wanted to do it, you could definitely make it exciting around an aircraft carrier, especially if the air wing is taking off and you have a hot flight deck, right, and you get a miss, you know, I don't know if you've ever been on a carrier that's done an emergency turn. It is, you're sitting there thinking, hmm, the floor is shifting, why is that? And you realize, hey, this is 60,000 tons and 6,000 people making a turn that's not normal. And it will disrupt your flight operations, could cause accidents, but they have missiles that can seek terminally. as they're coming down and see the carrier and could target it.
Speaker 0: How many missiles to give it an above 50% probability that you'll get a hit? How many missiles would you need?
Speaker 1: Against the carrier? What's our target?
Speaker 0: A carrier.
Speaker 1: Against a carrier. I would say a carrier group, 500. Because it's not a group. This is a carrier. It's two carriers now with two destroyers. Let's say it's three destroyers. They've got a total, you know, SM-3 destroyer. inventory of about i think it's 80 per vessel so that's 240 rounds that's why you need 500 because once they start intercepting and shooting these things down and they're excellent at shooting down incoming ballistic missiles yes there's going to be some leakers but if it's going to be you want the pacific island wars of world war ii right you want the uss franklin which was hit by suicide That's what a ballistic missile is, right? It's a kamikaze that's more sophisticated, right? It's like a 16-inch gun shop. Or, you know, drones are kamikazes. But if you're going to do that, if Malcolm Nance or you were, you know, commander of the IRGC Navy, and you go to Mustafa Khamenei and he says, I need absolute pain out of the Americans, absolute pain, I'd say, hey, listen, it's going to hurt us, and it's going to hurt our inventories, and we're going to go back to full-scale war. But, you know, let's try to make a carrier or two burn. or at least make them move all the way down to Yemen. And that's what I think Trump was saying, that during the entire length of the war, 111 projectiles were fired into the Northern Indian Ocean. And I think that they just viewed anything that came into the Northern Indian Ocean as an attempt to strike the U.S. Navy and centered it around aircraft carriers. But there was no full-court press of 100 ballistic missiles to strike the carrier. Maybe one, maybe two, you know, but they probably, if they missed by 10 miles, was it really serious? So, but it's possible. It's viable and possible.
Speaker 0: I want to show you just a map of what was struck. You've got Bashir Bandar Khagan Bandar Lenge Bandar Abbas, the terms I've heard you mentioned time and time again, Abu Musa Island, Qashem, Sirig, Jask, Qanarak, and Shabahar. All of them you can see on the coastline just for the audience that doesn't know these locations. Is it fair to conclude this is the US doing something that, as you said, should have been done already and surprising it's not done, and that is as much as possible degrade Iran's ability to control the Strait of Hormuz? And the question is, How much more could you strike? Are they striking things that were not destroyed? Are they striking things that were rebuilt? Were things rebuilt that quickly? And most importantly, will that actually impair Iran's ability to control the shadow Homs? Will it make a difference at all from a military perspective?
Speaker 1: I'm looking at the table of strikes, right? And this is designed, as Trump said, the actual objective is punishment. The chairman of the joint chiefs working with the chief of naval, well, I don't think we have a chief of naval operations, working with the commander of US Central Command, Admiral Cooper, has just expanded the zone. This looks to me, if I were to be quite honest, I would say, this is two board air wings. You want to use both air wings, right? So you're going as far as Boucher. What are you hitting in Boucher? Radars? You're hitting a surface search radar, you're hitting an air search radar. Okay, why? Do you feel that there is something which could transit down Bushehr to Qeshem Islands almost 500 nautical miles? I mean, that's a long ass distance. Bandar Kagan, are you just hitting all IRGC bases? Every place that has a high speed boat, every port. Bandar Lenga, Bandar Lenga is a big port. There's a commercial port there. They hit the radar there. They hit the port control tower almost four months ago. You know, and of course, you could just wire that a new radar up there. Same thing with Abu Musa Island. Abu Musa Island, I'm almost certain it's because they don't want visual reporters. They're just hitting IRGC naval assets everywhere. Chabahar, Kunarak, JASC. We've hit JASC a bunch of times. Sirich. Okay. If you were to say, hey, man, we need to keep hitting stuff, I'd just go, yeah, let's just run through the tables. Back and forth.
Speaker 0: Nothing surprises you there? Nothing surprises you at all?
Speaker 1: Nothing at all surprises me. Nothing, Eric, surprises me. This, as I said yesterday, it was a narrow... A week ago, very narrow focus. Six strike aircraft. Same targets. This yesterday, broader set of targets within the eastern Strait of Hormuz patrol area, the western Strait of Hormuz patrol area. Today, I want bigger, wider scope. Chabahar to Bushehr. What are they going to do next? They're going to go all the way around up to Bandar Khomeini on the Iraq-Kuwait border. They could try to knock out the surface search radar again at Karg Island. Guys, what is the objective? If the objective is to follow the President's orders, then those are excellent. You follow the President's order. Bigger, broader, better. If the objective is to degrade Iran's capability to fight the U.S. Navy along the length of the Strait of Hormuz, then you're going to have to be fighting, you should be striking for 40 more days. If the purpose is to soften this up with the intent that you may land Marines down on Larrak Island, Hormuz Island. The big raid that I was expecting in the early war when we had real assets carrying out enormous number of strikes, I thought they would use the Marines to raid, right? You could drop 500 Marines on Sirik and fight your way into the tunnel complex. Yes, you will come out with 20, 30, 40 Marines dead, Yes, you may even get the Marines trapped in the tunnel complex. But at least, you know, as an amphibious raid, that made a lot more sense and it would have had a lot more, you know, a lot better response. This entire, you know, strike matrix that you're seeing here is designed to be casualty-less. And yeah, you killed eight Iranians yesterday. Well, for the enormous amount of ordnance that was dropped yesterday, that's pretty lame. You got some guys who were doing maintenance on their boats or were on the midnight crew and they had to stay near the boats or were smoking a hookah on the pier of the Syrac IRGC port or the chief of maintenance was trying to get motorboats ready. Okay. But there's 92 million people. There's still 150,000 more IRGC. Replacement guys are going to be coming from everywhere. Air defense systems are going to be moving around in a little shell game to shoot down another MQ-9 drone. We've lost two in two days. And they're almost using those Reaper drones as suicide drones to identify where the surface-to-air missile sites are. They're allowing those drones to be shot down so they can get the imagery of the plumage, the thermal image, and then get eyes onto that missile and then track it as it goes into somebody's garage and then put ordnance on top of it.
Speaker 0: What would you need to see to say, OK, holy shit, this is different? So we've seen the same thing again and again and again since the ceasefire, striking the coastline, Iran's ability to control the Strait of Homs. We've talked about it a few times. What will be a target where you'd be like, hold on a second. The objective seems different this time around.
Speaker 1: The only thing, the thing that would really get my attention, because I was watching on your show yesterday. I was like, yeah, yeah, whatever. Bombs at the commercial port. Okay. Yay. We put five bombs down the commercial port. Somebody gets another air metal with an Oakley cluster. Okay. Whatever. That is not real bombing. Okay. Don't forget, I went through Desert Storm, where we were dropping thousands of bombs per day.
Speaker 0: That's crazy. That's crazy. Right? That's crazy.
Speaker 1: With enormously high concentrations of areas. So if you were to come, if you were to say, hey, Malcolm, Kishim Island, Larik Island, Hormuz Island, Bandar Abbas, Sirik Island, Bandar-e-Jas, Abu Musa, Hengim, Siri Island are getting bombed, but hundreds of hits across that, I'd say they're about to do an amphibious landing.
Speaker 0: So much bigger, so same targets, but much bigger, much more ordnance than what we're seeing right now.
Speaker 1: Yeah, and then, I mean, B-1 bombers coming over and dropping off, pickling off, you know, 75, 80, 2,000-pound bombs, or B-52s coming over, because that would be a preparation of the battlefield of the amphibious battlefield that would be the united states preparing to kill everyone on those beaches and if you want to see how good that works you go and you watch the movie you know uh santa iwo jima right or or songs of our father both of those and because that's prep right and that would be airstrikes it was wild the amount of bombardment it was wild and guess what effect it had horrifying
Speaker 0: Yeah. It's crazy. It's crazy. Like when you watch it, you'd be like, fucking hell, it's no man's land. You'd be like, everyone's just been destroyed. Everything's been killed. And then find out they're still alive on the ground. It's just crazy.
Speaker 1: I mean, the fact that I'm alive, I mean, I was, we were fighting in Kharkiv. I, we, we went under 72 hours of nonstop Russian bombing, but they didn't, their grits were so bad. Their, their dispersal was so wide. It became a game for us. Right. know who could count the number of hits in that that that salvo fastest and you'd get like a cookie or something really it's just stupid yeah but if you're dug in and we weren't even dug in these guys just sucked right but that's when russia had complete 100 artillery overmatch you could not fight russia on the artillery scale so that was world war ii levels of bombardment that's what you would need on those islands we don't have the warships that are capable of doing that i have done naval gunfire support direct support When I was in Lebanon, my warship fired off 400 rounds of five-inch gun, off two guns, in I think it was a 12-hour period. That's almost nonstop. We were like a conga line of ships bombarding. Then we had to bring up the battleship New Jersey. None of that stuff worked. And then when I was in Desert Storm and I was on the battleship Missouri, We had to do precision bombardment because it was more effective than all that, you know, blasting everything that we were hitting on Falaka Island. So the Iranians could get, the Americans don't have that kind of naval gunfire support, tactical support. We would use HIMAR rockets, and then we would do the air wing from the carriers would be doing airstrikes, right? Dropping dumb bombs and stupid things like that or precision bombs to find it. Half those guys could, there's 53 villages on Kisham Island. going to be in the houses of civilians bunker and all that would tell the iranians is uh they're going to land troops here they're concentrating on the coastline they're going to land troops let's get our guns out let's get our fpv drones out and just before you jump off because i know you have to go and two other things quick things i want to ask you sure you want to be on tonight what to so we're not going behind our expected
Speaker 0: And you said they might decide in the next few days to sink a ship in the Strait of Hormuz, a commercial ship. What would be something that the Iranians would do where you'd be like, all right, shit, they've just changed the rules of engagement now. The Emirates, if they strike the Emirates, would that be a change of... No, they're not going to strike the Emirates.
Speaker 1: They know how many interceptors everybody has, all right? And their objectives have been very clear about Bahrain and Kuwait. U.S. aircraft are flying out of Sheikh Issa, the Poseidon... and the Triton aerial surveillance aircraft, right, maritime surveillance aircraft are flying out of Sheikh Issa. They know that. Now, they could decide to overwhelm that base and make it burn, right? So we're sitting here going, oh, here it comes, five more ballistic missiles at Sheikh Issa. They could fire 100 and say, okay, we're just going to put an end to that base, right, for the Bahrainis, for the Americans, for everybody, you know, or Bahrain International Airport. There's one that you haven't seen, right? Starting hitting civilian infrastructure.
Speaker 0: You know, but... That would be a pretty big shift on the Iranian side. That would be a change in engagement.
Speaker 1: Or hit Kuwait and knock out two of the last four water desalinization plants. Warning shot.
Speaker 0: All right, you're going, okay, but that's...
Speaker 1: But Mario, we talked about it. You know what? We've spoken about it so much. These scenarios have come up so many times. It's easy to forget them. Because, and they do ratchet the tension in your head, right? You go, oh, whoa, that's not good.
Speaker 0: Yeah, you don't say that. You don't say the D word, the desalination word. We don't say that.
Speaker 1: That's very true. But why waste, you know, 50, 25 missiles on the Emirates when they're just going to get shot down when the people you really want to influence are Bahrain and Kuwait or Qatar? If I understand some of those tankers, right, the KC-135s and the C-46 Pegasuses may have gone from Ben Gurion to back to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
Speaker 0: I saw that.
Speaker 1: Maybe. I don't know. All I know is that whatever you're going to do in terms of punishment, you make it hurt. Or if you were, you know, Sheikh Admiral Malcolm Nance, I'd hit 20 tankers. Fuck you. Right? Everybody who's down off the Dubai anchorage, you all get it. You are now suffering a tanker tax. Do we make ourselves clear? All right, let the Americans bomb whatever they want. They're hitting rock. But you are actual international assets.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I just don't think they'll do that because there is a lot of relationship rebuilding right now between the Gulf and Iran. So for Iran to kind of throw that all away, they'll need a lot.
Speaker 1: Yeah, again, like I said early on, I think they'll just go back to the Kuwaitis and go, we have a rolling calculator going, and we're going to ask you for that money back every time this happens. Plus a bombardment premium.
Speaker 0: The Bahrain power outage that happened yesterday, it was before the retaliation. Did you see that? What was that?
Speaker 1: Cyber. Cyber? Yeah, we talked about it this morning on my podcast. It went down simultaneously, Kuwait and Bahrain. And at some point, you're going to find out. We're going to find out. Now, my first thought was drone. I go, no, that's too easy. Two simultaneous power outages of two countries' major substations. Everything in Kuwait, all the way down to Ras Kalea, all the way up to Kuwait City. Now they could have been sabotaged. It's easier just to have that the Iranians, finally Iran, I expected this 133 days ago to use their cyber warfare capabilities. But I pretty much, I believe it's cyber.
Speaker 0: Holy fuck. Trump just said Alshara made commitments to helping with Hezbollah in Lebanon during their meeting today.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but Alshara just a couple of weeks ago said, we are more than willing to help out humanitarian, with humanitarian support.
Speaker 0: I hope he's playing Trump. I hope. That's scary.
Speaker 1: We talked about this on my Substack, and I'm sure I've mentioned it with you one time before, that the United States, with their treaty with Lebanon, and this talk of getting Hezbollah, and not Hezbollah, Alshara, and that weird Syrian peace or Syrian peace front, this sudden political group that popped up in 2021, that appeared to me to be some sort of intelligence supported asset that came out two weeks ago. And they were like, we want to start an armed conflict against Hezbollah in its rear. And I'm like, aren't you the Syrian party of peace? And so al-Shara, if he does that, no, out of nowhere, out of nowhere, go look him up, Syrian Peace Party or something like that, run by a Syrian woman. And they made a statement that they could not tolerate Hezbollah's presence in Lebanon. And I go, someone's running an operation here. This is clearly trying to create an armed opposition in Hezbollah's rear. But I'm going to tell you something straight up, folks. You start a Syrian Hezbollah fight, Syria will lose. You could see Hezbollah forces entering Damascus and taking all those weapon systems that you collected from Assad. So if they can't fight downward, they have been in deeply embedded through the Bekaa Valley for decades since I was in my 20s. And they could say, oh, you want to take this fight over there? All we have to do is a bunch of meeting battles with a bunch of hillbillies who have a bunch of Emirati pickup trucks and AK-47s. We're Hezbollah. We can fight. You want us to fight East first before we take over Damascus? Okay, let's have that fight. This is a dangerous game. Whoever has thought this could be a resistance organization in the rear of Hezbollah and then have the Lebanese army. And don't forget, the U.S. Army is talking about joining forces with the Lebanese army and the Israelis in the Nebatia region. Someone is thinking long ball about this, and it's a stupid game that we will lose.
Speaker 0: Very stupid game.
Speaker 1: You push Hezbollah to a suicide battle. You're going to have a fight on your hands.
Speaker 0: Trump is speaking, by the way. He said, as we wrap, we just hit them very hard. And I say, we hit them 20 to 1. Every time they hit us, we're going to hit them 20. When they hit, we hit back much harder. He's on the plane on Air Force One. Then he says, we've already won militarily. They called it a little while ago. They want to make a deal badly. They called a little while ago. They want to make a deal so badly. I just don't know if they're worthy of making a deal.
Speaker 1: with tears in their eyes. And they came to him and they said, sir, sir, I know I'm the Supreme Leader of Iran, but sir, I so badly need a deal from you, Mr. Trump. You hit us 20 times harder, and we can't take it.
Speaker 0: Okay, people, hard-ass reality check.
Speaker 1: The fuck did we do during the first 40 days of this war if that wasn't 20 times harder? We used literally every weapon system, every predetermined target set we had prepared for 40 since the Iranian hostage rescue in 1979. We hit it, right? So what more can we do now? Something's going to break here, and I think it's going to be us. And I think the Iranians are just going to have more tea, and they're just going to close the SOH. And they're going to say, let's see how long Trump can take this.
reSee.it AI Summary
I connected the dots on the map: Kharg, then the Gorgan line, then the final link of the Eurasian Land Bridge from Xi’an to Tehran. Oil means nothing if it can’t move, so this phase targets Iran’s energy flow, not just fields. Iran’s response is the same Bahrain and Kuwait packages—another wave tonight—while “Qatar” remains untouched, implying no red line crossed.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 U.S. strikes reportedly reached the railway linking Iran to China, and that target choice says plenty about what this phase of the war is actually about Brandon Weichert connected the dots on the map. Kharg yesterday, the Gorgan line today, the final link of the Eurasian Land Bridge that starts in Xi'an and ends in Tehran. Producing oil means nothing if you can't move it, and in his read Washington is now going after Iran's entire energy profile, the flow as much as the fields. Iran's answer? The same Bahrain and Kuwait packages, third wave tonight, smoke rising over the Fifth Fleet headquarters again in unconfirmed footage. Brandon sees discipline in that restraint: Tehran is running an economic countdown while Washington burns through its reserve, and by his math the regime only needs to hold on another 20 or 30 days. Qatar sits "on the menu," untouched, which tells him the red line hasn't been crossed. His sharpest detail was legal, not military. The whole fight over the Omani corridor exists because every ship that uses Iran's traffic separation scheme strengthens Tehran's case to charge its fee. The routes ARE the war. One reassuring cross-check: a genuine clearing operation for a ground push would drop fifty times this ordnance. He agreed without hesitation. His words: that's a blessing. @WeTheBrandon
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on the scope and pattern of U.S.-led attacks during the day and how Iran may retaliate and sustain pressure. Speaker 0 says he is not tracking events “blow by blow” but indicates strikes were directed toward targets along the coastline rather than a nuclear power facility, and that Bashir was hit. Speaker 1 adds that the attacks struck the coastline with more significance than yesterday and references Axios reporting that a railway near the Turkmenistan border—connected to China’s Belt and Road—was struck. Speaker 1 says the initial impression was sabotage, but then reported that the U.S. struck it, which surprised Speaker 1.
Speaker 0 frames the attacks as “finishing the job,” arguing the president is targeting Iran’s entire energy profile—production and, crucially, transportation. Speaker 0 specifically says the strikes are aimed at collapsing Iran’s ability not only to produce energy but to move it, citing Karg and saying additional attacks against Karg are likely. The Belt and Road Railway is described as keeping Iran’s energy production viable during the war by enabling shipment out, and Speaker 0 says the goal is to remove that capability. Speaker 0 then states: “Now Iran is retaliating.”
Speaker 1 discusses reported air-defense and early-warning activity in Gulf locations: air defenses in Kuwait and Bahrain, and early warning alerts reportedly sent in Qatar, followed by “all clear.” Speaker 1 notes speculation that the UAE might be targeted but says there were no alerts or reports of anything in the UAE, and that explosions were heard in Kuwait and Bahrain. Speaker 0 says Qatar is “on the menu,” but not yet confirmed as a strike target.
The speakers outline the U.S. target set as consistent with prior strikes since a ceasefire: targets from Bashir “all the way” down to Shabahar, Iran’s main port linking to the sea, and Abu Musa. Speaker 0 adds that beyond degrading Iran’s ability to control the Strait of Homs/coastline, the attacks also degrade Iran’s ability to defend the strait, and he worries this could be a prelude to attempts at landing. He emphasizes that the U.S. is methodically hitting what it can see, while “a boatload of stuff” cannot be seen, and he asks how Iran will retaliate both immediately and long-term, including what weapons and quantities Iran still holds in reserve.
A major theme is whether the escalation pattern will broaden to additional Gulf countries. Speaker 1 asks why Iran is not responding “in kind” every time the U.S. escalates. Speaker 0 argues Iran does not have to escalate further because time is an advantage for Iran and a disadvantage for the U.S., describing the U.S. as operating on a countdown tied to oil reserves. Speaker 0 also argues Trump’s “escalate to de-escalate” approach is unstable: “a pause is not a de-escalation,” and he says the situation is continuing rather than genuinely de-escalating.
The exchange turns to prior actions involving “Project Freedom.” Speaker 1 claims Trump has previously de-escalated when Iran retaliated (including the Fujairah response), while Speaker 0 disputes that those were true de-escalations, attributing outcomes to external constraints such as Saudi refusal to allow use of bases and the resulting “gap.” Speaker 0 characterizes the overall U.S. approach as being “dictated to by events” rather than controlled.
Speaker 1 and Speaker 0 discuss the operational picture regarding shipping. Speaker 1 says the Strait is not closed, with discussion around “30, 40” ships and claims that Iranian-side waters are still open enough for ships to pass using Iranian traffic separation. Speaker 0 responds that the dispute is tied to Iran’s traffic separation scheme and claims U.S. efforts aim to prevent use of that scheme.
Towards the end, Speaker 1 says there are multiple waves of explosions ongoing from Iran, with many interceptions and likely impacts expected near the Fifth Fleet headquarters. Speaker 0 shifts to a broader strategic argument: the Iranians allegedly do not need to do much beyond sustaining blockade-like conditions, because forcing the strait’s flow below pre-war levels is what matters. Speaker 0 argues Iran is playing an economic/survival game and that the regime’s metric is to remain in power, even while sustaining damage. Speaker 1 suggests Iran should retaliate more aggressively, but Speaker 1 and Speaker 0 both emphasize that symbolic strikes may not deter U.S. defense efforts.
The speakers repeatedly suggest the key question is whether Iran believes a “red line” has been crossed, especially if the U.S. strikes Iranian energy infrastructure and transportation routes like the railway. Speaker 0 says Qatar is still “technically” on the menu but has not been struck yet, which he interprets as evidence Iran does not yet view current actions as crossing that red line. They conclude with continued concern about escalation and uncertainty about any practical off-ramp, while noting the attacks are continuing with patterns that resemble prior targeting rather than ending the memorandum.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: Have you been keeping track of the attacks today? What the Americans have attacked?
Speaker 0: Not blow by blow. I know we hit, what is it, the nuclear power facility? No, we didn't hit it. No, no, we hit the one with the... Bashir, yes.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but not the power plant, the facility itself.
Speaker 0: No, I know. I'm saying we hit Bashir. And that's what, that's the last I heard. I've been sort of on the go today. It's the coastline.
Speaker 1: So they struck the coastline. Same targets as always, but more significant, more significant than yesterday, which we covered live yesterday. And also they struck, there was a report, Axios reported it. So I saw reports and I was talking about it in my last show, my last interview about an hour ago, that the railway was struck up near the Turkmenistan border. Yeah, the BRI one, right? The Belt and Road one, right? Yeah, exactly, exactly. But initially it looked like sabotage, but then I actually reported that the U.S. actually struck it. That was surprising to me.
Speaker 0: I can give you an inject here. This is part of a – this is finishing the job. The president wants to finish the job. What he's doing is he's going after their entire energy profile. This is about basically collapsing Iran's ability not only to produce energy, This is why they hit Karg yesterday when we were on the air. Remember, they did that, and there's probably going to be more attacks against Karg, I suspect. And this is also why he's going after, Trump's going after the actual transportation of oil, not just shutting down possibly the coastline, but also, obviously, the Belt and Road Railway. That railway really kept Iran's energy production going, right? Obviously, they could produce at least a limited amount during the war and at least know they could ship it out via that railway. Trump wants to get rid of that. And that's what they're doing. All right. So now Iran is retaliating.
Speaker 1: Naturally. So we know that there was air defenses in Kuwait and Bahrain. And I saw... So so far, it's just, I don't want to mention any Gulf countries, early warning alerts have been sent in Qatar. But then the all clear was given. Yeah, that's a new one. When the missiles are being launched, some are speculating that they're that the UAE is being targeted, but there's no alerts or reports of anything in the UAE. So far, all explosions have been heard in Kuwait. And in Bahrain, which is what we saw yesterday. If Qatar is included, that will be that will be new. That'll be interesting. Now, I wouldn't be too supportive.
Speaker 0: I did tell you yesterday. I did tell you, though, that that's on the menu right now.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Especially considering the scale of the attacks today. The U.S. did not just attack again, but they attacked more significantly than they did yesterday.
Speaker 0: So... Well, I think the president's comments this morning when he was at the conference calling... calling the Iranians, he said they were scum. And he said that, you know, he announced unilaterally, he announced that not only was the memorandum of misunderstanding over, doesn't even really feel like it began, but, you know, we were not going back to it. That was it. He's done. And I really think that that's a very serious statement. I don't think... There is no off-ramp here. He is going to destroy or try to destroy their oil infrastructure, their energy production infrastructure.
Speaker 1: But there hasn't been any energy infrastructure struck.
Speaker 0: No, but what I'm talking about, I'm not just talking about the production. I'm talking about the movement as well. Because if you produce it and you can't move it, well, then what's the point? So he's going after the infrastructure that moves the energy. And I suspect they're going to try to go up the escalation ladder from there. If that doesn't what Trump's trying to do is he's trying. This is what we talked about yesterday. He is trying, I think, to escalate, to deescalate. But I don't think he's going to get to the deescalation part. I think this is just going to keep going.
Speaker 1: So just want to be clear. So if you could show the target list again, KK. So these are what was targeted. All of them the same as can you expand it, KK? all the same targets that we've seen since the ceasefire. And they're all targets that allow Iran to control the Strait of Homs or the coastline. Yeah. All the way from Bashir, all the way at the top, down to Shabahar, which is their main port that links to the sea.
Speaker 0: And Abu Musa.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Abu Musa is the island in the middle. Yeah, yeah. That's always been targeted. So it's the same types as we've seen before.
Speaker 0: Yeah, they're not only degrading the ability of Iran to potentially control the straight, they are degrading the ability for them to... possibly even defend the straight and this is why yesterday i was very worried that this is all prelude to potential attempts at landing at some point just look at how they look at how they punch through i mean it's it's a pretty methodical punching again though they're hitting what they can see and there's a boatload of stuff that we can't see and so it's going to be very interesting to see um what precisely the iranians how they retaliate not just immediately now but But in the long run, what kind of weapons are they still holding on to? What kind of quantities do they still have? As you know, I think they still have a sizable arsenal in reserve. And I just think that this thing is, you know, we're blowing up what we can see. This is exactly what we did in Vietnam. We hit what we knew. But as we all know, that wasn't enough.
Speaker 1: Yeah. So, so far, we have no reports of explosions or attacks on Qatar or the UAE. Just to be clear, there's multiple explosions that are ongoing in Kuwait and Bahrain. Would you be surprised if they only target Bahrain and Kuwait?
Speaker 0: No. No, this does seem to follow a pattern as well. The last round, a lot of those were the targets they went for.
Speaker 1: But then why would you say Iran is not responding in kind every time the U.S., escalates us escalates Iran responds the same I didn't say that I didn't say that they are going to respond in kind I just said it's not going to end I didn't say they didn't respond I'm saying I know I'm not saying why do you think they're not escalating so I'm not saying you said that why right now why do you think Iran is not striking other Gulf countries why do you think they're not um officially the straight home was either
Speaker 0: yeah well okay they haven't officially closed the strait but there's nothing really going through man i mean this is like on the iranian side there is not the armani side there are ships right but they're not at the level that they were before the war we need the level before the war we need we needed that a week ago they're not they never did get to 140 ships per day they did not and so you know that there's that as well but Why aren't they escalating is your question? You know, the sky's the limits for the reason. Look, the time plays or I'm sorry, time is an advantage for the Iranians in this war. It is not an advantage for the United States. We're the ones on a countdown to the depletion of our, as you know, our oil reserves. So the Iranians don't have to really do much of, you know, escalating in the media sea. They can wait. And I think that's part of the plan is they know that we're speeding toward zero here. And they're just going to let it happen. And then they're going to see how we react. Because I have a feeling once we really do hit the emergency level that we're rapidly approaching, I have a feeling that things are going to get very, very, very unstable here. And President Trump will start doing things really spasmodically. And I think that's when you That's when you set yourself up for defeat, when you start acting spasmodically.
Speaker 1: But you said that Trump is escalating to de-escalate.
Speaker 0: I think that's what he thinks he's doing. I don't know. Look, the problem is I don't really know what Trump is doing. I'm trying to divine – the problem is I don't think Trump knows what he's doing. I mean today – He was at that briefing today or the press conference today, and he looked off to the camera, and he ordered somebody. Nobody knows who the hell he was talking to. He ordered somebody to stop doing all trade with Spain. Okay. So, I mean, I don't know what the hell this guy is doing. You know, I'm trying to divine, you know, any semblance of pattern or rationality here. But the man is… Yeah.
Speaker 1: But you said earlier that your worry is that the goal is to escalate all trade. The objective is to escalate, to deescalate.
Speaker 0: To deescalate from him, yeah.
Speaker 1: But you're worried that the deescalation will be the issue.
Speaker 0: I don't think that... Look, if he doesn't know how he's gotten to this point, which he doesn't seem to fully understand, it's pretty surprising if he's going to have some pathway he's charted to getting off of this course. This is the hardest kind of course to get off of. This was, I think I might've said this to you before, but Herman Kahn, who was the great nuclear warfare theorist in the 60s, he referred to something like this as an insensate wargasm. Basically, once you start, the whole thing just keeps going and you can't stop until it basically just burns itself out. And this is not being controlled by disciplined practitioners of statecraft. This entire thing is by a bunch of amateurs who actually hate expertise. So this is not a good position for the United States to be in. So I think his theory is escalate to deescalate. I also think, if I could have a little bit of fun here, I also think he sees Putin blowing up stuff with wanton glee right now in ukraine and i think he wants to get in on the action in the you know in the middle east because i think that he has this little tip for tat with putin where he wants to be as big as putin so um i do think that there's some weird thing going on there as well but i do not believe this man has any any idea of how to de-escalate but he's de-escalated multiple times in this war
Speaker 1: We've seen multiple times where things are escalating.
Speaker 0: Mario, we're still at war, man. A pause is not a de-escalation. A de-escalation is we pull back. Let me make my point.
Speaker 1: So there's multiple times where the U.S. attacked Iran. And Iran, for example, I'll give you one example. Remember now, Project Freedom. The U.S. tried Project Freedom. Iran went guns blazing, don't fuck with us, attacked Fujairah, burnt Fujairah, Trump, what did he do? Oh, that was nothing. It was nothing at all, et cetera. Perfect example of him literally deescalating a situation that even the Gulf were like, what the hell are you doing? So he has, this is one example, and he did a few other times after that. The Iran would retaliate and Trump would dismiss it as nothing. which indicated that he did not want the war to continue. So there are examples before throughout the world where he did de-escalate. So I think saying he doesn't know how to de-escalate, well, he's done it before. It's not hard to de-escalate.
Speaker 0: He didn't de-escalate with Project Freedom. He didn't de-escalate with Project Freedom. Well, he did. Then Saudi closed the airspace and forced him to respond. The Saudis told him, you're not going to use your bases in our country. And that created a massive gap in the... Hold on, hold on. No, no. This is the important thing. Trump didn't do jacked. Okay, the Saudis told them, you're not doing this and you're not going to be able to use your bases here. And that caused a huge, huge, huge rupture between Riyadh and Washington. And they're still trying to repair it right now, by the way. This is a very serious issue because the Saudis said you're not allowed to use your base. That's the reason he de-escalated. It's because he had his hands tied.
Speaker 1: He had his hands tied. There's two stories to it. So this is one. The other story is that the Saudis told him, hey, Because he didn't want to retaliate. What do you mean de-escalate? He didn't attack. He said, we're not going to attack. He dismissed the attack. The report of the Saudi closing their airspace came two days afterwards, a day and a half technically afterwards. After the Saudi closed their airspace, the report came out of Axios that Trump then agreed, because of the Saudi closing the airspace, Saudis like you got to defend us. You got to retaliate because Dubai was struck because of your actions So the Saudis closing the airspace led to the escalation But I think a few times after that the Iran is ready to retaliate whenever Trump to sneak and tries to sneak out ships And he would not escalate as he did now so he's shown examples where he did escalate other examples where he's shown the opposite he did de-escalate throughout the last few weeks and what I'm saying is that what I'm saying is that
Speaker 0: The whole point I'm making is this man has been overcome by events. He's OBE. He's overcome by events. And what you're talking about de-escalation, I don't see a man who's willingly de-escalating. I see a man who's being dictated to by events. And he keeps going back to his reset position, which is, I'm going to annihilate these people. He called them scum today. Now, look, again, I am a very big opponent of the regime in Iran, but I'm not going to sit around here and say what the president is doing is conducive for the grand strategy of the United States because it is not. And sitting around calling them scum and attacking them during this funeral period when we were not supposed to be doing anything, this is not. And by the way, like we said yesterday, this entire thing happened because the Americans have been pressuring everybody to use the Omani route. The Omani route is the problem in the Strait of Hormuz. And to me, that's not deescalatory. This is nothing in this is deescalatory.
Speaker 1: He's not deescalating now. Of course not. No, no. I'm just saying in general.
Speaker 0: No, I know. But I'm saying in general, if you look at the span of the war, there's pauses. There's no real deescalatory move, though. None. None. And any time that he did. And again, the Project Freedom example, the Project Freedom example, that was OBE. That was not Trump saying, OK, this is the off ramp. That was Trump saying, crap, I can't implement this thing. And why? Why did he do Project Freedom, which, by the way, didn't really work? Why did he do Project Freedom? It's because. The generals told him, you're going through the stockpiles too quick. We need to slow down. So a counter blockade was their suggestion. And that technically is what that was. That was a counter blockade. Your audience should Google that because it's a very specific thing. A counter blockade is a very specific tactic that the U.S. Navy has in its repertoire. But it's a very, very laborious task. And he didn't have enough ships committed to it. He didn't have the airspace he needed because the Saudis created a gap there. So the whole thing's been a mess. And so, yeah, okay, you can label that a de-escalation in terms of the result. But that wasn't the purpose behind it was not de-escalatory. He was OBE. He was OBE. And so everything I see is a man who's overwhelmed and he's out of his depth. And we didn't elect him to be a foreign policy president. This is why we liked him. He was going to focus on America. So this is not his forte.
Speaker 1: Yeah, and I obviously agree with this. I disagree with this entire war. I know that the project freedom is to get oil out. I think the battle that we're seeing right now is to control the Strait of Homs. The U.S. is like, don't charge a fee. Iran's like, we're going to charge a fee. It's like, all right, cool. We're going to hit you with a stick. But we'll also give you a carrot. We'll lift the sanctions and unfreeze the assets. Iran's like, no, fuck you. I'm going to control the Strait of Homs anyway. All right, we're going to strike you with the biggest stick. This is exactly what we're seeing now. And if it was something different, we would see Iran retaliate differently. And I'm not talking about striking other Gulf countries. I'm talking about something significant. They could sink a ship. They could sink a commercial ship to try to end this back and forth. But from the targets that were struck by the Americans and the responses from Iran, it's literally we're seeing a more aggressive version of what we've seen in the last few weeks. And the worry of this escalating, getting out of control, it's a concern that I have. And if the Iranians get fed up, they're like, you know, we're done with this shit. We're going to escalate now. That could happen. That is a worry that I have. I think we're close to that.
Speaker 0: Yes.
Speaker 1: But I also think, like I said, I also don't think I mean, just for the audience, there's explosions and new waves right now launched from Iran again, just to give an audience and a quick update. I think this is like the third third wave, if I'm not mistaken. So it's been two, three waves, all of it was behind in Kuwait, multiple explosions. We don't have any reports of any impacts. There probably was, but we know there's been a lot of interceptions based on the videos we're seeing or I'm seeing. We can play them for you guys in a second. And I'm sure there's already smoke rising from the Fifth Fleet headquarters again, and I would expect there to be impact as we've seen in every single attack.
Speaker 0: So much money. So much money we spent building that place. I mean, we could have been building bridges and roads, but... The Iranians, though, again, they don't even really have to do much. All they have to do... Look, the only people that are being hurt... Listen, four points.
Speaker 1: The only people that are... All they need to do is get the shadow home was closed. That's all they need to do is be patient. That's all they need to do.
Speaker 0: All they need to do. And they know this. And so, you know... you know, they know that the Americans are the ones who are up against the wall, not the Iranians. Yeah, this is hurting Iran. It's certainly not great for Iran in the near term. But if the Iranian regime can ride this out, they know at the end of this thing, there's a much better deal for them long run. And it's not so great for America. And it's definitely not great for Trump. And they definitely want revenge on Trump. Now, maybe they can't kill Trump. OK, but maybe they can get him weakened in power if he loses the next election or the midterms. Maybe they can really cause him a lot of hell and a lot of grief for the last two years of his presidency by putting in his helping to put in his enemies in power in D.C. I mean, do not do not mistake. The Iranians are a very, very savvy group of strategists, and they know exactly what what our inputs are and what our concerns are better than we do, apparently. So this is why I say, you know, the Iranians are looking at the American. This is like, it's like the Shane McGillis, you know, meme where he's got the gun and then he's pointing it and then he's pointing it at himself. You know, that's America right now. And the Iranians are looking at us like we're crazy because we are.
Speaker 1: Question. Yeah, there's smoke coming out of the Fifth Fleet headquarters, but it's expected. Question. At this point, it's just an incendiary activity. Yeah. just trying to see if there's other countries other than bahrain early warning alerts have been sent in qatar that's the one before you're not hearing anything it sounds like in terms of uh in your no i think my alerts haven't gone out nothing in the uae or qatar nothing's been confirmed in qatar as well but um question where we're speculating that the iran is doing well all that all that the iranis need to do is just wait it out the Americans are wasting their time striking these targets. I'm in that camp as well. At least I'm not an expert. But let's, why not? I like to poke holes at every belief that I have. What if these strikes are actually degrading Iran's ability to close the Strait of Hormuz? And what if there's more ships coming out than what we, the reports we see because they turned the AIS transponders off?
Speaker 0: Yeah, it's very, look, it's very possible, Mario. And then in a perfect world, that's exactly how this will be. And hey, look, Trump has, you know, like I said before, in the 90s, Trump was up to his eyeballs in bankruptcies and he got the banks to bail him out. I mean, how many times has that happened? So maybe Trump is just touched and he can, you know, he's like the idiot savant. You know, he can just turn it around. Okay, good. I hope that's the case for us. I don't think that's the case, though. I don't. And I'm happy to be proven wrong because it's going to be our asses in a sling if I am right. So, no, it's very possible. And look, like I said, this is not like this is not perfect for Iran. I mean, they are having things get destroyed. They are seeing their oil infrastructure and their natural gas infrastructure degraded. But it's not the kill shot. It's not the kill shot, not yet at least. And that's the key because the longer we can't get a kill shot in on the regime, which is clearly what Trump really wants, the longer that goes on, the longer the war goes on, and the longer the war goes on, the more it hurts us in the economic realm than it does the Iranians.
Speaker 1: It is interesting. So I had one of my – I had some guests mention – But the Iranians should respond very heavily. They should strike all the bases in the region. They should strike all Gulf states. There's not many left.
Speaker 0: There's not many bases left. I mean, let's get real.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but they are using those bases. There's more aircrafts going from Ben Gurion Airport to the Gulf bases. The Gulf bases are being used in these attacks. Those satellite images showing 13 aircrafts going from Ben Gurion two days ago, three days ago, to I think the base in Qatar, I think. But so that was one of my, a few of my guests saying that Iran should retaliate and go gloves off. But my answer is, this is why I said the point you're mentioning is really important. That was my answer as well. I'm like, Iran doesn't really need to do that because Iran strikes those bases, but that's more symbolic. A lot of it gets intercepted. At this point, yeah. Yeah. There'll be damage caused, but it's not going to be enough to really deter America's defense. America's perseverance in trying to break Iran's control of the Strait of Homs, which obviously the U.S. has made it very important for them. Rightly or wrongly, that's the position of the Trump administration right now. All that Iran needs to do is let Trump strike it, and then again, strike ships again. Keep their control of the Strait of Homs until the U.S. gives up. Now, but if the U.S. escalates and starts causing significant damage to Iran, which is what we've seen yesterday and today, this is where I'm like, okay, we are getting at a stage where Iran...
Speaker 0: continue going to back and forth that's what we saw before iran needs to do something a bit more forceful you really think that we you think you really think that we we really harmed them this this last round of strikes i'm saying because i don't i don't think i i think and like you said you were we're attacking the same targets i think the this is like the iranians like okay we know they're going to hit here there are they've already destroyed a lot there let them hit there and then we'll we'll shoot back but But we'll just keep everything closed down. That's the point.
Speaker 1: They can keep everything closed down. It's the most significant attack since April 7th. Yes, there's no doubt about that. There's no doubt about that. Which says something. Iran is retaliating more aggressively for less.
Speaker 0: It says that the Americans, it says that Trump is spazzing out is what it says because he's being attacked.
Speaker 1: So we got a new location.
Speaker 0: There you go.
Speaker 1: I give it a 50-50 Qatar and the Qatar gets trapped. I don't know for sure. Unless there's something behind the scenes business being done.
Speaker 0: Well, I mean, they're very probable. I mean, the Qataris are masters at playing the kind of the middleman role, right? I mean, this is what they do. This is how they survive. It's a small country in a rough neighborhood. They don't have the mass to be able to fight. They've got to do sort of these deals, and they're very good at them, and this is how they have managed to stay an independent country. We know that Saudi has always wanted to absorb Qatar, and they never did because partly of how deft Qatari leaders are at kind of cutting deals and, you know, keeping everybody happy. So, yeah, I just I would say that the the probability has increased. It's not definite. But I think that the I think Qatar is on the menu now. But at the same time, I also think that the Iranians are looking at what the Americans are hitting. And, yeah, it's putting on a great light show, but it's not fundamentally destroying the regime. As long as the regime survives, it wins fundamentally. And that's the problem is that we don't seem to comprehend it.
Speaker 1: So you could destroy 30% of the regime's military capabilities, let's say, but are the regimes surviving? It's fine, we'll just wait it out. That's a lot of damage.
Speaker 0: Yes, but Mario, the alternative is they all be destroyed and they're overthrown. So that's their metric.
Speaker 1: No, but why wouldn't the Iranians do something to then... forced Trump to stop his attacks.
Speaker 0: They are. They're holding the Strait hostage. That's the whole thing.
Speaker 1: The Strait is, they need to close it. They need to do something now. I'd be surprised if they don't do something.
Speaker 0: By default, it's already closed. They don't have to do anything more than they've already done. There's no way those ships are coming through and they never reach the pre-war level. They never reach the pre-war level and that's the key. You've got to get to the pre-war level.
Speaker 1: Yeah, 30, 40 is still not zero. Everyone's saying, even Iranian groups are saying, why isn't the Strait of Hormuz closed? They're upset that the Strait of Hormuz is not closed. But before the war, it was 140.
Speaker 0: 30, 40 ships. I understand, but it's... And the real question is, and this is an honest question because I can't seem to be able to get a straight answer out of people, but the real question is not the outflow. The number of ships going out of the Strait of Hormuz helps, but what about the commiserate number of ships going into the Strait? And I have not seen a good number on that. I have not seen a good number going in and picking up new resources.
Speaker 1: So what you're saying right now is, okay, so the U.S. could keep bombing Iran, could keep escalating, and Iran would just strike Georgia and Kuwait and Bahrain?
Speaker 0: They might. They might. And not even close the Strait of Hormuz? They don't have to actually do anything in terms of closing. As long as the missiles are flying, there's no ships that are going through. Not unless they're under heavy American escorts. And I don't believe the Americans are going to send their warships. I'll repeat.
Speaker 1: The Iranian side of the Strait of Homs is open for ships to go through. Ships are going through it. There are ships that left the Omani side, went to the Iranian side. They're going through it today.
Speaker 0: But Mario, Mario, that means they have to use the Iranian TSS, the Traffic Separation Scheme. This whole fight is over that. Because Trump doesn't want anyone using the TSS that Iran created because that's a backdoor for international legal scholars. That's a backdoor for then Iran to say, okay, the world's been using this. Now we get to impose our fee. Now, I'm not saying that's, yeah.
Speaker 1: Go ahead. No, I'm just saying Iran is being bombed. Yes. When Project Freedom happened, Iran's like, we don't want this to happen. They struck Fujairah and other Gulf countries. Trump is like, all right, I'm stopping Project Freedom. Iran's getting bombed right now. and getting bombed more and more. Iran should do something that would stop the US from bombing them. Now, you might be like, they're not causing much damage. They're causing some damage. They've caused the most damage since the war, since the ceasefire started. Iran can do something where Trump is like, all right, I'm going to stop bombing them. And they're not so far unless things change in the next 20, 30 minutes, 60 minutes.
Speaker 0: Because again, they're playing a different game. I really believe they're not playing a straight military game. This is not tit for tat. They're playing an economic game. And I think they've calculated. I think they've gamed it out. And I think it is a risky thing because, hey, maybe this thing goes totally upside down on them. But for them, this is survival. So they're all in. I don't think Donald Trump is all in. It's not. He's not. He's very, very blasé about this thing. And then when you get like that in a situation like this, that's when it doesn't work out in your favor. And so I really think the Iranians are playing a very different game. And I think they're looking at the economic consequences for the Americans, and they're counting down. And they're saying, if I can hold on, we might lose 40% to 50% of our ability to make money and whatever, but we'll be in power still. That's the key. That's the metric for them. That's not our metric, but that's their metric. And right now, they seem to be doing okay by that metric.
Speaker 1: Yeah. I know. So there's what I'm trying to figure out. I agree with you. This is their strategy and it's worked well so far. What I think is that I'm sure there is a line where if that line is crossed, they're going to escalate to try to deter that escalation. Yeah, I'm sure. The question is, what is that line? Yeah, I just don't think we're there yet. Exactly. If the US starts bombing funeral processions, killing thousands of people, that's obviously a line. I'm not saying this is going to happen, but I'm giving an extreme example of a line. If they start striking the energy infrastructure in Iran, That's a massive line. They struck the railway, and you were telling me how important that is.
Speaker 0: That is. That's how they move. That's how they've been moving. Even when things got slowed down out of the strait, they were able to move a lot of their or some of their energy over the rail line. They were also moving some of it over the Russian-controlled waterways in the Caspian Sea or those shipping routes. And this is why the Israelis allegedly – dropped bombs in front of one of those Russian tankers back in April, I think, during the early phase, or March, I guess, the early phase of the war. They tried to ward off Russian tankers that were coming in from the Caspian Sea to pick up Iranian oil and natural gas. And the Russians had very strong words with Benjamin Netanyahu, and that didn't happen again. But I think the key thing here is, yes, at some point you might see, because again, I don't think Trump is really interested. He said today he's not. I don't think he's ever really been serious about ending this the way it was ending or looking to end with Iran having some kind of control over the Strait. So yeah, he's going to keep pounding away. He's going to keep pounding away. And at some point, he might go over a line where the Iranians do say, okay, that's it.
Speaker 1: We got to hear back. That's my worry.
Speaker 0: Yeah, and that's my worry too. But so far, again, like I said, Qatar is still on the menu technically, but they haven't done it yet, which indicates to me the Iranians don't think this is yet the red line. And they're going to keep holding on, and they'll keep their powder dry, and they're just going to let the economic situation collapse over time for the United States. It's coming a lot sooner. uh, you know, it's coming in the next month or so. So it's, they just got to hold on basically for another 20, 30 days.
Speaker 1: And that's really, that's the impact by the fifth on the fifth fleet, by the way.
Speaker 0: Jesus, you know how much money we spent so much money building that thing up and it's all just gone in about a hundred days. It's just, it's, it's incredible. Actually, the more I think about it, I mean, how, what a waste. And then, You know, you look at all the bases we have within range of China's anti-access area denial weapons in the first island chain, and you think, what the hell is Washington doing? Why are they even maintaining one of those bases? We should be pulling out. There's absolutely no way we should be maintaining those targets in Asia, where the Chinese have 10 times what the Iranians have. It's absolutely insane, and it's strategic malpractice, and it's the sort of thing you come to expect from, you know, the midwits running Washington, D.C. today.
Speaker 1: Yeah. It seems Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, similar targets as before, which to me shows not escalation, not an end of the MOU. That's my position. Not an end of the MOU.
Speaker 0: The president said it was over. President Trump said it's over. He's done.
Speaker 1: He washed his hands of it. President Trump also said he'll be getting a percentage out of this trade at home. I just... I tend to not pick and choose what he says. That's smart.
Speaker 0: That's smart. Yes.
Speaker 1: I'm definitely very worried about it. But there's no indication, at least yet, that there is an intention beyond trying to gain... Control or gained leverage over the straight of home was I think this is the power struggle.
Speaker 0: Hopefully doesn't get No, I agree with you.
Speaker 1: It is that is the point you point you mentioned about this being a clearing operation for a ground operation Malcolm Ness brought that up. But what he said check out that He said if you if this was a clearing operation for something bigger a ground operation, uh-huh you to yet a the hundreds of bombs dropped like, you know, 50 times more than what we're seeing right now over two, three days. That is right.
Speaker 0: He's right about that. That is true.
Speaker 1: And it goes with your point as well because you were just telling me how the damage is limited. They break it right out and rebuild it. Well, that's a blessing then.
Speaker 0: That's a blessing then. That's a blessing because if Trump is...
Speaker 1: If it starts escalating, you'd see me with a different background. I won't be in Dubai anymore.
Speaker 0: You'll be in Miami.
Speaker 1: I miss Miami. I love Miami.
Speaker 0: Hey, man, I live near there. Yeah, go ahead.
Speaker 1: I love it. And I just want to thank you for jumping on a short note.
Speaker 0: Yeah, no, and I think I'll be on tomorrow with Lieutenant Colonel Karen.
Speaker 1: Karen Kwiatkowski.
Speaker 0: Yes, yes, I have to be able to say her name properly. I'll practice that. All right, well, thank you, and see you manana. See you soon. All right.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’ve heard the intelligence community judged killing the Supreme Leader would rally Iran; the funeral crowds proved it. Joe Kent says Israel outplayed Washington by getting it on board with the assassination, setting any negotiated exit back. Now Araghchi faces Americans while streets chant “death to the compromiser,” and Netanyahu likely won’t strike Iran proper, instead pressuring via Lebanon—while politics at home shifts, leaving me uneasy: no diplomatic or military solution, just widening proxy war.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 The intelligence community always assessed that killing the Supreme Leader would rally Iran behind the regime. The funeral crowds just proved it at a scale nobody modeled… Joe Kent ran counterterrorism for this government, and his verdict on those processions was unsparing: the Israelis outplayed Washington by getting it on board with the assassination, knowing it would set any negotiated exit back tenfold. Soleimani was a general; this was different. Now Araghchi sits across the table from Americans knowing his own streets are chanting “death to the compromiser.” Militarily strong, politically unable to concede an inch. His read on the Bibi visit: Netanyahu won’t push for strikes on Iran proper. He’ll work the Lebanon seam, quietly pulling Trump deeper into the side deal until the tit-for-tat reignites itself. And the domestic ground is shifting under all of it. Rahm Emanuel, a longtime pro-Israel Democrat, just gave a speech calling for sanctions on violent settlers and conditional aid. Joe’s point: a machine politician like that doesn’t test a message unless the voters already moved. Where he left me uneasy was the honest part. No diplomatic solution Trump can accept, no military one the Pentagon can define. Just a proxy war spreading through Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria, with an axis that now retaliates in the open. @joekent16jan19
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on how Iran’s mass funeral processions for Ali Khamenei’s funeral revealed a strong “rally around the flag” effect, surprising many outside observers who had expected large-scale opposition to the regime. The speakers connect the scale of public unity to Iranian nationalism and Shia martyrdom culture, arguing it is not simply the reaction of a “backwards country” but evidence of widespread emotional and cultural commitment. One speaker notes personal surprise after seeing the processions and says the emotional reversal will take years, not decades or generations, to undo the perceived damage to US standing in Iran and other countries.
They also discuss how the killing of the supreme leader changes negotiation dynamics. The argument is that even if some Iranians revere figures like Qasem Soleimani as military commanders, the circumstances after the assassination are “completely different,” making it hard for Iranian leaders—especially those who attended the funerals—to offer concessions at negotiations. Another speaker adds that Iranian public sentiment on the streets is pressing leaders toward hardline positions, with chanting about “death to the compromiser,” suggesting many people are not excited for a deal.
The conversation then broadens to related US and Israel political signals, including Rahm Emanuel’s speech positioning an end to unconditional US support for Israel and calling for conditional support such as sanctioning violent Israeli settlers. It also references the Trump–Erdogan meeting and the NATO summit context, including Turkey lifting sanctions on Turkey and possible approval of disputed F-35 sales, alongside claims that this might reflect a US–Israel split. The speakers tie these developments to domestic and election pressures affecting how any leadership might act.
On the Middle East battlefield, they emphasize escalating risk in Syria involving Turkey and Israel. They describe looking at potential clashes and expect proxy dynamics rather than a purely conventional Turkey–Israel war. The speaker portrays Syria as a proxy-pulled battleground involving actors tied to Kurdish and Druze communities, while Sharaa’s forces could be pushed toward conflict that includes ethnic cleansing and further intervention by conventional Israeli forces, potentially including Turkish forces and even US involvement. They also discuss the likelihood of pressure on Sharaa to target Hezbollah when his support is threatened, stating it is possible only if he is “truly against the wall,” but still unlikely, and that Hezbollah may not initiate a fight either.
The speakers discuss Syria’s instability as a “powder keg,” including past patterns where fighters in uniforms are used in ways that blur responsibility and create opportunities for further escalation. They describe how US and broader involvement in Syria was driven by proxy-war concerns and the role of Turkish intelligence in fostering or supporting extremist-linked elements, and they discuss ISIS detainees and repatriation from refugee camps—framing it as a key source of ongoing volatility.
Finally, the conversation returns to whether a direct war has ended while proxy war expands—Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and possibly Iraq—creating a prolonged, unresolved power struggle. They argue Iran is enforcing the MOU through control of the Straits of Hormuz, making diplomatic off-ramps difficult and raising the possibility of additional bombing campaigns or more aggressive naval actions. The speakers also connect Middle East conflict to US homeland terrorism risk, citing blowback patterns such as attacks referencing the Gaza war and arguing that more large-scale fighting increases radicalization and the chance of attacks in the US.
They conclude with the idea that the situation is largely about waiting for what happens next, particularly regarding proxy warfare and the evolving Iran–MOU–Straits dynamic.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Well, I mean, so so, let's talk about the things that that matter that your kids probably find very uninteresting. Yes. First, were you were you surprised by the size of the funeral processions in Iran? Did you see those videos?
Speaker 1: Yeah. I mean, I think they surprised pretty much everyone. What's not surprising, though, is the rally around the flag effect that's taken place. I mean, again, this you and I have talked about this before. I know a lot of people in the West were like, wow.
We we we're really surprised that the Ayatollah was popular. We've been told that there was massive protests and people hated the regime. And even though some of that was true to a certain degree, we always assess that if the Ayatollah were taken out, there would be a massive, you know, popular uprising, of support for the regime. So seeing all the people out on the streets, it was impressive, I mean, for sure. I mean, to see how unscared they are, especially if all the rumors that there might be more strikes, that's just really, I think, puts the the Iranian nationalism combined with, you know, the Shia martyrdom culture just on full display to show that we're we're not dealing with a a simple backwards country that's gonna just take it laying down.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Now I was surprised. I put a tweet. I was actually in the middle of one of my interviews, and I got the folks. So I put out a tweet that says, I saw after seeing the funeral processions in Iran, I feel lied to about the country or something like that.
I after seeing the funeral Ali Khamenei's funeral processions, I feel lied to about Iran. And in a way, it's true because I understand there's the rally around the flag effect, but not to that extent. I expect a few million, but we're seeing numbers bigger than Komenees unless we heavily underestimated the rally around the flag effect. But I think this is, you know, someone who's who's a director of the National Counterterrorism Center, you know pretty well how long these emotions will be felt. You know, this is reversing the damage done in the way The US is perceived in Iran and other countries as well.
You know, Shiites is not only in Iran. It will take years, not decades, or generations to undo.
Speaker 1: Yeah. It really will. I mean, this is gonna make our negotiations very, very challenging, not just because of the military factors that that where where Iran is succeeding on the battlefield. I mean, we made a major mistake. And, this is where the Israelis really outplayed us, where they got us on board with killing the supreme leader knowing that, basically, even if we wanted to get out of this thing through negotiations, that it would that this killing of the supreme leader would set us back almost tenfold.
I think a lot of Iranians, ones who, really revered Qasem Soleimani, they understood that he was a military commander. And even though they would get out there and say that, you know, we need to avenge Qasem Soleimani, the Americans assassinated him. In the in the back of their heads, it was different because he was a general. But this is completely completely different, and this is gonna make it really hard for for any, you know, leader in Iran, even even leaders who want to to sit down and to actually negotiate with us. I mean, you saw Arachi's face, and it's always hard to, you know, gauge facial expressions at events like these, but Arachi has a very difficult job right now in Gallipath.
I mean, the ones who have to actually come over and sit down at the negotiating table with us, they know they have militarily, they're in a good position, but they really can't give us any concessions because they were at the funeral. They saw the way that that the Iranians are acting, in the wake of their supreme leader being killed.
Speaker 0: Exactly. The same way we have to take into consideration what Trump will do because of politics back home. The and we talk about that being the case with Dijkov and Netanyahu in the elections. The same applies with in Iran. There was a clip I was watching, and I played on the show earlier today of the president, people calling him a traitor, death to the traitor, or something along those lines, or to the person death to the compromiser because of the compromises that he's accepted to.
Yeah. You can show the video, Lisa, without the audio, because of the compromises he's accepted in the MOU. And I think that's what worries me. The Iranians seeing the the leaders seeing that sentiment on the streets are like, okay. The people want us to be more hardline.
They want us to be more strict. They're not that excited for a deal. Many of them are against the deal, and that's worrying. It's very worrying. That's the video there.
I put it on mute because they they're yelling the the the death to the compromiser in Persian. So, now we have Bibi visiting Trump. That's always exciting, Just like the World Cup for your kids. And we have Trump in Turkey in Ankara with the NATO summit. And it's pretty fun to watch Trump just sitting there praising Erdogan while Bibi going on TV on Fox News and other channels criticizing Turkey.
So on on TV, he hit Erdogan Netanyahu was saying, know, Turkey is a horrible regime. He just smiles on the West when it's convenient for him, supports terror, all these different things. And then you've got Trump in the meeting with Erdogan. Erdogan is a very strong man. He's the reason I came to this meeting.
He lifted some sanctions on Turkey. He's he's talking about potentially approving the f '35 sale that's been disputed for so many years. So it's I don't know what to make of this, whether we're seeing more indications of that split between The US and Israel. And Ian Bremmer mentioned to me earlier, was chatting to him. He he talks about Ram Rahm Emanuel's speech in Israel.
I'm not sure if he saw it or about Israel. And I'd asked, Grok to do a summary of the political piece. So Rahm Emanuel is positioning himself as a pro Israel democrat who nevertheless argues that the era of an unconditional US support for Israel is ending. He sees this as both good policy and good politics. And, again, this is not a progressive like AOC.
This is someone who's been seen, someone who's received money from APAC. You know, Ramwell. Or you know about it. So someone who's received money from APAC, someone who's seen as pro Israel. He's talking about the era of unconditional US support for Israel ending.
He places most of the blame on Netanyahu arguing Netanyahu has damaged Israel's standing with Democrats and internationally through the Gaza war and its close alignment with Republicans. He calls for US support to become conditional, including sanctioning violent violent Israeli settlers. Please, that would be one of the best things The US could do, reducing or ending some US subsidies for settlements and contra conditioning aspects of military and diplomatic support on Israeli policy changes. He rejects the traditional blah blah blah. I'll read the rest of it in a bit.
But, you know, linking all this together, Joe, there's a lot there to unpack. The Netanyahu PR campaign he's ongoing right now, the Trump Erdogan meeting, and then the Ram speech.
Speaker 1: I mean, the Ram speech, I think, is pretty significant because for for, a good gauge of domestic politics, Rahm Emanuel, that Obama machine, they are very, very savvy in terms of what, you know, what responds well with younger demographics, who they need to get out and vote and win elections. So for him to come out right now in, you know, mid twenty twenty six, the summer of twenty twenty six, and deliver a speech that says we need to start putting sanctions on Israel. We need to change the way that we deal with the Israelis. He's positioning himself, obviously, as at least a thought leader, if not a presidential candidate, going into 2028. But I think that shows you an accurate read of where, you know, swing voters and younger voters are because Rahm Emanuel is not doing this just on a whim.
That's not that's not how he rolls. He's a political operative. The the Bibi Trump, meeting, I think, is gonna be very, very interesting. Again, the the Israelis, I think, are in an interesting spot. I mean, obviously, BB wants us to resume hostilities with the Iranians.
And I think in a way, Trump's in a in a box because everybody almost wants him to resume hostilities that he's gonna be speaking with. Bibi wants him to resume hostilities. We've got a lot of hawkish people on our side of the aisle here in America that want him to resume the hostilities. The Iranians are testing the MOU on a daily basis. There was, what, four strikes in the last twenty four hours in in the, the Straits Of Hormuz.
And so I think Bibi really is going to try to push Trump on the Lebanon issue. I think he's gonna leave the the Iran, homeland proper. I think he's gonna leave that to the side, but I think he's gonna say, hey. We need you to pressure the the Lebanese government maybe to join the Abraham Accords or maybe to come out stronger against Hezbollah, to to really try and, separate the MOU or separate the Lebanon Hezbollah issue from the MOU, but that's gonna kinda play right back into Iran's hands in a way because Iran got us to put the MOU put the the issue of Lebanon Hezbollah in the MOU. So the second that that we start enabling the Israelis to either hold ground there in Lebanon, which we've done with that separate side deal that secretary Rubio cut, then the Iranians, I think, coming off a high of, you know, the the the four day funeral of the supreme leader and what they're doing in the Straits Of Hormuz, I think that they're going to be inclined to act as well.
I think Netanyahu knows this, and so the more that he can just gradually lean on president Trump, not come in hard like he has in the past and say, hey. We appreciate all your support. But we've got this issue of Hezbollah. They're in our backyard, etcetera, etcetera, knowing that they that can really get the ball rolling again to to amp back up the, the strikes and the tit for tat in the war. Because look, Iran, they're not caving.
I mean, they're they're they're basically enforcing what they view as the MOU in the straits, and they know that we're under pressure to keep the straits open.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Are you, are you getting more convinced that we are seeing a split between The US and Israel or not necessarily? Because I I like to ask you that question because I remember you were one of the first people I brought this up when me and you were analyzing that Trump has that opportunity. And we're kinda getting mixed messages because on one side, we got we talked about Ram's speech. We talked about Trump and Erdogan, but Trump's been friendly to Erdogan before.
It's nothing new. The JD Vance and Trump media campaign against Israel went on for a couple of weeks, it's kinda eased up now. It's been quiet. It hasn't been anything since. So they they it's kinda mixed messages.
At the same time, you've got, you know, The US you would have liked to see The US disengage. I would have liked it for the sake of The US as well, disengage from the region. That that doesn't seem to be happening. You guys seem to be doubling down more. You got Rubio doing the rounds.
You've got the Cooper in Lebanon. You guys are signatories on a deal in Lebanon. So I don't know why you guys are there. So I don't think you're leaving the region. But I'm trying to trying to understand whether we will see actual results from all this.
What's your analysis when it comes to policy?
Speaker 1: Yeah. I mean, in the in the long run, for sure. I mean, younger generation, younger voters, this war, I think, is really gonna set back our set back the Israelis in the way that they they deal with us, which is why we're but then again, the Israelis are always kinda one step ahead of us. This is why we're seeing the, the blending of our military and the NDAA, senator Cotton's bill to try and get us deeply intertwined, on the intelligence sharing level with the Israelis. So all this just gets baked into the cake, and you could still have politicians from either either side of the aisle say, well, we need to, you know, restrict how much money we're giving the Israelis.
We need to condition it. All this tough talking, tough talking rhetoric that moves the ball in the right direction, but still at the end of the day, we're still deeply intertwined with the Israelis in the short term. Again, just because the Israelis set the conditions so well in their favor, it's gonna be hard for us to I mean, this is why, you know, I I've I've been saying, like, the just walk away method just remains to be remains Trump's best option Because the the more we play this out, the more we try to both enforce the MOU and also this Lebanon side deal that we cut, we're gonna end up drawn back into this. And the more that we're drawn back into it, the more that benefits the Israelis. So we we have a very, very bad relationship right now.
And Bibi's got nothing to lose. He's got elections coming up. Some are saying, you know, it's looking like he's gonna lose these elections. He's getting attacked basically from all sides politically. There's many that are saying on his, you know, on his side that he hasn't been hard enough, that we should just go for it, that the Israelis should just go even harder when we listen to Ben Gavir and some of the other ones in his his own cabinet.
So I think we remain very much at, unfortunately, at the behest of the Israelis because we are trying to be all things to all parties in in this entire equation, not realizing that the entire region is changing. I mean, the the funeral was a great example of that. You have the Saudis go over there and basically pay pay homage to the supreme leader and to the Iranian government. I mean, we're we're watching the Middle East being reshaped while we're desperately trying to cling on to it. And the longer that we try and cling on to it, the more, you know, deeply intertwined with the Israelis that we are and we let them drive.
But also, we're losing more and more the more we try and hold on to our control of the Middle East, which has basically slipped through our fingers because of this war.
Speaker 0: Let let's go back to a topic me and you discussed last time, and I've actually mentioned that to a lot of my guests. And that's, kind of what started it, but we're talking about Tucker potentially starting a new political party coalition or whatever you wanna call it, and then, you know, Massey and Marjorie Taylor Greene, and and I mentioned you joining that group in a party that's a nonintervention, as you know, genuinely focused on America first and stop intervening in all these different wars and global issues. And, was July 2 yes. I don't know if we talked about this, but Tucker did announce that he wants to build a third party. Tucker says he's helping put together a new political party, one built around fixing things at home instead of chasing fights abroad.
His pitch is simple, stop obsessing over foreign wars and start caring about ordinary Americans who feel left behind. Quote, I'm going to help build a third party. There should be a good faith effort to figure out what benefits the country. And one of my guests told me that Mario, you know, the third party doesn't really need to win. It just needs to be able to move the needle similar to RFK before Trump's election.
And then this way, it could actually lead to change when it comes to policy deciding which side to ally itself with. Have you spoken to Tucker about this?
Speaker 1: Not about this the the third party, but all the issues that he articulates, I've I've spoken with Tucker about. It's the same thing he says publicly. So I, you know, I I really support at least the sentiment. I mean, a third party, I think, at this point, because both sides of the aisle are just so broken and regardless of who we vote for, we get the same outcome. I think it is worth presenting an option to people that, hey.
You don't have to choose one or the other. Here is a third option. Now whether that third option becomes a full on, you know, political party that shows up on the ballot, easier said than done because we've got so many rules. Getting ballot access is challenging. But something and you pointed this out that third parties have been good about doing.
They have been good about bringing issues to the surface that forces one party or the other or both in many cases to to adopt those issues. So I I think that this is definitely a productive way within our own system other than voting for the same politicians over and over again or just sitting it out. This is a way to actually, I think, affect some change.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Are you worried about the escalating rhetoric between Turkey and Israel? I've dismissed it for a while, but it just keeps getting worse and worse. Is that even something it's even being considered at places like the National Counterterror Center or people within the administration that you've spoken to when you're still director that a potential clash between Israel and Turkey direct or indirect?
Speaker 1: As things developed in Syria, we we figured that there was going to be a clash in some way, shape, or form between the Israelis and the Turks just because they both have competing interests, in particular, in in Syria. But also just more broadly, they're both relatively superpowers in in The Middle East. They both ought be have a very close relationship with us and with the West. So it puts a lot of different allies in a very, very challenging position. But they are, you know, I would say, both, you know, strategic rivals in a sense.
So we have been looking at this for quite some time. If the Iran war wasn't taking up so much of our and, you know, Netanyahu's bandwidth, I I would think that it right now, they wouldn't have time to get to Turkey. However, the Likud party strategy does seem to be to light as many fires as they possibly can to, again, to to get us involved to the point where we have to support them in some way, shape, or form. So a lot of, you know, the the rational actor factor of, like, no. They're too busy for this.
I don't think that necessarily applies right now. Although I do think BB and and probably the smarter folks in the Likud party realized that now is not the best time to to ask us for a for a new war. But, again, you you do have this friction point of Syria where Turkey and Israel could end up squaring off just due to a series of events that kind of unfold and and grow a life of their own.
Speaker 0: When you guys were talking about it, especially when it came to Syria, has have you guys take you know, game, what is it called, war game, a potential war between the two and how The US would respond and what to do, or that hasn't hasn't gotten to that stage?
Speaker 1: I mean, we we we try to war game pretty much everything. I I don't think it would necessarily be a conventional war like we're seeing in Iran where it's like the Israelis versus the Turks. I think a lot of this would play out in the proxy space. I feel bad. I mean, I'm not a fan of Ahmed Shar Al Sharra.
However, that that guy is in probably one of the toughest positions there that there are out there between what he has going on internally with the his own base, the extremists who brought him to power. And now he has us, and he has the Israelis, and he's got the Lebanese, and he's got the Turks, all attempting to kinda pull him in in a different direction. And pretty much every direction he goes, it's a war of some sort. So I I think the conflict between Turkey and Israel will will take place via proxy initially. The Israelis will make some overtures and attempt to jump in bed with the Kurds, probably not the SDF, but probably the PKK.
But and and then also a lot of the Druze communities. There's a lot of overlap there with the Druze communities and and and the Israelis. And then that is going to result directly in Sharia's forces having to go back to war with those elements. And then with that comes ethnic cleansing and because that's how that's who Sharah has in his ranks. And a lot of times, he can't he can't rein that back in.
And then that's gonna give a justification for further intervention by the conventional Israeli forces, potentially even by the Turks, then potentially even by us. There's the Hezbollah factor. We keep trying to encourage Sharah, to go after Hezbollah. So when Sharah's got his back up against the wall and he's worried about losing some support, could he be convinced then to go after Hezbollah?
Speaker 0: Fucking way.
Speaker 1: There's no I mean Do you really
Speaker 0: I I I don't think consider it?
Speaker 1: I don't think he necessarily would unless his back was truly against the wall, and he was like, man, I've got fires being lit everywhere. I need to curry some good favor with the Americans because we could this would be a point where it'd be pretty easy to go to him and say, hey. If you wanna be in our good crisis and and get, you know, x amount more support, if you could help us out with this Hezbollah issue because we think that that would kinda help us clear the deck there so the Israelis wouldn't have to deal with it. I still think it's unlikely. I think he would probably say no to that.
But, I mean, in in these situations, you just you just never know. I don't think Hezbollah necessarily would pick a fight with him either.
Speaker 0: Oh, they wouldn't dare. But, man, if if Al Sharat attacks Hezbollah, I would be as close to certain as possible that his life would be on the line, that he was informed that Israel or The US would strike him if he does not carry a favor for them.
Speaker 1: Yeah. And in in this case too, I mean, there's just so many different militias that have been cobbled together to form what is now Syria. It's not that hard to get the is Israelis or some other intelligence service pay one of those militias to attack Hezbollah and to be like, well, that was the Syrian military. And the guys might have had Syrian military uniforms on, but was it really the Syrian military? I mean, that's kind of always been the question, in all the fighting that we've had recently inside Syria, whether it was against the Ahweds or against the Druze, it was like, well, they had on Syrian military uniforms.
It was Syrian military divisions, but did Sharan know, etcetera, etcetera. That's just the nature of the way things are right now in Syria. So it is, you know, just ambers under the ashes right now ready to burst out into the the inferno full war just because of the the geopolitical landscape there.
Speaker 0: No. You're absolutely right. I already know that there were instances of, massacres and attacks that were conducted by men in uniform, but they were not done on the orders of al Sharra. They were done against the orders of al Sharra. Al Sharra being able to pull all these pieces together and have these commanders abide to his orders, you know, his biggest threat you know, there's a list of people that a list of countries that could assassinate him, but the most likely people to kill him are people internally.
Professor Pepe was telling me about how Iranian leaders are always thinking about, you know, similar to the prime minister of Israel decades ago. The same thing could happen to an Iranian leader where someone internally, someone more hardline eternity could end up assassinating them. I can't remember the context of the conversation. And that's, you know, on steroids when it comes to Al Sharron considering what he's dealing with putting all these pieces together. Just keeping him alive and I know that comes off as very cold or or crude to say, but genuinely just being alive is already an achievement considering what is the position he's in and what he's trying to do.
Speaker 1: Yeah. He he's very much in the hot seat. I mean, the the bombs that went off today at the Four Seasons, you know, hotel when Macron was there, I I per I don't know who did that. I don't know if we'll see a full claim. There are active ISIS elements.
But, again, I think that was the the hard line elements, the Saudi Jihadis, whether they're ISIS or Al Qaeda, sending Sharra a message of like, hey, man. Don't get too comfortable being full on westerner. We are the ones that brought you to power. We can take you out of power. So, again, the the guy is sitting on, you know, a ticking time bomb right now.
So there there's a lot of instability in Syria. And, Sharah, politically, when we pulled out American forces out of Syria, we had to basically hand him back the Al Haul Refugee camp and the Roj Refugee Camp of ISIS. They weren't technically prisoners. Were internally displaced people. A lot of ISIS family members who had been living in these camps, basically, an incubator for ISIS for the last nearly decade, they were basically repatriated back into the Syrian general population.
When I was still the director of the counterterrorism center, we arranged for the the worst of the worst ISIS detainees to be handed over to the Iraqi government, so they weren't in the mix inside Syria. But that was just about 5,000 of the the worst of the worst. The rest of the ISIS detainees were basically repatriated by Al Sharra, and he wasn't able to because of a lack of capability just because the immaturity of of his government services. But also be politically, he wasn't really allowed to lock all these people back up. He because of the pressure he was receiving from the Sunni community that brought him to power, he had to let them all back into the population.
So, again, Syria is very much a powder keg right now.
Speaker 0: Do you think Al Sharra was working with the CIA for many, many years before becoming president? Do you think he was he became president because of that American support, and America worked with Turkey to make to put him in that position? How involved was The US in all this, or was it just Turkey?
Speaker 1: Directly, it was the Turks. I mean, HTS and and Nusra, that was all in the Turkish, like, sphere of influence inside Syria. Now, I mean, the the broader story of us having to go back into Syria or us having to go into Syria is basically because the Israelis said, well, America, you you installed the Shia Iranian proxy government in Baghdad. Assad is still in charge in Damascus, and now Hezbollah has a clear line of supplies going from Tehran all the way to Damascus. So we got involved in a proxy war inside Syria, and we enabled hardline Sunni elements, basically, which gave birth to Nosra and then gave birth and gave birth to ISIS as well.
We had to go back in because ISIS got so out of control. Meanwhile, Nusra HTS was heavily, I'd say, fostered, cared for, trained man, and equipped under the supervision of Turkish intelligence. Now the Turks were working closely with us to do this to do this at the same time. And, again, like, the the Turks have a very jaded past when it comes to support of jihadis. Their their basic arrangement was, hey.
We'll help you guys against your count with your counter ISIS fight. Don't give the Kurds too much, but we'll tolerate it. But at the same time, look the other direction, and we'll handle everything, you know, over in the Western sector with that that they plan on doing with HTS to bring Sharra into power.
Speaker 0: This is so messed up. Is there a just a complete science question before we go back to the region, and I wanna focus on the proxy wars aspect. It's because my yeah. Actually, let's just jump to the proxy wars one. So, again, in our early days of the war when Trump was putting out those posts, I remember telling you like, hey, Joe, I think, you know, I know most people are up in arms because of his statements.
I think this is an indication he wants to ramp. And, you know, we you agreed you were in a similar mindset as me, and we were both hoping that will be the case. And then I think in our second video, we in our second interview, just before the ceasefire, we talked about how Trump has that opportunity to turn on Israel, and that seems to be happening. Where my mind is at now and has been for the last week, I don't see if you're you'd agree with that with that theory, is that the war is ended as in terms of direct war. Might restart next year.
It's hard to tell about next year, but at least for now, it's ended. But what worries me is that it's moved fronts. It's now a proxy war. It's a proxy war in Yemen. It's a proxy war in Lebanon.
It's a proxy war in Syria to an extent in Iraq. And and I think the region will you know, things are gonna get better for Iran, for The US, for Israel, when it for The Gulf. But when it comes to all the other countries, those proxy battlefields is gonna get worse than what was before. And the region's only going to get worse now that the war is because the war is not. If the war took a decisive end where The US is completely capitulated, it's leaving the region with massive destruction and pain, or Iran has just been completely obliterated or Israel, one has to be extremely decisive.
Rather, now what we have is The US lost the war, but not in a decisive way. It still has its presence here, limited damage, same for Israel. And therefore, the issue of finding an end to this power struggle is we we haven't reached that end. So therefore, it's gonna only have to continue until there's an end, whether it takes a year or ten years or fifteen years. That is the worry that I have.
I'm not sure if if you'd agree or you're in a different place.
Speaker 1: I think that that that's fundamentally right. The the only wild card is the the political factor and the the inescapable reality that there's no diplomatic or military solution. There's no diplomatic solution in the sense that president Trump wants. The Iranians are not gonna give him an inch on the MOU. MOU basically was their starting point.
They'll take more, but they're not gonna go any lower. And as we're seeing right now, they're in they're enforcing that. And the way that they're enforcing that, that's simply not sustainable for us because that that has the Straits Of Hormuz very much in their control. And the second a ship veers out of line, you know, they send a drone or a missile at them. And so president Trump's not gonna be able to just sort of laugh these off, in the long run.
So Trump is gonna be stuck back in this box where he is going to be told, and this is my fear, of what's taking place probably behind closed doors. I'm sure he's getting briefs from the Pentagon where they're saying, well, hey. We do have some more military options that we could ply here. And because of his frustration, I think that's just going to generate from the lack of a diplomatic solution. I I do think there's a good chance that he tries some form of another bombing campaign.
It's gonna be hard for the Pentagon to define because it's like, what do you want us to do? You want us to bomb them all over again? We've been through this. But I I do think beyond the the typical, you know, like we've seen in the last couple weeks where there's some tit for tat strikes, I I do think there's a there's a potential anyways in the near future before the midterms at least for the president to try to either force open the Straits Of Hormuz with more aggressive strikes and more aggressive navy patrol naval patrols through the Straits. But I think your your broad thesis of how this is going to much more of a proxy war, I I do think that that's that's the direction things are going.
But there's gonna be more overt, Iranian involvement. Whereas before, you know, it was covert. We we've already seen Iran reach out and strike Israel, in response to something that Israel did to to Hezbollah. We'd never seen that before. If the Houthis get involved, we could see similar actions as well.
So I think we're gonna see the the axis of resistance acting in a in a much more unified way, going forward. But I you know, dangerous times, and I I do think this is far from being over.
Speaker 0: Do you think the terror the terrorist cells or the terror threat in The US has increased? And how how worried are you about it right now that we might see some terrorist attack in The US? It's been a quiet period. It's been many years of know, you it's been years since the the wave of terror attacks that has that has taken over the West. Do you think that could restart if we continue seeing that tension in the Middle East?
Speaker 1: Certainly. I mean, the terrorist terrorist attacks we've seen here in America in the last couple years, the vast majority of them, there was at least a reference to what's taking what has taken place in Gaza. Right when the war first started, we had that individual down in Texas that went into a bar wearing an Iran shirt, and and he and he killed, I think, three or four people. So we've already seen some some blowback from our participation in the war. I I fear that we will see more.
I think right now, there's a lot of people who have their their focus in The Middle East. However, we had an open border for quite some time under the Biden administration. We haven't been able to locate a lot of the people that we suspected of being terrorists in in in The US yet. So I I do think, unfortunately, for terrorists, they only have to be lucky once, and we have to be lucky always. And and the more war that we're involved in in The Middle East, especially large scale combat operations, those have proven, you know, over decades now to be a driver for radicalization and and to give us more and more blowback terrorism.
So it it's certainly something that I'm concerned about.
Speaker 0: Cool. Alright, man. Well, anything else, on your side that's interesting that I missed? Let's see if there's any news on the Erdogan front. Nothing new other than the statements they made earlier that we talked about.
Anything else that I missed?
Speaker 1: No. Just proxy bore and, you know, waiting to see what happens next.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Okay. Cool. Great way to wrap it up. Alright, Joe.
Appreciate your time, man. Thank you so much.
Speaker 1: Absolutely. Thanks, Mario.
Speaker 0: Take care, man. Alright, guys. We'll be live again in fifteen no. Twenty four minutes with oh, nice. Oh, sorry.
George Gammon. Yeah. George Gammon. First time on the show. So we'll see you guys in twenty four minutes.
Bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m listening to Prof. Robert Pape argue that Trump is treating missiles and Hormuz like the core problem, when he’s really strengthening Iran’s regime. He says Khamenei’s funeral marks a psychological shift: trauma can turn millions of emotions into one resolve—like the U.S. after 9/11. He adds that Iran’s leverage keeps rising, so August matters more than headlines.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Political Scientist Prof. Robert Pape: Trump thinks he's forcing Iran into submission, but he's actually making the regime stronger. Most analysts are watching the missiles, the ships, the Strait of Hormuz, and the price of oil. Prof. Pape thinks they're looking at the symptom instead of the disease. He says the real story isn't what Iran is doing, it's what the war has done to the Iranian people, and Khamenei's funeral is a psychological turning point. Prof. Pape studies how societies respond to war, and he says events like this transform millions of individual emotions into one collective feeling. A population that was traumatized becomes a nation convinced it has to fight back. Then he compared today's Iran to America after 9/11: three thousand Americans were killed, and the country didn't calm down. It became more determined, more united, and ultimately more willing to support wars that many would later regret. Why do we assume Iran will react differently? Because while that anger is building inside Iran, its leverage is growing too. It still controls the Strait of Hormuz, and every week that passes brings Iran closer to what Prof. Pape calls its moment of maximum coercive leverage. That's why he thinks August matters far more than today's headline. Not because another ship might be hit, but because that's when emotion and leverage could collide. @ProfessorPape
Video Transcript AI Summary
Two speakers discuss escalating attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz area during Iran’s funeral period and how this fits into a broader “escalation trap” framework.
They report three ship attacks in total: two attacks yesterday and one today, with attacks occurring on the Omani side; one of the targets is said to be Qatari, while another is Saudi and Qatari, and the third struck today is not yet identified in terms of ship type or ownership. The speakers link these attacks to developments involving Oman and the UKMTO, stating that the Omani side announced it is “open for business again” and has expanded operations, which Iran is described as not being happy with.
A central question is whether the United States will respond during the funeral. The professor says he does not expect the United States to respond until after the funeral, arguing that responding during the funeral would heighten escalation risk. He also rejects the idea that Iran would refrain from attacking during the funeral, describing what he calls the “steady state” in which Iran enforces “the four corners of the MOU,” including control of the straits. He argues that attempts to run or break that grip through the southern corridor will lead to Iranian response, followed by US counter-response.
The professor emphasizes that near-term risk depends less on whether the US retaliates tit-for-tat and more on the number of ships going in and out of the Strait of Hormuz. He stresses that tracking shipping volume is critical because the situation will intersect with oil inventory run-down timelines. He claims the tactical balance of power is shifting in Iran’s favor because Iran can attack ships “at will,” with no sign America can defend all attacks before they happen.
He further argues that during the funeral Iran is gaining advantage not only through power but through “balance of resolve,” presenting the funeral as a focal point event that converts individual grief or anger into broader public anger over time. He describes nationalist and emotional dynamics as building and taking time, comparing the process to how populations react over months after major attacks. He cites domestic-political effects in past conflicts and says that, as a result, overreaction can follow when leaders interpret domestic anger and fear.
Mario provides additional context: the US is trying to get as many ships out of the Strait of Hormuz as possible to support oil-price and political/economic goals, while also managing the fact that strategic reserves are nearly out. He says Iran is enforcing control of the strait “without jeopardizing the negotiations,” striking ships via the Omani side roughly every few days, and notes a Kepler-reported figure of 108 crossings between July 3 and July 5 (about 36 ships per day), described as about half of what Trump is claiming and a third of what it was before the war. He adds that despite talk of a massive oil glut, US strategic petroleum reserves fell by 6.2 million barrels to 320 million barrels, the lowest since the 1980s.
They discuss whether Iran’s pressure could force the US to concede the Strait of Hormuz by increasing ship throughput to refill strategic reserves, which they say would give Iran control. They also mention reports that European and Gulf countries may accept some kind of Iran fee for transit, with differences in whether China and Russia are charged, and that the US is described as offering “carrots” to prevent Iran from fully implementing its approach.
Mario expresses a concern that Iranian forces may become more forceful after the funeral, increasing the likelihood of falling into the escalation trap. The professor agrees with Mario’s analysis and figures, but says his larger August concern is tied to how the funeral influences Iranian society and how that societal anger can drive policy and coercive leverage.
The professor argues that Iran’s leverage is likely to grow as oil inventories draw down toward minimum levels, which he says have never been reached before. He frames August as the start of “maximum coercive leverage,” and claims Iran’s next goal will likely shift beyond the four corners of the MOU. He identifies potential changes in what Iran demands—specifically getting American troops out of the region and removing bases—as a plausible next objective. He suggests Iran may use a fee structure with “contingent fees” based on whether countries are “friendly,” with examples including different treatment for China and potential implications for Gulf states such as Kuwait and other countries where the presence of US bases would affect how Iran structures leverage.
On whether the US and Iran will escalate after the funeral, the professor says that day-by-day prediction is difficult but expects attention to move toward Netanyahu early in the post-funeral period, potentially affecting when attacks occur. He predicts that by Monday the world will shift focus toward shipping and shipping flows—how many newly loaded oil tankers are moving, and whether oil production is restarting—arguing that understanding loading activity is critical to explaining why inventories are still running down.
They note satellite imagery of loading activity in the Persian Gulf and say it could be used alongside historical comparisons to estimate what is actually being loaded and how this relates to oil inventory drawdowns. The professor also mentions a planned live Substack event with Kurt Campbell to better understand developments involving China from strategic and technical perspectives.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: We have three ships that were attacked, professor.
Speaker 1: Oh, we're up to three. Oh my goodness. I was ripping this morning before. It's growing. Yeah.
I see. Yeah. Well, they're just bound to determine they're bound to determine to keep the model on track.
Speaker 0: They're not giving up the funerals ongoing. What during the funeral processions, which are huge, by the way, you saw the numbers?
Speaker 1: Well, did a few times. Most oh, well, I've been following it. Again, I'm about an hour and a half out of because I was preparing for you in a different way. But the but yesterday, Mario, I did a big post on the escalation trap about the funeral. So I put it out yesterday morning, and we can talk about it here.
I explained, and and you're quite right. You you have been covering this extensively.
Speaker 0: It's called Theratex. The gathering gather the gather because I got it in email. The gathering storm, Iran's funeral, and the coming August Shock. So that's the
Speaker 1: next thing
Speaker 0: we did.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. This is gonna be yeah. This this is not just a a one week story, Mario. And and, of course, it's historic, but there's a lot more that is likely to unfold as a result of this.
And it really is quite the it's it's a big story already. I'm really glad you and a few others are covering it. The American media, and I don't know about the European media or the Middle Eastern media, they're they're almost not covering it. They are, like, putting in a few seconds here and there from what I've been able to see, but they're just simply not giving it the attention it really deserves. And what that's gonna do is set up for some pretty big surprises as we go forward.
Speaker 0: Let's start with the attacks on the ships. We had two attacks yesterday, one today, all of them on the Omani side. I know one of them is Qatari. I've got the information on them. So the other two are one was Saudi and Qatari, and then the third one that was struck just today, we don't know what type of ship what ship it is and who it belongs to.
But that is the third such attack, and this is as we got reports in the last few days that the Omani side UK MTO announced that the Omani side is is open for business again, has expanded. Obviously, Iran is not happy with this. And the concerning part is that every time this happens for the last few weeks, the new escalation system or escalation rules that we have is every time Iran attacks the ships, The US bombs Iran, Iran retaliates against The US, and everyone's worried that this could escalate and and get out of control. But would you expect the same thing to happen again?
Speaker 1: I don't expect The United States to respond till after the funeral. So I think that for The United States to to respond during the funeral, which basically is gonna go on for a few more days, would only heighten the the amount of escalation coming back. I think this is something that's easily anticipated by CENTCOM and folks in the White House even though we keep saying they're a bunch of income poops. Here they might be at some level, but I think that this is even too obvious for them to miss. So what I think is that if you recall, a lot of the talk just a few days ago was was there some sort of a secret truce?
There was gonna be no fighting at all funeral. And of course, what you would then do is take strategic advantage of ideas like that to get more out through the Omani pipeline or the Omani avenue, which appears to be what happened. I think this was just simply false confidence. I saw no information whatsoever to expect that Iran had actually decided not to attack during the funeral. And I think that what you are seeing is just the steady state that I've been describing for several weeks now, which is that Iran is enforcing the four corners of the MOU that includes it is in control of the straits.
It is in control of the straits. And that means that if we try to run and break the grip, so to speak, through the southern corridor, Iran is going to respond. Now we then are in a situation that you just said that we don't wanna lose face, so we'll do some counter responding. But the big issue here, I just wanna be very clear for the audience. I understand that escalation is the thing everybody's worrying about.
I think there's simply a few weeks too soon for the bigger risks that may be coming. Here, in the short term, what really matters is not whether The United States does a tit for tat response. What really matters is the number of ships going in and out of four moves. You've been doing a great job of tracking that, Mario. I think you're one of the people that consistently tracks it.
I think several times a day if I'm not mistaken. And this really is very important because this is the issue between now and when the oil inventories run down. So since May, okay, I've been explaining this on the substack that that the the key key thing to keep the eye on are whether or not we're gonna run down the oil inventories. And now folks like you have really gotten that mess. You know, you're on it, man.
And but it is important to know that that is is even more critical than the kinda little these little flare ups and the things that that people think are like the escalation and so forth because the bigger issue here is Iran the balance of power is shifting more and more in Iran's favor. The aggregate balance of power has shifted for months. That's Iran's control of the Strait Of Hormuz. The tactical balance of power has shifted in Iran's favor. Iran can attack these ships at will.
There's little, there's no sign whatsoever that America can do anything to defend those ships or to shoot down all of the attacks before they happen. Iran just can attack at will. So it controls it has advantages in the tactical balance of power. Now what you're seeing with the funeral is it is gaining a huge advantage in the balance of resolve. The political element of the balance of power is going dramatically in its favor.
And this is happening during this period I've been describing where we're entering the period of Iran's maximum coercive leverage. And that has not started yet. That will start once we get to these or near these bottoms of the oil inventories. And the truth is, as I had this big meeting with some of these oil experts in in early in in May, and there's some disagreement. And you're covering all the disagreement.
There's disagreement about exactly where these bottoms are, what exactly are the limits, what's happening with the salt, you know, walls and the caverns and all this stuff. And the reason there is some uncertainty, Mario, is we've never run this down before. Okay? So we're we're this is tear this is not like, oh, sure. We did this in '91.
We ran it down to two forty three and the walls held and all. We have really no there's a giant unknown unknown here. Okay? And it all but we know the direction of the effect. And and that is why you can't really get like a 100% agreement among these unbelievably world experts here who are just the best there are.
And the reason is because there's really this is going to a new point. But we know that it's coming because you can't talk your way to oil. You can talk the price down, maybe you could even talk it up, but you can't invent oil by talking. So at some point, these inventories really are gonna run down. And that's what I'm I'm saying is the August issue that we really need to already be preparing for.
CENTCOM needs to prepare for this. So our military needs to prepare for it. Folks in the front lines where you are need to understand what's really, like, the risks that are building building. And it's not just the oil prices suddenly gonna pop up. That that may happen, but that's not the actual set of issues here that are coming.
That that's gonna be like people make money on polymarket or something. I don't do that. I I just don't do that. Maybe I should, but I I just don't do that. It's probably why I'm a professor and not like the mega the mega, you know, but still, I'm just explaining that that those are the things I've got my focus on.
And because we're in the middle game of this escalation trap and Iran, it's it's advantage Iran that continues to grow, and that usually leads to growing ambitions. So that's what you are seeing play itself out. And Iran is showing it's not deterred, not at all. It's not even gonna be deterred during the funeral when you might expect it would be, like, too busy morning grief, etcetera. But what is happening here is Iran is gaining power in that power framework more than a religious framework, more than a pure political framework.
That power framework does quite well in helping us to anticipate events week by week and month by month.
Speaker 0: Okay. So what's happening right now is over the last few weeks, The US is trying to get as many ships out of the Strait Of Hormuz as possible to get oil prices down because that's important politically for Trump, it's important economically for The US, and it's also The US needs to ref or to stop using its strategic reserves because they're almost out. And they've been that that process has been going on for a while, what Iran is doing without jeopardizing the negotiations is trying to enforce their control of the Shreid of Hormuz, something the Americans are trying to break. And what happens every few days or weeks, mainly every few days, is Iran would strike ships going through the Omani side. Now the amount of ships going through according to Kepler, and according to other sources, but Kepler put out a piece yesterday, that said between July 3 and July 5, the amount of crossings were a 108, which is about 36 ships per day, half of what Trump is claiming, a third of what it was before the war, and that's been the steady number throughout this entire period.
Now everyone talked about a massive oil glut, which led to the drop in oil prices. But if there's a massive oil glut, then why did yesterday the the report came out that The US strategic petroleum reserves fell again by 6,200,000 barrels to now 320,000,000 barrels. That was last week, and that's the lowest level it's been since they started the the strategic reserves in the eighties. So if there is an oil glut, then why are we seeing that those strategic reserves continue to go down? And that is the leverage that Iran has.
If Iran maintains that pressure on the Omani side, maintains the limit on the ship that go through the Strait Of Hormuz, not stop it completely because that would lead to war. That will be a red line for The US, but maintain that pressure. It might eventually force The US to just concede the Strait Of Hormuz to get the number of ships going through it up to refill a strategic reserves, and that would essentially give Iran control of the Strait Of Hormuz, Something that European countries have already accepted according to a Bloomberg report. They accept there's some European and Gulf countries. They accept that Iran will charge some sort of fee.
They're just asking for it to be be to be for all countries to be treated the same. Not China and Russia get no fee, but Europe get to pay a fee. And according to Axios, The US is still trying to dangle carrots in front of Iran to convince them not to actually go ahead with it. Now the question I have for you, professor, is you said that you don't expect the Americans to respond till after the funeral. I agree.
Now another thing I feel if I if I look at all these different groups, the telegram groups, the the Iranian telegram groups, is they're they're they're they're very energized, but they're also very angry. And I worry Iran is going to be different after this funeral processions because it just gives a lot more energy and support for the IRGC. I worry that they will be more forceful in their responses to the Americans. No longer pragmatic and strategic pragmatic strategic, but also more forceful. And that increases the likelihood that we fall into the escalation trap.
I'm not saying this is going to be the case. I'm I'm just saying it's a worry that I have considering that a funeral have just ended and, you know, days after The US is gonna respond and attack them, they're responding to these ship attacks. Is that a worry that you have where you think that ship that
Speaker 1: ship I do. I do, but that's not the exact worry I have for August. So let me just explain. So that part of this is I'm I agree with you a 100% on on your analysis. I think it's really quite excellent.
The figures you're giving, you're keeping us everybody up to date on exactly where the oil inventory drawdown is and your your puzzles about, you know, if there's this glut, why are we going down? And that, of course, reinforces the argument by some of the experts. Well, it's it's either an imaginary, a mirage glut, or it's very, very temporary, etcetera, etcetera. So so all of that is is is, I think, in line with this. There is a debate among these experts.
My point, Mario, is the bounds of the debate are pretty narrow. I don't think people should think, oh, yeah. Experts disagree. Fifty fifty. It could be anything.
No. You're showing this is what happens when we have serious discussion. The actual mound of expert debate is pretty narrow here. But nonetheless, back to the the bigger picture. So the big reason to worry about Iran overreaching, doing something dramatic is because of the what you're seeing in the funeral and what all the other Iranians see in the funeral.
You see, it's one thing to be individually angry. It's another thing when you see so too is everybody else. K? That's what's happening with the funeral. It's a focal point event, in other words.
It has become the norm in I I study political violence. I study how it percolates in publics and in audiences, Mario. And and so this is what you're just a little bit of of of sort of understanding background framing here. What you are seeing is a focal point event. And what focal point events do is they take that individual who understood, I was individually angry, or you could also be individually fearful dot dot dot, individually angry.
And now I realize, my goodness, so too is just about everybody else I see. Now maybe it's not literally everybody. Okay? Because nobody can really see everybody. But what you're seeing here when you have well over 10,000,000, I mean, we we may end up with 30,000,000 by the time all said and done coming out.
It's clearly gonna be in that giant, you know, unprecedented historic range. We just don't know exactly where it's gonna settle out. But what that what that means, Mario, is that that body politic now is not just traumatized in an individual way from what's happening to the war. They are they are now translating that trauma, that grief into anger in a way that is now coming to be. And that takes time.
People don't really fully so I study populations under air attack. I study what happens to the people over time. Been doing this for thirty years. People think, oh, there was an attack today. That must mean all the anger happened, the emotion happened today, and it's over.
The attack's over. Well, and from the attacker's perspective, that seems to be the case because they don't see it. However, from the population's perspective, this is a brew. This goes on. This this is why you got Britain, two years after the bombing of London to blast those German cities on purpose.
They they they they're disappointed they didn't kill more German civilians. They're not embarrassed by the German civilians. Now thirty years later, they're embarrassed, but not at the time. And this is true with democracies. It's true with authoritarian states.
You don't have to be a religious nut to go down this road. This is what happens when you have traumatized populations. For America, just to put this in a little bit of context that a lot of Americans will remember, this is what happened to us after nine eleven. What happened to us after nine eleven is that three thousand people died that day. We watched as many of them jumped voluntarily to their death to avoid being burned to death at the top of those buildings.
We saw that in real time, Mario. For people who see it in in historical time, don't really fully realize the terror as we literally watched it on TV, not knowing what was coming. No trigger warning. This was unbelievably terrifying for fifty, seventy million Americans. And then what happened is, and I know because I was on the the nine eleven.
I was on the talking head show in Chicago with our senators, Rahm Emanuel, and I was it's a big honor. I'll explain why I was on there at a different time. But I said, we need to be careful because this fear is going to translate into anger, and that will translate into overreaction. Every one of those politicians, Mario, said not gonna happen, professor Pate. Not gonna happen.
What did we do eighteen months later? Iraq. What happened with Iraq? This wasn't three people in the Oval Office the way we try to pretend it was now. 70% of the American public, 67% to be precise, supported going to war against Iraq.
I was I disagreed with that war at the time. I know what it was like to stand up in public audiences and say, this was not gonna work out, bad idea, no WMD, all of that. Oh my goodness gracious. The amount of anger in those rooms was unbelievable, Mario. And that was the churches I went to.
Think about the I mean, I'm just trying to point out. So the the we often think, well, the, you know, the the religious people, oh, they're gonna be more passive. I'm telling you, they're gonna be often leading the charge, not the other way around. And so what you're seeing here is a bubbling brew, and this is now four months after this. But also keep in mind, what happened in the first week of this war is we, meaning The United States and Israel, killed not just the supreme leader, but his wife, three other members of his inner family.
That's like killing the president of The United States, Melania, the first lady, and the members of the first family. And then we killed the senior members of the military, religious establishment, intelligence establishment, top 50. That's like taking out the Pentagon, the top leadership in the Pentagon, the CIA, the cabinet who would be then in replacement. That's why nobody really was gonna be sure how you're be able to replace the supreme leader. So think about the and then in addition to that, then after that, we did a six week air campaign where we killed something like 3,700 people, a mix of civilian and military to be sure, but not
Speaker 0: And and and then threatened to wipe out a civilization.
Speaker 1: Yeah. And this was 09/11. Three thousand people died, a mix of civilian and military first responders. And so the so what you what you did what you had happened here, if we also control for population size, is Iran's about a third, a little little less a third the size of population in The United States. We basically inflicted a nine eleven every week for the opening weeks of this war on this population.
And now we're surprised that this is this is what nationalism looks like that I've been talking about for a long period of time. And this is when it comes to the floor, and it is just an outpouring, and it translates the grief, the trauma, the fear into anger. A lot of Americans after nine eleven I live in Chicago where we talk about the Chicago way with the mobsters. They put one of our one one of us in the morgue, we put two of theirs in the or one of us in the hospital, we put two of theirs in the morgue. That's what everybody was talking like in Chicago after nine eleven.
They they hit us once. We're taking out Afghanistan and Iraq, and they don't care that they're killing hundreds of thousands of Muslims and so forth. They're they're really, really angry, Mario. This is this is something that is the real the the the emboldening here that's gonna happen over time is gonna get stronger and stronger. And over and this is where if America does the resistance, as it likely will, they're up against the tiger of nationalism now.
This is riding the tiger of nationalism. And and we we America is used to riding it on the other side. And then saying, oh, we don't care that, you know, the world doesn't think we should do Iraq. And and, you know, we're just gonna you know, who are we? You know, who's who's the French to be criticizing us when we go into Iraq?
Well, this is, you know, a lot worse trauma for Iran than we experienced on nine eleven. And I think that this is this is what you are seeing coming, and it's not gonna be over here by January. It there's stuff to worry about between now and then that I I I try to keep my my focus on, like, the nearer term assessments, Mario. But your basic point is right. You're not calling look at Israel after October 7.
Three years later almost, what do they wanna do? They wanna go in and wreak havoc in Lebanon. You you see? Doesn't that do you see the commonalities here?
Speaker 0: Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. It's a very good comparison, very relevant one. That so that that really increases the likelihood for for getting back into an escalation trap.
Speaker 1: Yes. We've got one We're in middle game of the escalation trap. Everybody keeps thinking in the West, this is over. Why? Because they weren't behind us in the first place.
They never did understand most people why we're doing this. Okay. We can give them explanations, but the bottom line is, you know, I talk to people in my neighborhood all the time. They have no idea what's going on here. Okay?
And the big thing they see is the price of gas, and now they're worried about other prices going up. And so, of course, they want the war to be over, and they see it through that lens, which is, well, we just want the war to be over. Right? They'll the Iranians will understand. Yeah.
We killed a few of them, you know, but, you know, they'll understand. Really? Did we understand when when Al Qaeda only killed a few Americans on 09/11? I don't think so. And I think this is what we're really not this is when I when I talk about the politics.
So I'm a realist who attends to domestic politics. Most realists hive that off. They don't wanna touch domestic politics or it's always a problem for their theories. I'm the realist who is really focusing on how wars actually work. And I think this is why, in a lot of cases for thirty years, these expectations, have have come, have been have been more accurate.
And it's because I'm attending to the impact of the military action on politics on both the attacker and the target. And that helps to explain a lot about what to expect. And that's why it's not just a chess game, the way a lot of realists want it to be. Or it's a chess game with a lot of emotion charged in that chess game. Put it that way.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Like seeing those people, millions of people on the streets and them chanting death to Israel, death to The US, I just don't don't think people in the West really understand how big of a liability or a threat that is. If those people
Speaker 1: Just imagine Kuwait. Imagine imagine Kuwait decides to dig its heels in, and it's gonna keep thousands of American troops based in Kuwait. K? Imagine that. And we're gonna say, oh, those Iranians, man.
They would never launch an attack on Kuwait. We'd kill them by the hundreds and so forth. Really? Really? You see, this is what I mean by the the not taking seriously the domestic politics or or or doing it in a way that only, like, doesn't you need to take it.
Now does that mean it will certainly happen? I don't think the that kind of a thing and I and I've had audiences here that are on the front lines asking these questions, Mara. So not just, you know, with you. So I'm just explaining. I don't think that's likely to happen in the next couple of months.
It took us eighteen months to do Iraq. Eighteen months to do Iraq. And we did not calm down in that eighteen months. It wasn't like, oh, yeah. Understood.
We we understood why why it was okay to kill 3,000 Americans. No. That's not what happened here. And so I think that we do have to worry about things longer term. The nearer term, however, is likely to be a little bit different here.
And so if if it's okay, could we talk maybe about the nearer term a little bit? But I did wanna I did wanna support what you are. Your basic instinct, Mario, I think is a 100% on the money. It's just that we need to understand that that just like when I warned on 09:11, those senior decision makers not to let that grief morph into anger and they dismissed me. Okay?
I wasn't telling them it was gonna happen tomorrow. I was warning something like an Iraq was gonna happen. And look, they they didn't do anything to stop it. In fact, most of them were in favor of it. They were pissed too.
They're angry too.
Speaker 0: Yeah. And just imagine those countries, those Gulf countries, as they decide how to adapt to this new reality, this new shift in balance of power, Seeing Iran, all these people galvanize, the anger towards The US, how do you think the Kuwait example is a great one or The Emirates or Saudi, etcetera. How what would their mindset be as they they be talking to some American companies or Israeli companies or the Israeli or American military In
Speaker 1: the near term yeah. Yeah. This gets us to the nearer term things to worry about as the getting back to the trajectory we started with, which is still true. So notice, all of this nationalist anger is laid on top of what we're talking about, not going in a different direction. So come August, we are gonna be in more of a panic than we are today about those oil inventories drawing down.
And you just said we're down another 6,200,000. Here, we're drawing them down at about point 8,900,000 a day, not too different than it was. It's not point one three 1.3, but still, we're still drawing it down and we're getting closer to those minimums here that we've never really hit and we get to watch the the salt caverns cave in or not. We're gonna find out if that actually happens. So so as we as that happens, Iran's leverage is gonna grow.
Now what are the more natural uses of that leverage? Okay? This is where we gotta put ourselves so one of my work that I do, Mario, is look at it from the other side's perspective as what would the their that's what I look at for the North Vietnamese when we're doing the Bosnian civil war. What are the Serbs perspectives here? That's why that's been my what are what's Al Qaeda's perspective?
That's what a lot of what I do. And it's not intel. Intel basically says, what can I eavesdrop? Professor Pape looks at the incentive structures in terms of power. That's where this comes from here.
And so and and and what you are likely to see is not just the hardening of the four ed four corners, as I call it, of the MOU. That's already happened. That happened before the funeral, And that's not changing, and that's what you see this week. Okay? That is still happening.
What you're likely to see is the goalposts of what Iran wants are gonna start to change beyond the four corners of the MOU. Now they might wait until, you know, the MOU, I think it's up on the August 17, so they might wait until but they're already talking about what the next goal might be. I put this in my escalation trap post yesterday. Okay. Araci and others for the last few weeks here, and you can interview people and and you drill you have a lot better contacts than I do.
Okay. But you can about getting American troops out of the region. That is not having the bases in the region. The bases are likely to be the concrete issue that starts to come up here for Iran. They're already talking about some of this here.
And if you start to look into August, how would that goal intersect with their growing leverage with Hormuz? That's what I put in the escalation trap analysis. That is what the analysis is about. Okay? And what I think is and it's it's a it's a plausible scenario, I would call it.
I wouldn't say it's absolutely certain. But I think the most plausible scenario is they are going to not just have fees, but they're going to have contingent fees based on whether you're a friendly country. They're already talking about doing this with China. Now with China, they're friendly. And how do they define it?
You can look at what our what the foreign ministry has said. It's because they're not supporting the US military in this war. Well, what would that look like here then to make Kuwait a friendly country? Okay? Or other Gulf states a friendly country, where then they would have either no fees or diminished you know, well worth fees.
That would mean they don't have US four bases. You see what I mean? So so this is a baby step from where they are now. It is a natural step because it just simply intersects the different lines, the incentive structures that are already in place. And that's what I that's what I do with risk assessment.
That's that's what I'm worried about as the August shock, which is we're gonna discover that that Iran is not just slow rolling the discussion on the nuclear program. Iran is not feeling the pressure of, oh my god, Iran can't couldn't imagine The US blockade coming back or another six weeks of bombing. No. I don't think so here. I don't think they're gonna be deterred.
They're not deterred now. And those tens of millions that are pouring out in the street, they're not gonna be deterred by, you know, another six week bombing campaign. In fact, they might be more emboldened than ever by that. What you're gonna what you're gonna see is, I think this will start to get channeled to the next set of goals. And this is where president Trump is in real hot water right now, and I don't think his team has really taken this.
They're focusing on how can they wiggle out of the MOU. They're fighting yesterday's war. That's what Rubio's doing. They're fighting yesterday's war. Now that's important.
Okay? And we could talk about the issues in Lebanon and whether Trump could really wiggle out of the MOU with the framework or will there be a civil war in Lebanon. All those are near term things this week. Okay? But the bigger thing that's coming is Iran's leverage is going to grow.
As its anger is growing, those two lines are going to be connecting. What will that mean, you see? I think in the shorter term, meaning August, that means that they're gonna start to think about what's that next objective, and that is getting those bases out of the region. And they have the midterms. They've got the fall.
You know? Yep. Trump's not gonna wanna restart or maybe Keshem Island. You know? Maybe he's this this is how you get to a Keshem Island, you know, bay of Pigs, bay basically.
How do you get to these scenarios where the loser here is so desperate? You see this with Putin as well. But the loser is so desperate, They start to do things that only are likely to weaken their strategic position, Mario. And that's what that's the escalation trap. It's the the literally not just go back to escalation, but you're doing it out of desperation to avoid that even bigger loss.
And it's because the bigger loss means domestic political loss, something realists rarely really take into account. They're really not. They're looking at it as chess masters where the worst thing that happens to a chess master is they lose a game. The worst thing that happens in international politics is when you lose.
Speaker 0: And I also wanna point out there's a lot of people in Iran that are critical of the MOU. And if you could play that clip quickly, Elisa, this is a clip of the president of Iran that is going to the funeral, and people around him are chanting death to the compromiser. So they're calling death to the president because he compromised in the MOU when they saw him they saw him walking on the streets in the funeral. That was yesterday. You're seeing there walking and people are just yelling it in Persian.
And and the reason I bring this up is
Speaker 1: This is Mussolini. Can I just point out? In Italy, in World War two, who kills Mussolini? His own people. They hang them up.
They string them up because he was a loser. The losers here, that's what you're seeing with the compromises. They're viewed as traitors. They're viewed as losers. Right now and we talk about, well, is Israel going to assassinate the Iran negotiator?
Okay. Well, no. I mean, the the the who's I mean, the actual people doing the negotiation. No. I mean, you've had a lot of discussion of this in the last week.
Would they Yeah. You know, US warned
Speaker 0: And New York Times and New York yeah. Exactly. New York Times report came out that The US was warning Iran through Qatar and Pakistan that that was during the Islamabad negotiations that Israel was planning to kill the negotiators. And even there was an emergency landing of Ghalibaf's plane in the airport up north because there were fighter jets, Israeli fighter
Speaker 1: jets getting killed. Point out is we often think of the assassins coming from the enemy. But we don't understand that in reality, there's another corner where the assassins often come from. Who killed Rabin, for instance, in the nineteen nineties was a Jew from Koch. That is a more extreme ideology of Zionism than Rabin, and Rabin was killed for being a compromiser by another Jew.
This was not being killed by a suicide bomber from Hamas, for example. And what I'm trying to point out is this happens all the time in international politics, but we don't tend to focus on that until after the fact. And then I you know, people like me, come on. What's happening? We explain it after the fact.
But it's an extremely common pattern here. And so those Iranians who are doing the negotiation, man, they're they're this this is a a fully predictable that if they don't get in line with that bubbling nationalism, they too are gonna be finding themselves at the barrel of a gun by some of their own people. In fact, at the UFC fight here with the White House, I don't know if you covered it, but there was a a terrorist plot here by five people who look like they're basically from the far you know, they're upset at Trump because of Israel, and a lot of them could easily have been from the far right. And this is not know, people say, oh my god. How could that be?
Isn't Trump a MAGA far right? Well, no. You're you're you're missing their things are spectrums. You see what I mean? And so the those negotiators for Iran, man, they're taking their life in their hands.
You got Trump threatening to kill one. Yeah. I mean, look at the Israelis threaten I mean, how many people eventually one of them might those assassins might break through? Because there's so many who are upset about that negotiation.
Speaker 0: And that's exactly why Mushtaq Khan and Ai when he put out the statement after the MOU. He said, I was hesitant sign the MOU, but I got guarantees from the president and decided to sign it. Him distancing himself from the MOU is exactly one of the benefits
Speaker 1: of this. Thing, but it also adds to the pressure on the other side. So there's both the personal survival motive and then the country, the nationalists, they go side by side. They're not really at odds. They they reinforce each other.
And this is why I've been saying for some time, Mario, that I understand how desperate everybody was to declare victory. We're gonna and this is why they won't the Iranians are not giving Trump a fig leaf here of allowing him an easy out. Trump is complaining, you know, better watch what they say. You know, they're they're getting too, know, uppity here. Well, the reason the Iranians are getting uppity is because, you're seeing the nationalist anger.
If they don't do that, they're gonna get, in trouble by their own people. And what does that mean? They're not gonna give Trump a fig leaf easy way out. They're gonna rub his face in that l for months and months and months, and that is then the pressure on Trump because can he really survive being a loser here? Milosevic couldn't survive being a loser.
Mussolini couldn't survive being a loser. Maybe Trump will be the one loser. I mean, LBJ couldn't survive being the loser. Maybe Trump will be the one loser as a loser who survives. But he's not gonna be because he put lipstick on a pig and everybody's gonna agree.
Let's be nice to Trump, nice to grandpa. Okay. Just let him think what he's thinking, and we're gonna go about our business. No. The Iranians just aren't having it.
Speaker 0: And there is the meeting now between Bibi and Trump happening in a few days. Do you expect much to come out of this? Obviously, Netanyahu is making his position clear. He's dug his heels in when it comes to Lebanon. He's criticizing Trump or pressuring Trump not to do the deal with Erdogan and Turkey for the fighter jets.
So there is that power struggle between Turkey and Israel, and this is all trying to get something political.
Speaker 1: Yeah. I'm expecting most of this is gonna be about how they both need each other for each of their domestic politics. I mean, again, this is you know, it could be that this will be the meeting that will blow up the the framework, you know, the MOU and so forth. That's possible. I don't I'm not sure that's really the agenda of both these men.
I think both of them have are running have elections coming in the not too distant future. Bibi's gotta come to Washington to pick up some some cash. Okay? So he's gonna you know, it'd be interesting to see if we you know, if you can get at his schedule and see, does he spend more time with Trump or more time with donors here? But I also think president Trump is very much gonna wanna put on a case because he's gonna need a lot of the pro Israeli donors to donate money for candidates in the fall.
So I think that now it may be that that this will then there's also a possibility, I would say a lower possibility, that this will just blow up here because Iran won't is not gonna accept a civil war in Lebanon is somehow fitting the MOU and its new power in The Middle East here. But I think that that what I'm expecting here more is on early Monday is that there'll be an awful lot of reasons why for both of these top political leaders, they're gonna want to raise money from donors for their elections, and I'm and I'm looking at it that way. Now maybe, you know, we'll we'll see where if this really you know, how this plays itself out. But I think for Trump to read Bebe the riot act like he did Zelensky remember Zelensky came and he said, you don't have the cards in front of everybody? I'm not expecting that.
That could happen. I would say maybe one in four chance. I would say a three in four chance is they're gonna talk about how much they have a great friendship, they Respect
Speaker 0: for each other, blah
Speaker 1: blah And then let Rubio do a lot of the dirty work underneath. I mean, that's what I think is gonna happen. I think the dirty work here is gonna happen underneath this by the second tier.
Speaker 0: And last quick question for you, professor, is what could we expect once the funeral ends? The US would strike in your view, will strike Iran. How how would that compare to previous strikes? And will Iran retaliate the same? Will they strike the bases?
Will it be more intense? What would you expect there?
Speaker 1: I expect I I think what's gonna happen here between now and next week, it's a little tricky to make literally day by day predictions, Mario. So come on. Okay? But what I what I think is by Monday, we're gonna be so focused on Netanyahu that even the Trump administration is is is a little bit less likely to attack after. If they're going to attack, I think it's gonna be Sunday, Monday, Tuesday as a result of what just happened.
But a lot of the world is gonna move on. The bigger picture is gonna be what's happening by Monday, Tuesday with those with the ships and and how many exactly are going into Hormuz. And Mario, if you could start asking about how many are newly loaded with oil not in Iran. So you're you're you're now I mean, oh my goodness. I mean, anybody who's not paying attention to you bringing on so many of the top people here is just missing is just missing this.
But one of the things that I'm trying to find out, and there's a little bit of information in these trackers, but not on the loadings of the oil. I mean, literally the loading. How much oil is literally being loaded here that wasn't loaded before, which would tell you are the oil wells and the gas wells coming back up, are they actually functioning and so forth. Yeah. Because if you don't have that, that particular critical piece, Mario, then that's probably why the oil inventories are just running down.
That's my hypothesis. Hypothesis you cut through all this. Okay? Because I keep in mind, I spend my life with experts. Okay?
And they are just unbelievably critical. But I I when I listen to all this, I wanna know, are we actually pumping oil? I mean, Iran is. I'm not forget Iran. I'm talking about the other countries.
Are they pumping oil that they had shut down and putting it and loading it on those empty tankers or not? How much is that actually happening? Because that, I think, will be super precise in helping to understand, like, you know, what's happening with the with the actual oil as it flows in the future.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Exactly. As you wrap up, this is a report done a couple of days ago. Just some satellite images showing that the ramp up in the Persian Gulf of the loading activity. There's no numbers.
Very difficult too difficult to get numbers. But, Lisa, if you can show the images I've just sent you now just for the audience. So this is optical satellite imagery showing showing the loading activity in the Persian Gulf. That was about four days ago, and I saw something similar.
Speaker 1: Yeah. So this would give you so this will give you, Mario, that loadings. And then if you can get the historical comparisons as well, you'll be able to get a better sense of what's coming. You see what I mean? Because we're getting like, the one third down is is helpful, but the one third down has a lot of ships that are not oil.
And, of course, those other ships matter too. I'm not saying they don't matter. But the issue that a lot of people are very focused on is, well, when I'm focused on the oil inventory drawdown. And I'm and I too am noticing that we're still drawing down. And and that's just a really important important thing.
And that's one of the reasons tomorrow tomorrow night or Thursday night, I'm gonna have a big live sub thing on my Substack with one of the people here, Kurt Campbell, who knows a ton about China. Because we need to find out what's really going on here inside of China from not just, like, a technical side, but a strategic side to understand that.
Speaker 0: Agree. Professor, always a pleasure. Thank you for
Speaker 1: jumping on. For having me. Thank you for having me. Keep up the great, great work. Thank you so much, John.
Speaker 0: You, professor.
reSee.it AI Summary
Iain Bremmer argues the biggest Middle East shift isn’t in Iran but in Washington. He says bipartisan U.S. support for Israel—long shared by Republicans and Democrats—is eroding. He cites centrist Rahm Emanuel calling Israel a “territorial pariah,” plus growing criticism from JD Vance, Tucker Carlson, and warmer toward Erdogan while turning colder on Netanyahu. He warns this consensus collapse could reshape U.S. foreign policy across the region.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Political scientist Ian Bremmer thinks the biggest geopolitical shift in the Middle East isn't happening in Iran, it's happening in Washington. For decades, America's support for Israel wasn't up for debate; it was one of the few issues Republicans and Democrats broadly agreed on. Ian thinks that era is ending. He pointed to Rahm Emanuel, one of the Democratic establishment's most influential voices, publicly describing Israel as a "territorial pariah." Those are the words not from a progressive firebrand, or a fringe activist, but from a centrist who has spent years firmly in Israel's corner. Then Ian pointed to JD Vance becoming increasingly critical of Israel, Tucker Carlson openly attacking Israeli policy, and even Trump publicly praising Erdogan while becoming noticeably colder toward Netanyahu. Americans instinctively root for the underdog, and for years, they saw Israel as one. Today, he says more and more Americans see it as a wealthy, technologically dominant, nuclear-armed regional power. That's a profound psychological shift because once voters stop seeing an ally as the weaker side, they begin judging its actions by a completely different standard. The biggest threat to Israel's long-term position may be the slow collapse of the political consensus that has protected it in Washington for decades. And if that consensus really is breaking apart, it will reshape American foreign policy across the entire Middle East. @ianbremmer
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion begins with sports and the U.S. hosting the World Cup. Ian describes the experience in cities like Seattle, Dallas, Philadelphia, and New Jersey as “fantastic,” and says the American team has shown heart, energy, strong offense, and deeper-than-expected success.
Ian then focuses on a “controversial red card call” involving the U.S. team. He says Trump inserted himself by calling FIFA’s president, demanding the red card be overturned, and that FIFA suspended the red card for a year. Ian says no one on the American team asked Trump to do this and argues it makes the U.S. look like it received “special dispensation,” undermining the value of the event and putting an “asterisk” on the outcome. He also says the controversy became what fans talk about instead of the players and game, and links this to a possible motivation for Belgium to play harder. He expresses regret that Trump “had to be in the news.”
When asked whether Americans praise or criticize Trump for the overstep, Ian says there is a small “pocket” of Americans who support Trump for everything, but most Americans are more “sensible” and not focused on politics. He says many Americans dislike interference by an American president in sports, and emphasizes a preference for fair play and underdog narratives. He also argues that Israel is increasingly treated like a Goliath rather than David, and ties that to how Americans view fair play—though he frames this as part of a broader discussion.
The conversation shifts to Rahm Emanuel’s speech in Tel Aviv. Ian says he has not heard the speech but received a copy, calling it a “barn burner.” He says Emanuel describes Israel as having moved from a technological and economic power to a “territorial pariah,” losing young Americans and leaders globally due to unacceptable actions in the West Bank, Gaza, and elsewhere. Ian says Emanuel condemns Hamas’s Oct. 7 terrorism, but also argues that supporting Israel “no matter what they do” undermines Israel’s position. Ian describes Emanuel as a centrist Democrat among strong pro-Israel, pro-Zionist figures, and says the speech provides cover for Democrats seeking office in 2028 to be more critical. He also claims Tucker Carlson has become increasingly hostile toward Israel and says Trump’s relationship with Erdogan contrasts with criticism of some European leaders.
Trump’s visit to Ankara becomes the next topic. Ian explains that “CATSA sanctions” were imposed in 2020 after Turkey engaged with Russia purchases of advanced weaponry, and that the U.S. would not provide similarly advanced interoperable weaponry because Russia could gain information. He says Trump unilaterally undid those sanctions, with the stated approach that the U.S. will not sanction friends and will instead use tariffs, framing Turkey as a friend. Ian says Trump praises Erdogan personally and contrasts that with how Trump criticized democratic European leaders.
Ian discusses the F-35s possibility, saying it would require Congressional approval and that he does not see support. He lists opposition factors in Congress, including an Armenian lobby, a human rights lobby, and issues related to Fethullah Gülen and political donations. He also cites Greek lobby influence, and he says Bibi is dramatically opposed as well. He concludes these factors create “solid reasons” to expect Turkey would face problems in getting advanced technology approved.
Netanyahu’s comments are also raised. Ian says many Americans would agree with Netanyahu’s portrayal of Turkey as aggressive and disruptive, but he also notes that increasingly large numbers of Americans, especially young Americans, describe Netanyahu similarly. He says Trump would not agree with Netanyahu’s claims about Turkey.
Asked what might come from Netanyahu and Trump’s meeting, Ian says despite lack of trust, both have shared interests: intelligence coordination on Iran, interoperability, and coordination benefits. He says the Abraham Accords and integration of advanced AI defense companies into U.S. and Israeli defense systems are reasons these ties would not “go away.” He adds that by October Netanyahu “may be out of power,” suggesting a scenario where he could be removed or face major coalition difficulties, and says Trump may prefer Netanyahu lose because Netanyahu wants to keep fighting Hezbollah, remain in southern Lebanon, and continue a conflict with Iran—something Trump does not want. Ian says he is most interested in whether Trump says anything about the October elections, including reiterating calls for Netanyahu to be pardoned for alleged crimes and potential sentences.
The conversation returns to Israeli politics. Ian references Ben Gvir’s role and says 20–30% of Israelis have a favorable view of him. He compares that to Hamas, saying he expects Palestinians in Gaza still have more than 20% favorable views of Hamas despite two years of war and devastation. Ian argues both sides commit war crimes and holds both leaderships as beyond basic humanity. He also discusses candidates mentioned by the host, including Ben Nesli Bennett and Benny Gantz/Eisencoat (Eisenkot), describing Eisencoat as more pragmatic, wanting to exit Lebanon and stop stretching Israel thin.
On the region and shipping, the discussion turns to attacks on ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Ian says Iran’s demand is continued control over the strait and financial profit from it, with negotiations involving Gulf states and reduced oil leverage due to pricing changes and OPEC dynamics. He says the U.S. still has military leverage in the region, and the attacks are framed as contained and consistent with a ceasefire environment. He suggests the U.S. could respond kinetically within 24 hours with targeted shots at sites near the strait, but says there is no proximate risk that war restarts.
Ukraine is discussed next. Ian says Zelensky appears more confident and argues Zelensky is taking an approach with Trump by backing a “winner,” emphasizing that Ukraine is killing more Russians than Ukrainians are being killed, damaging the Russian economy, and making limited territorial gains without U.S. taxpayer dollars being spent. Ian says he expects progress in the Trump-Zelensky meeting in Ankara, including missile defense joint work and potentially faster U.S. actions such as providing interceptors previously funded by Europeans. He says closer alignment with European allies is promising but fears it will not resolve the four-year war.
Ian argues the biggest danger is that Putin, facing mounting strain and with no checks and balances like Trump, might escalate if his situation worsens or if his population turns against him. He mentions Russian attacks and operations near NATO, including fiber optic lines in the Baltic Sea, drone incursions into Romania and Poland, and other hostile actions. He says confidence about nuclear or extreme escalation is lower than months ago, and raises scenarios about near-misses and worse outcomes. He does not support stopping aid to Ukraine; instead, he calls for outreach to Russia to pressure it to accept reality, suggesting Trump should work the angle with Xi Jinping because Xi has more influence over Putin.
The transcript ends with a brief sports update: Egypt leads Argentina 2–1 after a cancelled goal for Egypt, followed by another Egypt goal and an Argentina goal, with about ten minutes left. Ian expresses excitement about underdogs and notes he watched the U.S. loss to Belgium, describing the match and Trump intervention as “depressing” and difficult to watch, despite U.S. efforts.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: We're talking about sports. You were you were just telling me that you did a a video on your channel about the red card for Yasco with Trump getting involved. What happened exactly, and why did it bother you so much to make a video about it?
Speaker 1: Yeah. I I I almost never talk about sports or the politics of sports, but here was The US has done, in my view, such a spectacular job of hosting the World Cup, welcoming fans from all over the world. The US football is still not the most exciting sport for most Americans, but they're getting into it. And they're very and they've been very welcoming of all the crowds from cheering on their different teams and the experiences in Seattle, in Dallas, in Philly. I went to a couple of the games in New Jersey.
The experience has been fantastic. And and not only that, but the American team, you know, a lot of players that most Americans don't know have have played with great heart. They've been, you know, sort of very energetic. They've played great offense. And and they've they've had real success going deeper into these matches than I think everybody thought.
And and then on the back of what was clearly a controversial red card call, Trump inserts himself and and calls the president of FIFA and says, you gotta overturn this. And they they suspend the red card for a year. And let's face it. The the first of all, no one on the American team was asking Trump to do that. And and it makes it look suddenly like the US team is getting special dispensation that other teams would not get.
And and and it undermines the value. It puts an asterisk on on what's happening and and and and probably motivated the Belgian team to come out and and play harder and better than they otherwise would have. And, I mean, look, four one is a a pretty big loss for The US, but it's horrible for the team to go out that way with this controversy around it. It now has become something that the fans are all talking about when they should be talking about the game, when they should be talking about the players. And so I I I wish Trump hadn't.
He so wants to be in the news. He so wants everything to be about him. And and in this case, he succeeded and at the expense of a lot of great athletes and a lot of great fans. So I I thought it was really too bad.
Speaker 0: Do Pete, asked this to one of my guests earlier, but they couldn't answer it. Do you know people in The US, are they see are they praising Trump for it, or they're critical like you are for the for the overstep, one you could call the abuse of power in a way?
Speaker 1: Well, I think the fact that, the American team lost so badly, and it wouldn't have, you know, it's it's so it's not as if having that additional player really helped. And, also, let's keep in mind, the Americans played with one man down. So not just flow not available, but literally, you know, essentially shorthanded for almost the entire second half of the match that they won against Bosnia Herzegovita. Herzegovita, and they they actually scored an additional goal shorthanded. They extended their lead.
So I I I think that there are very few people that are excited. Now, of course, Mario, you and I both know that there are there there is a a a pocket of Americans who have decided that supporting Trump for everything he does is the most important thing to do, and it's performative. And so it doesn't matter what the issue is. It's just, you know, you've gotta be on that political side. And, of course, those people are going to support this because it's one it's just one more headline for the deal leader that can do nothing wrong.
But most Americans don't act that way, don't feel that way. They they're much more sensible. They don't criticize Trump for everything that he does. They don't praise him for everything he does. And and this is one that Americans don't spend most of their time thinking about politics.
Most Americans don't spend most of their time thinking about the president. And so I would argue that this has been it's been a very welcome celebration with all of these teams playing their hearts out with some great stories, like Mexico playing so well and losing against England, Cape Verde playing so incredibly well with that 40 year old goalkeeper and and, you know, almost almost making it through against Argentina, which was extraordinary. And and those are the stories people are talking about just like they were talking about the Knicks, which I was so excited about, and their and their run, their extraordinary run, first finals they had in over half a century here at Madison Square Garden. So to to take home the cup. So, you know, I think that most Americans don't like the fact that an American president, any American president, is interfering.
And I also think Americans have a sense of fair play. For most Americans, it is how you play the game. It's showing up. Americans don't like the bullying dad who uses his influence to get his kid to to play first base as opposed to sit on the bench. Right?
They don't like that. They think that, okay. Maybe it wasn't fair, but you suffer through it and makes you a stronger person. That's that's that's the way we you know, Americans always root for the underdog. You know that.
We've got the sweet 16 and the the the the March madness, the '64, and everybody loves to see these teams you've never heard of that, you know, manage to take down the number one. And by the way, something that you and I talk about a fair amount in The Middle East, I think part of the reason that Americans have turned against Israel as we're seeing with Rahm Emanuel's speech today in Tel Aviv is because the Americans no longer think of Israel as David, but instead as Goliath. They're not an underdog, and they're acting they talk as if they're the underdog with grievance. But in reality, they're the nuclear power. They have the dominant military.
They have the dominant technology, and they're really rich. And so, you know, I do think that the idea that the Americans and, okay, maybe they're not really super into soccer as we call it. But still, I mean, you know, you got hundreds of millions of people in the dominant economy in the world. You know, you you generally should be able to deal with a little adversity against Belgium. Right?
And so the idea of the American president had to weigh in to help the Americans against Belgium, I think, doesn't sit well with most Americans.
Speaker 0: And you mentioned Rahm Emanuel's speech, having listened to that, what what about the speech that caught your attention?
Speaker 1: Well, I I haven't heard him, but I I I got a copy of it a few days ago from him. And it is you'd call it a barn burner of a speech now. I mean, he's Jewish. And and like David Axelrod, both of them, when they were in the Obama administration, were criticized as self loathing Jews by prime minister Netanyahu, and there is no law love lost between between Ram and Bibi. So he goes after Bibi very strongly, but he refers to Israel as having gone in the eyes of most of the world from a technological power, an economic power, to a territorial pariah.
That's the term he uses, a pariah. And that they're losing everyone. They're losing young Americans. They're losing leaders all over the world, the Europeans and others because they're acting in unacceptable ways in the West Bank, in Gaza, and the rest. Now, of course, Ram burnishes his bona fides at the beginning and and talks about the terrorism that came from Hamas on October 7.
And so, I mean, it's it's not as if this is an anti Israel speech at all, but is it is a speech that says that that that Israel supporting Israel, or wrong, no matter what they do and acting as if everything that BB has done to his country and for his country is a good thing ultimately has undermined Israel's position. And that Ram is saying that that is unsustainable and will not be tolerated if he has anything to do about it. And that's let's face it. We're not again, we're not talking about Bernie Sanders. We're not talking about AOC.
This is not the progressive wing. This isn't Zoram Mamdani. This is a centrist among the Democrats. These are the people that were taking APEC money. These are the folks that have been among the strongest pro Israel, pro Zionist politicians in the country telling the Israelis we will no longer tolerate this way of doing business, and and we will cut you off if you keep doing it.
So I I think in that regard, first, it gives a lot of cover to other people running for office in 2028 on the democratic side. You have already seen how JD Vans has been quite critical of Israel in the past weeks, which he certainly would not do if if Trump had a problem with it. You've seen how Tucker Carlson has come out publicly increasingly very hostile towards Israel and frankly not just anti Zionist, but also anti Semitic in ways that I find completely unacceptable. But nonetheless, he has a lot of followers in The United States. And Trump just landing in Ankara was praising his host, president Erdogan, and and sort of said, you know, there are some leaders out there.
And it was clear that he meant not Yahoo who have you'd think that they act better towards me, but they actually haven't, and you've actually been a much more stalwart and supportive ally. So, you know, again, I think that there is there is no small number of powerful Americans who are getting on the let's bash b b bus for Israel, and that that could easily start having a bigger effect on on US Israel relations longer term.
Speaker 0: Let's talk about Trump's visit to Ankara right now. He's talking about the Kadzar sanctions being removed. I think they've been removed. And maybe you could explain how significant you think that is as well as the f 30 fives that are looking more and more likely to be approved as well because that's been going on for years now.
Speaker 1: So those sanctions, the CATSA sanctions were put in place, if I remember correctly, in 2020 on the back of the Turks engaging with Russia purchases of advanced weaponry, which would mean that The US was not going to provide equivalently advanced interoperable weaponry because the Russians would potentially get more information as a consequence. Right? So you don't want that. Excuse me. And the fact that Trump has decided to unilaterally undo those sanctions, which, you know, has been a sticking point.
The Turks have pushed for a while, but it wasn't necessary. He's basically saying we're not gonna put sanctions on our friends. We'll put tariffs on our friends. We're not gonna put sanctions on our friends, and the Turks are our friends. And he's saying very nice things to the much more authoritarian leaning Erdogan than he is to a lot of the traditional leaders of democratic allies of The United States, like Maloney in Italy, like Starmer in The UK, like Mertz in Germany, who Trump has been much more critical of for many reasons, but in part recently because they were not there to support Trump after his unilateral decision to go to war in Iran.
So, I mean, again, the fact that Erdogan that, you know, Trump wouldn't have even gone to the NATO summit if it had been hosted by one of those democratic leaders, But, you know, when it's hosted by the leader of Turkey, who traditionally you would have found I mean, there there are many American political leaders who think that Turkey shouldn't even be in NATO. I mean, I remember talking to Richard Haas who used to run the council on foreign relations and a, you know, Republican member of the foreign policy establishment in very strong standing saying Turkey should be thrown out because we can't rely on them. They were, you know, trying to throw up a fight over the expansion of NATO to include the Nordics. They, you know, they they they act in in ways to to they're they're they're corrupt, the government, and they they take on the the opposition. They try to destroy it.
They arrest them without cause, all of these things. Right? A lot of human rights abuses. But but Trump doesn't care about any of that. He he likes Erdogan personally.
And so he wants to do more. Now the f 30 fives, that's a political statement, but that would have to go through congress. And as of right now, I don't see support for that in congress. So I I suspect that that's a nice a nice display of friendship and warmth from the American president that will not lead to a policy change in my view.
Speaker 0: Interesting. So you don't think the f 30 fives will be approved?
Speaker 1: I don't. They don't.
Speaker 0: Interesting. Why?
Speaker 1: Because I think there's a lots of opposition, to Turkey and congress. Some of that is an Armenian lobby that continues to have a problem with it. Some of it is a human rights lobby that has a problem with it. You have the Gulenis. Historically, you remember when, you know, that that when he was in Pennsylvania and and and he was allowed, you know, sort of to escape the long arm of the law from Turkey, and that caused the big problem.
And he's given a lot of money. His supporters have given a lot of money to different members of congress. So there are a whole bunch of, not necessarily aligned, but individual special interests that would have a problem with providing the most advanced technology to a country like Turkey and a leader like Erdogan. You've got the Greek lobby. I mean, the Greeks are in very good standing in The United States and also have significant ethnic, you know, Greek Americans that are well-to-do businessmen and women that provide a lot of donations and The Israeli
Speaker 0: of The stuff The Israeli hope is still there.
Speaker 1: Of course. Of course. I mean, all of these things matter. Yeah. And, of course, BB himself is much more dramatically opposed.
So you add all of that up, there are good reasons why you would expect or good reasons. There are solid reasons that analytic reasons that you expect in politics in The US that the Turks are gonna run into problems whenever they're trying to get something done with The US.
Speaker 0: Yeah. And Netanyahu just said a few minutes ago on CNN about the the selling of the f 30 fives to Turkey. It would destroy the power balance in The Middle East. That was actually earlier today. I think because Turkey has aggressive aspirations, this is not a force for peace and stability.
If you give this kind of radical regime that admitted admittedly smiles to America when it is necessary or smiles to the president of The United States when it is necessary, when you've given that power, you're going to see aggression in its wake. I wouldn't do that. So and Netanyahu's doing that PR, tour in The US doing all these interviews.
Speaker 1: Look. There are so there there are there are many Americans that would agree with BB that Turkey is an aggressive, a hostile, a disruptive, an antidemocratic leader in the region. But, of course, as you know, there are also increasingly large numbers of Americans, especially young Americans, that would describe the Israeli prime minister that way. So, I mean, they're taking shots at each other. I can assure you that everything that Bibi just said about Turkey, Trump would agree with none of it.
None of it. That that is the reality. And so, I mean, you know, the The United States right now is prepared to play ball with a bunch of these folks.
Speaker 0: What do you think will come out of the meeting between Netanyahu and Trump in a few days?
Speaker 1: Look. I I don't believe, despite the lack of trust between those two men. I I think they still recognize a lot of common interest in utility. Israel has some of the best intelligence that The US gets from any foreign power, and that certainly is true on Iran, and that's important. And and that the interoperability of the weapon systems, the level of high level coordination, the the big win for Trump of the Abraham Accords, which the Israelis were one half of, right, in in getting that done, All of these things make The United States very close to Israel.
The integration of the most advanced AI defense companies like Palantir and Andriel and Scale AI. I mean, these are systems that are completely integrated in the US Department of Defense called now Department of War, though not legally changed. And and and with the Israeli defense forces as well, none of those things are gonna go away, Mario. So look. I I I think the core point here is that come October, BB may be out of power.
There's there's a decent chance, at least a coin flip, that he's not going to be able to stay. And it's it's very unlikely that he can win elections and form a coalition. It is reasonably likely, it's certainly plausible that no one else can form a coalition, and that means that he ends up staying in power. But at least fifty fifty, he's gone after October. And, you know, there's a long history of betting against the survivor, Bibi, and he finds a way.
But if you're Trump right now, you find Bibi problematic because you know that he's interested in keeping the fight going against Hezbollah, keeping the forces occupying Southern Lebanon, and keeping a fight going with Iran, which Trump doesn't want to have happen. And if there were a new Israeli leader, not BB, with a coalition that really wants to engage in a more productive and constructive way with Trump and and isn't captured by a small ultra right wing fringe, which is what BB has to deal with in his cabinet, particularly his national security adviser and his finance minister, that that would actually be more stable and preferential for Trump. So I think Trump would like b b to lose in October. And and that dynamic is gonna be interesting to watch. That's what I'm gonna be most interested to see is whether Trump says anything about the October elections.
Does he reiterate his call for BB to be pardoned for the crimes that he is accused of and and the the sentences that he would be facing? Those are the things I'm most interested in.
Speaker 0: How I spoke to to not Eisenkot. Who's the other candidate?
Speaker 1: Is Ben Nesli Bennett. Natalie Bennett. So I spoke
Speaker 0: to Natalie Bennett last week and have it going through various points, the various policies, Israeli policies and get his stance on it. As we all know, not much different from from Netanyahu. Now I don't know what he's saying just to get the political votes in versus how you know, because he talks about short to wars, not prolonged conflicts. And he talks about doing business with Egypt, doing business with Jordan and other countries, not Turkey. That's for sure.
Yeah. And then you've got Eisenkot. Eisenkot seems that I wouldn't say more moderate, but more pragmatic than both of them. Someone that wants to get out of Lebanon, that wants to stop stretching Israel as thin as it is right now. How how big of a how much difference would it make if there's a new prime minister in Israel when it comes to the entire region, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and, of course, Iran?
Speaker 1: So first of all, let's keep in mind that both of those men would strongly reject the other being prime minister. And that is that is part of the way that BB might stay in power is, you know, they end up requiring a a willingness to work with each other to achieve a majority, and and they refuse to do it. And that's what BB is counting on. Now I I accept that across the Israeli political spectrum with with all of the plausible prime ministers, no one supports a two state solution anymore. No one is going to pull out IDF from Gaza completely until there is a not just a handover of power, but also a disarmament of Hamas that we are not yet close to achieving even though that's in the road map for Gaza.
None of them would support a full withdrawal of the territory they presently occupy in Southern Lebanon because there are Israelis in the North that are being targeted by Hezbollah rockets. So you're right on all of that. But BB is in coalition with Ben Gavir, with Smotrich. These are honestly fascist. They are no different in my view with their perspective than Hamas leaders would be.
They just support the other side. They they they think that there are no innocence in Gaza. They they support from the river to the sea, but within with Israel being in charge of all that territory. They want to illegally take more land that the Palestinians are are on in the West Bank. And because Netanyahu requires their support to keep his government afloat, he has been willing to take a lot of action that has made Israel into more of an international pariah as Rahm Emanuel has publicly stated today.
And that that either that that either Bennett or Eisencoat or Gantz, for example, other leaders would not do. So, I mean and I I don't actually think it's Phoebe's preference. I just think he's willing to do anything, literally anything, including things that undermine his country's national security and undermine his country's democracy so that he can stay in power and he can avoid jail. I think that's the reality. I and those other leaders that we're talking about would not do that.
That's the problem. And so, essentially, by supporting BB, the Americans presently are supporting a government that includes a a directly fascist element. And that's a that's a serious problem. Now they they don't they're they don't ultimately have their hands on power. They're not making the decisions themselves, and thank god for that, but they have real influence.
That's a serious problem. And these are people that show the intel. They're they're war criminals. They're war criminals. Man, look at
Speaker 0: what Ben Gavir already said today. It just drives me fucking nuts that people still support him. It's just and what what bothers me more is not that he's one. There's stupid people and crazy people everywhere. What bothers me is that 20 to 30% of Israelis have a favorable view of Ben Gavir.
20 to 30% according to polls. I know he doesn't get many votes in the Knesset, many seats in the Knesset, but there's thirty, twenty to 30%, one in three people to one in five people, so a quarter of people in Israel have a favorable view of it.
Speaker 1: You're right, Mario. But, of course, what percentage of Palestinians in Gaza have a favorable view of Hamas? It's lower now that they've been through two years of war and devastation, but I bet it's still over 20%. I bet it is. So, I mean, this is this is the consequent.
And, I mean, don't don't tell me that you're happier with Hamas than you are with Ben Gavir. I mean, you know, again, these guys are we're talking about people that support war crimes. We're talking about people that commit war crimes. We're talking about people that also hold to ransom their own population, their own children, you know, to advance their own political and and and theological goals. So, I mean, we're we're well beyond the basic precepts of humanity whether we're talking about Ben Gavir and Smotrich or whether we're talking about Hamas leadership.
I I for you know, a pox on both of their houses from my perspective.
Speaker 0: Yeah. And you've got also people in Iran yelling death to Israel, death to The US. And let's talk let me read out that quote by Ben Grier today. Yeah. That he was talking about the flotilla activists.
He's like, they wanted me to hand sandwiches to those terrorists, those terrorist supporters, and tell them how beautiful Israel is. With me, that ends. I'm not a sucker. I took away that marmalades, the marmalades, the chocolates, the lamb meat, the ping pong, the television, the radio. They used to come he they they used to come out fat.
Today, they come in and leave thin. That's how terrorists should come out. Obviously, it's not incomparable to his other statements, but I just saw that a few just before we went live. Yeah. That was so that's
Speaker 1: pretty that's pretty tame stuff for him.
Speaker 0: It is tame. Yeah. Yeah.
Speaker 1: It must be a slow news day.
Speaker 0: Yeah. So something more important today is the strikes on the ships through the Shreve Homos. We're back at it. Three ships in the last twenty four hours Yeah. While there's massive funeral processions in Iran.
What's happening there? What do you expect to will The US retaliate by striking Iran again? Does that mean Iran would strike the same way they did before? Or after the funeral processions, they'll be even more emboldened and respond differently to what they did before?
Speaker 1: I think the dynamic right now is virtually identical to the last time you and I talked about this, which is that Iran demands a level of control over the straight and the ability to profit financially from that. Whatever the manifestation is, it's voluntary. It's not a per ship toll, but the money's gotta flow. They are negotiating with the Gulf States. The Gulf States are trying to get them to compromise.
Of course, oil prices have gone down a lot, and they probably will continue. The Saudis have taken down their pricing some $12 a couple days ago. Iraq is producing wants to produce a lot more. We already know the Emiratis have left OPEC. So that undermines Iran's leverage.
And The US still has all of their military in the region. In fact, a funny joke that I had heard circulating around the brand the brass, The US brass, is that, you know, the Americans don't necessarily have the military to be able to fight two cease fires at the same time. So, you know, gotta be gotta be careful on that. Anyway, point is that as long as that is true and the Americans are maintaining that leverage, the Iranians wanna show that they're maintaining leverage over the ships that go through, and a lot more ships continue to go through, but they're taking potshots. There was one Saudi ship, an oil tanker, one Qatari LNG tanker.
I do not think that was random. That was going after two big economies in the region and saying, we are gonna continue to flex until we get the outcome that we want. And might the Americans respond kinetically to that? Yeah. It's quite possible in the next twenty four hours.
It wouldn't surprise me if The US again takes a few direct targeted shots at some military sites that are on the strait or near the strait, but this is very contained. So we are still talking about a ceasefire environment. I I I do not believe that there is any proximate risk that war restarts between these two countries, and the markets clearly clearly believe that.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I wanna get your thoughts on Ukraine. We haven't spoken about Ukraine for a long time while this continues to escalate. I wanna ask a specific question. I'll keep it broad.
What is going on there? You've got the attacks, the heavy attacks in Kyiv. You've got Ukraine targeting the refineries, the Russian refineries forcing Russia to to have an energy issue internally and importing, I think, refined oil from refined crude from India, if I'm not mistaken. And then you've got Zelensky repeating that he's ready to meet Putin. And then you've also got Trump talking about ending the war and that both Zelensky and Putin wanna end it.
Same thing we heard earlier or early last year. What's your analysis of what's happening there?
Speaker 1: So I think Zelensky, who who looks a lot more confident today than he did a couple months ago, has the right approach with Trump, which is that you're backing a winner now. You know? I mean, you're on the side of the country that is doing better. It's killing a lot more Russians, than Ukrainians are getting killed. It's doing a lot more damage to the Russian economy than the Russians can presently do to the Ukrainian economy.
It's even taking back some, albeit small, levels of territory, and it's all, by the way, doing it without any American taxpayer dollars being spent on Ukraine. So, you know, Trump, at the end of the day, especially after having been bruised so badly with Iran, he supports a winner. He wants a winner. Right now, Putin's not looking like a winner. Putin's looking pretty weak, and Zelensky is looking like he's got cards that Trump had not anticipated back a year ago, April, when he threw him out of of the White House.
And so I expect we don't have a readout of the Trump Zelensky meeting yet. They are meeting in Ankara. But I expect that there's gonna be progress. I think there'll be progress on some joint work on missile defense. I think there'll be some progress on the Americans sending interceptors over to help the Ukrainians that, again, the Europeans are paying for, but there's been that's been slow.
I think that'll move. I think it's gonna be more promising. And and and Promising.
Speaker 0: Sorry, promising how? To get a deal or for Ukraine to get support?
Speaker 1: Promising to align The United States more closely with its European allies on the issue that has most bedeviled and shown vulnerabilities for NATO. So now now then there is the but your question is correct, Mario. Does this get us any closer to a resolution of a four year long war that has led to hundreds and hundreds of thousands of Russian casualties? And I fear the answer is no. And I, you know, I am starting to worry that the biggest geopolitical danger out there is that Putin, who doesn't have the checks and balances of Trump, doesn't have the checks and balances even of Xi Jinping.
This guy has has basically, put himself and his country into a ditch, and he is unwilling to accept that. He's done far more than you think about the mistake Trump made in Iran, not even close to what Putin has done in Ukraine. NATO has expanded. It's getting stronger. Ukraine has become the the toughest military in Europe in complete opposition to Russia.
The Russian economy is taking big hits. They are losing oil capabilities, refining capabilities all over the country. They now have to import refined product from India to deal with all of the disruptions they have just to get people gas. There's a national emergency that was just declared in Crimea, where they're having a hard time getting their supply chain, actually routed there. This is a disaster for Putin, and and he's unable to prevent the Ukrainians from, hitting, Saint Petersburg and Moscow.
And and the only thing that's stopping a whole bunch of Russian civilians from getting killed, on a daily basis, the way that Putin is targeting apartment buildings and kindergartens in Ukraine, in Kyiv, is because the Ukrainians are showing restraint and don't wanna commit the level of war crimes that the Russians are committing in Ukraine. But it's only the Ukrainian restraint that's stopping them. So, I mean, at the end of the day, this is a this is a a becoming increasingly dangerous because you and I can imagine a situation where Putin is is doing worse and worse and worse, and he's not getting any younger, and his own population starts to turn against him, and he decides to escalate wildly. He goes down with the ship. That that would be a very, very scary thing.
Speaker 0: As in strike NATO?
Speaker 1: As in be willing to escalate farther. I mean, he is striking NATO. I mean, there there have been direct attacks against fiber optic lines, for example, in the Baltic Sea that the Russians are clearly responsible for. There have been drone incursions into Romania, for example, Poland that the Russians are directly responsible for. There have been espionage attacks.
There's been arson attacks even against
Speaker 0: the threat. Expected. Asymmetric warfare like this is expected. Yeah. So the question Warfare is everyone's worried about.
Speaker 1: Yes. But but might they be willing to do much more of that? Might that turn into attacks where NATO civilians get killed? For example, might be near misses of Russian vessels and aircraft in NATO airspace might and territoriality, might that become, you know, like, the a Korean airliner situation that the Americans had to deal with? What was that back in was that Reagan days?
That was in the eighties, guess, Clinton days. That you know, those things are much more plausible. Might might Putin be willing to go truly scorched earth against Ukraine, in the worst case, maybe using a tactical nuclear weapon? You know, I think the answer to that still is likely not, but I recognize that my confidence in saying that is a lot lower today than it was even three months ago. So I think we have to focus on that.
And and that that by by the way, that does not lead me to conclude that the Europeans and the Americans should stop supporting Ukraine and force them to surrender with Russian terms. I don't believe that. But but I do think that more outreach to Russia to pressure them to accept reality. So for example, if I were Trump, this would be at the top topic of conversation with Xi Jinping, who I'm developing a more stable relationship with because she has more influence over Putin than Trump does, for example. I I would be working that that angle more directly.
Speaker 0: All in, as we wrap up, do you wanna get an update on the Egypt, Argentinian game?
Speaker 1: Yeah. What's going on?
Speaker 0: So two one to Egypt.
Speaker 1: Egypt.
Speaker 0: So we had yeah. Egypt had a canceled goal. I haven't been keeping up, obviously, while we're doing the interview, but we're seeing the update now. A canceled goal for Egypt, but then they scored another one, and then Argentina closed they closed scored another just a minute ago. So set two one with it's at minute eighty now.
So we've got just over ten minutes left. So it's pretty exciting.
Speaker 1: Wow. Look. I mean, I I I do I love to see the underdogs. I mean, at this level of play one shot in the off
Speaker 0: hour round.
Speaker 1: Right? I mean, like, anything can happen. Anything can happen. You get and and the it's it's it's fun to watch. It's really fun to I would love to see at least one or two truly unexpected teams make it through the final round.
Speaker 0: In the final.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 0: Yeah. The Portugal, Spain one was pretty intense. Did you watch I don't watch full games. I don't have the time. Do you?
Do you get a chance?
Speaker 1: I saw most of The US debacle against Belgium. The red card one? Oh, no. Okay. Last night.
Yeah. Was really that was depressing to watch. I mean, you
Speaker 0: know, I I even
Speaker 1: with all of the bullshit with the with the Trump intervention, you know, you still I mean, it just made me want the Americans to win big so it would have been clear that, like, it didn't matter. Right? Like, you didn't need to have, flow playing or not. But, but four zero one in the other direction, that was hard to watch. That was hard to watch for these guys.
They've given they've given their best, and it just wasn't good enough last night.
Speaker 0: Alright, man. Ian, always a pleasure. Thanks for
Speaker 1: jumping on.
Speaker 0: Have a good day, man. Appreciate it.
Speaker 1: Talk to you soon. Yep. Thank man. Yep.
reSee.it AI Summary
I flipped the debate: instead of $200 oil, it fell to the 60s because global demand is dying. Gammon says China stopped buying—it doesn’t need it. Saudi Arabia’s Asia discounts echo the same stalling economy. He then described Argentina trying gold/silver/Bitcoin; nobody wanted it. The dollar’s network effect means it won’t dethrone easily—his fear is it crashing up, dragging the world.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Everyone expected $200 oil when the strait closed. It fell to the 60s instead, and one explanation almost nobody wants to hear: global demand is dying George Gammon flipped the entire debate on its head. While guests have argued supply and manipulation, his read is simpler and darker: China stopped buying because China doesn't need it. Their real estate market, once the LARGEST asset class on Earth, has erased twenty years of gains, a financial crisis playing out in slow motion. Saudi Arabia offering Asia discounts it hasn't given since 2020 tells the same story. Energy is the economy, and the economy is stalling. Then he told me about driving across Argentina trying to live on nothing but gold, silver, and Bitcoin. Nobody wanted any of it. Jewelers offered 50 PERCENT haircuts on gold coins. What everyone demanded instead was dollars, and even their own peso, melting 20 percent a MONTH, beat Bitcoin. His explanation is the network effect: the dollar is the iPhone, everything else is a flip phone, and to dethrone it you'd need something a hundred times better. Which is why his fear runs opposite to the crowd's. He doesn't worry about the dollar crashing down. He worries about it crashing UP, and taking the world with it. @GeorgeGammon
Video Transcript AI Summary
Oil prices had risen to around 120 (“or so”) when the straits were closed, with market expectations of 150–200, but oil moved the other way to the 60s (below 70). George argued that focusing only on the supply side doesn’t fully explain the decline, and suggested the bigger story may be demand being extremely low, implying a global economic slowdown. He connected this to China, saying China “stopped buying,” and argued that China has effectively been in a “GFC” for the last couple of years, citing major real estate price declines (he referenced a drop of roughly 50–60% from highs over a few years). He said the slowdown in oil demand could help explain why oil didn’t reach higher levels despite “tight supply.”
The discussion broadened from oil to U.S. credit conditions and demand. George said the U.S. economy is “propped up by asset prices” and AI capex spend, and argued that private credit—described as the “new subprime”—had been a major risk before the Middle East crisis. He said banks “produce liquidity” by circulating money and credit, and that increasing perceived counterparty risk can trigger liquidity events. He compared mortgage default dynamics during the GFC (default rates moving from roughly 1–2% to around 5–6%) and said confidence changes and collateral drawdowns in mortgage-backed securities produced major outcomes. He claimed the same mechanism could apply to private credit, adding that major firms are “gating more and more” of private credit funds.
On Blackstone, George said it was backing out of and selling deals (including data center deals), attributing this to worries about the model, and tied it to potential weakening GDP drivers, including AI capex overspend. He referenced economic indicators such as Atlanta Fed GDP falling from about 3% to 1.2% (and said this didn’t factor in the non-farm payrolls miss). He said the unemployment rate fell due to people leaving the labor market, emphasizing declines in employment from June to July by over half a million.
George also introduced an equity-market indicator: the “Delta between the Dow and the NASDAQ.” He said if the discrepancy exceeds 5% within 7–10 trading days, there is a 67% chance of a bear market. He described it as capital rotating from “high-flying tech risk” toward “risk off in the Dow,” referencing the dot-com bust as a major instance. He said it doesn’t provide certainties and argued that the U.S. economy and the S&P 500 can be divorced, noting that S&P-level bullish arguments can be supported by capex spending funded by selling equity and taking on more debt rather than cash flow.
On gold, George said he doesn’t understand a single common denominator for gold rising in the short-to-medium term, saying gold can fail to keep up with inflation over 2–5 year spans. He argued gold tends to have a more consistent bid when counterparty risk rises in the monetary system or geopolitical conditions. He tied this to central banks’ buying, saying outcomes depend on whether central banks are net buyers versus sellers, and said the dollar’s direction depends on net buying (as he described it). He said his long-term view was that gold has a place in portfolios (about 10%) due to limited “counterparty risk,” and he said silver might be more interesting because it has an industrial component and because breaking long-term highs (he referenced 2011 around $50) has historically preceded larger moves over subsequent years.
The conversation returned to the dollar and manufacturing. A claim discussed was that bringing manufacturing back to the U.S. requires a weaker dollar; George disagreed, saying manufacturing requires regulatory reform, certainty about taxes and regulations, and predictability for 5–10 year horizons rather than exchange rates alone. He used Argentina as an example of weak currency without becoming a manufacturing powerhouse due to regulation.
On the dollar’s strength, George explained it through Japan: he said Japan imports most energy priced in dollars, so Japan must acquire dollars (selling yen for dollars), which can pressure the yen and support dollar strength. He said if the global economy slows, Japan sells fewer exports (using Toyota as a proxy), reducing dollar inflows and increasing pressure to sell yen again for dollars—potentially creating a “death spiral,” with central banks defending currencies until reserves are exhausted. He argued similar dynamics occur in other Asian economies (India, Indonesia, South Korea).
He addressed the possibility that Iran could allow oil to be bought using currencies other than the dollar, affecting demand. George said that “less use of the dollar isn’t necessarily the dollar going down versus other currencies,” and emphasized that if dollars are not used, the mechanism would involve how dollars are created and how they disappear when debts are paid down. He argued the dollar’s “network effect” is extremely difficult to disrupt, giving analogies to consumer technology and to people wanting local currency (even when depreciating) rather than gold, silver, or Bitcoin in a hyperinflation context.
As for the global outlook, George said they are in late stages of a credit cycle and that it usually plays out with economic contraction, though the form could vary. He said he expected probabilities favoring the cycle’s late stage to arrive soon, with central planners’ responses affecting the outcome. He discussed geopolitics and de-globalization as trade-offs rather than a panacea, and said he thought probabilities for improved net global outcomes were low.
Finally, on China, George said he doesn’t know the reality and was “completely speculating based on what we know.” He said China’s real estate decline mattered because Chinese real estate was described as the largest asset class in the world, and he said a 50–60% fall wasn’t a “nothing burger.” He argued that if loans lent into China weren’t repaid, banks would tighten balance sheets, slowing money and credit circulation and impacting liquidity beyond Asia, including the United States. He offered a historical metaphor comparing the modern dollar system to “Sea Peoples,” arguing that disruption to trade partners and import/export capacity can contribute to broader declines. He said a “Plaza Accord 2.0” could be a possible central-planning intervention, but noted it would depend on how large the “hole” in the “bucket” is relative to how much intervention could be made.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: George, you were just telling me about, and I was asking you to explain to me what the hell happened to the price of oil. And you started giving that explanation and I'm like, stop, stop, stop. Let's go live because I think the audience would love to hear it. So can you start over again?
Speaker 0: Sure. Well, first of all, I don't know that anyone knows for sure. But what happened is oil got up to, what was it, 120 or so when they closed the straits. And everyone thought that it was going to 150, 200. And instead, it went the other direction. to the point where now it's, I think it's trading with the 60s. Below 70, yeah.
Speaker 1: Something like that.
Speaker 0: And so I think that everyone talks about the supply side of the equation, which I think is relevant, right? You've got this.
Speaker 1: Brent, just picked up again, sorry. Literally a few seconds ago, news came in. Oil prices rose more than 3% after the US announced it would revoke the license authorizing Iranian oil sales, raising concerns of a tight global supply situation. Brent Crude and USWTI both climbed by over 3% following the announcement. That just came in, so I thought it was worth interrupting you for it because the timing is impossible.
Speaker 0: Yeah, for sure. So they're talking about tight supply. So then you ask the question, okay, well, then how was oil trading in the 60s, right, when it was 120 just a couple months ago? And so everyone looks at this as though it's just completely and totally baffling because they strictly look at the supply side of the equation. But I think the bigger story, although it's not the only story, but I think a bigger story may be the demand side. and maybe why we didn't see oil go to 150, why we didn't see oil go to 200, even though, according to this, we still have tight supply, and why we're seeing it down in the 60s is because the demand is extremely low, which would imply we're having a global economic slowdown. Now, China, as you pointed out, have just, I mean, they stopped buying. So you gotta ask why. I mean, is there some strategic move there? Maybe, but maybe not. Maybe it's just, they don't have the need for as much oil as they did a few months ago because they're continuing this slide. A lot of people don't realize that China has been in a GFC for the last couple of years. And that's not hyperbole. Like if you look at a chart of their real estate prices, I mean, they have come down massively, probably I'm guessing 50, 60%, you know, I don't have the chart in front of me, but from their all time highs, and this has happened over the last few years, I mean, it's nothing short of catastrophic what has happened in their economy. And I mean, we think back as Americans what the economy looked like in 2010, our economy, right? 2010, 2011, 2012, exact same thing that they're experiencing right now. So the fact that they're not buying oil, again, there's multiple reasons that could be, you never know for sure. But I think a lot of things are pointing to the lack of demand. which would explain, again, why everyone was expecting oil to go to 150. And from 120, it pretty much went straight down.
Speaker 1: I want to talk about China. If you can show that chart, Lisa. China's real estate market has raised all gains from the last 20 years. Houses are for living, not for speculation. It's a Chinese political slogan to curb excessive speculation in the real estate market. The phrase was coined by Xi Jinping, the general blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. So it's a whole story about it.
Speaker 0: Think about if in the United States, like I argue that our economy, unfortunately, is propped up by asset prices. It's pretty much an economy that is asset prices and AI capex spend. That's pretty much our economy. So think about as in right here in the good old US of A, what would happen if the last 20 years prices went down nominal terms to what they were 20 years ago, if home prices went down in the United States. I mean, that would absolutely decimate the economy. And then going back to oil, I don't know if you saw in the news the other day, but Saudi Arabia is now selling oil to Asia at a massive discount, something they haven't done since 2020.
Speaker 1: I don't get what's going on. I read that. I kind of just missed out on why.
Speaker 0: Demand. I mean, again, we don't know for sure. But I just think the probabilities are the highest that this is a result of demand slowing down quite substantially. And we know energy is the economy at the end of the day. So if demand for oil is slowing down, then that tells you everything you need to know about the global economy. the timing of it as well just like in the midst of the iran war demand drops that quickly well i think it was something we're continuing a trend i don't think the global economy was just booming before the middle east crisis i think the trend was down i mean let's think about you know in the news in the mainstream here in the united states which i follow quite uh extensively you know prior to the middle east Things were not looking good. I mean, the labor market was deteriorating. We've seen a huge continuation of that just the other day with the non-farm payrolls. But also, it was all about private credit. Remember? Private credit, private credit, private credit. That was the new subprime. And everyone was trying to sweep that one under the rug because it's a $3 trillion market pointing to mortgages back in 2008 as, I think it's like a 50 or 60 mortgage. trillion and saying that it's a nothing burger. But that is a total misunderstanding of how the monetary system works, right? Because the monetary system really functions with risk and it's all about risk and reward. And a lot of that's psychological. So if the counterparty or perceived counterparty risk increases, you're gonna have a liquidity event because the banks are the ones at the end of the day that produce that liquidity by circulating money and credit. So if you have the psychology as a result of a $3 trillion blow up, the same as a $60 trillion blow up, the net result is identical. And I'd also like to, for those people that have that argument, I'd like to point out that during the GFC, the default rate on those mortgages went to like, what was it, five or 6%? And we started at one or 2%, and there was only about a four, percent change on that. Like most people, if you ask them what the default rate was on mortgages back in 08, they'd say like 50%. And no, it was like maybe five. So just that little change in confidence and taking out a lot of collateral for the monetary system and the plumbing in the form of mortgage-backed securities, that produced what we saw. So private credit could, I'm not saying it will, it could do the exact same thing so that's what the shiny object was prior to the middle east and now all of a sudden you've got iran and the straits of her moves everyone forgets about private credit like it just went away and is is no longer an issue it absolutely is i mean you follow the news just as much as i do and you know that blackrock blackstone all the big guys even are gating more and more and more of their private credit funds. And we think that it's just software on the balance sheet of these guys. It's not, it's subprime auto, it's subprime multifamily real estate, subprime commercial. I would argue it's probably a lot of AI CapEx overspend We're starting to see with Blackstone backing out of some of these data center deals. So my point there.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I saw that. Actually, push on that a bit further. So Blackstone is standing back out some of these deals because they're worried about the whole model.
Speaker 0: They're selling and they're backing out of deals. And you could say, well, it's just because of NIMBY, not in my backyard. But OK, the net result is still the same when you had AI propping up GDP. So you take out that AI CapEx spend. And now you're likely headed for negative GDP, which by the way, if you look at GDP now at the Atlanta Fed, I mean, that absolutely plummeted. It went from about 3% just last week. I think July 1st was the last report. It went all the way down to 1.2%, but that didn't factor in the non-farm payrolls that we had last week, which by the way, I'm sure you know this, but your audience might not. We had a miss that was 57,000. Everyone knows that, but you gotta look underneath the hood and look at the household survey. And we see that the, employed the amount of people employed in the united states went down by over a half a million just from june to just from june to july so again my point there is that i don't think the economy the global economy was really running on all eight cylinders prior to the middle east i think it was maybe running on four cylinders and now it's just everyone's gone from that shiny object being the slowdown to the Middle East. And now I think it's probably back to the slowdown. You know, another thing that's really interesting, going back to this idea that the United States economy is pretty much a combination of CapEx spend and asset prices going up is, I don't know if you saw this, but there's a very interesting indicator that I had never seen in my life. I didn't know it existed. And it goes all the way back to 1971. And it's the Delta between the Dow and the NASDAQ. And if you go like, it's like seven days, seven to 10 trading days. If you have a discrepancy of over 5%, meaning that the, you know, no matter if the Dow's going up, the NASDAQ isn't going up to the same degree, or if the Dow's flat, you know, the NASDAQ is down by 5%. Just within a seven to 10 trading day period, you have a 67% chance of getting a bear market in both. And that's like nobody's, Talking about that.
Speaker 1: Where's the correlation there, though?
Speaker 0: Because what's happening is you're having a rotation of capital from high-flying tech risk basically to risk off in the Dow.
Speaker 1: Oh, interesting. Okay, yeah. Makes sense.
Speaker 0: And so one of the major times that this was triggered was during the dot-com bust, I think appropriately enough, where once we got to that level, it was right at the peak. And from there, the NASDAQ went down by 80%. and the S&P 500 went down by, I'm guessing 40, 45%. So I'm not saying that that's gonna happen, but I'm saying that, again, it's a game of probabilities. There are no certainties. So when you look at what's happening in the subprime space, that's literally what it is. And when you look at what's happening with the labor market and you look at the fragility, I would call it the US economy. I think you could have a decent bull argument for the S&P 500, but to have a bull argument for the US economy, when we all know that those two things are completely divorced from one another. I don't know what the real bull argument is for the US economy other than just, okay, we spent 3 trillion last year on CapEx spend, and this year it's gonna be 10 trillion, but none of that's coming out of cashflow. It's just gonna come out of selling more equity and just taking on more debt. Maybe that's the argument.
Speaker 1: So what does that mean? How would that impact gold prices? How would it impact the US dollar equities in general? You've already answered that in a way. Actually, can you dig deeper into equities as well, especially with the AI boom? Do you expect that to pop? Could we see that continue? We'd love you to kind of go through all the asset classes.
Speaker 0: I have no idea. I mean, that indicator, Again, it's got a 67% hit rate. So that tells you, and oh, by the way, I think since that time, the divergence between the Dow and the NASDAQ has actually increased because that was an indicator that I saw, I believe at the beginning of last week, if I'm not mistaken. So you want to keep, yeah, so I mean, you look at Blackstone backing out of the data center deal, selling some data centers. You look at Facebook or Meta, whatever you want to call it. that they're now have excess capacity for compute when no one thought that would happen.
Speaker 1: Jesus Christ. I stopped following this stuff for the Iran war. I'm coming back and now they've got excess capacity for the first time. I remember last thing I listened about Meta is like catching up. They need more capacity. They're behind. But now they've got excess capacity. How fast things change.
Speaker 0: Yeah, exactly. Now they're spinning it to where, oh, we're just, this is our new cloud business. Right, right, right. Or it's the demand is just, it ain't there, you know, like you thought. So there's a lot of indicators which would signal possibly, possibly that a decline that is being picked up by the divergence between those two, you know, indices, the NASDAQ in the Dow. So, but I don't know, look, there's so much passive going into the S&P 500. I mean, our friend Mike Green talks about that all the time. And I think that totally explains the move that we've seen in the buy the F and dip, right? For the last 25 years. And so it's a counterbalance. There's multiple currents out there. So you could have a current slowing down with, let's just say AI CapEx spend, but then you could have a counter current with, Passive somehow increasing. Now that leads back to the labor market though, right? Because that's really your trigger. And I talked to Mike about this. I don't know how long ago it was, but we were having lunch together and I asked him if he ever modeled out, you know, what the unemployment rate would need to be in order for that passive bid to go to a passive inflow into a passive outflow. Right. And his number was right around 5.5 or 6%, which actually is interesting because if you look at that horrific labor market report that we got just the other day, the unemployment rate went down, but it went down because people leaving the labor market, you know, because of so it, the bottom line is you got to look at the amount of jobs that people actually have and the amount of people that are employed, not necessarily just the unemployment rate. And when you look at that, we're seeing a pretty significant decline.
Speaker 1: How does it compare to what we had in 08?
Speaker 0: That would be a Mike question. I don't know how extreme passive was and how much of a role it was playing back then relative to how it's playing today. But I guess to answer that question, because your main question was about the S&P 500 or if you want to use that as a proxy for stocks or equities. And I just don't, like with my money, I'm not buying calls and I'm not buying puts, right? Like, I don't know. I could make a really good argument on the bear side, but I could make maybe a kind of decent argument on the bull side as well. So with my money, I prefer to set up my portfolio so I'm not taking a directional bet on the S&P 500. I'm more so kind of stock picking like with pairs trades.
Speaker 1: Okay. Gold?
Speaker 0: Gold, I don't know how to, I don't want to, value is not the right word, but I don't really understand a common denominator for gold going up. So, you know, people like to think that it's a big inflation hedge. Over long periods of time, it absolutely is. I mean, there's no doubting that. But you can go two, three, four, five-year periods where it does not keep up with inflation at all. I mean, it goes the complete opposite direction. So you can say M2, you can say all these things, but if you go back and look at history, there's not anything that's more than just kind of a coin toss other than counterparty risk. So when you see counterparty risk, especially in the monetary system or geopolitical go up, that's where gold usually is gonna have a consistent bid. So I think what it goes back to there is probably central banks. So it depend on your view with central bank buying. If you think that they're going to continue to be a net buyer and that plays into the dollar, right? So the dollar is going up, they're likely gonna be a net seller because they have to sell that gold or the treasuries to get the dollars they need. That's probably a different topic. but it would really depend on kind of the net buying for the central banks in my view. So I don't know that I'd have a big, although it was really sold off, right? It was way, way, way oversold. Now it's popped back up to 4,100 or so, but it might've been a decent trade once it got below 4,000 really quick. But, you know, with gold, I don't really have any, you know, you know, any view on it other than long-term, I personally want it in my portfolio. Like that's every single portfolio I have, it always starts off with like 10% gold just because there's no counterparty risk. And, you know, we're living in tumultuous times and who knows what the next risk is gonna be that's going to make gold pop. So that's, I think silver is actually maybe even more interesting than gold because silver, you know, it's got that industrial component to it, which, you know, I struggle with if the economy is slowing down. But on the other hand, you look at a long-term chart of silver and it hit its last high in 2011. And that was 50 bucks. And then we just exceeded that. What was it? Maybe four or five months ago, something like that. So usually, and I've got to give a huge hat tip to my good buddy, Hugh Hendry, who turned me on to this idea that the longer the chart goes back, as far as the preceding high, the more powerful the move usually is. So when you get, let's just use this as an example here, Silver, when you get that prior high in 2011 at 50 bucks, when it goes through that, usually for the next, let's just call it five years, it's gonna go a lot higher than 50. Now, you know, we've had that all the way up to 120, then back down to, I think maybe 60 or 62 where it is today. But if we had a bit of a slowdown that would bring it back down to close, maybe to that 50, I would probably be buying that for my own portfolio as a speculative play due to that long-term chart. You know, my favorite example of that is the Nikkei. Right, because we hit a high on the Nikkei in 1990 and you didn't hit a high or you didn't get back to those levels and exceed that high for what 35 years or so. I think it was in 2025 when the Nikkei exceeded it. So anyway, that's, I probably got a stronger view on silver over the next year than I do gold.
Speaker 1: Talking about gold and silver just reminds you of an interview I had with one of my guests a couple of weeks ago. So it was a big discussion through the Iran war about America's manufacturing base. We're talking about the depleted munitions for the US to kind of catch up to the levels it had before the Iran war and to boost production levels. And then some people were comparing it to World War II, but how the US was able to move its entire manufacturing base to the military industrial complex. And then the argument people were making during these discussions was that the US today is very different to the US during World War II. The manufacturing base is 15% of global manufacturing in the US today versus 65%, I think, before World War II. And that kind of goes back to the discussion of bringing manufacturing back to the US requires a weaker dollar. So one of my guests was making the argument that he wouldn't be surprised if the US administration is actively working on weakening the dollar i'm sure you've heard that argument before is it possible or could there be any truth to that as well where the us well trump said it that the us benefits i think he said it from a weaker dollar um but could that become policy well if they're trying to do it they suck
Speaker 0: because the dollar's ripped, right? So we have to differentiate between intentions and results. So I mean, as we speak.
Speaker 1: Is it possible? And also, why is it ripping? Why is it doing? Because a lot of people, especially people not deep into finance, they're always making the argument that the U.S. dollar should be weaker. The U.S. lost the Iran war. The petrodollar is at risk, etc. They look at it from a very simplistic lens. And then when they see the dollar ripping, they're like, that doesn't make sense. We just the U.S. just lost the Iran war. They lost the straight home wars. But the dollar is somehow doing better.
Speaker 0: Yeah. So let's look at it through the lens of Japan. because I think that's easy for everyone to understand. And we all know that the BOJ or the Ministry of Finance or whoever does it, they've been having to prop up the yen. They've been defending the currency, right? And they even raised interest rates the other day from 75 basis points up to 1%. And it did effectively nothing, absolutely nothing. You know, it might've dipped down for a moment and then it just went right back to depreciating against the dollar. I think it got to maybe 162. or 163, I know it got to a level that we hadn't seen since 1986. So why is this happening? Well, if you think about it, the price of oil a few months ago went up to 120 bucks a barrel. Okay, well, Japan has to import almost all their energy. And whether we like it or not, that energy is denominated in dollars. And it's for the network effect. I mean, that's not going away anytime soon. Right? So if they have to have that oil where there's very inelastic demand for the most part, they have to take their yen and they have to sell it to get the dollars they need to go ahead and import that oil or else their economy completely implodes. So let's think that through. What they're doing is they're taking yen and they're selling that into the global FX market. I mean, that's one way to do it. We'll just kind of try to oversimplify it. So you're increasing the supply of yen and then you're increasing the demand for dollars. Well, what's that gonna do? That's going to make the dollar appreciate versus the yen. And when it does that, it just exacerbates the problem. Because whether the price of oil is going up, that, like we said, would increase your need to sell yen. But if the dollar is appreciating versus the yen, then you still need to sell yen, even over the price of oil staying the same, you see? I mean, the price of oil could go down by 5%, but if the yen depreciates by 10%, you still have to sell more yen or you need more yen in order to get those dollars you need. So now let's think about it through the lens of the global economy. We're just talking about that. Well, one way for Japan to get those dollars is to sell stuff to the United States. So we'll just use Toyota as a proxy for their entire economy. So they're selling Toyotas, they're selling Toyotas and they're getting dollars in return. And this works great because then they can take those dollars that they need to go ahead and buy the oil, they don't have to sell yen. But what happens if the global economy slows down, they're selling fewer Toyotas, aren't they? So they're selling fewer Toyotas, fewer dollars coming in, that increases the need to sell the yen to get the oil or to get the dollars to then go ahead and get that oil or commodities, just plug in whatever you want for the needs for USD, whatever's priced in USD. So then you have this death spiral, really, where the central planners in Japan have to come in and defend the currency. Well, how do they do that? They have to take their FX reserves, dollars, and they have to sell those out into the, it's basically do the reverse. They have to sell the dollars to buy the yen. Well, that only lasts so long where this problem that they have just continues and it gets worse and worse and worse until the yen goes to, who knows, 200. I've talked to some really, really smart guys lately that think the yen is going to 300. And so part of the reason why it's so difficult for the dollar to quote unquote crash against other currencies is number one, because commodities are priced in dollars. But even more importantly is because you have that network effect of the dollar and whether we like it or not, the dollar has the greatest network effect in human history.
Speaker 1: so it's just very hard to break that very very hard to break that are you worried that it's being chipped away though um with things like if iran starts to enforce you know if they control the shadow humus and they offer discounts or enforce countries not to use the dollar anymore to be able to get their oil across could these in the long term start to impact the dollar negatively
Speaker 0: Well, how would you mean negatively? So that less use of the dollar isn't necessarily the dollar going down versus other currencies, right? So that gets really, really technical.
Speaker 1: But if you're using another currency to buy the oil through the Strait of Hormuz, that demand for that other currency, whatever that currency is, that means that currency relative to the dollar would do better. And if that happens across three, four currencies that Iran allows to be used to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, then wouldn't that make the dollar weaker relative to those currencies? I know this is long-term and it's very theoretical, but just putting it out there.
Speaker 0: So let's shelf the network effect for a moment. Let's just remind me to come back to that. But in your example there where they're using fewer dollars, you have to ask where do those dollars go and what created the dollars to begin with? That's probably the most important question. So what created those dollars to begin with was debt. Those dollars were lent into existence. So what happens in your theoretical is those dollars are no longer in use. So they go back to pay down the debt. And when they pay down the debt, those dollars disappear. So you have this very interesting mechanism where if the demand for dollars goes down, most likely the supply of dollars would also go down at the same rate. And it's very unique. It's very unique. And again, I don't like it. I don't dislike it. It is what it is. But as investors, we've got to play the cards we're dealt. We can't set up our portfolio based on the way we think the world should be. We have to do it based on the way the world is. So the fact that, again, when a dollar is created, it literally creates future demand for that $1. because of that lending component. And then when you get the network effect, because most currencies are lent into existence, but again, what makes the dollar unique is that combined with the fact that you have this network. So I always use the example of someone in the United States that has a USD mortgage, a dollar mortgage, or someone in the United States. Try using rubles or try using the Chinese Yuan if you're in the United States. No one's gonna accept it. Why? Because no one wants it. Why? Because it has no value, because there's no network effect, right? And try going to Argentina and using Chinese Yuan. It's not gonna happen. By the way, I think you probably know this, but I drove across Argentina for my channel trying to use nothing but gold, silver, and Bitcoin. And what everyone wanted is, you can probably guess, was not gold, it was not silver, it was not Bitcoin, it was dollars. Why? Because it has that network effect.
Speaker 1: It's just like- Hold on. How am I meant to know this? How am I meant to relate to this?
Speaker 0: Oh, well, because it was very, those videos that I did, because I live streamed the whole thing for the entire week. Oh, really?
Speaker 1: And you're driving around Argentina and no one, actually, hold on. You said, you just said no one wanted gold, silver, or Bitcoin?
Speaker 0: Correct. In fact, so what I was doing, is I wasn't trying to barter, like going to a hotel and saying, hey, I've got some gold, you know, can you give me a hotel room? I wasn't doing that. What I was doing is I was taking my gold, silver, Bitcoin, and I was going down to, you know, I'd go to a new city, and then on my way across, and I was going across to meet Doug Casey in BA. But anyway, I'd go to the city, then I'd go to the jewelers, and I'd try to sell the gold for Argentinian pesos. or I'd try to sell the silver, or I'd try to go to a tech shop or a college campus, and I'd try to sell the Bitcoin to get Argentinian pesos, which, by the way, back then, they were depreciating by 20% per month. And no one wanted the gold, silver, or Bitcoin. They all wanted their local shitty currency even more that was depreciating by 20% per month. Why? Why, Mario?
Speaker 1: Because of the network effect.
Speaker 0: The network effect. That's right.
Speaker 1: That's fucking wild, Mario.
Speaker 0: Yeah, you can't, if no one wants what you have, then you've got to sell what you have for what everyone else wants. And it's just, that's, you know, you go through, like my good friend Mike Maloney went through In Hidden Secrets of Money, that very famous video series he has. He goes through like the seven characteristics of what makes money money, right? And one of them is a store of value. But I would argue that the network effect is, way, way, way more important than a store of value. And we see that whether it's in the Turkish lira and the Argentinian peso or any of these currencies that go down significantly, not just every single year, but every single month. And so the store of value I think can contribute a little bit to the attractiveness of a currency. But at the end of the day, it's all about that network effect. How do they want gold? That has network effect.
Speaker 1: No, because what are they going to do with the gold?
Speaker 0: They can sell it easily. No, no, no, no. You can't sell it. So I would have a gold coin and I'd take it to a gold dealer and I'd be able to sell it, but I'd have to take like a 50% haircut. So at the time, gold was selling, I don't know what it was. Let's just say it was $2,000.
Speaker 1: And what year was that? What year was that?
Speaker 0: It was a couple years ago.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 0: So maybe it was $2,500 an ounce or something. And number one, most even the jewelers didn't want the gold. They wouldn't give me – they just wouldn't buy it at any price. But the ones that would would just offer me this massive, massive haircut. That is so bizarre. What are they going to do with it, right? Then they got to find a buyer for it.
Speaker 1: That is so bizarre. Yeah.
Speaker 0: is even tougher to sell bitcoin just for the you know the easiest to sell mario were uh the silver the silver coins that i had silver was the easiest to sell oh yeah by far those were the easiest to sell but most of the the silver coins that i sold i would ask the person you know why they were buying it and they weren't buying it because it was silver they were buying it because of the coin like they care less whether it was silver or not they just thought the coin had like collectible value oh that is so bizarre yeah and if you think about why it's so hard to disrupt the network effect because it's just like google or it's like Facebook.
Speaker 1: It's like watch people watching. It's like people watching videos outside of YouTube. Everyone talks, everyone complains about YouTube, about this, about that. I was thinking about it. I was thinking about YouTube and censorship and I was thinking about these things. But at the end of the day, everyone still watches YouTube no matter what.
Speaker 0: Same thing at Twitter, right? Everyone bitches about Twitter and they fire over the blue sky for like three days.
Speaker 1: And they're like, oh, they're on Twitter. And they go bitch about Twitter on Twitter.
Speaker 0: Yeah. And so the thing is, in order to quote unquote dethrone the dollar, right? you would have to have a currency that was like a hundred times better. And what makes it better? So I always use the example when I'm doing presentations at like conferences, I always use the example of the iPhone, right? We all had flip phones like back in the day. So we know that, yeah, that was definitely an upgrade, but it sure as heck isn't an iPhone. What differentiates the two? It's the apps, it's the apps. It's the functionality, it's the utility of the iPhone. That's why none of us would give up that smartphone and go back to a Motorola Razr or a Nokia or something like that, right? So people have to understand, this is very difficult for the average person, that the dollar monetary system itself, it has all the apps, it has interest rates swapped, it has all these derivatives, it has all of these features and all of this utility, that although we don't use it, you know, the mega banks, the huge corporations, Toyota in Japan, I mean, they're hedging out there at this risk and they're hedging out yen. They're doing all these things and they can do that because of the liquidity and of the utility that the dollar network has. So until you show me something that isn't as good, it's got to be a hundred times better. Unfortunately, we're stuck with the dollar.
Speaker 1: No, well, unfortunately you're an American, fortunately for you guys, but that's a, Yeah, that's an incredible way of explaining it. So when I have, because I have a lot of political guests that don't understand the plumbing behind it. Like I have one of my guests is Jeffrey. He's a regular guest from Eurodollar University. And he talks about the Eurodollar.
Speaker 0: Jeff Snyder is a great friend of mine.
Speaker 1: He's on the show all the time. He was on two days ago. But he's great at explaining what the Eurodollar is. Really good at explaining it. Him and his Pringles box in the background. And... And yeah, but explaining these things to the average person is very difficult, very, very difficult to understand the concept of it. But your Argentina example is perfect. And the way you've described it as a network effect and compared it to X YouTube or what was the other one? X YouTube or the iPhone.
Speaker 0: And if the global economy slows down, if that's your, you know, let's say your audience, their base case, then it's not just a dollar going up as a flight to safety. although that might be a component of it. It's the fact that the amount of money in credit, the circulation slows down, right? So even if you have trillions and trillions and trillions of dollars, if it's underneath your mattress, it's not circulating, it's not doing anything. And those people that need the dollars in order to service their dollar denominated debt that created the dollars to begin with, they're screwed, right? So what are they gonna do? They're gonna sell whatever's on their balance sheet. And usually that's their local currency. And so that's when you get this death spiral. And that's why I always say that I'm not so much worried about the dollar crashing down. What I am worried about is the dollar crashing up.
Speaker 1: Going back to the global economy, how worried are you? Are you talking about a recession? Are you talking about something pretty fucked up like a massive deleveraging going on?
Speaker 0: I mean, that's a great question. I think what I can say with confidence is is that we are in the late stages of a credit cycle. How that credit cycle plays out, I don't know. It usually plays out with an economic contraction, but is that a .com type of kind of balance sheet recession that really doesn't impact the overall economy or is it a GFC type thing? where the unemployment rate goes, I forgot what it went up to in the GFC, but let's just say double digits, 10, 12%. I don't know, because these things always play out differently, but the cycle is always the same, right? So if you look at a late stage credit cycle and look at the characteristics, it's literally just check, check, check, check, like every one of the characteristics in a late stage credit cycle, you can see playing out right now. in front of our eyes. So I'm pretty confident, although not certain, but confident that we're going to go into that last stage of a credit cycle very soon. How that plays out, you don't know, because again, you don't know what the response is gonna be from the central planners. Right, Mario? Yeah, I mean, the response mechanism that we have seen
Speaker 1: I'm not in the mood for it. I'm really not in the mood for it. So I want them to kick the can down the road. I'm really not in the mood for an end of a credit cycle right now. Yeah.
Speaker 0: There's a lot of variables in there. But globally, just the geopolitics, I'd be surprised if things speed up to the degree to which we would need for the dollar to really start going down significantly. And that's because more dollars are being created because you have the economy that's really kicking into high gear, let's say. With all the protectionism, with all the, I mean, look, every single, not every single, but a lot of these countries in Europe are now talking about how they wanna start a nuclear program and they wanna get nuclear weapons because of Russia and what's happening. And everyone now is trying to get gold and nukes, right? Usually, that's not great for the global economy. Generally speaking, if we look at precedent, yeah, you're right. I just see that being a cross-current that we're going to have to deal with for a long time. Now, is it possible for us to have a growing global economy with those conditions? Yes, it is. But it's all a matter of probabilities, and I think the probabilities are pretty low.
Speaker 1: And are you worried about the whole talk of de-globalization?
Speaker 0: That's tough. That goes back to my favorite economist, Thomas Sowell. And one of his famous lines was, there are no solutions, there are only trade-offs. So when we look at de-globalization or globalization for that matter, it is not a panacea. It's not a solution. We have to realize there's trade-offs. So that being the starting point, ask yourself, there's gonna be winners and losers, right? What are the trade-offs? And on net balance, is it going to be a positive? On net balance, is it gonna be a positive? I don't think so. I think it's probably gonna be a negative, but I think it could be, it could be. but I don't think that we in the United States are willing to do what is necessary to make that a net positive. So at the beginning of our conversation, you were talking about manufacturing and trying to bring that manufacturing back to the United States and needing a weak dollar. I actually disagree with that. I don't think that a weak dollar is a necessary condition, but what I do think is you have to have regulatory reform and you have to have certainty Uh, so if, if look, if the dollar is trading, let's say at one 10 or something like that, you know, I'm okay with that. If I'm, uh, building a plant, as long as I know what the regulations are going to be, what the taxes are going to be for the next 10 years. Right. But if I have a weak dollar, let's say, and I don't know what the hell is going to happen tomorrow, as far as the regulatory environment, I'm not building that factory. You know, that's why, uh, uh, uh, You didn't, Argentina, as an example, didn't turn into a manufacturing powerhouse, right? They have the weakest currency, but they're stifled by regulation. So if you're stifled by regulation, the currency really doesn't matter too much. So my point there is if we really reduce regulations, I mean, right now we're increasing the size of government, even with Trump in there. So if we were able to decrease the size of government, decrease the regulations, and instill back into the economy certainty about what the rules of the game are going to be over the next five years or the next 10 years, I think that would be the most beneficial thing that we could do to bring manufacturing back home to the United States.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Last thing I want to ask you about, George, is China. Your friend Snyder is pretty concerned about China. I have no freaking idea because it's impossible to know what data to trust. And I remember since I was young, everyone's talking about China's collapse and the end of that boom, et cetera. But yet they keep humming along. You've talked about their real estate market. We showed the chart earlier in the interview. It's not looking good at all. But somehow they still, at least they seem like they're doing well. What's the reality like in China? How bad is it there?
Speaker 0: I have no idea.
Speaker 1: I have no idea.
Speaker 0: Yeah, just like you, I mean, I'm just completely speculating based on what we know. And we know a couple things, right? We know that their real estate market just absolutely fell out of bed. And why is that important? People need to realize that prior to that big decline that you showed on that chart, Mario, the Chinese real estate was the largest asset class in the world. That was literally bigger than the US stock market, bigger than the US housing market. It was the largest asset class in the world was Chinese real estate. So for that thing to go down by 50 or 60%, that is not a nothing burger.
Speaker 1: Like you are taking- You'd expect people on the streets, you'd expect a revolution in China if you're looking at this in the silo.
Speaker 0: Yeah, and then another thing too is, look at the Chinese, or excuse me, the Japanese banks, and a lot of them were lending dollars to the evergreens of the world, right? So the point there is that, let's just assume for a moment that the Chinese economy is suffering to the degree to which the US economy suffered during the GFC, and they're just trying to put window dressing on the numbers to however much they can there. We have to realize that that has ripple effects throughout the global economy through the banking system, because there were so many dollars that were lent into the Chinese economy. If those loans aren't being paid back, then what you're gonna have is a tightening of the balance sheet with the banks, and then you're gonna have that circulation of money and credit that we talked about earlier that's so important. You're really gonna see that slow down, and that's gonna impact liquidity, not just in Asia, but it's also gonna impact liquidity in the United States. Another thing I'd like to point out because we were using Japan as a proxy there for the dollar, let's just call it the dollar wrecking ball, right? But we need to understand that the exact same thing is happening in India and not a small economy. The exact same thing is happening in Indonesia. The exact same thing is happening in South Korea. We see it happening all over Asia. And I think it will likely, start to bleed out into other major economies. I just did a presentation at a conference where I went back in time to 1200 BC. And at the time the global power empire was Egypt. And the whole world was basically kind of just Egypt and then going up to Italy or the known world, I guess I should say. And at the time there were these pirates and they were called the Sea Peoples, right? And no one knew who they were, but everyone knew that they just wrecked shop. So they basically went from Italy all the way down and just like, you know, raped and pillaged and just destroyed all the cities and towns and took all the gold and did basically whatever they want. And they're making their way all the way down to Egypt. Right. So the Pharaoh at the time was Ramses the third and he was a military genius. So what he did is he lured them into the Nile River Delta, the sea people, the pirates. And then he had his guys hide out in the cattails. And then once he consolidated their naval fleet, he you know, they lit him up with arrows and they and they beat him. Right. So the point here is after they beat the sea peoples, they thought they're all in the clear. You know, everyone was celebrating. The Ramses guys builds himself another 10 pyramids. But what ended up happening is the sea people were maybe not the main cause, but they directly contributed to the fall of the Egyptian empire. Why? Why? Because they took out all their trading partners. So all of that stuff that they were employing. from all these other places. They couldn't import it anymore. They couldn't export it anymore because there's no one to trade with because the sea people took them out, right? So my point there is the dollar is the modern day version.
Speaker 1: Is the pirates, yeah, yeah, the sea people. And it's just taking out all these countries that the U.S. trades with. The only twist here is that the U.S. is the one. If only the Faro was actually supporting the Sea People in the background, then it would make sense because it's the U.S. that is backing the U.S. dollar.
Speaker 0: Now, to be clear, Mario, I think before we get to the Sea People's 2026, I think that we would probably get a Plaza Accord 2.0. So you remember the Plaza Accord back in 84, 85? That was because the dollar just got way, way, way too strong. So just let's say we get- What's the Plaza Accord?
Speaker 1: No, what was the Accords? I don't know about it.
Speaker 0: The Plaza Accord was, I'm almost, is either 84, 85. And what happened is the dollar got really, really, really strong, especially versus the Japanese yen and the German, was it the Mark or- Deutsche Mark, I believe it was back then. And so the United States got together, the central planners, with these other countries and like, okay, we have to devalue the dollar. It's not good for anybody here. So that's exactly what they did is they devalued the dollar. Now what's interesting is it might've been easier to devalue the dollar back then than it is now due to everything that we were just talking about. So I don't know if they could do it to the degree to which they would need to, assuming the DXY, and we're just using it as a proxy, right? Got up to 140 or 150. But I think that when it got to that point where the dam was really starting to crack due to the sea peoples, the central planners would come in and try to intervene.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but with the Euro dollar, the size of the Euro dollar right now, I don't think it's possible. If I listen to your friend Snyder, It's not within your control, really. Unless you get the rest of the world in cahoots, maybe.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I mean, from a plumbing standpoint, you could probably do it with, I don't know. But does, I don't know. That would be a Snyder question. It's like a beast. You could do a plaza.
Speaker 1: No, it's too, I'll ask him. It just becomes so complicated. The Eurodollar just made the whole system so, it's like you created a beast that got out of control. Just wild to imagine, but that's how it feels like.
Speaker 0: With that, what I always try to do, Mario, is I imagine a bucket of water, right? And what we're talking about is could the central planners devalue the currency? But you've got two cross currents there, right? You've got the immovable object and the unstoppable force, right? So if the central planners are, let's say, pouring water into the bucket, that's not the only question you have to ask. You have to ask, how big is the hole at the bottom of the bucket? Because if the hole is big enough at the bottom of the bucket, then water is still going to be going out a lot faster than they're able to pour it in. And so that's kind of the question that I would have about a Plaza Accord 2.0. That was cool.
Speaker 1: George, I really enjoyed the conversation, and you've done a great job at explaining those complex matters. I enjoyed it.
Speaker 0: Oh, thanks for having me.
Speaker 1: Your Argentina trip is on your channel?
Speaker 0: It's on the Rebel Capitalist channel. You got to go back a couple years. And everyone always wants me to do another. I'd love to do another one if I get some time. But I'd probably go to Turkey next time and try to do the same type of thing.
Speaker 1: That's a good place. That's a good place to do it.
Speaker 0: You want to go to somewhere with hyperinflation. Yeah, yeah.
Speaker 1: Turkey's getting screwed right now.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: George Gammon, Argentina. I'll try to find it on YouTube. All right, man. Absolute pleasure. Thank you, George.
Speaker 0: All right. Have a good one.
reSee.it AI Summary
I watched the night unfold and Brandon Weichert’s verdict felt flat: the war is back on the menu. From Bandar Abbas to Kharg—plus unconfirmed anti-ship missiles and drones at US Navy ships in the Gulf—his point holds: it’s never been about nukes. The red line is Hormuz, leaving only collision, not rationality.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇮🇷🇺🇸 Kharg Island reportedly hit for the first time since April, the red line Tehran named months ago, and the war may be back on... Brandon Weichert's verdict came out flat as the night unfolded: the war is back on the menu. Bandar Abbas, Sirik, Qeshm, then reports of Kharg, and before we signed off, unconfirmed reports of anti-ship missiles and drones launched at US Navy warships in the Persian Gulf. We were counting missile flight times on air. His argument has never wavered, this was never about nukes. The one true red line is Hormuz. Iran can't surrender it while this regime stands, Washington can't concede it, and two absolutes leave only collision. He reads tonight's reported target list as battle-space preparation, softening the coastline for an eventual amphibious move on the islands, likely after the midterms. And he keeps circling back to McNamara's warning: rationality will not save us. One claim he stressed was unverified but couldn't shake: that earlier in this war, a Navy commander demanded WRITTEN orders before taking ships into the strait. Commanders ask for paper when they doubt they're coming back. Part of me still holds that Iran's battered economy makes pragmatism the smarter bet. But with funeral crowds chanting revenge in three cities, tonight didn't belong to pragmatism. @WeTheBrandon
Video Transcript AI Summary
Iran struck three vessels in the last 24 hours—one Qatari, one Saudi, and one vessel of unknown ownership—while they were transiting via the Omani side through the Strait of Hormuz amid a power struggle between Iran and the United States over control of the waterway. The US wants it kept open like before February 28th, while Iran wants to control it and eventually charge a fee; this was expected to be the main sticking point in the memorandum of misunderstanding (MOU).
The initial US response described was the revocation of a sanctions waiver placed about a week earlier covering Iranian oil sales and petrochemical sales and related services. A few hours later, the biggest US strikes on Iran since the ceasefire were described as hitting Bandar Abbas, Sirik, and Kashem, in multiple waves, followed by power outages reported in Kuwait and Bahrain.
Axios was cited as reporting that US officials told Axios the response is a direct result of acts of international terrorism perpetrated by Iran on innocent ships transiting the Straits. CNN was cited as reporting that Iranian officials said the attack was not meant to be proportionate, but meant to be punishment. The Iranian president was described as having arrived in Iranian airspace after traveling from Iraq.
A separate thread described the timing and authorization of US strikes: it was reported that Trump approved the strike plan against Iran and gave the final order on Tuesday while attending the NATO summit, after a meeting in Ankara with Hexeth, Rubio, Scott Besant, Dan Cain, the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, and other senior officials. A US official was cited as saying it remains unclear how long the strikes will continue.
Across the discussion, the Strait of Hormuz was framed as the central issue that would not be resolved through consensus between Washington and Tehran, with expectations of continued cycles of violence rather than a lasting peace deal. The recurring use of the Oman route was described as being under pressure from the Americans to avoid further escalation, while Saudi and Qatari positions were described as becoming increasingly awkward as they balance wanting the crisis to end quickly with aligning with Washington.
One speaker argued that the strikes could be interpreted as preparing the battle space for a potential amphibious landing by targeting areas related to Iran’s ability to control the Strait of Hormuz. The possibility of further actions—mines, sinking ships, and other ways to disrupt control of the Strait—was discussed, alongside claims that the Iranians believe they can survive economic calamity by keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed better than the Americans can.
Another thread emphasized the role of the funeral processions and crowd emotions after the Iranian leadership’s death, describing large crowds chanting revenge as part of why negotiations and rational restraint might fail. At the same time, the counterpoint raised was that Iran faces massive inflation, currency collapse, and unemployment, and that the government prioritizes stabilizing the population and economy; still, revenge remained a major motivational force among many voices.
The conversation also linked Iran’s actions to regional dynamics and to broader theaters, including Lebanon and Ukraine. Israeli strikes in Lebanon were described as potentially being part of a pattern connected to the US strikes on Iran, and Lebanon was characterized as inextricably linked to Iran through Hezbollah.
Operational constraints and resource depletion were highlighted repeatedly: the defense industrial base was described as struggling to replenish what has been spent, and there were concerns about dwindling strategic petroleum reserve levels and the global price effects of damaging oil refineries. The strategic reserve discussion included claims about usable barrels remaining and accelerating depletion.
Retaliation options were reviewed: it was suggested Iran could strike US bases (symbolically), strike Israel (though framed as less logical if Israel is not striking), or keep the Strait almost closed and carry out symbolic strikes. Closing the Strait was described as likely because it would produce immediate systemic shock through insurance and shipping market reactions, potentially restarting earlier pressure dynamics. There was also discussion that sinking a ship or more kinetic attacks would be escalatory.
As additional reports emerged, the transcript noted explosions reported around Kashem and Cog (with Cog described as especially concerning). The discussion then turned to reports that Iran launched multiple anti-ship ballistic missile and anti-access area denial threats toward US Navy ships in the Persian Gulf, with saturation dynamics described as drones going first to drain defenses. The speakers discussed uncertainty about whether ships were hit and the likelihood of information gaps depending on what imagery and monitoring are available.
The transcript ended with continued monitoring: it stated that Iran had struck three ships via the Strait route, that US strikes on Iran had continued for hours with peak effects early on, and that Iran’s retaliation began with at least two missiles and drones targeting US Navy forces, with no additional confirmed information at the time of the final updates.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: What did I tell you? Optimism is cowardice at this point. No, I'm still optimistic. I'm still optimistic.
Speaker 1: Even though that surprised me, it was a lot more than I expected and the timing of it. The president of Iran, so just to kind of recap for the audience, Iran struck three vessels in the last 24 hours, one Qatari, one Saudi, and one we don't know who it belongs to yet today, the one we don't know yet. So that was in the last 24 hours. They were going through the Omani side, the Strait of Hormuz. This is all part of the power struggle between the two countries on who controls the Strait of Hormuz. The US wants it open like it was before. Iran wants to control it and eventually charge a fee. So this has been the main sticking point in the MOU since the beginning, and it was expected to be the main sticking point. So everyone was talking about if and how the US would respond. Initially, the US revoked the sanctions waiver, that they had placed about a week ago on Iranian oil sales and petrochemical sales and all services associated in the sale of that oil. And so I thought that could have been it. Maybe they decided not to strike Iran considering the funeral processions. Well, a few hours after that, we saw the biggest strikes on Iran since the ceasefire. They struck Bandar Abbas, they struck Sirik, they struck Kashem, the same targets as they've hit before. multiple strikes i think in three waves four waves um and then we saw power outages in kuwait and bahrain um i think kuwait's confirmed bahrain i'm not sure um i think some of it has been restored already but that could have been side the warfare by the iranians lastly we had the iranian president um head immediately from iraq to uh to iran he's just arrived into iranian airspace a few minutes ago from um and from iraq from shiraz i think not sure as from uh Najaf in Iraq. And also we have Axios says, just now, they came in now fresh off the press, the response is a direct result of acts of international terrorism, that's the US official talking to Axios, that have been perpetrated by Iran on innocent ships transiting the Straits. The Iranians know the consequences of their ridiculous actions, yet they still chose to carry these attacks out. And they told CNN, officials told CNN that this attack is... It's not meant to be proportionate. It's meant to be punishment, something along those lines. And this is what it was. So initial reaction.
Speaker 0: Well, this was predictable. This was coming always. The issue, as I told you before, the issue, it's not just a sticking point as you described it. It is the entire, it's the whole enchilada, as they say. It's the whole thing. It is control over the Strait of Hormuz. And what you have seen the last couple of sort of outbursts of violence, you know, the breakdown in the memorandum of misunderstanding, which is really what it is, because the Americans are saying you need to restore the Strait of Hormuz. Thank you. Yes. I'll be here all weekend. You need to restore the Strait. The Strait of Hormuz to what it was before February 28th when the war began. And the Iranians are saying, hell no, we are not ever going back. We are going to extract some kind of penance from the world for letting this attack go forward. And this is the way they're going to do it. And they're not going to drop this. I've said this from the beginning. It doesn't matter if Trump is offering to pay them more money up front. They don't care because this is more than just about the money. It's about, as they say, sending a message. And the Iranians are trying to throw their weight around, and this is how they're going to do it. They're not going to drop this. There's never going to be consensus between Washington and Tehran, regardless of what Israel wants. There's never going to be any consensus over this issue. This is why you keep seeing... repeatedly the the omani route being used and it's clearly being used under pressure from the americans they're pressuring these you know as qatari ships that got struck the saudis are are stuck in this very very awkward place because clearly the saudis want this over as quickly as possible and yet they're still kowtowing to washington um it's look this is not going to end with a peace deal this is not going to end with any deal and if you looked at that funeral of the Ayatollah and what they were chanting. And yeah, you can say it was all propaganda. And of course it was propaganda for them, but that was a hell of a lot of people. And whoever sat down with the president, Mr. Netanyahu, whoever sat down with the president before the war began and filled his brain with notions that, oh, we just brought bomb them into democracy. You know, that person should have their head examined and there should be some kind of investigation because this was, Looking at those crowds alone, this was the biggest intelligence failure since 9-11, but since the Iraq war. So I'll just say, Mario, the issue of who controls Strait of Hormuz, it ain't going away. There's never going to be a consensus on it, and you're going to keep seeing this happening. And by the way, tick-tock, tick-tock, right? We're running out of oil here. The world needs that oil restored. And Iran knows it. And by the way, we can't discount the fact that Iran is so peeved at how they were treated, at the assassinations of their leaders. You looked at that funeral. That was a very emotional thing. There is a very high probability that Iran has figured they can survive whatever economic calamity is coming by keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed better than the Americans can. And they might be dead set. on punishing us by strangling our economy, which they are about to do.
Speaker 1: So Trump just came in now from Axios as well. Trump approved the strike plan against Iran and gave the final order on Tuesday while attending the NATO summit. Tuesday as in yesterday, it wasn't today. No, yeah, today. So Trump held a meeting in Ankara with Hexeth, Rubio, Scott Besant, And Dan Cain, the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and other senior officials before authorizing the operation, a U.S. official said it remains unclear how long the strikes will continue, saying, quote, we'll get the assessment about the results of the strikes and make decisions after. Yeah.
Speaker 0: This is an insane clown car posse. That's what this is. This is the insane clown car posse presidency. and uh you're seeing that play out um dan kane is basically there for decorative purposes i'm not really sure what he's contributing at this point um the the you know bombs away is what is the word of the day so they they're going to keep doing this whether they whether they pause and you know all that you know and they give everybody hope because it's about manipulating the market um the bottom line is The Americans, the red line is very clear to me. It isn't the nuclear issue even. It has nothing to do with nukes anymore. The red line is straight-up Hormuz control. The Iranians will never let that go as long as that regime is in power, and the Americans can never cede that to them. And that means it's war. The war is back on the menu is what that means. And if you look at the targets they hit again, you listed them at the beginning. If you look at the targets they hit, this looks a hell of a lot like they are prepping the battle space for a potential invasion of one of those outlying islands. I know. Well, it's like Vietnam.
Speaker 1: No, but also these targets are the ones that allow Iran to control the Strait of Hormuz. So if anything is degrading Iran's ability to do what the U.S. doesn't want them to do.
Speaker 0: Well, I'm not denying that. What I'm saying is if you look at what they're hitting, they need to punch a pathway for a potential amphibious landing. This is what you would be hitting. They need to punch a hole there because the Iranians are not going to drop this and you can degrade all you want. But I see no evidence that we have the ability to destroy the actual capability militarily of the Iranians to exert some form of pressure on over the Strait of Hormuz, which is why I still think landing troops, as insane as it is, and it will not end well for the United States, I still think the president has him this locked in. That's what he wants to do, whether he does it now or he does it after the midterms, probably after the midterms because it's too hot right now. And also, by the way, now there is a silver lining in all of this. The silver lining is now that this is happening, and I think I'm being proven right, there's no way the Americans are going to have the stomach to To get involved in a European war. So the Russians are going to have an open field at this point to do whatever the hell they want in Ukraine. And I think you're seeing that play out right now because there's no way the Americans can fight in Iran in an increased capacity and also do whatever the heck is going on in Ukraine.
Speaker 1: You're assuming you're assuming there's a full blown war in Iran.
Speaker 0: I think that's where this is headed. I don't think either side is really. Listen, I don't think the Iranians want to deal at this point. I don't agree with anybody who's saying that at this point, because you look at that funeral. There's just too much emotion there. There's no way they're going to be able to contain that emotional outburst. This is something more. We've moved beyond the realm of rationality. And I'm reminded of the 11 rules that Robert McNamara came up with after he lost Vietnam. And number four on that list of 11 was rationality will not save us. And I'm very worried that that is at play here. I don't think anybody involved, the U.S., Israel or Iran, is playing rationally at this point.
Speaker 1: Now, I think I agree with what you said. The funeral showed how many people want revenge. And that's a concern I've mentioned in a few times in my interviews. But it's also important to note that the same people in Iran are struggling economically. Massive inflation, currency collapse, unemployment rate skyrocketing. The economy is in a really, really bad shape. No, there's no doubt.
Speaker 0: It's horrible.
Speaker 1: Exactly. So at the end of the day...
Speaker 0: But let's just hold on real quick. This is where we get into materialism versus spiritualism, right? Are we economic creatures first and foremost, or is there something more to human beings? And I think many Iranians would answer you that this is something more. And I think if you saw that funeral, nobody's talking about how bad the economy is, and it's bad right now for them. And it's going to get bad for us real soon. They're talking about the need for, on a spiritual level, revenge. So there's something more going on here. This is scary.
Speaker 1: I think the majority, remember, the majority of Iranians, it's a secular country, relatively secular country. It's not a hardline country.
Speaker 0: Yeah, but the secularists aren't running the country. Yeah.
Speaker 1: But they do have, but they are the people that the government is meant to represent. And I think the government knows this. I think the government wants to, their priority, I could get hate for this, but their priority right now is getting the population in a better state, the economy in a better state, over getting seeking revenge for the death of the Supreme Leader. To be clear, I'm not saying there's not a big chunk that want to avenge the death of the Supreme Leader. I've seen those videos. I've seen the people around the president saying death to the compromiser reeling next to him, death to the compromiser. So no, there's a lot of voices that want to seek vengeance. And I'm not surprised. But I do believe I could be wrong. So I'm not, I'm not very binary in this. But I do believe that there will, it will be it will be a pragmatic decision they'll make at the end of the day, where the economy is going to be the top priority.
Speaker 0: So I think that the economy is a top priority. I don't think it's the top priority right now. I think the top priority right now for the regime is proving their staying power, not just with their people, but within the region. And this is why they're risking alienating the Saudis, who they very well need on their side for this new Middle Eastern order to even have a chance at arising. But they're threatening the Saudis right now. They're going after Qatar. They're going after a lot of the Arab states one would think they would want to win over And that's because they're sending a signal right now that they have staying power. Still, they'll even risk their economic short-term well-being so that they can establish a foothold as the regional powerhouse or a regional powerhouse. And right now, they can't rest on the fact that, yeah, they've been able to beat back the Americans, but they haven't decisively done it yet. And I think they're getting set up to do something decisive because they have to establish... credibility and right now they still feel like judging from how the americans are responding they don't yet have full credibility and i think they're about to have full credibility because i think this thing's escalating more whether it happens right away or it happens after the midterms in this country i think there's going to be an escalation still and i know people disagree with me on this but this is this is not making sense from a rational perspective right now
Speaker 1: We could speculate on what they would do, but we could always look at what they've done. At the peak of the war, when everyone was worried, they eventually agreed to a ceasefire. Throughout the ceasefire, whenever there were back and forth attacks, all of it was within proportionate means by both sides not to escalate and get out of control again. after the MOU, whenever the US, they tried to ship the US struck them, they barely retaliated. So so far, their action has shown restraint, and has shown a country that wants to maintain escalation dominance, they want to maintain control, there's been, they did have escalation dominance at one stage, pre post these five versus three, they still do. Yeah, of course, they still do this, they said they still do. But they're know israel is still in lebanon they're not firing at israel israel struck they they bombed there was a strike so on a daily basis in lebanon struck israel so i think that the reason is they the voices the majority within the decision-making uh the decision-making um the decision makers of the government they are still choosing to all of it the end goal is still peace and prosperity they want their economy to do well and they want peace and regional security altogether. But I think their actions still, even though they're less so than before, they still want to prevent war, want to avoid war.
Speaker 0: I hope you're right. I don't think anybody wants to avoid war at this point. I don't think Trump does. I don't think Israel does. I think the Iranians feel like they have no choice now. I mean, you hear some of the stuff coming out after this attack. It's very clear. The Iranians have made it very abundantly clear even before the MOU was signed. that they're not going back to pre-war straightover moves. That's the sticking point, as you say. I know, but that is it right now. That is the whole thing. And so far, there's no consensus. And so we may get these periods of rest, but it's a marathon, not a sprint. And this is what I'm looking at. And I'm saying, I don't think this thing's over by a long shot. We'll have lulls. Like I said to you before, it might look a lot like the Ukraine war where we'll go through these long periods of sort of frozenness and then all of a sudden it'll. But the point is, is I don't think the president I don't think President Trump can afford to let this go because he's worried about what that precedent is going to set. with other regions in the world, or at least that's what Marco Rubio keeps saying. And I think that is a legitimate concern. But I think we've also crossed that Rubicon because we started this stupid war. The Iranians are not going to let us reset. It's just not going to happen. And as long as they're dead set on that, we keep going back to the weapons. Now, the real interesting thing here is, though, Mario, we keep depleting. And there is no relevant data proving that we are able to catch up with those depletion rates. The defense industrial base is still struggling to replenish what's been spent. And if this thing opens up again, this is only going to speed up the decline of those very precarious arsenals.
Speaker 1: I don't know what they're using these attacks. They're firing on the coastline, not deep into Iran. I understand that.
Speaker 0: But I'm saying if the war goes back on, this is going to become a problem. because we're not able to replenish and i know that the military has told him this they have told the president this and yet here we are right back where we were a couple weeks ago it's like he's like the kid that keeps putting his hand near the hot stove pulling it back at the last second eventually he's going to get us all burned and by the way again the oil depletion That also is very worrying, and I know you've had Chris Martinson on. I've seen your interviews with some of your oil experts and Pilkington and whatnot. This is a very dangerous game the president is playing. I don't really understand why he can't just let this thing alone. The memorandum of understanding makes it very clear that the United States is not going to be dictating to the Iranians how this waterway is used during these 60 days or less of relative peace. The Iranians have been very clear. And I don't know what the Americans are going to do to try to flip the script short of escalating with troops, with Marines trying to do sea control from one of those captured islands. This thing is not going to end well, I don't think. And I think this is a... law of unintended consequences it may very well be that in the backs of their mind all of these groups think okay we'll push and then eventually de-escalate but as world war one showed us everybody thinks there's an off-ramp until they get there and suddenly the off-ramp is gone and you're stuck so that's the fear here um did you see the videos by the way of uh jackson hinkle Did you see that? Yeah, I did. I did. I've been on his show once a year or so ago. That is wild. Another guy. Yeah. I mean, look, he was a nice guy, but he's, he's, first of all, he's a Bernie bro. Second of all, uh, you know, it's very clear that, um, you know, I don't know what's going on with him. I don't know. I, I, it's very odd.
Speaker 1: I, I, I understand the audience. Let's tell the, sorry, let me tell the, also in other contexts. So as a video, so there's a lot of, um, um, American influences and political analysts in Iran right now. And Jackson, I can see Jackson Hinkle was there with Max Blumenthal. And Jackson Hinkle, there's a video of him. I don't know why I can't find it now. But he's in Iran on the protests. And he's waving a flag. I'm going to try to find it quickly. He's waving a flag and saying death, death to America. And then all the Iranians in the protests are yelling death. Quite a lot of Iranians. Yeah.
Speaker 0: yelling death and repeating after him death death to america or something like that i think it was a bit much it was a bit much um i understand being a critic of u.s foreign policy but uh there are some bridges we shouldn't cross and that's one of them um so you know it was very interesting but you know there's also this uh former warren staffer elizabeth warren staffer who was uh running around giving speeches um in tehran during the funeral i don't know if you saw her that's an interesting one i often wonder if if people like her are actually uh very deep cia assets but i don't know anything um but it's just odd that they would be running around acting that way anyway um it's very odd i'm gonna i'm gonna play the uh
Speaker 1: the by the way, Pisa scan has just landed in Tehran. He left Iraq and just landed in Tehran. But this is Jackson Hinkle with the chance to play with audio please, Stephanie. It's wild. Like I know he likes the shock factor by the way he likes. He likes he's got a following and he's good at that.
Speaker 0: Down with USA.
Speaker 1: Down with USA. I pinged him to come back on the show. You can remove it, Stephanie. I pinged him to come back on the show to chat. I haven't spoken to him for a while. I've had him a few times. Like I said, he was always a nice guy. He's a very nice guy. He's a very nice guy on a personal level. He has that shock factor. I remember when he comes on, he's like, he's like, Hamas should have a nuclear weapon. I was trying to keep a straight face because it's like a serious debate. And the person, and the person he was debating Shamus, something Shamus, the person he was debating was like very supportive of Israeli foreign policy, was really angry at it.
Speaker 0: He goes all red like, what do you mean Hamas should have a nuclear weapon?
Speaker 1: Yeah, he's just trolling him and he went viral for it. I knew the game he's playing. He plays with fire. He went to a Hezbollah funeral as well. He meant to see the Houthis.
Speaker 0: Yeah, he actually spoke to the Houthis like three or four years ago. I remember that.
Speaker 1: He did. He did. But this one is – okay, he didn't say death to the U.S.A.
Speaker 0: He just said down with the U.S.A. Down with the U.S.A. Yeah, okay. Well, hey, one in Tehran, I guess. But – No, no. I think he meant –
Speaker 1: Even for Henkel, that's a step too far.
Speaker 0: As an American, I was whinging when I saw it. It was a bit much. I should say wincing. Every man has to make his bed and lie in it, though. I'll leave that to more learned people in terms of coming down on him. I don't agree with what he said, and I think it's unfortunate. I do think it's interesting... I just really think people should really take a look at the footage generally of the funeral, because I mean, you know, they said seven to 9 million. I'm hearing that maybe it was closer to 2 million. Yeah.
Speaker 1: The point is even financial times, I think they finally, okay.
Speaker 0: Cause there was a lot of debate the last three days over that. The point is it's millions of people. Okay. So the point is, is that there's a hell of a lot of more people who are, sympathetic to the regime in iran than what we in dc were led to believe for the last several decades than what they're telling the president and that is why we're in this quandary this quagmire that we find ourselves in, because yet again, the intelligence services did not do their job. They did not provide real capabilities and intentions. They didn't provide a real threat assessment to the president. They provided an ideological assessment. And it was an ideological assessment based upon the needs and desires of a foreign country, the Israelis. And we're going to be paying for this a long time. A long time. And there needs to be some kind of a investigation and a reckoning because this whole thing was avoidable. And, you know, it's not over. This thing's not over. And neither is the Russia thing in Ukraine. I mean, this this in both cases, these are conflicts we find ourselves either directly or indirectly involved in on behalf of foreign allies. Right. NATO, European, Ukraine allies. in the Ukraine war and Israel in the Iran war. In both cases, we're not faring too well.
Speaker 1: What do you make of the whole Erdogan versus Netanyahu drama? Trump obviously siding with Erdogan, praising him, saying he's at the NATO summit, not because of NATO.
Speaker 0: Maybe give them the F-35.
Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly. Now talking about giving them the F-35 that Netanyahu and the Israeli lobby has been You know, again, it's Trump that blocked the Turks from, made it illegal for the Turks to get the F-35s. Yeah, in 2019.
Speaker 0: Yeah, he did. But I don't, my read on that. Yeah, 2019. My read on that was that was not his idea. That was like somebody like Mattis or John Kelly. That was one of the, quote, adults in the room who were holdovers from the previous iterations of American presidents. I don't really think that Trump really wanted to do that or was really aware of what that would mean, because he there is a consistent through line with Trump, both non consecutive terms where he is very close on a personal level with race of Erdogan. He likes them. They like each other. I mean, I was watching them this morning. Erdogan has his arm locked in with Trump and Trump is walking around with him. I don't see that very often, Erdogan doing that with other American press, certainly not with Obama. You know, I don't see him doing that with many other leaders around the world. I'm sure he does. But I just thought that was a very telling thing. It was they like each other and or at least Erdogan knows how to push Trump's buttons. You know, it's a lot of flattery and a lot of extravagance. Everybody knows that's the way to Trump's heart.
Speaker 1: I have one more question before we continue on that. How do you think Iran would retaliate in the short term? Do you think it will be quite behind as always? Will it be more this time around? What do you expect?
Speaker 0: You know, I don't know.
Speaker 1: They might need to strike more because of the funerals. Iranis are in that mindset now.
Speaker 0: Yeah, they might. They might target some of the U.S. bases. They might actually go for some facilities in Saudi. I don't know. Qatar is definitely on the menu, I think. So is Bahrain. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Why was Qatar beyond the menu? Qatar is the one that's working out the... Well, they went after the Qatari ship.
Speaker 0: One of those ships was a Qatari ship that they went after.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but striking Qatari infrastructure is a whole other level, man.
Speaker 0: Well, I don't know. I'm just saying, at this point, given the severity of what's going on and the fact that the Iranians feel that they need to do something decisive to restore their deterrence or what they think is their deterrence, I would not take things like Qatar off the table. I would just be looking out. Again, they might decide to just keep everything localized to the straight because that seems to be the thing that gets the Americans going. You know, if you really want to pressure the Americans, you do crap to the straight. They could very well, you know, do more mines. They might not even do it. They could sink a ship. Although I do think that that... Someone said that to me today.
Speaker 1: It is possible...
Speaker 0: Yeah, okay. Well, he's been pretty good on this. I think that that is a possible – I mean, I disagree with him on Ukraine, but, you know, that's fine. A gentleman can disagree. But, you know, he's been right about that, about Iran, and I think – I do think that there is a very increased possibility that they sink a ship to send a message. Again, they think that's sending a message, but that might only then force a greater escalation. I mean, this is where we get into, you know, Robert Pape's theories on escalation and whatnot. And I think Pape is right on the money with a lot of what he's saying as well. I don't think we're out of this thing yet. I don't think there's any rational off ramp here. I think we're all going to be very poor at the very least for a period of time. in the coming months.
Speaker 1: What do you make of the strikes? Israel struck Lebanon. There was an airstrike at the same time as the Americans are striking Iran. Do you think they're bringing Lebanon into the mix now? So whenever Iran strikes ships, the U.S. and Israel strike Lebanon and Iran instead of just U.S. Yeah, I think there's a linkage there.
Speaker 0: Now, I don't know. Now, it's probable that there is some degree of coordination between Trump and Netanyahu on this. But it's also very possible that Netanyahu saw what we were doing or knew we were going to do something and was like, all right, we're going to go now with Lebanon. This is going to continue on, though, in this pattern. Lebanon is now inextricably connected. In many respects, they've always been because of Hezbollah's presence there and the fact that everybody in the West views Hezbollah as an undeniable extension of Iran. So they're inextricably linked, these two theaters. They're two theaters in the same war. And I still don't discount the possibility in the near term of, or soon, I should say, Jelani's people may be getting involved to do something. I mean, that... That is still very – I wouldn't say no way.
Speaker 1: I'd be so shocked.
Speaker 0: Well, and we'll see because Turkey will be the real determinant of that. But it is possible that Trump – because Trump is the one who floated this. It is possible that Trump really wants Jelani, who's his boy, to run into Syria – I'm sorry, to run into Lebanon from Syria – Yeah, and it's very possible that the F-35 thing is a sweetener that Trump is throwing at Erdogan to get him to stand up now.
Speaker 1: I thought about this. I thought about this. I had a whole discussion with Larry, and he got riled up with it about al-Sharaa because it's very easy to bash al-Sharaa. He's like an easy target that it's easy for me to criticize him as well considering his past, you know, leader of HGS, which I freaking despise, and what they've committed throughout the war. But I would just say, just give him a chance. Like, you know, he's in a place conducting mission impossible. So far, there is no more the civil war in Syria stopped. There's no killings and shootings and stuff on a daily basis. There was the massacres of the Alawites and the Druze that happened. Some people blame al-Sharra. Others say al-Sharra was the one that stopped them. There were some commanders acting rogue. I have no fucking idea. But I know that the Kurds, they put down their arms. They've been given equal rights and that was done peacefully. Everyone expected al-Shahra to just massacre the Kurds. That didn't happen. With the Druze, al-Shahra is trying to merge them into Syria to make Syria as a one country. And then you've got the Alawites, the massacre stopped. The attacks, the fighting stopped. It was mainly the fucking, the extremists attacking the Alawites. So I think he's conducting mission impossible. And I think any alternative could drive Syria even worse than it already is. So my position is like, give the guy a chance. The West, Macron's there, Trump, et cetera, has given him a chance. Erdogan's obviously, this is his best friend. So give him a chance. Let's see what he could do with the country. He stopped various militias from attacking Israel. He so far has not accepted to attack Hezbollah. Let's hope that's true. So I would just say, let's hold judgment. Let him try rule the country. And if he fails, if he goes there and attacks Hezbollah, if he goes there and starts massacring Alawites, then, you know...
Speaker 0: I think we have a fundamental disagreement on what exactly Jelani is. I don't think Jelani is a serious leader of anything other than a U.S., Turkish, maybe Israeli proxy shock force. And I think that if his puppet masters tell him, you need to go do this in Lebanon... I think eventually you will see him execute that mission with wanton disregard for any notion of peace and prosperity. I don't believe that Jelani is a real thing. I think Jelani is a creation of whatever we did to him at Camp Bucca. And he's a Frankenstein's monster. This guy did, before we captured him, he was an al-Qaeda in Iraq, He was a very savvy battlefield commander. He was very young too. He was one of the younger ones and he killed a lot of, a lot of people and he wounded a lot of Americans in, in the Sunni triangle. Uh, so, you know, I, you know, my view on him is basically if we're not going to drone him, we should definitely extract him and put him in Gitmo. Uh, I, I'm, I, I'm not, I'm not, I'm not on board with it.
Speaker 1: My question, and I don't blame you. I'm not on board with him either. Um, just to be clear, I said, hold judgment, but definitely not on board. Um, And I don't disagree with anything you said. My only answer is what is the alternative? Because the West has a great habit of going and criticizing leaders, and for good reason. But then the alternative will be something a lot worse.
Speaker 0: The alternative is we restore Assad. That's the alternative. He's sitting right now in Moscow.
Speaker 1: You know that's not going to happen.
Speaker 0: Well, just like I know we're never going to do anything Jelani. I'm not telling you that this is going to happen. I'm telling you, in my world, this is how it should be. We have no business sitting involved in Syria to begin with. We have no business doing anything to destabilize Syria.
Speaker 1: But I'm saying, if Assad comes back to Syria right now, you think that he'd be more likely to bring peace to Syria than al-Sharaf?
Speaker 0: I think it was a hell of a lot better under Assad. It was. It was. It was. I'm saying...
Speaker 1: It was, yes. I have no idea.
Speaker 0: I don't really care because it's not my country. The point is that we are relying on a guy in Jelani who is not what he seems to be. Either he is only extremely Al-Qaeda, you know, hiding behind a suit, or he's Al-Qaeda, but he's got these weird ties to U.S. and Israeli and Turkish intelligence. In either event, We can't forget where he came from. He came from the killing fields of Iraq. And I understand there are people in your audience who hate when I say this. And I understand they don't view it that way. They think that he was resisting. Okay, but the point is, these are my people.
Speaker 1: My audience is butchering me for the comments I'm making on Alshara. Everyone, there is no one that would put out, but I can find me one person on YouTube that puts their head out and say, hey, let's give Alshara a chance. I'm just saying it because that's from my discussions, et cetera. I'm like, okay. from from my perception, yeah, what my perception when he got when he came into power versus now, his life and then when he came into the power into power, holy fucking shit, what just happened? I was terrified. I was like, it's gonna be catastrophe. And see what happened from then to now. Okay, maybe I was wrong about him. Let's see. Yeah, no, I know. I hear you could go all downhill.
Speaker 0: But I hear you. And there are many there are many learned people I know, in the foreign policy community, what few learned people they are. And There are, and they keep telling me what you're saying. Give him a chance. He surprised us. Oh, there you go.
Speaker 1: Hey, hey, hey, hey, hey. Explosions. Explosions in Kesham Island and explosions in the vicinity of Cog Island.
Speaker 0: This thing's not over. It's not. And we're doing more. This is more than just tit for tat. There's something going on here, and I just smell there's blood in the air, and it's not going to get out anytime soon. I think Trump is dead set on doing sea control. I think he's going to try something. Maybe it won't happen right away. Like I said, the Israelis keep saying after the midterms, Mark Levin keeps saying after the midterms. I think Trump at one point a few weeks ago in the Oval Office said, well, I could always wait until after the midterms and I'll have a freer hand. But they're shaping the environment for something. There's no way Washington is ever going to allow Iran to have the kind of control they are exhibiting and that they want to hold over the Strait indefinitely. There's no way.
Speaker 1: It's just not going to happen. That is surprising. I have a question. What do you think... Don't give me the answers. There is no logic, no calculations being done. These are generals and military analysts, etc. advising Trump to access... All right. No, I'm sure there is. I disagree with your analysis. But what do you think is the strategic thinking when they're having those discussions behind the scenes? What is the strategic thinking to convince Trump like, hey, don't just retaliate? And this is Trump that wants gas prices low, that wants to get out of this, that wants to survive for the midterms for him to decide to do this. What do you think of the calculation behind the scenes? Do you think that, hey, we have to show strength because that's the only way Iran would respond? Or they've intercepted some form of communication that gave them, I don't know, the timing of it as well. I don't know what to make of it.
Speaker 0: I think what you said first is probably the most logical. You know, my dear friend Sam Faddis, who's a legend in the CIA community, You know, paramilitary community. He agrees with me that this war was a disaster, that we executed it wrong. But he seems to be going in another path. And I respect him for it. I mean, this is you know, this is what a lot of people in D.C. who oppose the war are now saying is, look, we're in it now. We have to just try to find a way through it where we win. And he's always and he's right when he says the Iranians think they're winning. And the Iranians do think they're winning. And his whole thing and a lot of other people in D.C. that I know, even those who are opposed to the war, are telling the president, either directly or indirectly, you're going to have to do something big to kind of reset the whole thing. My point is, looking at it from the outside. Any attempt at resetting the tables in your favor is just going to lead into this escalation trap that people like Pape keep warning about. It's just going to get us into a position that the monarchs of Europe were in in 1914, where everybody thinks, oh, there's an out, there's an out. And it's not. It's a mirage. You're stuck. And it gets bloodier and worse until the whole thing implodes. The generals are probably telling him something along the lines of, well, the Iranians think they're in control. If you want to have a shot at real negotiated settlement, you have to do something big to reset the conversation with military might. That's probably what some of them are saying. I do know, though, that the Dan Cain wing, that's why I said at this point he's just there for decorative purposes, the Dan Cain wing is telling him the entire time, Mr. President, we can't do anything more than we've already done and expect different results. The president doesn't want to hear it. He's doing what he wants to do. And what he thinks he needs to do is exactly what you started out with it. With this question is I got to do something big and bold in order to get my deal. I've got to escalate to deescalate. And as I told you before, that sounds great on paper, but sometimes when you escalate to deescalate, you don't get to the deescalation part.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's a good quote. Brandon, just now reports of explosions at Karg Island. Yeah. Not Cashem, Karg.
Speaker 0: No, I know. I know. Well, and again, it's not just about shaping for... I don't know if I said this. I've said this today to somebody. Maybe I didn't just say it to you. But Karg, it's not just about potential sea control or planning for sea control operations. It's also... most of the ships or a lot of the ships that were getting through the Strait of Hormuz the last couple of weeks were Iranian oil ships. And the Trump administration is PO'd about that because they want to put as much pressure on the production facilities in Iran as possible. And so another thing they want to do is they want to stymie Iran's ability to produce oil on its own. And so targeting Khar, where something like I think 90% of their energy production is done, or refining at least, that's another thing that he wants to do is degrade that. So it forces the Iranians to come to the table on his terms. But again, I don't even think that's going to really have the impact because if he puts the Iranians in that position, then they're locked in.
Speaker 1: That's the first time since April 7th.
Speaker 0: Yeah, and let's point out also, even though we don't get our oil or natural gas from Iran, it's a global market, and when you start blowing up refineries, that's going to jack up the global price of energy. Not only is it going to take stuff offline, any attacks tend to, on any kind of oil infrastructure anywhere, tend to increase volatility in the oil market, which then leads to higher prices on UNI. So at some point, we're not going to be able to keep these prices deflated through whatever artificial means we're employing. At some point, you're going to have to deal with reality. And I think it's coming up sooner than we think. And, you know, that's also very scary to me because that's going to have impacts on everybody every day.
Speaker 1: Strategic reserve being depleted.
Speaker 0: Oh, we're, we're, I mean, we've got like me, you know, I heard somebody, it might've been Martinson on your show, but I heard somebody in the last 24 hours say we had maybe eight days left of, of usable 320, 320 million.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 0: You can't, you can't go off that number. You cannot go. Yeah. Yeah. So it's what I was told a couple of weeks ago, um, Yeah, no, what I was told a couple weeks ago was that it's really closer to 100 million usable barrels, and that was two weeks ago. And if you look at the rate we've been blowing through everything, we're probably much lower than that in terms of usable oil, not total oil. This is a problem. And the Trump administration, what blows my mind is all this yapping they're doing. They're not actually doing anything to ameliorate the concern of the dwindling oil supply overall. and restoring the flow of energy. And they know, because I know that guys like Bessett know what's really going on. These guys understand what's really going on with the oil reserves, and they don't seem to care. And you have to wonder why. Is it because all of us in the public are wrong? Maybe. Bless you. Maybe. Or is it because they're playing some other game? And I don't know what it is, but... I'm very worried about who's running our country because it does seem like they're fine with all of us going short on energy. And that's not good for anybody.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's the next question is why would they do this knowing that these strategic petroleum reserves are being depleted? which is a question you've asked, so I want to know.
Speaker 0: Yeah, no, well, I can give you a theory. I mean, it could just be what you were saying before. The generals are saying, yeah, we've got to reset things, and that means we've got to get nastier with these guys, even if it means we're going to feel a pinch in the pocketbook for a period of time until they come crawling back to us.
Speaker 1: Sorry, but I just want to give you the important question. Sorry to interrupt you, Brandon. Yeah. I just wanted to confirm it, and that's why I kept seeing you look down. This is the first time they strike Cargillan, not since the MOU. But since the ceasefire.
Speaker 0: Yeah. In April 8th. Yeah. Yeah. Because Trump understood that that's the and I think the Iranians back in April even said, if you hit Karg Island, that's the red line. So, I mean, we're really approaching or we've we've hit a very, very serious one, which is another reason I say I don't think we're getting out of this thing. I don't. And I think actually. We've all been happy, people like me, have been happy to see U.S. forces drawing down from Europe, tag your it, Europe. But I think actually that's kind of scary because that means those forces now are going to be redeployed elsewhere. They ain't coming home. We're not bringing the legions home, I don't think. I think we're going to put them in a position where they can quickly interdict at the call of the president into the Middle East. This is a big problem. It's not going to end well for there is no winning this war with the current force structure. We are not capable of it. By the way, just as a sidebar, because they're all kind of connected here. I'll just let your audience know I have a I have an essay. It should have been published today at 1945 talking about yesterday's. nuclear, or it was a dummy warhead, but the SLBM, the submarine-launched ballistic missile test that the Chinese did from one of their subs. Yes, I know, yeah. Yeah, that was a message. The Chinese, listen, this is not going to end well for Uncle Sam. The Chinese, since we're weak, they're looking to push now because they know that we're on our knees. Nobody in Washington seems to understand. They're all living in denial. It's very bad for us here in the United States in terms of our global power. This thing is going to lead to a very bad place very quickly. And nobody in D.C. wants to talk about it because I don't think they have any solutions. Or alternatively, Michael Leon, my friend who's the independent war correspondent, he's been saying, look, this is part of a globalist plan. that they want to basically impose the new world order, if you will, by destroying the energy reserves of the great powers of the world, which is what's happening right now. What better way to implement that agenda, Agenda 21 or whatever, than by doing that? I don't know. But the point is, I can tell you right now, your audience and you, At this point, there's no off-ramp. At this point, it looks like we're going to escalate. And at this point, it looks like we're all going to be a lot poorer for a period of time, you know, in the coming months.
Speaker 1: Can you tell me more about that Chinese test? Why is it so significant? They've done many tests before. Why is it so significant?
Speaker 0: Yeah, well, so as I say in the piece, because if you talk to any – Submariner, either in the U.S. Navy or the Russian Navy, they will tell you the Chinese submarine force has always been kind of a joke. One guy I spoke to when he was a sonar guy in the Navy in the 90s, and he said, we used to be able to hear Chinese submarines all the way back in Pearl Harbor when they'd be operating in the South China Sea. Now, he was exaggerating, obviously. But the point is, is that that was the one weak spot. Chinese are very good engineers. They're very good at catching up with the West. But the one weak point that they've consistently demonstrated until recently has been their nuclear submarines. Well, now they're demonstrating not only that they have the capability, a second strike nuclear capability, but they also now can fire them from these very sophisticated submarines. By the way, those submarine that submarine force of China's. as of last year is now larger for the first time ever than the russian submarine force which means the only other force that's larger in numbers than china's submarine forces the american sub force and if you look at the put the shipyards of china and america back to back it's very clear that china has the long-term competitive advantage in terms of being able to churn out more numbers of these nuclear submarines, which with each iteration gets more sophisticated, catches up more to the American systems, and eventually will surpass them. But we can't even maintain current numbers of submarines, let alone build more at an effective rate because of this decline in our shipyards. And that's a very important thing because what it indicates is second strike capabilities. What that means is... If let's say the US were to initiate a nuclear launch against China's nuclear forces, we know basically where they are on the ground. We know where their air bases are. We could conceivably degrade or destroy a lot of China's nuclear weapons that we know of on the ground and possibly in the air. The second strike capacity allows for China to keep their subs, which are very much harder to detect, keep them in a hidden spot, and if we do something or they think we're going to do something, they can pop them off from a protected location. It's called a bastion defense strategy. And that's what this demonstrated. And they did this launch. They did not tell anybody they were doing it. They just popped it off at noon Beijing time. Everybody was surprised. What the hell is this? It traveled. I think it can go up to, I think, 8,000 kilometers. That's the distance it can go. So this thing, it can hit. wherever it needs to hit in terms of Chinese enemies. The Australians condemned it. The Japanese condemned it. I believe New Zealand condemned it. We obviously had a problem with it. But the Chinese don't care because they're sending a message. Power is shifting. Don't try anything on us. We have your number. And so what I'm getting at here is this Iran war has so catastrophically blown back in the Americans' face that we're going to be paying this down for probably the rest of the century. And it's going to hit us in unintended ways. It's going to hit us in ways we can't even think of. But the end result will be the diminishment of U.S. power and prestige and prosperity and the rise of something else.
Speaker 1: Man, this is ongoing. Bushir has just been reports of explosions. What the fuck are they doing?
Speaker 0: They're going to this. I have a feeling that they think they're going to finish the job. That's his quote. That's what Trump keeps telling everybody. Finish the job. So I think that's what in his mind. Again, this is a 1980s guy. He thinks everything's a Rambo movie. So, you know, this is what you're getting. And in some ways, he's more hawkish than Mr. Bush was. So we'll see. Look, this is not going to end. The Iranians are going to have to retaliate, unfortunately. They're going to retaliate against the Arab states, our friends there. You know, we're doing a real stand-up job of being friends to them, aren't we? I mean, how much money did Qatar give? I mean, they gave them a $400 million plane, and instead their country is now under risk. I mean, this is not going to end well for anybody in the Middle East. It's not going to end well for the Iranians either. I don't think it's going to end well for anybody. This is like mutual assured destruction time.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I'm really surprised by the extent of this attack because it's – the fact – Wasn't there thinking that doing it during funeral processions is a stupid idea?
Speaker 0: Who's thinking? My thinking, yes. The thinking of the president? I don't think the president thinks that far ahead. I think the president does whatever the hell he wants at a given moment with not much thought. without much consultation. Well, I can tell you, he doesn't like to consult anybody. He likes to keep things close. Just remember he appointed, and this is probably a good thing because Kellogg's an idiot, but he appointed that General Kellogg to be his Russia envoy. And within 48 hours after appointing him, he decided to bring in Witkoff and supersede. So, I mean, this is a guy who doesn't, he doesn't plan. And I told you this before, he's America's id. This is not a guy who's sitting around thinking in terms of five-dimensional chess. You're lucky if you get one-dimensional checkers from this guy. It's all just in the moment. And that's who's got his finger on the button.
Speaker 1: What would it indicate to you if Iran responds in a de-escalatory way, just limited attack again on Kuwait and Bahrain as we've seen before? It's possible. Would you be surprised?
Speaker 0: No, it's possible, but it doesn't mean that this ends the war. It doesn't mean that it de-escalates. All it means is that in two or three weeks, we'll be right back to this position. Maybe it won't be over the Strait. Maybe this time it'll be over whatever the hell Lebanon is going on in Lebanon. We're going to keep coming back to this every two – I mean, this is – I said this before, it's like the guy in bankruptcy who keeps telling the people he owes money to, just give me two more weeks, I'll have the money. That's what Trump is behaving like, two weeks, two weeks, two weeks, two weeks.
Speaker 1: Would you see that as a sign of weakness if the U.S. escalated to that level in the midst of the funeral processions and then all the Iranians would do is just retaliate?
Speaker 0: Maybe, or maybe it indicates that the Iranians aren't really fazed by this because they have maintained their capabilities underground. We still are not destroying the center of their gravity, which is those underground complexes. When I say underground, these are not just like caves that bin Laden was hiding out in in Tora Bora, which also, by the way, were very difficult to destroy, as evidenced by the fact we didn't kill him then. These caves are like underground cities. They're under granite. They are highly interconnected. We have been trying to collapse them the entire war. We have not done it at all.
Speaker 1: And so... No, these are not being targeted right now, just to be clear.
Speaker 0: I know that, but what I'm saying is that's their center of power militarily, and we're not even hitting them because we can't hit them. So my point is the Iranians might not really care. Whatever the hell we're doing right now, they know they still have retaliatory capabilities that remain untouched.
Speaker 1: Exactly. That's my point. And all they need to do is keep the Strait of Hormuz safe. them escalated further.
Speaker 0: But what I've been saying this whole time is the Americans are never going to let them have the Strait of Hormuz.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but I'm saying what I mean is that they don't need to respond in an escalatory way. I'm not saying they won't, but say they don't need to, because they don't the ROI on escalating is very limited to what causing more damage to these American bases. But my ROI on the Gulf.
Speaker 0: Yeah, no, I hear what you're saying about ROI. But But just let me be clear. they don't have they don't even have to respond at all. It's not going to change the fact that Donald Trump is not going to let them willingly have control. So at some point, this thing is going to come to a head. I understand.
Speaker 1: I understand that your concern is that The impasse that we're in where Iran would not give up control of the Strait of Hormuz and the U.S. would not allow them to keep control and charge of the Strait of Hormuz. This is what worries you, that the only solution is a military solution. Now, before I respond to that. Well, I don't think it's a solution. I'm just saying that's the only thing that's left. The military outcome. So what I was asking about is how the Iranians would retaliate now. And my belief in what I'm trying to say is that the Iranians don't need to cause... So what options do the Iranians have? They could strike US bases, they could strike Israel, they could strike the Gulf, they could sink a ship, or they could just do something de-escalatory and that's it. So let's go through them. Striking the Gulf, not necessarily a good idea. They're trying to improve relations. The Gulf are part of that reparations fund, et cetera. So there's a lot of... relations, the repair going on in the background of these relationships, and a lot of businesses happening between the Gulf and and Iran, we've seen visits by these countries to Iran and vice versa. So Iran striking the Gulf right now may have a pretty negative outcome because we're in a very different position and I think it needs more before it gets back to that level. So I don't think Iran would strike the Gulf, as in strike Gulf infrastructure like they did before. So I would take Gulf out of the picture unless the U.S. really escalates and we're back to full-blown war. That's when we go horizontal again. The Iranians could strike U.S. bases. That's just symbolic. There's not much more damage they could do. They could strike Israel, but why would they drag Israel into it? Israel's not striking them. Israel's not striking Beirut. So that doesn't make that much sense either. And the last one is keeping the straight of almost closed and striking ships there. I think this is their best outcome. What they would do is they'll keep the straight almost closed. There is the only other response they could have. One other option is sinking a ship, but that will be escalatory. That is the one other option they have. But otherwise, keep the straight almost closed and some sort of symbolic strike on the American bases.
Speaker 0: No, I think the most likely is they're going to do something in the straight over moves. I think that's whether it's shutting it down permanently or relatively permanently or sinking a ship. I think that you're going to see some response closer to the Strait of Hormuz. Like I said, though, we can't rule out those other targets, the Arab states. We can't rule out any of this. I just think that this fight— It's too early for that. Right.
Speaker 1: Because it comes with a cost.
Speaker 0: I'm not saying that that's the likeliest. I'm saying the likeliest is— Something in the straight, whether it's sinking a ship or just squeezing it harder. Look, the Iranians, all they have to do, and I think they already did announce that they're closing it down again. All they have to do is close it down. Okay, well, all they have to do is, again, phone Lloyd's of London and say, you know, we're closing this down and Lloyd's of London is going to go apoplectic and the entire system will be put into shock again. And we're right back to where we were a few weeks ago. And the Iranians know this, and I think that is probably the most likely play, because for them, this is about demonstrating control over the Strait of Hormuz. So you demonstrate control over the Strait of Hormuz by demonstrating control over the Strait of Hormuz. And that's what's happening.
Speaker 1: The New York Times just reported the same thing that the other outlets reported. A U.S. military official said the airstrikes against Iran would go on for a while and would focus on a series of Iranian military targets. The official did not disclose what types of targets were being hit, but in strikes last month, U.S. forces hit Iranian coastal radar sites as well as missile and drone storage facilities.
Speaker 0: Well, there you go. This thing's not going to be ending anytime soon. And we, you know, just don't forget, rationality will not save us. And so at some point, This sort of thing leads to grave miscalculations and unintended consequences that we can't get out of. So that that's really the fear that very few analysts. If you notice, I'm one of the only people who talks about things like this. Everybody's looking for their their mathematical solution. But the human factor is also irrational.
Speaker 1: So press TV just confirmed the explosions at Kesham and Cog. By the way, Cog is the one that worries me.
Speaker 0: well it all worries me it all works but hey i don't think we're going to be seeing u.s troops fighting in ukraine anytime soon so there's that how's that for optimism no i need to do a better job of being optimistic until we meet again i take it this is our goodbye so uh um i'll bring you again if you're how's your day today if it escalates again you want me to ping you again uh what what's tomorrow wednesday um in the anytime afternoon or later tomorrow i'm available but the morning i'll hit you up yeah keep me keep me around hopefully i won't need to hopefully i won't need to yes i don't want to darken your doorstep too many times so by the way the ukrainian drones are attacking refinery in saratov now as well um oh there's about a couple hours ago okay let me just real quick i just want to comment because you hear that news and you pair it with what's going on in the shirt of her moves and suddenly i think Michael Yan is 100% correct. This is not even about nation states. This is about the elite destroying our energy infrastructure. Why the hell is this happening? I think you should talk to Michael Yan at some point too, man.
Speaker 1: I would, but why do you think it's elite? We know the Ukrainian strategy. You don't have to believe it's a good strategy.
Speaker 0: I don't want to get too deep into it, but I'm not saying this is what's happening, but you can't help but start to think that. And you look at who's behind the Ukrainians. You look at who's behind what's going on in the Middle East. Ultimately, it's not just nations. It's factions of very powerful industries and elites, and they all have these sort of ideas.
Speaker 1: Iran is... Do you have to go now or not yet?
Speaker 0: No, no. I mean, I am going to have to go in about 15 minutes, but...
Speaker 1: Yeah, let's do the five, the five minutes or so because Iran just launched right now missiles. So let's see where those are heading. Before we wrap it up. So there's just been reports of missiles launched from Iran. They're already retaliating. Also, Michael Yan, he's based he's the gentleman from Brunei.
Speaker 0: Well, he was Yeah, no, he was he was over there. But he lives in Japan now with his wife.
Speaker 1: Okay, send them to the team.
Speaker 0: I mean, I can I can give you his contact info happily. Another guy you should talk to is Matt Bracken, who's another buddy of mine. I don't know if you've had him on.
Speaker 1: I'll check him out. So yeah, we've got the missiles launching now ballistic missiles launches from Iran. Let's see, we might see my alerts go off. And that means the UAE is being attacked. I would be surprised. There's anti ship missiles. Okay, we took one we took one option. We didn't mention one option. Strikes on US warships. You can consider that option.
Speaker 0: Well, because a lot of our ships are hanging back because of those ASBMs.
Speaker 1: Yeah, well, anti-ship missiles towards U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf.
Speaker 0: Look, our Navy, listen, there's a reason that the Iranians even have control of any kind over the Strait of Hormuz, right? Remember 1987, the tanker war? We had no problem rolling our ships in and out, even during then. Now it's a different story because the the Iranians have very serious anti-ship ballistic missile and anti-access area denial capabilities. And by the way, that's a snapshot of what a war with China would look like only times a thousand. And the Navy won't go. The Navy is doing everything it can to avoid the president giving them a direct order to go in to the straight. In fact, I was told and this is unverified. I was told at the earlier stages in the war. The president did want the Navy going through the Strait. And the guy in charge of the flotilla out there demanded that he get those orders in writing. OK, so that's a big deal when an officer wants the orders in writing, because that means when the thing goes pear shaped, he can point and say, this was not my fault. This was the command authority's fault. And then the White House backed down. Now, I don't know if that's true. That's unconfirmed. But it's very believable, given the stupidity of the people running this country right now.
Speaker 1: getting more reports, man, of anti-ship missiles targeting U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf.
Speaker 0: Well, we know also, by the way, you know, this is what I reported the last time I was on Tucker a week or so ago. The SM-6 and I think SM-3 or ship defense missiles, we're almost out of them. And as I said at the time, that indicates to you that we were popping a hell of a lot of those things off because the Iranians were seriously threatening the U.S. Navy ships. And our ships did come under a hell of a lot of fire throughout the war. You listen to the president and everything was hunky dory.
Speaker 1: Trying to get more information on this. That will be pretty significant. So we've got U.S. Navy ships. We'll cover for another few minutes with Brandon here before he has to jump off. But yeah, they've launched multiple anti-ship missiles towards U.S. warships. This is how an escalation trap looks like. If there is impact at one of those Navy ships, that changes a lot. Well, let's just be clear.
Speaker 0: I still think, well, I'm not going to get into that. But let's just say, I don't think, I think ships have already been hit.
Speaker 1: And I think the White House is going to say if a ship is hit now, I think that would require them to report it.
Speaker 0: And that the only way that you would have any, I mean, you're right, yes, theoretically, yes. But given the way in which they've covered up so many things, it's possible we won't find out. And, you know, I don't know what that would mean. But the only way we would probably know is if the Iranians have overwatch of the battle, which they might with drones and whatnot. And China certainly is monitoring with their satellites. In fact, China is probably helping the Iranians target still these ships. So, yeah, it's going to be ugly tonight. It's not going to be good. I don't know what time it is in the Persian Gulf right now, but it's night here. 4 a.m. Okay. So it's going to be ugly in this dawn period.
Speaker 1: Let me see how long it takes. Okay. Let me see how long the ship missiles will take to reach the warships. Because they fire drones at them as well. Right.
Speaker 0: So while you're looking, I can talk. Basically, how it would work is the drones go first and they would try to drain the whatever ship defenses there are. And, you know, we fire the expensive ship defenses at the cheap drones. And then there's no reload left or there's very few reloads. And they have to be very picky with what they're going to shoot. And then that leaves an opening for the actual ASBMs to come in and land or potentially graze whatever ships are out there. And that's sort of the mentality here. That's saturation tax.
Speaker 1: It takes about six to seven, anywhere from... So anywhere from two to seven minutes to get there? Well, that means in the next three minutes, the missiles, we'd know if there's... Well, we were not...
Speaker 0: I don't think we're going to necessarily know anything.
Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly. We won't know if there's any impact.
Speaker 0: The only way we'd know is if the Iranians have pictures of it, and then we're going to deny it, and we're going to go this rigmarole, and, you know, it's in the eye of the beholder. Remember, we're in a post-truth society. That's what... was it Kellyanne Conway said, you know, I think that's what she said, post-truth or fact, post-facts or something in 2017. So that's where we are right now, Mario. Yeah. You know.
Speaker 1: Well, this is, obviously we won't have information on whether there's impact or not. Brandon, always a pleasure. Thanks for jumping on. Thanks for having me.
Speaker 0: See you, if not tomorrow, I'm sure Friday. So till we meet again.
Speaker 1: Bye-bye. All right, guys, we'll be going live again if we get more information. I don't think we'll get more information. There's only two missiles fired as well as drones. I think this is more of a warning shot. I don't expect there to be impact if it's two missiles and drones, but I could be wrong. And I don't think Iran would want to seek a US Navy ship. I think that's, look, they're in the middle of the funeral procession. So the calculations there would be different than what we've seen before. So I could be wrong. on that front, but if I had to look at their responses over the last few weeks and how they would respond now, I think they would want to cause damage. It would be very different to what they've done before. They wouldn't strike away at Bahrain. They would escalate in some way. They have to show strength. They are emboldened. Again, it's in the middle of the processions. They're full of anger, vengeance, et cetera. But for them to really genuinely attempt to sink a Navy ship, I'd be surprised. I could be wrong, but I'd be surprised. At most, I think they'd sink one of the cargo ships that are going through as a warning shot that they could escalate. But this is all we have right now. I don't think we'll get any more information. I don't think the American strikes will continue for much longer, especially now that there's retaliation from Iran. I think Iran's retaliation, they might strike a few bases in the Gulf region. But beyond that, I just don't expect much more. I think we'll see calm before this continues as both sides weigh all options available to them. I think all eyes are on Iran right now and how they will retaliate. Because I think we've seen the worst. We've seen the peak of the American attacks. All the strikes after the first wave were less extensive. About the car guy, we don't know if car guy was actually struck. we know there were explosions heard at Kaag Island, IRIB News reported it, but there could be explosions from air defense systems, there could be explosions, maybe some ships that were attacked near Kaag Island. And if Kaag Island was struck, could be military installations, maybe one of those bases for the fast attack boats or a radar that was struck. If Kaag Island was struck, it doesn't mean it was their energy infrastructure was being struck. If that's the case, that's a different story. Sorry, I'm pretty exhausted, so I apologize if I'm not speaking very coherently. We'll go live if things escalate. If we get any more information, it seems very quiet right now. So if you don't see me live again, this is where we're at. The Iranians struck three ships, three vessels going through the Strait of Homs, the Omani side, the last 24 hours. Trump authorized strikes that have been going on for hours on Iran. The worst of it was at the beginning. We've seen strikes as early as 20, 30 minutes ago. And Iran's retaliation has started, maybe ended, I don't know. But Iran has retaliated. They fired at least two missiles and drones, nothing since, at the US Navy in the Persian Gulf. No other information we have so far. So I'll keep watching this very closely. I'll be up for a bit longer, for a while longer, to make sure there's nothing else that happens. And I will go live with the team as soon as there are updates. I hope you enjoyed the coverage, guys. And hopefully I won't see you soon. I'll see you tomorrow because if I see you soon, that's not good news.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m seeing the U.S. hit Iran with strikes 4–5 times bigger than anything since the ceasefire, approved by Trump after NATO, answering Iran’s attacks on three ships in 36 hours. CENTCOM says it targets air defenses, radar, missile sites, drone launchers, and ports across Sirik, Qeshm, and Bandar Abbas as Treasury revokes oil waivers.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 The U.S. is hitting Iran with strikes four to five times BIGGER than anything since the ceasefire, in the middle of the funeral commemorations. Trump approved the plan from Ankara, per Axios, huddled with Hegseth, Rubio, Bessent and Gen. Caine on the sidelines of the NATO summit. CENTCOM says the wave answers Iran striking THREE ships in 36 hours, including a Qatari LNG carrier hit amidships by a drone. Malcolm Nance's chilling aside: had that tanker been loaded, you'd be looking at an all-hands-lost fireball. Empty was the message. The targets, per a US official: air defenses, coastal radar, anti-ship missile sites, drone launchers, ports. Explosions rolling across Sirik, Qeshm, Bandar Abbas. Moments earlier, Treasury revoked the oil waivers, and Tehran fired back that the revocation itself breaches the MOU. Each side now holds a signed document accusing the other of tearing it up. Malcolm has watched this loop since he was 26, and his verdict hasn't budged: the geography favors Iran, the tunnels survive, every round resets the clock. After a package this size, he expects Tehran to skip symbolic tarmac strikes and escalate where it hurts, possibly sinking the next vessel that runs the Omani corridor. His question hangs over the night: what exactly does hitting rebuilt rubble buy? @MalcolmNance
Video Transcript AI Summary
- Messi scored a goal after missing a penalty.
- The U.S. began launching “powerful strikes against Iran” via CENTCOM, described as imposing heavy costs for attacking commercial shipping. The strikes were said to respond to Iranian attacks on three commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz in the last 24 hours, involving one Saudi, one Qatari (al-Raqayat), and one vessel “we don’t know about.” The vessels were said to have been hit on the Omani/Indian Ocean side of the Strait after transit.
- Explosions were reported in Iran at Qeshm Island and Bandar Abbas, with significant aerial activity observed over Bandar Abbas (Hormuzan province). Reports within Iran characterized the attacks as more symbolic, but attacks nonetheless.
- The discussion claimed the U.S. strikes targeted sites including the Syriac island/Syriac Tunnel Complex for the IRGC, and were likely aimed at additional assets around Qeshm Island, including a surface search radar and operations connected with Hormuzgan inland launches. It was also argued that Iranian assets strike in ways that can reach ships despite U.S. air defense structures.
- On the Qatari LNG carrier al-Raqayat, the discussion said a Shahid drone hit the vessel amidships, and that the ship likely had to be empty as it did not explode into a giant fireball. A pattern was described: U.S. warships providing air defense coverage while ships transit in clusters, with vessels turning AIS off and back on at points near the Omani-UAE border.
- The discussion asserted the Iranians “verified these transits,” using maritime intelligence (including tracking high-speed boats) and IRGC fast attack boats. It referenced satellite/visual confirmation of squadrons of 20–40 high-speed boats and described small-boat movement between areas near Larak Island and Sirik base into the Strait of Hormuz.
- A broader argument was made that repeated tit-for-tat strikes (including potential retaliation) risk pushing oil supply toward “tank bottom” and economic consequences. Oil throughput through the Strait was claimed to be “less than 15% to 5%,” and “95% below” pre-war amounts in the prior week’s context.
- The U.S. sanctions waiver removal and continued attacks were framed as significant drivers of escalation, alongside claims that U.S. warships remained on alert to reimpose a blockade on Iranian ports if Trump decides.
- Additional reports cited included: U.S. officials stating strikes targeted Iranian air defense systems, coastal surveillance systems, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missile sites, drone launch sites, and port facilities; and PBS describing an Iranian posture of “turning up the volume” after demonstrating they were “not listening.”
- The conversation described ongoing or renewed strikes in Qeshm Island/Siri (and also portrayed continued U.S. strikes as involving primary/secondary targeting), and stated the George Herbert Walker Bush and Abraham Lincoln’s air wings were being used more extensively.
- Iran’s possible future response was discussed as potentially shifting tactics toward sinking ships rather than merely damaging them, including use of small boats, cruise missiles, torpedoes, or unmanned underwater vehicles, with the stated goal of ensuring a vessel and its cargo are lost. The discussion also tied ship-sinking risk to incentives for rerouting via specific traffic separation schemes.
- Reported Iranian site impacts during the exchange were summarized as: Sirik struck “eight plus times,” Qeshm Island and surrounding waters struck “ten times,” and Bandar Abbas struck “three times,” according to reports from Iran.
- Lebanon and Yemen were also discussed in relation to broader proxy dynamics. Israel’s alleged Lebanon strike timing was described as coordinating with U.S. indications of an “alpha strike” on the Syracuses, while Kyiv was mentioned as being struck nightly since February 28, 2022.
- A sequence of commentary tied the wider strategy to pressure on regional allies and potential port/airbase targeting. It referenced claims of fires at Bandar Abbas (including near an air base and a port area identified in the discussion) and speculated about targeting civil aviation maintenance hangars and runways.
- The MOU was discussed as potentially “dead,” with the view presented as an overreaction and framed as a “big dick contest” dynamic, with Iran portrayed as seeking leverage through continued ability to disrupt Strait of Hormuz shipping.
- Near the end, the discussion stated: the American airstrikes targeted the small boat port in Bandar Abbas, likely striking IRGC speedboats; the imagery was said to suggest high-speed craft at Iranian navy piers/ports; and the attack was characterized as the biggest U.S. attack on Iran since the ceasefire, with expectations it could continue into early morning.
- Retaliation possibilities were discussed with the view that Kuwait and Bahrain were more likely than the UAE, including the idea that Iran could target aircraft and maritime assets (including P-8s and aircraft at Bahrain/other bases), and that the Strait might be closed for some period if escalation continues.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Yeah, Messi scored a goal after missing a penalty. Is that right? And the US is striking Iran. No, no, no.
Speaker 1: The breaking news is what you just said before. Messi scoring a goal after missing a penalty.
Speaker 0: That doesn't surprise you they're doing it during the funeral processions, after lifting the sanctions. Iran attacked three ships, not one. They... The sanction waiver that they had on the Iranian oil and petrochemicals, that was removed. And I'm like, okay, that must be America's retaliation without strikes. And I said, if they strike, they might wait a few days till the funeral processions are done. And they haven't. CENTCOM put out a statement saying, CENTCOM have also begun, sorry, CENTCOM have begun launching a series of powerful strikes against Iran to impose heavy costs for targeting and attacking commercial shipping crewed by innocent civilians in an international waterway. The U.S. strikes are in response to Iranian attacks on three commercial vessels that were transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's demonstrated aggression was unwarranted dangerous and a clear violation of the ceasefire that is in retaliation to the Iranian strikes on three ships that we know of. One is Saudi, one is Qatari, and one we don't know about. All in the last 24 hours. All of them going through the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz that you've explained. Correct. over the last few weeks. And the explosion so far that we know is an explosion in Qeshm Island and Bandar Abbas, same places as always. Significant aerial activity involving jet aircraft have been observed over Bandar Abbas, Hormuzan province. So far, they seem to be, from the reports within Iran, more symbolic attacks, nothing too significant, but attacks nonetheless.
Speaker 1: Well, there are attacks and they're exactly on target. time it is 5 p.m eastern time which means that it is 1 a.m no 2 2 3 a.m where you are uh so uh that's about right this is and it was coming i think you spoke to robert babe today and i didn't get a chance to see his his video but i know he what he was saying he was saying that we're in the escalation cycle And that the United States is going to attack in retaliation for these three ships. And he's right. And I'm going to come on to you because I haven't read the reports, but I can tell you where they attack. They attack the Syriac Island, the Syriac Tunnel Complex for the IRGC. They probably attacked Kisham Island with another surface search radar that they were after. Right. And flying over Bandar Abbas in Hormuzgan province, which is over the mountains that dominate the Strait of Hormuz. It probably tells us that the Iranians are launching assets from further inland, and they are now coming down there and striking. So the attack on the al-Raqayat, which is the name of the Qatari liquid natural gas carrier, which I got to tell you, that was a serious attack because they didn't use a loitering munition to just break the windows of the bridge. They launched a Shahid drone. The drone hit the ship amid ships. And as an LNG carrier, it had to have been empty because it did not explode in a giant fireball. It had a fire, but it could have been a catastrophic all-hands-lost explosion like the kind that we saw when the Ukrainians attacked the Russian LNG carrier in the Mediterranean. It created what they called second sunrise. So the Iranians, of course, are sending a message with these three attacks. We told you all to stop using these convoys. Because we've been seeing three ship convoys. They're not escorted by the Americans. They're covered by the Americans. So U.S. warships are coming in that vicinity and giving them air defense cover. And then they are sneaking out very fast. Every one of them has been struck on the Omani side, the Indian Ocean side of the Strait of Hormuz after they've conducted their transit. So the Iranians have verified these transits. And they obviously have weapon systems that can reach out and touch them that are in defiance of U.S. air defense structures out there. You know, I found it funny that they would go after the Qatari ship first, considering the Qataris are helping them gain billions upon billions upon billions of dollars. But it is a message to hit the LNG carrier, right? We could break your industry. We could make sure none of your ships ever move. It'll take you three years to get a pipeline from the Dolphin Field over to the United Arab Emirates getting out of Fujairah. We told you to stop using that. You already used the IRGC traffic separation scheme to great success. Come back up here. Stop playing politics with the Americans. Because that southern traffic separation scheme, the STSS, as we call it, or the Omani OTSS, it's nice, but it's shallow. But it's being run now by the Americans as if they are conducting escorted ships. And you see that they come in clusters of three in a row. The AIS gets turned off, right, just north of Ras Al Khaimah. And then they go dark. And then they come out and they turn their AIS on back at Khor Fakhan, right at the Omani-United Arab Emirates border. And the Iranians are watching you. I told you, the Iranians have a magnificent maritime intelligence force. headquarters, wherever it is. They're tracking these guys, whether they're using pins, right, and estimated speeds, you know, surface search radars, a DAO that actually sees these ships or IRGC small boats that are out there. We had not reports. We had visual confirmation through satellite that they were running squadrons of 20 to 40 high speed boats out of Zurich yesterday. So these IRGC boats are running that gap between Larrak Island and where Sirik base is. And they're going into the Strait of Hormuz at their will. And we have a lot of U.S. aircraft up there. You could put an E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control up there all day long. But when you get lots and lots of these little small clusters, they sort of look like clutter on the radar screen. But we decided to do this. And every time you and I talk about this, I go to the same point. Every time America strikes Iran, and Iran does a retaliation attack like they're going to do again tonight against Bahrain and Kuwait. All right? Ballistic missiles. They've got lessons they have to meet out here. This is the cycle of stupid, as I like to call it. The United States damages and sets back for any number of days or weeks the ability of the world to avoid going to tank bottoms. in the global oil system. Oil is not getting out. Your guests are telling you this. It's not getting out to the world. We are operating at less than 15 to 5%, depending on whether there's airstrikes or not, oil from before the war leaving the Strait of Hormuz. We're 95%, last week it was 95% below the previous pre-war amounts of ships that were needed to carry very large crude out. So from geopolitics to Trump's and Hegseth's addled macho man, let's do a demonstration of strength. Let's hit them every time they hit us. The end of this scenario is that we could end up at the end of the summer where the shortage of oil literally starts meeting the hard reality, which is now in a fantasy zone, where people are buying oil at $75 a barrel, when in fact it really should be $150 going on to $200. And those things are going to quickly come up because we keep fighting in the Strait of Hormuz. A mature president would have said, we're going to let that slide, or we wouldn't have put ourselves in a circumstance where the Iranians would have fired. Here we are again.
Speaker 0: Are you surprised that they retaliated in the midst of the funeral processions or that doesn't really matter?
Speaker 1: It doesn't matter to these people. Look, Trump doesn't care. Trump doesn't care one way or the other. It has nothing to do. Now, if they had fired, you know, HIMARS missiles from Kuwait and tried to hit the funeral cortege as it's heading to Najaf or Karbala, that's a different animal, right? And it wouldn't be beyond Trump to think that's amusing. the urging of benjamin netanyahu kill him vaporize his corpse right the corpse of the four people and his granddaughter uh if that would not be beyond them and that would set things off on a level you couldn't possibly imagine in terms of insult but right now it is limited to these ship attacks and airstrikes down there you know these guys by the way these guys are sitting in the cab going what time are they going to attack and they go two they're taking bets As to what time their complex gets attacked. There's a pool.
Speaker 0: All right, so now Iran's going to retaliate. Will they retaliate the same way they did before? And if we're going to keep seeing that same thing repeat itself time and time again, when and how does it eventually end? Because the US is still using their petroleum reserves. There was a report yesterday that came out that they've drawn out even more from the petroleum reserves. They've hit a new low. How long can that go on for?
Speaker 1: Well, let's separate these two.
Speaker 0: By the way, there's also repeated explosions in Ketchum Island, so apparently the attack is ongoing.
Speaker 1: Yeah. They're hitting anything that they rebuilt. Hitting bunkers that look like they were having construction. I mean, good God. You know, I was 26 years old when we did this. Same thing over and over again. You know, we know what that place looks like. It's hardened, but... The geography stays the same, and it favors the enemy. It favors our opponents. It favors the Iranians. And we can keep doing this, which is you and me talking once a week that we are in the process of keeping a cycle of strikes which is supposed to degrade the IRGC ability to retain the Strait of Hormuz. They're always going to be able to retain the Strait of Hormuz. Now, if I were the Iranians, I would not attack Bahrain and Kuwait. Wouldn't attack them this time. I would make sure... that the next ship that they send through the Omani traffic separation scheme, in case anybody didn't get the message, the next ship sinks. Full scale effort. I would send out small boats. I would send out cruise missiles this time or put out a torpedo, right? The unmanned underwater vehicle. And I would make sure that this time the message is you will lose the vessel and its cargo. And then the UK, you know, Maritime Trade Organization and Lloyds of London will go back to this and go, hey, the Iranians actually have the gumption, not just to hit us, but this time to damage us, to sink us, which, of course, could create an ecological disaster. But the Iranians were smart. They would do it on an empty inbound shuttle, not a ship that is outbound full of crew.
Speaker 0: They're striking the small... Local reports say a group of IRGC fast attack boats are burning in Sirik Pier in Iran's almost gone province. There's a photo of it as well.
Speaker 1: Yeah, okay. Ahmad, go bring me 10 more boats from the tunnels. But boss, I told you no boats left on the pier. And you never know. Look, they use civil craft. So... Okay. That was the mid-watch as we call it, right? The guys who have to drive the boats out in the water in the middle of the night. Maybe they left them there. Maybe they left all the boats that needed repair left out at Zurich. But they're going to come out of those tunnels. And okay, there's one. Let's see the... That's not a video, it's just a photo. Oh, it's just a photo. Yeah, that's a fuel-fed fire right there. So there's gasoline or whatever is on it. But okay.
Speaker 0: So, Sirik got struck eight plus times, Keshom Island and its surrounding waters got struck ten times, and Bandar Abbas got struck three times, according to reports from Iran. Is that similar to previous attacks in terms of size or more significant?
Speaker 1: Well, you know, when we put this into the context that the United States didn't hit any of those targets for almost the first 40 days of the war, except at Bandar Abbas where they destroyed, they sank the ships of the Iranian Navy. And they did hit some of the IRGC boats around Qeshm Island and areas like that. Iran has a robust asymmetric surface craft capability. And you never know, that vessel obviously was fueled. We don't know whether it was a fuel lighter with small boats next to it that's creating that fuel fire there, right? It's classic. you know, fuel fire that they're running on that pier, but they have the ability to weather this. We are going to leave eventually. They could also make this very painful for one of America's allies. Maybe this time they shoot 20 ballistic missiles at the Ali Salem Air Base, or the Sheikh is an air base in southern Bahrain this time. They're not going to hit Central Command, right? Why hit rubble? But they could say, hey, we're going to destroy the P-8 squadron. That's in Bahrain. And this time we're going to make sure that shit hurts. But why get into this escalation of violence? Iran can take this. Iran has taken everything America has thrown at it. How many times do you guys have to hear Malcolm Nance say that to you? There is nothing shy of an atomic bomb that we haven't used on Iran. And this is now tit for tat. It's like little girls doing...
Speaker 0: There was one thing shy. There's one thing shy. The energy infrastructure. Not a good idea, but I'm saying... No, no, no. That's a target.
Speaker 1: That's a target, yeah, but if you do that, all the energy infrastructure in the Western Persian Gulf disappears, right? And again, I will reemphasize this. Yeah, well, you can. We're in upstate New York. In the mountains. But the radiation from Baraka Nuclear Power Plant is going to spare no one. We aren't going there. The Iranians aren't going there. The Iranians are going to make bank off of this. But they are going to point to your friends and go... Why do you have these idiots keep doing that? And they're going to say, but you are a tech guard tanker. And they're going to say, yes, but you and I understand this tit for tat. You're letting the Americans punish you now, right? Why do you keep slapping yourself is sort of what the Iranians are saying to them while you get slapped by the Iranians. This needs to end, but So long as Trump believes this thing that every time Iran dumps something, he must respond with force, the outcome is that the world takes one closer step to tank bottom, to economic Armageddon. And I don't think he believed it a month ago, but now he goes, oh, nothing happened. Maybe we'll be okay. That's what Maggie Haberman says. He has this unshakable faith that everything he does is awesome. But then again, he may have just done to oil what he did to the U.S. team yesterday, which is put the ultimate...
Speaker 0: Yeah, like in the last hour, we've had Iran, Kiev and Lebanon, by the way, there was an airstrike in South Lebanon as well, literally at the same time Iran was getting bombed. In the last hour, Iran, Kiev and Lebanon were bombed. I don't know if that's a strategy, by the way, Israel bombed, there was an airstrike at the same time as the US is striking Iran. So I'm not sure if this is a message to Iran, like, hey, you keep, you know, doing what you're doing in the Strait of Hormuz, we'll strike you, but also Israel will strike Hezbollah, which from a strategic perspective, not saying it's a good idea, from a strategic perspective, I can see how they can come to that conclusion.
Speaker 1: Yeah, first off, take Kyiv out of this equation. And Kyiv has been struck every night since February 28th.
Speaker 0: Oh, yeah, I mentioned Kyiv. Yeah, sorry. It was struck in February.
Speaker 1: I'm sorry, since February 28th, 2022. Every night. There has not been a day in four years. That's not true. On the two armistice of 48 hours that they've had. But Kyiv has been struck every night. Now, with dozens of missiles that have never gotten through are now getting through. Because they're out of Patriot interceptors. Set that aside. Yes, Israel is carrying out that airstrike in Lebanon. Because they go, Central Command is telling us they're getting ready to launch their alpha strike on the Syracuses. And they go, awesome. Let's hit the Nebatia. Let's take down whatever is going on in southern Lebanon. And the Americans can come talk to us after they finish their airstrikes. Israel coordinates highly with the United States. So that's not a surprise. I think it's happened the last three times too.
Speaker 0: Why do you think Iran may actually not strike the American bases, but actually sink a ship? Why would that be a consideration? How would that benefit Iran?
Speaker 1: Well, first off, not sink a U.S. warship.
Speaker 0: I think that they... Not sink a U.S. cargo ship, one of the vast... Not U.S., sorry. A merchant ship. Oh, merchant, not an oil tanker. A merchant ship in the Strait of Hormuz is a warning.
Speaker 1: An oil tanker is considered a merchant, but not a VLCC, not a very large crude carrier. But they could, if somebody wanted to try to sneak out. The United Arab Emirates has been running what we call the Tawila shuttle. which is they're going back and forth from the oil fields in southern United Arab Emirates and shuttling in the dark through that system. And they've been doing that since the beginning of the war, bringing oil over to Fujairah on very smaller ships, not on these. So I just think Iran needs to make it clear that how dangerous is the southern traffic separation scheme? Dangerous enough to lose your vessel, not damage your vessel so you can be pulled in. Karachi and back at sea in two weeks. Lose your vessel. Also, a burning vessel makes a much more significant, how can I put it, motivator for you to turn back, go north, and go through the IRGC traffic separation scheme, especially if it's burning at night. You know, back in 1988, we destroyed the largest operating oil platform in Iran called the Syria Island Oil Oil platform. And when it was done, you know what we called it? For a year it burned. Siri Island Lighthouse.
Speaker 0: Sorry, what was that? This is a Bandar Abbas what I'm showing you now. But what was that? Sorry, what burnt for a year?
Speaker 1: The Siri Island gas oil platform that Iran had that we blew up in 1988. For a year it was burning? For one solid year, every day and night. I mean, it couldn't cap it. You know, so that that oil platform burned in so much that you knew where you were. You could navigate off the fire. Right. Anyway, they called it Syria Island Lighthouse. So but that is what Iranians will want to make a lighthouse of their own. Right. That big explosion that you see there at Bandar Abbas, that's a 2000 pound bomb going off. That's a pretty big bomb. But they've been hit with them for months now. And guess what? You know, they're adding this up in their bill. The Iranians said it would take $200 billion to restore the country and the armed forces. And we're about to give them $300 billion, so they don't care. It's a rounding error, the concrete repair they're going to have to do in Bandar Abbas.
Speaker 0: Yeah, there's a column of smoke rising from the direction of Bandar Abbas Air Base. Local reports say the smoke columns are rising from the IRIAF. So I'm guessing the Iranian Air Force 9th Tactical Air Base. What do you think they're shocking the air base?
Speaker 1: Whatever. Okay.
Speaker 0: Whatever they could find.
Speaker 1: Good God. This is the fucking go find me something. Right? Boss, we hit them.
Speaker 0: There's nothing left. There's nothing left.
Speaker 1: It's like, hey, go see if there's a refueling farm at Bandar Abbas that is servicing Mashhad or Iran Airlines. And this time, go blow up the maintenance hangars of the civil airliners. Let's punish them. Go crater the runway. There's nothing. Did they not tell us they utterly destroyed every aircraft in the Iranian Air Force? So why would you go back to the... It's like bombing Bahrain sent comes, you know, NAV sent forward. There's nothing there. When you destroy the Baskin Robbins, you're just striking it for show. And to hit the freaking Iranian Air Force Air Base, which has nothing in it. Maybe they had some derelict airframes, you know, sitting outside. We do stupid shit, by the way. I'm going to give you a great example. Operation Desert Storm. Anybody who knew Kuwait City or had been to Kuwait City before knew that in Kuwait Harbor, there was this old hotel restaurant called Safina. And Safina was a concrete ship built on land that was a restaurant in the shape of the ship. During Desert Storm, strike planners actually bombed it thinking it was a ship not once three times and every time our group would go hey strike air strike air right strike air that's a restaurant why do you keep bombing a concrete restaurant on the shore and it's like we were told to strike every ship in the harbor and that one won't sink Gus, I wonder if Safina is still there. I think they might have re-built it.
Speaker 0: What would you need to see to see escalation on the American side? Because we do also have the sanctions waiver was lifted. So I'm worried. And by the way, I'm getting reports of more explosions in Zurich Island now as well. So it hasn't ended. Unconfirmed. But from what you're seeing right now, are we seeing escalation? Because I do want to point out as well that The sanctions waiver was lifted. That's pretty significant. But also Iran struck three ships in 24 hours, not one. Usually they strike one, the US retaliates. So you could say that. And the Wall Street Journal just put out a piece as we speak right now saying US warships remain on alert to reimpose a blockade on Iranian ports if Trump makes a decision to do so. Obviously, they leaked that intentionally as a warning to Iran, I'm sure.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but good God. They're burying the Ayatollah and his family, right? The Supreme Leader and his family. What are you going to do to them? Really, what are you going to do to them? I had a disagreement with a guy from Brookings Institution today.
Speaker 0: Can you turn off the notifications, by the way? Is it easy or is it hard?
Speaker 1: That's not mine.
Speaker 0: Oh, weird. Yeah, it's not mine.
Speaker 1: But maybe that's the sound of every time the Americans are doing an airstrike on Zurich. But I had this talk, this Twitter beef with a guy from Brookings Institution who was arguing that the United States really won the war because they have more, what he believed was more leverage. And I go, are you kidding me? There's nothing we can do to that country. There's nothing we can do to impose our will on the Iranians. And as long as you keep living in the fantasy world that we have the one-ups, impose the blockade. Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Russia, Turkey, and Iraq are openly trading with Iran on land routes. Pakistan opened six border crossings to move oil. So none of that is stopped. Only your blockade, the fantasy that this blockade is working is in the minds of the joint staff and Donald Trump. We are not getting real intelligence from Mujtaba Khomeini that this is impacting people. There are economists out there who would say, oh, this is the net effect that it would have on the Iranian population. That does not stop the amount of dates, chickens, pomegranates, or or coffee and tea that comes into that country that affects people on a minute-to-minute, day-to-day basis in that nation. Also, we just delivered, I believe, $12 out of $24 billion has been handed to them. So you could put that sanctions waiver back on. All that does is now hurt the global oil transport industry and move the West closer and closer to a catastrophe.
Speaker 0: the iranians are like okay i'm going to have another cup of tea because none of that affects me put the blockade up we should every time we talk about new strikes me and you should just make a cup of tea and then drink our tea while talking about it um access just reported the following u.s officials tells me that iran has clearly demonstrated they're not oh okay so two pieces of news so first access reports the u.s strikes targeted iranian air defense systems coastal surveillance systems surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missile sites, drone launch sites, and port facilities, according to actual US officials.
Speaker 1: And then- I could have told you that before I heard there were air strikes.
Speaker 0: True. And then PBS says, a US official tells me, Nick Scherfen, sorry, from PBS, a US official tells me that Iran has clearly demonstrated they're not listening. We're turning up the volume.
Speaker 1: That's a stupid, epic comment.
Speaker 0: Good. God. And there's renewed explosions in Kachem Island and Siri. They have solo striking now.
Speaker 1: Okay. Yeah. This seems like three strikes they're going for now, right? Primary, secondary cleanup. If a fourth strike comes out, because we have two carriers there and the George Herbert Walker Bush really did not get in their licks. The only significant strike we carried out before this involves six airplanes. You might recall that. And so now the George Herbert Walker Bush is, and the Abraham Lincoln are getting both air wings involved here. Great, knock yourselves out, because I'm going to tell you what this is going to bring us. Now, without any question, Bahrain and Kuwait are going to get it today. They're going to get it, because now the Americans are pulling a major strike package with primary, secondary strike targets. They're now roving over Hormuzgan. The thing is, is that you can If the guy riffles off six Shaheed drones, you can go to the black mark of where it is and you can even do persistent real-time intelligence surveillance to see where that truck goes. Okay, so you get one of the trucks that shot off one of its seven or three of its seven Shaheed drones. Okay, you can do that. We're good at that. But how many have they built or rebuilt or re-inventoried? And since, you know, the war is now at day 132. So tomorrow my show goes back to being a war cast. We stopped the war. The war ended at 40 days. So the last two months, three months going on has really been the Iranians reconstituting, rearming, refueling, retraining, having huge amounts of tea, getting their cash counting machines to get ready to count all that sweet, sweet money the United States is giving them or allowing to have transferred to them. They don't give a fuck. about what we think. They don't give a fuck about how we see them. They don't give a fuck about anything that you do to them unless you hit their energy infrastructure and bridges. And then they will give a fuck at a level that you will not appreciate because they will now punish every ally in the South. That's the Bandar Abbas Corniche it looks like.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Can you move the audio, KK? So this is in Bandar Abbas, yeah.
Speaker 1: Yeah, you can see where it took place. I can tell you precisely where that guy was shooting from because the main town is up and to the left. This is the Corniche, the waterfront. And so you drive down that waterfront and Bandar Abbas Airport, Bandar Abbas Air Base, I think it's to the south-southeast. then further on is the ocean curves that's when you get down to syrac but i think what you're seeing there is bandura boss airbase airport on fire yeah also there's a report here from cnn cnn reports centcom strikes against iran will continue and the strikes are designed to punish not to be proportionate oh good god he watched he watched he watched martin sheen in the west wing with his discussion about proportionate or in proportionate strikes. This is ridiculous. This is ridiculous. Y'all could just forget, you know, I suspect the price of oil here in the next week is going to really take a big spike because now it's it's it will get the realist in the oil market to say, hey, we've had this artificial cushion. You mentioned it earlier. Three hundred nineteen million barrels of oil is in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. There is a cutoff. of 270 million barrels right and I think to I I think I saw a YouTube short of Larry Johnson talking about this who you know uh that that 270 million that is the defense cut off now that means all of that oil that 270 million down to 10 million barrels if I'm not mistaken cannot be used cannot be executed distributed out because that is all the oil the U.S. would need for a major war. And they were talking that Trump is just going to blow through that. And if they blow through that, then you've got until October. If they stop, you've got till mid-July when we're at tank bottom. And no amount of oil that we produce, no amount of sludge we bring from Canada or Venezuela or any of these places will stop the inevitable recalibration of the absent oil with the crazy fantasy prices of oil. Those prices are going to go like that, and the absence of oil is going to go like that, and that gap between my two hands is called a shortage. And don't believe me, y'all go talk to Mr. Global. I'm just the spy in the ointment that is trying to tell you geopolitically, this is going to create a shitload of pain. And by the United States continuing now, saying they're going to continue strikes, nobody's leaving the Strait of Hormuz now. And the Iranians will make a point of sinking a ship. Now they have to. They have to. If I were to do an intelligence predictive analysis, I would say our opponents right now are in a position where any attack on Kuwait and Bahrain is just going to be swatted down. It will be seen as a limited strike. Iran now needs to ratchet their response to the pressure the Americans are putting up in and that everyone in the SOH needs to understand the IRGC traffic separation scheme is the only way out. Sink me a ship.
Speaker 0: I'm trying to figure out why the U.S. would be doing this, would be striking and escalating what they know.
Speaker 1: This is the Trump-Hegg cycle. The cycle of stupid, right? The circle of stupid. And no, people say, Malcolm, you know, you're very offhand, you're very flip. I am an intelligence professional. My job is to give you facts. I deal with those facts on the basis of culture, language, experience, context, and precedence. And if you don't fucking listen... then what you get is called consequences. And those consequences, which I can tell you right now what it's going to go, and I will hand it off to the Department of Energy Intelligence Division, and they're going to tell you the Iranians are going to behave in a way which D-I-L-L-I-G-A-F, right, do I look like I give a fuck, is the Iranian method of responding to you now. They don't care or about you, Donald Trump. They don't care what you think. They're going to issue a Lego video tomorrow morning. They just did one yesterday about your World Cup. Everything Trump touches dies.
Speaker 0: Oh, they did? I didn't see that.
Speaker 1: It was pretty good. So it was Trump pulling the red card, right? So and then they're going to make fun of you. And then we'll go another week to two weeks where no oil goes through the straighter formulas and things will get very bad indeed.
Speaker 0: Yeah, because the strategic reserves are emptying out.
Speaker 1: I think he believes that they're unlimited. I think he believes the fantasy that Scott Besson and these other people are telling him that we're America. We produce unlimited amounts of oil. We're the biggest oil producer in the world, all of which is a fact. But America consumes so much of it. I know you guys have heard this 30,000 times with me. We are 2 million barrels short every day, and every day we are consuming. So in a week, that is 14 million barrels. In two weeks, that's 28 million barrels shortfall. And we are lifting that shortfall through our strategic petroleum reserve, which is about to hit the military level where we should not touch it. Because of a war with China breaks out, all of our warships will just... You know, won't have enough fuel to sustain itself for a war. We won't be able to create enough Avgas. Right. And in some analysts have said that's 14 days from now, 14 days, if we stretch it, maybe a month, but what do you do?
Speaker 0: What do you make of Trump's visit to NATO and his comments with Erdogan? Well, he's all been pretty pissed off about, and Israel is going to be meeting Trump. Netanyahu is going to be meeting Trump in a few days.
Speaker 1: So Trump loves her to one because he loves dictators. He loves dictators. He likes that Erdogan is like Xi. He's like Sisi in Egypt. He can just tell people what he wants and he makes his will happen. By giving Turkey the F-35, and there's a US law, I believe, that was passed that prohibits any country that has bought the Russian S-400 air defense system, which is an advanced system, has an advanced radar, but the Russians have never run a real calibrated S-400 against the S-35, right? F-35 that they would have good data on, right? The Turks could fly an F-35 in the morning and have an S-400 light it up and have a completely calibrated way to detect the F-35 in war. Trump wants the money and he wants his dictator pals to be friendly, all right? To tell you the truth, this was sort of a no-brainer. He shouldn't have done it. He shouldn't have given it to Turkey.
Speaker 0: No, the F-35 is not confirmed yet. He's hinting that he might accept it, but there's a lot of pushback. I don't know if it needs congressional approval. He did lift some sanctions on Turkey.
Speaker 1: It requires congressional approval, yeah.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I don't know if Congress will accept, because it's not only the Israelis that don't want that to happen. You've got the Greek lobby. Ian Bremmer was telling me earlier, there's the Greek lobby, the Armenian lobby, obviously the...
Speaker 1: If you have to rely on the Greek lobby, we're totally screwed because he sent Kimberly Grifoil to Athens to act as our representative. And that's, you know, that's wailing, you know, Banshee. We'll just make him side with Turkey every time. But I think the biggest pressure is going to come from the Jewish lobby in the United States. That the Israelis now have strategic, have total air dominance. And they want air dominance of any nation ever. out there. And yeah, Turkey could try to create their own indigenous aircraft.
Speaker 0: More reports of strikes, Malcolm.
Speaker 1: Pretty significant, no?
Speaker 0: And this is a scene from the Shahiq Haqqani port in Bandar Abbas. It's a pretty big fire. If you can mute the audio, okay.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's at the airbase. That's at the airbase south of the city. And That's what you get. I mean, this is what we're good at. We're good at blowing things up. That will not do anything. Here's what they're going to do. They're going to go to Qatar. We're going to go. We're going to add every fucking dime from these airstrikes to our negotiations. Now you're going to give it to us. We want three hundred and ten billion now. We're paying them. Why are we even bothering to do that? We're going to give them a better airbase, better air defenses, better high speed boats. Now they're going to probably start buying them from China. I do not understand the logic of this. This is what happens when you have drunk monkeys with machine guns, right? Dancing techno and thinking that they're the masters of the universe. They're not. They are just breaking rocks, people, wasting ordnance because we're good at it and it looks cool.
Speaker 0: And lastly, I want to get your thoughts on is the Lebanon strike. What do you make of what's happening in Lebanon? We haven't spoken about it. And Yemen as well, there's those clashes between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed forces. Yeah, that was really weird. It seems that proxy war, exactly, proxy wars are starting to get fueled now.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that incursion by the armed forces of Yemen, right, of the legitimate Yemen government, which is recognized, where they claim that they had a clash in an incursion, which, according to them, killed 12 troops there. from the Yemenis army and killed 50 Houthis. I have been around there, been to Yemen. I've seen how that the United Arab Emirates Joint Allied Force operations in Yemen have taken place. I'm going to tell you straight up, you can invert those numbers. It's probably the Yemenis army lost 50 guys in the Houthis. These guys are fighting with flip-flops, baggy pants, and khadjars, right, and winning. This is an armed force over there that actually shot down Saudi F-15s with alarming regularity, would ambush and destroy Saudi M1 tanks all the time. I remember they had one ambush. They captured over 300 Saudi soldiers.
Speaker 0: Jesus Christ. How are the Houthis so capable?
Speaker 1: Well, number one, they have great advisors with the Iranians. Number two, they're hillbillies in the hills. And when you're a hillbilly in the hills, the hills have eyes. And don't forget, Yemen has that. There's a region they carry the khanjar, right? Knife. Every man in Yemen is backwoods Johnny, okay? These guys are all required to have a weapon on them at all times. The Houthis all carry rifles and knives on them at all times. It is a culture. And so, but the combined Arab forces trying to train, the US was training Yemeni forces down there. Um, yeah, there's a, that's a missile strike.
Speaker 0: You see the, you see the missiles. Yeah. That's from the south. This is in Shahi Shahid Hangani in Bandar Abbas. Yeah. Yeah.
Speaker 1: That's Bandar Abbas. That's the airport. Okay. Great. We're great at burning stuff, hitting fuel tanks and stuff like that. Now the fishermen won't go out. Right.
Speaker 0: There is reports that the IRGC Navy have received preliminary instructions, unconfirmed, uh, to prevent all traffic through the shadow home was until further notice.
Speaker 1: Here it comes. Here it comes. That's the IRGC Navy, right? And what they're going to do, they're going to let the Americans have their strike. They're going to watch very carefully the air environment. I'm looking at this from the Iranian perspective because this was, red teaming this was all we did as cryptologic linguists, right? Because we know what kind of, well, let me step back for the kind of things I was about to tell you. We know how the enemy behaves because that's our job is to know what they would say and how they would say it, when they would say it, what kind of orders they would give, and what direction to come from. So if I'm sitting in Bandar Abbas, I would say, okay, let these strikes go. I want you to prep me 25 boats that are in the tunnels. I want you to prep me a shitload of mines, and I want to see if I can get three or four Shaheed drone launchers up here, and let's start working with strategic space forces to see if they're going to carry out their ballistic missile attacks. And when you start hearing the 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40 rockets ballistic missiles are airborne, that's when he's going to go, I want 25 boats in the water right now. Direct attack straight over to the western side of the Strait of Hormuz. Any vessel you find, burn it. And they'd be like, this will be great.
Speaker 0: Is it too premature to say the MOU is dead. I would say it's too premature, but a lot of people are saying it, a lot of groups and stuff, all these news groups saying the MOU is dead. What do you think? Overreaction?
Speaker 1: No, this is just an overreaction. This is a big dick contest. Iranians are getting their money, buddy.
Speaker 0: One way or the other.
Speaker 1: It is. It is. And a big dick contest with a guy with a little fucking mushroom dick. Right? Thank you, Stormy Daniels, for that visual. He talks bullshit. All right? It's a man who wears size 60 freaking pants now and a huge ass diaper. The Iranians understand them better trump and his administration better than trump would ever understand the iranians they think this is cool it's only cool to maga and the strike groups that are out there we get our air metals all right guys if you're watching this one you know if you're the intel shop you're the s n2 shop on the uss george herbert walker bush or on the abraham lincoln y'all know that this shit is not effective right keep doing it continue your orders But this is just making the Iranians exercise their leverage. Their leverage is they have the ability to really shut the Strait of Hormuz down. And then Trump's going to say, we impose the blockade. But not until Bahrain suffers for you, Kuwait suffers for you. And maybe even Jordan gets a little taste of this. But it's not going to be three missiles and five Shahids this time. The more you strike, the more the Iranians are going to need to have a strategic demonstration that they are the regional power that dictates What happens out there?
Speaker 0: Let's see what they do. Hopefully they don't sink a ship. I wouldn't be surprised if they close the Strait of Hormuz. They've done so before, but the question is for how long. They've closed it before. So let's see what that leads to, because I know that the negotiations are expected to continue, I think, next week once the funeral processions are over. The American airstrikes targeted the small boat port in Bandar Abbas, likely striking IRGC speedboats.
Speaker 1: that's the fire that we saw remember one of the last you did the one before with the car driving with the fire that's the the yeah with the small boats yeah well that could just be fuel but that port is the civil port right the irgc the iranian navy piers and ports will all be destroyed maybe they just pulled in for snacks at night and the imagery intelligence showed these fiacs right what we call fast and short attack craft also known as high-speed boats and they just said we're going to do that one too so that they don't have any capacity to come out let me tell you it's not going to piss off it's not going to piss off the fishermen all right because the irgc is going you're all getting new boats when we get our 300 billion dollars but that is the word the biggest attack by the us on iran since the ceasefire just to be clear this is the most extensive attack i wouldn't be surprised if it continues over the next hour two hours until dawn it'll stop let's see how everyone retaliates
Speaker 0: Will the likelihood of them striking the UAE, 20%, 30%? No.
Speaker 1: It's much more fun to punish the Kuwaitis, right? I think it's a strategic message. They want Kuwait to close those bases. They want to say, hey, listen, this really isn't worth your time. The UAE would have to really do 100 missile launch and the Emiratis would have a really good time of shooting it down. But that would just bring us back to war. Iran wants the money, right? And if they could get their licks in by hitting those P-8s down at Sheikh Izzah or getting their licks in by destroying fighter aircraft or helicopters at Camp Bueling, they'll do it.
Speaker 0: Malcolm, thank you for jumping on and for the analysis as always. Really appreciate it.
Speaker 1: Well, if this continues on, we'll be back tomorrow.
Speaker 0: I'm sure we will. Thank you, man. You'll be back tomorrow to talk about the retaliation. You know you're going to be back tomorrow. You have to carve out time in the calendar. You know that.
Speaker 1: It's going to happen by dawn, baby. All right. See you later. Bye-bye.
Speaker 0: Thanks, man. All right, guys. We'll be live again with Larry Johnson. The attack is probably going to continue for the next few minutes, and then we'll see if Iran retaliates tonight, tomorrow, or in a few days after the funeral processions. So we'll be live again in five minutes. I'm just seeing if there's any other updates, any new strikes. I'll be live at nine minutes with Larry Johnson to continue our coverage. See you then. Bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m hearing Iran’s Foreign Ministry says Washington violated Article 10 of the MOU, with US strikes continuing in rounds into Sirik, Qeshm, and Bandar Abbas and officials saying they could last for hours as punishment. Larry Johnson claims clauses 1, 5, and 10 are breached. Power outages hit Bahrain and Kuwait simultaneously without reported missile launches; Kuwait blames lines, while Larry flags possible sabotage/cyber timing.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🚨🇮🇷🇺🇸 Iran's Foreign Ministry says Washington just breached Article 10 of the MOU, and the mystery deepening tonight: power outages hitting Bahrain AND Kuwait as the strikes roll on... The US wave continues into its second and third rounds, Sirik, Qeshm, Bandar Abbas, with officials telling reporters it could run for hours and is designed to punish, not to be proportionate. Larry Johnson's scorecard has Washington now in violation of clauses one, five, and TEN of a deal it signed three weeks ago, and Tehran's statement says exactly that, holding the US responsible for the consequences. Then the strangeness: both Gulf states that Iran traditionally answers through went partially dark at the same time, with no missile launches reported. Kuwait blamed transmission lines. Larry doesn't believe in coincidence, and reads it as possible sabotage or cyber, a retaliation that leaves no contrail. His larger warning was about timing. Fifteen MILLION people filled Tehran's streets, more than the population of most countries on Earth, with Najaf and Mashhad still ahead, and the crowds are chanting revenge. Striking into that, he argues, guarantees Iran skips the symbolic response, and Hezbollah may finally get the leash taken off. One more report landed tonight, from CNN: commanders allegedly bypassed warnings that targeting intelligence was a DECADE old before the Minab school strike that killed nearly 200, most of them children. @NewSonof
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion begins with the speakers commenting on timing and then shifting to updates on ongoing U.S. strikes against Iran and the regional spillover. Multiple reports are cited (CNN, PBS) saying the strikes are expected to continue for a while, described as punishment and not proportionate retaliation. The speakers also mention reported strikes on locations including Bandar Abbas, “Sirik as always,” and Kashim, and say there have been two rounds of strikes so far. They reference unconfirmed reports of power outages in Kuwait and Bahrain and note conflicting claims about whether outages are occurring.
They connect the strikes to a broader maritime confrontation, describing Iran’s earlier attacks on three ships (a Qatari LNG tanker that was “empty,” the Saudi one, and another ship today with unknown details) and discuss whether U.S. attacks could affect Israel’s actions against Hezbollah. Alongside the Iran strikes, the speakers say there was an airstrike in South Lebanon. One speaker suggests flares and shelling on the Ali al-Tahrir Hill in Lebanon, saying it is a strategic position contested between Israel and Hezbollah.
A major theme is escalation and retaliation. One speaker predicts Iran will “take out” Muwaffak al-Saudi Air Base, repeatedly strike air bases if planes launched from Prince Saud Air Base or if sorties came from Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Force Base, and also attack air bases in Israel. They further discuss the possibility of escalation beyond bases, including sinking a ship in the Strait of Hormuz instead of only striking military assets. They emphasize Iran’s stated maritime protocols, saying vessels must file requests to Iranian authorities to transit in designated lanes, and they argue the U.S. has encouraged noncompliance and then struck.
The conversation addresses strategic rationale from the American side, with one speaker saying there is “no thinking” and framing the action as a show of strength rather than a strategic plan. They also discuss how the timing coincides with funeral celebrations and argue this could make Iranian responses less limited. They state that Israel appears to be escalating strikes in Lebanon on multiple fronts, including air activity over Beirut and suburbs, and that renewed shelling on Ali al-Tahrir Hill coincides with U.S. strikes on Iran.
Iran’s domestic and diplomatic messaging is also covered. The speakers say Iran’s foreign ministry condemned Washington’s move to reimpose a ban on Iranian oil sales, calling it a clear breach of Article 10 of the “war-ending MOU,” holding the U.S. responsible for consequences, and warning it will take measures to protect its interests and national security. They also state that the U.S. is being accused of repeatedly violating the June 18 MOU over the past 20 days directly and via Israeli actions in Lebanon.
Power outages are revisited. Kuwait’s statement is summarized as involving several electricity transmission lines going out of service, with emergency teams activated to restore electricity and determine the cause. The speakers connect the timing of outages in Kuwait and Bahrain to the Iran strikes, suggesting possibilities including cyber sabotage, while noting the Iran side reportedly said there were no reports of missiles flying out of Iran and no alerts in Bahrain.
The transcript then shifts to Turkey and NATO-related developments and their intersection with U.S.-Israel relations. The speakers discuss Trump’s meeting with Erdogan and Netanyahu’s activity in Haifa, including Netanyahu’s remarks opposing the sale of F-35 aircraft to Turkey and framing it as affecting regional power balance. They mention Trump praising Erdogan, removing CAATSA sanctions tied to Turkey’s S-400 purchase, and discussing a possible reversal of a ban on Turkey’s ability to purchase F-35s. They cite a New York Times account that Trump is expected to tell Erdogan about restoring conditions for Turkey to buy F-35 stealth fighter jets, reversing the ban imposed in 2019 after Turkey was thrown out of the program for buying S-400 systems. They say the concern is that S-400 systems could collect data on F-35s, compromising stealth capabilities, and that Congress could oppose the change.
Later, the speakers discuss Syria and the new Syrian leader Al-Shara. The debate centers on whether Al-Shara is integrating factions and bringing peace versus allowing or failing to stop atrocities, with one speaker arguing that leaders must punish those responsible and asking why commanders were not hauled in for atrocities. The other speaker argues there is “no alternative,” warns the alternatives could be worse (fragmentation resembling Libya or Yemen), and highlights claims about Al-Shara’s acceptance of Kurds into the Syrian government and an attempt to prevent attacks that could give Israel justification to strike Syria. They also mention explosions in Syria (including around the hotel of President Macron) and concerns about threats to Al-Shara from multiple external and internal actors.
The conversation returns to U.S. actions and oil strategy. It includes figures about U.S. strategic petroleum reserve stocks falling by 6.2 million barrels to 319 million barrels (lowest ever, per the discussion) and argues this relates to the Strait of Hormuz dispute. They discuss whether either side will fold, and they reiterate that they believe the U.S. is violating parts of the MOU rather than offering concessions.
Finally, the transcript mentions reports about a U.S. strike that hit a school in Iran, described as Minab School, with CNN reporting senior U.S. commanders approved the strike despite warnings that intelligence on targets was outdated (over 10 years old). The speakers describe it as one of the worst civilian casualty incidents in recent U.S. military history and say an investigation is ongoing. The session concludes with ongoing expectations of further retaliation, including predictions about whether strikes will stay limited to Bahrain and Kuwait or broaden, and a closing acknowledgment that the U.S. strikes are being described as ended while discussing the likelihood of further responses.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I'm really early today. 7 o'clock, man. I just want to be noted for the record. I'm supposed to be here at 7. I'm here at 6.20.
Speaker 1: Well, it's good to see you.
Speaker 0: I never want to hear another word about your wife.
Speaker 1: I'll never say it again. I'll never say it again. You can come an hour late. I'll still keep my mouth shut moving forward. Can I say the war is still over or am I not allowed?
Speaker 0: The war is still over? I'm going to rename you Stub. I'm going to call you Stub after the president of Finland, because the president of Finland said, hey, Ukraine won.
Speaker 1: Ukraine victory. So let me give you an update. It's getting worse, by the way, because obviously Iran is being struck by the U.S. And these strikes are – so multiple reports from CNN, PBC, et cetera, are reporting that these strikes are meant to be continuing for a while. And then there's a report that just came in right now from Washington Post. These strikes are expected to go on for some time tonight, perhaps hours. That's after the CNN reported – that the attacks are meant to, they're not meant to be retaliation, but they're meant to be punishment, something along those lines. They're designed to punish and not be proportionate. That's based on CNN's journalist. PBS says, US officials tells me that Iran has clearly demonstrated they're not listening. We're turning up the volume and they've struck multiple locations. They've struck Bandar Abbas, they've struck Sirik as always, and they've struck Kashim, the same targets as always. And it seems that there was two rounds of strikes that I know of so far. And there's reports that there's unconfirmed reports that only one source of reporting of power outages in Kuwait and Bahrain. But I don't think they're true. There's some people saying there's large parts of Kuwait and Bahrain have power outages that comes in from one of the telegram groups are highly unconfirmed. But others are saying it's not true. But what we know so far is Iran is getting bombed, and there was one airstrike in South Lebanon at the same time as Iran is getting struck. So I don't know whether that was changing the calculus where Israel will attack Hezbollah every time Iran attacks a ship. So if the US attacks Iran, Israel attacks Hezbollah. That's just me speculating. And all this is in retaliation for the three ships attacked by Iran. qatari the saudi one and the one today which we don't know details about it yet the qatari one was a was an lng tanker um it was empty obviously otherwise would have blown up um and it was struck with i think it was struck with a missile it's not like a loitering munition um that would cause limited damage so it was a pretty heavy attack um on these ships that are going through the omani side which we talked about yesterday except the ship today the new one um so that's kind of an that's not kind of that's an overview of what we have so far and they will probably get more reports of strikes as this continues.
Speaker 0: Okay. The United States is going to get its ass handed to it. Stand by. They think they can do this, and Iran's going to sit back and go, oh, we stand corrected. Sorry. Very mistaken. Iran is going to... particularly in the midst of the funeral celebrations when the cries in the street are revenge, revenge, revenge. Iran's going to hit back. I anticipate they will take out Muwaffak al-Saudi Air Base. They will hit that repeatedly. If any of these planes were launched from Prince Saud Air Base, they will go after that. If any of them came out of Qatar's Al Udeid Air Force Base, which I doubt, but if they did, That will be hit, and I think they'll go after air bases in Israel. I think Iran has now reached its limit of patience with the West.
Speaker 1: One of my guests told me one thing they could do is also sink one of the ships going through the Strait of Homs. Instead of just striking American bases, they could escalate it by sinking one of the commercial vessels. Do you think that's possible?
Speaker 0: Oh, yeah, absolutely. No, absolutely. So, you know, this is, again, this is an unprovoked attack. The United States keeps provoking Iran by encouraging these ships to ignore the protocols. Iran has been very explicit about what those protocols are. And as we've discussed before, only Iran, not the United States and Iran. It doesn't say if Iran interferes with any shipping, the United States gets to blow the hell out of them. No, none of that. He said, it's basically Iran, it's up to Iran to figure out how to get the ships through safely in the Strait of Hormuz. And they said, here's the safe way. You file a request with us, we approve it, you go through in the waters and lanes we designate. Period. End of discussion. No argument, no dispute, no gray area, it's black and white. And the United States continues to poke Iran in the chest Daring them to do what Iran has done. And now the United States is going to say, well, we're entitled. No, you're not. There's not one damn thing in that MOU that gives the United States the right to strike back like this. It's just the United States thinks it can do whatever the hell it wants. And I think Iran's going to now make them pay a price.
Speaker 1: What do you think is the strategic calculation there from the American side to strike so aggressively? Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait.
Speaker 0: What was that word you used, Gavin, with an S? Strategic. Strategic calculation. Strategic. Okay. That implies that there's some thinking behind this. There's no thinking, dude. This is a motion. Those Iranians aren't going to push us around. We're going to show them. That's what this is. Because if they were thinking strategically, they'd say, you know what? If our goal is really to keep oil flowing through the Persian Gulf... to stabilize the global economy, we're going to first talk to Iran and say, what's the deal? They're going to say, stop the ships from going through the Omani waters. But the United States, they want to tell Iran to go, fuck off, we're going to do whatever we want, you can't tell us. And Iran's going to say, okay, that's your attitude, we're going to show you what we're prepared to do, and they're going to do it. So there was no strategic thinking in this. It is this mythology that the United States, we're strong enough, we're big enough, and nobody can stop us. Well, yeah, just like you did during the first 40 days of this war where you got stopped.
Speaker 1: By the way, Israel is escalating its strikes. If you know the Al-Tahrir Hill, the Israelis are apparently firing flares up there, and they struck it earlier.
Speaker 0: Well, and I think you're going to see after this, I think Iran's going to tell Hezbollah, take the gloves off, go get them. This will be the, I think this will be the end of the ceasefire, maybe the end of the MOU. I know Pakistan was, Pakistan, oh, we got it all set up for Saturday. Oh, everybody's going to come together. No, they're not. Actually, I don't think they will. I think they still will.
Speaker 1: I did a post that's getting a lot of hate. I said the MOU is not dead. Okay, there's renewed explosions in Zurich. Let's see what happens before I make any statements. There's renewed strikes in Sinai.
Speaker 0: Axios is saying this.
Speaker 1: Axios is saying this one. The US strikes on Iran were four or five times bigger where they're ongoing. So far, I guess. Were four or five times bigger in scope and power than previous strikes, according to Axios.
Speaker 0: Yeah. That's the story at least that they're putting out. Yeah, of course.
Speaker 1: The videos that are coming out are showing a lot of damage. I haven't seen such videos in previous strikes. They strike a radar, they strike this. If you can start playing, Stephanie, if you can start playing videos of the damage from today, there's more coming out. There's another one here that just came out as well. There's a lot of videos and photos, but I've never seen that much footage. I don't know if you can see. I'm getting a blank. Okay, now I can see it, I think. Hold on. There it is. Yeah, this one's as well. That's in the port. And there's a lot of them. You can just play them, Stephanie, as we're speaking. But we haven't seen that much damage. That's the first time I see damage like this since the ceasefire and since the MOU.
Speaker 0: In the previous strikes, the U.S. Well, even this, I'm told that the U.S. strikes, while they appear to be more dramatic, they're limited compared to what they were before, you know, before the ceasefire. But... I think because of the timing of this coinciding with the funeral, I don't think Iran's going to engage in a limited strike. Pakistan may be begging them to do a limited strike, and I think Iran will tell Pakistan, you know, sorry, but we're going to defend ourselves.
Speaker 1: If you could play the one I just sent you now as well, Stephanie, when you can, that's in... That's in Iran again. Just play the one I sent you now. This is artillery shelling of the Ali al-Tahrir Hill. That is the hill that Israel and Hezbollah have been fighting for throughout, you know, since the ceasefire and even before the ceasefire. It's a very important hill strategically for, that's still in Iran, Stephanie. Play the one I've just sent you now, just for you all to see what's happening in Lebanon. Iranian foreign ministry put out a statement just now In a new statement, Tehran condemns Washington's move to reimpose the ban on Iranian. Oh, we forgot to mention. Let me give the context first because that's what they're referring to here. Okay, a lot happening. Two additional explosions were heard now in the peer village of Ziarat in Syria County, southern Iran, according to Irib. Oh, wow. There is more reports of power outages in most areas of Bahrain. Why would there be power outages in Bahrain?
Speaker 0: They got hit with ballistic missiles already.
Speaker 1: But the Iranians said there's no reports of missiles flying out of Iran. The Iranians said they haven't attacked yet. No alerts in Bahrain. I don't know.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Unless Iran has launched some drone strikes that aren't reported. We'll just... I mean, look. This is... So right now, let's see, it is 6.30 p.m. Eastern, which means it's, what is it, 2 p.m. your time? 2 a.m. your time? 2 a.m., 2.30 a.m., yeah. So it's 2.30 a.m. your time, and what does that mean, 3 a.m. Iranian time?
Speaker 1: No, I think half an hour before, I think it's 2 a.m. Iran time.
Speaker 0: 2 a.m. Iran time, okay.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's 2 a.m., yeah, half an hour before me.
Speaker 0: Yeah, so this is going to go on for the next six hours or so. So when daylight comes, they'll still be firing.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Also, there's the sanctions waiver that was revoked. You know, the sanctions waiver on Iranian oil and petrochemicals. When that happened, I'm like, maybe they won't strike. So I was actually optimistic they won't actually strike. Who? You mean the United States? The Americans won't strike. And their response, their retaliation, I'm like, okay, maybe they'll just lift the sanctions. Sorry, revoke the sanctions instead of striking. And if they do strike, they'll do it after the funeral processions.
Speaker 0: So now they violated another article of the MOU.
Speaker 1: MOU is dead. MOU is dead. It's dead.
Speaker 0: Yeah, that's what a lot of people are saying. I mean, if I'm Iran, I'm going to tell the United States, you know, You sign things and you don't keep your word. You lie. You kill children. You murder our leader. You murder the leader's wife and child. That's what they're remembering this week. And they're doing it. Here's an interesting number for you. There are 194 countries in the world. Guess how many of those countries have populations of fewer than 15 million, because that's the number of Iranians that were in the streets in Tehran. Oh, wow. 15 million. Guess how many countries in the world have populations of 15 million or less?
Speaker 1: And don't look it up, don't cheat. I would guess... A random guess with no looking it up, I'd say About 150 countries, 15. You liar, you looked it up.
Speaker 0: Listen, I mean, I apologize. I should not call you a liar. That is insulting. That's demeaning to you. I apologize. I shouldn't call names. But you're right. I did cheat. I did lie. No, actually, you didn't cheat. You did what a smart person would do. I don't know. Let me look that up. So think of this. Iran, and that's just that one event. And then you add Qom, where they had at least 5 million today. And then tomorrow in Najaf, that's going to be in Iraq. That's not even the home country. Then you're going to have probably 3 to 4 million people there. And then you come to Mashhad on Thursday for the culmination of this. Yeah, this is... I think the United States is now... It's relit the torch. Not in a good way.
Speaker 1: The Bahrain power outage is just confusing to me. I'm trying for more information. Iranian foreign ministry says the following. In a new statement, Tehran condemns Washington's move to, that's a summary of it, move to reimpose the ban on Iranian oil sales, calling it a clear breach of Article 10 of the war-ending MOU and holding the U.S. responsible for the consequences. So this statement is only about the sanctions, and I'm guessing it's not about the strikes. Iran says the US has repeatedly violated the June 18 MOU over the past 20 days directly and via Israeli actions in Lebanon and warns it will take measures it deems necessary to protect its interests and national security. So yeah.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I mean, they've admitted, hey, it's not Iran that's violating the MOU. It's the United States. It's always the United States. And I know I get accused by Americans, why do you hate America? Because we don't keep our fucking word, okay? Your word is supposed to be your bond. Your word is supposed to mean something. We're liars. And that's all we do is lie, unfortunately, particularly with this administration. Sorry. I shouldn't get angry.
Speaker 1: So, and as I said earlier in the footage that team was playing, play this one again, please, Stephanie, this one. So that is the Israeli shelling. There's two videos in that link. That is the Israeli shelling of Ali al-Tahrir Hill. Again, I want to point out that this is happening. Okay. So that is happening at the same time the U.S. is striking Iran. The reports of outages are actually in Bahrain and Kuwait. So I don't know. And these are the two countries that are usually struck by Iran whenever there's retaliation. So I don't know what... So this is in Lebanon, by the way. This is Ali Al-Tahrir. Is there audio in it? I would like to hear if there's audio. Play it again. Okay, it's not much. You can't hear the explosions or anything. But this is... Yeah, this is the Al-Tahrir base. You could turn off the audio. But yeah, I don't know what it could be, what the Iranians could... We're assuming it's the Iranians, but it would be pretty bizarre if it's a coincidence that Kuwait and Bahrain, the two countries that Iran strikes always in retaliation for American attacks, these are flares in Lebanon, have power outages at the same time as Iran is being struck. So it's a pretty rare coincidence.
Speaker 0: You know, I don't believe in coincidence.
Speaker 1: I know, that's why I mentioned the word waiting for you to respond and tell me what you think it is.
Speaker 0: I think, you know, somehow Iran has launched a retaliatory strike there. Maybe a cyber strike.
Speaker 1: Iran is reaching a lot of cyber warfare. There was a report about it from a few days ago. Expected, I think, nothing new. So it just could be something, a cyber response to the attacks. Would you be surprised... If Iran retaliates in a limited way as they did before, because that's also a possibility because for them, they don't, they don't really need to cause damage because all they need to do is keep the Strait of Homs closed. All they need to do, by the way, there's unconfirmed reports that the Navy is preparing to close the Iranian Navy is preparing to close the Strait of Homs or has already been ordered to close the Strait of Homs. That was about 20 minutes ago, unconfirmed from Iranian sources. But, um, that's all that Iran needs to do. If you think about it, Larry, they don't need to strike that can strike the bases. But really what moves the needle for the world and the U.S. is keeping the Strait of Homs closed. They're going to seek revenge.
Speaker 0: The people are crying for it. I think this is getting into the range of the emotion the Iranian people are going through this week through these funeral services. and particularly with the tiny body of the granddaughter being front and center. This is, you know, if the United States had not revoked, you know, not violated the paragraph 10 of the MOU with respect to reimposing sanctions, and they had just conducted these, let's call them limited military strikes, maybe Iran might have said, okay, we'll We're not going to make a big show of this. I think, you know, the Arachi and Ghalibaf have kind of enough pressure for being a bunch of, they're being taken, they're being told, you're being played for fools. And you keep going along with this. You're being played for fools. And I think now they're saying, okay, yeah, we're not going to be played for fools anymore.
Speaker 1: Their strikes, as we speak, in Bandar Abbas, And we've mentioned the ones earlier in Syria. Sorry, Syria, according to Arab News. So the attacks continue. And as we said earlier, according to one of the news outlets, PBS or whatever, CBS, that the strikes could go on for hours. I'm going to say, I have to admit, this one caught me by surprise. I definitely did not expect this level of retaliation from the US and the timing of it. And the sanctions, um, I don't know, maybe it is, it is the low oil prices. And I was reading a report earlier today in analysis that the low oil prices have given Trump more room, more maneuvering, um, capabilities or more moving, maneuvering flexibility. Uh, because that's one of the barometers he watches all the time.
Speaker 0: And you saw the oil prices are already going up.
Speaker 1: 72. Yeah.
Speaker 0: Remember, Mario, those paper prices are for traders trading paper. What are they actually paying when the oil arrives in port and is taken off board? Yeah, it's higher for sure.
Speaker 1: Yeah, much higher. I'm saying that I think the futures price is what Trump would look at. He'd look at those paper prices and the stock market. I think these are some of the indicators he looks at. And of course, he must be looking at the strategic reserves, which are still being used and getting depleted. Yesterday, there was a report came out again. It was drawn down even further yesterday from a few more million barrels. Sorry, not yesterday. It was a report came out yesterday of the last week. So all this is happening before Netanyahu's visit, by the way. So Netanyahu has not visited the US yet. So there's that visit that is imminent. And Trump is in, as you know, in Turkey as well. um meeting um erdogan and a lot of positive developments on that front have you seen while we're waiting for more information on the strikes have you seen the info that what trump has been saying about erdogan and the developments on that front yes hello oh yeah no listen it's just it's typical trump you know making it up as he goes along do you make of that because that's not something that israel at the same meanwhile israel let me see and latonia was talking to fox news saying uh about the sale of the f-35s it would destroy the power balance in the middle east because latonia was speaking because turkey has aggressive aspirations this is not a force for peace and stability if you give this kind of radical regime that admittedly smiles to america when it is necessary or smiles to the president of the united states when it's necessary When you've given that power, you're going to see aggression in its wake. I wouldn't do that. So that's Netanyahu. Meanwhile, you've got Trump saying, calls, he criticizes NATO, but he starts praising Erdogan. He says he came to the summit because of Erdogan. He announced the removal of the CAATSA sanctions, which are sanctions because of Turkey's purchase of the S-400 air defense systems from Russia. He says, he starts praising Syria as well. Also, Netanyahu visited today as well. Netanyahu visited the naval base in Haifa and the focus he made remarks there targeted at Turkey. He came to the naval base in Haifa today, according to Israel Hayom, as a message aimed at clarifying that Israel will guarantee the freedom of its maritime routes in the face of the growing strength of the Turkish Navy. During the tour, Netanyahu also reiterated his message that he opposes the sale of the F-35 to Turkey. Meanwhile, Trump's while this opposition comes in, Trump says, well, it's a decision we're going to make. And we have a very good relationship. I would think that many people, I can tell you many people, including the people sitting right here thinks, you know, why wouldn't we do that? We have a better relationship with Turkey and Turkey has been men in many ways, much more loyal than other countries that we think would be loyal. So yeah, it's something certainly we would consider. It's a great plane. It's the best about the F 35 currently the best plane by far. And it's something we will consider. Yeah. But by the way, Joe Kent told me earlier, you can criticize.
Speaker 0: Here's the headline. Turkey gets a Turkey.
Speaker 1: But Joe Kent mentioned something, but he mentioned something in that statement. I just read as well. Um, when Trump said, um, uh, where is it here? Um, and in many ways, Turkey has been much more loyal than other countries that we think would be loyal. Kent is like, I think it was Joe Kendall, Ian Bremmer, said, Mario, this statement, he could be jabbing at Israel because he said countries that would be loyal. Obviously, it could be jabbing at other NATO countries considering he's going to NATO and keeps criticizing NATO. But it could also be a jab at Israel because he knows and everyone knows that Israel doesn't want Turkey to get those F-35s.
Speaker 0: Well, you know, actually, this would be the one case where Israel would have done Turkey a favor. I mean, if they get the F-35s, one, there's no telling when they'll actually be delivered. I think Erdogan will be dead before they show up in Turkey, number one. Number two, not even clear they can show up with full radar systems. U.S. planes don't even have those yet. Number three, they cost about $45,000 per flight hour to maintain them, so just like You fly that plane for 10 hours, you've got to spend a half a million dollars to just maintain it. And then the combat readiness, it's like 25 to 30%. So let's say they buy 10 planes or 10 of these aircraft, and they might have three that work. So there's explosions, by the way, in Bandar Abbas, as you're speaking. such a deal yes no we're going to continue uh attacking and iran's loading up its ballistic missiles and drones and i don't well let me put this way we'll know if they confine themselves to bahrain and kuwait then we'll know it's just another symbolic iranian strike and for whatever reason iran's going to keep its powder dry and let the united states show off but they're going to continue to stop these ships And they may, in the process, they'll close the straits. And the straits are now closed.
Speaker 1: Power is also beginning to reactivate in affected areas in Bahrain. So maybe, again, it can't be coincidental. Okay, so in terms of the Erdogan back and forth between, because that is, you know, we always talk about words versus action when it comes to the US policy towards Israel. And there's been a lot of talk between J.D. Vance and Trump Now, if there's a sale of the F-35s to Turkey, that's something that Israel has been for years lobbying against. Already the lifting of the CAATSA sanctions, whatever they are, the S-400 sanctions, this is already a signal in that direction. But if the sale of the F-35 goes through, then there's action supporting the rhetoric we've seen from Trump and J.D. Vance, and we will be seeing more indications of that split between all that. shift in American foreign policy towards Israel. Let me get you some more statements here. According to the New York Times, Trump is expected to tell Erdogan that he is a Turkish president, that he's prepared to restore the country to a program that would allow it to purchase F-35 stealth fighter jets, a move that would reverse a ban Mr. Trump himself imposed seven years ago on national security grounds. I didn't know Trump is the one that imposed that ban. In 2019, during Mr. Trump's first term, Turkey was thrown out of the F-35 program because it brought advanced S-400 anti-aircraft systems from Russia. And the issue here, what the Americans are worried about, is that the S-400, the same country having the S-400 and the F-35, the S-400 system would then be able to gather data on the F-35, and the F-35 stealth fighter would no longer be able to avoid... detection by the S-400 aircraft. That is the concern on why the U.S. has a policy of not having any country that has foreign air defense systems, or at least from countries that are seen as adversaries, to also have F-35 fighter jets. And that Russia would learn how to deal with the fighter jet stealth and other missile avoidance capabilities. There it is. But the shift by Trump, who is heading to an aid assignment in Ankara this week, would make Erdogan very happy but it could face opposition in Congress, which could seek to block it as expected. So yeah, there is that big showdown right now. And I think what happens on that front would say a lot on that relationship between the two. And more importantly, the relationship between the US and Israel. So do you think they'll allow for it, despite the lobbying by Israel?
Speaker 0: No, actually, I think they'll block it. and Congress in its current form. So Trump will say yes to it and Congress will block it. The Israeli lobby, if Israel really is that keen on stopping it, they'll stop it. Members of Congress, like I said, they're the cheapest whores in the world.
Speaker 1: Kuwait put out a statement on the electricity outage. Several electricity transmission lines have gone out of service, causing power outages in multiple areas across the country. emergency teams have activated the national response plan and are working to determine the cause of the disruption and restore electricity as quickly as possible. So just an update there. So no information on what caused it other than its transmission lines. So I don't know how they've been disrupted.
Speaker 0: Yeah, well, maybe Iran has come up with some ability to conduct sabotage operations in those countries without having to commit to a high-profile missile or drone strike. Yeah, that wouldn't be surprised.
Speaker 1: And also cyber warfare to bring down for power outages is something that is nothing new. Somebody's talked about how they've war-gamed a lot of times how China could easily hack into America's electricity grid. I'm sure you've seen those reports or heard about it. So something that's been a concern for many years and there's still no solution to it is a lot of people believe, a lot of analysts, experts, whatever, believe that China's already hacked into America's energy grid. And if it ever comes to it, if it comes to that level of warfare, a war between the two countries, being able to bring down a big chunk of America's electricity is something China's capable of doing. Probably vice versa as well. So that's on that front. As we know, the strikes seem to be ongoing, but not in the same volume as the initial round. Then we have So that's on the Trump-Erdogan meeting. Trump did make a statement on Syria. Because of the president, we have a very good... I'm talking about Erdogan, I think. We have a very good relationship with the new leader of Syria, and he's done an amazing job. He's pulled the whole country together. Somebody said, he's pretty rough. I approved him along with the president, as in Erdogan. And we were the two that really wanted him. So he's talking about him and Erdogan are the ones that really wanted him in power. They approved him, etc.,
Speaker 0: You want to have a jihadist head chopper in power. Yeah. Boy, brilliant move there, Trump. Jesus. Way to go, man. That really strikes a blow against the terrorists.
Speaker 1: But are you with me that he should be given a chance or you're really critical of him? You don't trust him at all?
Speaker 0: Don't give him a fucking chance.
Speaker 1: Why give him a chance? Honestly, God.
Speaker 0: I'm sorry, I'm not Trump. Al-Sharra, yeah?
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah, yeah. I don't, obviously, Al-Qaeda, et cetera, his background is terrible. But if he's able, because give him a chance and try to bring the country together.
Speaker 0: He's not bringing the country together. He's attacking Alawites. He's attacking Shia. He's not Abraham Lincoln saying, oh, with malice towards none and charity for all.
Speaker 1: Come on, man.
Speaker 0: Wake up.
Speaker 1: But the issue with what's happening in Syria is controlling all these different commanders and groups is like a commander with his own regiment could go there and conduct atrocities. Just because they're wearing the uniform, it doesn't mean it was approved by the president. I spoke to – because this is a place where I spoke. I've been trying to get an interview with Al-Shara. And I spoke to different people in the government, private conversations. And they were telling me stories, different stories, and all of them were serious ministers. They were telling me stories where members of the Syrian military were trying to do things where the president and sometimes a country would warn the president, al-Shara, get them in line or we're going to strike them or we're going to do this, we're going to do that. And he's just trying to put all these pieces together. And I was actually talking to someone today, he's on live, so nothing discreet. And we're literally talking about how he's, He could be killed by so many different countries that don't want to see him do well. Israel being on top of that list, the US being another, Turkey being another if he crosses them. Maybe Turkey and the US ask him to go fight Hezbollah. He says no, they're not happy with him anymore. But most importantly, probably his biggest concern is people within Syria taking him out. Because you had an explosion yesterday, by the way, near the hotel of President Macron. And you've got an attack, an explosion a few days before that in a cafe in Damascus. So you've got elements within Syria, terrorist elements or ISIS-linked elements, that potentially you could see this as a warning to him, like, hey, you're getting too close to the West. So I don't know. I haven't spoken to him. I'm not a fan of everything that's happened in Syria, the campaign to bring down Assad or how the country ended up. But looking at it from the outside, and obviously I could be very wrong. I don't have strong opinions on this. I really think he's trying to bring the country together. I could be wrong, but I just have that sense.
Speaker 0: What is your evidence that he's bringing the country together? Has he brought in an Alawite into his cabinet and said, you know what, we need to get along? No. He's attacked the community, killed people, taken their property. How about with Christians? Same. What's your evidence that he's trying to bring the Syrian society together? Because you're right, it is a fragmented society.
Speaker 1: On the Alawite side, so I know there were the massacres being conducted. And from what I know, the reports that I've been told, and it's impossible for me to know what's true or not. And I can't believe I'm here defending al-Sharwaj. I'd rather defend others than al-Sharwaj. He's probably the hardest one to defend. And I don't want to seem like I'm defending him. But trying to look at it from the other side, again, I could be very wrong. I'm not very opinionated on this one because it's something I'm – It's hard to have an opinion on because it's hard to know what the facts are. But from the discussions that I've had, and I'm sure you've seen those reports, is that these were factions within the military doing it against his orders. And he held those people, held them to account. Whether it's true or not, I don't know. So I would like to take that point as well.
Speaker 0: The UN report on the death toll statistics for Syria, this report came out in 2022. that HTS, which was established by al-Jilani, now al-Shara, they killed at least 505 civilians, which included 71 children, 77 women, and 371 were killed in what are called unlawful combat attacks, 28 killed by torture, and 106 executed. No, he's conducted atrocities as HTS.
Speaker 1: Yeah, he's conducted atrocities.
Speaker 0: My book, he's a motherfucker and you don't excuse it. And you certainly don't clean him up in a suit and say, well, now we'll sit down and talk to you because you're now Mr. Reasonable. I'd say he's Mr. Reasonable if he wasn't, if again, you've had, since he's taken office, you've had the slaughter of Alawites, Shia in Syria.
Speaker 1: I know, I know. I spoke to one of the biggest leaders in the Alawites community, a private conversation, and they told me a very different story. Obviously, they're very critical of al-Shara. They told me about these massacres. I know the details very well. I'm hoping the reports that al-Shara did not authorize these attacks are true. I could be very wrong.
Speaker 0: He's in charge of the organization. Ask yourself this, did he bring anybody in that did that and punish them? No. That's the key. You can say, God, I didn't know about that. Okay, you're fucking in charge. Get the people that did it, bring them in, put them in prison or execute them and say, I'm sending a message. We're not going to behave that way, but that's not what he did.
Speaker 1: He claims he's done that, but I can't verify it.
Speaker 0: Bullshit. Bullshit.
Speaker 1: Okay. I'd rather keep my ammunition for debate for something I believe in more. Because obviously Al-Shara is not someone I'm a fan of at all. I'm in a position where I really want Syria to get better. And whoever can make it happen, great. Because it's such a fractured country. What he did with the Druze community up north. You know, I'll tell you what I'm more critical of with... in terms of Syria, the Druze, the Druze north is the Druze down south. Yeah, the massacres that happened, etc. But then he there was an agreement, no, sorry, the Kurds up north. And when they advanced towards the Kurds, the Kurds put down their arms. But instead of massacring the Kurds, they were welcomed into the government. And they've merged them into the Syrian government. There hasn't been any massacres at all. So that was actually a successful integration. They were given similar rights. Now, you know what could happen? Next week, there could be a massive massacre. And he could end up being a puppet of Erdogan and just doing whatever Erdogan tells him. Very possible. Because for someone to transform like this is really hard to believe. But he is someone that did bring in the Kurds. He's someone that is trying hard. And I know a story where he tried hard to... to stop a faction within Syria that was about to attack Israel and give justification for Israel to rain hell on Syria. He stopped that from happening. The Alawites won conflicting reports. I really hope he's not the one massacring them or authorizing it, and he held those people to account. Results will speak for themselves. I think someone will try to kill him. But it all depends. He could go and attack Hezbollah next week, which I would take back everything I said because that would be one of the worst, dumbest things to do. It means he's a puppet of whoever. But he hasn't attacked Hezbollah despite Trump asking him to. He's welcomed all these different countries. He hasn't personally, if you want to believe what he's saying, he hasn't ordered any attacks on Alawites, etc. I'm hoping that's true. And he's accepted the Kurds into the Syrian government. So that's why I'm giving him the benefit of the doubt, which is When I'm giving someone the benefit of the doubt, it's not enough to defend them. So I want to stop defending them because they're still in the doubt section. What I'm critical of when it comes to Syria is Israel. Israel is striking Syria whenever they want, still occupying Syrian territory. For me, they are a bigger threat to Israel than al-Sharaa. And again, if it was up to me and I can go back in time, as much as I hate Assad, by the way, I would still want him to be in power. Syria was much better off back then than it is now, even though I'm not a fan of the Assad, the father who's in Moscow and his father, Hafez.
Speaker 0: This guy's track record, they were listed for two or three consecutive years as in the State Department annual report, country reports on terrorism, in the top 10 of all terrorist groups in the world.
Speaker 1: That's why I don't want to defend him. He's a horrible person with a horrible background.
Speaker 0: But you are defending him. You are defending him. No, I'm saying this. You're saying, let's give him the benefit of the doubt. No, look, you don't give a rattlesnake the benefit of a doubt. You don't give a brown recluse spider, which is deadly. benefit of a doubt you don't give a scorpion the benefit of a doubt you look at them for what they are what they have been what they've done and it'd be one thing if he if he led an organization you judge leaders just like we judged netanyahu and the israelis do their military commanders hold the soldiers out who've committed the atrocities against the Palestinian people and punish them. No, they protect them. The guards in the prison, they're raped, Palestinians. Did the Israeli leadership punish those people? No, they protected them. So that's how you judge leadership. Did Bibi Netanyahu order those guards to rape? I don't think he did. But by God, he's in charge of the government and he has a way to say, this is what my government stands for. And the same applies here to al-Shara.
Speaker 1: Why I would give him the benefit of the doubt is there is no alternative. And Syria is a very bad shape. So Syria was in a bad shape with Assad. And look how it is now, significantly worse.
Speaker 0: Why? Why was Syria in bad shape with Assad? because the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey were interfering and promoting jihadist, terrorist activities inside Syria. That's why Syria was in trouble, because of outside interference. And when Iran actually sent its IRGC to Syria to fight those jihadist elements, they prevailed over them. And the United States is like, you know, it's like the two faced woman, or Janice, the Greek job to look in both ways. You know, on the one hand, to claim we're fighting terrorism, we're going to attack ISIS. But on the other hand, that we're, we're funding them, and helping them actually helping them overthrow Bashar al Assad.
Speaker 1: Yeah, look, you're making arguments I've made in previous discussions, I don't disagree with them. But the point I'm making is that things are bad now with our shower. um so they were bad with assad for the various reasons but they you know the alternative look where we are now they're not great now i would like to see someone better than al-shara leading with a better background leading syria for sure and we agree with that but my worry is the alternative could be worse the fractured country that it is right now it could end up being a libya could end up being a yemen and where we continue we continue seeing civil war you know different factions fight together that is my worry So for me, I just want what's better for Syria. If Al-Shara, considering his background, he actually brings it together, gives Alawites equal representation of the government like everyone. If he does the things that both the values me and you agree with, then I think we'll both tip his hat to him. And obviously, if he does what he did when he was under HTS, me and you, we're both going to give him the middle finger. So we're in full agreement there. I'm just... I just would love to see Syria have some time at peace. It's just sad what's happened to it over the last decade.
Speaker 0: Well, no, I agree. Syria deserves peace. But to start with peace is get the United States and the Brits and the Turks, the hell, and the Israelis, the hell out of Syria. Would you say, and the Iranians as well, everybody? Everybody, everybody? Iran didn't interfere. Iran came in at the request of the legitimate government. to help that government fend off these attacks by foreign powers.
Speaker 1: Big difference. I'm saying now. I'm saying now, now. Would you want all of them to be out, correct? Would just Syria to be independent, let it take care of itself?
Speaker 0: Let Syria be independent, take care of itself. Now, the Russians are still there. Al-Shar asked them to stick around. But Russia, to its credit, is protecting the Alawites up north. And it's protecting some of the Kurds too. At least the Russians have been keen on protecting civilians and having to protect civilians from the likes of al-Shara. Like I said, show me one example where he's hauled in any of the commanders of these paramilitary groups that are carrying out these atrocities and punished them, held them accountable. He hasn't done that at all. That's how you judge a leader. If a leader says, no, we're not going to act that way. And look, the criticism applies across the board to any leader in the world, regardless of whether it's Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Macron, the leader of Mali, whoever, one standard for everybody. Don't make exceptions and judge them Judge him by that standard. Sorry, I'm not mad at you. Sorry to be so passionate about this.
Speaker 1: It's good to see you and Netanyahu agree on something. Oh. I know how to get you at the end. Man, that was a low blow. It's a mic drop though. So the Israeli airstrikes in Nabatea al-Faqwa just happened again. So one is Beit Hanoun about two hours ago, and now one in Nabatiya, Farquhar district. And there's Israeli jets flying over Beirut and its suburbs. So Israel's escalating things in Lebanon. Seems to be escalating on many fronts.
Speaker 0: Yeah, and that's why I... That's why, excuse me for interrupting. That's why I think Iran's now going to tell Hezbollah, okay, you can go back on the offensive. Hezbollah has been setting this out largely because of Iran, because of Iran's request.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I think we're getting closer and closer to that stage. All right, so let's go back to the Hormuz Front and the oil storage, the petroleum reserves. So yesterday, and probably a good time to mention that because I think it's very important on what what Trump is thinking by doing what he's doing. I know you said it's more based on emotion. So yesterday, stocks of crude oil in the US strategic petroleum reserves fell by about 6.2 million barrels to 319 million barrels last week, the lowest ever. And then one of my previous guests, Philip Pilkington, that I mentioned to you, put out a... about a post and he said, if there's an oil glut, you know, everyone's talking about that oil glut, why is the strategic petroleum reserves in the US still dumping? And they've dumped more than 11% than average since the Hormuz crisis. So why, like, it just doesn't add up. If oil prices are low, the US should be buying up oil and filling up the strategic petroleum reserves and they shouldn't be emptying out. So that's the post he made about that issue, which is also bizarre because the strikes on Iran we know that Iran would likely close the Strait of Hormuz. And if the strategic petroleum reserves are still being drawn down, unless really the, unless the U S maybe it is a red line. Maybe the U S is not going to concede Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz. And that ends up being what breaks the peace deal and leads to continuation of the war eventually. So maybe, maybe this is the reality we have to accept because I'm in the belief that One of them will fold. Either Iran will fold because they'll get enough concessions from the U.S. or the U.S. will fold because Iran would not budge and it's too costly for Trump to keep fighting and trying to open up the Strait of Hormuz. That's my assumption. But what if no? What if none of them do?
Speaker 0: And we're back to it. Well, what concessions do you see the United States making? Instead of making concessions right now, they're breaking key parts of the MOU. They've already violated Section 1 and then... They're now violating 10 and essentially violating five.
Speaker 1: Concessions will be so, because you could see violations during negotiations where concessions are being had. So maybe the US offered concessions to Iran. Iran said it's not enough. So the US thinks, okay, let me bomb them. Then I'll pressure them to accept those concessions. And as we've discussed, that doesn't usually work. Maybe it does, but me and you don't think this works. The bombing doesn't work. so that you could still have violation of the MOU as a way to pressure Iran to accept concessions that would be given in those negotiations that we would, I still think the Pakistani negotiations you mentioned a few days ago, I think they would continue, but I could be wrong because Iran, as you said earlier, they've just finished the funeral, not finished, they're about to finish the funeral processions and they're in a very different mindset right now. That's been one of my questions earlier today is that as we're trying to analyze what Iran could do if the US strikes them, now that the US struck them, We have to remember Iran is mourning the death of their supreme leader, and they're probably more emboldened than ever seeing the amount of people on the streets and the amount of people calling for revenge. So my worry is that the mindset, and we talked about it yesterday, the mindset of Iran right now is different to the mindset of Iran during previous clashes. So that's, again, that's why it's just surprising to me the Americans are going to escalate right after the funeral procession. So it's... It's a bizarre development for me, unusual, unexpected development.
Speaker 0: Well, again, I would argue that this was deliberately provoked by the United States, that they encouraged a number of these ships. One of them was a Qatari ship. Basically, screw Iran, ignore their protocols, take this path. We got your back. We'll cover you. I'm sure that that's what they said.
Speaker 1: Yeah. It's very, very bizarre. It was a Qatari one and a Saudi one. You would have expected usually Emirati ships to be attacked. You had a Qatari and a Saudi one struck. So it's interesting developments. Anything else we missed for today? Would you want to do a quick recap of the Ukraine, what's happening there? There's... UK fighter jets intercepted a Russian maritime patrol aircraft after repeatedly approached a carrier strike group in the Norwegian Sea. The Russian BRF plane passed at low altitude and unnecessarily close to the Prince of Wales, the HMS Prince of Wales aircraft carrier, and is believed to have dropped 10 sonar buoys into the water. What are sonar buoys, buoys? Sonar, sonar buoys.
Speaker 0: Oh, these are sonar buoys. Yeah, sonar. to track position and activity. They're not offensive weapons. You know, look, I guess you didn't get the memo from Stubb in Finland. Ukraine has won the war. And I guess Sweden said, hey man, that's true. When did he say that? Today, on CNBC. Wow. Stubb was speaking to CNBC. Oh, so the war is over. Yeah, the war is over.
Speaker 1: Okay, you didn't tell me that. I'm glad. Let me change the title to Breaking News. The Ukraine war is over.
Speaker 0: They said that the war is over, which means I guess Donbas has been returned to Ukraine. Russia's abandoned Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. They're pulling the troops out of Sumy and Kharkiv, and they've given up Crimea. I mean, that would be – to me, I think that's the definition of winning.
Speaker 1: Well, congratulations to Ukraine. So President Pesachian has urgently gone back to Tehran, just reported. So he's left a funeral procession, I think, in Qom to head to Tehran, obviously, because of the later strikes. Also, a report just came in. According to CNN, that's about the Minab School. Senior U.S. Minab School is the school that the Americans, for the audience, the Americans struck in the first day of the war with the Tomahawk missile that killed... It killed 160...
Speaker 0: 168 girls, little girls.
Speaker 1: Yeah. So according to CNN, senior U.S. military commanders have been accused of bypassing warnings about outdated intelligence on potential targets in Iran, which led to a strike on a school that killed nearly 200 children and adults. The strike occurred on the first day of U.S. operations against Iran, with the U.S. military scrambling to update targeting information for thousands of sites. Despite warnings that the intelligence was over 10 years old, senior commanders approved the strike for expediency, according to sources. The incident has raised questions about the US military's targeting process and the role of Pentagon's leaders in pressing for rapid results, which may have contributed to the accidental strike. An investigation into the incident is ongoing, but the Pentagon has not released its findings. The US has said it does not target civilians, but the strike on the school has been described as one of the worst civilian casualty incidents incidents in recent us military history um yeah i i wanna i wanna give um i've been criticizing mainstream media uh you show that image by the way please stephanie i've been criticizing mainstream media for a long time but i do want to point out and i've said this before not all journalists are the same when you criticize cnn cnn has that hundreds of journalists and they're not all the same So when they come up with a report like this, you know, the U.S. media has done a good job in analyzing, most U.S. media, in analyzing that shooting, coming out with reports. By the way, that's the plane of the president, the Iranian president heading, President Shikhan heading quickly to Tehran, leaving the funeral processions in, I think in Qom, no? In Karbala, sorry.
Speaker 0: But the Karbalas, you know, Najaf, Najaf.
Speaker 1: Najaf, okay.
Speaker 0: That is on Wednesday. So even though it's very, very early Wednesday morning, dawn has not broken. But when dawn breaks, they will be doing that procession in Najaf.
Speaker 1: Oh, okay.
Speaker 0: That's why.
Speaker 1: But anyway, the US media, I think the New York Times was the first to come up with a report that it was a Tomahawk missile and offer evidence and then other reports and now another report on what led to the strikes. But yes, one of the most, if not the most, not one of this, probably the most tragic. That and the shortage of fertilizers and what's going to lead to famine in different countries, these are the two most tragic consequences of this war. But yeah, that's it for today. The American strikes have ended, by the way.
Speaker 0: They're now saying they've ended?
Speaker 1: Do you think they'll retaliate tonight or maybe another couple of days?
Speaker 0: Oh, yeah.
Speaker 1: No, they're going to retaliate. They'll retaliate tonight.
Speaker 0: Why wouldn't they? But again, okay, so to monitor, to know which direction this is going, if they combine themselves again to just hitting Bahrain and Kuwait, maybe the uae uh then that'll tell you it's a limited strike uh yeah but if they if they expand beyond that then it lets you know that iran's gonna iran will escalate i think iran will escalate this now but i could be you know i'm not nostradamus so i could be wrong yeah i'm not sure that'll give you a chance tomorrow to say see old man you were wrong um
Speaker 1: Iran is reportedly preparing for a broad response to the U.S. aggression with a new target bank. No shit. Great report. Great news. Iran is preparing for a broad response to the U.S. aggression with a new target bank.
Speaker 0: That's called, you know, in CIA terminology, that's called no shit analysis.
Speaker 1: No shit analysis. NSA. All right, Larry, I'll talk to you soon. Talk to you tomorrow.
Speaker 0: Thanks, man. Bye-bye. Take care, man.
Speaker 1: Bye-bye. All right, guys. I'll be live again in 12 minutes with our friend Brendan Weicker to continue our analysis. And we'll see if the Iranians strike the US while we're doing that live. So I'll see you in 12 minutes, guys.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’ve been looking at Trump’s threat to “knock out” Iran’s power plants if no deal is reached. War correspondent Elijah Magnier says removing Iran’s electricity would blackout GCC states at once in extreme heat. He reads Iran’s mourning as a message to Netanyahu, and argues Netanyahu’s “tunnels” claim reflects strategic exploitation of ambiguity.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
"We can knock out their electricity and power generating plants. Every plant will be gone." That's Trump today, threatening Iran's energy infrastructure if no deal is reached. War correspondent Elijah Magnier has spent over 35 years reporting from conflict zones, and he wasn't impressed by the threat. Knock out Iran's power plants, he says, and every GCC country loses electricity simultaneously, in temperatures above 50°C. He also had an interesting take on Trump saying he was surprised to see Iranians mourning in such numbers. He thinks it was a direct message to Netanyahu ahead of their White House meeting: you lied to me, and I know it. Netanyahu's claim that Trump "never mentioned tunnels" tells its own story too. Magnier argues the specificity is deliberate, Netanyahu is exploiting the gap between Trump's demand to de-escalate and what he didn't explicitly say, to keep the bombs falling. Neither side may actually wants this resolved before the midterms. Trump needs oil prices stable. Iran is content selling oil and projecting strength from a position of momentum. Perhaps best to expect 30-day extensions, not a deal. Enjoy my latest conversation with @ejmalrai!
Video Transcript AI Summary
Talk focuses on the scale and impact of Iran’s protests in Tehran and how that signals support for Iran’s position amid broader regional conflict. One guest cites reports of very large crowds—“11 million”—and argues that the main roads in Tehran (Azadi, Enqelab, Damavand) could be fully filled, with additional people still arriving. They compare expected turnout to the crowd size reported for Imam Khomeini’s funeral.
The discussion then shifts to Donald Trump’s comments threatening to “knock down their bridges” and “knock out their energy supply,” and whether Trump is either ill-informed or sending messages after comments by Benjamin Netanyahu. The guest argues Trump’s remarks function as a direct message to Netanyahu, saying Netanyahu’s prior claims to Trump resulted wrong in multiple scenarios: hammering Iran’s ruling system, sending weapons to the Kurds without accounting for Turkey’s reaction, destroying Iran’s missile system and negotiation leverage, and maintaining stability goals while Netanyahu allegedly pushes for continued war. The guest says Trump’s threats are presented as business as usual while technical teams talk in Doha, and claims the Iranians would use violations of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to suspend technical talks.
The guest describes Iran’s posture as strong leverage—especially regarding Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz—while arguing that energy infrastructure threats are framed as civilian targets and would create major humanitarian and regional consequences in extreme heat. They link regional events to future escalatory risk, including a Yemen story involving a plane reaching Sana’a and returning, and argue it was not done with Saudi permission, pointing to Saudi jets attempting to intimidate an aircraft.
From the Yemen angle, they raise the question of whether Yemen could close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait if sanctions are not lifted, describing it as paralleling steps Iran takes around the Strait of Hormuz. They then play a clip of Trump saying the goal is either a deal or “finish the job,” claiming he can destroy bridges and energy infrastructure quickly.
The guest says escalation timing matters around U.S. midterm elections, arguing Trump would try to preserve his legacy and avoid decisions before midterms. They claim Netanyahu’s objectives are to negotiate and potentially shift focus to Lebanon while keeping “freedom of action,” whereas Trump wants peaceful continuation of the MOU until the midterms. They argue Israel’s actions and Netanyahu’s language about “tunnels” suggest disputes over escalation boundaries in Lebanon, including an example where Netanyahu allegedly said Trump did not ask him to stop destroying tunnels.
Iran’s “red line” is described as “paragraph one,” covering Lebanon and all allies, including: ending the war, ensuring Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and complete withdrawal of Israeli forces without a timetable. They claim advances on Iran’s nuclear program depend on implementing MOU paragraph one, and they describe a scenario where Iran would not concede on nuclear issues unless clause one is met. They also argue that closing the Strait of Hormuz is not enough on its own; Iran seeks guarantees against renewed carpet-bombing in southern Lebanon.
The conversation turns to Israeli politics and future leadership, listing possible Israeli figures and arguing that regardless of which leader replaces Netanyahu, the stance would remain similar unless Americans force withdrawal. They discuss Golan Heights and Lebanon withdrawal conditions, emphasizing that Israeli leaders would not withdraw without American pressure. Finally, they assess risks of renewed strikes, with attention to whether Trump prepared for confrontation over nuclear monitoring (no inspectors) and the Strait of Hormuz, and how the MOU could be managed rather than fully applied—especially through gradual handling of funds and humanitarian exceptions for food and medicine.
Full Transcript
Speaker 2: Right now in Iran, they're huge, aren't they, these protests? The protests are huge. The numbers are crazy. I'm not sure if you've seen the numbers. They're like 11 million people on the streets, bigger than the Khomeini's funeral from some reports. That's wild.
Speaker 1: Yes. If people know Tehran or not, I mean, you see there are three main roads, the Azadi Street, the Enkelab Street, and the Damavan Street. And the Damavand is the longest, around 13 kilometers. And the Azadi is 4.5, 5 kilometers. And Enkelab is also 5 kilometers. So you're talking about 23 kilometers completely full, and still people are still coming in. And when you say 23 kilometers, you have at least 2 to 3 million people there filling only that space. Then there are other spaces. So yeah, they're expecting more than Imam Khomeini. Imam Khomeini, there were between 10 to 15 million people present. And then you have Donald Trump making comment that was interesting. And I think that was making a comment on Donald Trump's comment that he saw people crying. And In my opinion, there are two points to highlight, if I may. First, he is either very ill-informed and people are not telling him, or he is sending a message to Benjamin Netanyahu by saying, actually, you lied to me, and now I can see something completely different from what you and the Mossad chief told me on February 2026, when they met in the operational room and they said that Iran is going to collapse in three or four days. So I think, in my opinion, I think the latter is more plausible than saying, oh, wow, I've seen people crying and I thought he was hated. And prior to the visit of Netanyahu to the White House, I think this is what Donald Trump is telling Netanyahu because Actually, he's not at all happy with Benjamin Netanyahu. And he followed that sentence by, well, he knows who the boss is. And for me, they are connected.
Speaker 2: Interesting. Yeah, that's something that I've been thinking about as well. I've mentioned on the show a few times is the comment that he made where he was surprised to see him. By the way, just for the audience, we'll go through the comments he made a few minutes ago. he threatened again to bomb iran's energy infrastructure if no deal is reached so we'll play that clip and talk about it but just on that point that's a very interesting point elijah because i've been mentioning it too um where there's two scenarios one of them he's just saying that what i was saying in the last few days that he's just saying that because he you know trump is being trump or number two he's genuinely surprised and if he's genuinely surprised that'll be pretty surprising that the the president of the world's most powerful military with all these intelligence agencies is surprised by something that he should have, information that he should have as the leader of the United States. But you gave an interesting take is that that could also be a message to Netanyahu. He's like, hey, you lied to me. I know you lied to me. And that's linked to the other message where he said to Netanyahu, I'm the boss now. I don't know. I just find it hard to believe in Elijah. I'd love to get your thoughts. I find it hard to believe that he didn't know this. He has access to all this intelligence briefs. Maybe he was lied to, but it's just hard to believe the United States president does not know something that should be considered basics from an intelligence perspective.
Speaker 1: Well, if he's watching television every single day, making comment, on journalists accusing them of being fake media and attacking them and commenting on what the various TV in the US are saying, it is impossible to consider that he was ill-informed. Therefore, his comment that comes after Benjamin Netanyahu's demand or request, actually, to meet him in the White House. And then we have Donald Trump making this kind of comment. I think it's pretty much a direct message to Benjamin Netanyahu saying, don't come here and lie to me. I had enough of your lies and everything you said turned out to be false. And why I'm saying that is because if you look at the sequence of events, everything that Benjamin Netanyahu told Donald Trump resulted wrong. He said we need to go and hammer Iran because we can change the ruling system and didn't happen. He said send the weapons to the Kurds and he sent the weapon to the Kurds but did not take into account how Turkey would react and the preparation and readiness of the Iranians to deal with the northwest where the Iranian ground force was not at all engaged at any moment in this war, which means they were very ready, even if the Israelis said they would offer an air support to the Kurds. But that implication would have affected Turkey, and this is where Turkey moved in. And we've seen how Donald Trump said Turkey is a friend and an ally, and Benjamin Netanyahu was extremely upset with President Erdogan because of that aspect, because he considered President Erdogan is part of the failure of his plan, which is not really entirely true because then the Iranians were very ready and they were even prepared to be extremely aggressive with any attempt to destabilize Iran from inside during the war. So we see Donald Trump saying, you said we can destroy the Iranian missile system and program. And we haven't. You see, Iran is going to be very weak, unable to negotiate. And now we gave it the straight to foremost that we're not managing to take it back. And now Benjamin Netanyahu wants to continue the war. And Donald Trump has a completely different objective, which is to maintain the stability of the market. This is why I wouldn't give too much weight on what he said today and his a threat because that is business as usual, particularly when the technical teams are talking to one another in Doha to try and prepare the ground for the leaders when they agree to move forward. But today we understand that everything that Donald Trump is saying threatening Iran is a violation of the MOU. The Iranians are waiting behind the corner to jump on anything that he's saying. to be tougher during the negotiations and say, well, you are violating the MOU, therefore today we suspend the technical talk. And this is what they've done in Doha today after what he said. So we see the Iranians are not at all flexible, not because they are happy to go to war, they're ready to go to war, but they prefer to keep things ongoing until after the uh congress midterm elections which is suitable for both sides donald trump wants the stability of the market he doesn't want to have a very high price of oil before the elections the iranians are happy to sell their oil but happy to show to the world how they've done during the funeral to send very strong message to every single country coming and visiting them particularly in the verses of the quran telling every country a different version to indicate their position. But all in all, Iran was in a very strong position saying, I am today a regional power and I am confirming my position, particularly when they sent the plane to Yemen, violating the airspace that is under the Saudi and coalition sanctions. They didn't care about The first time in 11 years that took away 200 wounded and the Yemeni delegation visiting Iran. So that was quite significant.
Speaker 2: Do you think they got Saudi's approval for it or they did it despite sound? I'm sure there was some discussions behind the scenes.
Speaker 1: Not at all. I don't think so because this is not a permission. They did not ask permission. Otherwise, We wouldn't see two Saudi jets trying to intimidate the Mahan Air in the air before they reached Sana'a, but the pilot continued without blinking and just landed in Sana'a, stayed there, took all the passengers and the wounded, and returned to Tehran.
Speaker 2: Okay, so let's play that clip. It's interesting you brought up the Yemen story. Not many people are talking about it, and I think it is significant. I think what's happening in Yemen is an indication of what's going to happen in the entire region. It's almost like a barometer of what we're going to see in the region.
Speaker 1: But you have another point, sorry if I interrupt you. Is Yemen saying we will close the Strait of Hormuz if the Saudis do not lift sanctions? The Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Yeah, sorry, Bab al-Mandeb, which means that the Yemeni are following the same... steps as Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.
Speaker 2: Interesting. So let's play the clip. Let's start with that clip from Trump.
Speaker 0: If you can play that, please, Lisa. Because we're close to maybe making a deal. I don't know. Look, we're going to win one way or the other. We're either going to make a deal or we're going to finish the job. Okay? And it won't be tough to finish the job. I'd rather make a deal because I don't want to affect 91 million people. We can knock down their bridges in one hour. We can knock out their energy supply, all of those big plants that they built, big, beautiful, modern plants that had a lot of money. They don't have any money now. We haven't given them any money. But we can knock out their electricity and power generating plants in, I would say, a small part of an afternoon. Every plant will be gone. And they know that.
Speaker 2: The President All right. First, I agree with you on the fact that he doesn't mean it. And I think where we, I wouldn't say we disagree, but I'm still not sure about what happens after the midterms. Did you say you believe that the war is more likely to continue after the midterms or did I misunderstand you?
Speaker 1: No, this is a possibility, but not before. But after the midterms, you think? After the midterms, Donald Trump is not going to be reelected. It's over for him. so he can decide whatever he wants and he would not make any decision that will be his legacy. So for now his legacy is he listened to Benjamin Netanyahu, manipulated him and the entire US administration and took him to war for a war that he thought is going to be like Venezuela. This is what Axios said actually that Benjamin Netanyahu told Donald Trump it's going to be a very quick win like Venezuela. So it didn't happen. Then Netanyahu fired the Mossad chief. And then, of course, someone has to be blamed because failure doesn't have many fathers. Only victory has many fathers. And now Benjamin Netanyahu is in trouble, but he's going to go and ask. I don't think he's going to ask anything about Iran. because the whole MOU is against anything that he advertised for and set the initial objectives, him and Donald Trump, that he's going to go to talk about Lebanon mainly. He wants to be able to move in and have a freedom of action. This is not something that Israel has, but today, you see how Benjamin Netanyahu is trying to sabotage anything, but he's saying, Donald Trump forced him to stop killing people in Lebanon. However, two days ago, he said, well, the U.S. president did not ask me to stop destroying the tunnels. So he really specifically said what Donald Trump did not go into detail because Donald Trump has no clue what Ali Taher Hills mean and where it is located in Nabatea Falcon. I'm sure many Lebanese don't know where it is. and what's happening there. So Benjamin Netanyahu took the advantage in saying, well, he did not ask me to destroy the tunnels under the ground, therefore he went and bombed Al-Tahrir yesterday and killed four people. Any member of Hezbollah nearby is immediately targeted. So he always trying to find a way to say, well, Donald Trump did not specifically said this, therefore I'm going to do it. He's all the time doing this because war is on his side and in his favor for the elections, which is not the case of Donald Trump. Donald Trump wants the MOU to go peacefully until the midterms. And Netanyahu wants to sabotage the MOU always, not only until his own elections in October, but at least until October, He doesn't want to see a deal with Iran or with Lebanon.
Speaker 2: If war does restart after the midterms, if Trump decides he does not want his legacy to be a failed war because of Israel, and Israel tricking him into a war that led to a massive strategic failure for the US, and he decides to continue the war, which I think is unlikely but definitely possible, do you think the energy infrastructure of Iran, the threat he just made now, is on the table?
Speaker 1: Okay, that's a very good question. If you hear what he said about energy and electricity, these are civilian objectives, which means his military bank of objective is empty. So he doesn't have any military objectives because he has used all his objectives and destroyed them. And Iran continue fighting. Therefore, he is not going to touch these locations because the whole Gulf will be without energy and electricity when there are 50 degrees. Well, we have 44 in the north of France today, and we had that last week. So you imagine this week is going to be very hot. How is it going to be in the Emirates, in Kuwait, in Saudi Arabia, in Bahrain? And if the Americans hit the energy and the electricity, power plants, you can be sure that all of the energy and electricity power plants in all the GCC countries will be completely destroyed. And the partition of damage is a policy that Iran has adopted. And then what's going to happen? How the Arabs are going to feel? What kind of country people will live without electricity in about 50 degrees? I know how Iraq feels. because this is where I lived for many years. And at two o'clock in the morning, we had 52 degrees in July and August. So that really hot and without electricity, I don't think many people can live in the biggest free sauna on earth. That is crazy, 52 degrees Celsius in Iraq. At two o'clock in the morning, I would go in the car and turn on the air conditioning after stopping a taxi and sitting in a taxi just to have a little bit of fresh air.
Speaker 2: 52 degrees. That's, you know, I live in Dubai and I'm sure we have, I don't know, I don't go outside when it's hot or I leave the country when it's hot, but that's for people in the US, that's 125 degrees Fahrenheit. To be clear also, just an interesting fact, we were talking about the size of the funeral processions earlier, I think as soon as we went live, that's on a hot day in iran i think that's 35 36 degrees celsius which is fahrenheit it is one is 87 degrees fahrenheit right now in tehran um even though the streets are full but let's go back to the threats of energy infrastructure being struck in iran there's a lot of points you've made um i want to focus on the netanyahu point because he's made a lot of statements and you seem to be on top of everything because you mentioned another important statement he made yesterday where he said that Trump did not, he said, I heard reports in the media claiming that Trump asked us not to take action against terrorist tunnels in Lebanon. That's a myth, fake news. He didn't say anything to me about it. And I didn't ask him. We act according to our own considerations. And what you're saying is that the fact that he mentioned tunnels says a lot when he specified tunnels. And he's essentially admitting that Trump did tell him to stop escalation in Lebanon. because he kind of used a very specific word of tunnels, and Trump was not going to be that specific in his demands, which kind of leads me to my next question. Israel is still in Lebanon. Israel continues to bomb Lebanon on a daily basis, a lot less than it was before the ceasefire, but it is getting bombed. How long before Iran, what is Iran's red line when it comes to Lebanon?
Speaker 1: Two points. First, the discourse, what Benjamin Netanyahu said, in academia, you do something that is called discourse analysis. So you look at the language, the implication, and what is behind it, and why he's saying what he's saying, and then you examine also the facts on the ground. We've seen the Israeli drones hitting many empty areas, empty targets, at the exception of Ali Tahrir's Hill, wherever they consider there is a member of Hezbollah close to that vicinity of the hills than they target to kill. And they've killed four people so far in the vicinity of Alitar, but nowhere else. So having watched the event unfolding on the ground, the behavior of the Israeli army, the discourse of Benjamin Netanyahu saying he didn't specifically tell me about the tunnels, We understand that actually he told him not to give him a headache in Lebanon and stop the killing. However, Netanyahu found a little hole to go through it. And I think this is where he wants to develop that little hole to make it much bigger in Washington when he goes there to see Donald Trump after the NATO meeting in Turkey. Now, you said what Iran's red line is. Iran's red line is the paragraph one, Lebanon and all the allies. So it's including Lebanon, it's not only Lebanon. So now they are starting with the Lebanon because they saying where the ceasefire, the end of the war, not the ceasefire. And also what they are saying is that the, not only the end of the war, but also the ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. For the Iranians, that's very clear. The sovereignty of Lebanon means the complete withdrawal of all the Israeli forces, even if President Aoun did not request that in his MOU, and there is no timetable for the withdrawal of the Israelis. This is where Benjamin Netanyahu is going to negotiate with Donald Trump to separate again Lebanon and Iran MOU, but for the Iranians, that doesn't mean anything. The Iranians want to see the end of the war. If there is no end of the war, they're not going to make any step related to what Donald Trump believes is a victory. It is the nuclear dossier and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. The opening of the Strait of Hormuz, now there are agreements between the Iranians and the Omani that they really remove the insurance company who used to provide the services and they will provide the services and divide, share the benefit. That is something they can offer because already this is happening and what Iran has been doing since always, not asking for any penny for the services they were providing in the Strait of Hormuz. Now, with the Omani, they were divided. The main point is the nuclear program. And Donald Trump is saying, I will take the enrichment uranium, which is not true. He's not going to take it. But he's saying that I will prevent Iran from having a nuclear bomb. And Benjamin Netanyahu is saying, Iran will not have a nuclear bomb as long as I am a prime minister. Again, which means both for me, because I am preventing Iran from having a bomb that Iran doesn't have. Anyway, so there is no advance on practicality of the Iranian nuclear program unless MOU paragraph one is implemented. That's Iran's red line. One and 11, and 13 actually, because the 13 include the one.
Speaker 2: So essentially you're saying that they won't concede on the nuclear program unless clause one is met. But that means if close one is not met, they won't consider their nuclear program and they'll just leave Lebanon as is. So in other words, all that Iran would do is not, they won't act on Israeli aggression in Lebanon, but they'll just won't move forward with any concessions on their nuclear program. Do you know what, I don't know if I'm wording my question right. Could they do anything more than that?
Speaker 1: Yes, I understood your question. So what they have done is they established any attempt to bomb the suburb of Beirut that would bomb the north area occupied by the Israelis. In exchange, what they have done later on is when Israel started to bomb south of Lebanon intensively, this is where the Iranians sent a message to Donald Trump in saying, we are going to bomb your allies because you did not respect the MOU where our allies are bombed.
Speaker 2: This is where Donald Trump stopped the war. They also closed the straits on that day, if you remember, when they were bombing South Lebanon.
Speaker 1: Yes, that's a soft step. The soft step is to close the Strait of Hormuz, but that is not enough. Closing the Strait of Hormuz is not enough for the Iranians. They want really to make sure that the Israelis will not go again and carpet bomb the south of Lebanon. It's over for Iran. They will not allow it because they've been preparing for the last over 65 days for another potential round, because at the end of the day, Sayyid Mustafa Khamenei is not going to offer any victory to Donald Trump. I am very clear on that. This is why the MOU is going to be renewed for another 30 days, plus another 30. for negotiation to take on and on and on. And neither Donald Trump wants to give all of Iranian money. So far, he said $6 billion. And he's saying, we're not going to give them cash. Have you heard him today? He said, we're not going to give them cash. And that word is important. This is where the analysis is made, because when he's saying, I'm not going to give them cash, it doesn't mean I'm not going to give them the amount they want to buy whatever we agreed upon with the money they have, but they're not going to receive the green paper that is the dollar. But he is releasing slowly but surely the Iranian frozen asset. So he moves from three now to six, and the Iranians will ask for more. Otherwise, they will not move on the nuclear program. And so far, Iran refused the visit of Rafael Grossi because this is not going to be a free walk into Iran without concession from the United States. Rafael Grossi is the head of the IAEA for your audience.
Speaker 2: We talk about Elijah. You're saying my audience doesn't know who Grossi is? No, but someone who jumped in.
Speaker 1: No, someone who's jumping for the first time in a journalistic way, you really need to give background always.
Speaker 2: We keep talking about the war restarting because Trump strikes Iran. But I think, as you said, the calculus has changed now after this war, especially now after the death of the Supreme Leader. Even Iranians, I'm sure, when they see the number of people on the streets, for them, it's more of like a vote of support by the Iranian people. Like, hey, we're behind you. And I think Iran would come out I'll use the word emboldened again. They'll come out even more emboldened, not only from their strategic win in the war, but seeing how many people are supporting them. I had a feeling even they're surprised by the level of people that, the number of people that went on the streets. So I think we should start, whenever we talk about the ceasefire collapsing or restart of the war, I think it goes, You know, there's a higher probability Iran could restart the war rather than always just looking at the U.S. Will the U.S. strike in Iran retaliate? Will the U.S. strike in Iran retaliate? So I think now Iran and you've already explained how they have some red lines, Lebanon being one of them. And the only question is what will lead to what response? So if Israel doesn't do anything, one more question on that front, and I want to move on to Yemen. If Israel doesn't do anything, okay, let's say they don't strike Beirut, they don't strike Lebanese territory anymore, they remain in that occupied territory. So that becomes the new status quo. Will Iran accept that new status quo?
Speaker 1: No, because Iran is very much aware that Benjamin Netanyahu, or perhaps if he folds Naftali Bennett, they both have already said that they will stay in Lebanon. They will not withdraw. They have ambition to keep Lebanese territories in Lebanon. This is why the only thing Iran can do is to exert leverage on all the points mentioned in MOU, give no concessions, unless the United States put pressure on the Israelis. And this MOU is going to last more than Benjamin Netanyahu's in power, hopefully, because in October, November, if he fails to get the majority in the Knesset, then you have someone like Naftali Bennett coming in. This man said- What about Isingkot?
Speaker 2: There's Isingkot too. He's leading in the polls, I think.
Speaker 1: Yes, on his own, but then they have to sit together. Gadi Isingkot, Naftali Bennett, then you have Yoav Galant, even if he is in the side of the Likud party. But maybe you have the other opposition group, Yair Lapid, and others to stand all together and then see who is going to... Sorry, not you, Afghanan. The former chief of staff who was a minister in the cabinet. So they can come together and... decide maybe on a relief, as they've done in the past, where the opposition gave the possibility to chain the prime minister, divide the terms into half. So, yeah, but at the end of the day, anyone who's going to lead Israel is not going to pull out from the Golan Heights. This is what Naftali Bennett said, and he's not going to pull out of Lebanon. They both said that. They said to you, I mean, Naftali Bennett said to you during your interview. I don't know if you pay attention to what he said about the Golan Heights too.
Speaker 2: Yeah, but the Golan Heights, no one expects Israel to pull out of the Golan Heights.
Speaker 1: Pull out? On minute 16, he told you that when I am sure that the mother and the family are living in peace in the Golan Heights and not afraid, So he already considered Golan Haidt as his. And then when you asked him about pulling out from Lebanon, minute 30, he said, well, only when Hezbollah is disarmed, which is exactly what Benjamin Netanyahu is doing. So if you change the head of the Israeli government by Benjamin Netanyahu or Naftali Bennett or Gadi Ezzinkot, you have the same result. Israel will not withdraw without being forced by the Americans.
Speaker 2: I think Guy D. Isingcott would have a different approach. Because he's always vocal about shorter wars, more decisive wars, but shorter wars, not being stuck in a prolonged war. A quagmire. So he considers right now Lebanon a quagmire. He supported the 2000 withdrawal out of Lebanon. I think he supported the 2006 withdrawal. I haven't checked that. But he talks about wanting freedom of action to strike and weaken Hezbollah. but then pulling out of the country. It's also difficult to tell what's going to be policy versus what he's saying to get elected. It's really hard to tell what their policy is going to be before elections. And it's also important to note how their policy would change once US support and protection is removed, if it is removed. If the US continue on that path of decoupling from Israel or changing their approach to Israel, does that mean Israel will change their approach to the way they conduct their wars in the region? No, I don't think so, Mario.
Speaker 1: No, I think Naftali Bennett in previous interviews said we want the Americans to consider us as a carrier in the Middle East. So the relationship between Israel and the United States will be softer and more of a subordinate to America rather than a challenger like Benjamin Netanyahu. That's the only difference. We have never seen Benjamin Netanyahu. That's an important difference. Sorry? But that's an important difference. Yes, but listen to this. The Israelis changed their doctrine after the 7th of October. Even we used to say Benjamin Netanyahu doesn't go to war for more than 30 days. That is not his doctrine. That is not his philosophy. But after the 7th of October, everything has changed. We need to reset all our understanding of Israel and look at it completely differently. Today, Israel had been at war for the last 1000 days and the Israelis are taking more or less 70% of Gaza and saying they want to continue and toward 80%. In Lebanon, they don't want to pull out. In Syria, they still attack the Syrian villages beyond Quneitra. They established checkpoints. Who is going to be the leader of Israel and sell domestically a withdrawal from Syria or Lebanon or Gaza unless he is forced by the Americans. That's the only criteria that is important and that forces the Israeli, the future Israeli prime minister, to leave the occupied territory. Otherwise, they will not, the Israelis will not. The society has changed.
Speaker 2: No, I don't disagree. I don't necessarily disagree. Yeah, I think I do agree. I think with Eisenkot, I'm not sure. It's a bit tough to know what his policy will be because if they remain in Lebanon and Iran draws a red line and Iran threatens escalation, if they remain in Lebanon and Hezbollah starts their attack on Israel again, that should be taken into consideration, putting aside American pressure. Now, if you remain under Netanyahu... I would say yes, it's going to be very difficult for Israel to pull out of any of those territories without American pressure. But I do think that American pressure will be there. Turkey will pressure the U.S. to pressure Israel to pull out of Syria, potentially. These are all theoretical. They might never happen. Iran is going to pressure the U.S. to pressure Israel to pull out of Lebanon. Gaza is a difficult one, but we might have the entire Arab world come together for the first time finally and start putting pressure on the West, on the U.S. and Israel. to find a solution to the Palestinian issue. Now, this is a five-year discussion, maybe even 10-year discussion. But in the short term, I think after this election later this year, a lot could change. Next year is going to be a very important year for the Middle East. Trump would be done with the midterms. Israel would be done with their elections. Then we'll see who the prime minister would be. And then those two factors will dictate a lot of what happens in the region. And that would apply to all the countries.
Speaker 1: I wouldn't really see the Israelis pulling out of Syria. I consider that a possibility at the moment. Even if Donald Trump is going to meet Ahmad Sharif during his NATO meeting. But for me, that meeting is similar to Jamail, Amin Jamail in 1982, December 1982, when he met Ronald Reagan and then he met him again twice. in 1983, but then the Israelis remained for 18 years in Lebanon despite the agreement with the Lebanese. So I don't think the Israelis are interested in having a deal with the Syrians. I don't think Donald Trump is really bothered by forcing Israel to pull out of Syria because this is not giving him any headache. Even if Turkey wants to put pressure, but the pressure is really balanced here. It's not really major because Turkey is not using any leverage against the Americans, but only the friendship. However, with Iran, it's completely different. Oh, you don't want to do that, then the Strait of Hormuz suffers. You don't want to do that, then there are no inspections in the all nuclear sites. So it's a tit for tat that Iran, can bring out any time against any dossier that hurts Donald Trump the most. That's different. There is a leverage here. With Syria, there is no leverage. In Lebanon, there is zero leverage. On the contrary, it's minus because the president delivered himself to the Americans and the Israeli agreement and accepted that Israel remains. This is what Benjamin Netanyahu is telling us, that Lebanon agreed for Israel to stay there forever. without a timetable for the Israeli forces to withdraw. So the leverage really here is only in the hand of Iran. And the leverage Iran has is multiple, is not one.
Speaker 2: And could we be discounting the possibility of strikes? Me and you could, because we both agree that Trump won't strike before the midterms. But are we discounting the risk a bit too much? Strike, you mean we would not go to war? Iran. Would not go to war, sorry, yeah, not a limited strike. Would not go to a full-blown war with Iran before the midterms because of the political costs involved. One of my guests made the argument that Trump kind of gave up on the midterms already and Iran is a lot more important for him. You think there's a possibility that this is the case? Or maybe I'll rephrase the question. What if Iran does not budge on the Strait of Homs and charging a fee? What if they don't budge on their demands when it comes to Lebanon? Isn't there a scenario where Trump will just calculate that the cost of war, the cost of accepting a deal with this current situation, Iran controls Australia, whom was Lebanon is an issue he cannot solve because Israel is not letting him solve it. The cost of that is higher than the cost of going back into war. And then he decides to go back into war to finish the job. You know, is that risk still there? Is it worth considering or you think it's way too minimal?
Speaker 1: Now, Donald Trump prepared us for what it could come worse for him. And he said already multiple times that actually the Iranians cannot access the nuclear sites because there are tons of troubles under the nuclear facility and nobody can come in or go out or look for whatever is that the Americans have destroyed. And also, he said, we're keeping 24-7 eye on these facilities and we can monitor anyone coming in or out if there would be any attempt. Having said that, is it preparation for the Iranian saying, right, no inspectors, so he can't say to his people that I prevented Iran from not having a nuclear bomb And this is why I went to war against Iran. And now they're not allowing me to go and inspect if they have a nuclear bomb or not. He's saying, well, we've destroyed everything and they cannot have access to it. If we don't have access to it, they will not. Exactly like the Strait of Hormuz. If they maintain a blockade, we maintain blockade on them. So he prepared us for this dossier. That's the most important. Second one, is the navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. He's saying, well, I have very little benefit, and the main country suffering is China. And in fact, in the agreement between Iran and Oman, they have taken into consideration a reduced fees for the Chinese because they are the one who will suffer the most of these services fees that will be divided between Oman and Iran. Therefore, for Donald Trump, he really doesn't care. He didn't care about the same US citizen when he said, well, they would suffer a bit when he was asked, what about the price of oil that is increasing in the United States? People are suffering. He said, well, they will suffer a bit. Yes, he doesn't care. But then you have the Republicans who are putting pressure because then his life will be difficult in the second half if the Republicans fail to have the majority. And he doesn't like to be stopped in any of his plans. So he's going to struggle domestically, not because he cares about the Republicans. He has never been a Republican. In his first term when he arrived, he wasn't a Republican. He was against Hillary Clinton and then the Republicans adopted him and he adopted them in one way or another. And then suddenly he speaks in their name because he's supporting the Republican and bringing congressmen and congresswomen to be voted for, and he supports them, he supports the Republicans. So for him, it is, to a certain point, important, but that's not going to stop his plans. And what can be his plans in Iran? To manage the MOU, not to solve it, not to apply it, to manage it. So if the Iranians are saying we want 24 billion now, who would give them three and say, no, I'm not giving them anything, but I am allowing them to buy food and medicine, which is something that has always been excluded in theory of all the sanctions since Jimmy Carter in 1979 until today, but never applicable, never applied. And because they were never applied, now we can say, well, I am applying the part of the sanction that said everything is sanctioned at the exception of the humanitarian part, which are food and medicine, and they can buy food and medicine because, as he said today, 91 million, I don't really want them to suffer and be without electricity. And suddenly he is merciful because he didn't think of the 47 years of sanction the Iranian people have suffered from due to the American sanction, not only Donald Trump, but you start from Carter to Clinton to Biden to Trump, everybody. So this is where we are at. He can manage the MOU. He can slow it down. And the Iranians are artists in that. They have the art to know what to give and what not to give and how much, what is the dose to give Donald Trump for him to be happy exactly as they had bombed him in 2020 during the attack on Ain al-Assad in al-Anbar when he killed General Qasem Soleimani. They informed the Iraqi that they were going to launch the missile, so the Americans took their precautions and they evacuated the base, most of them, not all of them, and there were no people who were killed. So even that, sending 16 missiles only, was kind of symbolic, but not enough. It was a hit. You hit the United States of America, but not enough to drive Donald Trump crazy and respond violently. So that is the rhythm that countries keep, particularly when they have suffered so many sanctions and are expert in warfare and diplomacy.
Speaker 2: I agree. Elijah. Thank you for jumping on. Thank you for the analysis and always an absolute pleasure to speak to you. Thank you.
Speaker 1: Thank you for inviting me. It's a pleasure.
reSee.it AI Summary
I can’t shake the timing: an LNG tanker hit on Hormuz, and hours after millions poured into Iran’s streets in mourning. Larry Johnson argues Iran should be met with full force during this period, skipping calibrated retaliation. With projections of 30–40 million in mass mourning, it feels like a Pearl Harbor moment. The Axios leak and Tehran’s reply only add fuel.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
AN LNG tanker on the Omani side of Hormuz reportedly took a projectile and caught fire, hours after millions poured into Iran's streets in mourning... The first ship hit in days, and the timing carries all the weight. Larry Johnson's read was blunt: retaliate during this mourning period and Iran skips the calibrated tit-for-tat entirely. Full force first, escalation math later. The crowds were already chanting for revenge. And those crowds may be the real story. Projections run to 30 or 40 MILLION across Iran and Iraq, on track for the largest funeral gathering in recorded history. Larry reached for Pearl Harbor: a strike that fuses a divided nation overnight, one he believes reshapes Iranian culture for fifty years. I posted that watching those processions made me feel lied to about Iran. It struck a nerve. Add the Axios leak of a senior official saying Bibi's war promises never came to pass, and Tehran's reply to Trump's bridges-and-power-plants warning, a several-thousand-year-old civilization answering a 250-year-old one, and the week feels combustible. On Ukraine, Larry was colder still: this gets decided on the battlefield, and the terms won't be Trump's. @NewSonof
Video Transcript AI Summary
The interview is delayed and then resumes, with discussion shifting to major international developments. On Iran-related negotiations scheduled for Saturday, July 11, Speaker 4 says the Pakistanis believe talks will resume by then, but multiple parties (Iranians, the U.S., Israel) can still disrupt events before that date. Speaker 4 says the first thing to check is whether the parties meet; if they meet, the MOU remains viable. He lists unresolved issues including failure of the United States to fulfill Article 1, efforts to control Iran’s duties under Article 5, Iran not relenting, and the issue of unfreezing assets. Speaker 1 adds that total relief of all sanctions is also still on the table, and raises the ongoing Lebanon issue.
On maritime activity near the Strait of Hormuz, Speaker 1 cites a UKMTO statement claiming the southern route is open again for all traffic, with a corridor expanded for day or night travel if ships keep AIS on, radar on, and lights on. The threat level is described as substantial due to mine danger areas and concern about naval forces hailing ships over VHF. Speaker 4 says he is monitoring ship tracking and describes container ships and other cargo vessels returning, with most traffic going through Iranian channels and only one or two via Omani channels.
The conversation then turns to a Netanyahu–Trump meeting during the NATO summit context. Speaker 1 relays an Axios report quoting a senior Trump official: Netanyahu made promises about the Iran war that didn’t come to pass, showing trust is broken, and the report’s leak is framed as significant. Speaker 4 references criticism of Netanyahu coming through reports attributed to Barak Ravid. Both discuss that any public warmth may mask deeper concerns, and they emphasize that what matters is what happens afterward. Speaker 1 worries about U.S. decisions that could greenlight Israel in Lebanon and undermine negotiations with Iran due to Israel’s violations of ceasefire and MOU language that Speaker 1 says is tied to Lebanon.
Speaker 1 describes conversations with people from Lebanon (Laith Malouf of Free Palestine TV, and Sharmeen Narwani of The Cradle) and explains his focus on what the Lebanese government is thinking. He argues the Lebanese government’s actions contradict the MOU Iran made with the U.S. regarding Lebanon and references leaked clauses that he says require the Lebanese army to disarm Hezbollah across all Lebanon, which he says could trigger civil war. Speaker 4 replies that the deal represented only a portion of Lebanon’s population, with the rest split among Sunni and Shia Muslims and the Druze.
Speaker 1 also relays an Axios item saying Netanyahu urged Trump to reign in Erdogan over increasingly anti-Israel rhetoric, and asked Trump to avoid approving weapon sales that would help Turkey modernize its air force. Discussion includes claims of mutual hostile rhetoric and disagreements between Israel and Turkey, as well as debate over whether economic escalation like oil pressure should occur.
A clip of Trump’s comments is discussed, describing threats to attack Iran’s infrastructure and promises about enriched uranium. Speaker 1 then reads Iran’s response, attributed to Muhammad Bagheri, criticizing the threats and urging respect, with a statement that the Iranian people are “strangers to the language of threats” and warning of response “in another language.” Speaker 4 says the language was prohibited in the MOU and frames it as a violation, while Speaker 1 counters that violations may not be expected to be perfect in an MOU context.
The transcript then focuses heavily on the scale of Ali Khamenei’s funeral as reported by Al Jazeera and other estimates: Speaker 1 cites projections of 14 to 20 million across Iraq and Iran over the entire period, and gives specific city estimates: Iran 15 million, Qom 2 to 4 million, Iraq 3 to 5 million, and Mashhad 7 to 10 million, with combined attendance projected around 30 to 40 million. Speaker 4 responds that the size indicates Sayyed Ali Mohammed’s unpopularity. Speaker 1 describes a viral post and a quote broadcast on Iranian national television from a person who says they were previously against the government, engaged in protests, and now begs forgiveness, portraying a shift in sentiment after the war. Speaker 4 compares the funeral’s impact to the U.S. unity shift after December 7, 1941, and says it will affect Iranian culture for the next 50 years. Speaker 1 agrees, adding that even critics may mourn and respect due to the defense of the country and the war’s narrative.
Israel/Iran-related moral and protest comparisons appear next, including discussion of alleged violence by Israeli police and prisons versus claims about Iranian guards. The conversation then reports a new maritime incident: Speaker 1 says an unknown projectile hit a Qatari-owned LNG tanker, Al-Raqayat, on the port side near the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz, causing fire with no casualties or environmental impact reported. Authorities advise vessels transit with caution, report suspicious activity to UKMTO, and Speaker 1 frames the incident as showing escalation risk despite ongoing negotiations.
On Ukraine, Speaker 1 relays comments attributed to Russian spokesperson Peskov calling it “a war,” and Zelensky’s statements about nuclear weapons as a form of security and vulnerability if lacking them. Speaker 1 connects this to reports that Ukraine may consider obtaining a nuclear capability and mentions a large Russian attack allegedly with drones intercepted but few or no missiles intercepted. Trump’s remarks are also discussed, including a claim that a 90-minute call with Putin and efforts by Trump could bring talks to an end, and that NATO summit discussions may help. Speaker 4 responds by shifting to arguments about escalation and retaliation patterns, then provides a long historical breakdown of Russia’s shifts in tactics and force posture: from early invasion framed as special military operation, to mobilizations, shifting operational focus (e.g., Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Pokrovsk), the Kursk invasion, and later expansion across multiple regions. Speaker 4 claims Kyiv has been struck repeatedly and discusses air defense failures, and he asserts Russia has reserves while Ukraine does not.
The transcript then returns to military, economic, and political pressures. Zelensky’s Financial Times quote is read: once attacks reach “1,000 flying towards Moscow” Putin will “feel it personally,” and farther from Moscow means closer to ending the war. Speaker 4 counters with skepticism about Ukraine’s ability to match Russia’s scale of attacks, and discusses glide bombs and claimed casualty impacts. Speaker 1 asks about pressure from energy infrastructure strikes and oil market impacts, while Speaker 4 says Russia exports increase, premiums are obtained, and the broader oil-market impact is limited.
Additional regional updates include Lebanon: the Lebanese president denies reports of meeting Netanyahu and says he would immediately leave if in the same room while Israeli attacks and violations continue. Speaker 1 also cites a Lebanese government preliminary report placing direct damage from the war between $3 billion and $4 billion, excluding indirect economic losses of $16 billion, and Speaker 4 responds by calling the deaths “priceless.” Yemen is described as a major development: Speaker 1 says Saudi imposed a blockade preventing Iranian airplanes from going to Yemen for the first time in 11 years, and Iran breached it with an Iranian Mahan air flight to Sana’a transporting injured people and a high-level delegation. The conversation frames this as strategically favorable for Iran, with proxy-war consequences and ongoing clashes linked to Houthi activity and Saudi-backed forces. Speaker 4 adds that Yemen heating up could affect Saudi exits through Bab el-Mandab and change logistics depending on where oil is being sold.
On Gaza, Speaker 1 discusses claims that Hamas government bodies resigned or were dissolved and describes other circulating reports (from Emirati outlets) saying these were false and that Hamas instead renovated an emergency committee into an interim committee led by Abdul Hadi al-Aqra (as stated). Speaker 4 accepts this alternative framing as more credible, and Speaker 1 says Hamas aims to expand political control in Gaza and the West Bank. Speaker 1 adds news that an International Security Force presence (described as Trump’s “peace” border force) may bring 20,000 personnel mostly from Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, and Albania, while Gaza continues to be bombed.
The episode ends with discussion of negotiation prospects: Speaker 1 argues Trump needs a political win after the Iran war and is more optimistic about Ukraine negotiations, while Speaker 4 says Europe may push confrontation with Russia and risks of escalation at sea. Both agree that the conflict’s end may happen while Trump is still president, but not on Trump’s terms, and they conclude after exchanging commentary on future tracking tools and other unrelated remarks.
Full Transcript
Speaker 4: You're late. I've been sitting here cooling my heels waiting for you.
Speaker 1: No, no, I was on time. I'm like, let me be late because I know Larry is going to be late because he's got a habit of being late now. But I'm like, no, I'm actually going to stick my guns and I'm going to be early. And I was early, but then I had camera issues. But I'm glad you're on time this time for a change. Yeah.
Speaker 4: You don't want to play that. I will wear you out.
Speaker 1: To be clear as well, I asked you to delay the interview by an hour. Technically, I'm late by an hour.
Speaker 4: That's what I'm saying. As long as you had something good to do, like eat, take a nap, all worthy endeavors.
Speaker 1: How's your day?
Speaker 4: It's been productive. Busy but productive.
Speaker 1: Do you see where to start? I think I'd start with the funerals massive, which you know already. Pepe, I know you and Pepe were talking about, Pepe was telling me about it earlier, that the negotiations are back in Pakistan and things are looking good on that front, correct?
Speaker 4: Well, the Pakistanis believe... They're going to be back in business on Saturday, July 11th. And my view is I understand what the Pakistanis believe, but they're not the only ones involved. Iranians have a vote. The U.S. has a vote. Israel has a vote. So there's a lot that could disrupt it before then. We'll find out. So the first thing you look for is do they meet? If they meet, That's a good sign. At least the MOU is still viable, and they are talking about it and trying to figure out how to move forward. Still a lot of issues unresolved, and failure of the United States to fulfill Article 1. That's efforts to try to control Iran's duties under Article 5, but Iran's not going to relent on that. The issue of unfreezing assets.
Speaker 1: the issue of really really total relief of all sanctions those are still on the table still need to be discussed and hammered out yeah there's the lebanon issue as well that is ongoing that one's a pickle um let me get hormones out of their way and also there's some important developments in ukraine as well today that's back in the headlines let's get hormones out of the way to give you an update there So the number of ships going through, according to Kepler, is still the same as it has been for the last few days, which is about a third of what it was pre-war. So on average, the last July 3rd to 5th is about 306, 108 ships altogether, 36 a day on average, which is far below 140 to 150 pre-war levels. And it's also...
Speaker 4: Well, I was just going to say, the ones coming out today went through the Iranian channels. There's only one or two that may have come through the Omani channels.
Speaker 1: Yeah, your friends at the UKMTO put out a statement saying that the southern route through the Strait of Hormuz is open again for all traffic. The new Joint Maritime Information Centre advisory says the corridor has been expanded and ships can move through day or night as long as they keep their AIS on. Radar's going and lights on. The threat level is still substantial with a mine danger area to watch for any naval forces hailing ships over VHF. Checking in with whatever the rest of the comments is. So they're saying or they're claiming the Omani side is open. We'll see, obviously, on the marine tracker, your favorite website, which you're probably opening right now to see if any ships are going through.
Speaker 4: Oh, no, I've been actually monitoring it here. I'm just looking to see. You've got a variety. You've got container ships. Here's a Batuman tanker that's headed out. Its destination just says for orders. That's called the Virage. And then you've got the Sun Unity. That's going to Singapore. That's a general cargo ship. And the Cassian, which is a container ship going to China. Zhuhai. so you know you're getting you're getting uh some traffic back up to normal and it's not all oil it's container ships and and other cargo vessels yeah so that's on the straight home there's nothing too significant there obviously that still is being negotiated um the other big point upon a big big point to discuss is the netanyahu trump meeting
Speaker 1: A few reports on that front. Also, some of the comments that Netanyahu has been making. Let's start going through the reports before Trump's meeting with Netanyahu. There's the NATO summit that is happening right now that links to Ukraine. So we'll get back to that because it's going to be a lot of talk about Ukraine. But in terms of Bibi meeting Trump, a senior Trump official told Axios the following, quote, Bibi Netanyahu made a bunch of promises about the Iran war that didn't come to pass. But what can we do? He'll come, he'll make his promises, and then we'll have to check everything out. So it shows that the relationship is very different to what it was before. Trust has been broken. And that report by Axios. It's interesting that it's important to note that it's actually being leaked. Remember that Axios gets leveraged by the Trump administration to advance their their objectives or to send a message that they want known. So for someone to leak this means the Trump administration wants the world to know that they don't trust Netanyahu anymore. So it's pretty significant there. As we've been seeing that happen for a while.
Speaker 4: Yeah, and the reports coming through a former Unit 8200, you know, clearly an Israeli military operative. Oh, Barak Ravid. Yeah, Barak Ravid. I'm presuming that's who provided the report.
Speaker 1: Um, not sure, but I think that, I think the, the, uh, I think access gets leveraged more by the Trump administration. I'm sure he's pro IDF pro, uh, unit 80, 200. But if you look at the reports, they've been very critical of Netanyahu in recent weeks and months. Um, and it's a, it's a us publication. Like if they put, if they start screwing Trump at the behest of Israel, I think Trump would just go after the publication.
Speaker 4: Right. No. So, but it's, you know, I don't think you'll see a public fight or chill between Trump and Netanyahu. It'll appear very warm and friendly.
Speaker 1: I think so as well. It's what action that matters. What will happen afterwards. That's what really matters.
Speaker 4: Well, I know if the Israelis are expecting Trump to authorize new military missions, I don't see that happening.
Speaker 1: Not to say they can't, but the U.S. is... No, it's more like giving Israel the green light in Lebanon. That concerns me.
Speaker 4: And if they do that, then that, again, will undermine the U.S. negotiations with Iran on Saturday. Because Israel... Israel's violations of ceasefire and the MOU are probably, you know, that's all, the first paragraph is all about Lebanon.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Lebanon is a tricky what's happening there. I was speaking to a gentleman based in Lebanon today. Actually, I spoke to two people from Lebanon today. Laith Malouf from Free Palestine TV. Yeah. Maruf, yeah. And I also spoke to Sharmeen Narwani from The Cradle, the news outlet. So she's, I don't know, she's the CEO of one of the reporters, I think the editor-in-chief of The Cradle. Yeah, you know The Cradle, the news outlet.
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, yeah. They do a good job.
Speaker 1: Yeah, so she was on the show. It was a good conversation with both of them. And the main thing I was really trying to really understand is the deal that the Lebanese government, even I was speaking to Trita Parsi about it, like today, my biggest focus was trying to understand what the hell the Lebanese government is thinking, because I'm not able to really make sense of it, like the logic behind it. And my conclusion is something happening behind the scenes that I don't know about. There's some discussion. Maybe the Iranians have hinted that they might stick to defending Hezbollah, but not South Lebanon. Or maybe there's a relationship between the Lebanese president prime minister and the U S that is deeper than we think. Maybe there's a threat to their life. I don't know what it is. The other explanations are they're naive. There's just stupid politicians, but I don't think so. You know, these politicians are pretty, usually pretty astute. So I don't know what I'm talking about is the deal that the Lebanese government made with Israel contradicts. the MOU that Iran did with the US when it comes to Lebanon. And also the clauses that leaked a couple of days ago, which essentially they were clauses not released in the initial draft of the agreement that I think Israeli media leaked, which screws the Lebanese government, to be honest. And essentially says that the Lebanese army should disarm Hezbollah across all of Lebanon. That's literally the formula for civil war. So that worries me.
Speaker 4: Well, they've only got Let's call it a third of the deal. Whatever deal that's signed with Joseph Aoun represents only a third of the population of Lebanon. The other two thirds are basically between Sunni and Shia Muslims and the Druze. So the odds that you're going to get a full agreement
Speaker 1: and you know it's not going to happen so it's just it's an agreement that's never going to be put into effect yeah the lebanese army cannot disarm hezbollah they just don't have the capabilities correct um in other news by axios as well israeli prime minister netanyahu urged trump in a phone call on friday to quote reign in erdogan the turkish president over his increasingly anti-israel rhetoric quote one u.s official said Netanyahu made an ask, and then the president heard him, adding that Trump might relay the message. Quote, hey, can you just get a little easy on this? When the two leaders meet during the week's NATO summit. Netanyahu also asked Trump to avoid approving the sale of weapons systems that would help Turkey modernize its air force. Israel has always been one of the hurdles, if not the hurdle, for Turkey getting those fighter jets and other military equipment. And now Trump is dangling that carry. He's considering giving these parts of these fighter jets to Turkey, approving that sale. It's been a saga going on for many, many years since before Trump's administration. And now as they start considering it, we talked about this about a week ago, Hexeth and Trump made comments on it. Netanyahu is trying to sabotage that deal. There is that power struggle between the two countries, Turkey and Israel, and the hostile rhetoric between the two.
Speaker 4: Now, I don't know why Turkey puts up with this for one minute. They control oil going into Israel. Cut it off. Just cut it off. And tell the Israeli, you're not getting another drop of oil until you apologize and stop making threats against us. Otherwise, screw you. But again, it goes to the level of corruption of people like Erdogan. They talk a tough game, but when it comes to actually doing something, they roll over. They're like a turtle on its back.
Speaker 1: No, I think also why, to be honest, I wouldn't advocate for them cutting off the oil. I think unless they do it for a different cause, to pressure Israel when it comes to Gaza, et cetera, then I would understand. But when there's this, Turkey's like, oh, Israel, we're going to go march to Jerusalem, or they're saying, Turkey, the president is a maniac, whatever, he's a... He's a Nazi, whatever they call him. I think these war of words, keep it at that. I don't think they should escalate into economic warfare just because they're fighting each other in the political landscape. Plus, Turkey's economy is taking a hit. The currency is taking a hit, et cetera.
Speaker 4: Oh, really? So let's take it to a different level. Let's assume that you are providing me a critical service that allows me to make money. And without you, I couldn't make money. And so every time you had me on your show, I'm calling you, you stupid motherfucker, you asshole. Would you continue supplying me with that service? I don't think so. In fact, I don't think you'd have me back on the show.
Speaker 1: But can't Israel go to Saudi or Azerbaijan or another country and get their oil from there, one of the Gulf countries, the UAE? No, because...
Speaker 4: are they going to get it there oh okay they can yeah they go to saudis and saudis are saudis aren't going to supply them maybe maybe the uae might but uh you know the pipeline and stuff that comes through turkey turkia and you know from there it's an easy drop down it would i guess it would dramatically increase the cost the shipment costs my only point is if you're in a relationship with somebody even if you're not the best of buddies, there has to be a fundamental level of respect. And everything that Israel does vis-a-vis Turkey is complete disrespect. And the Turks put up with it. So I don't want to hear them complain about anything.
Speaker 1: But Erdogan is being pretty hostile towards Israel too. So when Israel started attacking Turkey and criticizing Erdogan, I had one of my guests and he was telling me about how, talking about what Erdogan has been saying about Israel. So I looked it up. It goes both ways. Erdogan is saying Turkey can march through to Jerusalem and talking about how Israel as a state shouldn't exist or words like that. So I think he's not a saint either.
Speaker 4: It's not like Erdogan is being like a nice… I've never argued a saint, but before he was making any threats, Israel was talking about Turkey as the next enemy, their next… Once we dispatch, dispose of Iran, we're going to take care of Turkey. So that was just out of the box, the first provocation.
Speaker 1: I don't know who started the war, so I can't comment on that. For me, the one that bothers me more is when Israel uses that rhetoric against Egypt. Egypt is nothing compared to Erdogan. They're not making any statements similar to Erdogan. They've been very patient. They've been cooperative with Israel. So when Israel makes those statements towards Egypt, for me, I'm like, shut the hell up.
Speaker 4: Erdogan, I don't know who starts here. They're getting paid. Egypt's getting paid a ton of money by the United States. True, true. So, hey, you know, they just talk to him like some prisoner talks to his, you know, enforced girlfriend in prison. You know, just shut up, bitch.
Speaker 1: I've got a clip here from Trump. If you can play that, Lisa, today. If you can play that quickly and I'll read out the response from Iran's secretary of the SNSC, the Supreme National Security Council.
Speaker 4: I got it.
Speaker 1: I think it's the Supreme National Security Council. I'm just guessing here. So he did a response. So Trump said he should put out a statement. If you can play that, Lisa, please, with the audio. He put out a statement about
Speaker 2: about iran um he's back to the his old rhetoric so that was in a press conference earlier today close to maybe making a deal i don't know we'll make either look we're going to win one way or the other we're either going to make a deal or we're going to finish the job okay and it won't be tough to finish the job i'd rather make a deal because I don't want to affect 91 million people. We can knock down their bridges in one hour. We can knock out their energy supply, all of those big plants that they built, big, beautiful, modern plants that had a lot of money. They don't have any money now. We haven't given them any money. But we can knock out their electricity and power-generating plants in, I would say, a small part of an afternoon. Every plant will be gone. And they know that.
Speaker 1: and we then freed up the black so this is um he's making the same threats as before then he says we're going to be getting uh the dust the enriched uranium the nuclear dust i went for one reason very strongly that iran cannot have a nuclear weapon i'm not looking for regime change although although this is regime change the first regime is gone the second regime is gone and i think the third regime is more reasonable but we'll find out um it's the same rhetoric as always i just don't think it has the same impact if any impact at all um and iran i'll read out iran's response i'll get your thoughts uh so this is uh muhammad baggers to the delusional president of america who today threatened 91 million iranians i say Before this, as the president of a rootless country with a 250-year history, you had spoken in similar language about wiping out Iran's several thousand-year-old civilization. And the result for you was nothing but defeat, desperation, and a request for negotiations and a ceasefire. The Iranian people are strangers to the language of threats. So speak to the people of Iran with respect. Otherwise, we will respond to you in another language." So that's Iran's response. They're not really in the best mood right now in the midst of the funeral to be talked to like this. Give them at least one week break from talking like this.
Speaker 4: Well, again, that language was prohibited in the MOU. It was prohibited to threaten the other country. And here again, Trump's violating the MOU. So this is where I think at some point the Iranians are going to have to make a decision. Is it worth sticking with this? Because, you know, Trump violates it at every turn.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but I think those violations are... Like, we never expected the MOU to be abided by perfectly. You know, if you violate... I know it'd be nice, in theory, it'd be nice. Like, it's an MOU, you stick to it word by word.
Speaker 4: In theory, that would be nice to see, but... Well, again, the violation was not some minor, you know... failure to follow protocol. The United States violated by attacking, physically attacking Iran, and now continues to physically, to verbally threaten it, and continues to refuse to expel Israel from Lebanon. You know, that's just the first paragraph.
Speaker 1: All right, let's go into the funeral. Al Jazeera says the funeral is projected to become the largest funeral gathering in recorded history. There's millions of people there. One estimate says over 14 million people. I saw another estimate earlier as well. It's a massive funeral. The number is massive. If you could play videos of the funeral, Lisa, it would be great. Just without the audio, let me see the number I saw earlier. I didn't save it, but I think I can find it. There was a number of 14 to 20 million across Iraq, Iran, over the entire period is estimated to hit that number. Let me see if I can find it. Anyway, millions and millions of people on the streets. Okay, there it is. The funeral in Iran and Iraq is on track for a combined total number of 30 to 40 million people in attendance projected over the entire period. I think it ends in a week or so. Iran is 15 million, Qom is 2 to 4 million, Iraq is 3 to 5 million, and Mashhad is 7 to 10 million.
Speaker 4: You see, Barry, see what you're failing to see here. This proves how unpopular Sayyed Ali Mohammed was. Because instead of getting a majority of Iran out there in the streets, he's only got 40 million. So, you know, clearly he is unpopular.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I put actually a post that went viral. I don't know if you saw it. I was in an interview when I wrote it. but I put a post that says, after watching the size of Khamenei's funeral processions, I feel lied to about Iran. I expected a lot of people, and I obviously knew the media is going to paint Iran in a negative way because that's how media warfare, I'm sure Iran will paint the U S in a, in a misleading way to send their message across on every country does it about the other China, about the U S the U S about China. But, um, I didn't know it was to that level. Um, I really didn't expect, I understand also there's the impact of rally around the flag. There's actually a quote there's, it was on TV. Someone being interviewed. I saved it just for our discussion. So there was a video of people in a neighborhood, um, called, um, uh, So it's a neighborhood that's famous for having a lot of anti-Islamic Republic protesters and populations and heavy riots, a hotbed for riots. And there were people on the streets supporting Ali Khamenei and mourning his death. And then there's one person said the following on TV in an interview. And I think this is a really important quote that I wish more Americans would read it. Quote, To be honest, I was against the government. I still disagree with some aspects, but I used to engage in protests, and I have even set government property on fire. I want to beg... I don't know if this is a legitimate quote or not. It is on Iranian national TV, so people could take it with a grain of salt, but I think it's important nonetheless. I want to beg for forgiveness. I was completely wrong. Our minds were corrupted by false promises of those who do not care about us. The war was an eye-opener. They used... They used us and discarded us like cheap waste. Kamenei is a thousand times more honorable than the dog Pahlavi or his American masters. I never saw a person more Iranian than him. Today, I'm here to honor him. And please forgive me, dear sir. I wronged you. I was wrong. I don't know what to do except cry. I'm sorry. It's a pretty extreme statement. I read it briefly earlier. It's that extreme. But it does reflect the sentiment that even people... that are against the government, critical of the government, they're secular, they don't like the hijab, they don't like the IRGC, they don't like the religious police, whatever, all these different things. They like the concept of a democracy, the Western world, whatever. But after this war, they'll still be on the streets as a sign of respect. A lot of people would see that these leaders that they hate sacrificed their life defending the country against an aggressor that wasn't there to defend them. An aggressor that threatened to wipe out their civilization. So I think this is one part of the big strategic loss that the U.S. has faced that a lot of people in the U.S. and the West don't really understand or won't realize. And it will be felt for many, many years.
Speaker 4: But not only that. What this represents, this will affect Iranian culture going forward for the next 50 years. This is comparable to what the United States experienced on December 7th, 1941. You know, prior to that attack by the Japanese, a surprise attack like February 28th, a surprise attack, there was great division in the United States even about entering the war in Europe to fight against Adolf Hitler. As soon as December 7th happened, that surprise attack, as FDR called it, a day, that shall live in infamy. The entire mood of the United States flipped 180 degrees. There was unity about the war. That's what happened in Iran. If you think about it, people who are, let's say, 54 years of age barely have any memory of that war because, you know, you know, it was 40 years ago. So, you know, basically, you got to be about 55, maybe 54, to have a good memory of that war. Otherwise, you have no memory. Now, you've got an entire new generation that has this as a permanent memory. And, as you said, we don't have an event in written living history. in the last 2,000 years, 3,000 years, 4,000 years, that compares to what we're seeing with 14 million, maybe up to 40 million people coming together to mourn one leader. And remember, that leader was a reformist. He was the one that lifted the restriction on women having to wear hijab. So, you know, he made a number of important social concessions. Um, so this, the lingering effects of this are going to transform not only Iran to transform the Middle East and transform the world. It is, I think it is that important of a, of a shift.
Speaker 1: I agree with everything you said. I still would. Um, and I don't want to discount what they did in January. what i believe they did in january i still my position is to the way they govern i hope they reform the way they govern i don't think they will especially when they're aggressive they might double down on it but i'm still not a fan of what they did in january the people that died in january whether it's four thousand forty thousand um well it was i mean let's be serious it was not forty thousand by any stretch i don't think it was yeah and this was a provoked insurrection funded by the cia funded by the brits
Speaker 4: from outside forces. This was not an indigenous uprising. This was deliberate, provoked, including the economic collapse. And if somebody did it, I guarantee you, if Iran did that to the United States, we'd be stacking the bodies here.
Speaker 1: I'm sure Mossad and CIA were definitely involved. But I think in every protest, there's always going to be people that are there that So it's like most protests, there is a popular uprising, and it just gets hijacked by outside forces. Now, to know exactly what percentage are hijacked, what extent, et cetera, I have no idea. I can only pretend to know.
Speaker 4: ANTONY PASSEMARDER- January 6, case in point. You had literally hundreds of FBI human assets interspersed in the crowd. Hell, they even brought over Ukrainians that were connected with the neo-Nazis to be there in the crowd. Those were flown over by the Democrats. And then you had US military special operations, you had CIA. It was all set up, designed to provoke and to create a narrative. It was not organic. One of the reasons there was such hatred towards Iran going back to 1979 is, The overthrow of the shawl was purely an organic movement, very rare. It was not carried out by some external support funding from some external asset. This was entirely the, if you will, a real people's uprising.
Speaker 1: You sure it wasn't Russia behind it? Because we tend to blame everything on Russia as well.
Speaker 4: Well, of course. Remember, that would have been the Soviet Union. They were to blame.
Speaker 1: So the joke applies. The joke applies.
Speaker 4: They were too busy getting involved with Afghanistan. Again, tempted, baited by the United States, by Zbigniew Brzezinski. So...
Speaker 1: Look, if you can play that clip, please, Lisa. Netanyahu does a great job of explaining why the government of Iran is still standing. I think he's got a really good analytical explanation, Larry, that you'd enjoy listening to.
Speaker 3: The other thing is we've had over 13,000 strikes on them. You've had over 8,000 strikes on them. Why is that government at that point? The other thing is we've had over 13,000 strikes on them. You've had over 8,000 strikes on them. Why is that government still standing?
Speaker 0: because it has a few hundred thousand goons who kill, murder in broad daylight and at night. They murder their own people. They've murdered and maimed over 40,000 of their own citizens. And I think that's the reason they're in power. That's the same.
Speaker 1: So it is 40,000, Larry, you got it wrong.
Speaker 4: Yeah. Listening to Bibi, you know, the projection inherent in Bibi Netanyahu describing the murders that he and his fellow genocidists have committed in Palestine, in Gaza, in the West Bank, in Lebanon. There we've got actual documented murders. As Professor Morandi has pointed out, we've got the names of the ones who were actually killed during these outside-inspired riots, and several of them were police officers, members of the security service who were killed by these people that had been armed and equipped by CIA and outside intelligence assets. So it is, you know, again, that was the first attempt. That was the first bite at the apple. They basically already agreed to take the second bite, which took place on the 28th of February.
Speaker 1: There's one more clip I want to play, actually. But there's something, actually, I want to ask you, I'll make a point that someone's made to me. It's a good point. I'll probably get criticism from this for anyone that's not a fan of Israel. And they say to me, they're like, Mario, you might disagree what Israel has done with Gaza and other countries, but when it comes to their own people and protests on their own streets, they haven't gone there and started gunning people down. What do you say to that statement? So, you know, the big protests before October 7th.
Speaker 4: And neither has Iran. So it's just one lie. They've actually, you can go back and find Israeli police beating protesters, beating Israeli citizens. But then, you know, you want to open up what happens in Israeli prisons. We've got zero evidence that Iranian guards are raping prisoners and using animals to rape them. We've got ample evidence of that with respect to Israel. The Israelis just need to keep their mouths shut. Every time they open it, they end up indicting themselves.
Speaker 1: I've got a breaking piece of story. Iran just attacked a ship going through the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz. And most likely the Qatari owned LNG tanker Al-Raqayat that was going through the Omani side. Just came in now.
Speaker 4: Let's see if it shows up on the map here.
Speaker 1: Yes, the Qatari one. It's called Al-Raqayat.
Speaker 4: Can you see it? Don't see it right now. Al-Raqayat. There's a garage. I only see one. Well, there's one that's not identified by name. It just says satellite position. It's an auxiliary ship. It is just... We don't know when.
Speaker 1: I'm not saying it was done just now. Maybe it was just being reported now. The UN, you know, they're reporting about it. What's the time? Report time 9 p.m. 22119 UTC. Which is what exactly? What time is it? Let me see. What time is it now? UTC time. It is right now. So two hours ago. So the attack was two hours ago.
Speaker 2: Just been report.
Speaker 1: Reports coming now. A tanker has reported being hit by an unknown projectile on the port side, causing fire. If you can show that image on the port, the Omani port, actually, right next to the Omani port. If you can show the image here, at least on screen, this one there. No casualties or environmental impact reported. Authorities are investing. Vessels are advised to transit with caution. Caution, report any suspicious activity to UKMTO. So there's a fire on the ship as well. And it was traveling southbound. So it was traveling on the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz. So the power struggle is ongoing in the Strait of Hormuz as the negotiations continue. It's nothing... I know it's pretty significant because no ship has been attacked for many days, but that's been happening. Can you zoom in on where it was attacked on that red dot? Just zoom in on that red dot a bit more. Go down. Zoom in on the red dot there. So that's on the Omani side. This is where it was attacked, that red dot there on the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz. So, yeah, for anyone that thinks that we're out of the woods and the war is completely over, you know, that's not the case. Negotiations are ongoing and there is no solution for the Strait of Hormuz. um yeah let's let's go to um um ukraine um a few things so alex christopher mentioned something to me that's interesting he said to me yesterday peskov said quote the war he referred to this as a war which he doesn't do that often he's done it before but not that often he said there is a war going on this is a real war it started out as a special military operation It continues as a war because behind Kiev stand Berlin, Paris, The Hague, Oslo, and unfortunately, Washington. So that was Peskov yesterday. Zelensky said about an hour ago, without nuclear weapons, you are no longer part of the club that others fear attacking. Instead, you can become part of the club that can be attacked. And that reminded me of something Brandon Weicker said to me a couple of days ago. He believes that Ukraine is considering getting a nuke themselves, which is a big red line for Russia. And this is a concern that Brandon has, and he's been telling me about it for the last few days. So that comes after the big attack yesterday by Russia against Ukraine. And Trump said the following. He had a call, a 90-minute call with Putin, and he said the following. The reporter says, Putin, shortly after speaking to you on July 4th, struck Kiev and killed innocent civilians. Why does he keep feeling any pressure after speaking with you? And Trump says, well, I think he does feel pressure. He wants to end it, the war. And Ukraine wants to end it. And we're in talks. And we'll see if we can get it ended. I ended eight wars and this was, in my opinion, going to be an easier one because I know both heads. I think we're getting much closer than people realize. Putin wants it to end. I will tell you that very strongly. We had a very good call. Zelensky actually wants it to end. We're going to be going to the NATO summit and we're going to be talking about it and I think we're going to get it ended. So that's Trump being very optimistic again about ending the war. Meanwhile, you've got yesterday a massive attack that Politico says none of the missiles from Russia were intercepted this time. Only drones were intercepted by Ukraine. You've got Zelenskyy talking about how being part of the countries that have a nuclear weapon, he's implying that not having a nuclear weapon makes you vulnerable for attacks. And in a way, nuclear weapons are the best form of security. And Peskov reiterating that this is a war, not a special military operation. So mixed messages on that front. We'd love to get your thoughts.
Speaker 4: Yeah, well, the United States does not have the military power to open the Strait of Hormuz. And with all this other background noise, like right now, the likely – if the United States chooses to respond by launching A-10s against Iranian boats in the strait, then ron's going to turn around and launch back at at the bases for i think likely this time at the basis from which uh those ships those airplane aircraft were launched which means jordan so then you know we'll be i'm glad you're sticking to that point we completely moved on from what the us would do after a ship is attacked i forgot every single time that happens the us retaliated so i'm glad you let's let's let's talk about ukraine later if you could
Speaker 1: I'm glad you did that. I was confused why you're talking about Iran. It's because we moved on too quickly. So yeah, please go ahead.
Speaker 4: Well, no, I'm drawing the parallels with the retaliation. So Russia, in the same vein, they're retaliating. They have escalated. If you go back and trace out the evolution of the war, In the first year, Russia invaded with 125,000, 150,000 troops. They treated it as a special military operation. The goal was to get a negotiated settlement, which they did achieve, and then it was sabotaged by the United States and the UK. Then in September, you had Ukraine launch this counteroffensive that pushed Russian troops out of Kharkiv in the north and left the Russians where they were in a deficit of troops because they had, I think, about 50,000 contract soldiers that the contract was up, so they walked away. So Russia had to quickly mobilize reservists. They mobilized a total of about 400,000. There were two separate mobilizations. And then from that point, the face of the war changed. So in 2023, the focus was on taking... They had one military focus, taking Bakhmut. Then in late 2023, they started working on Avdiivka, and Avdiivka extended into 2024. They took Avdiivka, then they started on Pokrovsk, and it was in the fall of 2024 that the Ukrainians invaded Kursk. So then, by 2025, basically from September of 2022 until then, now January of 2025, Russia was continuing to build up its forces. But they continued to treat this as a special military operation, which means they did not mobilize society, they did not go on a total war footing. And yet in 2025, we saw Russia, instead of being able to only focus upon one campaign, they started expanding. So now we get into 2026. Now they are conducting major military operations from Sumy to Kharkiv to Donetsk to Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson, so six areas. They've been built up – they went from 150,000 troops in Ukraine to over 700,000, and that's even been acknowledged by Sersky, the head of the Ukrainian army, and now we've had in this last week, the language has changed. And Peshkov, instead of talking about special military operation, is talking about war. And the attacks that Russia promised to carry out in Kyiv have in fact been carried out. So, and they destroyed, they hit one factory. I'm told that there was evidence of depleted uranium in the shells that were going off. They were cranking off. It cooked off for over a minute. So this is now the second time in a week that Kyiv's been hit by, as they say, this was the largest strike ever. And at least in this one, they finally admitted they don't have air defense and the air defense didn't work at all. So this war is rolling on towards an inevitable conclusion. The difference between Ukraine and Russia Russia has reserves of it just already in the army, reserves of at least 800,000 fresh troops, trained, ready to go. Ukraine's got 600,000 troops. They do not have reserves. That's the difference.
Speaker 1: And because you started talking about the – I know we kind of jumped to Ukraine – We have that ship that was also just attacked in the Strait of Hormuz because you're talking about escalation. Every time Iran attacked a ship in the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. retaliated and struck Iran. This is right after the funeral. They're obviously in a very different mindset to what they were before. If the U.S. retaliates in the next 24 to 48 hours, do you think Iran would respond the same way, tit for tat, without escalating? Yeah.
Speaker 4: No, Iran's going to respond. they're hit they will respond uh there were people there were people uh in the crowd chanting according to professor mirandi revenge revenge i've seen the videos yeah there was but do you think everyone will retaliate as they did before because before they would retaliate in a de-escalatory way or yeah yeah no i don't i don't i i think they will they will they will retaliate with full force without concern for whether or not it escalates or not. Because again, if the United States strikes them during this period of mourning, they won't put up with it for a second.
Speaker 1: Okay. So that's on that front. And then going back to the Ukraine front, I want to read out something Zelensky told Financial Times. Zelenskyy told Financial Times that Ukraine's expanding long-range drone campaign is intended to bring the war closer to Russia's leadership, arguing that sustained strikes on Moscow will eventually force Putin to, quote, feel it personally. I'll read out an excerpt from the article. Quote, when it is no longer 100 drones, but 1,000 flying towards Moscow, he will understand, Zelenskyy said. adding that once he begins to feel it personally, you will see advisors urging him to relocate somewhere beyond the Urals. Discussing operations against Crimea, Zelensky said Ukraine has demonstrated, quote, what it means to operationally control the sky at a specific point, at a specific time, with the goal of striking military bases, air defenses, logistics hubs, and other infrastructure supporting Russian missile attacks. He concluded, quote, The farther away Putin is from Moscow, the closer to end the war we will be.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean, he's delusional. Do you think Ukraine can mount an attack on Russia that would be even one-tenth the scale of what Russia hit Ukraine with last night? No. Absolutely not going to happen. So, You know, the West needs to stop indulging in this fantasy that Ukraine can somehow put Russia on its back foot and Russia's going to say, oh my God, we can't handle this. All it's going to do is – and let's assume that Russia's attacks on Ukraine have the same effect on Ukraine. It makes Ukraine angry. The question comes back, what can they do about it? It's Ukraine that's got the limitations on ammunition, on drones, on artillery shells. They certainly don't have any glide bombs. I mean, for God's sake, over the last three years, Russia's dropped between 125,000 and 135,000 glide bombs. And if you've watched any of the videos of those, they're launched from 50 miles to 100 miles away, and they come in and they hit targets. where the Russians believe there are concentrations of Ukrainian troops and the buildings are literally obliterated, including the troops inside those buildings. And so just think of it this way. If there were just four troops in each of those buildings and 135,000 drones, that's over 500,000 casualties right there. Just with the glide bombs alone. And I guarantee you that the casualties are actually much higher than that. Uh, given, you know, when you're talking about a 6,000 pound bomb, it's, it's, it's enormous.
Speaker 1: If you can show that image Lisa sent you, that's the energy infrastructure that was struck by, um, the targets that was struck by Ukraine in Russia, um, from, um, so, so far this year. Till June 30th, that excludes the last six days. And we know that Russia's importing refined crude from India. I think other countries as well. I'm not sure if you've seen those reports from a few days ago. So do you think that pressure incentivizes Putin, maybe mildly incentivizes him to end the war, to accept some sort of deal? I'm not saying desperately forces him, but it plays a role in incentivizing, say, you know, I can continue, but let's just stop that energy, the impact this is having on the oil market, because, you know, you've seen the footage of people lining up, et cetera.
Speaker 4: But it's having zero impact on the oil market. The only area where it's having an effect in some areas of Russia, there are gas shortages. One from Russia. some of the damage done to refineries, but two, from panic buying. But at the same time, Russia's exports of oil are increasing, not decreasing, increasing. And they're getting paid, you know, a 20 to 40 percent premium on each barrel. They're doing fine. They're making money off of this.
Speaker 1: They're making money on crude. No, but they're importing the refined oil from India.
Speaker 4: Yeah. which is okay. So they're importing it from India. So the impact will be pretty minimal. Yeah. The fact is, I think you talked to Stanislav Kropivnik. He got into some areas of the Donbass coming back where they were out of gas and got to other places where there's plenty of gas. So it's been hit or miss. I'm not suggesting that Russia is not suffering any damage from that. Yeah, they're suffering damage, but they're not suffering the kind of damage that undermines public support for the war effort. It is the kind of damage that ends up pissing people off saying, go kill the motherfuckers. That's what's going on. Intensifying political pressure to wipe out Ukraine. I don't think that's in Ukraine's interest. you optimistic at all that they'll be able to wrap it up that trump will be able to make a difference this time around more than alaska no trump's irrelevant trump's gonna have his own he's gonna he's gonna have his hands full trying to deal with an economic crisis at home and uh you know the well Putin made nice with him the other day. He said they had a pleasant conversation. Great. But Russia has made it clear, this is not going to get settled with negotiation. This is going to get settled on the battlefield. And once they take Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, remember, when they started this war back in 2022, this special military operation, Russia only controlled like 55%. of Donetsk, now they control essentially over 90%. They've got the two remaining towns which are basically fortified defensive positions, Kramatorsk, Slovyansk. And you've got predictions all over the board. Some predict it'll be taken by the end of August, end of September. Others say it'll stretch into 2027. regardless of how long it takes, they're going to capture that. Once they capture that, then Russia's entire battle plan changes. It's no longer about securing the Donbas, securing Kherson, securing Zaporizhzhia. They'll secure Dnipropetrovsk, they'll secure Krasumy, they'll secure Kharkiv, and ultimately I think they'll secure Odessa.
Speaker 1: Reuters put out a report yesterday A European intelligence assessment warns that Russia could face an explosive banking crisis as lenders shoulder the growing financial burden of the country's war economy. The report points to rising bad loans, mounting household debt, and increasing pressure on banks despite continued state support, warning that additional Western sanctions could expose deeper vulnerabilities. Russian officials have dismissed the assessment, insisting the country's banking sector remains stable and adequately capitalized. What would happen to Russia if they get sanctioned again, Larry? They're on the verge of collapse. One more round of sanctions and that will be it, no?
Speaker 4: Can we agree on a deal that for every one of these reports about the implosion of the Russian economy, I get paid 50 bucks? At that rate, I'm going to have more money than Elon Musk. Plus, let's not forget, Russia is running out of missiles. Their soldiers are having to fight with shovels and they're having to scavenge computer chips.
Speaker 1: refrigerators and washing machines just in order to stay in the war um i'll read out another support here by aljazeera moscow's message to europe on ukraine stay out of the conversation you have nothing to add russia's foreign minister so lavrov publicly declared european nations incapable of offering constructive solutions to end the war A dig that lands harder given Europe just spent weeks running to fill US military gaps in NATO. That's ironic because just in the meantime, there was a report today on the NATO front. And Mark Root said, according to the Wall Street Journal, that the alliance and NATO's focus has shifted from increasing defense spending to rapidly turning new funding into military capability. Root said European defense spending. So is it Rooty? Rooter? Rooter. Rooter. Rooter. Ruta said European defense spending is now rising so quickly that production capacity is becoming a bottleneck with around $300 billion in weapons already ordered from US companies. A year ago was all about promises. This year is about delivery, he said, adding that government must expand industrial capacity and accelerate production. This is very rapid militarization happening or weaponization happening in Europe. Started obviously after the war in Ukraine, but really accelerated now with Trump's
Speaker 4: pressure you don't think so well no i mean they say they're accelerating it with what you know most most of those weapons systems that they want to accelerate with require rare earth minerals where are they getting those china's not selling it to them so yeah again they're they're in the they're in a world of self-deception self-delusion uh and if they decide to ramp up and to basically Go to war with Russia. Be prepared for, you know, Russia's not going to hold back. They're not going to wait until these countries have somehow rearmed and now are prepared to attack Russia. Russia will preempt. They will strike.
Speaker 1: All right. So on the Ukrainian front, let's see what else we have. Obviously, we have Russia advancing towards Kostantynivka, which is the first city that will capture in that defensive position.
Speaker 4: They've already captured it.
Speaker 1: Sorry, sorry. They're already not advancing towards it. They've already captured Kostantynivka, 90% of it. Ukrainians say there's some, you know, they haven't captured all of it, but we've seen that back and forth all the time.
Speaker 4: I mean, the Ukrainians, they still haven't admitted that Avdifka and Bakhmut have been taken. So, you know, they lie about this. The reality is the Russians have got, you know, control of, you know, complete control of the city. You know, are there one or two pockets of you know, let's call like Japanese soldiers hiding in the jungles of New Guinea. Yeah. There may be a few of those hiding in some buildings somewhere, but they're going to be rooted. They're not, they're not going to retake the city. That's the point.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. That's, so this is what we've seen the whole saga go on with Pokrovsk. Like it essentially fell, but there's a few pockets there that put up a strong defense and, and, that would just delay of what the exact date would be of when Pokrov's fallen. So it doesn't really, the bigger picture doesn't really matter. It's fallen, it's a matter of time when it's between 85 or 95% and 100%. But yes, the more important point is that this is the first major city in that defensive belt of four cities to have fallen. And that makes it very significant in the war. That belt is the biggest leverage that militarily speaking that Ukraine has. Before that, it was Pokrovsk. After Pokrovsk fell, the next step would be that defensive belt.
Speaker 4: Yeah, look at the... I'm not sure what percentage. The combined territory of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, I think, represents only 8% of Donetsk, which means the Russians now control 92% of Donetsk. They went from 50%
Speaker 1: 2022 to now almost they're closing in on 100 percent um on a completely different front i'm going through a fair bit of news today um let's go through lebanon there was a report of the president of lebanon meeting netanyahu a lot of people were up in arms and he put out a statement today to lebanese media saying there's no truth in reports of a meeting with netanyahu i am not considering it and i will not respond to it as long as the israeli attacks against lebanese citizens and violations in their territory continue if we were to find ourselves in the same room i would immediately leave so the president was a good decision politically um Also, the Lebanese government releases first preliminary report of the cost of the war, this war, placing the damage between $3 billion and $4 billion, excluding indirect economic losses, which make up $16 billion. Fucking hell. So that's on the Lebanese front.
Speaker 4: And how do you put a price on the 4,000 plus dead Lebanese men, women, and children? Yeah. That's... That's priceless.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Big news on the Yemeni front. So Iran, for the first time ever, breached. There was a blockade done by Saudi of Yemen where no Iranian airplanes could go to Yemen in or out. For the first time in 11 years, Iran has breached that blockade. An Iranian Mahan air flight landed in Sana'a, transporting 200 injured people and a high-level Yemeni delegation from Ansarallah, to Iran. So that's pretty significant. I spoke to one of my guests about it early in the morning. I don't know if Saudi okayed this, or they did it despite Saudi not wanting it done. So I don't know whether, I don't know what's diplomatically happening behind the scenes, but we are seeing the consequences of the war ending in Iran's favor, Iran winning this war strategically. We're seeing in Lebanon, them doubling down on Hezbollah. We're seeing that in... haven't seen much in syria and iraq and we've seen that mainly in yemen there's also though a power struggle we've talked about it more and more and now it's you know there's there's the houthis that made a move against the south the saudi-backed forces trying to capture some territory so the clashes i can i want to say have begun because that yeah that civil war hasn't really ended but they're continuing And I think that will be a good barometer on the Saudi-Iranian relationship. The more things flare up there, the more that I think there's disagreements or flare-ups or lack of agreements between Iran and Saudi. And if things quiet, it means the diplomatic negotiations between the two countries are going well. But I think this is one of the fronts of the proxy war is already in motion.
Speaker 4: Yeah, you know, if Yemen heats it up, you know, they can shut down the Saudis exit at least through the Bab el-Mandab. Saudis will have to exit only through the Suez. Now, if they're selling most of their oil to Europe, okay, that won't be a big deal. But if they've sold a lot of it to Asia and they can't get to Asia quickly, that's a whole other matter.
Speaker 1: Yeah, this is what makes Yemen so important. And this is the image of the plane that went out of... Yemen I went all the way to Iran and we there were reports about it we spoke about it briefly where there was the um the sound of fighter jets over Yemen and then the Yemenis said the Houthis said their air defenses were active we saw footage footage of it we spoke about it briefly a few days ago that was about this plane that was being um the Saudis were trying to intercept it according to the Yemenis maybe I don't know if they're bullshitting and the fighter jets were Saudi fighter jets for another reason but um Yeah, I think this is going to be a very, very important front. And poor Yemeni people. They're suffering. Yeah. Fucking crazy.
Speaker 4: Yeah. You know, the Yemenis, never count them out. They are a bunch of hard warriors.
Speaker 1: The last question I want to ask you, do you know much about what's happening in Gaza? I'm seeing different reports, but I haven't really spoken to anyone about it. Have you had time to look at what's happening there?
Speaker 4: No.
Speaker 1: no i mean the um i know that one uh a ruling council resigned yeah exactly and i got different reports this one of them says they've resigned the hamas delegation resigned the dismantling of some committee government work committee and the israeli saying alleged resignation of hamas government in which all its members remain in their positions is a spin and has no meaning whatsoever hamas fears that it will be declared as the one violating the agreement and therefore it is stalling and doing spins and then you've got report here In other reports, circulating reports originating from Emirati news outlets of Hamas announcing the dissolving of governors of the Gaza Strip is false and misleading. Instead, Hamas has announced a complete renovation of its emergency committee into an interim committee to be led by Abdul Al-Ghagha, whatever his name is, Abdul Hadi Al-Aghra, the former deputy, whatever. So I think just some political stuff.
Speaker 4: That sounds more credible. Because I don't see him resigning and then what, leaving a vacuum? No, I... think that their actions are such to you know again expand the control of hamas politically in gaza strip and in the west bank and ultimately they want to have credibility there as well yeah um that's it we've cleared all the news including some of it from yesterday uh that i thought would do today um an interesting one here is that on the gaza front there's one more piece of news
Speaker 1: There's a deployment of the ISF, the International Security Force. I'm trying to guess what it's called. But this is the force that's part of the peace, the border peace that Trump set up. 20,000 international stabilization force personnel, mostly from Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Albania, arriving in the coming weeks to Gaza. Also, no concrete is being allowed to Gaza. So there is some movements there. Also, Gaza is still getting bombed all the time. We'll see what that leads to. I wouldn't hold my breath.
Speaker 4: Yeah, but the presence of those troops will ease a lot of the pressure on the Palestinian civilians. And it's going to create another point of friction between Trump and Netanyahu.
Speaker 1: Yeah, because Trump needs a win. He needs something after this Iran war. That's why I'm more optimistic on the Ukraine negotiations more than Alaska. Because in Alaska, he's like, yeah, I'm going to get a win. He's very too optimistic. Now, he needs something, especially as he gets close to the midterms. He needs a proper war that he's ended. The whole narrative of, I've ended many wars. He can't sell that anymore after what happened in Iran. No one knows about any war he's freaking ended. Everyone knows when he became president, all he promised was to end the war in Ukraine. That hasn't ended. And he started a war with Iran that he managed to end, thankfully, for now. So he needs to end the war in Ukraine to be able to get at least part of that image of being the peace president again. So I'm hopeful he might go the extra mile in making it happen. But I'm definitely, you know, I'm not definitely... not where i was you know a few months ago when it comes to the iran war that optimism towards ukraine not there but um well i was gonna say but what is it what is it you think he can do to quote in the war in ukraine i think both okay my position on ukraine that i'm still i'm a lot more flexible in that position because i'm i'm you know It's just much harder to really read what's happening there and what's happening on the ground. But my position is both Zelensky and Putin want to end the war. Zelensky is more desperate to end it. Europe, they're starting to realize that, hey, this can't go on forever. Our economies are screwed. The war in Iran should have been a big wake up call. Trump is screwing us. We're on our own. We need to really focus on our economies and we can't continue sustaining this war. I think more and more of these pragmatic voices are rising and because they have to politically. All the parties that are starting to gain momentum, the AfD, Le Pen's party, are parties that are critical of the war. So I think Europe is slowly waking up. They're going to be the slowest. Trump needs a political win. And he's obviously, US is the country supplying all the weapons. So there is leverage there if Trump is willing to use it. And Zelensky is pretty desperate. So I think it's just about Zelensky accepting the compromises necessary and for Putin to accept ending the war. And this is where a bit of a push from the US and maybe Europe could get us there.
Speaker 4: Europe is pushing for confrontation. And that's heated up between Russia and Europe. Like the incident three days ago with a German boat that tried to interfere with a Russian tanker. the russian uh cruiser came up and ran it off so you know i think one of these days what we're going to have is there's going to be an exchange of fire something's going to get out of control and they're this would go into a shoot shooting war that worries me yeah well it should i i just think pragmatic voices will eventually prevail here uh because
Speaker 1: the people are really, the votes is what matters. These politicians need these votes. And when people are just turning against Merz and Macron and all them so quickly and all the British politicians, but mainly Merz and Macron in this case, you know, eventually they will have no choice. So they won't be in power anymore. If AfD is able to continue garnering more and more support, that's it.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I think, I admire, I admire your optimism.
Speaker 1: You don't think it will end on the Trump's administration in one way or another? Do you think it will end while Trump is still president?
Speaker 4: Yes, it will end while Trump's still president, but won't end on Trump's terms.
Speaker 1: Then we agree. I'm in that same camp. We agree.
Speaker 4: Hey, we've not had a lightning bolt from heaven, so that's good.
Speaker 1: Larry, thank you so much. Pleasure to chat to you again.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I always enjoy our conversations and I was watching with Chris Martinson a little bit earlier.
Speaker 1: The one from yesterday. Yeah, that's a nice one.
Speaker 4: I thought that was from today. Or you must have posted a short clip from the conversation from yesterday.
Speaker 1: Yeah, the conversation was one hour. So if the clip is shorter, it means it's just a clip. And then you're going to check Marine trackers.
Speaker 4: Or vessel finder, doctor. I like vessel finder. Vessel finder. Okay.
Speaker 1: Vessel finder.
Speaker 4: That way you can click on the ship and it automatically show you the ship's name. Do you watch football? Yeah. You got the United States that I play in. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Do you want me to tell you who just scored the goal? Yeah. Who? Okay. I don't want to know. Belgium scores the first goal against the US.
Speaker 4: Oh. Well, Sam, I've seen one of these commercials, shown all these commercials about the world, global fans watching the football games. This one beefy guy comes out of his house. He's got his television in his hands, tosses it into the swimming pool.
Speaker 1: Did you see the red card fiasco in the U.S. where Trump interfered? That's fucking wild.
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah. It was, well... A lot of good it did. It didn't stop Belgium from scoring, did it?
Speaker 1: True, yes, yes. That's what makes this game so significant because the U.S. now has the player that is not meant to be playing. So if the U.S. wins, and especially if that player has a role in it, people will be fuming. I forgot about that.
Speaker 4: That's all you got to have is some more controversy. We just need something else to fight about.
Speaker 1: Let's people forget Epstein. No one's talking about Epstein. Have you noticed? No one's talking about Epstein. It's always the Iran war, the World Cup. This guy called Jeffrey Epstein, he's the guy that killed himself in jail.
Speaker 4: Never heard of him. All right, Larry, I'll talk to you soon. All right, buddy. Take care. Bye. Take care.
Speaker 1: All right, guys, this is it for today. I'm sure you've enjoyed the conversation. Let me see if there's any interviews. There's one interview today. The lady from The Cradle, the journalist from The Cradle, first time she was on the show. I think you'll enjoy that conversation. She knows a lot about what's happening in Lebanon. So if you're interested to know what's happening there, check out the conversation with Sharmeen Narwani. That was my first conversation today. It's on the live section. Then I spoke to a favorite of yours, guys, Elijah Magnea afterwards. It was a great conversation. Then I had a short conversation with Trita Parsi. It's been a week he hasn't been on. He took some time off. Pepe Escobar was after that. Then we had Alex Kristoforou to talk about the Russia-Ukraine war. Then Laith Marouf, he's been on the show before. Then we had Larry Johnson. So hope you enjoyed today's coverage and I'll see you as always tomorrow. Thanks, everyone.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m trying to unpack who’s really making decisions in Washington now. Karen’s argument is that Trump isn’t governing alone; it’s a tight “Trump Board of Peace” of family, White House loyalists, and inner-circle figures like Kushner and Witkoff. New ideas get filtered through this group, concentrated in finance, defense contracting, and Israel. She contrasts an old military-industrial complex with a new one of AI, data centers, and surveillance. Hegseth’s Pentagon pick is about loyalty and optics, not merit.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Karen Kwiatkowski and me try to unpack who's actually making decisions in Washington right now. Her core argument: the real governing body isn't Trump alone. It's what she calls the "Trump Board of Peace," a narrow circle of family, White House loyalists, and inner-circle figures like Kushner and Witkoff. Her read is that new ideas don't enter from outside. Everything gets filtered through the same small group, heavily concentrated in finance, defense contracting, and Israel specifically. Her sharpest distinction is between the old and new military industrial complex. The old model built ships and tanks and employed people. The new model is AI, data centers, and surveillance infrastructure that costs billions and employs 50 to 85 people. That disconnect, she argues, is quietly reshaping domestic politics, and why an anti-war, anti-elite message is polling stronger than establishment Democrats expected. On Hegseth running the Pentagon: not a merit pick. A loyalty and optics pick. And she thinks that alone tells you how Trump actually staffs power. @karen4the6th
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation centers on concerns about U.S. policy choices and their effects—especially regarding potential censorship laws (Section 224), the regional consequences of the Israel-Iran conflict, and how information access and domestic politics are shifting perceptions.
Chris is described as “incredible,” and the claim is made that Section 224 “seems like it’s going to pass.” If it does, the speakers say it would be an “obvious stupid bad thing” for the United States and the average person, raising fears of government control over speech and censorship. The concern is amplified by context around Bibi visiting Trump early next week and Trump’s remarks connected to a “massive funeral” attended by “nine million people.”
The speakers discuss the scale of mobilization and compare it to U.S. experience, recalling large marches in the past (such as “million man” style events). They connect such mobilization to how people in Iran and Israel might perceive the U.S. and Israel after the war’s human costs.
A key theme is the ramifications of assassinations and violence. The speaker compares it to how assassinations of leaders (including Martin Luther King) can generate widespread crowds even among people who did not previously support the targeted figure. They argue that the U.S. and its policies are understood differently internationally, especially in a society where religious leadership holds symbolic and inspirational authority. They describe the Ayatollah as a figure likened to a “Moses” role who embodied suffering under sanctions and years of leadership, and they say Americans do not typically think about “religious leader” symbolism in the same way.
Another theme is how misperception and informational bubbles can drive harmful decisions. The speakers say Trump may be genuinely surprised by reactions to him, or may be saying it politically, but either way they emphasize the danger of ignorance and misinformed assumptions. They claim the war was expected to be quick but escalated into years and decades, and they cite street chanting such as “death to Israel and death to the US,” along with vows to avenge the “dear leader” and target President Trump.
They contrast the logic offered by 9/11’s perpetrator(s): they say the stated reasons included U.S. death and destruction in the region and U.S. bases in “holy land” (Saudi), as well as support for Israel and harm to Palestinians. They argue that instead of changing foreign policy, the path was “doubling down,” and they question when disengagement from the region will happen. They reference alleged U.S. moves such as negotiations and actions in Lebanon, plans involving Al-Shara, discussions of dealing with the Houthis, continued work on the Iran deal, and efforts to enforce U.S. control over the “Strait of Homs.”
On regional posture, one speaker argues the U.S. is “retreating” eastward rather than all the way back, including expanding or maintaining military footprint across areas like Lebanon, Gaza, Israel, and Jordan, and repositioning to allow Israel to operate without refueling during bombing runs. They say Rubio’s trip to Gulf states did not change much: the claim is that Gulf states nodded and thanked him but continued balancing foreign policy regionally.
The speakers then discuss Trump’s decision-making, describing a pattern where he does not blame himself and attributes issues to others. They argue Trump’s relationship to Netanyahu is complicated: they say Trump is aware of Netanyahu’s unpopularity at home and that Trump “does not associate with losers.” They also connect Trump’s interest to longstanding ties, money, and friendships involving Zionists. They speculate Trump may call Netanyahu or possibly cancel Netanyahu’s visit, framing it as potentially non-deferential and strategic.
They broaden into critique of war’s domestic drivers. The military-industrial complex is described as shifting toward AI, computing, information technology, and “totalitarian surveillance” systems that yield profit for a few but do not create many jobs. They argue military transition away from construction/shipbuilding reduces employment compared to earlier eras. They also claim Congress is incentivized by these structures, and that as fewer people benefit from defense work, voters become more discontented with elites and war spending.
The speakers connect these dynamics to political changes, including the idea that Americans don’t want war and that the Iran war was unpopular from the beginning. They argue that despite years of messaging, it became even less popular after the war began, forming a “true America first” perspective. They discuss potential political consequences, including third-party possibilities and an “America first” alternative, citing figures like Perot as historical comparison and arguing new coalitions could emerge among anti-war voters, health-system critics, young independents, and disaffected Democrats and Republicans.
They also discuss a possible ceasefire or reduced hostilities while asserting that “nothing’s changed” based on rhetoric and actions, including Netanyahu statements about maintaining a “security zone” and claims that Trump did not ask Israel not to take action against tunnels or demolish villages (described as “fake news”). They mention Gaza reconstruction being conditioned on “disarmament and demilitarization.”
A discussion turns to retaliation psychology and the U.S. response to attacks on Trump. One speaker says that if a country killed Trump and bombed a school, “that country will be wiped out,” and they claim Americans might widely cheer such a response due to anger and accumulated distrust in government narratives about war.
They emphasize that modern connectivity changes information access, making it harder to sustain war narratives, and they cite skepticism built from past wars (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan) and Gaza-related developments. The conversation also includes examples of public celebration after violence against high-status figures, including the asserted reaction to the killing of a United Healthcare CEO.
Finally, the speakers discuss Iran’s likely forward trajectory after the current conflict. They say that as long as further escalation is avoided and the U.S. continues withdrawing rather than intensifying regional commitments, “we’ll be fine,” while recognizing that demands for “justice” will remain. They suggest Iran’s internal cohesion is driven by patience and guidance attributed to Hamonet, and they argue they do not see mass Iranian attempts to restart regional war. They conclude with the belief that nothing would cause millions of 16-to-24-year-olds to rush into recruitment offices, and that such an outcome is not expected.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Except a little depressing listening to what Chris was talking.
Speaker 1: He's incredible. Yeah. It's something I'm discussing more and more because it's just true. He told me at the beginning of the conversation that Section 224 seems like it's going to pass. So I'm like, if Section 224 is going to pass, one of the most obvious stupid bad things for the United States, for the average person, like if you go to an average American on the street and say, hey, there's a section that says X, Y, Z, and that's going to pass and become law. They'd be like, no freaking way. You're making shit up. No, no, it's actually about to pass. If that passes, how the hell are we going to prevent censorship or having that, I wouldn't say autocracy, but kind of that level of control by the government that we believe will never happen in a country like the United States that is based on the foundation of liberty and freedom is, yeah, it's concerning. And now, and it all started with the visit, because Bibi's visiting Trump early next week. So that's never a good thing. And then you've got also Trump just a few days ago saying about the funeral. So that was a massive funeral. You saw the funeral for Adi Khamenei, yeah?
Speaker 0: Yeah, I can't even.
Speaker 1: Nine million people.
Speaker 0: Yeah, that's what I saw. That's one-tenth of, the population just under one 10th.
Speaker 1: So imagine that in Washington, that would be like 35 million people coming to DC or would you ever have we ever seen that in the United States, that level of mobilization for anything?
Speaker 0: No, I remember maybe it was under Obama where we had a million man March and they used to have there for a couple, three years, we had million man marches and I forget what they were about. probably civil rights or something, but could have been anything. Anyway, they didn't quite make a million. They were almost a million, you know, and that was kind of the target goal. And I think they don't have those, but that's less than a million. That was probably the biggest thing in my lifetime. So this is just incomprehensible, really. And then you see that, yeah, from a distance, and you see where people, it's crazy.
Speaker 1: But they're- Like maybe the government was not popular before, but like this is the cost of this war. Like all these people, how do you think they look at the U.S.? A lot of people in Iran used to love the U.S. and so many of them Israel too. How do you think they see the U.S. and Israel now?
Speaker 0: Oh, yeah. I mean, that's what assassinations of political or civil rights leaders, you know, Martin Luther King, his assassination brought out crowds. I mean, people felt that even now. people that didn't even support Martin Luther King, they still felt like they'd been personally attacked, and that wasn't from another country. Can you imagine if another country had come in and killed an American figure, whether 60 years ago or right now? It's just, I think we don't understand the ramifications of our policies, and we don't even try to because it's very easy to understand them. You just, you know, look at some case studies, and this is totally, I think, predictable, you know, and also, I was watching some of the guys, English speakers who are there, broadcasting stuff, and one of them had some pictures of parts of Tehran that had been really destroyed, hit hard, and not, you know, haven't had a chance to really build them back. And, you know, you think about the number of average Iranians that have also died, and, of course, the children. You can't get away from the Manab 168, but it's not just that. I mean, they've had other... families and children, men, women, and children targeted. So they've lost a lot. And they lost their leader. And this is almost, I mean, it's understandable in some ways. In another way for Americans, though, it's not understandable because this is their religious leader. We don't have an American religious leader. I think Trump with MAGA, maybe he thought he was going to do that. But we don't have a single religious leader in the United States that that everyone respects and honors and feels connected to and has confidence in. We don't have anything like that in our country. And so when we took out, when this assassination was executed, you know, we took out not just the political top dog, in a sense, but the religious inspirational leader, the one who puts together what it means in today, in this day and age, what it means to be and Iranian, you know, and also he's the symbol of all those years of suffering and sanctions and everybody saying bad things about Iran. And he led his country through really a desert, you could say. So like a Moses figure almost. And Americans, we don't think in those terms. We don't, you know, we have freedom of religion. That means freedom not to have a religion. That's what a lot of Americans think about. And they don't, we don't even imagine that, countries like Iran even exist, where they are not just bound in a political state structure, but they're also bound in a religious construct. And, you know, it's interesting because the Christians, the Jewish communities, the other religious communities that exist in Iran all have representatives here. They're all paying, you know, their respects and homage to the Ayatollahs. So, yeah, I don't think, I mean, It's like our government, I mean, why do we have highly educated and highly paid people in government? Don't they know that this, don't they, I don't think they even have any concept. Trump seems very surprised. Oh, I thought everybody hated him. How can he possibly be that stupid, that ill-informed, even on his own, but much less with the whole system of U.S. intelligence and U.S. policymakers able to communicate to him? And how could we all be that stupid? It just makes...
Speaker 1: it's it's very very it's it's incomprehensible really yeah it's concerning for when i saw him say that um there's like two theories for me i'm like either he he's just saying the truth he genuinely is surprised or um he's just saying it because politically you know he's just he's just saying things just political um just trying to make a point But if it's the first, if he was genuinely surprised by this, it concerns me because you worry that the person that has so much influence around the world is actually living in an information bubble. And I don't think people understand how dangerous it is to be misinformed, the dangers of ignorance. When you have someone making decisions, you know, thinking, hey, if I kill their leader, they're all going to collapse like Venezuela, I'm going to control their oil. Decisions like this lead to sorry, false assumptions like this lead to decisions that have severe consequences. The consequences of this war was meant to be a quick four day war, whatever it is, one week, two week war. It gonna be fought for years and decades. As I said, those millions of people gonna have the wrong perception, not wrong, a very negative perception of the US. They're actually chanting on the streets, death to Israel and death to the US. And some of them saying, we're gonna avenge our dear leader and kill, go after President Trump, et cetera. You've just created that hate in millions of people. And I was telling Chris earlier that 9-11, Osama bin Laden, when he gave the reasons, when someone does something evil, you don't want to ask him, like, hey, why did you just freaking do this? And he told the world, he's like, hey, I did this because the US is causing a lot of death and destruction in our region, has bases in our holy land in Saudi. That's our land. It's Muslim land. And it's killing a lot of Muslims through all these different wars and back all these different proxies. And number two is the support for Israel, which is doing what it's doing to Palestinians in the region. And that only got worse since, by the way, just to be clear, that was back then. And 20 years later, look where Palestinians are at. So instead of learning from this and just trying to change our foreign policy or America's foreign policy, I feel like we're just doubling down on that path. And to what end? When will things change? That's a big question. When will we really disengage out of the region? We thought we'll disengage. The US will disengage after this war with Iran. Well, there's a new deal that the US signed up to in Lebanon. Get the hell out of Lebanon. Let the Lebanese figure it out. You've caused enough mess. There's meetings with Al-Shara trying to figure out a plan there and telling Al-Shara to go into Lebanon. There's talks about how to deal with the Houthis, visits to the Gulf regions. continuing work on the Iran deal and trying to enforce America's control over the Strait of Homs unsuccessfully so far. And now Bibi's going to Trump. Trump should even just say no to Netanyahu's visit. Like, you visited me last time. You got me into this freaking war. Let's just have a phone call. Let's avoid meeting one another.
Speaker 0: Well, Ben Gavir didn't go. Ben Gavir didn't go to New York. You know, he canceled his New York trip to arrest him. So I think there's some things that we don't measure if we only look at what the government policy makers are doing, because clearly, yeah, we are expanding military footprint in Lebanon, in Gaza, in Israel, in Jordan, beefing up the base we have in Jordan there. Where else? You know, so we're, but we are in a, I don't think Rubio's trip was successful in telling the Gulf states what they need to do. I think they pretty much nodded and thanked him and then continued to do what they were going to do, which is to balance their foreign policy much more closely with their neighbors and with the regional. So I think that is happening. I think our retreat is right now eastward, not all the way back to Washington, but eastward at least into the, you know, where Israel can fly an airplane, drop a bomb, and not have to be refueled on the way back. We're moving to that. So we are seeing a little bit of a shift. in our foreign policy. The language and the leadership has not woken up to what everybody else in the world is waking up to. You know, Trump, well, first off, Trump has, I think, you know, we talked about this before, you know, his whole Karg Island thing was invented in late 1980s, and he never let it go. He never let it go. It was like, you know, I got a good idea, I'm going to hold on to it. for the next 50 years or whatever. And he did. Okay. He says, once he gets an idea that he thinks is good, then he checks that box.
Speaker 1: Do you think Netanyahu can play on that card to try to convince him again on Iran? Does that worry you?
Speaker 0: Well, no, I actually, I think Trump, you know, he likes to, well, Trump never blames himself, right? Trump never makes a mistake. It's always somebody around him who's done something wrong. They've told him wrong or they let him wrong or they were in it for their own business. They didn't flatter him enough. That's why he didn't listen. Whatever it was, it's never him. It's always somebody else's fault. So he is not happy with Netanyahu. And I've said this before, but Netanyahu is not a winner here. You know, he's very unpopular at home. Trump is, now this is something Trump is aware of. You know, he doesn't understand his potential enemies or people that he wants to attack or regime change. He has no interest in, how those countries actually work or what they think. He didn't care about that. But he does have an interest in Israel, partly because Israel, Israelis, Zionists have given him a lot of money. He's benefited from them throughout his whole life. So he has a connection there. Many of his friends, his son-in-law are avid Zionists. He trusts them. So he pays attention to Israeli politics. And Netanyahu is very unpopular. You know, Trump tells the nation, I'm the most popular guy. He's still out on a, you know, all his speeches are like, look how great everything is. And you watch him if you're an American and you watch him, you go, well, that's not true. That's not true. What do you mean a jobs economy, stock market? That's how you make, he said he made all his money because the stock market went up. I mean, my God. So a lot of people don't believe what he says, but he's big on how popular he is. But he does know, He does pay close attention to how popular Netanyahu is not, which he isn't. I mean, his government, they're going to have elections. I'm not saying Netanyahu's coalition couldn't squeak through, but basically he's not popular. Trump knows this, and Trump does not associate with losers. This is Trump's, this is just his operational policy. If you're a loser, I'm going to humiliate you, publicly torture you or whatever. I'm going to have fun with you like a cat with a mouse, but I'm not going to I'm not going to really hang with you. I'm not going to defend you. I'm not going to help, you know, try to make you more popular than you are. This is why we see this all the time when he endorses in primaries or when he makes an endorsement in a domestic race. He always waits until the numbers pretty well show that his candidate is going to win, and then he doesn't. So in some ways, he's not a risk taker. And I think he may call Netanyahu. He may end up canceling Netanyahu's visit or have a visit with Netanyahu that's not the typical You know, I pull out my chair in the Oval Office, and, you know, it's all deferential. So because Trump is a blamer, and I think Dan Yago is getting some of the blame for this. Trump, I mean, I'm just saying this based on what he's been saying, you know. Well, look how much we've done for Israel. Vance is echoing some of this. You know, we've done everything we could possibly do for Israel. They should show some gratitude. Remember when Vance said that a couple, three weeks ago? So this kind of messaging is, is floating around in Trump's head. So this visit may not be- But it just depends.
Speaker 1: So I've been saying what you're saying, but that's based on looking at it from the outside. And then there's another way of looking at it. In other lenses, some people say, what does Netanyahu have on Trump? Other people say, how much influence does Netanyahu and the lobby have on Trump? Other people say, how much does Trump even matter really in those conversations? How many of the decisions does he make versus others in that beast, in that system that is the United States. So there's all these questions that are up in the air that make it difficult. I don't know. I feel like if it was just Trump calling the shots, then why did we even get into this war? If it was Trump that said no more forever wars and I want the Nobel Peace Prize for ending wars, how are we even here?
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, we have the Congress also bought and paid for. They like the war. The military industrial complex supports them. They like the war. So there's a lot of folks interested in making money in war. But that also assumes that you are going to make money. You know, there are systems that, well, there's two things going on, I think, in our military industrial complex. One is this outrageous amount of money going into not just AI, but computing and information technology of all types. And that is not, you can make a lot of profit there. but ultimately your manufacturing of that is zilch, okay? It's not like a job creator, okay? So as the military industrial complex needs fewer people, employs fewer people at home. Yeah, sure, there's still profit for the guys at the top, but you're not actually employing a bunch of people. And that's a problem because we hate the rich. All countries that have poor people pretty much look at the rich folks that are skimming off the top, particularly in government with government contracts. They don't like them. Like if I say Alex Karp, Most people who know who he is have a negative perspective on this guy. And he's not the only one. Peter Thiel, who, you know, is a fellow libertarian, I guess, or what he was years ago. Peter Thiel's a bad guy. Most of the people that hate Vance, the main reason they hate him is because he's a product of Peter Thiel. His political career was subsidized by Peter Thiel. So anyway, these guys who are working kind of for the new totalitarianism in our country, That's the next phase of the military industrial complex. They're not popular. And Congress can't do everything it wants for them because there's no job benefit to do that. You know, these data centers, nobody in America wants data centers. And it's not just because they use up your water and drive up your electricity bills. It's also because you can take a massive data center, put it somewhere, and they say, well, how many jobs are we going to get for all those billions and billions of dollars? And it's like anywhere from 50 to 85 people. And what are those jobs? Well, they're kind of like air conditioner repairmen, okay? They're walking around, making sure all the systems are running. These are not high-tech jobs. So data centers have a problem in selling how great they are because they make profit for very few and they don't create jobs. So our military transition is away from construction of things because we don't have the, we've abandoned that for the most part. It's gonna take decades to really get shipbuilding back or sub-building back. And we certainly can't beat what the Russians, the Indians, the Chinese can do. We can't beat that. So we're going to be doing more purchasing with our military dollar, more purchasing, more IT and totalitarian surveillance type stuff, which is a huge profit for a few people and very few jobs. And so when you wean people off of those government, those defense jobs and the baby boomers start to die off and they're not worried, they just care about their social security check, they're good. Then you have people disconnected from their government, which is how you get revolutions. And Congress knows this. The Congress members know this. You're seeing it all over in these races. How in the world did the Democratic Socialist win the Democratic primary in Colorado? Well, how did she do that? Well, it's a Democratic district. So she and the Democrat argued Democratic principles. And she had the lead on justice. She had the lead on democracy. Our government should not be taking our tax dollar and murdering babies in Palestine, bombing countries for no reason, and enriching the elites, right? That's the democratic socialist message. Guess what? Very popular. It sells. And if you had a bunch of people in a military town who were all making money off the military base and lots of people had good jobs making weapons, old-style weapons, then they would fight back. They would say, no, no, I like this. But they can't fight back because those jobs aren't there. As we blew up all of our antique stuff, both in Ukraine and lost a lot of what we thought were good systems and technologies, they were shown not to be as effective, and they got blown up. Pete Hedgeseth wants $2 trillion to redo military acquisition. But what's he going to do with that $2 trillion? Let's assume he gets $2 trillion, even if the Israelis get half of it, right? Because it's a whole different issue, the Israelis in our system. That's also the totalitarianism that's coming. We'll have to deal with it. But the money that Pete Hedgeseth will spend, a lot of it's going to go to the AI and the IT stuff, which doesn't hire a lot of people, doesn't create jobs. AI can write your code. I mean, you can hire an AI company with 10 people and they can do what 1,000 or 2,000 people might have done before that, or maybe 100,000. I don't know. We also are going to have to upgrade into drones. Well, how do we do drones? It's off the shelf, commercialized, get an LLC, buy somebody else's stuff, stick an American part on it, and now you have an American drone, right? Or we copy, like we did the Shaheed drones, we copied those. So that also does not create a lot of high-paying jobs. That manufacturing, that kind of manufacturing is just like with cars and other things. You've got robotics to do it, computers to do it, 3D printing to do it. You don't need people working at that. So that money that Trump is going to pour into the military, that headseth wrote a really insane article about how great the military was and how they were going to use all that money and how accountable they were for, you know, that is not going to equate to jobs. And so now you have further disconnection between D.C. and the five wealthiest counties in the United States around D.C. and then all the rest of the people. So Congress depends on those people to vote for them. And that's the wild card. That's what Of course, AIPAC and Israel are worried about that. That's why they have to spend a million dollars to do Hasbara, to make sure people are not alienated by Israel or whatever. But this connection, these congressmen, and it's not just the ones that are in that are hoping to get reelected. It's their competition. It's their competition like that Democratic Socialist. It's the competition like Mamdami. You know, you're like, oh, how could New York do that? Well, I don't know how New York could do that, but guess what? Apparently, something Mondami said was way more appealing than what the other guy said. So why was it appealing? Why would, you know, knocking the elite off of their ivory towers, why is that appealing? Because really, I mean, capitalism, we tolerate it. It's not a bad thing. But when it becomes abused and then it becomes a target of why I don't have anything, why I have all the student debt, whatever your thing is, then politics change. And so Congress will respond to that. And we will elect a president, perhaps, or have one that almost gets elected in 2028, who is going to tap into that, much like Trump.
Speaker 1: But then what happens is when that new president with that messaging similar to Mamdani takes the office and then reverts back to the same policies, because remember, Trump was that person. Then people will just completely lose their shit, because I think people are just... On the edge, they're just really fed up by voting different person every time getting the same results.
Speaker 0: Yeah, they are fed up with it. And I'll tell you, I watched your really fantastic interview with Barnes, with Robert Barnes.
Speaker 1: Oh, Robert is great, yeah.
Speaker 0: And he's like, he says, oh, it won't be 2028, it'll be the one after that probably. But we are in a place of, you know, we're transitioning. Our country is changing. And actually, something has already changed, which government is not adapted to. And that is Americans don't want war. This Iran war was unpopular from the beginning. And even after some people, you know, we had 13, supposedly 16 casualties or something. But even after that, you know, and all the political Fox News, everything, you know, war, the war, we have to beat these terrible Iranians. And of course, we did not beat them. But I'm just saying at no point, Did that war become more popular with Americans than it was? It became even less popular after the president started it, after the deep state started, after Israel started it. So, you know, that's different. That's different. That is a fundamental coalescing of a true America first type of perspective in this country. That's got to be dealt with. And if they don't deal with it, that's right, it will be revolutionary. And I don't know, I hate flop cameras. I thought Chris was talking about you know, the flock cameras and stuff, but you know, people, if there's anything that people can strike out at, and obviously we're not going to go shoot all the elites. That's not something a few might do that very few, but how many people or teenagers or old folks are able to take out a flock camera? And I don't mean take it out, just damage it so that it doesn't work. Those targets are everywhere and they're not protected except obviously by other flock cameras, but, um, you know, this movement is very, it's very interesting. And it's not necessarily good, but it's just the way it is. Our government has alienated the people. But I agree with you back to Iran, though, that, you know, it's heartwarming and amazing to watch, well, and sad to see how the people are participating and sharing their grief. But at the same time, you're getting messages, particularly from the IRGC and others and the people with the down with America or whatever. They want, they, this is, this is the end of the grieving ceremony for the most part. Once this is done, then we go forward. We've finished the rebuilding and we deal with what's been done to us, not just to, you know, hominy, but to, the people of Iran. And there is a lot of language which is which Americans should totally understand that says we're getting even or we're going to take revenge.
Speaker 1: Just for people listening, what did the US do when 911 happened? Wars that killed 10s of 1000s of people hundreds of 1000s of people. What do you think the US would do right now if a country came in killed Trump and bombed a school?
Speaker 0: That country will be wiped out. We wouldn't play little military float your boat over there and try to blockade something. We wouldn't do that. No, I think our government is really irrational in so many ways. And so we would probably nuke them. We would turn them into a parking lot. And guess what? Probably if something like that happened, 70% of the population would cheer it. Maybe not 70. Maybe 20 years ago, 70. Now maybe at least 60%, maybe 55 would cheer it. There are a lot of people in America who understand there's a big difference between what Washington says wars are about and what they're really about. I mean, we have multiple generations of folks, Vietnam generation, the first Iraq war generation, second Iraq war, Afghanistan generation, and now our younger people who know everything there is to know about the genocide in Gaza. and yet are powerless to do anything about it. So you've got all these waves of people who understand that our government lies, and they lie particularly about war, and it's usually because they're profiting from it. So it is possible that if something like that happened, Americans would take that opportunity to, you know, which is what we want them to do with regime change, right? We go hit somebody, we knock off their leader, we put them in a war. We say, oh, you're going to rise up and throw your government out. Well, wouldn't that be interesting if, Somebody hit us, and yeah, we're going to fight back, and then also we did a regime change at home. Those techniques of regime change usually don't work, but the psychology of regime change, we aren't immune from that in this country. We are not immune to it at all. I mean, you know, honestly, I can't think of a single country, regardless of what they did to us, that would cause young Americans to rush down to the recruiting offices and sign up to join the military. I don't see it. And we saw that after 9-11. But at the time of 9-11, sure, we had cell phones. We had the internet, but we hadn't had it for very long. I don't think I did much on the internet before 1995.
Speaker 1: No, not even close. The access of information was very different than to what it is now, incomparable.
Speaker 0: And so the narrative control from Washington through the main, what, CNN, ABC, CBS,
Speaker 1: NBC, they were all convinced the Americans that Iraq made sense.
Speaker 0: Yeah, well, they did. And they lied. And it was known that they lied because I was I was one of a number of people that were I was just a tiny portion of I mean, actual paid journalists who were doing their job globally and in the United States were, you know, pointing out that a lot of what we were being told wasn't true. But we didn't have the countervailing impact of being able to find out for ourselves. You couldn't just go on the internet and find out. But see, now we can not only do that, we can actually talk to people in other countries. We can read what they're saying. We can watch them live. We can ask them questions. I mean, it's just amazing the connectivity that we have. So I think, and again, I would have thought that the COVID thing would not have gone as smoothly as it did from the government's perspective. I thought more people would have pushed back. And they didn't. So fear is a problem. But even with COVID, there was a whole bunch of people who bought the COVID lies who have since then come out of that stupor and realized that, oh my God, the government just said that because it had an agenda, which we're not quite sure what it was. Maybe it was to enrich big pharma. or kill old people. You know, we're not sure what the agenda was. We don't know. But it had something that it wasn't really telling us. And it was also misleading us and taking advantage of our fear. So every little thing that happens, the world changes, the technology, the connectivity, the information, all these things, they make us a slightly different people in a slightly different political environment. So I'm not 100% sure if we had a tech. And I'll tell you this, I don't wish any harm on anybody, including Trump. or any of the administration officials, and there's many of them that I despise. But if you just take Trump alone, he's such a lightning rod for antipathy and hatred amongst the people in this country. Not the MAGA people. I mean, look, I've admitted and apologized for voting for him. But a lot of people did not vote for him. You know, they had Trump derangement syndrome or whatever, and they really don't like him. They look at all the negatives that he brings to bear, which... are many. So, you know, you remember the guy that shot the United healthcare CEO, I guess he's having to try. I say, I mean, he's accused of it. Who knows what really happened? I mean, but the guy's going to be, but when that happened and I paid very little attention to, I don't know a lot about big pharma or healthcare insurance companies. I didn't know who this guy was, but, What surprised me was the outpouring of support for the Luigi guy, the one who was accused of doing it.
Speaker 1: That's worrying.
Speaker 0: Not that he was innocent. They were just assuming that he did it, and they loved it he did it. They said, this guy's big.
Speaker 1: That's worrying.
Speaker 0: Yeah, that's extremely. So I'm not sure that if you killed an unpopular president, and I don't know anyone that hasn't been, none of them are.
Speaker 1: Oh, look what people celebrated. There's some people that celebrated the killing of Kirk. How messed up is that?
Speaker 0: Oh, yeah. Well, there you go. I hate to say that.
Speaker 1: That was a crazy time. Yeah, exactly. But that was a crazy time.
Speaker 0: There were a lot of people. And again, the left wing types or Democratic Party types or even some of the rhino types, they didn't really like Charlie Kirk or what he was doing. And they saw, and what did they, what did they, what labels did they give him? Well, he's probably, you know, a white supremacist. He might be a racist and certainly he's a troublemaker, you know, but turned out they didn't, they just, it was all, they didn't know him. They didn't read his, listen to his speeches. They didn't know him. And, but they, they were able to put him in a category to instantly say, I don't like this guy and then move to the next stage when he got killed to celebrate it and think that's great. Why don't we, too bad they didn't get his kids or something, you know, I mean, terrible things. Now, I don't like to think of my country as being filled with people like that. But unfortunately, we have a lot of people like that. And it doesn't, I'm not saying they would hate anybody that's killed, you know, maybe Bernie Sanders, you know, they would be upset about that. But the way they went after, the way they supported the guy that killed the United Healthcare guy, assuming he's the one that did it, they celebrated that. And given the way Trump is held in contempt by so many people in our own country, mainly because he lies so much. So I think, you know, you can't just keep telling people how great it is with no context because so many people are not feeling it. They just don't think it's great. They have evidence in their own lives that it's not great. And they see you making a lot of money, quote unquote, on the stock market, doing things like, you know,
Speaker 1: that no even biden couldn't get away with i mean you know we had the hunter biden thing with ukraine exactly exactly to a whole other level whole other level it is insane the amount of money they're making i made a joke too yes because i i was um having a private conversation earlier i'm like and you know we were told certain information And in my mind, I can never trade on that information. It's not legal. So something I don't even consider. I put a joke off the cuff joke. I'm like, just imagine if we were in Trump's circle, we'd be able to trade on all that information because it's just wild the amount of money they're making. And they just trade on everything with just complete impunity. So it has taken it to a whole other level. Even I think the Iran war itself is not, look, presidents break promises all the time. It's bizarrely and unfortunately, the American voters are just it's expected from a president to break campaign promises. It's just a matter of which ones and to what extent. But when you break the biggest promise that you make to the voters, that's different. So it's like you go to someone, you're like, hey, I'm going to do this, this, this, this, this. But the most important thing I'm going to do is I'm going to do that. That will be my main focus. And you go ahead and first you just break that so blatantly. i just feel like it's yeah it just it and i was saying this to chris earlier it did break a lot of people and i everything is everything is possible now like that meeting between nathaniel and trump i believe and as you know i've been saying it for a long time that i think the war is over i'm still in that camp but i wouldn't discount that might not restart next year right there might not be something like Israel was meant to pull out of Lebanon. Israel is still there. Israel is still bombing Lebanon, a lot less than it was. So it is abiding to an extent by a ceasefire, but a lot less so. Netanyahu proudly said today in a speech, he said the following. Let me get that for you. He says, where is it? Okay, Iran wants to remove us from southern Lebanon, and they are trying to put pressure on the U.S., We are handling this pressure well. We have received legitimacy to maintain the security zone from our great achievement against Lebanon, but they will try to eliminate it in every way, including putting pressure on the Lebanese government. And then he says, I heard reports, the media claiming that Trump asked us not to take action against terrorist tunnels in Lebanon. That about not demolishing villages. That's what the claim is. That's a myth, fake news. He didn't say anything to me about it. And I didn't ask him. We act according to our considerations. So here we are believing. And then he says another statement. There will be no reconstruction in Gaza without disarmament and demilitarization in the designated area. So when you see statements like this, you look at all the rhetoric we've seen a few weeks ago, Karen, and then you look at the actions that follows.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: Nothing's changed. Nothing seems to have changed.
Speaker 0: Nope. And it, yeah, and I don't know what it will take. Obviously, you know, if Trump wanted things with Israel to change, that relationship could be shifted, even despite AIPAC. It doesn't even matter about that. Trump could, just from executive power that he has already, could suspend and halt and threaten to halt and all these things. this relationship does provide the United States, since we're providing the oversight and the political support and the aid and the military spending and the cash and the Israeli bonds, all the things that the US is providing, each one of these things is a leverage point that could be leveraged to get Israel to get back in their borders and start behaving like a normal country. But Trump doesn't do that. So he doesn't want to do it or he can't do it. Well, if he can't do it, Maybe that's why he's getting himself so rich. Maybe he needs more money because otherwise he can't build a bunker that's secure enough to prevent him from being assassinated by people in Israel who are threatening him.
Speaker 1: I'll ask you a question that Chris asked me. How many of the decisions he makes are his own decisions in your mind?
Speaker 0: I used to think every Truth Social tweet that he made was his because of the weird way that he writes them, right? You know, he puts capital letters where you wouldn't have capital, unless you're writing in German, you wouldn't put, Americans, we don't use capital letters and everything. We don't boldface stupid things. And we don't speak in that kind of halted, weird language that he uses, that nobody texts to write. Well, okay, the guy that killed, the Patsy that killed Charlie Kirk did write texts very similar to the way Trump writes them. So maybe, I'm not saying Trump did it, but there may be a family of writers that write, that write social posts. I'm not sure. But I did think he was writing those. He was producing those because of the way they're written. And I know older people, sometimes people older than me write weird stuff. I don't know. And Trump has a big personality. I thought maybe he was expressing. But it turns out I'm not sure he does that either. I think that whole part of some of his writings are produced for him by others. I think maybe when we think about the Trump presidency, we need to look at all the members of the Trump Board of Peace, because that's most of the White House staff, plus Trump's relatives and his best friend, Wyckoff. So, you know, and his kids, I guess, are in part, well, Kushner, son-in-law. So if you look at the Trump Board of Peace and the membership of that, then you have a circle that includes all the inside staff at the White House, plus Trump's relatives. And I think that's who, that's really what's governing us. And it's smaller than an oligarchy. I mean, it is an oligarchy of a sort, but it's a really small, and then it interfaces with the other powers. So yeah, but I do think Trump or fear of Trump is keeping some kind of discipline in the White House. Like don't piss Trump off or he'll fire you. So there is some kind of, consistency in how they're going to behave. We must please Trump. So whatever's on Trump's mind, you know, how do we sell it to Trump? If we want to put something in his mind, how do we make him think he thought it up? How do we sell it? But all of this is, there's a small group of people doing that, not a large group. See, if there was a large group of people doing that, that would be like a more, I think, more normal presidency or whatever. Yeah, where you have a guy that, let's say, he goes out to the countryside or he goes, meets with the governor. and he comes back with a really cool idea that he never thought. Yeah, I met with the governor, and I know he's a Democrat, but the guy, you know, he gave me an idea, right? You could see that happening with a normal presidency or any leader, but we don't see that with Trump. Trump's ideas are coming from a very small and narrow circle, heavily populated with Zionists, and, of course, that's a military state, constantly, you know, under risk by neighbors, you know. It's always in a lifetime, you know, existential survival battle, you know. that way of thinking, very high tech, very interested in financial things and dealings and in money and global control via the financial system, that kind of thing. I mean, Israel is interested in that. Trump is interested in that. So this is a little circle that kind of feeds itself ideas and no new, really new ideas come into it. And I think that's the big problem. But so I don't know if Trump's completely in charge, but he does have a way of, limiting the people that influence him he's not really bringing in new people and i'm going to say something really sexist i guess it is but you know how they all the presidents and even i remember uh bush jr did this you know they always want to talk about how many women they brought in to the government or uh you know if it's blacks or uh hispanics you know they're always it's and it's not dei if it is dei it's been around for 25 years but this idea that that we listen to everybody, right? It's kind of a, we're America, we're a melting pot, and everybody has a chance to govern. But when I saw, and Trump has brought in women, a number of women, some very competent, into his administration. He did it the first term, he did it the second term. But there is a kind of, and this is where I'm gonna get catty, and I'm sorry, it's just, this is what I think. You know, you look at the way the women present And except for the World Wrestling, or the Wrestling Federation, when we put in charge of the education department, and Susie Wiles, and those are women that are in their 60s. If you look at all the ones under 50, they all present in a way that is kind of reminds you of Trump's days when he ran beauty contests, right? Everybody has to look a certain way. Everybody, you know, I want to see, you know, I mean, I don't miss this, but you remember Biden, and he put in, he had some, like, crossdressers and he had a transvestite man woman yes woman started out as a man woman she was running one of the health i guess she was the the surgeon general or something i don't know what it was but anyway she was not an attractive woman she i'll give her that she says she's a woman she's a woman but she was not like attractive she was like you could you would just run into her in walmart you know that's like fine it's all right but with trump you see appearance over everything appearance over competence, appearance over, you know, loyalty to Trump in a competition. And I've said this before about Pam Bondi, but that famous thing a couple months into the administration, they had something and he's going around recognizing people and he left off Pam Bondi and she goes, but sir, I'm right here, sir. You know, like, look at me, look at me. And again, that's not very professional. You know, in my world, in the military, if somebody didn't mention your name, you're in good shape. You do not want to attract undue attention to yourself.
Speaker 1: It's a focus on the wrong things. It's no longer a focus on merit. There's a military, I think one of the generals that he fired, one of the guys he fired that put out a, fuck, I didn't save it, that put out a book or something or an article, wrote an article for the first time on foreign policy. And he was talking about this. He was saying that the president, I think he's talking about how the president, number one, is using the army on domestic issues and that's moving away the focus and that's stretching them too thin. And number two, he's no longer focusing on merit. And that's a problem that a lot of people have. A lot of the decisions that are being made are not focusing on the right things.
Speaker 0: And again, Headset is a prime example. He's not, he doesn't fit into the, well, I call him the Ken doll. He's the Ken doll to the rest of the Barbies. But Headset clearly, to put a guy... with his lack of experience, knowledge, and also just judgment on top of the, it's your guy in the Pentagon, the overall in charge of all your generals. Honestly, you know, if we lived in a time which Trump and all presidents think they live in the most dangerous and time of the, you know, we have wars, we're trying to end wars, whatever. If you really believed that, then you wouldn't put an incompetent in charge. of your Pentagon. You'd say, you know what? Some of these things aren't that important to me, some of these positions, like health and human services. There's a bunch of guys that could do that. Where do you put Pulte before you put him in intelligence, right? Pulte was up housing or something. So yeah, it's fine. He knows a little about housing. It's not a big deal because it's not my priority. But Trump said, you know, we're going to take Greenland. We're going to do, you know, Canada. We've got Venezuela. We've got all these things. We're going to be back. America is back. We've got the new Denver Road Doctrine. That's a lot of change. That's a lot of challenge. That's a big ask of the Pentagon. You'd think you'd put your best guy, your very smartest guy, the one who would not just have credibility in your eyes as president, but would also have credibility from the rest of the organization looking up to that guy. And he didn't do that. He pulled Headset off Fox News. I mean, that was Headset's last job was Fox News mouthpiece. That's not, that doesn't, that does not work, okay? And then Hedge Seth has stumbled again and again and again. At any time, people say, well, he's going to fire Hedge Seth. He's never fired him, hadn't fired him so far. Maybe he will. I mean, he certainly could have fired him any week of the past year and a half. He could have fired him for something he did. He is incompetent, not qualified to do the job, and yet that's Trump's pick. Now, why is that? What is Trump's thinking? Loyalty. Loyalty, flattery, but seriously – Optics are terrible in the military. I don't know. I think I know which one you're talking about, which general.
Speaker 1: Optics for the average. Yeah, exactly. You wrote one. But optics, when I say optics, it's not for the military personnel, but it's more optics for the average voter, the Fox News audience.
Speaker 0: You know, and that might have worked for a while until the Iran war because he, well, Obviously, he screwed up when he didn't go after Epstein. That was over a year ago. But then this spring, he screwed up again with the Saran War. So he has broken MAGA. You know, when you've got Tucker and Margie Taylor Greene, all these people talking about new parties, a new party, not new parties, not like, oh, I'm going to be a libertarian. I'm going to be a Green Party. They're not saying that. They're saying we're going to do what Perot did in 1991 or whenever it was. We're going to. we are going to have an America first party, a real America first party, which is what, you know, what was it? What was it? Reform. His party was the Reform Party, Perot. Do you remember him?
Speaker 1: I know Perot. Yeah, I don't remember him, but I know about him. A lot of comparisons are being made to what Tucker is trying to achieve now to Perot's success.
Speaker 0: But Perot did not have particular, Perot's audience was really the Republican audience. I mean, the existing Republican Party, for the most part, Perot had been a Republican. He was big in the military industrial complex. You know, he'd made his money selling arms, fighting the first Iraq war. And so, but different world from then. I mean, that was ages ago. So what these guys are talking about, that's actually possible. I mean, you've got a bunch of non-voters. You've got probably half or two-thirds of MAGA, which will never trust a Trumpite ever again. I mean, look at Dan Bongino. This is what happens. Dan Bongino is like, oh, big time Trump guy. Everybody loves his talk show, his podcast. But then what happened when he got out? He didn't disavow Trump because he's too loyal to do that or whatever. And he can't get his numbers back. Nobody wants to hear what Dan... Really?
Speaker 1: I didn't check that. He didn't get his numbers back?
Speaker 0: No, he didn't get them back. And Dan Bongino, he lost a bunch of his audience. And now he's ridiculed by some of the former folks that were a part of his audience because he... he lost his credibility. He had credibility before as a podcaster because of his background experience. You know, he'd been a secret service, you know, he'd done, done these things, knew these people, his credibility was, was solid. And then he worked for what? A couple of three months and they quit, but he didn't, he didn't throw Trump under the bus. Well, guess what? We're, we are in a nation where if you quit the Trump administration, you're going to be criticized. If you don't spill the, spill the beans and, and explain why this guy lied to everybody. If you're gonna say, oh no, Trump has a plan, he's playing 60 chess and you're still saying that, nobody's listening to you. So I'm just saying it's a different world. So a third party, an alternative party is, I mean, our system is not geared to that, but there are plenty of people out there that would be very appealing, that would be appealed to. And then, I mean, look at how Tulsi a Democrat, Tulsi Gabbard, And RFK, Democrat, lifelong Democrat, brought in disaffected, you know, Maha people, health people, your average non-voting independent, and people that had a bad experience with the health system. These guys were saying just on RFK's side. And on Tulsi's side, she's anti-war. You get the anti-war vote. You get the pro-health vote. You get disaffected young Republicans and conservatives. You get your Democratic socialists who are being beat down or will be beat down soon enough by the Democratic Party, you know, they're going to make what Hillary Clinton did to Bernie Sanders look like child's play. They will not, you know, they know that the old neocon Democrats cannot tolerate the new young Democrats. So there's tons of people who could easily come together. They're already together. They just don't know it. So that is a lot easier than what Perot did back in the day. He had to, you know, he had money. He could get himself on ballots. He only got on 20, I think, states. He wasn't even on every state ballot.
Speaker 1: So you think this time around that if they come together, if they join forces, if Massey, Kent, all of them come together, they could really make a difference?
Speaker 0: Well, it's, you know what? Okay. In politics, there's one of the things they say is like, you know, there's a cartoon. It's a cartoon. It helps you understand everything. So the politician is in front of the thing. He looks back to all the people. And they turn away. This is not the other one I told you where the guy walks off the cliff. This is when the politicians, he's got all his people behind him, turns and looks at them, and he notices they're walking in another direction. The whole crowd's just moving in another direction. And the politician says, wait, wait, I must lead my people. And so he can run around and get in front of it. That's what politicians do. They need support to propel them forward. Even the worst politicians who have the worst messaging, like Hitler. well, his messaging wasn't that bad for the Germans, but Hitler couldn't have gone anywhere without a whole bunch of people saying, hey, this dude's saying what I think. This dude is putting it all together. I like that. So the politicians, when they see the movement of popular opinion, and they understand that it's real, that people actually will not vote, no Republican or Democrat is going to get some of these people's votes. They will not vote. So it's either well, I could get their vote and then I could be in power. The politicians love power. This is what they're about, most of them. So, yeah, the politicians will, I think they're already sensing that this sea change is happening. And we won't see it in full this next election because it's only two years away. But it's a big problem for the country. But again, let's take care of our country. Let's figure out what our politics ought to be. Let's give Americans a voice. Why don't we do, I hate to say America first because Trump ruined that, but you know, we do need to take care of our own country. And none of that includes all of these wars. And it also doesn't include all of this profit-taking by American elites.
Speaker 1: The profit-taking is wrong. It's morally wrong. But for me, that bothers me. But nothing compared to the war. The war is just a whole other level. The war causes, you know, profit-taking, it makes a billion there, two billion there, three billion there. The war costs hundreds of billions of dollars.
Speaker 0: And it ruins everything. I mean, you know, the parents of the, if you have a child that's killed in a war, that should never have happened, and it did because, you know, arrogant Americans or arrogant Israelis or arrogant anybody that said, this is what I want, I'm going to kill your kids. You don't get over that. You know, there's, and everybody knows this around the world. I mean, Americans watch, we watch all these crime shows, like cold cases, right? And they interview people who have lost a child 30 years ago and they finally find out who it was that killed their kid 30, 35 years later. And those parents, it is the exact same pain that they felt the day they, their kid disappeared. Okay. So we know the cost of war. You kill people's kids. It stays with you until you end your time on earth. It does not go away. Most of the time it's not forgiven. You know, we're not all, uh, uh, Erica Kirk, right, where she could get up there on the day ever, two days after her husband shot and say, Oh, I forgive the guy.
Speaker 1: You know, time to do a deep dive into this without such a way.
Speaker 0: I don't need to. But that's interesting that she would say that because even Christians, and you know, we're supposed to forgive, forgive, forgive, we have, it's hard to do it, but you're commanded love your enemy and all that. So this is the challenge for Christians to do it. But when Erica Kirk said that, like two or three days after this happened, oh, this is what I want to say to the guy, I forget his name, that they said, I forgive you, I forgive you. And I think the Christians in that crowd, which was most of them, most of the people in that crowd were probably Protestant Christians for the most, some Catholics. You know, they're like, what? That's a little soon, because we know that it's just not normal to do that. Anyway, the cost of destroying lives and land. I mean, when you see what they're doing, not just in Gaza, not just in Lebanon, but in the West Bank where Palestinians have been, you know, they're carving up the land and using the law. They've always done that. But now you've got unleashed settlers, which really should be leashed. If they were on leashes, I think we would all be happier. But they're unleashed. They're kind of like wild dogs, you know, in packs. And they're going around setting fire to animals. wheat fields and, you know, uprooting olive trees and stealing sheep, you know, stealing goats, walking around people's houses, knocking on the windows saying, get out, get out. Well, that's thug behavior. It's uncivilized. And, you know, this is, nobody wants that. It's just not allowed. That causes great harm. And it only takes a few stories like that, and now that becomes part of your lived mythology, right? That happens when you're 16 or 17. You're really going to change your mind when you're 80? No, you know, settlers are evil. And again, the Palestinians have done a wonderful job of being kind to people. I mean, people that meet them, they say, well, they don't talk bad about the Israelis. They talk a little bit bad about people that might have personally harmed them and Zionism as a destructive political view. But But they don't blame all Jews for everything. And the Iranians impressed us too with this. They said the Iranians know that Americans don't support the war, and they accept that. They don't say like, well, you voted for the president, and that means his war is your war. They understand the difference between our government and the people. And honestly, even the Russians understand that. And I think we understood that about the Soviet Union back in the day. You know, there was a... A lot of people, when we thought about the Soviet Union, we say, well, it's their government. The Soviet people, you know, they just want to be free. They're a lot like we are, you know. We would say that. But when you interface directly with people that harm you or take your kids or destroy your property or injure you, you don't forget it. It is a lot of work to do that. And, you know, it's natural that we would hear death to America. I mean, my God, it's... All could have been prevented.
Speaker 1: Exactly. How do you think Iran would be moving forward if a deal is reached or not even reached? Do you worry that maybe some commander in Iran takes a decision that drags the region back into war, drags the US back into war? Do you think Iran would seek their revenge maybe two, three, four, five years from now? How do you think Iran would look like post this war once they have time to reflect on everything?
Speaker 0: yeah well if anything the the next year or two as we try to fumble through the mou and then extending the mou hopefully and you know maybe getting to a different place assuming we don't decide to forcibly rebuild all our bases and make this our top issue which we shouldn't do i don't think our national security strategy really includes making the middle east our top issue but if we don't if we just keep kind of withdrawing and you know, leaving Iran alone, I think we'll be fine. But there is going to be great strength. Well, there's already great strength in Iran, and you can see it with the response to the participation in this funeral. But there is a lot of folks there that want justice, and not just for the Manab 168. They want justice for all the wrongdoing that has been done to them and conducted against them by terrorists Tel Aviv and the United States specifically. And that's not going to go away overnight. But I think what it should do, instead of them trying to like maybe IRGC commander or somebody, you know, stoking up something, I think they're going to do it in unity. So I don't think they're going to make mistakes. They haven't made any mistakes so far. They've been very cautious. You know, the things that they are celebrating today or remembering in this funeral is the wisdom and the patience and how the guidance of Hamonet was to make Iran strong, resilient, self-sufficient. These are the things, sovereign. These kinds of things are what I think is bringing the people together now, and I think that'll hold them together. And we don't have that in this country. Sovereignty, what, Donald Trump the king? No, we don't have that. We have big... at home with issues with Israel. Israel has never been less popular in the United States than it is now. And that includes back in the day when we had real anti-Semitism, you know, in the 40s, when a lot of Americans, they did not want, you know, that was true anti-Semitism, hatred of Jews. We don't have that now. We have intolerance of Zionism, and it's very widely shared. So, yeah, we're not in a good place to do anything. I just don't think we have it in us. No, our leadership might be crazy, but there's not going to be any follow-up. Like I said, I don't see anything happening in the world, whether it's the Middle East or anyplace else, that would cause literally three or four million young men and women, 16 to 24, rushing into their recruitment offices. I see nothing.
Speaker 1: That's something that should... Not happening.
Speaker 0: We don't believe in it. We're not doing it. Nobody's going to do that.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m hearing Larry Johnson, a former CIA/State counterterrorism officer, break down Netanyahu’s press tour before his Trump meeting. Johnson says Netanyahu’s claims don’t match documented facts: no reports of Hezbollah targeting Christians; Lebanon’s Christian president and demographics show no recorded sectarian conflict. He disputes the “bot-driven” anti-Israel claim and notes only 35–45% of Americans buy it, with sentiment now shifting. On Iran’s funeral crowds, he argues turnout and respect for Khamenei don’t prove long-term regime stability, and he questions whether U.S. sentiment changes permanently.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Former CIA and State Department counterterrorism officer Larry Johnson breaks down Netanyahu's press tour ahead of his Trump meeting. And the claims don't survive contact with the facts. Netanyahu told reporters that Christian villages in Lebanon have asked to be annexed by Israel, that Hezbollah threatens Lebanese Christians, and that criticism of Israel equals anti-Americanism. Johnson's response is direct: there are no documented reports of Hezbollah targeting Christians. Lebanon has a Christian president and a population that's nearly a third Christian, with no sectarian conflict between Hezbollah and Christian communities on record. Netanyahu also claimed the online shift against Israel is being driven by bot farms tied to three unnamed countries. Johnson's estimate on how many Americans actually buy that framing: 35 to 45%, with a majority now taking the opposite view, a reversal Johnson calls unprecedented for U.S. public opinion on Israel. On the funeral turnout, 9 to 10 million people in 94-degree heat, Johnson's read is straightforward: the government has decades of experience mobilizing crowds, and a meaningful share of Iranians genuinely respected Khamenei. Both things can be true, and neither means the regime is stable long-term. So is the shift in US sentiment on Israel a temporary reaction to this war, or has it crossed into something permanent that reshapes the relationship for years? @newsonof
Video Transcript AI Summary
The hosts discuss an unusually intense Iranian funeral, with estimates of 9 to 10 million attendees and widespread anger expressed in the streets, including chants calling for death to Israel and the United States. A temperature conversion is debated (mid-to-high 90s Fahrenheit), and the discussion focuses on concern about where the hatred and anger could lead over “years from now.”
They then turn to remarks by Donald Trump about the funeral turnout, with Trump initially saying he was surprised by the number of people and later calling the turnout “very impressive,” comparing it to crowds at his campaign rallies. The conversation shifts to whether Trump could be operating within a “bubble,” with claims that information is curated for him and that supporters may tailor what he sees, including an anecdote about people buying ad space to get onto Fox News at times Trump is watching.
A separate U.S.-Israel discussion is driven by clips from Benjamin Netanyahu. When asked whether Israel is in a permanent state of war, Netanyahu says Israel is not, citing “four peace deals” and the Abraham Accords, attributing weakening of Iran to common “military action.” He argues Lebanon has “more cards in play,” asserting Lebanon wants to free itself from Hezbollah and that Christians, Druze, Sunni Muslims, and some Shiite Muslims seek protection. He also says that “some” Christian villages in Lebanon asked to be annexed to Israel because he says Israel protects them from Hezbollah.
Additional Netanyahu remarks address anti-Israel sentiment in the United States. In the clip discussion, Netanyahu links hatred of Israel to hatred of America, claims protests often burn both Israeli and American flags, and says supporters of Israel wave both flags. He also describes social-media influence and “bot farms,” arguing it correlates with declining patriotic feelings and support for Israel, while insisting the alliance is based on “common values.”
The hosts react by questioning how many Americans believe Netanyahu’s four main claims (that anti-Israel sentiment is anti-American; that Lebanese Christians want annexation; that younger and online shifts come from bot farms; and that Israel is a small self-defending country facing evil neighbors). They conclude that while a minority may accept those ideas, they argue the majority opposes them and that this represents a major change compared with prior U.S. history.
Discussion then returns to regional military developments tied to Iran. There are claims of U.S. air asset repositioning: B-52s pulling out from England, F-15s leaving Jordan for the UK, and reports that at least six A-10s have flown into Jordan. The conversation connects this to potential escalation involving the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian actions against ships. They cite updates that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains around the same level over several days (about 30-something ships per 24 hours) and mention an escort of ships, suggesting no major change in that narrow snapshot.
A statement by Mohammed Medvedev is discussed, presented as claiming Iran has two maritime “weapons,” with the other not yet used besides the Strait of Hormuz—also referring to the Bab al-Mandib Strait.
On Lebanon and Gaza, Netanyahu’s claims are summarized by the hosts: Iran trying to remove Israel from southern Lebanon, pressure on Lebanon, and Netanyahu’s assertion that Trump did not ask Israel to ease attacks on tunnels and did stop action earlier according to the hosts’ recounting of Netanyahu’s position. The conversation also includes Gaza: “no reconstruction in Gaza without disarmament and demilitarization” in a designated area, with Hamas not having given up, and discussion of impacts on Israel’s economy such as tourism.
The hosts then mention a viral video of USS Liberty survivor Phil Turney saying he burned an “evil flag” on July 4 in remembrance of 34 brothers tattooed on his arm who were “slaughtered” June 8, 1967. They also discuss the broader idea of perceptions shifting in the U.S., comparing it to the process of mainstreaming beliefs (described through an “emperor with no clothes” example) and referencing COVID as an analogy for when information becomes widely accepted.
They wrap up by broadening to U.S. society and recurring themes of “forever wars,” debt, inequality, and concerns about instability. They discuss a trending film, “Citizen Vigilante,” described as inspired by European rape-gang-related controversies and reflecting frustration with political handling of immigration and related social tensions. The conversation ends with stories about local law enforcement programs in Florida (rehabilitation-focused jail programs and sheriff-managed community structures), and a final return to the Iranian funeral photos showing Max Blumenthal and Jackson Hinkle attending, with Jackson described as attending multiple controversial international events.
Full Transcript
Speaker 2: It's been a pretty calm day, politically speaking, but at least internationally. But in Iran, the funeral is massive. Nine to 10 million people so far. Someone told me, the last guest was telling me the temperature is 36 degrees Fahrenheit. I don't know what that means. 36 Fahrenheit for American.
Speaker 4: That's about 94 degrees.
Speaker 2: Sorry. So 60 degrees. Yeah. Celsius. Sorry. Celsius. Yeah. In Fahrenheit is yeah. 97 degrees Fahrenheit. 96.8. So despite the heat, a lot of people were in the streets and just something I've observed that should be just a wake up call for the US. But I don't think it will be two things. Number one is the amount of people yelling. death to Israel, death to America, the amount of people angry for obvious reasons, and just people on TV being interviewed. I saw two clips of someone being interviewed saying we're going to avenge the death of our Supreme Leader. So my worry is that that hatred, that anger that has just been created among millions of people, no one knows where it will lead to years from now. So that was like a thought that I've been having today. And also, I want to get your thoughts on Trump's comment. There's not much to say, but he's saying that the turnout, initially he said he was surprised by the turnout. And I think he said people were crying. He's surprised there's so many people that love him. Something along those lines. That's what he said in the morning. And then later, a couple of hours ago, he said he called the turnout very impressive and says it almost compares to the crowds of his campaign rallies, but not quite. So he's just, I don't know whether he's saying that just to talk, talk shit, or whether he's genuinely surprised by the amount of people on the streets, which will be concerning if the president of the United States did not know that millions of people would turn out. Maybe he was living in his own bubble.
Speaker 4: Oh, geez. That'd be shocking if that was happening.
Speaker 2: No, I still find it a struggle to believe the president of the United States is living in a bubble. I understand there's... I know a lot of people have said this. It's only certain people that have his ear. But it's just hard to imagine that, the person leading the world's most powerful country with all the intelligence agencies, et cetera, that he has access to.
Speaker 4: He doesn't get the time every day to sit down in front of the computer and just surf, you know, surf through YouTube, surf through X, and, you know, go where, oh, that interests me. What about that? You know, the information is presented to him. here, Mr. President, you need to see this. Here, you need to read this. This is what you need to pay attention to. So it's easy to be the boy in the bubble or the Don in the bubble in this case, that he's not getting unfettered, unvarnished information. And then on top of it, you've got so many sycophants around. They understand that there's not an upside If you're giving Trump bad news, so give him the good news.
Speaker 2: And there's this, look at this. This is Trump watching himself, watching himself on Fox News. Have you seen that clip?
Speaker 4: No. Trump watching himself, watching himself.
Speaker 2: No, I haven't. Yeah, so look what he's watching. Can you see the screen?
Speaker 4: Yeah, now he's applauding.
Speaker 2: Yeah, exactly. He's watching. He's watching Fox News that is filming him watching Fox News. That was today as well. The reason I played it now is that it just shows you where he's getting his information. This video is a reminder to me that what a lot of people have said how, you know, I was told by some people, and again, this, I think it's public information as well. But I was told how, for people to get to Trump, they literally buy ad space to try to get on Fox News at a certain time they know Trump is watching. So yeah, I'm sure there's a concerted effort to control what gets in there.
Speaker 4: You know, I remember the first time I went on television. I was asked by CNN in August of 1994 to go on air to talk about the capture of Carlos the Jackal. And, oh, that was exciting, particularly because my mom would get to see it. But, you know, after you do it for a while, it's like, you know, okay, so you're on television. No big deal. Most people won't remember you anyway. Or they'll look at you like, are you that pedophile they're looking for in the post office, you know, with the picture on? So... You know, you learn to put it all in perspective. You know, if you're obsessed with being on television, oh, I've got to be on the internet. It's like, please, just relax. Trump, Trump evinces, and that's for somebody who's not insecure. You know, I'm not known for being insecure. Trump is. So he's got to be told he's wonderful, he's great. Hey, that was superb. Look how good you look.
Speaker 2: to sit there and watch yourself watching yourself watch yourself a little strange epic clip though but um it does um it is a reminder that uh at the end of the day he is human and um maybe there is that bubble around it that a lot of people have told me about by the way it's not no it's not a secret a lot of people are concerned about it a lot of people talk about it they're worried on who has trump's ear I'm just struggling to believe that it's really that easy to influence the president of the United States. All these three and four letter agents, all these three letter agencies exist for a reason, to make sure the commander in chief has, and his administration, have all the information they need to make the right decision.
Speaker 4: In theory, yes. But in practice, no. In practice, I witnessed firsthand when Bob Gates, who, you know, Bob was the Director of Intelligence, the DDI, at the CIA when I was there. Had a deputy, Dick Kerr. Dick Kerr was a fabulous man. Bob Gates, very smart guy, but not a fabulous man. He was a little unprincipled in my view. And I watched him try to hook the intelligence, particularly about, with reference to South Africa, Nelson Mandela, where he tried to override what the analyst assessment was. And the question was, was Nelson Mandela a communist, a part of the communist party, communist system? And the analyst said no, and Bob Gates wanted to say yes, because that's what the White House wanted to hear. So in this case, Bob Gates tried to override the analyst, but the analyst fought back. And the analyst, to his credit, did, you know, stopped stop Gates from twisting the intelligence but you know I've it's there it's been done not the first time it was done under George W Bush to justify invading Iraq that's the craziest one that is the craziest one so yeah there is um nine million people nine to ten so far at the funeral processions according to some estimates um which if
Speaker 2: Not all Iranians, but let's say they were all Iranians. That's 10% of Iran's population. Trump was surprised by the amount of people. And Mustafa Khamenei has not shown up yet. I know we talked about it yesterday. There hasn't been any reports yet on whether he's going to show up or not. Yeah, I think that's it on the funeral side. The next story I have is one more on the Iranian front. Then I want to go to Netanyahu in Israel. A lot of news there. Ghalibaf did make a statement two, three hours ago. He said he met with senior Hezbollah officials and said that support for Lebanon and Hezbollah, the resistance front, remains a red line in Iran's negotiations with the US. And they called Hezbollah, the recent Hezbollah war with Israel, a historic turning point. So he's just reaffirming what we know already is that it is a red line for, Hezbollah is a red line for Iran. in the negotiations now, nothing new.
Speaker 4: That remains to be seen if Iran's, how they're gonna enforce that. Yeah. Will they suspend the negotiations? Will they continue the negotiations? We don't yet have a firm announcement about the next round of negotiations. I imagine it'll be sometime after July 9th, at least the proposed date, whether it happens or not, it's a whole nother thing.
Speaker 2: Yeah, and if, that's gonna be a red line. So I know Hezbollah's a red line, but will South Lebanon remain a red line? So another big piece of news, probably the biggest piece of news right now, and that's why we start moving towards Israel's, Netanyahu is heading off to meet Trump. He's gonna be meeting him in the next couple of days. I know historically, especially in the last 12 to 18 months, we've seen Netanyahu meetings with Trump precede military action. But I think the dynamic has changed significantly now. Do you think that Netanyahu will have enough sway over Trump where this meeting could lead to something stupid again?
Speaker 4: Oh, yeah. Never underestimate the power of stupidity.
Speaker 2: Absolutely. Are you looking at maritime trackers, Larry?
Speaker 4: I'm checking it out right now to see if anybody's going through. Yeah, no, you know, Netanyahu's going to try to persuade Trump, but no. There is one disturbing element. So we've had the news that the B-52s that were in England, they pulled out, they headed back to United States. That the F-15s that were in Jordan at Muwaffak al-Salti Air Base, they've flown from there back to the UK, which means they're withdrawing. But then I heard today there were reports that at least six A-10s have flown into Jordan. And so that's worthy of concern and alarming because those A-10s would be the ones most likely to be used to attack Iranian boats in the Strait of Hormuz that are trying to take action against wayward ships.
Speaker 2: So we've got the USS Boxer as well.
Speaker 4: All I think of is some guy in his underwear, okay?
Speaker 2: The USS Boxer. Yeah, so on that front, this is why it's been mixed messages on the military presence in the region and like no definite moves either way. So that's why it's been a bit... Well, if...
Speaker 4: Trump decides, okay, we're going to take action to force Iran to stop interfering with ships taking the Omani passage, then that's going to lead to further attacks on the US, remaining US air assets in the region. And I would say this next go round would be much more intense than what we've seen previously.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I'll give you an update on the Strait of Hormuz. I always get that update for you. So we know yesterday the Omani side got closed up for whatever reason. Today, where are my notes? So, hmm. Oh, I deleted them. I got a report anyway. So the Strait of Hormuz, there was about, in the last 24 hours, again, the same number, about 30-something ships have gone through Iranian and Omani side, which has been the same number for the last four or five days, a third of what it was before the war, about a quarter about half of what trump is claiming and yeah a third of what was before the one half of what the white house is claiming um oh and there's also one piece of news related to the strait of hummus is um there was one escort of a of a of ships so there was one escort that was done i think yesterday or today um so nothing too major as part of those 38 but the one piece of news is medvedev making a statement he told um the world iran has two maritime weapons and one of them hasn't been used yet. So he's claiming that they have a, okay, so he's not an actual weapon. He's talking about, he's saying that Iran has two big weapons. One of them is the Strait of Hormuz and the other one is the Bab al-Mandib Strait. So he's reminding everyone that there's still that other weapon that the Iranians have not used. Sorry, I thought I misunderstood his statement. So nothing that we don't know, but it's just a statement that Medvedev made. now i want to go to the meeting between netanyahu and trump i think this one's important because all eyes on are on what you know what happens afterwards um and there's been a speech that was given today by netanyahu as well and i want to play the first clip if you can play that stephanie that was about um uh when netanyahu was asked about israel's permanent state of war you know lebanon gaza etc house always in a water permanent in a forever state of war in this piece of the conversation you know what do you say
Speaker 1: to critics who argue that Israel has embraced sort of a permanent state of war and that there's not really an end game here? Because they point to places like Gaza and say that Hamas, you know, is still in power. They haven't laid down their arms. What do you say to those critics who accuse Israel of being in a permanent state of war?
Speaker 0: Well, we're not in a permanent state of war. I myself, with President Trump, we brought forth four peace deals. what we did it's abraham accords and i believe with the weakening of iran which has been achieved by our common action uh our common military action i think we're going to get more because because countries would like to align with us uh and to protect their future and also their prosperity israel is a powerhouse i mean it's a it's an engine of innovation of ai of of quantum of just of everything. So I don't see that. But I'll tell you one thing. I think that the Lebanon deal has shown that we have more cards in play. Lebanon would like to free itself of Hezbollah, these Hezbollah terrorists who are, you know, making their life miserable. And it's not only the Christians in Lebanon who ask for our protection. It's the Druze, it's Muslims, the Sunni Muslims, and quite a few of the Shiite Muslims, too. So they'd like to free Lebanon. I hope we can get more peace deals. And I can tell you... You know, if you want to have peace, you better be able to protect yourself against those who want to annihilate you. We do that. But in defending ourselves, we're defending our common civilization, the people who chant death to America. Last point, Jackie.
Speaker 2: He also says one other statement here. Let me add to it. He says it separately. I think in the same interview, he says a lot of Lebanese people, some of the Christians in Lebanon want us to annex their territory. Let me get the exact quote. That was a statement he made that some of the Lebanese people, the Christian Lebanese people want Israel to annex their territory.
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah. Hey, I want you to sleep with my wife. Bring your whole football team.
Speaker 2: I didn't expect that one. But yeah, this is probably the best comparison.
Speaker 4: Let me find the exact quote. Ask one simple question. How many Lebanese citizens or soldiers, military personnel, has Hezbollah killed in the last four months? How many has Israel killed? Israel's killed the majority. I mean, I don't think Hezbollah's killed any, but let's say maybe a few. But Israel's killed thousands. They actually have killed more Lebanese than they killed Iranians. during the first 42-day war. Let me play the clip.
Speaker 2: I found the clip of the annexing as well. If you could play that quickly, Stephanie. You're going to love this clip, and I'd love to get your commentary on it. So the first clip he's talking, we already heard the first clip. Play this one.
Speaker 0: So while this one's waiting to play, the first... AI and cyber expertise. You know, Israel is the number two country in cyber in the world. And our technology is so good. So the relations are not quite as they appear. And we have many, many friends. And I have to tell you, we also take care of our friends, especially the Christians in the Middle East. The Christian villages in Lebanon, some of them have actually asked to be annexed to Israel, because we protect them against the Hezbollah fanatics who want to kill them. And we do the same things with Christians everywhere.
Speaker 1: We protect the Christians in the Middle East. You're touching on my next point.
Speaker 4: Yeah, killing Christians. That's what he's been doing. He's done it in Gaza. What a crazy thing to say. I mean, they've got the one Christian town there in South Lebanon that's been devastated by Israeli bombing.
Speaker 2: What a crazy thing to say.
Speaker 4: This guy is just...
Speaker 2: There's no reports... There's no reports of Hezbollah killing Christians. No reports. Again, it's coming from a critic of Hezbollah. No reports whatsoever. Hezbollah has alliances with Christian groups. There's no religious hatred. There's no issues whatsoever between the two. Lebanon has a Christian president, has a big Christian population, 30-something percent. It was more before the civil war. No issues whatsoever whatsoever. churches, it's, it's just it's a Christian and Muslim countries, no issues at all there. Right. So for him to make a statement like this, he's capitalizing on the ignorance of the average listener in the US that doesn't know these things. I have no idea. They put Lebanon and Iraq and Syria and Libya all in one bucket.
Speaker 4: And I sit on the same bucket, because why not? Absolutely. It's, it's disgusting. It's disturbing. But, you know, again, I'm sure he may believe what he's saying. He may absolutely believe it's the truth.
Speaker 2: I think he's too smart. Maybe Trump? Netanyahu is freaking cunning. He's cunning. Yeah.
Speaker 4: No argument for me on that. I absolutely agree.
Speaker 2: Let's play that third clip as well, please, Stephanie. Okay.
Speaker 1: You're touching on my next question because a source close to the vice president's team told Politico that that statement that he made reflects his view of this new political reality where, quote, the vice president sees that the ground is shifting against Israel among voters, including with younger Republicans. He's responding accordingly with nuance instead of stridency. Do you take that as a warning that if Israel were to act alone, the Trump administration would withhold its backing?
Speaker 0: Well, first of all, it concerns me that there is that element of anti-Israel, first of all, in the Democratic Party and in the woke right. I'm concerned with that. And to the extent that we can do something to mend it, obviously, I'll do it. But I find that there is something unique about these attacks. And that something is that the people who hate Israel, end up hating America. And I've seen that. When they do these demonstrations, these protests against Israel, against Israel defending itself, this tiny country defending itself against these terrorist murderers who commit to exterminate us. And we do what any self-respecting country would do. We defend ourselves. But when they do the protests, they burn Israeli flags. And very often, right next to them, they burn American flags. But when those Americans who support Israel, non-Jews and Jews alike, when they do a demonstration to support Israel, they wave the Israeli flag and they wave the American flag. So I think there's a process taking place inside America, which you probably know better than me, of questioning America's traditional values and going to many places that I think challenge our... not our not only our alliance but they challenge the traditional values that form the basis of each of our countries and i hope that's not something that is going to proceed i hope america changes direction that's really what i hope to see and he says one more thing in that front i want you to hear one last clip then we can comment on all of them if we can play that last clip please stephanie
Speaker 1: So in this case, he's also being asked about the same topic about younger Republicans and what we're seeing with this growing radicalism on the left. Are you worried about the long term durability of the U.S. Israel relationship?
Speaker 0: I worry about the trends that I see. I won't tell you that I'm not worried about it because I think it has something to do with the frankly, with the social media, with a penetration of of social media that has been used and abused by countries, three in particular. And they've bought farms that push the stuff against America and against Israel. And it focuses on young people and young Americans. And I can't say that I'm not worried about the effect that it has. How do you combat this? It's hard because democratic countries don't have the ability to fight this crisis. You know, this bot war with the same means. We are accountable. We're transparent. It's not so simple. But I think you'll see a correlation between the penetration of certain social media and the decline in patriotic American feelings and support for Israel. It's something we have to deal with. But am I worried about it? Look, I think that our alliance is not merely based on common interests. I think it's based on common values. And as long as we stick to those common values, freedom, the right of every individual to live and not be slaughtered by fanatics. People should have free choice.
Speaker 2: So he's asked about four things in those clips. You could remove it, Stephanie. He's asked about forever state of war. He's like, no, no, no. Abraham's cause was the answer. He's mentioned about Lebanon. Our Christians want us to annex their territory to save them from Hezbollah. He talks about people that have anti-Israeli sentiment. He's like, no, no, those people, they're also anti-US. And then he talks about Israel being that small country protecting itself from all these big evil neighbors. And then he talks about the sentiment shift online. Oh, these are bot farms. I know there is politics and you try to control the narrative and Trump does it to an extent. But do you, and I mean this seriously, like, How many Americans do you think believe those statements?
Speaker 4: Would side with Bibi on that?
Speaker 2: Would side with Bibi on all these four points? The sentiment shift is bot farms. The anti-Israeli people are also anti-American. Christians in Lebanon want their territory to be annexed.
Speaker 4: I'd say somewhere between 35% and 45% still. Jesus. But the point is the majority take the opposite view. So it could be as high as 65% opposing that, which is unprecedented. That has never been the case here in the United States. It's always been a pro-Israel view. So that represents a significant change. And yeah, he's right to be concerned about it. But his trying to push this notion that if you're anti-Israel, you're anti-American, excuse me, I got, if I'm anti-American, why am I wearing this shirt? I am anti-Zionist, anti-Zionist to the hilt. But I'm very pro-American, as I've mentioned to you in the past. I actually did some additional research on my ancestor, Charles Thompson. He was my fifth great uncle. So he's sort of the embodiment of what I call the American dream. came to this country in 1739, 10 years old with his, I think he had two brothers, two sisters, and his father died before they landed on shore, two days before they landed. Don't know what, you know, he got some illness on board the ship. And Charles got, you know, he was basically an orphan. He was adopted. by a blacksmith family. His older brother, my grandfather, fifth great-grandfather, went to Virginia and became a farmer. And I think they never saw each other again. But Charles, he went on to, he became a Greek and Latin scholar. He was a businessman, very successful. And he was a leader in the American Revolution. And he served, he was the Secretary of the Continental Congress. Now, he wasn't just a note taker. the current Declaration of Independence that sits in the National Archives, the handwriting, that's his handwriting. He wrote that. That's his. And he was the one that was the first one to read the Declaration of Independence in public on July 9th, 1776. And on top of that, he was the one that kept the Declaration of Independence and his personal protection until 1989, when it was turned over to then Department of State. So I come out of this with a family history of patriotism. That's a cool uncle. Yeah, it is. Well, what made him even spectacularly cool is he became a great friend of the Delaware Indians. he even though he was not a lawyer but he was involved in a court case against the most powerful family in pennsylvania the penn family william penn's family who were trying to take the land from these delaware indians and my fifth grade uncle is the one who spoke in their behalf and they the indians ended up winning the court case and they called they called my my great uncle, he was known as the man of truth to them. So unlike many Europeans who came in and exploited the Indians and killed them, he had the exact opposite reputation that he was a genuine friend of and looked out for the interests of them. But what is really fascinating is that he had collected, he had all the inside information on all of the delegates to the Continental Congress. So he knew who was seeing prostitutes. He knew who was a drunk. He had all this information. Instead of releasing those...
Speaker 2: He was CIA before CIA.
Speaker 4: Yeah, or J. Edgar Hoover. But when he was being asked to publish those papers, he burned them, destroyed them, because he said... you know, I have a lot of information that if we told the true story about a lot of the people that we now venerate, they would have a different view. And he said, I don't want to do that. I would rather preserve the heroic account that exists instead of showing the feet of clay that many of these great men had. So he was a class act. And so, yeah, I look back on saying, okay, genetically, I mean, that's what I want to be in line with.
Speaker 2: Yeah. Going to the point of Netanyahu comparing people that are critical of Israel as people that are anti-US, one could argue it's the complete opposite. Caring about the US means putting the US ahead of other countries. Being critical of American support to other countries is what makes you America first. It's the complete opposite of what... Netanyahu saying, now he's probably referring to the people that are so upset at what's happening in Palestine and the region, especially in Palestine. They blame the U.S. and Israel. So even though they're American, they blame their own country. And some of them take it to another level by burning the American flag or criticizing their own country. I think this is the connection he's making.
Speaker 4: You know, to be pro-American doesn't mean that you excuse the evil that has been done in the United States by leaders. I mean, the attempt to exterminate the native populations, that is a sordid mark on our history. The allowance of slavery, enslaving human beings and depriving them of their rights, that's nothing to be proud of. So to criticize the leaders of the United States for not upholding the kinds of values that my uncle upheld. It doesn't make you anti-American. It means you understand what sort of the vision of America could be, what it was expected to be. As Reagan talked about it, a city on a hill, but we're not supposed to be the country that goes out and tell other countries what to do. Stay at home, fix your own problems, Be an example that others will want to follow. Lead by example, not by words, not by command, but lead by example.
Speaker 2: Values above country, I guess, the way I would put it. Obviously, everyone should put their country above others if you want to be nationalistic and patriotic, but that doesn't mean... You want to know what a good indicator of a good civilization is?
Speaker 4: How clean are the public toilets? I hadn't thought of that. Where'd you get that from? Me? Having traveled around the world and been in some real shitholes. Japan will be top of the list. Some genuine, authentic shitholes. Yeah. Well, when you see, do people take time to be clean? Or do they just trash the area they're around?
Speaker 2: Littering is another example as well.
Speaker 4: When I was nine years old, 10 years old, going into becoming a teenager in the 60s, it was common back then that you'd be driving down the road and you had trash, you just throw it out the window. That used to be sort of commonly accepted in the middle part of the 1960s. And then someone came up with this concept, hey, let's start an anti-littering campaign. which, you know, frankly, I fully endorse and support. And, you know, it's, again, part of that anti-littering gets back to, do you care about your environment? Do you care about other people, what they have to experience? Or are you just... so self-centered and that you can do whatever you want.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I agree. Especially the self-centered one, like someone that cleans after themselves in the toilet is actually a good indicator of how selfish or selfless they are.
Speaker 4: Do you care about what is the person that comes after you? It's a good indicator. Yeah. So it's just, again, it gets back to the thing about the bottom line, the fundamental line in human relationships is how we treat each other.
Speaker 2: He bestowed it must be a mess.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I would say so. You know, he's not concerned. His concern about humanity and others is very limited and it's restricted.
Speaker 2: So another three things he said that linked to his visit, and these are more political. He said, one, Iran wants to remove us from southern Lebanon. And that goes back to our point. So Iran wants to remove us from southern Lebanon. They're trying to put that pressure on the US. We are handling this pressure well. We have received legitimacy to maintain the security zone from our great achievement against Lebanon. But they will try to undermine it in every way, including putting pressure on the Lebanese government. But then he says, I heard reports in the media claiming that Trump asked us not to take action against terrorist tunnels in Lebanon. That's a myth, fake news. He didn't say anything to me about it and I didn't ask him. We act according to our own considerations. So he's saying that Iran tried to pressure Israel to go out of South Lebanon and they failed. And he also says that Trump did not tell them to stop or to ease up on the attacks on Lebanon. Now, we had reports earlier that they wanted to attack Beirut. Trump stopped them. They wanted to continue moving into Lebanon. Trump stopped them. They want to continue demolishing villages. Trump stopped them. He's claiming those reports are true, which politically, he would probably do that anyway. It's politically better for him. So I don't know what you make of these two points. Number one, his first point that Iran still hasn't been able to kick out Israel from South Lebanon. Does that concern you?
Speaker 4: Yeah, it's a violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Look, it would be one thing if the evidence over the last now six months showed that Hezbollah was routinely bombing civilian areas, killing civilians, attacking civilian buses, etc. But that's not the case. I mean, the numbers, the actual numbers, of civilians. Have a few been killed and wounded? Yes. But the overwhelming number of dead civilians are on the Lebanese side of the border because of Israel's actions. But let's assume that Israel was not killing civilians in Lebanon, but that Hezbollah was routinely attacking every civilian center, ignoring military targets, because the reality is what Hezbollah has been focused on is attacking military targets. well in that case i yeah i would say israel would have a right to create a buffer zone because hezbollah is killing civilians you know i i you know i don't support anybody that thinks it's okay to launch a missile or a drone or a hand grenade or a suicide bomb or whatever that's going to blow up school children uh diners at a restaurant you know sorry I apply that. That's a universal standard. It gets applied to everybody. And what we've seen is Israel uses that as its excuse to kill civilians in Lebanon. But the fact of the matter is Hezbollah has not been doing what Israel claims it has been doing.
Speaker 2: Yeah. The last thing he said is about Gaza. That's a bit heartbreaking as well. There will be no reconstruction in Gaza without disarmament and demilitarization in the designated area.
Speaker 4: Hamas has not given up. So we'll see. We'll see how long Israel can sustain that kind of activity. Look, the last three years have not been kind to Israel's economy, despite Bibi's upbeat assessment. It has... It is, you know, significantly suffered. If nothing else, just the lack of tourism. Tourism used to be a big, big moneymaker. Not anymore.
Speaker 2: Yeah. I want to play one more clip here. Obviously, you know about the USS Liberty. And there's one guy, I'm not sure if you know, a survivor from USS Liberty, Phil Turney. This is a video of him. And he burns... the flag of Israel. You can play it whenever it's ready. He endorsed Thomas Massey for president for 2028 as well, but I'll play the video. That one went viral today.
Speaker 3: I burned this evil flag on the 4th of July in remembrance of my 34 brothers tattooed in my arm who were slaughtered by Israel June 8, 1967. I also call out all the Zionist Congress Senators, you're supposed to fight for this country, not Israel. So you should be voted out of all of you. Thomas Massey for president, 2028.
Speaker 2: Yeah. Actually, I've got a good question linked to this. So Chris Martinson told me something interesting today. He said, I can't remember the context of it, but there is something that everyone knows. And then the next level from that, so obviously the lowest level is something nobody knows. next level from that is some people know that people start talking about analysts etc right we know iran won the war then the next thing is something that everybody knows something like um i know isis is bad or israel um people in gaza are suffering and then the last one is the last stage is something everyone knows that everyone knows. So that's when it becomes really mainstream. It becomes almost irreversible. What it means there is that he gives the example of the emperor with no clothes is that everyone would see the emperor with no clothes, but it takes for one person to say it and then everyone to realize, yes, he doesn't have any clothes. And then everyone knows now that everyone knows. And that's when it becomes reality. COVID was a good example. It's like everyone knew something was off. But then when people started speaking out and censorship didn't work anymore, then everyone knew that everyone knew something was off. And I feel we're at that stage that, you know, crossing of the chasm stage when it comes to Israel, Israeli influence in the US, US support for Israel and Israeli foreign policy. We're getting to the stage from where everyone knows and we're crossing as we speak in the next few years, few months and years where everyone is starting to know that everybody knows. And I think this is This is where it becomes, in my view, almost irreversible when it gets to that stage. What we know about COVID now cannot be undone. And I think we're witnessing, especially this year and the last couple of years, been accelerating the same thing happening when it comes to the perception of Israel.
Speaker 4: Yeah, and within that is this survivor of the attack on the USS Liberty, Lyndon Baines Johnson, the president. I mean, he was a tool of Israel back then. He had an Israeli mistress. So that was one of the things that led him, that he was involved with the coverup of the murder of John F. Kennedy. And he went to great lengths to suppress and to threaten the sailors who were attacked on that day. And it's just now, 59 years later, it's now starting to get around and Americans who weren't even born then are now saying, what the hell? Israel attacked one of our military vessels and killed 38 sailors. Think of this. More than Iran just killed in this war. Damn you, you took my line. Sorry, sorry. It just clicked in my mind. Yeah, no, good pickup. You were tracking exactly the same. You know, we want to get outraged at it. Iran for the deaths of 13 soldiers. Okay. Israel killed 38, almost three times that amount. So if we're going to be upset with Iran, we need to really be upset with Israel. Oh, no, no, no. They're our ally. Well, God, with friends like that, man, you don't need enemies.
Speaker 2: And the context matters as well. With Iran, the U.S. was attacking Iran. Iran was retaliating. Iran stopped as soon as the U.S. stopped. In the case of Israel, the U.S. was not attacking Israel.
Speaker 4: was not attacking, just collecting intelligence. That's, you know, that's all. And, you know, the Israelis knowingly, you know, attacked and killed Americans. Hence the term chutzpah. Really? Well, I'm just saying that's an example. That would be a classic example of chutzpah. Or as Michelle Boxman called it, chutzpah.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I don't know. It's just we're witnessing something. I want to get with you one last story to wrap up, but we're witnessing something pretty significant when it comes to the US-Israeli relations. I really think that this Iran war would be the straw that breaks the camel's back. Going back to my question about when I showed you these clips from Netanyahu and asked you how many Americans believe it, just to see what bubble the Americans are living in. and there's this one last story and new financial times and focal data paul found that 60 or 58 to be exact 58 of u.s voters believe trump's war with iran was not worth the cost okay as the conflict continues so 58 believe the war was not worth the cost fine but that also means 42 believe the war was actually worth hundreds of billions of dollars right right That's the crazy thing. I understand the majority believe it wasn't worth it, but 42 to believe it's worth it, knowing what we know, knowing the facts, is still a wild number.
Speaker 4: When you're repeatedly subjected to the propaganda that Iran's this great terrorist state, that Iran is the most active terrorist-supporting nation in the world, again, all of it's not true, but that's the story that gets put out, and that propaganda does have an effect, and it has created at least... a minority buffer that believes that, even though, again, it's not true. Yeah.
Speaker 2: Cool. And that's it. The last story is related to Gaza, but I think it will have a story on Gaza on October 7th, but it's not time sensitive. I'll leave it till tomorrow. But that's it for today. It's maybe Netanyahu's speech, the big protests.
Speaker 4: Anything on your end? Well, a question. I have not yet watched your interview with Chris Martinson. I was out I'm busy today, and I'm sorry for my late arrival. You'll be chastising me for that for months to come. I'll never live it down. But did you get Chris to talk about the difference about the mid-oil, the mid-distillates, and the difference between the heavy sulfur crude and the light crude?
Speaker 2: No, no, because we got too distracted. I wanted to bring that up. That was the big topic I want to talk to him about, the price of oil. but we really got carried away. And like, it was a really good conversation, but we got carried away into the, just the American society, the American system, like just the stage we're at. We're like, you know, Trump talking about the stock market on a daily basis, but the average American looking at their last lifestyle and realizing how fucked up it is and things are not improving. The fact that people voted for Trump expecting at least the end of forever was And at best, the debt being addressed and then for Trump to become like all the other presidents and repeating the same foreign policy and policy as all the others. So we started talking about these things and even started bringing up the topic of if we continue going down the path where people try this and try that and try this and try that and nothing works, are we heading to something to the movie? You should watch the movie Citizen Vigilante Citizen or Citizen Vigilante. that's been going viral. I spoke to the producer a couple of days ago. We brought that up and like, are people in the West, in the US, in Europe, reaching breaking point if things are not addressed? So that kind of, we went really deep in that discussion.
Speaker 4: Well, you know, we've... This goes in cycles. We were there actually in the 70s. So, and Charles Bronson, he played, I think, the first... let's call it modern vigilante in film, in American film history, I think. I would be happy to be corrected by someone who's a genuine film buff. But he, the movie centered around the fact that these thugs broke in, raped and killed his wife and maybe his daughter, at least his wife. And he went on, the movie is called death wish and he went on a vigilante hunt and and you know was sort of um you know taking them out the i guess you could say predating that was the dirty harry movies with with uh clint eastwood that uh you know he was uh you know he was a vigilante cop you know taking out taking out the bad guys, but he was at least doing that as a law enforcement officer. The first one who was a genuine vigilante was, I think, Charles Bronson. Made a famous role, and that's been followed up by other sort of these revenge movies.
Speaker 2: Bruce Willis had one called Death Wish as well from a few years ago.
Speaker 4: Or Die Hard.
Speaker 2: No, no, he has Death Wish as well. I didn't know they remade it as well. I'm guessing it's the same thing. Yeah, because I've seen the trailer of it. So it's Death Wish with Bruce Willis. If you could play the trailer of it without the audio, Stephanie, I'll just show it for people that don't know. But for Citizens Vigilante, though, the reason it's like people are concerned about it is because it literally touches on a real life issue that people are struggling with, which is the way immigration has been handled in Europe. And the story, you should really check it out. But it's inspired by a story in Germany where a girl was raped by a few immigrant men, Muslim men. And they, the judge said one of the boys was also a victim, one of the rapists. And then the mother blamed the girl on a social media post saying that she was raped, she had she should take some of the blame for being raped because of the way she dresses or something. And it's a painful and then it's also inspired by the whole gang rape um um rape gangs in uh in in the uk right right yeah the the the grooming gang sorry the gang raping grooming gangs um so the grooming rings yeah so so yeah so this is what inspired the movie and this is based on a topic that people are being are are really upset about in europe and they keep voting in a new leader based on the fact that we want you to take care of this issue. And then the new leader does not change their policy about this issue. And eventually this guy in the movie takes matters into his own hands. And the reason people like Patrick, but David, he said on his show, I played that clip a few days ago. He said, I really expect someone. He said, this is Tommy Robinson. I expect someone to be there. And I expect someone to do something very, very violent, inspired by this movie. But this movie is not going to be the cause of this violence. This movie is... is an expression of something people are feeling, anger people are feeling. And then how this relates to the US. People are sick of these forever wars. People are sick of the ballooning debt. People are getting sick of that inequality that keeps expanding in the US. And Ray Dalio has been warning about it year after year after year. One of the smartest people in the US, one of the most successful people in the US just keeps warning that the widening gap in the US is going to cause instability. So that's kind of the path we took. Probably a discussion you could do a whole episode on. But it's something that's worrying and just I really thought Trump would start the change. I really was hoping for that.
Speaker 4: It's a real issue. And again, the problems differ state to state. Like in Florida, open carry, which I'm against. I'm against open carry of firearms. I'm a big believer in concealed carry. because it's better to not know if somebody's carrying a gun, but if you assume somebody might have a gun, it's like you tend to be more polite to each other, you know, instead of letting it just escalate out of control, let your anger and emotions take over. So, you know, and we're fortunate that, you know, the sheriffs that we have in many of the counties, I mean, they're the most famous sheriffs It's just north of me up in Polk County. Grady Judd is his name. And, you know, like three years ago, four years ago, there was this one fellow who shot and killed one of the police officers. And when they caught the guy, they shot him like 66 times. And one of the reporters asked Grady, he said, Grady, what? Why did you shoot him 66 times? And he said, we ran out of bullets.
Speaker 2: I remember that. Yes, yes, of course. That's the police chief. He went viral and everyone was talking about him and massive support. There were talks about him running for office or something. Maybe he ran for office for Congress.
Speaker 4: Well, he is elected. Sheriff, you are elected.
Speaker 2: Oh, okay.
Speaker 4: There you go.
Speaker 2: But did he run for Congress or something afterwards? No.
Speaker 4: No, because I think he understands he's going to be far more effective in how society and how people behave as sheriff. And Polk County is a pretty safe place. And similarly, I live in Manatee County. We've got a great sheriff, Rick Wells. So, you know, the police are not oppressive. But, you know, if you commit a crime, you get – Well, you're going to go to jail. Now, the interesting part is they do a citizen's police academy. And as part of that academy, you know, citizens get to, you know, attend this class. It's like a 12-week experience. And one of those classes you actually go to the county jail. And it's remarkable in the county jail what, you know, They genuinely are involved with rehabilitation. Inmates that have screwed up and done wrong and they want a chance to get straight, they have a chance there. I mean, they got tilapia fish tanks. They grow tilapia. They've got vegetables, vegetable gardens. They raise cows, pigs. They have basically a farm. They make They've got a steel and they manufacture things out of steel. They manufacture furniture. So any M&A that goes there is not going to be sitting around playing video games, watching television. Nope, dude, you're going to work and you're going to work at something that's actually productive. It's not just make work. It gives them a purpose as well. Yeah. And then they actually get a skill that when they get out, they don't have to go back to you know, a life of addiction and drugs and violence. So, you know, it was... I came away from that experience seeing that just, you know, damned impressed. And then the Florida sheriffs also, they're good about housing children that don't have parents or their parents are no longer functional. And that these... These are, they're raised not as foster kids, they're really raised in a, like a family unit, but at a physical location that's controlled by the Sheriff's Department. And, you know, a lot of those kids have gone on to do some really impressive things. So, you know, there's a way you can take care, you know, where society can function. And, you know, you got to deal with the dysfunction. I mean, you know, drug use, alcohol use, yeah, that's real. Child abuse, child trafficking, that's real. But they go to great lengths to not only to, you know, when they arrest people, they're not going to get off and be walking the streets again.
Speaker 2: Yeah. And to wrap up, someone just sent me photos. You can show them, Stephanie. You know Max Blumenthal, obviously, and Jackson Hinkle. So they've both been on the show. I know them both as well. And someone just sent me photos of them attending the funeral. That's Max. Of course, he's there. He was there before the war as well. And then Jackson Hinkle's there. Jackson Hinkle. Of course, Jackson Hinkle's there. This guy's everywhere. Anywhere that's controversial, Jackson Hinkle will go. Funeral of Hezbollah, he's going to be there. The Houthis, he's going to go there.
Speaker 4: That's an Ansar Allah.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah. You can tell by the sword there. You can tell by the belt.
Speaker 4: The dagger and the belt. Yeah. Yeah. No, I know them both. I spent more time with Jackson. You know.
Speaker 2: He's a funny guy. I remember once he was... He came on to... I can remove it, Stephanie. Jackson, I got him on a debate with a guy. I forgot the guy's name. Fuck. Um... But I got him on a debate, a guy who's very pro Israeli. They did a debate about a year ago or so, eight months ago. And then Jackson Hinkle, he comes off and starts a discussion with Hamas should have a nuclear weapon. That was his slogan because he knows that will get attention. It went berserk. People just went wild. And he knows it will trigger people. And he says it. And I'm trying to keep a straight face because I know what he's doing. And then the other guest just losing his mind. What do you mean you're talking about? You're crazy. And I know Jackson doesn't mean it. I'm sure he doesn't want Hamas to have a nuclear weapon. But he wants the shock factor. Yeah, yeah. All right, man. Well, great chat. I appreciate it.
Speaker 4: I always enjoy our conversations.
Speaker 2: Thank you, Larry. I'll see you tomorrow. All right, my friend. Bye-bye. Bye-bye. All right, guys, this is it for today. In the comments today, give me your thoughts of what you think of the conversation, because we obviously went down paths away from the Iran war and about other topics that interest us, talking about American society, et cetera, and observations that Larry has made. I want to get your thoughts on that. Do you like us going down these different rabbit holes that kind of digress away from the Iran war discussion, or do you like the discussions to be more focused? Let me know in the comments. about this interview and the Chris Martinson one. Today's structure of the interviews is a bit different. The live and three of them were merged together. So it's one long interview with Chris Martinson, Professor Hank and Karen Kwiatowski. And then there were all three, if you want to watch them separately, they're posted as normal videos. My producers are testing something. All right, guys, I'll go through the comments. I'm off to bed. Have a wonderful day and I'll see you tomorrow. Thank you so much.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m struck that Brent futures sit near pre-war levels despite only 39 ships moving through Hormuz in 24 hours—about a third of normal. Steve Hanke argues the curve is pricing a “fantasy”: real scarcity should produce backwardation, but forward prices are flat. Refined products show backwardation, not crude. He also calls the MoU a surrender document and cites transit-fee hypocrisy, suggesting a formal multilateral convention.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
What the oil market isn't answering: why are Brent futures near pre-war levels when only 39 ships moved through Hormuz in the last 24 hours. Roughly a 3rd of normal traffic? Economist Steve Hanke says the market is pricing a fantasy. When oil is genuinely scarce, markets go into backwardation; spot prices above futures because people are borrowing from the future to cover today's shortage. That's the normal signal. Right now, with inventories near record lows and Hormuz still running at a 3rd of capacity, the forward curve has gone flat instead. Hanke calls that anomalous, plainly disconnected from the physical reality on the water. Refined products are telling the honest story: gasoline and diesel are still showing real backwardation, meaning real shortages. The crude price is not. On the MoU, Hanke's blunty calls it a surrender document. Trump needed out because continued closure meant economic catastrophe. Netanyahu is reportedly pushing to reopen the fight. And on the hypocrisy of Washington's "no country can charge Hormuz fees" position. Turkey raised Bosphorus transit fees 15% on July 1st, fully legal under the Montreux Convention. Hanke's suggestion: settle Hormuz the same way, a formal multilateral convention among Gulf states and major powers. Is crude simply wrong right now, or is there supply nobody's tracking that explains the disconnect? @steve_hanke
Video Transcript AI Summary
In discussing the economy and oil markets, the conversation focused on rising transit fees in Turkey’s straits, U.S.-Iran negotiations, and why oil prices appear inconsistent with supply constraints.
On the 1st of July, Turkey increased the transit fees it charges to go through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by 15%. Speaker 0 said this is legal under the Montreux Convention of 1936 and noted the timing is “symbolic” given broader disputes about whether Iran should be able to charge a fee. Speaker 0 stated that the signatories of the Montreux agreement included the Black Sea countries plus France, Greece, Yugoslavia (no longer existing), and other related states; the U.S. and China were not involved. Speaker 1 asked whether the U.S. would eventually accept an Iranian fee or continue resisting, referencing concern that disagreement could drag both countries toward war. Speaker 1 said some European and some Gulf countries have accepted that a fee is inevitable, while the U.S. continues to say this is a “red line” and will not accept an Iranian fee. Speaker 1 also mentioned that Oman sent an official proposal to the Americans about a new fee structure for the Strait of Homs.
Speaker 0 argued that a convention like Montreux would be the best way to create a stable arrangement going forward, describing historical agreements before Montreux (including Lucerne) and stating that earlier arrangements involved fortresses and military oversight that were later “demilitarized.” Speaker 0 also said the easiest solution would be a convention among the Gulf states, similar to the Black Sea states, and possibly the great powers (Russia, the United States, and China).
They then shifted to oil prices. Speaker 1 said that oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz is still about a third of what it was before the war, yet futures prices are down to pre-war levels despite low strategic reserves and the expectation of a market needing restored supply. Speaker 1 questioned how prices could be so low given reduced flow and market risk.
Speaker 0 explained oil price behavior using forward curves. He described the post-war-start market structure as “extreme steep backwardation,” where spot prices for current delivery are far above future delivery prices. He said that, historically over the last 20 years, Brent has been in backwardation only about 5% of the time, while it is normally in contango (spot lower than futures) about 95% of the time. Speaker 0 said the oil market has moved from extreme backwardation to “flat” (not fully into contango), citing examples such as spot around 72.13 with roughly flat one-year pricing and lower longer-dated levels. He contrasted this with refined products: gasoline and diesel remain in a shortage profile, with spot prices higher than futures later in the year (gasoline spot 295 vs 227 later; diesel spot 326 vs 299 later), and he said refineries are running “full blast” yet product inventories show tightness.
Speaker 1 asked whether refined-product shortages relate to Russia and logistics—oil stuck in the Gulf coming out slowly, and whether it is refined elsewhere. Speaker 0 said Russian factors are part of the explanation, stating that Ukrainians damaged Russian refining capacity, reducing refined products coming out of Russia. He added that Russia is rationing gasoline and diesel and importing some refined products.
Speaker 0 concluded that the unusual part is that, despite all-time-low inventories, the forward curve does not show the level of backwardation Brent would typically indicate. Speaker 1 highlighted the disconnect between traders expecting the war’s end to restore Strait of Hormuz flows to pre-war levels and reported that, in the last 24 hours, only 39 ships went through the straits—about a third (or less) of pre-war levels.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: What's happening with the economy, Professor? What is going on? Oil prices are just not making any sense right now.
Speaker 0: Well, yeah, let's get into that a little bit. I think the one thing following up on other conversations that we've had is the fact that on the 1st of July, the transit fees that Turkey charges to go through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles went up. And those are legal, of course, under the Montreux Convention of 1936. Now, if you listen to what's coming out of Washington, D.C., as well as other capitals around the world, the claim is, by the U.S. Secretary of State, is that no... transit fees, tolls, whatever you want to call them, are charged on any international waterways or straits any place in the world. And he claims that those are illegal. Well, here's a legal one. There is a legal one. It's a Montreux agreement. And it was just July 1st, only a few days ago, that the rates were increased by 15% by Turkey. They annually adjust these, but they the fee went up by 15% on July 1. So is that more than usual?
Speaker 1: Is that more than it usually goes up? Not No. Okay, but it's this simple, the symbol is the timing of in the symbolic nature of it is that while when you go while we're talking about the strait of wars and how Iran should not be able to charge a fee, Turkish fee in their straits went up the fee they charge per year. It
Speaker 0: It went up, and it is legal under an international convention and agreement where the countries that signed that agreement, by the way, were all the countries that have access to the Black Sea, those countries, plus France, Greece, Yugoslavia, which doesn't exist anymore. Of course, some of the borderlands where the Soviets signed it, but the U.S. and China... were not involved. So you had a small list of countries, all the Black Sea countries, plus France, Yugoslavia, Japan, Australia. Those were the signatories. The U.S. and China were not involved.
Speaker 1: Do you think the U.S. will come around to it and eventually accept an Iranian fee, or they would continue resisting it? And the reason I ask is a lot of people are worried that this is This disagreement is what drags the country, both countries, but one of them will instigate it back into war. European countries, according to Bloomberg, have already accepted, some European countries, sorry, and some Gulf countries have already accepted that a fee is inevitable. I don't know what the sentiment is in Asia, but the U.S. is still saying That is a red line. They will not accept a fee by the Iranians. And the Iranians are still saying is they will not go back to how things were. And the Omanis, which are in the middle, according to, I think, New York Times or Wall Street Journal, they've sent an official proposal to the Americans of the structure of the fee that they will be charging with the Iranians, the new structure of the Strait of Homs that will include a fee. So just trying to understand what the outcome is likely to be.
Speaker 0: Well, the... Some of the Europeans are already on board with the concept anyway. Maybe it's because they're used to paying a fee to Turkey to go through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. And the Asians are on board or appear to be on board. I think the best way to solve it and have a stable situation going forward would be to have a convention like Montreux. Because, by the way, that was preceded by Lucerne. There was another agreement before the Montreux. So it went on for a long time after World War I, basically, and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. By the way, before those agreements, just to put things in historical context, Turkey... The Ottomans, Turkey had fortresses and military operations overseeing what was going on on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. And these agreements kind of, shall we say, demilitarized the thing and eventually settled it down into what we have today. And I think the easiest way to do it, you've got the Gulf states Those would be similar to the Black Sea states and maybe the great powers also, Russia, United States, and China, and they have a convention and settle the thing.
Speaker 1: Were you surprised, by the way, at the size of the funeral in Iran? Over 10 million now, it was nine yesterday, 10 million people have attended so far. the funeral processions, that's a massive number. I don't know. Like, if you look at the number, it just shows that the Iranian government, the Iranian regime, whatever you want to call it, the IRGC is there to stay. And obviously, they're all pretty upset with the US. And then if you look at the red lines that the Iranians have drawn, they haven't really budged from them. I don't know. And then you've got Netanyahu coming to the US in a few days, I think in a couple of days, in two days. Um, so putting all these pieces together, I just worried that we are at an impulse and then, but then that's the negative side. Then the positive side professor is that the argument that the Americans cannot afford a resumption of the wall. Um, people are challenging this argument saying, Hey, there's breathing space. Now look at the price of oil that gives Trump the flexibility to maybe reconsider military action because he has. You know, he has more leeway. You know, it's a very different world now to what it was when the price of oil was over $100. What's your analysis of the situation now?
Speaker 0: Well, I think, first of all, I think Trump has concluded, and he literally has said this, that if the strait continued to be completely shut off, we would end up with an economic catastrophe. So he... He wants a deal and he wants to get out. And it's clear the MOU is just the starting point in that. But you have to remember, I view that as essentially signing a document that basically said, we give up and we want to get out. So I think that's where we're at. I think he wants to get out and he doesn't want to continue. We know what Netanyahu is going to try to talk him into, and that is continuing and wrapping the thing up. So there you have the dilemma that is going to face Donald Trump.
Speaker 1: What do you make of oil prices? That's something that's been really perplexing me. I've spoken to a lot of economists about it. The amount of oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz is still about a third of what it was before the war. Yet futures prices are down to pre-war levels when the strategic reserves are still low and there's still that massive shortage that the market is... the market needs really. It needs the oil that was coming in before the war to get back to the status quo. There hasn't been that massive demand destruction that is needed to maintain low prices when supply is restricted. And that's not even considering the risk premium that should be taken into consideration about the risk of the war restarting or Iran closing the Strait of Homs again. So putting all these pieces together, how are oil prices so low?
Speaker 0: Well, I think to look at that perspective, By the way, just back to the MOU, the word that was going through my mind but not coming out of my lips was it was really a surrender. The U.S. surrender documents, yeah. So that's that. Now let's go to the oil prices. The oil prices, understand what's going on. You have to look at the forward curve. That is the spot or current market. for current delivery versus the price at some future point in time. And what happened after the war started, the oil market and the diesel market, gasoline market, all the derivative products went into what they call extreme steep backwardation. That's when the spot price for current delivery is way above the price for some future delivery point, whether it be the end of this year or end of next year or what have you. So that's the thing that happened. Now, this is fairly unusual because if you look at the last 20 years of data, the crude market, the Brent market has only been in backwardation about 5% of the time. Now, what normally, I'm setting up the economics, kind of the principles of what's going on here. Normally, It's in what's called contango, or a carry market, where the spot market is a lower price than the future market. And that is, for Brent, 95% of the time. That's the way it is. So flip from contango, basically, it was kind of flat, right? Right before the, it wasn't contango, it wasn't backward, it was basically flat. So the war starts, it goes into this huge backwardation And the best way to understand the shape of the forward curve, it gives you the, basically it's a loan market. So if a market is in backwardation, that means that inventories are very scarce and people are trying to borrow from the future and resupply short inventories. That's when things are in backwardation. Normally, it's in contango. It's adequate inventories. Everything is fine, positive carry, and so forth. So now, what's happened, it hasn't completely flipped, by the way. I just looked at this, the Friday markets. It hasn't completely flipped into contango. In fact, it hasn't flipped into contango. The oil market's still in backwardation. If you look at Friday's spot market, Brent was 72.13. One year out, it was more or less flat, 72.37. And then if we go to December 2027, it's 70.34. So it's basically kind of flat now. And that compares, by the way, to April 7th, 2026. The spot was 111, and they two-year, December 2027 was 75, so it's a huge difference. Now, what you get into, and you've interviewed Jeff Curry about this, he's on top of the thing, and so the oil market's kind of flat. It's gone from backwardation to flat. The gasoline and diesel, that's not the case. There's still considerable Shortage in inventory showing up if you read the curve properly and and the curve now for gasoline spot 295 Forward what at the end of this year? 227 So the spot market price is a little higher than the futures market for the end of the year in December and and diesel You end up with the same thing spot price is 326. And the December 2006 is 299. So that means there's still quite a bit of tightness in these product markets on the refined product side, refined products. Now, this is a point that Curry's made in interviews you've had with Curry, of course, is one of the real experts on this kind of stuff. So we've had this kind of temporary increase in the flow, kind of, shall we say, unanticipated increase in the flow coming out of the Gulf as things loosen up a little bit. And they're only loosening up at a trickle, I would say. It's not a flood coming out of there. Some more is coming out than was coming out before. And as a result of that, you've had the immediate spot inventory starting to fill up and that backwardation has come out of the curve, and it's settled down. That's not the case with these refined products, by the way. The refineries are going full blast, and we still have shortages in inventories of products Gasoline and diesel as well as all the other refined products Is that because is that because of the issues in Russia as well as the logistical?
Speaker 1: Issues with all that oil stuck in the Gulf and coming out slowly at a trickle and they're going to the right refinery to be refined Is that why the refined products?
Speaker 0: Yes, that that's the Russian thing comes into the picture because the the Ukrainians have been Damning the refining capacity and damaging it in Russia, and the refined products have dried up, the ones coming out of Russia. I mean, Russia's into rationing for gasoline and diesel fuel and importing some of those refined products. So that's why we have this situation for the refined products. Now, going forward, what do I anticipate? that the markets don't seem to be anticipating, and that is that people are going to find out that, well, we actually are short of inventory. What about all accrued that was drained up? We're at all-time lows in inventories, but that isn't showing up in the market today. Exactly. That's the weird part. The market would be normally, I think the market should be in backwardation for Brent.
Speaker 1: And it is it's flat, where the spot price is higher than the futures price.
Speaker 0: Yes, spot spot prices should still be higher than the futures price, in my view, even because of the shortages because of the shortage of oil for the refineries as well.
Speaker 1: So not enough is coming out of the Strait of Hormuz.
Speaker 0: Well, it's mainly my argument would be that the inventories are at all time lows. And normally, normally, by the way, all you have to do is look at a forward curve with the spot and futures prices and you know whether you've got adequate inventories. If you do, the spot price will be lower than the futures price. You'll have a carry trade, a carry market, a so-called contango. If you have a shortage, however, and inventories are low, you're always in backwardation. Heavy backwardation where the spot prices above the futures price, and people are actually borrowing from the future to put product into inventory. And they're paying a price for it, with the spot price, of course, being above the futures price. That's normally what happens. So this is very abnormal, by the way. And all this was worked out, by the way, in 1930 by Holbert Wilkins. He was the big expert who got into the relationship for the first time between the forward curves and inventories. And what we know from that work and the work going forward is that when inventories, you know when inventories are inadequate when you see backwardation in the forward curve. But we're not seeing that right now. But we know inventories are at very low levels. So it's kind of anomalous what we're seeing right now.
Speaker 1: It is bizarre. It is. I don't know why traders are just expecting not only the war to have ended, but oil to just flow out of the Strait of Hormuz at the same numbers as it did before the war. But that's just not happening today. In the last 24 hours, only 39 ships in total went through the Straits. About a third of what it would be, even less than a third of what it was before the war. So reality is just so disconnected from what the markets are telling us. It's just weird for everybody. Different people have different explanations.
Speaker 0: I have no explanation except to say that we know this is anomalous and we can go back to all this academic and as well as industry studies that have been done relating the forward curved inventories. And if inventories are low, which they are now, we know that. That's something we know. You find the price structure should be one in which you observe spot prices above futures prices by a considerable level. They are a little bit now, but not very much. But you should be seeing quite a bit of backwardation in there for Brent, and you're not.
Speaker 1: I agree. Professor, always a pleasure. Thank you so much for the analysis. Really enjoyed it. And I always appreciate you giving us the time on the show.
Speaker 0: Great to be with you, Mario. Have a great day. Same to you, Professor.
Speaker 1: Thank you. Bye, guys. We'll be live again in about an hour with Aaron David-Biller to go through the latest updates with the negotiations. I'll see you guys shortly. Bye-bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I talked with PhD economist Chris Martenson about oil market numbers that don’t add up: only 39 ships passed Hormuz in 24 hours—about half what the Trump administration claims—yet crude sits near pre-war lows. At the same time, money managers are the most bearish on record while physical supply is tight. He asks: lost the thread, or a timed sell order suppressing price? The worry: demand is up while SPR and stocks are at multi-decade lows, leaving little cushion if a ceasefire cracks.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
I sat down with PhD economist Chris Martenson on the oil market numbers that genuinely don't add up. 39 ships through Hormuz in 24 hours, half what the Trump administration is publicly claiming, a 3rd of pre-war traffic. Yet crude sits near pre-war lows. Meanwhile money managers are the most bearish on oil they've been in 15 years (not slightly bearish, the most bearish on record) at the exact moment physical supply is the tightest it's been all year. Martenson's 2 explanations: either some of the smartest people in finance have simply lost the thread, or someone with deep pockets is running a standing sell order timed to peace deal headlines, letting momentum algorithms pile on and crater the price on cue regardless of what's happening at the strait. The part that should worry people more than the price: U.S. oil product demand is up 2.9% year over year while the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and commercial stockpiles sit at multi-decade lows for this time of year. The concern isn't that oil is expensive right now. It's that if the ceasefire cracks again, America hits a real shortage with nothing left in the reserve to cushion it (having spent the intervening weeks burning through what remained to maintain the illusion of cheap oil.) Is this algorithmic noise or engineered price suppression while the physical reserves quietly run dry? @chrismartenson
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion focused on how growing numbers of people feel the public “story” doesn’t add up—particularly economists’ emphasis on inequality gaps and stock market performance versus everyday Americans not seeing lifestyle improvements. A comedian guest described giving up on voting because every four years a new president repeats the same behavior, and the conversation said this year broke many people who had put hope into Trump, especially after a perceived move away from “swamp” behavior toward actions described as swampy: money-making from the presidency, “forever wars,” and increasing debt.
Chris said he recently attended a Feds for Freedom conference in Washington, D.C., led by federal workers connected to “Feds for Medical Freedom.” The group expanded from COVID jab refusal into broader concerns about the country’s direction and reported extraordinary pressure tactics despite constitutional and legal rights to refuse. Chris also said CIA-related attendees filed a suit against the CIA after investigations were shifted to a counterterrorism task force, treating them like terrorists or known spies for refusing vaccination.
Mario linked political developments to a piece of news about Tucker discussing starting a new party that referenced Joe Kent, and argued it may be less about winning votes as a third party and more about forming a block with enough voting power to shift policy influence between Democrats or Republicans. Both described political “homelessness,” arguing that regardless of who is elected, they see similar war and foreign aid policies and lack of reform in major health institutions.
The conversation turned to information control and political inevitability. Mario said the UK is trying to influence YouTube’s algorithm in the UK. He described a pattern in which people might not notice or may become complacent if they do notice censorship, and suggested that people may feel there’s nothing they can do. Chris added that under Trump there has been faster progress toward a “technological dystopia,” citing government data integration initiatives and surveillance expansion as examples he believed would not have happened under a Democratic president.
Israel/Iran developments were discussed, including whether there is a shift in Israel-related support and whether actions match rhetoric. Chris said he trusts actions, not words, and pointed to a Section 224 issue he described as moving toward harmonizing and merging Israeli military with U.S. structures. He and Mario argued that many Americans likely don’t know what Section 224 is and said dissemination of information is the main issue, connecting this to broader freedom of speech concerns. Mario cited survey figures claiming 58% of U.S. voters believe Trump’s war with Iran was not worth the cost, and noted that objective-cost judgments differ from disputed outcomes.
They discussed a UK-themed concern about social and cultural breakdown, referencing policing decisions and how people in the UK might consider “bailing” as conditions worsen. Mario described speaking with the producer of the movie “The Vigilante” (referred to as “The Citizen,” with clips), summarizing a plot he said is inspired by gang rape dynamics in the UK and arguing that the “mind virus” behind such narratives reflects a real worrying mindset. Mario also referenced Neil Oliver (from GB News) expressing concern that the UK is heading toward civil war.
Economics and stock market interpretation were revisited: Chris argued that the top portion of households owns most equities, so stock market gains are not a general indicator. He said they need to look at other measures like household formation, labor force participation, and happiness, and claimed leaders appear indifferent to average people, with the feeling that dissenting citizens are treated as enemies.
Mario asked what “average Americans” say about these conditions. Chris responded that social conversation has shifted: topics once considered impolite—like COVID jab harms—are now more openly discussed, as well as inflation and the cost of insurance. He explained a framework based on “private knowledge” becoming “common knowledge,” using “The Emperor has No Clothes” and the Weinstein example to argue that change happens when people realize everyone knows the same underlying reality. He said his role is to help move issues from private to common knowledge through repeated open discussion.
They returned to Israel-first versus America-first perspectives, with Mario arguing they are crossing a “chasm” where it’s increasingly discussed openly and censorship is trying to act too late. Chris said Israel-firsters have lost the younger generation and suggested this was tied to global reactions to a major Iranian funeral procession, describing large-scale mourning and world leader attendance as turning public sentiment and as creating consequences he linked to long-term hatred and regional conflict dynamics.
Mario described clips and messaging about the Khamenei funeral, including the U.S./Trump-related claim that Trump said the crowd was “all there, one shot, and we can take them all out,” but that bombing wouldn’t be done because there would be nobody left to negotiate with. Chris said this was shocking, and Mario argued that such statements make it harder to criticize opponents because they can respond that their own president said such actions are possible.
On negotiations, Chris said he believes the U.S. has limited military options left, emphasized “actions not words,” and argued that airstrikes alone don’t change wars’ shape. Mario asked about oil and whether Netanyahu and Trump meeting next week matters given claimed U.S. constraints. Chris said Israel has a strong interest in keeping the U.S. engaged in the Iran conflict, while the U.S. and Israel have limited capability to stop missile launches. They discussed the Strait of Hormuz control and ship passage numbers described as lower than U.S. claims, with Oman and European proposals focusing on fees and management structures.
A major segment addressed oil pricing mechanisms, especially the “crack spread” and futures-driven prices. Mario said guest Philip Pilkington argued that refined-oil margins suggest either price gouging or higher costs than spot prices, and claimed that futures and spot markets may be manipulated. Mario also suggested U.S. leverage could weaken if reserves are used while prices remain artificially low. Chris explained that futures are paper markets with high speculative trading versus real production/consumption, creating a “noise-to-signal” problem, and said managed-money algorithmic trading can shift prices through momentum cascades.
Chris elaborated that algorithms follow momentum rather than fundamentals and that coordinated headlines plus “nudges” like large sell orders can trigger cascades. He described how he detects these events through sudden spikes in one-minute bar volumes aligned with headlines. They also discussed China’s relative behavior in oil demand and market dynamics, with uncertainty about China’s actions and incentives.
Finally, Chris said he worries the U.S. is draining SPR and gasoline/diesel inventories at multi-year lows while demand remains higher than would be needed for demand destruction. He said if negotiations fail and conditions “get spicy” again, the U.S. could face oil shortages, and he suggested that if futures were manipulated lower for short-term political gain, it could create severe downstream outcomes. He also tied the broader future to expanded data infrastructure and surveillance capabilities, describing an “easy when they want it” approach to data centers and cameras and “hard when they don’t” approaches to certain other initiatives.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: Did you reflect on the year?
Speaker 0: Of course, yeah.
Speaker 1: How were the discussions like?
Speaker 0: You know, it was interesting. So more people than ever kind of feel like there's something wrong with the story and something isn't quite adding up. And yeah, these are good folks in Western Massachusetts. You know, they would call them, you know, working class. And yeah, something's not quite right in the story here.
Speaker 1: Yeah, like I feel, I can't remember which guest told me, but people are looking, I think I spoke to a lot of economists yesterday. He's like, Mario, people are just looking at the, we're talking about the gap, the inequality gap, and people keep talking about Trump praising the stock market, et cetera, which we know is led by these big tech stocks. The average American doesn't know that, but they also don't see their own lifestyle improve. They're like, all right, you keep talking about the stock market doing better, but our life is just getting worse and worse. And I was actually saw a clip of one of the guests at comedians that Joe Rogan has on his show all the time. The big guy, he's on the show all the time, the big comedian. And he's like, you know, I just since I was young, I just gave up on on voting because every four years, you get a new president, he says all these things, and then does the same things as the last guy. I think people are, I think this year broke a lot of people I feel because A lot of people put a lot of hope into Trump, and he did seem like the first president in so long, in so many decades, to really go against the swamp, whatever you want to call it. But then for him to revert back to such an extreme level to the swampy behavior from making money from the presidency, going into forever wars, increasing debt, I think it really shook a lot of people.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I would agree, and sort of that was my local bookend to last Wednesday. I was down in Washington, D.C. at a Feds for Freedom conference, and this is being led by a bunch of federal workers who really they started where they got like really canned for their refusal to take the COVID jab, right? And so it was Feds for Medical Freedom, but they found out it's a bigger issue than that. And so they were really talking about, I mean, this was – Jim Erdman invited me down. He's the CIA whistleblower who's been in front of Rand Paul. Anyway, but these are really great people, very dedicated. It was really heartwarming to see people that were this solid, full of integrity. Joe Kent was there. And they're just very worried about the direction of the country. I consider myself red-pilled, black-pilled, depending on the topic. They were pretty concerned that there wasn't an easy fix here.
Speaker 1: Yeah, now I'm starting to get that feeling as well. Yeah, that's worrying. Um, well, it kind of links to a piece of news that came out a couple of days ago. And that's Tucker, did you see the the comment he made about starting a new party actually referenced Joe Kent, I actually brought it up with Joe Kent as well. And he started floating the ID, I think I floated the ID to him. I'm like, what if you and Massey and Marjorie Taylor Greene, I mentioned Matt Gaetz because he was part of the conversation and Tucker and others. It's not about forming another party. Someone was explaining to me yesterday. It's about forming a block that has enough voting power, similar to what RFK did. I think Robert Barnes was explaining to me yesterday. It's like having a block that has enough following that could shift the needle for the Democrats or the Republicans, and then they have influence over the policies of whatever party they decide to back. So it's not about a third party getting the votes. It's about a group of a new party, if you want to call it that, that supports, that merges with the left or the right. Again, RFK is the best example when everyone was waiting to see which side he picks.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, it's an attractive idea because I think a lot of people, myself included, feel politically homeless, to your first point. it doesn't seem to matter who you elect in, we get the same policies, right? It's just, nothing seems to really change, right? The same war policy, the same foreign aid policies, the same lack of reform at the major health institutions. It's kind of, nothing changes, you know? And so that was what I found like was really concerning with these Feds for Freedom was the stories they told about the pressure they were put under by their respective organizations to get the vaccine when they didn't want it, right? And had every legal right, constitutional right to say no, but the pressure tactics were extraordinary. And the CIA people, they filed a suit against the CIA because what the CIA had done was rather than saying, oh, this is an HR matter, you know, we're gonna try and lean on this person, they actually, shifted the investigation of these people over to their counterterrorism task force, which you reserve for terrorists and known spies. So that's in their files now. They were treated in the same category as terrorists and known spies for simply saying, no, thank you.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's pretty screwed up. Another thing as well for someone that creates a lot of content than me, a story that I saw yesterday that the UK is trying to have influence over YouTube's algorithm in the UK. Not sure if you saw that. But this, I thought two days ago, and I started thinking a lot about it. What I was thinking of is like, if they actually do this, people would either not even realize, and the ones that realize would still accept it and just choose complacency. For example, when we realize, when people realize that YouTube was censoring content related to COVID, as one example, and I'm sure there's many other similar examples. People complain, but the majority of them just didn't care or didn't know about it. And even the ones that complain, I'm sure most of them still go on YouTube and still watch their content on YouTube. So I'm like, man, if I was in those rooms where the guys that have the influence making decisions, in their mind, do they think that they just have that ability to do whatever they want? Like, even if we know what they're doing, for example, the YouTube algorithm or the way they've weaponized lawfare to be able to get their agenda across, in their mind, there's nothing people can or will do about it. It's almost like the ship has sailed, which is even more worrying. Like, if Trump was able to start a war with Iran, it's like, this is the craziest thing right under the only worst thing that's logical is starting a war with russia so the only next level next step up but other than that starting war with iran was like one of the craziest things trump would do if i told you that when he first got elected yet he still does it and while he lost popularity he still has a pretty strong support base in marga weirdly enough yeah yeah it's it's there's that sense of inevitability to all this right you know and and um
Speaker 0: there's a direction to this story and it's been going there and it's independent of who's in power. Weirdly, under Trump, we've had a much faster progression towards what we would call that technological dystopia. I think of it as other people think of it as a utopia, but things that never could have been done under Biden because my good people never would have put up with it, but because it's Trump, it's okay. But when we're looking at the flock cameras bringing Palantir in, to harmonize and merge government databases and on and on and on. I don't think any of that would have been possible under a Democratic president. So faster.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I agree. I agree. That's a good point. That's a good point, Trump. I remember one of my guests told me, talking about the Iran war, they said something along the lines of, if there's any person that could really break that relationship with Israel, it is Trump. who's right now the biggest backer of Israel, because Trump, he's just got that ability to really do the unthinkable and get away with it. And you've given an example where that has happened or accelerated. But it could also accelerate in the other direction. It's not looking like, I don't know. What do you think of the possible shift with Israel? We've talked about it for many weeks now. Are you seeing anything substantial? substantial or not substantial anything uh of substance other than the rhetoric since all the statements were made in a few weeks ago because in lebanon they're so israel's still there um yeah the bombing is still happening on a daily basis i don't know yeah and and iran is not reacting for some reason so maybe we could discuss that in a bit but i i trust
Speaker 0: I trust actions, not words. So if the central bank tells me gold is a barbarous relic, but they're accumulating it, I prefer to watch what they're doing. So in this case, there's words that say, oh, there's this fracture, not with Israel per se, but maybe between Bibi and Trump. But on the other hand, we have this section 224. Looks like it's going to scream right on through, right? Which is going to harmonize and merge the Israeli military with our own.
Speaker 1: It's going to get through.
Speaker 0: It looks like it's going through. It looks like it. at this stage.
Speaker 1: I completely lost track of it. I'm guilty of losing track of it. Fucking hell. That's wild. That's worse than anything else.
Speaker 0: Yep. No, I totally agree. I think Joe Kent makes this point very, very well. He says, because he's just trying to get the Overton window open a bit. He says, look, it's totally okay for Israel to be Israel, but they have their interests. We have ours. And our interests are our interests, and their interests are their interests. They're not always overlapped perfectly, so we should make sure we have autonomy and separateness in decisions. And it's just very sensible, obviously. But I feel like we've kind of entered an age where sensible things are, I don't know. We're just in an era where there's a lot of nonsense going on right now. It's almost like reason has left the room entirely at this point for a lot of things. I can't explain it.
Speaker 1: No, or just people are not aware. I think we go too deep and start imagining that most people know what we know. I bet if you just go to the average American, just walk down Times Square, just ask 20 Americans, 100 Americans there, do you know what section 224 is? I bet you'd be lucky to get one. I think that says a lot. I think the dissemination of information is the main, main issue. Because you could do, if you're controlling what information people get, and that's why freedom of speech is so important, you can get away with anything. I saw Paul, I don't know if I saved it, actually, just before we started. It doesn't make the point too, but in New Financial Times and focal data, Paul found that 60% or 58% of US voters believe Trump's war with Iran was not worth the cost as the conflict continues to weigh on his approval ratings. 58% believe the war was not worth the cost, but that means 42% of Americans believe the war was worth the cost. I'm not saying who won the war, or whether the objectives are achieved, it's worth the cost. Almost half of Americans believe that, one in two. But that's like an extreme stance. It's like some things are disputed. Who's winning the war between Russia and Ukraine? Depends who you ask. You know, there's a lot of nuances. But in terms of was the war with Iran worth it, you speak to any analyst, even the most pro-American, anti-Iranian analyst, people from the FTD would tell me the same thing, like from an ROI perspective, looking at America's interests, it was not worth the cost. But then, so I might get, you know, one out of 20 analysts that wouldn't say that. But then to have one in three Americans, it just shows that the information that the average American has, it's not only in the US, but we're just talking about the US because that's like the pinnacle of freedom of speech, free speech. Yeah, section 224 seems like a drop in the ocean.
Speaker 0: Well, I think most people are probably-
Speaker 1: we're very cynical today chris on july 5th july 5th i know looking forward to the next 250 exactly exactly man and well the irony as well of the of the sorry go ahead i'll let you make the comment well i'm just it's hard because you know you and i and and our followers i'm sure are very high context people so we're tracking all of this and and
Speaker 0: And I think it's hard once you really become familiar with what's actually happening and you can start to see the patterns for what they are, it's difficult not to say, wow, this is wrong, it's going in the wrong direction. I mean, just from my perspective, you mentioned UK wants to control YouTube's algorithm, right? In the UK right now, I literally can't believe what I'm seeing in terms of who police are arresting, what they're arresting them for, which crimes they're not prosecuting, which ones they're being soft on. If that isn't an intentional dismantling of the culture of the UK, I don't know how else to interpret it. And when you see it that way, once you realize you're under attack, I don't know that there's any other proper response besides to get angry and put up a wall around that. I don't know how to interpret that, but I know so many people in the UK who are considering bailing on it at this point in time because it's bad and getting worse and they don't want to live there as it goes through its descent into...
Speaker 1: wherever it's headed yeah i am i spoke to the producer of the movie um the citizen one you know which one i'm referring to the one that you posted about vigilante yeah vigilante citizen um so i was speaking to the producer of that movie and uh you you know about the the obviously you know about the storyline so it's about um a person that had his family i think killed by a migrant something along those lines And then he became a vigilante. And then one of the first victims, the first crimes he acts on was a woman was raped by six men, I think illegal immigrants, Muslim illegal immigrants. And it was inspired by the gang rapes in the UK. And then he takes matters into his own hands. He kills the judge because the judge called one of the perpetrators, one of the boys that raped a girl, also a victim. So the girl was a victim, but the boy that raped her was also a victim. So that mindset, that mind virus triggered vigilante to kill the judge. And then he goes and not only kills the boy, but he also kills the boy and his whole family, including his mother, who posted on social media that something along the lines of the girl that was raped deserved it because of the way she's dressed. So I'm trying to get the story right. I haven't seen the movie. I've just seen clips of it. But I spoke to the producer about it. One of the questions I asked, one of the conclusions we made is like, the movie, there's no risk of the movie leading to violence. It's more the movies and an indication of the mindset that people write because remember, Hollywood makes movies or people make producers make movies that people could relate to to relate to movie that means you have to have those feelings or those thoughts already in real life so that the mindset of people in Europe is in a in a very worrying place. There's another gentleman I spoke with, Mr. Oliver, I forgot his first name, but from GB News. He's been on the show a couple of times. Great guy, Neil Oliver. Great, great guy. And he's very concerned, as in genuinely concerned, that his country, the UK, is heading towards, I'm just going to say the word, civil war. It's like a taboo word no one wants to use. And, you know, you get to that level when kind of all else fails. And I feel like people are just trying to, people are starting to feel that way. Like no matter what we do, no matter who we vote in, no matter how many times we protest, protest, nothing changes. Yeah.
Speaker 0: Well, yeah. So if we look at the direction things are going, you know, economically, obviously that's where a lot of people start to feel the pinch, right? And I think, know trump likes to say oh the stock market's going up that means everything's awesome and and the issue is is that when you look at it the top 10 of households in the u.s own 93 of all the equities right so so the stock market might be going up and that's really good for the top 10 but it's has no bearing on everybody else pretty much right so so it's not even like remotely a general indicator of health, right? We would be wanting to look at other things like, I don't know, are people having families? Are they starting households? Are they in the labor force? What's their happiness index? There's a lot of things you could look at. I just get the sense that the people in charge, not only it's, I think they're actually indifferent to the plight of the average person, which is a pretty harsh statement, right? They're indifferent. It's not even that Sometimes I feel like you get the sense that almost like you're an enemy of the state if you don't say exactly what the state wants. That's clearly how the UK is treating its citizenry. They're enemies. If you don't believe in our policies over here, you're the enemy. But I think it's worse than that. I think they're indifferent. And I don't know how we got there.
Speaker 1: When you speak to – so I live in my bubble. Like I – I don't speak to a lot of people, and the only people I speak to really are people like yourself, people that have all this information, have all the context or high achievers and all the other time in my world, running my businesses and stuff. So I never really get the chance to speak to the average person about these things. I'm also not a social person, so I never sit there having a coffee or beer with friends and chat about these things. So I'll ask you a question that might sound silly to you, but it's actually I'd love to know the answer is when you speak to the average American, I don't know if you get that opportunity. I'm sure you do. What do they say? How do they see things? Do you know what I mean? How do they see things? How do they see where their countries are? Maybe they in a completely different mindset. Maybe they think the country is doing great. But then how do they make sense of how they're living and how the cost of living has become a lot worse? Everyone's worried for their children. People are starting to worry about AI and how their children are going to find a job. What should they learn about? What are these conversations like?
Speaker 0: So this is a great question. It's been shifting lately. So I think just as recently as a couple of years ago, it was almost verboten. Like, we just don't talk about those things. It's impolite. Like, you know. sports, weather, kids, you know, you stick to the topic, safe topics. And then people started to slowly start to notice, they were allowed to notice this thing that maybe the COVID jabs were not good, right? That everybody now knows somebody who they suspect had or know in their heart of hearts, you know, had a very bad reaction to those. And so you're starting to see, you can have conversations like that now. And as well, a big topic that's now totally safe to talk about is inflation, is the cost of everything, right? Because it's not just the cost of milk and eggs, it's insurance. Insurance costs have exploded in the United States, you know, home health auto. And so people are talking about that openly now, and that shock level is rising up the socioeconomic ladder where I think we're starting to see a clear majority of people can talk about this stuff. So the way I think about this is, there was a guy, Ben Hunt, he put together like a really beautiful series of essays, I don't know, five, six years ago. And he related it around this idea of the story of the emperor has no clothes, right? And he said, this is a very, very important phenomenon because social change happens when something comes out of what's called private knowledge. You and I talking, everybody listening, we can say whatever we want. It's still private knowledge, even though lots of people know it. Something becomes common knowledge when everybody knows that everybody knows the same thing. And then suddenly, boom, it changes, right? So in that story of the emperor has no clothes. The emissary is the, is the kid is the child. Everybody, everybody has private knowledge that he's naked, you know, but until somebody yells it out. So the whole crowd knows that the whole crowd knows the same thing. And then suddenly, Oh, you know, King's embarrassed and he walks off and all that stuff. So private knowledge was like in the way Ben Hunt wrapped these stories up. He said, remember Harvey Weinstein, everybody knew this guy was not a good guy. You didn't want to get caught alone in his office for your young starlet. Right. And, There were whole networks of women who would take the young starlets aside and say, hey, don't get caught in an office with this guy. Everybody knew, you know, privately. And then it took Rose McCone saying it out loud. And all of a sudden, oh, the Clintons didn't want anything to do with him and prosecutors were prosecuting. And once it went into common knowledge, because everybody knew the same thing, that's when the change happened. So that's why it's so important to have these conversations like you're having, like I'm having, because we have to just say things as if, We want to get to that common knowledge stage where we can just openly admit something that everybody kind of privately knows, but isn't yet there. So that's what I consider myself to be as a common knowledge emissary. You just say things that people need to hear. And if you do that often enough and it breaks through that mindset, then all of a sudden you can have those conversations. So two, three years ago, if I said on a crowded bus, hey, I think these COVID jabs were harmful. I mean, you would have gotten frowny faces. I mean, there would have been all that. Now, I think you get people just kind of nod and go, oh yeah, you know, I know that now because it's moved out of private into common knowledge. So that's kind of, that's the work. The work is how do we get these things that everybody knows to something that everybody knows that everybody knows that same thing.
Speaker 1: That's so well explained. And I feel like, so if we go back to the, israel issue in the way israel first versus america first i think we're crossing the chasm on that front it feels that before no one would dare say it become anti-semitic but now it's you know becoming slowly becoming something that everybody knows that everybody knows everybody talks about and i feel like as we're crossing the chasm they're trying to crack down on it they're trying to censor it but it's a bit too late kind of when you cross into that into the everybody knows that everybody knows when you cross into that world, then it's really almost impossible to put the genie back in the bottle. Do you think we've crossed the chasm on that front or we're still not there yet?
Speaker 0: I think it's dangerously underway for the people who want to keep that genie back in the bottle. It's for sure one of the things that we know is that the Israel firsters, they've lost the younger generation. almost, I mean, pretty comprehensively, right? At this point, they still have the boomers, but so we're getting that generational divide on the whole piece right there. And I think it was, you know, astonishing how little coverage it got in this country, but just looking at the outpouring of support and mourning at Khomeini's funeral, how many world leaders showed up there, right? Like from how many different countries and just the, I mean, if anything, I think it's common knowledge across the rest of the world, maybe not in the United States, but it was an enormous mistake, a strategic mistake, a tactical mistake to kill this, you know, their supreme religious leader.
Speaker 1: If you can play, KK, can you play funeral clips? Because they are massive. Nine million mourners, according to some estimates, that have hit the streets. and obviously leaders from around the world. But that's one of the biggest, I think the third biggest, there was one in India decades and decades ago in terms of funeral processions, the most people to attend a funeral procession. Second biggest was the death of the last Supreme leader, Mushtaba Khomeini, sorry, Ayatollah Khomeini. And now Ayatollah Khamenei, he's got about 10% of Iran's population on the streets, along with world leaders from around the world. So I think that from a strategic perspective, short term thinking, you don't look at the consequences of this. But these are tens of millions of people that see the US in a negative light. And that is the sentiment that leads to things like 911. I've had guests on the show. And one thing I learned in the last couple of years or last year, really, was the fact that the main reasons Osama bin Laden did what he did, he said it himself. in various writings and in interviews is the U.S. basis in Saudi and U.S. intervention in the region. And number two is American support to Israel. So it's the U.S. intervention and what the U.S. did in the region that led to that level of hatred that led to an act as violent as 9-11, that then led to the destructive foreign policy or self-destructive foreign policy of the U.S. within the region, Iraq war, Afghanistan war, and we're still stuck in the region until now, decades later. And then things like the killing of the leader. There's chants on the streets in Iran, death to Israel, death to the US. We will avenge your death, D leaders, things like that. I was watching those clips. So these are Iranians that might have been indifferent to the US, might have even liked the US. Their whole mindset changed. And for 10% of the population to be on the streets, that means a lot of these people are people that don't even like their government. They're people that maybe were on the streets in January, but they're on the streets now again. But these are things that are not being measured. When Trump talks about, I've sunk their navy, that is not even short-term thinking. That's just a marketing slogan. But what really matters are things like this, the people on the streets. And Trump yesterday, I was shocked when I saw this. I don't know if he's just talking shit or whether he means it, but he said something along the lines of, I saw people weeping. And I don't know why they're weeping, because they're supposed to hate their government. He's like, talking like how it's bizarre. He was surprised to see people crying at the funeral. If that's true, that means the President of the United States is not delusional, but he's living in his own bubble. And that's pretty dangerous.
Speaker 0: Well, even more shocking, he said out loud, again, he could have been just talking shit. But he said, Oh, you know, we could have bombed them and taken them all out. But then we wouldn't have anybody left to negotiate with. So he was openly talking about bombing heads of state at a funeral procession in a morning session, right? Which is, well, that's a level of moral nihilism. I think it's kind of hard to wrap my head around. That is not the leader of the free world, the people who are defending democracy. That's not the kind of statement that comes out of the people who are The people you want to be in charge of anything. I found it shocking, that level.
Speaker 1: Who said it? I know that the guy, the commentator, the pro-Israeli commentator, the one that him and Tucker fight all the time, Mark Levin. I know Mark Levin was saying that, but you're saying Trump said that as well or just Mark Levin? Yeah, Trump said that too. I know Mark Levin posted something along the lines of a missed opportunity. All the leaders were there in one place. It's a missed opportunity to kill them. Something like that. He posted it today. But what did Trump say? Do you remember approximately what he said?
Speaker 0: Yeah, if you give me a second, I can dig it up here.
Speaker 1: Yeah, if you can.
Speaker 0: I missed that point.
Speaker 1: Please don't tell me he said it yesterday on July 4th. during the celebrations of the 250 50th anniversary, because that would make it even worse. Let me find you the mark. Let me find you the mark live in tweet. I'll actually read that out as well. But let me see. But oh, by the way, you know, Mustafa Khamenei actually didn't didn't know there's Mark Levin. Mark Levin says, yesterday, the enemy gathered on in mass or mass all in one place opportunity lost. And he was quote tweeting another account on X who was saying Ayatollah Khamenei's funeral, the crowd chanted death to America. Every US ally who attended should be forced to answer questions. But this is a problem. So again, I'll read out the statement that someone said that Mark Levin is quoting. He says, Khamenei's funeral, the crowd chanted death to America. But instead of reflecting on why they're calling for death to America, what did the US do to lead to millions of people making chants like this? His conclusion, instead of reflecting on what did we do to lead to all that hatred, his conclusion is every US ally should be forced to answer questions. It's just weird. It's just weird that that's the conclusion they come to instead of the US needs to answer questions on what they did, what decision they made to be able to lead to so many people calling for death to America and death to Israel and death to Trump, some by name.
Speaker 0: Yeah. So here's... Here it is. Economic Times reporting, Trump said, one shot and we can take them all out.
Speaker 1: Oh, yeah. I saw that one. Yes, yes, yes.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: Yes, I did. I did. My team put it in one of the titles for one of my interviews today. Let me get it out. I've got the whole statement. KKK, you know which one you're referring to, KKK. Can you send me that story? I saw it earlier. I want to open up my screen as well. But that's, I'll read the whole context as well. Because I was reading it a few hours ago. President Trump told Axios that the Iranians, quote, are begging to make a deal, but said both sides decided to take a week off. And then he says the following on the funeral. They are all there, one shot, and we can take them all out. But we are not going to do that because we would have nobody to negotiate with. But just the mindset of making statements like this, it's just, these are the things that people like Ben-Gavir say. It's even... even if you know, we always give him and I give him that kind of leeway. It's like, this is Trump, you know, he speaks his mind, you know, when someone speaks their mind, if I speak publicly, the things I would say to my loved one, you know, it would be perceived in different ways. But you speak a lot more freely when he's speaking to you. I'm sick of this guy, like what? Remember, the Fox News, the Tucker's messages came out what he was saying privately about Trump. So when you say these things privately, you don't say them publicly. But Trump kind of blurts everything out sometimes, because you can always give him that leeway. But there are limits when you're the leader of a country.
Speaker 0: There's a certain level of etiquette, because what you're doing is setting the precedent where this is okay.
Speaker 1: And it just makes it harder to criticize people according to death to America, for example, or the annihilation of the state of Israel. When we criticize them, they could just respond, say, hey, your own president said he wanted to wipe out a civilization to never return again. So who are you to dictate to us what we could say? So see the moral, there's a term for it, moral, whatever,
Speaker 0: would cause the moral harm that was caused by this so yeah yeah i mean it's just a it's a it's not diplomatic b it's kind of a bad look all around but but c it sends the message that says look when we negotiate with you you have to accept our terms or we'll kill you and that's not negotiating anymore right at that point in time but clearly where i think trump should be aware at this point in time that you and i have been aware for months now is that the United States doesn't really have any good military options left. And so we're going to have to negotiate and possibly admit maybe it wasn't worth the cost. Maybe we shouldn't have done it in the first place, that there were lots of other avenues. I mean, let's not forget that the Strait of Hormuz was never closed, never had any tolls, never had any friction prior to February 28th of this year. So, I mean, that's the reality of the situation. So I don't understand where all this bluster goes. But last time you and I talked, you're like, well, If you wanted to keep things sort of like fiery and like cooking, this is the kind of, again, actions, not words, right? So the actions of the United States have been not, I would not consider that we've negotiated in good faith or with any urgency to say, hey, we got to get this trade open as soon as possible. That has not, not how I've perceived it so far.
Speaker 1: We're going to get to the straights, and I want to ask you about oil prices because I've just learned a lot in the last week, so I've got a lot of questions for you. Just one thing on that front. Are you worried that Netanyahu and Trump are meeting next week? Or that worry is gone knowing that the U.S. has no options left, so nothing Netanyahu would say would change that reality?
Speaker 0: So my belief system is that Israel has a very strong, compelling interest separate from ours. They want to keep the United States engaged with Iran. I don't believe that Iran has been properly defanged by Israeli standards. In fact, worse, they may be coming out of this with a bigger swagger and a sense of more power than before the war. That's certainly how I'm seeing it at this stage. So, you know, Israel's always going to be advocating for do more, do more, you know. And Israel's approach is always bomb first and, you know, ask questions never, I guess. That's just how they are. And they've done that with, you know, the West Bank and Syria and Iran. now Lebanon, and of course Gaza. So I don't know. Israel's interest is very strong to keep us involved in this whole thing. So that's that. I don't know what, Trump has to be getting talked to at this point in time by senior military leaders saying, look, there's only so much we can do here. And I don't think there would be anything to be gained by going back into just sort of what we'd call just airstrikes, because airstrikes never really change the shape of war. They're painful, but They don't change anything. Nobody ever won a national, international campaign by air alone. And I can't see anything anywhere that would suggest that it makes any sense to put any boots on the ground. But if we did that, as we've talked about before, colossal mistake, it's going to be very painful. And I will regret that too, I would bet. So I don't know what the options here really are besides negotiate and give up some things that it's going to hurt a little.
Speaker 1: Yeah. I just don't want to get too complacent because I'm in your camp. I don't want to get too complacent because I never thought a year ago we'd be in this war in the first place. So I just, what I would consider unthinkable, I should probably always leave on the table. But I'm in the same camp. The other argument that people make is that It's a matter of when, because of the importance, we've talked about this a while ago, of the importance of the Strait of Hormuz for the US. So the cost is significant, but one can argue that the cost of not capturing the Strait of Hormuz or not causing regime change in Iran is even more significant in the long term because it just gives the world's most important energy choke point to China. So now China still has rare earth refining, but also, and you know, renewable energy, et cetera, getting miles ahead of the US and the rest of the world, catching up with nuclear energy, but also control or influence over the strait of Hormuz. And look what we're seeing right now with the straits. We've got the Americans trying to escort ships out of there and failing time and time again. The straits. There was a report yesterday. I'm not sure I've been keeping track of it. I was looking at it yesterday. So there's a report by by Kepler talking about the number of ships going through. So the number of ships going through the Strait of Hormuz is about half of what the Trump administration is claiming, and about a third of what it was before the war, so still significantly less. And then there was also yesterday, there were a few ships trying to get through the Omani side, but then they turned around and went back. Some of them just did not go back in. Others went through the Iranian side. And the Omani side completely closed yesterday. Today, a few more ships started going through, just a handful. There was one escort. But it's fair to say, the fact is Iran still controls the Strait of Hormuz. And there is that big power struggle happening right now. The Americans are trying to make some sort of offer to Iran to just give up on controlling the Strait of Hormuz. Apparently, they're dangling a carry of lifting the sanctions in return for Iran not charging a fee. Meanwhile, the Europeans, according to Bloomberg, have already accepted that there'll be some sort of fee. The Omanis have also given a formal offer proposal to the US a few days ago about the new management structure, which includes fees of the Strait of Homs between Oman and Iran. And the only things the Europeans are looking for now is not having a fee. It's for Iran to charge the same fee to everybody. It's like, hey, please treat us like you would treat Russia and China. Don't give preferential treatment to any countries. That's what the Europeans are allegedly requesting from Iran. Whereas the US is still trying to wrestle that control away from Iran. But that gives you an idea that
Speaker 0: iran is controlling the straits and the only question is can the u.s really afford it or is it worth another gamble or two um i mean listen like you said anything's possible i've given up trying to to predict this along rational lines it would be irrational at this stage to um you know renew a tax but that could easily happen for reasons you know and we've all seen that there's like You know, a little back and forth. Iran has sort of floated the trial balloon that maybe they have to preemptively attack Israel, tired of sort of, you know, doing tit for tat. Maybe it's time to, like, you know, become aggressive again. We found out this last week from some satellite photos that actually the damage that Israel had sustained from those missile attacks was a lot higher, obviously, than they were admitting at the time. I think one of their main refineries up in Haifa is going to take a long time to fix. And so as we look at all of that, obviously Iran also said earlier on, I don't know if they're sticking to this, but they said, listen, if you attack us again, we're gonna go after the remaining infrastructure and we're just gonna take out all the energy infrastructure, right? Which is of course creates a global catastrophe. So nobody wants that whatsoever. And so I can't imagine what the upside would be for the US to do more attacks at this stage. I can only see pretty significant downside because obviously, Iran, we, Israel, and the U.S. lacked the capability to stop them from launching missiles. Tried hard, bombed a lot of sites, bombed where we thought all those missiles were stored, and they just patched up the tunnels and brought them back out and kept firing. So I think that's just the reality of the situation. We, the U.S. and Israel, were unable to stop them from firing missiles. And if they wanted to, we also learned from satellite photos we saw last week that how accurate they were, I mean, really accurate, You know, not just hitting buildings, but hitting specific parts of buildings, you know, from, you know, a thousand kilometers away. So that's the reality of the situation. And plus now, as we just saw with the morning processions, that it's a fairly galvanized nation as well. So those are bad sort of signs to say, well, let's just, let's keep annoying them with these bombings. And, you know, because... I think Trump's, like we mentioned last time, one of the things I love about him is that when he does speak, he has no filters. So just what he's thinking comes right out. And two weeks ago, he said we were four weeks away from real catastrophe running out of reserves of oil, and that would lead to very bad economic outcomes. I think all that's true. And that's the reality right now.
Speaker 1: There's something I learned about recently. Do you know much about the crack margin, the crack spread, how that's calculated in the oil prices? Okay, so one of my guests was telling me about it. I have had him on the show twice to really do a deep dive into it. And his name is Philip Pilkington. And in the interview yesterday, he kind of went deeper into it, trying to calculate it. And Based on his calculation, looking at the price of the refined oil coming out of the refineries and looking at the margin they're making, he's like, Mario, there's two logical explanations for their margins. One of them is price gouging. One of them is their cost is actually significantly higher than the spot price. And based on these calculations, et cetera, how much they're paying per barrel right now coming out of the Strait of Hormuz is $110, $115 a barrel. There's no way to know for sure, but this is based on the calculation from the available data. So his argument is that the prices on the markets, the spot prices, and obviously the futures are heavily manipulated. So first, do you think there is some sort of manipulation going on, number one? Number two, what would you say is the price of the oil coming out of the Strait of Homs? And that links to number three, which is how long before the US, because even low oil prices doesn't mean the US is getting enough oil. The US could still be using its reserves, which are already almost completely depleted. And that means the US would lose significant leverage in any future conflict with Iran. So Iran knows that and that gives them the upper hand in the negotiations. But I'd love to get your analysis on the price of oil and the current supply glut that everyone's talking about, because the numbers just don't show up like in the last 24 hours. It's been 39 ships that went through the Strait of Hormuz in the last 39 hours. So still the same average that's been going on for the last few days, which is, again, half of what the Americans are saying and a third of what it was before the war.
Speaker 0: Yeah, let's take the... So in the price of oil, we're really quoting the futures price, which is a paper market, right? And so in the paper market, you and I could open up an account and start trading oil, right? You don't produce any. I'm not consuming any. have no interest in it we're just speculators right and so right now the amount of speculating in the oil market is super high right so if you consider the the signal producers and consumers coming to a fair market price that's the signal the noise is people like you and i just trading who have no interest in either producing or consuming the stuff and i get there's there's a point where you say okay you know it's good to have some speculators they provide additional liquidity that's good you know it's easier to sort of make trades but right now the noise to signal ratio is 50 to one, right? So for every barrel that's finally produced and consumed, there's about 50 that are traded off. And it's just all this paper going back and forth. Okay, that's part one. Part two is all those managed money people, you know, the money managers, the CTAs, those are the commodity trading advisors. These are the people that are really out there doing all of this crazy paper trading. All right, that's highly subject to being manipulated. If you have a big player come in, who just starts just selling paper oil. And that'll make the futures price for oil go down. It just will. And there's a normal ratio that they look at, which is, okay, how many of these managed money people are bullish versus how bearish are they? That is, how many long positions have they taken compared to how many short positions are they holding? And then this chart just came out, I'm gonna put up here, just came out a couple days ago from John Kemp. And this is absolutely crazy. astonishing what we're looking at here so what this is is this is the ratio of money managers total long and short position so it's it's long divided by short so if you see here a number like 18 it says they had 18 long positions for every short position they were heavily long in March 31st of 2026 they were sitting at about 12 and This is between 2011, 2026. So this is 15 years of data. So Mario, in 15 years, we've never seen a reading as low as this one. We got on June 30th of 2026, where these money managers are as bearish on oil as they have been at any point in time in the past 15 years. Not just a little bit bearish, but the most bearish they've been in 15 years. Now, how do we begin to account for that? Because normally what you're doing in this market is you are saying, well, what are the risks? So we've seen inventories get drawn down. Normally there's a ratio between the inventories and the price. We've set new records for how low the price is given where we are in the inventory curve. New records, right? Like, oh, never been here before. And as well, you and I both know that if you're in this space, these are very smart people. They have to be looking at the tanker traffic. They have to be looking at the verbiage going on back and forth. Those are risks, right? Is the risk of the straight being reclosed zero? No, it's not. It's something higher than that. So just seeing that we have max bearishness in these money managers, there's two explanations. One, they've completely lost the plot line and they've become idiots. Or two, somebody's in there selling a lot, just selling. Somebody's got a sell order in on that. Hey, just sell this. So that's when we say manipulation, to me, that would mean some... entity, maybe a government, maybe Japan, maybe ours, maybe both, somebody with deep pockets has an interest in saying, we need the price to go down. And so we're just going to just, you know, we have a standing sell order. If any buying comes in, just sell it. That's how you would create that. But that Charlie just showed us is like, we've, this is max bearishness at a time of literally what I can't, it's one of the most elevated risk structures that I've ever seen in the oil spaces is an odd signal. me give you one other possible plausible explanation though in truth there's actually a massive recession that's already been kicked off because of all of the stuff that's already happened and that's what we're seeing is there is going to be a big uh dive in demand because something really got got injured in the global economy that's the other way to interpret that at this point in time but I don't have good data for that in my economic statistics yet.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's not that. And there's not like a massive, at least no, there's the possibility of a big recession, but nothing too significant that would lead to those prices considering the risks involved. A third explanation that Philip was talking about, what he believes, is that he thinks algorithmic trading is very easy to manipulate, and that's what Trump and the administration are doing. When you feed news to Axios saying, there's a deal about to happen, there's that many ships being escorted, we control the Strait of Hormuz, we've got a great deal with Iran, all these different claims. While an analyst that's following this closely would read these statements, we know, oh, he's manipulating the markets, and we start making jokes about it. Oh, it's Sunday again, Monday, market's open tomorrow. Trump's going to say something positive and then he says something positive. But what Philip's argument is that these algorithms are not taking that into consideration and that manipulation is an information overload for the algorithms that is actually having the effect that's needed on algorithmic trading. So all these different algorithms are selling oil and bearish on oil because of this massive amount of information. that talks about a massive glut in oil and a drop in oil prices and the war is over forever and all that, whereas reality is different. So that's what the market manipulation is, a manipulation of the algorithms rather than the people.
Speaker 0: Well, that's true. And let me take it a step further because the vast majority of these algorithms are, listen, they're machine algorithms. They have no emotions. They don't really care. The vast majority of them also are not basing their positionings or there are trades and all their behaviors on actual fundamentals. Most of them are what are called momentum trades, right? So they're agnostic. If oil's going this way, they go this way. If oil's going that way, they go that way. And these are the machines that are actually co-located on the floor of the trading houses, right? So the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Aurora, Illinois, there's people, there's these firms with these algos, they have machines tucked right on the floor of that, right? Just like they do at the New York Stock Exchange, et cetera. and they have really short fiber optic cables because they need to be a millisecond or a nanosecond faster than the next guy or gal, right? So that's the nature of the beast. So how easy is that to manipulate? Well, one, you do the headlines, but two, if somebody just comes in and gives a little nudge at the right time in coordination with the headline, you get everybody stampeding off and all the algos start going this way.
Speaker 1: What type of nudge? What do you mean by nudge?
Speaker 0: Nudge is somebody just dump, so just by way of context.
Speaker 1: Momentum trading, yeah. So exactly. So it's like a big dump along with the news. So you put out a news saying, peace deal imminent. Trump says he has a deal with Iran. And then someone gives that nudge by doing a big sell order, obviously a few sell orders. The algorithm catches the headline, catches the momentum, ticks all the boxes, and then the cascade begins.
Speaker 0: Exactly. So the way that I detect this is the smallest resolution I have on my trading screen is a one-minute bar, right? Yeah. Normally there's a normal amount of volume that happens, you know, a few hundred lots go this way or that way, right? There's normal volume, but then all of a sudden you'll see something right in coordination with those headlines, two, three, 4,000 lots just come piling in, right? Which is two, three, 4 million barrels of oil suddenly all being sold in that one little chunk of time. Well, that's, That little chunk of time, all these other algos are looking at that going, oh, I better be on the right side of that trade. Let me get out of my longs. Let me go short too, right? And so, yeah, that's the nudge that happens.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Interesting. I never thought of that momentum aspect of it. And then there's China as well.
Speaker 0: I don't know what China's up to. Do you?
Speaker 1: Exactly. I swear. It is just insane. They're just so quiet in the background. I feel like they're like steps ahead of all of us. Or maybe they're behind us. We're giving them too much credit. I don't know. I don't know what the hell's happening there. Their economy's an enigma. There's all these different cracks that people tell me about, but somehow they keep humming along. I don't know.
Speaker 0: It's astonishing. So China's housing market went from super bubble territory to into deep correction and everybody said, well, that's it. Cause that was 30% of their GDP was just building apartments, you know? So that should have just, that should have just absolutely cratered their economy. And I don't think it did anything. And I don't understand that, you know, it's, it's a very weird thing. So they have a different, they have a command and control economy. I think they're able to move pieces around in, in ways that, that other nations can't. Cause otherwise that should have, that should have really cut one of two, two,
Speaker 1: at least two legs off of their stool you know and nothing yeah and jeffrey curry um he he um a couple of weeks ago we're talking about the price of it of oil and trying to figure it out because obviously he's been extremely long oil and he's just surprised by how far it's dropped and how quickly he dropped and he's telling me how mario that something happened in that trump she meeting because since then that was the peak around that period you know a few days plus or minus and something happened in that meeting to not only bring down because already started going down the Chinese demand for oil but keep it down despite the low oil price he doesn't know what it is doesn't know what the next month will have Taiwan as part of China or something completely different but something was a discussion was had at that time between Trump and she we just don't know what it is yeah yeah well the quid was um China stopping importing oil like pretty dramatically what's the quo pro don't know
Speaker 0: But guaranteed, China got something out of that. That was max leverage. So we'll see what it is.
Speaker 1: Have you been looking at the numbers coming out of Trump's wealth? How much money he's making from all the stock trades and stuff? Yeah, you have. Crazy.
Speaker 0: Crazy. When I talk about the moral nihilism, it's just insane to me that a president not only can... trade stocks and and then make deals with that being not somehow completely illegal but the volume of his trading it's like a full-time sport like you would have a hard time trading that many shares if that was your full-time job right so he must have somebody doing it for him i guess but at any rate it's just it's just as unseemly as it looks and then you know all there's all kinds of stuff that happened with obviously the meme coins and then um this crazy crazy thing that happened where, and this is the one that still, I don't know how to interpret this one, bothers me a lot. So there was this shooting at Brown University. And then a couple of days later, there was this professor, an MIT professor gets gunned down at the door of his home. Oh, these two people must have known each other way back when they were both college students. That guy was the head of a fusion company. It was one of his jobs. And the competitor to that fusion company, just days later, got a $9 billion funding commitment from Truth Social, which is Trump's, you know, it's not an energy company. You know, it's just very weird. And I will not be surprised to find out that that company, TAE Systems, ends up with a big contract at some point. I mean, we've seen enough examples of this. Like, this is now a thing.
Speaker 1: Look, I've said this, I say this a lot. The more I do what I'm doing and talk to the people that I talk to, especially when I have these private conversations, the more I realize how much is happening behind the scenes. It is wild. I'm not in the belief that there's a few people pulling the strings. It's that easy. They meet in one room and make decisions. But I definitely don't believe that the system is perfect and decentralized and fair, as I used to believe 20 years ago. even 1050 15 years ago. The reality of it just there's a lot there when you understand things like how much influence certain people have, how easily they can be impacted. Let's just give you a silly example. That was a video a few hours ago, I saw it. There was a video of I don't know if you could find it KK. It's a video of Trump as Fox News filming Trump watch himself on fox news did you see that okay i saw a still picture of it i gotta see the video let me let me see if i can i can find it kk if you can find it it's the most hilarious thing oh there it is there it is if you can if you can please play this kk show on screen the reason i mention it right now is that i want to i want you to play kaka while i i explained it and this is Not the best example because I'm talking about private conversations and private decisions being made. And they're pretty much people that do pull the strings. Just it's not as simplistic as people make it out to be. But this is a smaller example of it. So this is Trump watching Fox News and on Fox News is filming. It's him being filmed watching Fox News and waving Fox News. You can't make this shit up. So now the reason I mentioned this is This is the person that is making, is influencing the world the most right now and will be for the next couple of years. And his mind that is coming up with these decisions is being influenced by Fox News and people speaking on Fox News. So this gives you an idea of the network alone has the ear of the President of the United States. So much so, and I can't remember who told me this, I think it's public information, is that people that want to influence Trump, I think it's public, but people that want to influence Trump would... get on the right spot or on the right segment on fox news and say something specific to get his ear that was one of the ways to do it other ways is like you know buying trump social buying membership to his club or son's club and all that but that was the way to get the president's ear and again this is an innocent example that i don't have much of a problem with this is just how the system works the i want to say more sinister examples but the the examples i've said getting a night getting a better idea of is that the conversations that she and Trump have. That if we were on a fly on that wall, we'd hear the conversation like, ah, number one is holy shit. Number two, now it makes sense. So this is something I'm realizing more and more. And this kind of, even if you go all, like some of my private conversations made me realize the process that led to Trump start the war in Iran, who had his ear on the power struggle and who had his attention more, et cetera. And there's some truth to what people say. The person that has Trump's ear last has the most influence. It's not as simple as that, but there's some truth to it. The truth is having his ear, especially at the right time, has an impact. So yeah, it's just fascinating to see. And then it links to the whole oil price discussion, what's happening in the markets and the corruption we're seeing with the presidency as well. I feel like we're starting to see reality more and more. i don't agree but mario how much how much power do you think trump actually has it is is there a force larger than him we have to discuss yeah absolutely absolutely like i've realized that and you've been speaking about it for a long time but i've realized that as well more and more uh joe kent tucker etc have done a great job explaining it and they've kind of woke me up even further to it like how much influence there is over him but yeah freaking hell yeah
Speaker 0: absolutely man yeah he's the lightning rod and we're like look what trump is doing but actually there's a machine operating somewhere in the background um that's that's carrying us along in this story and so um again you know sort of maybe the larger framing on this is like here's my here's my here's what i'm worried about from an oil price perspective what i'm worried about is that You know, we're draining our SPR. We're draining our commercial stockpiles. We're draining our inventories of gasoline and diesel. They're all at like multi-year, if not multi-decade lows at this time of the year. And so I'm worried that we're just going to keep this fictitious low price of oil, which keeps demand high, right? So in the United States, year-over-year demand amongst the citizenry for oil products was up 2.9% year-over-year. Not down 2.9%, not down 5% or 6%, which is probably where it needs to be. It's higher than ever, right? Jet flight, miles driven. Like we're just, hey, we're just, hey, the price is not nearly high enough to cause any sort of demand destruction. In fact, demand is higher. And that's kind of true worldwide as well. We're seeing, I can't find this demand destruction. So we're just eating into our stockpiles. And my concern is that we just keep that up. We keep that up. And then, oh no, something goes wrong with the negotiations. The MOU falls apart and things get spicy over there again for a bit. And next thing you know, we just slam into oil shortages across the world, but here in the United States as well, you know, we just, we just, we just hit tank bottom. And that's probably one of the most destructive things I could imagine. Um, it would be highly irresponsible to end up there because somebody said, let's, you know, manipulate oil futures lower for some short-term political gain. You know, we want to get through the July 4th weekend, you know, being able to crow about how, you know, oil prices were low and then we'll let them go or whatever the story is that I can't. So again, If we get to that point, this is a big if, big scenario, but if we get there and we slam into that, and that was because of, I don't know, we'll just call it ignorance, right? We just got there because it was just some broken process or it was intentional because somebody was actually trying to engineer that outcome because, you know, Washington DC never let a good crisis go to waste. However we get there, you know, in your heart of hearts, there are people behind there who are gonna be all ready for this crisis air quotes time right oh good thing we put all those flock cameras in because now we can see if uh you know joe blow was trying to like evade the system and he drove too much or more than his allotted amount or tried to get around you know the purchasing requirements minimums maximums that we had in place for gasoline whatever the story is you just know that that next price is going to be an opportunity to really use the data centers use the flock cameras use the whatevers And you already heard, I think, Marco Rubio coming out talking about how passports now, we'll just use this facial recognition thing now. You don't have to go to Walgreens anymore. That digital future state, that's something they want, whoever the they is in this story. But that's something they want. And we know that because when they want something, it's always easy, right? It's just easy. Data centers popping up. It's almost impossible for locals to organize against them. All sorts of inconvenient narratives like climate change, suddenly they took those right off the table. Like, stop talking about that, right? That's easy. If you wanna do something else though that they don't want, it's always hard. It's like selling raw milk. Man, that's hard, you know, or something. So that's the easy, hard framework that we use over at my site with my tribe. And we talk about that because when things are easy, that's just something that they want. So I guess they want, you know, data centers and flock cameras. At this point, you don't figure out why.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well explained. Chris, thanks for jumping on. I always enjoy our conversations. Thank you. Likewise. Thank you for having me again.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m Phil Tourney, a USS Liberty survivor. On July 4, I burned the Israeli flag, calling it evil and urging that Zionist members of Congress and senators should answer for it. I said Israel claimed the ship was a mistake, even though it flew a large U.S. flag visible before the attack, and I endorsed Rep. Thomas Massie for president in 2028.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇱 Phil Tourney, a survivor of the USS Liberty, which many claim was deliberately attacked by Israel on June 8, 1967, marked July 4th by burning the Israeli flag. Israel claimed the vessel was mistaken for an Egyptian ship, despite it flying a huge U.S flag, clearly visible to the several Israeli reconnaissance planes that overflew it prior to the attack. "I burn this evil flag on the Fourth of July. I also call out all the Zionist members of Congress and senators. You're supposed to fight for this country, not Israel." He also endorsed @RepThomasMassie for president in 2028 Writer: Ian https://t.co/bmgLPYrMAh
Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker says they burned an “evil flag” on July 4 in remembrance of “34 brothers” tattooed on their arm, who they say were slaughtered by Israel on June 8, 1967. They also say they called out “all the Zionist Congress senators,” asserting that senators should fight for the country rather than Israel and should be voted out. They conclude by promoting Thomas Massey for President in 2028.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I burned this evil flag on the 4th of July in remembrance of my 34 brothers tattooed in my arm who were slaughtered by Israel June 8, 1967. I also called out all the Zionist Congress senators. You're supposed to fight for this country, not Israel, so you should be voted out of all of you. Thomas Massey for President, 2028.
reSee.it AI Summary
I sat down with macro analyst and eurodollar expert Jeffrey Snider to unpack oil and the global economy. He argues the Hormuz flow is only at about a third of pre-war levels, yet the market prices a surplus because demand destruction from the energy shock is deeper, with inventory building now running into an “air pocket.” On China: “Terrible.” He also warns the stock market’s “booming” signals mask deeper social/political risks and suggests the political breaking point may come faster than expected.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Oil supply through the Strait of Hormuz is still running at about a third of pre-war levels. The market is somehow pricing in a surplus. Jeffrey Snider thinks he knows why. I sat down with the macro analyst and eurodollar expert to make sense of what's happening with oil, the global economy, and what comes next. His theory on the price collapse: demand destruction from the energy shock may be deeper than anyone expected. Manufacturers front-loaded months of activity when the war started, building inventory fast before shortages hit. Now that rush is over, and they've hit an air pocket. On China: "Terrible." Banking crisis, real estate bust, consumer spending collapsing. Chinese government bond yields almost back to record lows. He thinks China quietly agreed with Trump after their May summit to hold off on refilling strategic reserves, helping suppress the oil price. Nobody knows what China got in return. His bigger warning has nothing to do with oil. The stock market says the economy is booming. The median age of a first-time homebuyer in America is now 40. He says that gap is exactly what's driving the global wave of socialism, and the political breaking point is getting closer faster than people think. We've been in the downswing of a long economic cycle since August 2007. He thinks the 2030s could mark the turn. The question is whether the politics break first. Great conversation with @JeffSnider_EDU
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on why oil prices remain high despite supply-demand indicators that “don’t make sense.” After conversations with Philip Pilkington and Jeffrey Curry, the speaker focuses on Strait of Hormuz throughput dropping sharply and the implications for oil inventories and pricing.
A report from Kepler is cited showing ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in the last three days of 34, 48, and 38 ships, compared with about 130–140 ships before the war—roughly a third of pre-war levels. The speaker also notes American reserves are “almost depleted,” suggesting only “a couple of months” remaining if current pace continues. China is described as having demand that “hasn’t picked up,” while refinery margins appear unusually high: the price of oil is very expensive, yet margins are so high that it suggests either price gouging or that the effective per-barrel cost is significantly higher than the spot price, though exact costs for oil leaving the Strait of Hormuz are described as impossible to obtain.
In response, the other speaker argues the market’s pricing must reflect more than supply normalization alone. Some oil rerouting around the Strait is attributed to countries like the UAE, but the reduction from pre-war ship levels still implies major supply constraints. The speaker proposes two possibilities: either something may soon raise shipping levels rapidly, or a major factor is on the demand side. They emphasize that demand destruction can occur through macroeconomic weakness and price effects—especially in Asia, where high oil prices for “almost four month period” can reduce consumption, and in Europe, where economic data “fell off a cliff.”
A key point is the shape and speed of the WTI and Brent futures curves shifting toward contango. The futures curve is described as positioned for oversupply “in the near term,” even though the market would normally be expected to move from historic supply deficit toward normalization. The speaker highlights that the prompt spread (first two contracts) is “four pennies,” producing an extremely flat curve, and argues that it is not merely anticipating oversupply far out in time (e.g., March 2027). Instead, the market appears to be pricing a near-term demand shortfall.
China is framed as the “X factor” for demand via inventory refilling, described as more political than economic. The speaker references a meeting between Trump and Xi in May and suggests a plausible short-term understanding that delays quick inventory refills and reduces disruption to oil prices. They add that China has been relatively silent since then and that China’s lack of rapid strategic reserve replenishment aligns with prices moving toward contango.
The conversation explains contango as a condition where spot prices are lower than futures prices, implying the market expects oil to flood the market or otherwise be available for future delivery. The speaker elaborates that the spot price must fall relative to futures to incentivize buyers to take near-term oil and store it. They contrast this with backwardation (described as the curve previously steeply favoring immediate delivery when supply is tight), noting that backwardation existed for months but shifted too quickly and too far for supply-only explanations.
The demand explanation includes global “front-loading” of economic activity after the historic closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with producers rushing to build inventories and ship goods (including plastics and agricultural inputs) before shortages and higher prices hit. After this activity, an “air pocket” is described: production and purchasing slow, and if that coincides with macroeconomic weakening—softening consumer spending and weak labor data—demand destruction accelerates. The speaker argues that energy shocks often lead to recessions, and that oil’s curve shift reflects rising seriousness about the timing and magnitude of demand decline.
China’s economy is described as experiencing multiple simultaneous crises: a banking crisis, an “intractable” real estate crisis, weak May retail sales, and lending pullbacks toward major state-owned firms and the government. Government bond curves are characterized as recession-like, with low interest rates near levels from December 2024 and the 10-year bond near record lows. This is used to support the idea that China may not be refilling oil stocks because demand is weaker.
The impact on the rest of the global economy is described as broad: upstream economies take a hit, while Asia has been partially supported by AI-related semiconductor and equipment demand. The speaker suggests that as the AI bubble cools, the underlying China-linked weakness will show up more clearly across highly China-exposed economies. Commodity weakness (copper, aluminum, steel) alongside oil’s curve behavior is presented as consistent with a demand-side slowdown attributed to China.
Later, the discussion shifts to how financial markets and real incomes diverge. The speaker says the disconnect between stock market performance and everyday economic conditions drives political frustration, referencing the view that central bankers and politicians repeatedly claim everything is fine because the stock market is up, even while incomes for most people remain stagnant. The speaker proposes that the resolution depends either on growth returning or on political changes driven by worsening inequality and urgency as economic conditions persist.
Finally, the speaker frames the broader economic cycle as globalization tied to monetary evolution and the post–World War II reserve system, running until August 2007, followed by deglobalization as part of the downswing. They argue that eventually ingenuity brings an upswing again, but politics may break sooner due to accelerating urgency, diminishing inhibitions, and rising inequality—implying a “race against time” between economic recovery and political escalation.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: It's been a discussion I've been having with a few guests. You should listen to my conversation I had today. It got a lot of attention the first time we had the conversation two days ago. Today we went deeper with Philip Pilkington. Not sure if you know the guy. He's got a podcast. He's a finance guy. But then I got Jeffrey Curry's thoughts on it yesterday. And that's the price of oil. I'm just really trying to make sense of it. From a supply-demand perspective, it just doesn't make sense. There is not enough oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. There's a report that came out today from Kepler. There it is. Talking about how many ships are going through. In the last three days, it's 34, 48, and 38. Before the war, it was about 130, 140 before the war. So it's about a third of what it was before the war. And then you've got the reserves. The American reserves are almost depleted. What the exact number is, I don't know, but it's we know it's a couple of months away from being completely depleted if we keep going at this pace. You've got China, for some reason, the demand there hasn't picked up. And then you've got refineries. There was a calculation that my last guest was doing about the, I forgot what he called it, but it was a calculation. He was explaining it in the interview. And what we was talking about is that the price of oil is so expensive, but their margins are so high. So either they're price gouging or the cost of paying per barrel is significantly higher than the spot price we're seeing. But it's impossible to get the exact numbers on how much a barrel costs coming out of the straight home was. So you're the perfect guy to get your thoughts on what the hell is happening with the price of oil.
Speaker 0: What the hell is happening with the price of oil? Because you're right. You look at it from the supply perspective and it doesn't seem to make a whole lot of sense unless you're thinking oil traders are being wholly over optimistic about everything because you're The data you cited is enough alone to say, okay, wait a minute, hold on here. The issue on the supply side was always going to be the trajectory. How do we get back to at least something that approaches normal? Now, keep in mind, some of the oil states like the UAE, they've been able to reroute oil flow around or straight of Hormuz. So there is some ability to add back supply that has nothing to do with ships. So maybe the shipping through Hormuz will never go back to the way it was before. But 30 or 40 ships a day just ain't going to do it. So either the market is saying something's going to happen in the next little while that allows shipping and ship levels to get back up to where it was relatively quickly, or something else is going on on the other side of the economic ledger, which is the demand side. That's where I've been focused more recently. I think you and I talked about this last time we visited. That was always the two sides of the coin. When the conflict was over, oil prices were going to go down. supply normalization was going to be a big factor in it. But there were other side of the hidden side of that we wouldn't know we wouldn't we wouldn't get any real sense of for at least some time was going to be what happened on the demand side. And the demand side was not just not just physical shortfalls in those countries who ended up ended up getting on the short end of the stick here, but also you know, the price destruction, economies, especially in Asia, they couldn't they really couldn't handle the high price of oil for a three month period, you know, almost four month period. Europe, Europe was in bad shape to begin with. I forget what the central bankers over there said. Christine Lagarde all last year said, oh, Europe's in a good place. Europe's in a good place. And then look at all the economic data. It actually fell off a cliff. So there is a very big potential for demand destruction. And you look at the shape of the WTI futures curve, Brent futures curve, it doesn't really matter. You look at how the futures market is positioned. It's positioned as if there's going to be an oversupply in the near term, which is mind boggling. because we went from a historic supply deficit to now the futures curve is almost in contango. It's only pennies away as of Thursday trading before the market shut down for the Independence Day holiday. The futures curve was right there. In fact, it was in contango part of the day, which is the market saying we've got too much oil. The only way you're gonna end up with too much oil is if demand just kind of fell off completely, which is not an impossible possibility. It's one of those things that you have to start taking seriously. So it was always, okay, the price of oil, supply normalization, but also what is the potential for demand destruction? I think that's where the oil market is starting to shift. Whatever happens on the supply side, the market may be looking at demand for the next couple of months and thinking, it's just not there. So wherever supply came down, demand might've come down with it. And therefore it's roughly balanced, but with the market being more pessimistic on the demand side, and therefore it's pricing for an oversupply situation. What about China? Yeah, China, the X factor on the demand side was going to be refilling inventories. And that's more of a political than an economic choice. And you and I talked about this before, too. Trump and Xi met over in China. When was that? Back in May. We have no idea what they discussed. And it's very likely. I mean, just, you know, we have no inside information, obviously. But it seems very likely that Trump and Xi kind of struck up some kind of short term deal. They said, hey, don't. Don't kill us here or don't kill the oil market here. Don't refill all your inventories quickly or don't restore or, you know, normalize your import cadence, you know, very quickly. Let's allow the oil price to go back down to something that's more reasonable and something more manageable. So it seems like the Chinese, whatever they got in return, agreed to it.
Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly. What do you think they got in return? Sorry to interrupt.
Speaker 0: No idea. I mean, who knows what it could have been, but it had to have been something big or maybe Xi just kind of put a favor in the bank and said, I'm going to, I'm going to come back to this later. But that's the only logical explanation. Other than the Chinese are acting out of self-interest and say, you know what? We don't need to refill our strategic reserves that quickly. So there's no real reason to rush when the situation is fragile. Maybe we'll hold off on buying our oil imports and refilling reserves for a while just because we don't want to upset the apple cart that's in a pretty fragile situation to begin with. So yeah, it could be self-interest. But you got to think that maybe Trump and Xi came to some sort of agreement on on Hormuz maybe, the oil price, because the Chinese have been relatively silent ever since then. It hasn't really come up all that much. And then there's the behavior in the marketplace, which, like I said, the X factor on the demand side was going to be countries refilling their strategic reserves, which makes it a policy choice. But the fact that they haven't done it and allow oil prices to continue to drop to the point that it's in contango. I mean, or almost in contango.
Speaker 1: Just for the audience, because I mentioned it a few times, in contango means the spot price is lower than the futures price. So that's when the market is expecting a massive supply of oil to just flood the market.
Speaker 0: Yeah, so you're getting a delivery of oil someplace. It doesn't really matter what it is. You've contracted for delivery to show up in your place, your business, and you have to sell the oil sometime. You don't have it contracted yet. So what happens if nobody's taking your oil? Nobody wants to buy your oil. You have to drop your price of oil in the spot market lower and lower and lower to give somebody an incentive to take the oil off your hands that they can't use immediately and put it in storage. So the front price or the price of whatever point in time goes down below where the futures prices are. to give some speculators or real economy participants the financial incentive to take that oil, which isn't selling in the near-term marketplace, and store it. So you've got to- It's like the spot price.
Speaker 1: It's actually spot price plus storage price equals a futures price. So that's when there's so much oil that it's not even being used. Yes, that's the point, right?
Speaker 0: So backwardation is where you steep backwardation is where you have, you know, the oil futures curve is steeply, you know, the current price is way up here and futures prices are way down here. That's where we've been in the last couple of months, which makes sense because when you have historic supply choked off, you know, there's a desperate scramble to get every barrel of oil that you possibly can and pay any price to do so and have it delivered as soon as possible. So steep backwardation made sense. And coming off of that, you know, as things are starting to normalize, you would expect that backwardation to, you know, to normalize itself. And it did, but it has gone way past that. And even bigger, the bigger red flag here is it went way past that in a very short period of time. And looking around, like you started off the, you know, our conversation here with, the supply side doesn't, it doesn't make sense from a supply perspective. It doesn't make sense that the curve would just completely flatten. If you look at the WTI futures curve on Thursday, it's a straight line across. You know, it's very, very flat curve. So I think the spread, the prompt spread, which is the first two contracts is four pennies. It's extremely flat. And it's not like it's it's not like it's in contango next year. It's not like the market is saying we expect a whole bunch of oil to show up in March of twenty twenty seven, which would make sense. You know, it's a long way to normalization. We get back to where we were in December, which was an oversupply situation. The market's saying this is going to happen today. You know, this might be happening now. And so the only thing that I can think of, well, not the only thing, but one of the major factors that would explain that, how quickly the market developed this way is looking at demand. The market's saying, look, supply normalization's coming back, but it's not coming back all that quickly, but we're expecting a shortfall in demand that continues to develop maybe even much more than people were thinking about just a couple of weeks ago. Again, it's the speed of how quickly the oil curve has shifted that has to change people's focus to shift toward the demand side.
Speaker 1: What is happening with demand? What changed between now and just a few months ago?
Speaker 0: Well, one thing, if you're talking about just broad macroeconomic perspective, the manufacturing system throughout the entire world, and it was true everywhere, went banana. It went crazy. Everybody, not everybody, but producers on the production side of the economy started rushing to get material done, to build up inventories, to make stock, get things shipped. thinking that, okay, number one, prices of everything are going to go up because oil prices are skyrocketing. And number two, understanding what this historic closure of Hormuz meant that, you know, there was going to be material shortage, plastic. Plastic was always going to be a big one, also food, and especially the inputs for agriculture. So there was a rush to get everything done as quickly as possible before prices really skyrocketed and material shortages really started to hit. But now, Once you front load that much activity, and it was substantial activity, once you front load that activity, what ends up happening? Well, I mean, you've got all the stuff done, and then you hit an air pocket. You get a payback period where activity comes down. And if the payback period occurs when macroeconomic conditions are themselves falling off, and we've seen consumer spending soften, you've seen labor market data look increasingly weak, You get payback on top of macroeconomic weakness, which is the base case whenever you have an energy shock to begin with. That's why energy shocks and recessions usually go together. You can understand why the oil market is starting to look and focus on the demand side because you've got the historic energy shock recession case alongside that payback from all the front-loaded activity. And maybe there is an air pocket of demand here where the marketplace is saying, look, we're not going to need that much oil in the near term, at least for the summertime, because we did everything we needed to do a couple months ago.
Speaker 1: Going back to China, is there anything, because everyone mentions China as the massive, the biggest elephant in the room, but no one really does a deep dive into it. Everyone talks about the American jobs were poor and American interest rates. What is happening in China? How's their economy looking? Terrible.
Speaker 0: It's not good. China has, you know, several crises all at the same time. They've got the banking crisis, the real estate crisis that just, it's intractable. And the economic data looks worse than almost everywhere else around the world. The recent numbers for the month of May were terrible. Retail spending, retail sales, consumers, Chinese households, which you would expect with a real estate bus where most Chinese household wealth is held up and tied up in real estate. So if you've got an ongoing multi-year real estate bus where real estate prices continue to come down and deflate, Chinese households are not gonna be in the mood to spend and they haven't been. But some of the numbers more recently, look like a Chinese recession associated with the energy shock, though it's not necessarily about energy prices in China, more so the fragile situation. And then, like I said, you look at the banking statistics, banks continue to pull back on lending. They only lend to the biggest Chinese state-owned firms or to the Chinese government itself. You look at the financial statistics and financial prices in China, China's government bond curve looks like a recession curve. It is massively steepening. from an ultra low level. Front-end interest rates in China are almost to record lows back where they were in December of 2024, when everybody was running around panicking over tariffs. We're almost back to those same levels. The 10-year Chinese government bond almost at a record low. So China is not actually doing well, which may partly answer the question you asked earlier. What is China doing? Well, maybe they don't need to refill their oil stocks. Maybe it's a demand side coming from China. Maybe Chinese economy is, fallen off sharply enough where the chinese you know we don't need to buy any more oil because demand just isn't there for it but that would be consistent with the entire global marketplace shifting toward contango if china's demand has fallen off that sharply and looks like it's going to stay that way then that's certainly going to impact the calculation of oil prices in the physical flow of oil and demand for oil around the rest of the system too
Speaker 1: But if what you're saying about China is true, what does that mean for the rest of the global economy that's become a lot more dependent on the Chinese economy?
Speaker 0: Well, everything upstream of the Chinese economy ends up taking a big hit. One thing that we haven't seen that as much of is because of the AI bubble, especially in Asia. A lot of the Asian economies, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, they have been supported tremendously by this AI build out and so demand for semiconductors and equipment that goes with it. So some of the underlying weakness that would normally be associated with China falling off hasn't really shown up in the economic numbers or even in reality in the real economy. But as the AI bubble might start to cool off a bit, then you're going to see these economies that are ultra exposed to what's happening in China. Then you look at the resource economies that are upstream from China, they're already struggling to begin with and it's only going to get worse from there. If you're watching commodity markets, not just the energy sector, but commodity markets, you know, copper or some of the other metals like aluminum and steel, they suggested exactly what I'm saying, that China's gone through its early first year part of, you know, where they buy a lot of material and then they back off and see where the actual economy is for the rest of the year. So we see commodity weakness alongside oil prices and the oil curve behaving the way it is. That would tell you that China is probably one of the biggest factors with, you know, the setback on the demand side.
Speaker 1: You talked about the AI bubble, and a lot of people are still using the stock market as a barometer for the health of the economy or the average American. But there's a massive disconnect now between the average American and the stock market, which is centralized across these various companies, the handful of tech companies. Does that disconnect? Where are you? It's being talked about here and there. Ray Dalio has been warning about it for years now, if not decades. But the gap is getting wider and wider. Is that something that concerns you?
Speaker 0: Oh, absolutely. Because like you said, it's perception versus reality. It's one of the things that's driving the wave of socialism, not just in the U.S., but across the world. People are turning to socialism because they think, well, shit, if the stock market is huge and everybody tells me the stock market is representing the economy, I look around. It's terrible for me. It's terrible for my friends. We all struggle. We can't make ends meet. Our incomes are nowhere near enough. You know, the median age for a new homebuyer in the U.S. is 40. wait till i'm 40 before i can afford a home i can't buy a new car but the stock market's booming this economy is a booming economy and it sucks for me and sucks for everybody i know i'm going to turn someplace else i'm going to start hey mandami let's let's sign up for the democratic socialist of america right that's where all this is coming from it's the misperception that's driven largely by the stock market but also politicians and central bankers in particular central bankers who have an interest in you know blowing smoke up your butt telling you everything's great Central bankers are one of the few places in the world where we give them the authority or give them the mandate to try to make the economy, and then also give them the ability to tell us how they're doing, as if we have no independent judgment. And so central bankers keep telling everybody, stock market's up, the economy must be perfectly fine, and it leads to this massive disconnect. So people have the perception of the stock market saying, stock market's up, so economy must be booming, when in reality, those two things are completely different, completely different.
Speaker 1: So how does that end? How do these two things get closer again, that gap stops to widen and contracts to what it was a couple of decades ago? Is there two ways, fundamental changes in the system itself, which I'm not going to hold my breath, or the other is something political that forces a change and that's not really the best path historically, hasn't been too good of a path, not even a peaceful path.
Speaker 0: It's a dangerous path, that's for sure. So yeah, it's either a political change or growth gets back on track and we go back to where we were. And that's, I mean, the more optimistic take, and that's where I think we'll be maybe in the 2030s. Because this, look, this is not anything new. We've been through this before. In fact, the world in the modern industrial sense has gone through these super cycles several times. It's no fun when you get into the downside of the cycle, it becomes messy and violent in many different ways. Violent in the economy, violent in the marketplace, which, by the way, feeds into what Marx warned about capitalism, which is another reason why socialism has become so popular, because it looks like Marx was correct. But either the political system breaks and we take our chances and roll the dice with what it looks like on the other side, which I hope we don't get that far, but you can see how we're moving in that direction, or we fix what's actually wrong, you get the economy back on track, and suddenly the old adage about rising tide lifts all boats, which is absolutely true. We get back to a growth path and we get back on track, And all this stuff doesn't really matter anymore. It becomes a historical footnote. The thing is these cycles, they're not a couple of years. They're multi-decade cycles. But the good news is we've been in the downside of the cycle since August of 2007. So we're 20 years closer to the end of it.
Speaker 1: So when you say cycle, what cycle are you exactly referring to?
Speaker 0: You can break it down in numbers, but it's really globalization. we had a wave of globalization that that tied in with monetary uh monetary evolution and monetary uh really redrawing the global reserve currency system that took advantage of everything that came out of world war ii technological advance telecommunications so you had monetary flow that became very elastic and very responsive to the system and it allowed basically money to flow around the world which led to this massive wave of globalization really from the 1950s until august of 2007. Went through a period of, you know, it was that 60 some years, 50 some years, 55 years or so, where we had waves of waves of prosperity all over the place. Yes, there's always winners and losers in any economic development. You know, I grew up in the Rust Belt. I saw the downside of it in the United States. But overall, we saw a period of unparalleled prosperity through more parts of the world than anybody we'd ever seen before anybody could have imagined. So that cycle of globalization was still a cycle. We didn't repeal the laws of economics, or certainly not the laws of finance. When we got to August 2007, the monetary system broke down. It didn't recover. It triggered the next wave, which some people call deglobalization. It's really just the downside of the cycle. So that's where you see all of this deglobalization, lack of cooperation, people moving into their own spheres of influence again. Typical human cycle. We've gone through this a number of times before. And so humanity being... relatively ingenious innovation. Eventually people start figuring out what's wrong and how to fix it. And we go back into the upswing of the cycle again. So several decades into the downswing, it brings us closer to the upswing. The problem is the clock is ticking on the politics side while that's taking place. So you have to get back on the upswing of the cycle, the long-term cycle before you get to the political break that might happen in between.
Speaker 1: Yeah, and that political, that political break is moving, or at least moving closer to that political break.
Speaker 0: It always, it always accelerates, right? Because people become, you know, you think about your 20 years into a downswing in a cycle, things suck, and they only seem to get worse. People's urgency, the level of urgency goes up, they're, they're, they're You know, their common sense, the reluctance to take drastic action, you know, their inhibitions, that's the word I'm groping for here, their inhibitions start to diminish. The more urgent you become, you know, the older you get, the more you say, oh my God, my kids are gonna have to go through this, the more likely you are to embrace a more radical and extreme political position. So there's always that race against time and it does quicken toward the end.
Speaker 1: There's there, and if you add to as well, the widening gap in terms of inequality because of the centralization of wealth,
Speaker 0: with tech and AI that makes it even more- That's the primary, it's not the stock market, it's incomes. That's the primary symptom. If you're in the upper levels of the economic system, you've done perfectly well. It's everybody else at the bottom. So people at the top have continued to grow and expand at even better rates than they did before 2008. Whereas people at the bottom have been basically stuck. So they're watching all these rich people get richer and richer and richer. And yeah, you can understand where this is coming from. because they don't see any end to them. And most people are incredibly patient. They will wait out, you know, periods of prolonged periods of stagnation for lack of a better term. It's really a depression. They will wait out these periods for a long period of time, but you know, you get older, you start having kids and you don't see anything changing. You hear the same crap over and over again from politicians and officials telling you not to whine about it because everything's great. We'll just look at wall street, wall street's booming. So stop your fricking complaining. You get tired of it after a while. And you say, you know what? Enough is enough is enough. So that's the two parts of the equation, the upswing in the cycle and the downswing in politics. And hopefully the one gets to where we need to go before the other one really breaks down.
reSee.it AI Summary
I spoke with former CIA officer Larry Johnson about Trump’s possible meeting with Netanyahu. Johnson says Netanyahu will argue for continuing the war, but Trump will likely say it’s over. He calls the MOU effectively dead, citing Iran’s shutdown of the Omani corridor. He also points to Kepler data: ~5 million bpd through the strait, about half U.S. claims, and a quarter of pre-war. He dismisses Rep. Randy Fine as “a moron.”
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇱🇮🇷 "Netanyahu knows who the boss is." That's Trump, ahead of a possible White House meeting with Netanyahu as early as next week. I spoke to former CIA officer Larry Johnson to get his read on what's coming. His take on the Netanyahu meeting: Bibi will try to make the case for continuing the war. He doesn't think it'll work. "Trump's going to say, that's over." On the MOU: He thinks it's "effectively dead," with Iran sending a clear signal by shutting down the Omani corridor entirely. Ships that tried to use it turned around after what he believes were IRGC warnings. On the oil numbers: Kepler's verified data shows roughly 5 million barrels a day moving through the strait, half of what U.S. officials claimed, and just a quarter of pre-war levels. On Rep. Randy Fine's claim that Palestinians don't exist and were invented by the Soviet Union: "He's a moron." Always a pleasure having @newsonof on.
Video Transcript AI Summary
A Fourth of July birthday party was postponed after the death of a friend’s friend. Speaker 0 described multiple personal losses over the past month, including the death of Joe, age 82, who helped establish the Inspector General office at the Department of Defense in 1982 and later held access to Department of Defense special access programs. Another neighbor’s Fourth of July party went ahead with shared desserts, including a red velvet cake and a blueberry/strawberry/raspberry cheesecake.
The discussion then shifted to reporting about Muqtaba Khamenei, Mustafa Khamenei’s son. Speaker 2 said NBC and The New York Times reported Muqtaba Khamenei would not attend the July 9 burial due to security reasons, with sources citing leg injuries and potential burns, and saying security officials opposed the plan to prevent Israel from tracking his location or attempting an assassination at the ceremony. Speaker 0 said the concern was not his public appearance but tracking his whereabouts via his transportation, and suggested he might still appear on July 9 without advertising it in advance. Speaker 2 asked whether it would be unusual if no video message or audio release were issued; Speaker 0 said a video message would be unusual.
Speaker 2 read a New York Times account claiming Muqtaba Khamenei’s prolonged absence raised questions inside Iran about the sustainability of his leadership, and described internal pressure surrounding negotiations with the U.S. over a preliminary ceasefire agreement, including warnings about Iran’s economy, U.S. naval blockade impacts, and a role for the Supreme National Security Council approving the agreement by a 12-to-1 vote. Speaker 0 questioned the blockade-food-and-medicine claim, citing routes bringing food and medicine via Russia through the Caspian Sea, Pakistan, and China.
The conversation turned to a theory: whether Muqtaba Khamenei was killed during an assassination on his father. Speaker 2 speculated that only a small number of people knew his whereabouts and could coordinate a lie delaying acknowledgment of his death. Speaker 0 said this scenario was too complex and that other clerics could step up, arguing he was replaceable and that maintaining such a pretense would be difficult.
Next, Speaker 2 covered Axios reporting that President Trump said Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has requested a White House meeting that could occur as early as next week after Trump returns from a NATO summit. Speaker 2 characterized the bigger implication as Netanyahu influencing Trump toward outcomes Speaker 2 and Speaker 0 associated with continuing war. Speaker 0 predicted Netanyahu would argue for continuing the war, while Trump would oppose it.
Related political reporting included a claim that Netanyahu was working to unite right-wing religious parties to avoid wasting right-wing votes in upcoming Israeli elections, including offering guaranteed spots to each party if they ran on a joint list. Another report discussed Trump asking Israel not to increase military activity in Lebanon to avoid interfering with U.S. discussions with Iran, allegedly delaying an operation in the Ali al-Taha region.
On Iran’s maritime situation, Speaker 2 described changes affecting the U.S.-Omani designated maritime corridor. They said multiple vessels that had been heading toward Oman to leave the Persian Gulf changed course into Iranian waters or returned to the Persian Gulf. Speaker 2 then claimed Iran closed the corridor used to bypass authority over the Strait of Hormuz, while U.S. aerial presence did not stop the shift. Speaker 2 cited Kepler maritime tracking data contradicting Trump’s claim that oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz exceeded 10 million barrels per day, stating that vessel crossings were far below pre-war averages and that average oil exiting the strait was estimated at about 5 million barrels per day in June. They added that Kepler estimates were about half of the 10 million barrels per day claim and about a quarter of roughly 20 million barrels per day translated before the war. Speaker 2 also described how most visible traffic used an Iranian traffic separation scheme rather than the U.S.-supported scheme, and described ships attempting the southern route then reversing or switching to the Iranian scheme.
Speaker 0 offered an explanation for the maritime changes involving a belief that Western forces calculated Iran would be distracted by the funeral of an Ayatollah.
Finally, the conversation discussed U.S.-Russia/Ukraine and possible Russia-related negotiations. Speaker 2 mentioned a report that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner might travel to Russia before the end of the next month to talk with Russian leadership, and referenced a 90-minute call between Putin and Trump. Speaker 0 expressed skepticism about meaningful progress and argued the MOU was effectively dead, linking future steps to U.S. and Iran violations and ongoing tensions elsewhere.
In a separate discussion, Speaker 2 and Speaker 0 debated comments attributed to a U.S. member of Congress, including claims about Palestinians and statements related to starving children in Gaza unless hostages were released. Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 also discussed historical claims about when “Palestine/Palestinians” terms were first used, and argued about whether the term was invented by the Soviet Union or had earlier attestations. Speaker 0 concluded with the view that Arabs lived in the region for thousands of years and emphasized rights and humane solutions.
The session ended with greetings and a note that Speaker 0 had tried only one taste of the cheesecake while dieting.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I didn't expect to be here tonight, but we had a change of plans.
Speaker 2: Where'd you get a shirt with an Eagle on it?
Speaker 0: Oh, it's a 250th anniversary shirt. Is that a new shirt or? Oh yeah. Statue of Liberty flags on the sleeves. Fourth of July shirt. First.
Speaker 2: Is that a first time you wear it today? Yup. Looking sharp.
Speaker 0: We were supposed to have a birthday party for a friend of mine who was born on the 4th of July, but, uh, a good friend of his, uh, uh, ended up dying yesterday. So he had to go attend his friend before his death. So we canceled the party, postponed it a week.
Speaker 2: Sorry. I, he went from something. I missed it though.
Speaker 0: I have a friend whose birthday is the 4th of July. He was turning 82 today. And so another one of his, actually he, his friend, his friend's name was Joe. Joe and Bob set up the Inspector General Office at the Department of Defense back in like 1982. So they did massive investigations and Joe Joe was the holder of all of the SAP programs, the special access programs. So he had access to all of these top secret. He was the one that would brief the president, brief different Secretary of Defense and others on particular SAPs. And anyway, Joe was 82 as well. And he had... diabetes and some other things. But anyway, he went into intensive care on Thursday or Wednesday. And so my friend Bob drove over to be with him. And then Joe ended up dying yesterday. So, you know, life goes on. He had a good full life. It's just, you know, you never want to see anybody checked out if you keep them around as long as possible.
Speaker 2: Yeah. I'm sorry to hear. You've had a rough month because you also had the student. I remember that as well.
Speaker 0: Yeah. So we postponed the birthday party. And fortunately, one of the other neighbors is having a 4th of July party. So we had this beautiful red velvet cake. He said, happy birthday, America 250. And then a combination blueberry, strawberry, raspberry cheesecake. So we took that to the neighborhood party and shared it with the neighbors. them up with sugar oh yeah all i could do i could just do a taste i tasted the red velvet delicious but you know beyond literally one little taste i wasn't i didn't want to go to a sugar coma well good to chat to you um are we um so since this fourth of july
Speaker 2: And what better news than... Actually, before we get into the news, let's kind of wrap up our discussion for the last two, three days about Mujtaba Khamenei attending the funeral. According to the New York Times and NBC, he will not be attending due to security reasons. Not sure if you heard that. Nope, I've not heard that. Okay, perfect. So I'll get you the full story here. So according to NBC, Mujtaba Khamenei is not expected to attend the funeral today. according to an Iranian official and a Middle Eastern diplomat. He's seriously injured, etc., leg injuries, potential burns on the face and body. The full extent of the injuries and their impact on his ability to carry his duties remain unclear. So it's unrelated talking about his injuries, but he won't be attending the funeral. And then there was a report by the New York Times, which was more detailed. Mustafa Khamenei had expressed desire to attend his father's burial ceremony on July 9th, so in four days. and personally recite the funeral prayer, according to the New York Times, citing two IRGC members and a person involved in the funeral preparations. However, the sources said Iranian security officials have so far opposed the plan, fearing Israel could attempt to assassinate him at the ceremony or use his appearance to track his current location, which is what the concern I had is they won't kill him in the ceremony, But they would start tracking him then and potentially find out where he is and then maybe try to take him out a week or two afterwards when it would be less controversial when it comes to how the world sees it. Not saying not controversial, just less controversial than doing it on the funeral with all the world leaders there. And then there's another piece in that New York Times article about him being away in a power struggle, which I'll read about in a second.
Speaker 0: um initial reaction about which about not attending is that surprising um do you think he might say this is unconfirmed by the way this is according to reporting from nbc and new york times yeah well um israel trying to kill him it doesn't surprise me um the uh you know i think the concern not so much about his public appearance but tracking tracking his whereabouts using His mode of transportation getting there is, I think, a concern. I'd be willing to guess that he will make an appearance on the 9th. You know, they're not going to advertise it in advance. And they will take precautions to, you know, make it... It won't be clear where he originated from.
Speaker 2: You think it'll be physical appearance or just a virtual one?
Speaker 0: I think it'll be... I think it would be a physical appearance. I mean, the backup would be to do, you know, like you and I are doing, Zoom or StreamYard.
Speaker 2: It's weird that one thing I've been thinking about is why not have a video come out? Let's say he doesn't show up. Would it be bizarre for you if he doesn't show up, but also he doesn't put out a video message or an audio message even? Well, audio would be a bit odd, but putting out a video message, a video address to everybody... Would that be unusual for you?
Speaker 0: Yeah, no, I think that would be unusual. But again, the circumstances, I'm not sure what the security personnel know. I've heard rumors, but I'm not really at liberty yet to go into those rumors. But just suffice it to say that not just Iranian but Pakistani intelligence sources believe that there is a legitimate serious threat against Muqtaba. And so they're going to take steps to protect him.
Speaker 2: So in the New York Times story, I'll read out the rest of it. Mustafa Khamenei's prolonged absence from public view have raised questions within Iran's political establishment about the long-term sustainability of his leadership. Quote, his biggest challenge came during negotiations with the U.S. when he hesitated to approve the preliminary ceasefire agreement. President Pesachkan warned Khamenei that Iran's economy was in critical state. The U.S. naval blockade was crippling the country and that he would resign if the deal were rejected. Central Bank Governor Hemati warned in a letter to Khamenei, he sent a letter to him, that Iran faced a severe budget crisis and could run out of key food and medical supplies by the end of August if the blockade continued. These warnings helped convince Khamenei to back the agreement. He later said he opposed the deal on principle, but authorized the government to proceed after receiving the backing of the Supreme National Security Council, which approved it 12 to 1. So what the New York Times is saying here that there was a lot of pressure from the president and the governor, the central bank governor, for Mustafa to approve the MOU and Mustafa was genuinely hesitant to approve it. And it talks about how his prolonged absence is raising questions within Iran's political establishment.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I really questioned part of that report, saying that the blockade was cutting off food and medicine. I don't think that's true at all, simply because Iran had access to food and medicine coming from Russia through the Caspian Sea. And they had access to food and medicine coming from Pakistan and food and medicine coming from China. So that's an example of, I think, a big exaggeration.
Speaker 2: Yeah. That's for me. I knew the blockade would be causing issues for Iran when it comes to exporting their oil. And that would be debated. Some people believe yes, some people no, and to what extent. How effective was the blockade? But in terms of not being able to import necessities, obviously, I'm just speculating. I don't have any information, but it would be bizarre for me, especially with all these corridors that Pakistan opened to Iran and all of the neighboring countries where there's even reports that Azerbaijan was sending a lot of supplies to Iran. A lot of countries were increasing their export or the flow of goods into Iran. to make up for the blockade throughout the war. And we've talked about this, but that was a report by New York times. And it got me thinking today for the first time, if, um, now I do believe he's alive. I do believe he is injured. I do believe the only reason he hasn't shown up is not because of the injury or anything like that, unless he's severely injured. That could be the case. We don't know, but I think it's mainly for security purposes. But, um, you know, I do want to entertain the theory that I thought about it briefly today is that what if. Is there a possibility, even if it's low, that he was actually killed in that assassination on his father? However, because right now only a small number of people know his whereabouts and have met him. When I say small number, from what I understand, it's less than five people. We know that the president met him according to reports and maybe one or two other people. So let's say three people have met him since the war. Again, I'm just speculating here. But just think about it, all it takes is these three people to agree together to lie that Mujtaba Khamenei is alive and the lie, you know, the world would just trust their word. Now the question is, why would they lie about Mujtaba being dead? I think it would have started as a tactical lie at the beginning. Like, look, we're just getting bombed on a daily basis. We had many of our leaders killed. We have to keep morale high. So let's just say Mustafa Khamenei survived the strike, or maybe he was alive initially, but he was going through intensive care. But then when he was killed, they started waiting for the right time to inform the Iranians. And that right time, you know when you lie and then you just keep delaying telling the truth, and then the lie builds up and builds up, and you're like, oh, shit. Started with a lie, like, I'll tell you the truth in a few days, and a few days come, I'll delay it another few days. And eventually, months later, you're just stuck in that lie that started as a small lie. I know it's highly improbable, but what do you make of that possibility?
Speaker 0: Yeah, I think it's too complex. And there are too many other clerics that would step up and be willing to serve as the Ayatollah. I mean, it's not like he's got some special gift, magic healing hands. So, you know, to just... keep up a pretense like that without any really good reason. He's replaceable. He's not irreplaceable. So, yeah, I doubt it.
Speaker 2: I agree. And if they wanted to lie, the lie would be that alikamene was not killed that would make sense so again i do think it's also improbable because there's many replacements and there's a plan for him if he gets assassinated there's been a plan for years and decades but yeah for for a lie just for mushtaq when there's replacements and many would argue even better replacements was not on top of the list if you remember um right um to succeed to six uh succeed after uh he got us he got a sympathy on the company's father Yeah, so that's on the funeral story. Let's see if he shows up on July the 9th. And the funeral processions are ongoing now. The news today, the big news is, according to Axios, the title is exclusive. Trump says Netanyahu, quote, knows who the boss is ahead of possible White House visit. President Trump told Axios that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has requested a meeting at the White House which could take place as early as next week after Trump returns from a NATO summit in Ankara, in Turkey. Quote, we get along very good. Netanyahu knows who the boss is, Trump said in a brief phone interview. Trump told Axios that the Iranians, or the rest is unrelated. We'll talk about it in a bit. But yeah, so this is Trump saying that Netanyahu knows who the boss is. He's made similar statements before, but I think the bigger news is that, Bibi will be beating Trump early next week. And generally speaking, those meetings tend to lead to outcomes that people like me and you do not like. People that don't want to see war continue don't like. Thoughts on the meeting?
Speaker 0: Well, I think Netanyahu's going to come and try to make the case that you must continue this war. You can't let up. You know, the show must go on, so to speak. And think trump's gonna say no we're we're not doing that anymore that's that's over um so then to be back to the drawing board for bb and his uh crew of uh misfits in tel aviv yeah i agree um people are pretty they've got ptsd from bb meeting trump because you know
Speaker 2: That's what preceded the war in the first place, all these meetings between Trump and Netanyahu. And there was that New York Times report that was talking about how that meeting that Trump had with Netanyahu around New Year's Eve last year was when Trump was convinced to start a war with Iran. So people are worried that Netanyahu will be somehow able to influence Trump to continue the war. I just don't see how he could do it. You know my stance. I've said for a while the war is over, but more importantly that Um, I think the, the, the, the, the, the approach or the relationship between the U S and Israel is going to have a fundamental shift starting after this war. And because Trump and his administration are going to feel burnt and the actual speech does say the following quote, many of Trump's closest advisors think BB was wrong about everything. It says that I think BB was wrong about everything. So, uh, I don't know what damage control could do.
Speaker 0: Yeah, he was. i mean that's that's a good objective fact uh or like the broken clock he he probably got two things right to just predict the same thing and you get it right once in the morning once in the evening um you know i think i think the u.s israeli relationship is going to be undergoing a reappraisal um and and plus it's possible that bb won't even be around as the new to continue to be reelected as the Israeli leader. I think it's highly likely that he'll be ousted.
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, I think Eisenkot is above him, is ahead of him in the polls. We're talking about Bibi. He is trying to get, so there's a report today on channel, on I24. Netanyahu is working to unite the religious Zionism party of Belize, of Smotrich and Yehudit with a party led by Ben-Gavir. So he's trying to unite them further in an effort to avoid wasting right-wing votes in the upcoming elections. Netanyahu has offered one guaranteed spot to each party if they agreed to run on a joint list. The goal is to prevent a scenario in which Smotrich fails to cross the electoral threshold. Ben-Gvir prefers to run independently and has instead proposed that Smotrich form a technical alliance with Likud. So essentially, he's trying to get Ben-Gvir and Smotrich to unite together as one party, So they can get more, they can help them more on the next elections. They can get more, uh, seats in the, in the Knesset. So that's, I guess it become prime minister. Um, so yeah, we'll see. He tends to be very, um, very effective politically, you know, probably the perfect example of the house of cards, the TV series. Not sure if you've seen it. He somehow manages to always get ahead. Not sure if he's going to be able to do it again. Let's hope not.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Um, That was a great series, at least the first two years. Third year began losing its luster.
Speaker 2: Thank you. There's another report here by Channel 15. Trump asked Israel not to increase military activity in Lebanon as he does not want it to interfere with his ongoing discussions with Iran. As a result, Netanyahu has reportedly delayed a military operation in previously planned for the Ali al-Taha region. Remember that hill we talked about that they were bombarding nonstop and they were trying to capture and they're trying to encircle. So it seems they had a massive operation or they had an operation to try to capture it, but they canceled it. And we did talk about this because they were bombing it, bombing it. And then suddenly they accepted the ceasefire and stopped trying to capture the hill. So according to this report from channel 15, it's Trump's pressure that stopped them from that. Funny enough though, that the, they're still bombing, um, lebanon there's still airstrikes one or two a day on a daily basis there's demolition happening in the territory they've occupied and they've even they're even shelling the hill the ali al-tahrir hill they're shelling it on a daily basis so um not significant shelling but shelling nonetheless so um yeah and all violations of the mou i think exactly israel iran is going to let israel's uh efforts to sabotage the peace process go unpunished until
Speaker 0: After nine July, once the, I told is finally laid to rest, then the worry about, uh, sorting out justice.
Speaker 2: Well, there's a story on that as well, uh, on July 9th. So that was a report. Fuck. I didn't save it. There's a report. I think Trump said it, or there's a report somewhere I read today. I didn't save it. Um, but essentially there's an agreement between, uh, Trump and Iran to
Speaker 0: know pause negotiations or pause things and then continue them after july 9th so there's a delay of everything keeping the status quo and then july 9th they'll be continuing yeah again the united states is it i think it was you that reported yesterday that already b-52 bombers that were based in london and based in the uk have departed returned to the united states and that f-15s that were based in jordan have come back and are flying through the uk so There's at least two examples of U.S. military force being withdrawn.
Speaker 2: But nothing significant yet. The warships and stuff, I checked them yesterday as well. Warships and troops, there haven't been any significant moves out of the region.
Speaker 0: Yeah, where are those warships located?
Speaker 2: I don't know. I didn't write that down. I think they're the same place they were located before in the Arabian Sea. I'm assuming.
Speaker 0: That's pure speculation. They're so far away, they're not useful.
Speaker 2: Yeah, but I think they came from the Pacific, for example, around the South China Sea. I think some of them were located there and they headed back. They moved away from the Asian countries and moved to the region. So we'll probably see them leave the region. But look, I don't think you don't remove all your military assets in the midst of negotiations because you want to maintain at least the perception of pressure. So at least maintain something there. And then slowly and gradually as the negotiations proceed, I'm in the position the war's over. So I think they'll eventually leave. But you wouldn't, I would assume you'd want to keep a significant portion of it there to at least make the Iranians think that military options on the table. As soon as the Iranians are certain America's military options off the table, it's going to be very hard to get concessions from them.
Speaker 0: Well, but Iran's got some other information. One, they understand the lack of military readiness by the US forces that have been deployed, that they're going to have severe fuel shortages for both their vehicles and their helicopters. So I just think that there are not a lot of good options. The United States can say it's staying prepared to respond. saying is one thing doing is another and i'm not seeing any of the actions doing that would substantiate or justify the position they're taking which position well that you're you're claiming that they're on scene to prepare to engage uh i i say they're not no no i don't think they're on scene preparing yeah i don't think they're on scene preparing to engage but i just think they haven't moved to where they were before the war you know the pacific etc
Speaker 2: just because it's in the midst of negotiations, but we'll see that happen gradually.
Speaker 0: Yeah, but they made claims yesterday, before yesterday, about the USS Boxer. It was just, you know, flat out not, I mean, just ridiculous. You know, again, why would they say something like that when it's provably false? And then on top of it today, it looks like Iran has shut down that Omani passage. Yeah, the straight or foremost, uh, there's no nothing's going through there right now.
Speaker 2: Is that what you were looking on the screen before? Yeah, I knew it. I knew it. I knew that was it. I knew it wasn't the world cup. They're all going the Iranian route. Yeah. So that, that, um, that came in today and I think started yesterday as well. And so first thing today that came in, there's a few things, um, let's start with this one in the past few hours so that was in the morning they were transiting um uh several vessels that were transiting uh let me if you can show this image i'll send it to you as a screenshot stephanie show it to the audience so they can see as well and to larry um in the part so you can show the image and remove me and larry so that the image expands in the past few hours several vessels that were transiting the route towards oman to leave the persian gulf have changed their course and entered iranian waters something happened today or have returned to the Persian Gulf altogether. They were likely warned by the IRGC. So you can see he was heading out of the Persian Gulf. And then you can see some of them return. Let me show you another screenshot. Show this one as well. Stephanie, the next one I sent you. Iran has then later, that was in the morning, then afterwards, Iran has completely closed the U.S.-Omani designated maritime corridor that was used to bypass Iran's authority over the Strait of Hormuz. The constant U.S. Air Force... um aerial presence did not stop iran it seems so there's a lot of air force activity by the way i didn't mention it in today's chat because it seems to be more like training but there were a lot of american aircraft in the air today some people were speculating that um bombing could be imminent but it seems more like it was training exercises that was a few hours ago um and lastly there is um one report from capital you could remove them thank you uh stephanie maritime traffic um According to Kepler's data, their data contradicts Trump's claim. Is this what you're going to like? There's been a few discussions I had today and yesterday with a few economists that I think you'd like, because a lot of them are just questioning the oil prices, why all the oil is going to Asia, the numbers that are coming out of the Strait of Hormuz, things that you question as well. Kepler's verified data directly contradicts Trump's claims that oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz have surpassed 10 million barrels per day. According to maritime tracking firm Kepler, there were 34, 48, and 38 vessels crossing over the past three days. That's Iranian and Omani total. So total vessels crossing. Far below the pre-war average of 130 to 140, 125 to 140 crossings per day, about a third. Kepler estimates approximately 5 million barrels of oil are exiting the strait daily on average in June. This is half of the U.S. official's 10 million barrels per day. 10 million barrels per day claim. And just one quarter of the roughly 20 million barrels per day that translated the straight before the war. Now, I want to offer a disclaimer here. This does not include the pipeline that Saudi has or the Fujairah refinery. But that's still significantly less what the Trump administration is claiming. The numbers don't add up. A US official told Bloomberg this week that US military support had driven a shipping surge. Kepler's verified crossing data tells a different story. The Strait is moving oil again, but at a fraction of pre-war capacity, which is where the questionable, and you can actually saw this video, Seth and Emma sent it to you, which probably should have sent it to you beforehand, play this video there. But that goes back to your point. So this is the data over the last few days, Larry. And if you add the information that we've just talked about now, that what happened today is a lot of ships that were going in the Amani side were turned around. Something happened, but we don't know what it is. You can see here the ships, a few ships are going in, mostly coming out. This is 1st of July, so this is days ago. So you can see some ships coming on the Omani side, some ships going in as well, mainly on the Iranian side. So that's movement. But the ships, as per the Kaplan data we talked about, is half of what Trump claimed and a quarter of what it was before the war. And then lastly, one more report. I'll read one more. A review of commercial vessels. This is also a couple of hours ago. A review of commercial vessel traffic. I should have sent you this. I'll try to find it and send it to you in a second, Stephanie. Through the Shredder Home was visible via maritime traffic over the past 24 hours shows only one merchant vessel completed its transit using the US-supported traffic separation scheme through Omani waters. The overwhelming majority of visible traffic instead utilized the Iranian traffic separation scheme. Notably, two groups of vessels initially attempted to use the southern route, which is what we were talking about. One group reversed course before completing the transit, while the second group abandoned the Omani corridor and crossed into the Iranian traffic separation scheme. So that's just what we were talking about earlier. So something happened today that led to ships that were going through the Omani side to turn around. Maybe it's an agreement they had. Maybe it's a warning by the IRGC. Oh, there it is. I found the video. If you could play this video for the audience and for... Our friend Larry, please. Actually, hold on. Can I find it on Twitter? It's easier for you. So this is on what's happening straight home. This is pretty significant because this is where the big power struggles happening between the Americans and Iranians. And if anything could jeopardize the entire peace negotiations, play the video I just sent you, Stephanie. If anything could jeopardize them, I don't think it's Lebanon. I think Lebanon is important for Iran, but not as important as some people say, in my view. It won't be... the unfreezing of assets or the lifting of sanctions, it will be the control of the Strait of Hormuz, which overlaps with the sanctions because there's some deal being proposed by the Americans. We'll lift more sanctions. You give up your control or your fees of the Strait of Hormuz. Can you expand the video? Remove my video, me and Larry, so the screen expands. But you can see this is one ship goes through. Replay again. Start again. Start again because I know Larry likes to watch these. This is today, Larry. So you can see ships going through. One goes in from the Omani side. One's coming out. Stop, stop, stop. Hey, the bar. Almost gone out. And it froze. What happened, Lisa?
Speaker 0: That's Stephanie.
Speaker 2: Play. There you go. Almost comes out. Oh, I didn't tell you to stop, Stephanie. And then it goes off. Two are coming out. They stop. And then they return. Oh, that is fun to watch. Fast forward.
Speaker 0: Fun to watch.
Speaker 2: One comes out. One sneaks out. One sneaks out. Hormuz. It's called Hormuz. It's better than the World Cup. But, yeah, what do you make of this? Why do you think the – you can remove it, Stephanie. Thank you. Why do you think that's – what do you think happened?
Speaker 0: I know speculation. I think the West was calculating that Iran would be too distracted by the funeral of the Ayatollah to do anything. So it would take her chances. In fact, the IRGC is locked and loaded and let them know in uncertain terms. You proceed, you're going to be sunk. So they thought, you know, deferment is a better part of valor here. It's been pretty quiet, hasn't it? You know, relatively speaking, you know, as we talked yesterday, this funeral, this is a historic event in terms of the largest gathering of people to bury a national leader in history.
Speaker 2: Um, there's one more story when it comes to the Australia home was loading activity. Let me try to get it for you. Um, I'll get it for you. Let me read it out. We're starting to see a clear gradual ramp up in the Persian Gulf loading activity. Looking at the optical satellite imagery births that were sitting completely empty, even after the MOU was inked after, uh, initially seeing hulls. tied up alongside unsurprisingly Iran and the UAE are leading the charge here I'm expecting the Saudi and Kuwaiti and Iraqis to books to start showing a gradual recovery soon too the satellite birds caught the Iranian and Saudi prints on June 30th and the UAE tape on July 1st so essentially satellite images to show that there's a ramp up on the Persian Gulf in terms of the ship loading activity so a lot of ships are loading up in the region maybe expecting some sort of deal or at least the Strait of Homs opening further than it has already. But I think all lines are going to be on that meeting between Netanyahu and Trump. Do you have any worry whatsoever that Netanyahu will be able to change Trump's mind if we see a resumption of the war this year?
Speaker 0: I doubt. The earliest it would potentially resume would be in December. After the midterms? Yeah, after the midterms. I don't see it renewing before because there's too many losses associated. You know, the United States to take losses like that going into a midterm, you know, that's non-started. So Bibi can promise and say anything he wants. I suspect Trump will remind him and say, hey, you're the one saying you had this done in three or four days. What happened? Do you not know what's going on in your own world?
Speaker 2: Talking about meetings, there's another meeting that is happening. I don't know if you saw this news today. According to TASS News, the Russian news outlet, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner may travel to Russia before the end of the, I think I saw it on another source as well, by next month, before the end of next month for talks. So that report came in as well. I don't know whether you or someone else that told me that, Mario, in the last few months, I think it was someone else, the last few months, we haven't seen that kind of mentioned that commented that like, we haven't seen any, we haven't seen Whitcoff or Kushner go to Russia. You know, Trump's completely walked away from the Ukraine, Russia war. And now there's a report that Whitcoff and Kushner could go next month. There was also a long call that Putin and Trump had today. I think it was a 90 minute call that they had together, no significant leaks or information on what that call was about, what we can assume what's about, but what the, the, um, results of the call were. Um, but, um, What do you think is happening on that front? And do you have any hope that we could maybe see progress there towards peace?
Speaker 0: No, not really. Look, I think the MOU is effectively dead. It's going to be incumbent on Iran to correct the blatant violations by the United States. And the key issue remains torn between Lebanon, what's going on there, the potential flare-up between the Saudis and the Houthis. You know, that could be another, you know, turd in the punch bowl, disturb everything. But, you know, the United States, I think J.D. Vance said it best. Now, there's some saying he was just, when he said, We just did the sign of this MOU to get the oil flowing again, and then we're back at it. I'm not sure everybody who, I think the Iranians in hearing that from JD go, these guys aren't serious. They're just playing us along. So we've got to take some additional steps that they haven't taken so far.
Speaker 2: And what about Kushner Witkoff's visit to Russia? Next month.
Speaker 0: I doubt it's going to happen. They even will visit Russia. They can visit on their own. I don't think they're going to get to sit down with Putin. Not after what Trump has said of late and the Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, all made possible because of US intelligence.
Speaker 2: Well, they did have a 90-minute call, as I said earlier, Putin and Trump. That's a good sign. They had that call. I don't know. I see. I don't know. It's really hard for me. The Russia Ukraine was just much harder for me to kind of get a clear picture. The Iran war was a lot easier. I'm talking about for me, it was a lot easier to see, you know, Trump suffering politically, economically, the war being unsustainable. the Gulf pressuring Trump, all these different things that gave me that optimism that I had. The Russia-Ukraine one is really difficult. Depending who I speak to, they tell me, is Russia advancing? How much are they advancing? Is Ukraine advancing? Are they encircling that city? Did that city get captured? No, it did not get captured. Is the Russian economy suffering? No, it's doing really well. Is the Ukrainian military about to capitulate? All these different things that are being mentioned. And then now there's the new wild card of, Will the Poland, we talked about it yesterday, the US warning that Putin could attack Poland, is that being considered? Is he probing NATO? Is it consideration to strike NATO territory genuinely on the table? And would Putin still accept the four oblasts to end the war? I would guess yes, but some people are telling me, Mario, that should be stale.
Speaker 0: Yeah, exactly. Yeah, he's right. They're correct. Putin has said as much. The other day he talked about, well, we're going to get the Russian territory plus Novorossiya. Novorossiya, the new Russia, but it's an old concept. That'll include Sumy, Kharkiv. I think it ultimately is going to include Kyiv and Odessa.
Speaker 2: But how do you know he's not saying that as a way to pressure the Ukrainians? Like, hey, if you don't freaking take the deal now, I'm going to ask for a lot more.
Speaker 0: Well, he said that five months ago. So what has been made clear in the last couple of days is Russia's taken very seriously the threat of Finland to accept the deployment of nuclear weapons, and now I think it was Lithuania is doing the same. And Russia's going to say, no, that crosses the red line, and they'll act to stop it.
Speaker 2: don't think the americans could do anything if they do visit let's say they do get a sit down with putin for whatever reason let's say putin accepts you don't think like the us still has the leverage to be able to end the war obviously being the biggest arms supplier to ukraine so supplying arms that don't necessarily work by the way look maybe they're not working well But would you say the Ukrainians are not having any success on the ground, not beating Russia, but having successes, some successes?
Speaker 0: On the ground, no. Success on the ground constitutes taking territory and holding it. They're not doing that. They're launching counterattacks again in a few yards, then they get beaten back. And they suffer horrendous losses in the process. Winning is defined. We've got the metric. Every month, first of each month, Russians, Ukrainians meet to hand over exchange cadavers, bodies of dead soldiers. Russia is consistently handling over 1,000 plus a month, and Ukraine is consistently handling over 400 to 500 total. Well, I mean, the total number they've handed over is like 600, and that's over 18 months. So, you know, you work out... It's like an average of 37 a month. Wow.
Speaker 2: Yeah.
Speaker 0: So for every dead Russian soldier, you're going to get 37 dead Ukrainians. You can't call that victory. Or remember, some of the people you talked to said, well, the Russians are moving so slow, right? Yeah. Okay, yet the excuse that the Ukrainians offer for why they could only recover 37 bodies is because the Russians are moving so fast. So which is it, fast or slow? You could argue it's the fast because of the large number of courses that are consistently handed over every month.
Speaker 2: Yeah, so when I'm speaking to someone who's arguing the successes that Ukraine's having, my counterpoints would be, how do you explain the ratio? That's probably one of the best metrics because there's very limited metrics that people agree on. The ratio of cadavers, of dead soldiers that they exchange is one metric that everyone agrees on. The territory captured is one metric that somewhat people agree on. The numbers differ a bit depending what the source is. But there's very limited metrics. Economic metrics are difficult to determine. Another metric that we could depend on is the sentiment in Europe and the US because a lot of polls being done. So when someone's making the argument how Ukraine's having those successes, the kind of argument is metrics I know. The exchanges, the ratio of Ukrainian to Russian soldiers that are dead, that's one. Another one is the sentiment in Europe and the US. People are tired of the war, number three. is the munitions depletion in the US. That's going to obviously impact Zelensky. Zelensky sent a letter to the Americans pleading for more munitions. And then on the other side, so when I speak to someone who's talking about Russian successes, the argument I would make, the only indicator I have there that I would use is if Russia was having a massive, I think Russia has an advantage, that's my position, but if it's not a significant advantage, otherwise, If they do have a significant advantage over Ukraine, then the Donbas should have fallen already. And that's the argument that everyone makes. I'm sure you hear it all the time.
Speaker 0: Well, again, what's your basis for saying that Russia is moving methodically to avoid casualties of its own and to avoid casualties among civilians? Right now, the Ukrainians are basically... locking up and using as human shields the civilians that live in Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. So Russia is not going to unleash a 2,000-pound fab bomb on a building where there are some Ukrainian soldiers, but there are civilians in the basement. So it slows it down, but there's not a single area you can point to that... Ukraine has taken it and held it. The last time they tried that was Kursk in September of 2024. And, you know, they got pushed out.
Speaker 2: I actually like asking you those type of questions. Remember how I told you if you... If X, Y, Z happens, would you be worried? I'd ask you that. What would need to happen for you to get concerned or for you to consider, let's say, the Americans are winning in Iran? I always like to ask you these types of questions. Maybe it's a good place to ask you that question now. Is there a rough date where if the Russians don't capture the Donbass, you'd be like, huh, now this looks a bit odd. It's taking too long.
Speaker 0: Yeah, December. I'd say December 31st of this year. I think they'll actually take it much quicker. If they extend beyond the end of this year, then I'd like to know why, because they've got the advantage of manpower, firepower across the board, firepower with artillery, with drones, with fabs. Iran doesn't have a single advantage in any of that. Yeah, they've got some drones and they're able to inflict some casualties. Ukraine. You mean Ukraine, yeah. Ukraine, right. Sorry. so um and also there was no higher oil prices for a period of time gave a some breathing room or a boost to russia's economy as well oh yeah well they're still they're still getting those higher oil prices that hasn't yeah we discussed that that hasn't slowed down at all you know that's gonna that's gonna go on for at least another two months at least so
Speaker 2: there's there's one interview there's an interview i did today on that oil price i really think you'd love it remember i told you the guy that was calculating using an equation to calculate uh the two three days ago to say mario the the price per barrel of oil coming out of the straight of hummus is higher than the spot price being seen he talked about how he calculates it is that chris martin chris martinson no not chris martinson he's a new guy on the show uh second time i have him on people loved him because he's losing his shit at the price of oil. He's like, Mari, this is being manipulated. Economist Philip Pilkington. Oh, Pilkington.
Speaker 0: Pilkington, yeah. He does good work. But again, did you press him on the difference between the sweet and the sour? He talked about it. And I'm not talking chicken.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, no, no, he talked about it. Yeah, that was one of the points. The point that you'd love, I just sent you the interview on WhatsApp. But the point that you'd love is where he talks about how he calculates it because he I told you last time he used an equation to calculate how much because how much people have refineries are paying for the oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. And maybe we should do a sit down me, you and him, it'd be a great discussion. Check the interview if you get time, Larry, because you'll enjoy the conversation. And And then he, so the way he calculates it is he looks at the price that refineries are charging for the refined oil, the end product. And then he looks at that price and there's a way to calculate the margin they make. And their margin is really, really high, higher than it's been in I don't know how long, like a really long time. And he shows you the graph. And he's like, Mario, there's two reasons for that margin to be so high, for them to be making that much profit. One of them is price gouging. And the other one is the cost of, is sorry, two secs. The margin is too, hold on. They're charging a very high price. Sorry, I take it back, not the margin. She's like, Mario, we have the data of how much they charge for the refined oil. And that number is really, really high. He's like, there's two reasons it will be that high. One of them is price gouging. And the other one is because the cost is so high, The price of the refined product is therefore that high, and that's why prices – and the gas station is so high. So there's two reasons, and his bet is that it's not price gouging. I'm in that camp as well. Trump put a warning out against price gouging. So his bet is like – and we should watch in the next week. If their prices are still that high for the end product – then it's definitely not price gouging because price gouging should slowly drop. If it sees a massive drop in the next few days and it's not showing any indication of that, then something is really, really off. And the cost of the oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz, according to his calculation, is $115 to $120 a barrel, which is fucking high.
Speaker 0: I think he's absolutely right. So when the refineries have to buy that oil, when they put out the product... And this really is more for the sour crude. It's not for the light. The sweet crude, they can probably get away with not charging a lot for that because, if you will, there's plenty of sweet crude. There's not a shortage of sweet crude. The shortage coming out of the Persian Gulf is the sour, the high sulfur content oil. That was what Trump was talking about when he said we only got four weeks supply left. I think he's exactly right. I don't think he pulled that number out of his ass. Yeah.
Speaker 2: So, yeah, I thought of you, Larry, when I was having that conversation. I thought of you. Look, let's end the discussion with a nice clip. Let me find one for you. Okay. Let me play this one for you. This came out now. So this is – actually, I'll tell you who it is. This is – so Stephanie, play this. I won't tell you. I want to surprise you, actually. Just a clip that just came out. This is an interview he's doing right now. Someone I think you'd like.
Speaker 0: Surprise. Thanks. All right. Let's play that, Stephanie.
Speaker 2: Action. I despise. Just to let you know, I despise. It's not Ben Gavir. Very close.
Speaker 0: Oh.
Speaker 2: Is this Randy Fine? It is, yeah. We're not hearing the audio, Stephanie. You have to put the audio on. Let's replay it. But that is Randy Fine, yeah. He says, while waiting for Stephanie to figure out the audio. Actually, I want you to hear it. It's nice. So Stephanie, you're going to have an issue with the audio. Let me see the other clip. There's another one here.
Speaker 1: If you're walking down the street, someone says, you might even know that it's me, but it's true.
Speaker 2: Okay, okay. This is I've got to send two clips. The second one's gonna make you crazy. Stephanie, you're gonna have an issue or should I just read it out? But that would destroy the drama. So we'll have the same effect on on Larry. I'm going to read out the quote because Stephanie's taking too long. Stephanie last chance is gonna have it. We're gonna figure it out or no. All right, I'll read out the quote and get your thoughts. So he says the following. There is no such thing as Palestinians. They're just Arabs from Saudi who migrated there. Palestinian is a term that was invented several decades ago, frankly, by the Soviet Union as a form of fighting with the United States. And then he says the following. If you're walking down the street here in Washington today on July 4th and someone yells out, praise Jesus, you're going to smile. If you're walking down the street and someone says, Baruch Hashem, you might not even know what that means, but it's a Jewish statement. But if someone yells out Allahu Akbar, you and everybody else on the street is going to be looking for a car to hide behind. Fear of Islam is rational. We need more fear of Islam, not less of it. This is a member of Congress, an American member of Congress.
Speaker 0: He's a racist. He's insane. You know, and... a racist with a bad diet, you know, they could cast him if they do a remake of Star Wars.
Speaker 1: I would reject, again, the rhetorical world. Palestinian is a term that was invented. There is no such thing as Palestinian. So if you want to describe Gazan Arabs or whatever, you want to know what the most common last name is on the Gaza Strip? Do you know the answer to this? No. It's the Egyptian. That's the, it's L something. And then it's like the next one's the Jordanian, the this. They're just Arabs from Saudi Arabia who migrated there. Palestinian is a term that was invented several decades ago, frankly, by the Soviet Union as a form of fighting with the United States.
Speaker 0: He's a moron. I mean, he really is. It's not true. I mean, the palace, so...
Speaker 1: If you're walking down the street here in Washington today on July 4th and someone yells out, praise Jesus, you're going to smile.
Speaker 0: If you're walking down the street and someone says, yeah, they've been there since the Romans destroyed the Jewish temple in 70 AD. They've been there permanently. It's the Jews, it's people like him that have come in. They're outsiders. They're Europeans. They're Kazarians. They're not natives at all. They have no native tie there. Go back and look at the numbers through the 1920s when the British did surveys in the 1920s, 1930s, overwhelming numbers. And, you know, yeah, these people like this, they make stuff up in order to justify their genocide.
Speaker 2: It really bothers me. There was a comment he made, where he said uh for um uh for the children in gaza to die away or something like this do you remember which statements i'm referring to he made a comment on twitter what is the controversial comment uh made about children dying it's disgusting comment and i just don't understand how someone like him could be a member of congress dan bilzerian i think is running against him um Well, he so, um, in July, 2025, he, after reports, he was responding to a reports about, um, the death of children in Gaza, the starvation of children in Gaza, the children dying of starvation. And he says, release the hostages until then starve away. And then he says, this is all a lie. That was July 25th. This is all a lie anyway. It amazes me that the media continues to regurgitate Muslim terror propaganda. But just to fucking, like someone who's representing the people to say, release the hostages until then starve away for children that are starving. How sick do you need to be? And what's weird is that people still vote for him. And I think people that vote for him don't know about this comment. That's what bothers me. This comment should be on the front page of CNN and Fox News when he's running for office.
Speaker 0: Yeah, just have your folks, anybody listening, look up, run the question. When was the term Palestine first used? The earliest, I'm reading, I'm quoting now, the earliest incontrovertible use of the Greek toponym Palestine is attested in Herodotus' history, written in the 5th century BCE. Weren't no damn Soviets back then. It was the Greek toponym Palestine, which is the origin of the Arabic thelas, first occurs in the work of Herodotus. It denotes generally the coastal land from Phoenicia down to Egypt. So, you know, this nonsense that this is an invention just shows this ignorance of history. And the Romans used it in the second century, okay?
Speaker 2: Like if someone makes a statement like this, I'd be like, it's fine. When people debate, people discuss, they want to make a point, they make statements that are false, they do it all the time. I don't like it, but they do it. But it's the intent behind it. It's the intent behind what Randy Fine is talking. He's talking about the abolishment of any hope for a Palestinian state. And then the question is, what do you do with the people, human beings? Well, it's a question I don't even want to ask him for someone that says until then the children should starve away. So if someone has your hostages, you go and starve the children that have nothing to do with the kidnap of hostages. Yes, a member of Congress is disgusting. Play the second clip. It's triggering me more than Larry today.
Speaker 1: If someone if you're walking down the street here in Washington today on July 4th and someone yells out, praise Jesus, you're going to smile. If you're walking down the street and someone says Baruch Hashem, you might not even know what that means, but it's a Jewish statement. But if someone yells out, Allahu Akbar, you and everybody else on that street is gonna be looking for a car to hide behind. Fear of Islam is rational. And so my point there is to, I believe we're in this war of rhetoric and to say that that term is not okay. We need more fear of Islam. not less of it. I reject the premise that Islamophobia exists because fear of Islam is rational.
Speaker 2: Oh, man.
Speaker 0: Judeophobia. Judeophobia. Yeah, be afraid of them because they've got the record of killing women and children. You know, they've killed, like I said, just Run the numbers.
Speaker 2: Zyophobia, zyophobia.
Speaker 0: Yeah, zyophobia. That's a better one. Yeah. Much better. All right. Yeah. I saved you. I saved you that one. I saved you from that one. I saved you. But I'm saying this, but no, but it's the same thing. It's where you label Islam as just one monolith, a block.
Speaker 2: No.
Speaker 0: Excuse me. You got Sunnis. You got Shia. Yeah. it's a very diverse religion with different interpretations just like happens within Judaism just like happens in Christianity now the first time I was sitting here looking this up the first you know the first time that the Palestinians were identified as Arab inhabitants was done by the Russians in 1898 the soviets didn't exist okay duh and it was uh it was uh it actually was not introduced by a russian it was by a guy named khalil beydas and uh he was translating a russian work on the holy land into arabic in 1898 so this is they say this is the first documented use of the arabic word for palestinian as an identity marker for the Arab inhabitants of the region. But the bottom line is the Arabs lived in the region for thousands of years.
Speaker 2: There's two, three million, four million people, whatever in that region. There's millions of people there. I don't give a damn when they were there and who was there first and which God says what. There's millions of people that have homes, they have land, they deserve the same rights as every other human. That should be the end of the discussion. Everything else is irrelevant. What your God said versus the other God is so irrelevant to this. And when the word Palestinian came and who called them Palestinians and what did the Brits say 100 years ago? There's millions of people that live there that deserve the same rights as you. Figure out a humane solution. Give them the land, the freedom that every other human being has. This is it. It's just such a simple argument that is complicated to justify atrocities.
Speaker 0: Yeah. No, I think you nailed it on that. Well, Larry, happy 4th.
Speaker 2: Happy Independence for everyone. Thank you for jumping on.
Speaker 0: You're going to go back and eat the cheesecake? No, no, no. I took one taste and I said, okay, this is good. But I'm... I'm dieting. I'm losing weight. Good for you. Well done. Well done. Congratulations. All right, my friend. We'll see you tomorrow.
Speaker 2: See you, Larry.
Speaker 0: Bye-bye.
Speaker 2: All right, guys. We'll see you tomorrow. That's it for today. I hope you enjoyed the coverage. And I'm burnt out, so I'm going to get some rest and go through your comments as always. Appreciate you. Bye-bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’ve never seen 100 million barrels dumped at once or oil released “like a popped pimple” when a strait opens. Crude fell to $70 while gasoline barely moved—read as a refining shortage. Ukraine outages, Europe’s retired refineries, China not exporting, no diesel reserve, and the bottleneck points more to Russia than Iran.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Crude crashed to $70 and gasoline barely moved… One read of that gap: the world is SLEEPWALKING into a refining shortage. Jeffrey Currie has traded commodities for three decades and says he's never seen 100 million barrels dumped on the market at once, trapped oil released like a popped pimple when the strait cracked open. It says EVERYTHING about today and nothing about tomorrow. Nearly all of it is sailing to Asia on Chinese-flagged ships, and pump prices stayed stubbornly high. His alien test: land on Earth, look at this market cold, and you'd conclude the shortage is refining, not crude. Ukraine has knocked out millions of barrels of Russian capacity, so completely that Russia is now importing gasoline from INDIA. Europe retired its refineries. China isn't exporting products. There's no strategic reserve of diesel. And the strait? He doesn't see Tehran surrendering the best negotiating card it's held in 47 years, better than a nuclear weapon, while China ends up holding the molecules, the minerals, and the processing for both. Everyone's watching Iran, he warned. The bigger problem is RUSSIA… and almost nobody has priced it in. @CommodMkt
Video Transcript AI Summary
Jeffrey and Mario discuss how focus on the space/war has diminished, while attention increasingly centers on oil, gasoline prices, and inflation. Mario brings up a conversation with Philip Pilkington, who argues that oil pricing is being manipulated through factors beyond simple supply and demand. Mario says Pilkington explained that barrels leaving the Strait of Hormuz are significantly higher than spot market prices, citing calculations and estimates around $105–$115 per barrel, and that future WTI pricing appears “ridiculous.”
Jeffrey responds that the transportation cost of moving barrels out of the Strait is expensive, and that the barrels are assumed to be coming out at steep discounts. He emphasizes that most of what is leaving is directed to the East—especially China—because delivering to Western markets is difficult, and he says Iranian/China-flagged shipping, insurance, and payment systems support this flow. He connects oil prices to election dynamics, asserting that inflationary pressures—driven by oil and gasoline—are a major determinant of reelection outcomes, and that lowering oil supports political goals. He describes actions such as releasing barrels, freeing reserves, and removing sanctions as intended to keep oil prices down, and notes that they stopped sanctions, releasing supply quickly: he cites an unusual event of 100–150 million barrels unleashed in the previous three weeks.
Mario asks whether this refers to Strategic Petroleum Reserve releases. Jeffrey clarifies he is referring to trapped oil behind the Strait that “came out like that immediately,” and he characterizes it as pushing out already-loaded supply, like “a pimple being popped.” He describes changes in market balance, moving from a long market to modestly short, with heavy physical and paper selling/dumping at the front end. He argues that while crude can crash, gasoline and diesel prices remain elevated due to the lack of magic levers for refined products, since reserves exist for crude but not for gasoline/diesel. He says the biggest unresolved question is whether the Strait will normalize and whether the supply can be converted into products—describing the market as trading like it is out of refining capacity.
The discussion shifts to strategic reserves and regional inventory dynamics. Mario asks whether, if oil goes to Asia, the U.S. will face problems refilling strategic reserves. Jeffrey says oil prices in the U.S. and Europe are driven by commercial inventories, and that explosive outcomes were mitigated because drawdowns happened through strategic reserves and satellite-measured floating stocks. If strategic reserves are refilled using onshore commercial supply, those other stocks could fall and create upward pressure. He reiterates that without refining capacity, crude price changes are “meaningless” for gasoline and diesel pricing.
Mario then raises current negotiations and reported positions involving Iran, including the rejection of U.S. proposals to unfreeze $6 billion and European discussions about Iran charging a fee equally to China, Russia, and the U.S. Jeffrey states that, if Iran is negotiating, controlling the Strait is its biggest tool and they will not let go of it.
Jeffrey argues that China and Russia reinforce Iran and that China’s control over “molecules,” critical minerals processing, and potentially refining shifts leverage away from the West. He says China can throttle supply, and that China controls processing capacity and equipment, including refining and critical mineral processing. Mario and Jeffrey connect this to a broader strategic picture: they describe the Strait as a dial that can open and close, and argue that Chinese policies and constraints can affect global refined-product availability even if crude price pressure appears.
They debate why markets may be discounting war risk. Mario asks why markets are complacent if conflict could affect essential supply chains. Jeffrey reiterates that no American cares about Iran as much as they care about pump prices and low interest rates, but he warns that losing supply chain control could create fast, severe problems domestically. Mario says he believes the war is likely “over long term” (citing uncertainty but optimistic odds) yet notes shifting proxy fronts: Iran to Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq. He argues that the “front line” may have moved, and that this could explain pricing behavior.
Mario later asks where the 150 million figure came from and requests ship destination details. Jeffrey says ships were already waiting and they had pushed them out; he estimates the scale as about 80–100 million, and sometimes adds extra recently, and describes how traffic through the Strait had changed (including numbers of ships and tanker composition). He asks whether crushing the market’s surplus could translate into lower U.S. inventories and emphasizes that the oil largely flows East, leaving U.S./Europe inventory effects uncertain.
They also discuss refining constraints in Russia and China. Mario mentions that Russia has reportedly imported gasoline from India by sea after strikes disrupted refining. Jeffrey says this indicates crude exports can exceed refined exports because Russia has more crude but insufficient refining capacity, and he suggests that tanker parking off China reflects constraints there too.
In the final portion, Jeffrey shifts to commodities and macro signals. He says he took off his shorts on gold and advises being long gold, citing a shift in interest-rate sentiment, geopolitical uncertainty, and weakening labor-market signals. He argues refining-product issues may keep energy markets tight and that commodity fundamentals are uncertain, with upside risk across the broader commodity complex. He also discusses rolling commodity positions and says passive rolling can reduce the relevance of “liquidating” oil views. The conversation closes with references to geopolitical developments, including proxy-war escalation concerns, and a claim that Israel may disrupt something within 48 hours.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Jeffrey, how are you? I'm doing well, very well, but not as busy as I was a few weeks ago.
Speaker 1: A few weeks, oh, because the war's eased up, is that what you mean?
Speaker 0: Yeah, but I don't think, I think it's premature, but people's focus on the space has diminished somewhat.
Speaker 1: I want to bring up a conversation I had with someone yesterday. me get his name he's got his own show and you might know him as well and he meant he echoed something you've been telling me for a while philip pilkings pilkington and he was telling me about how mario you know the price of oil is being manipulated um now a lot of people throw this word around whenever something doesn't make sense doesn't fit what they believe the price should be but he went deep he started explaining how first it's been going on for many years but he started explaining mario like just the basic supply demand It does not make sense. And he was also telling me something really interesting is that the price of oil of the barrels coming out of the Strait of Hormuz are significantly higher than the price, the spot price in the markets. And there was a way to calculate it. He gave it a term as well. And he said the price is about $105, $110, even up to $115 a barrel. Can you tell me more about this? Because just the price, the future prices of WTI is just ridiculous.
Speaker 0: I think part of it is what he's referring to is the transportation cost to move a barrel out of there is very expensive. But you assume that the barrels that they're getting at are on steep discounts, which then allows the the cost of transportation. But I do, you know, one thing we do know, most of that's leaving is coming out of the northern part, which is all Iranian, probably Chinese boats with Chinese flags, Chinese insurance, Chinese payment systems going directly into China, which is also everybody's waiting for China to come back and buy. My bet is a lot of that is China. But he's absolutely right. You try to deliver one of these into a Western market, you can't. um and which means that you know most of this stuff is directed into the east primarily china um so i that's where i think he's probably getting that but his point about manipulation i think just goes to a broader point whether if it was biden or whether if it was trump and you know many presidents before this administration the single most important variable in getting reelected is inflationary pressures. And the biggest driver of inflation, whether if it's right or wrong, is oil prices and gasoline. I sat on Wall Street for three decades, and I can tell you, break-even inflation is traded against oil and gasoline. So the correlation is almost perfect. So if you keep oil prices down, you keep inflation down, and you make the electorate happy. In fact, only 2% of U.S. electorate even cares about a tiny bit about what happens to the outcome of what happens in Iran. He could give away the farm and nobody cares. But I can tell you 46% of the U.S. electric care where the price of gasoline is because they care about inflation. And so you can call it manipulated, but they release barrels, they release from strategic reserves, they free up taxation that would normally be there, let go. The only thing that's been done in this deal so far is they've gotten rid of the sanctions. why because they want to keep oil prices low and when we think about the drop in oil prices you know i've been doing this three decades i've never seen 100 million barrels thrown on the market immediately like what just happened so this is unique but when we look at all the other measures you know like gasoline prices and diesel prices they still remain extraordinarily elevated Um, which means, you know, it could take time and we don't know if this stuff is going to even end up in Western markets. What is it going to do and how is it going to lead to lower prices at the pump? There's still a lot of big question marks that need to be answered.
Speaker 1: Um, when you said 150 million barrels thrown into the market, you talking about strategic petroleum reserves?
Speaker 0: No, I'm talking about the, in the last three weeks, the glut, well, you unleashed There was a bunch of barrels that were trapped behind the straight. They all came out like that immediately. So, you know, I'm sitting here thinking back in time. I can't think of another time. And also, not only do you do, let's say, 100 to 150 million barrels coming out of the straight, but you also took out 200 or 300 million barrels of length. We went from, you know, a very long market to being modestly short. So you've had a huge, you know, selling of, dumping physical and paper barrels on this market. All of a sudden, it's by the front end of the same crash. But the markets that don't have deep liquid paper markets like gasoline and diesel are still at very elevated prices. And I think that ultimately, if you go, hey, why do they want to push on prices to the downside? Manipulation is probably a strong word. I probably use the word um something along the lines of you know helping the fundamentals along because ultimately they're not trying to you know to manipulate it in a traditional sense but hey they're doing everything they can to fundamentally support lower oil prices but the problem is they don't have any levers to pull to be able to get gasoline and diesel prices there's no magic um you know strategic reserve a gasoline or diesel and that's what ultimately really matters here
Speaker 1: All right. So let me go back to the word manipulation. So the guest reference that I spoke to yesterday. So his argument is that algorithmic trading made it easier to manipulate the markets. So what Trump did in the last few weeks worked so well, him putting out those tweets saying that a peace deal is imminent. Negotiations are ongoing. Things are going great. And the purpose of doing that was because of these algorithms, the trading algorithms, all these different funds will use that information to be able to dictate what to do next. And all that positive information, while we understand this is Trump, you know, being Trump and trying to manipulate the markets, algorithms won't be as, won't be able to spot that as easily. That's the argument he was making.
Speaker 0: I mean, there is some truth to that, but the trend is, I mean, you look at the trend, the CTAs, these guys are all jumping on it. You know, I'm very close to many of these algorithmic traders. So yeah, the one thing that they don't like is volatility. Well, this thing is not, there's no volatility in this. It's just a one-way, it's a one-way trip. Actually, you look at when the one-way trip started, it started basically once Trump left China when he had his meeting with Xi. And it's been pretty much a one-way street since then. know whether if you're a trend follower or an algorithmic you're short this market that's why the shorts are so so so great but i i see his point that hey you want to put some information into the system they read it you know the the agentic traders that are you know you know ai driven they'll read whatever headline out there to do it yeah you could argue that that's happening but i think you know to say that there's not a big surplus of oil in this market there's huge surplus that's hitting the market right now does that tell you anything about tomorrow No, because we don't know if you're going to have a follow-through. My bet, almost all that oil ends up in Asia, most likely China, which then begs the question, what's going to happen to U.S. inventories, European inventories, and other parts of the world? Because it's not clear. Any of these ships are bound to the West. They're all going East. So is the market in a surplus right now, this minute? Absolutely, yes. It goes to my point. know normally production comes out at a very slow rate i've never seen somebody just flood the market like that 100 million barrels immediately and so it's not it's no wonder the gasoline price is up here and the oil crushes down like that so i don't think there's any magic to this in terms of why the pricing has been is extreme um you know is it given a hand of fundamentals yeah um i i'd argue there's some you know some of that going on but I think manipulation is a relatively strong word because, you know, just manipulation implies something that's, you know, against the market. All they did was use their helping hand where they could get the, you know, any type of inventory or supply and push it into the market. But I don't think it does anything. I mean, the bigger question is, will the straight normalize? Will we get through this next phase? um you know what we have what 30 some odd eight days or something left of this um i guess 41 42 days left of this current ceasefire what happens when we get to the other end of this um particularly doesn't look like there's a lot of movement that has been made and then the question is can you turn this stuff into products by the way if anything you ask me what is this market looking like it looks like it's trading like we're out of refining capacity Because if the gasoline price is going up here, crude is going down, and we push too much. And why would we be out of refining capacity? Look at what Ukraine has done to Russia. And Russia has huge supply lines. That's why I'm shocked. Everybody goes, oh, this thing's over with. No, it never was just about Iran. It's about Ukraine and Russia. At this point right now, we know that the Ukrainians have pushed really deep into Russia and Russia responded last night with a crushing blow on Kiev. The thing about it is the one thing all those US administrations know how to do is how to control oil prices. The one thing they do not have a clue on how to do is control gasoline and diesel prices. This is a different ballgame. think about you know china china's still not flooding the world with refined products you know are we just shifting this thing from a problem you know we have a crude problem into a gasoline problem and i think these are serious questions that need to be asked because if you ask me if i was an alien who came down to this planet earth and i looked at this market i'm gonna go ha you're out of refining capacity um you're out of refining capacity that's a lot worse than being out of crude there's no magic
Speaker 1: pill to solve that problem and what even ukrainians will probably go in there and blow up some more russian refineries in the over overnight so um i think this is a pretty serious issue um i want to go back to the first thing you said about 150 million barrels flooding the market where'd you get that figure from where are those ships going either because through the straight of her moves the number is still significantly lower than what it was pre-war so why is that number so significant is it just despite it being less than pre-war.
Speaker 0: David Plylar, Jr.: Oh, because you dumped it. There was, you goosed, you had ships, this was going on before the, remember they had their, the whatever that project was that they were doing. Yeah, I think that's what it was. So they were doing it before the, before the announcement of the MOU. But you put it together, I think actually, you know, I'm putting an extra 50 in there more recently, but I'd say it's like 80 to 100 is what most people would say. Because you think about, you know, they were pushing them out. So you were back to your normal flow. So of the 130 million barrels or 130 ships a day that were going through there before, only somewhere around 40 of them were actually big oil tankers. And you were getting up to 43 a day to that time period. So you were getting the full 20 million barrels out for a week or so. But it was, again, stuff that was already loaded just sitting there waiting to leave. That's why I like to call it like a pimple being popped. because it was just sitting there ready to go and you pushed it out. They were very aware of what was going to get. This is that point where you want to call it manipulation or whatever it want to be, is unleashing that trapped oil was going to be negative on oil prices. But the question is, can it be negative to gasoline prices if we don't have refining capacity and all of those marginal barrels that are leaving are making their way into the Asian market?
Speaker 1: look sorry if this sounds the question sounds too simple but if you look at the amount of oil that did not go out of the strata hobos um because of the war you know it's in the hundreds of millions of barrels so why is it that 120 120 million barrels i understand it's a lot in the market all of a sudden but it's very short-term thinking do you know what i mean like i'm thinking in the grand scheme of things that 120 million barrels if you look at it over a one two day period it's a lot but if you look at it over what happened in the last four months
Speaker 0: It doesn't seem that significant. That's the point. It's immaterial. It's a lot today, but it says nothing about tomorrow. We've done nothing to solve the bigger problem. Okay. So my simple question is a valid question. Valid question. Very valid question. And I think it's spot on because ultimately, you know, let's say you've dumped, you know, globally, you know, it should be somewhere around, know a billion barrels that was lost i think some estimates put around 1.2 1.3 you know it doesn't really do anything in terms of recovering how much has already been lost on a global basis and by the way most of that loss was taking place in places like asia which is part of the reason why most of it's heading that direction but you're absolutely 100 right this is this is the point i'm saying we've done nothing to solve longer term problem because ultimately you know you still don't you know i think the numbers yesterday whereas we got four big ships going into into the straight um you know let's say they were all vlcc that's eight million barrels that's not that's not solving the the the bigger problem we still you know we're not we're not bringing enough of them in there to get a full resumption back to normal yet
Speaker 1: All right, so that goes to my next question. The US needs to refill the strategic reserves that used up in the last few months. But if all that oil is heading to Asia, the limited oil that's coming out, which is less than what it was before the war, doesn't that mean there's an issue in the US when it comes to filling up the strategic reserves? Plus, if the strategic reserves are empty in the next three weeks. So one of my guests was really worried. He's like, Mario, even with the low oil prices, all the oil coming out of the Persian Gulf is all going to Asia. And if the US runs out, as Trump said, let's say it lasts longer, runs out by the end of this month, then what happens? Is that a concern?
Speaker 0: And I think one of the key points here is that oil in the US and Europe prices off commercial inventories. Part of the reason they didn't get explosive is that most of the drawdown occurred in strategic reserves and the stuff that's measured by satellites that's floating. And as a result, if you start to refill those strategic reserves with the commercial inventories that are onshore, that means those other ones are going to go down as the, you know, before it was the SPR was going down and preventing those from going down. Now the SPR goes up, those go down. And so that's going to put more upward pressure on prices. That's why I'm comfortable saying we're in a low point in oil right here. But again, if you don't have refining capacity, oil is just a transfer price. It's a meaningless transfer price. And so that's why everybody's focused. Economists had their big headline, we was wrong on oil. I think it's a little premature here. Yeah, you may have been wrong on crude oil. I was wrong on crude oil. I've never seen cracks like this. But my question is, how are you going to turn this stuff into gasoline?
Speaker 1: We're talking about being wrong on crude oil. It's a bit too early to say that. You're talking about how there's no agreement. Not only is there no agreement in terms of a deal after the MOU expires, but there are disagreements that are going on. Just yesterday, about 10 hours ago or so, so last night, my time, there was an offer made by the US, by the Americans. Don't control the Strait of Homs for the Iranians. We'll unfreeze $6 billion. Obviously, the deal was rejected. But from what you're seeing, there was another report by the Europeans saying that they're starting to accept a new reality where Iran will charge a fee. And what they're discussing now is not whether Iran will charge a fee. They're just asking Iran to please charge everyone equally. China, Russia, us treat us all the same. That's according to a Bloomberg report, Wall Street Journal, I think Bloomberg yesterday and an Axios report two days ago. um was making the point that was explaining America's position in all this and it was essentially saying the US is trying to offer Iran enough incentives to not control the shadow Homo something along the lines of hey you'll make a lot more money if we unfreeze the assets but if we lift the sanctions as well you'll make a lot more money a hundred times more money than you're acting like a gangster and charging a fee at the shadow Homo's so that is the carrot that the US is offering the Iranians not sure whether First, I don't know if it's feasible to pass it through Congress to remove all these different sanctions. And number two is whether Iran, I don't know if they'll accept it. I think they would if it involves lifting all sanctions. But what about the financial world? Is Iran controlling the Strait of Homs reality or is it too early to say that?
Speaker 0: I think if you're Iran, what is your biggest negotiating tool you've ever encountered in your entire career? You know, 47 years of existence it was. controlling the strait. Even a nuclear weapon didn't do this. Are you going to let go of it? Absolutely not, which is why they just, your point, they refused the six billion. I think it was one dance or something. Think big here.
Speaker 1: Yeah, they're thinking big.
Speaker 0: They're not going to let go of it. Not in a million years are they going to let go of it. I think your point about what does this thing look like in three weeks, in four weeks? I just don't see how anything changes. You know, and by the way, the Russians and Chinese are blatantly reinforcing Iran. It's not like, you know, and also the other thing that is completely, I don't know why everybody's not talking about this. Who is Iran's biggest ally? China. So China now controls all the world's molecules because it can throttle up and down, you know, 20 million barrels a day of molecules. And then, and by the way, you could build pipelines, but I'm sure that the Iranians, as they get reinforced with Russians and Chinese, will take some of these pipelines out. And now the Chinese control all the world's critical minerals. So they own the critical minerals, they control the molecules, and oh wait, they also can potentially control the chips through Taiwan. So what is left of anything that is physical and material that matters to the world? You know, that's why I'm kind of surprised. Everybody's just nonchalant. In fact, China, over the last week, cranked down in more rules around critical minerals exports. They're just slowly but churning, turning the dial. So, in fact, that's the way I like to describe what the straight looks like. It's a dial. Open, close. You can figure out where you want to send it. And again, this stuff's not going into the West. You know, they got the oil price down. But again, going back to the point, the other thing, China, controls the world's processing not only a critical minerals but of oil the refined products and they still haven't started exporting products um so what are they going to do take in all this oil hoard it all and then not export product and create a product shortage for the rest of the world i don't know but it's just you know this level of of complacency on what is happening right now is very surprising given that the situation with, and again, I'm gonna go back, Russia and China are blatantly resupplying with defense goods into Iran. So what happens in six weeks?
Speaker 1: You're talking about China. I was speaking to Realloys. It's a rare earth company in the US. And they were telling me, Mario, we're actually the first company that uses no chemicals or equipment from China. I'm like, okay, why is that a big deal? every single rare earth refiner that the US is supporting right now. So obviously the US is losing the refining of the rare earth to China. The whole world's losing it to China. They control the refining, but also the countries that are trying or the companies trying to replace Chinese refining are using Chinese equipment and chemicals. They control, hard assets are completely inside China's pocket. That's pretty terrifying.
Speaker 0: Yes. And I don't understand why... why we don't see more of this focus in because, you know, the level, and by the way, in general, the Chinese strategy, whether if it was in steel, aluminum, critical minerals, oil refining, control the world's processing and then you control the world's raw materials. By the way, you can go get raw critical minerals of any kind. Go to Africa. You can go get it. Good luck processing it. You'd have to send it back to China to process it. And whether if it's the equipment to process it, the manufacturer, chemicals, everything you need to process it, it's all made in China. And then similarly, if we're all out of a fine product, who's the ones that marginal exporter of this stuff? It's China. So, you know, it goes, you know, steel, alloy, Even copper smelting, all this stuff sits inside China right now. So you're still not learning Mandarin?
Speaker 1: Just confirming. If you start learning Mandarin, I start learning Mandarin.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I know. But ultimately, you can build this stuff, but you've got to have the willingness to do it. And part of it is the Americans and the Europeans didn't like this stuff because it's nasty. Yeah. And that's the main reason we're in this predicament. And then they go, oh, I don't want that stuff in my backyard. It's gross. And this stuff's really toxic.
Speaker 1: But the argument, sorry to interrupt you, but the entire argument you've made so far sounds like an argument that I would have said an argument for war, but an argument that the war has not ended yet because you've just explained why the US and the West cannot afford to lose the Strait of Hormuz, even if it means another year or two years of war. So why is the markets discounting the risk of war? While I speak to political analysts and they're talking about it, some of them saying it's inevitable, it's just a matter of when. Others are kind of more in the middle somewhere, but no one is certain, you know, 90%, 95%. I'm probably one of the very few that think the war is over long, long term. And even I'm not 90%, 95% certain of that. I've been more in the 70%, 80% range. So why are the markets so complacent?
Speaker 0: You're in that camp? I didn't know you're in that camp.
Speaker 1: I'm in the optimistic. I think the war is over at 70%. I'd give it at 70%. It was higher before, but I'd give it 65, 70 even. The reason I just think it's too costly. I just think that militarily the US cannot afford it. But when I say the war is over, it's within what time frame? I think it's over under at least this year. When we start moving to next year and onwards, it gets a lot more uncertain. But just seeing how catastrophic the war has gone. But the return has to be high enough. And what you're convincing me and others like yourself are convincing me is not that the cost is lower than what it was and they can achieve more success. They can't. It's that the return, even if it's so costly, the ROI on this war is existential in a way for the US.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I think the the right but here's the thing that the political calculus, it doesn't matter if it's Trump or whoever's sitting there goes go back is no American cares about Iran. They simply don't care. but they care about that pump price at the pump. So if they can keep that down, that's all they're gonna focus on. They don't care about anything other than that. And also they want interest rates low, affordability, keep the interest rates low, keep gasoline low, and you win that battle. And then you have a probability of getting reelected. You get those things out of control, you don't.
Speaker 1: Now here's the part they're missing.
Speaker 0: It is, but here's where I think they miss is if you don't control those supply chains and the rest of that stuff, you know, things can start getting really ugly, really quick in places like the US. And I don't think it's way too early to discount that. Then, so I agree with you, hey, you know, at least this immediate skirmish is likely over with. But let's remember, it's very much tied to the one going on in Ukraine. And that one just got turbocharged. And so, you know, the, and then if, you know, very much tied to that is the gasoline and diesel story, which is then tied to what China is doing. So I don't think any of these things, you know, you know, the current score ratio is gone. It's probably, it's not going to resurface in its current form. And I think that the only way that the, you know, but then again, you got to wonder if, what do they go, if they go on the, onto the offensive? Um, You know, because if they get completely resupplied and they're fully reinforced, who knows? But the, because ultimately they're not getting anything. The question is, do you really think the US is going to give them the 300 billion and the 24 billion?
Speaker 1: You actually want an answer? Yeah.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: Obviously not, in case you're waiting for an answer. Obviously not.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I don't, and then they're going to go, why did we do this? But I don't know. I think the point is this is just that what's going on in Iran over the last three to four months is just one piece in that bigger global trade war that's going on right now. The other thing, too, the Chinese like the sanctions. They don't like this. The sanctions on Iran, you mean? Oh, yes. Sanctions in Iran and Russia where the biggest benefactor was China. And so... They don't want to see those sanctions go away. In fact, those teapot refineries can't function without those sanctions. So you need the sanctions to create the discount in those crudes. So I, you know, it's not, the old status quo was much more preferred by many of those parties in the East than they are right now because ultimately China was planning on taking on the U.S. with the SWIFT system through its SIPs and SIPs was dependent upon You know, all those dark fleet, as we call them, as being the primary mechanisms to deliver commodities. And so, you know, I just, the current environment is so unstable from every possible way you can think about it.
Speaker 1: Talking about China, our last episode, I found fascinating where you're connecting the dots between the Trump-Xi meeting and trying to really understand why the China, not why China, reduce their demand for oil or use their reserves, allegedly use their reserves during the war? And more importantly, why are they still not buying? Why are they still out of the market if prices are so low? Do you have an answer yet?
Speaker 0: You know, I'm really being asked, I thought about this, we would never know. There's a lot of oil leaving the straits right now. And there's Chinese flag vessels. So China's not going to advertise. At this point, they're not going to show anybody their hand or what they're doing and how they're doing it. So have they entered the spot market for West African barrels or anything in the Atlantic Basin? Absolutely not. We would know just like that if they came in. There's no evidence they're coming in and buying, but are they just getting everything they possibly need out of the straits with their own insured ships, their own You know, their own payment systems.
Speaker 1: Without AIS, without the transponders on?
Speaker 0: They could even have transponders. We know where they're going. We know they're Chinese flagged.
Speaker 1: But if they have their transponders on, we can easily track them, can't we? Yeah, we should be able to. So if China's buying oil without us knowing, they would be buying it through ships going through without their transponders on.
Speaker 0: Mm-hmm.
Speaker 1: Am I right in assuming that?
Speaker 0: But we won't know how much they're bringing in until, put it this way, actually from what I understand as of this morning, there's a lot of ships that are sitting off the coast of China laden with oil. So they've made it there. But to say that I have any understanding of what's going on, absolutely not, because I would have made the argument once you got down to the $70 levels that you should see a big surge in Chinese demand to come in and restock. There's no evidence that that's happening. And they're not returning to normal behavior.
Speaker 1: I don't know. I feel I said it to my guest yesterday when he was making the argument of why oil in China. He's also perplexed at how oil prices are so low. And I was listening to him. It's like either he's on a completely different page Or this is one of those Michael Burry moments where it's just so obvious for even people that are not deep into it. But the markets are just saying something else. And then people are like, hey, if the markets are saying that's the price, then that's the price. Similar to the big short. It's like these assets, these assets, these securities should be collapsing. But then house prices keep going up for whatever reason.
Speaker 0: But I'm going to go back again. If I didn't know anything else and an alien came down this earth and know something about economics and looked at this market, I'm just going to go, you're out of refining capacity.
Speaker 1: The main reason, but that's because mainly because of what's happening in Russia, Ukraine, or also what's happened in the Persian Gulf because of the damage done.
Speaker 0: But you just barely, because China's out, China's not exporting yet. You've lost the Russian. U.S. and Europe have retired theirs for environmental reasons and don't have any flex left in the system. So, you know, you look at, you know, whether in Russia, you know, it's millions of barrels per day that the Ukrainians have taken out. I mean, you've got serious lines. So they're not exporting the product and using their own refineries. They've got more crude to export to the world right now than they do refined product because they usually export the refined product. So that's telling you, There's more than enough crude out there. There's just not enough of the refined product. And that's a, that's a different ball game.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Not enough people. No one's really talking about this, but from what I understand, isn't, um, I read somewhere that Russia's importing, um, refined fuel because of the Ukrainian strikes. That's true. Isn't it? Yeah. They have to be because they're, they're out.
Speaker 0: So. Because you know that they have serious shortages there. They got their long oil, but they're not their short refining capacity.
Speaker 1: Interesting.
Speaker 0: Also explain, you know, why these things, you just got tankers parked off the coast of China is because we're now bumping up into real constraints there. And we don't know for sure. The Russians aren't going to tell you how much of that refining capacity is taken out. They don't want to tell the world that. And then they always lie about how long it takes to get them to come back online.
Speaker 1: By July 1st, Russia started importing gasoline from India by sea out of all places. India?
Speaker 0: Oh, God. That's telling you a lot right there. Importing from India. So they send the crude from Russia down to India.
Speaker 1: Refined in India. It's wild. This is wild.
Speaker 0: So are we just sitting here all looking at Iran and at the time Russia is creating a much bigger problem that nobody's paying attention to?
Speaker 1: And the Iran problem is not even resolved. So this is a Michael Burry moment. Yes. In other news, I'd love to get your thoughts on the job numbers that came out. They were pretty bleak and also gold doing pretty well recently as well.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I personally took off my shorts on gold. I think at this point it's time to be long gold because ultimately it was the threat of higher interest rates. And with oil prices being down here, I'm not saying we're out of the woods. I'm just going to shift in sentiment around interest rates has been tremendous, which is opening up the upside in the precious metal space again. So I would really be focused on gold. You've got all this geopolitical uncertainty going on, and you have a labor market that is weakening. The K economy in the U.S. is definitely a big concern here. All of that points to more upside on gold. Before this all started, I spent all my time talking about gold, silver, copper, and all the atoms, the metals complex. and you know oil was kind of a side story uh and i think what's going to happen here is you know unless these refined products become an absolute problem you know it's going to be um i think you're going to see a lot of emphasis on owning gold again particularly if you have concerns over a recession the the number one driver of a rally in gold is always at the very end of a business cycle when there's indications of economic slowdown, particularly in the labor market. So you've got all the telltale signs of wanting to be long gold right now with a relatively weak jobs report. So I definitely would advocate it's time to get back into gold. You know, step back in because you've got to watch what's going on in these refined product numbers. You know, you could be in a situation where we are back in with every single one of these commodities doing relatively well again. You know, it's not, and I think the, I would say that the consensus view around commodities is the most bearish I've seen it this entire year right now. But we look at the fundamental backdrop. The energy market is fundamentally tighter than it has been at any other point in time. The forward outlook on supplies is still very, very uncertain at this point right now. Demand's holding in there. Don't tell me the demand's not there. We saw it came out last, you know, this last week in the data. It was relatively strong. So you've got, you know, lots of uncertainty, upside risk, particularly at $70 a barrel and record refining margins. And then on the metal side, with China, you know, cutting back more critical minerals, and you need, you know, your point before is there's only one producer of critical minerals who's not using, you know, Chinese equipment. Yeah, everyone is using it. the upside risk here across the board, I think is quite high. I'm still a believer, own the entire commodity complex. One thing I just want to make a step back. Everybody's going, oh, Jeff, did you liquidate your oil positions? A rolling front month, the passive position on these commodities liquidate every single month. You've reset. When those price spikes happen in oil back in, back in April and May, you were banking those on the roll. When the price spikes in copper and silver and everything were happening back in January and February, you were banking them on the roll, which is why I just want to own the broader basket across all these different commodities because that leadership is going to change over time. If you think this hard asset halo, hard asset local operation story is behind us, You're missing the point. This is a decade-long story. Right now, it's cooled off with what's going on in Iran. It's going to resurface somewhere. Gold in the U.S. It's silver. If you're out demanding solar panels, people are putting targets on silver of up to 300. I'm not forecasting. I'm just telling you the upside across this entire space right now is quite high. I'd like to point out when you're in one of these super cycles, The type of price increases is on average between 5 and 7x. And it's just sequences of spikes. That's why you want to be rolling into each one of those because you're capturing those different spikes. One of them is not like a nice trend in prices that are going to go up and stay up. It's just rolling sequences of price spikes and shortages here and there until you finally get prices high enough that people invest. But I can tell you right now, nobody's investing in this space right now you couldn't give it away if you wanted to in the current environment everybody wanted it three months ago but right now um it's not very you know right now the market is mostly short this space it's crazy how volatile the emotions of traders and investors are when they're meant to be unemotional meant to look at things objectively one second there's a pc ah hard assets are lame let's go back to to nvidia
Speaker 1: And then there's another strike on Dubai. All right, shit, fucking video. Fuck the tech sector.
Speaker 0: That's exactly what's going on. And it's just wild.
Speaker 1: No one's talking about Ukraine. No one's talking about what's happening to Ukraine, Russia.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Yeah. And I think part of it is people really want, you know, that also what's so scary, you know, talking about a Michael Burry moment, the market is so levered long right now. It's scary. They can't afford it. um any of these bad things to happen and they just keep levering up there in fact there was a report yesterday by the dip by the dip and they're three and a half times levered um i've been doing this 30 years i wouldn't be three and a half times levered this market um and yet you've got the average retail joe out there three yeah
Speaker 1: Like the world is not as optimistic. I'm usually the optimistic person. I would look at the world. I'm like, look, I'm optimistic, guys. When I talk to other strategists and experts, I'm the optimistic one, but not that optimistic. Like the Russia Ukraine war, there's no end in sight. Like I was talking to a few experts. I'm like, what is the solution if Ukraine doesn't want to give up the four oblasts? And some people are saying that even Russia now may not even accept the deal they had in Ankara and Alaska, which the Ukrainians may not even accept and the Europeans don't want for whatever reason. I still don't understand, even though I've asked many people. And the Americans just don't care. And then on the Iran issue, if the Strait of Hormuz is so important for the Americans, Iran is not giving anything up, not compromising in any way. And there's even indications that the war in Iran hasn't ended. It's just shifted fronts. That's what I've been arguing for the last few days. It's shifted from the front line being Iran to the front line being Yemen. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, these are the new front lines, so moving to a proxy war instead. And, you know, that means a big advantage.
Speaker 0: By the way, the one thing I want to ask, you know, if anybody had any good comments, this is outside of my realm, is in, you know, speaking of proxy wars, you have, what, 15 to 20 million Shiites going to the funeral of Khamenei, you know, it's like you have never seen, and then in the U S you have 250 year anniversary tomorrow with all everybody converging there. You've never seen, these are like big seminal moments in both places at the same time. And it's just like, you know, with Israel's like, I'm not a part of this MOU.
Speaker 1: And the report, let me creep you out more. A report came out yesterday, um, that the Israelis were, um, on the verge of killing Ghalibaf and Arachi during the negotiations in Pakistan. So the report was the Americans were worried the Israelis were gonna kill Arachi and Ghalibaf when they were going to meet JD Vance, and they couldn't stop the Israelis. So they warned the Iranians through Qatar and Pakistan, like, hey, careful, they might kill you. And then on the way back, The plane that had Ghalibaf, and I don't know if Arachi was on it as well or a separate plane, after it went through, so the Pakistanis escorted the aircraft into Pakistani territory. They escorted it back to Iran. When it was in Iranian territory, there were fighter jets that were spotted, Israeli fighter jets in Iraq going into Iran. So they did an emergency landing and drove eight hours to Tehran back, worried that they will get killed. That report came out from New York Times yesterday. When I saw that report, I'm like, you know, I don't think the Israelis are crazy enough to kill Mustafa Khamenei at the funeral processions tomorrow or this weekend. But I'm not going to discount it either, especially after I saw the report the Americans couldn't stop the Israelis from, you know, considering killing or even planning to kill. Maybe they were about to kill Ghalibaf and Arachi. So, yeah, I think people are just way too complacent. And that's coming.
Speaker 0: Way too complacent. Yeah. I mean, the bare minimum, Israel is going to disrupt something, my guess, in the next 48 hours.
Speaker 1: but we'll see but hey dream on on the video thanks jeffrey appreciate it you bet
reSee.it AI Summary
I think Uwe Boll’s view is that Europe’s illegal immigration crisis is pushing society toward a dangerous breaking point. In Citizen Vigilante, a man loses faith as criminals walk free and decides to act himself. Germany banned it, but Boll shared it on X, where it spread widely. He warns the real fear is how many people think, “I understand why he snapped.”
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Uwe Boll, who wrote and directed Citizen Vigilante, thinks Europe's illegal immigration crisis is pushing society toward a far more dangerous breaking point than most people realise. It's creating a generation of people who no longer believe the state is willing, or even able, to protect ordinary citizens. Citizen Vigilante has been branded reckless, inflammatory, and dangerous because it tells the story of a man who watches gang rapists and violent criminals walk free, loses faith in the justice system, and decides to become judge, jury, and executioner himself. Germany banned it, but Uwe uploaded it to X and @elonmusk posted about it, helping it to reach over 25 million views. Uwe says people are obsessing over the wrong thing. The scary part isn't that Citizen Vigilante exists. It's how many people watched it and thought, "I understand exactly why he snapped." He points to gang rapes, knife attacks, grooming scandals, and violent crimes that governments have spent years downplaying while ordinary people are told they're the problem for noticing them. Illegal immigration isn't a stand-alone issue; it's the spark that's exposing something much bigger: a justice system people increasingly believe protects offenders more than victims. A political class more interested in policing language than restoring public confidence, and a society poisoned with suicidal empathy. That's why Uwe says Citizen Vigilante should be seen as a warning, not a blueprint. He's not arguing that vigilantes are the answer. He's arguing that if governments keep refusing to confront the problems people are living with every day, eventually some will stop believing democracy itself is capable of delivering justice. When citizens lose faith that the state will enforce the law fairly, they don't simply become more cynical; they begin looking elsewhere for justice. And once a society starts losing that kind of trust, getting it back is far harder than controlling a border. @uweboll7
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation focuses on Citizen Vigilante and why it received major attention after Elon Musk brought it up. Tommy Robinson is discussed as an example of a real-world figure the movie’s themes are perceived to align with, and the guest says he shares some of Musk’s concerns about illegal immigration while also identifying as an immigrant and legal beneficiary of Australia’s immigration system.
Asked to explain the movie, the guest frames Citizen Vigilante as a vigilante-genre story meant to “correct errors” and respond to injustice, built on real crimes he says happen in Europe daily. He describes an escalation of scandals and violence he associates with immigration, and he says the story escalates further because officials and governments “lie to the population,” prompting people to vote for parties that “aren’t getting anything done.” He also criticizes streaming and TV writing for enforcing political correctness and demands for specific identities, saying he wanted the story to be told on its own terms with production based on qualification rather than identity categories. He calls the film “merciless” and depicts a vigilante targeting not only perpetrators but also corrupt judges.
A plot summary read by the host describes Europe “choking on migrant-fueled rape and murder epidemics” while “gutless officials” look away. The key emphasized scene involves the vigilante killing a judge after the judge argues that victims are victimized but frames the offenders in a way the guest portrays as justifying or minimizing responsibility. The host says the movie links to real life feelings and emotions and notes speculation that the inspiration is a real case in the UK, and then asks about those connections. The guest says the gang rape case in the movie is “actually basically happened in Hamburg in Germany, 2020,” with the defendants reportedly getting released and later being treated in a way he presents as inadequate. He says press supported the judge’s view, and he claims the offenders were incarcerated briefly, evaluated, and received one to three year terms and probation, leading to release before the trial had fully played out. He also says the judge’s reasoning in the film matches what the judge allegedly said in real life, including claims that the perpetrators were not integrated properly.
When discussing why the movie focuses on migrants and whether it implies perpetrators are only migrants, the host raises a concern that critics argue other forms of crime should also be considered. The guest responds that the point is the broader system failing to prosecute crime consistently and that the movie is a “catalyst” to address what he calls an imbalance in enforcement and prosecution.
The host then recounts comments by Patrick Bet-David: he claims the movie could inspire vigilantes, predicts more dangerous escalation, and worries it could lead to a new wave of chaos similar to mob eras in New York. The host asks the guest whether he worries this could happen and whether he would feel responsibility if someone acted by referencing the movie. The guest rejects censorship as a filmmaker, comparing it to debates about violent video games and school shooters, and argues the “problem makes the violence.” He also references viral violent incidents and says police actions in at least one case included arresting a stabbing victim after the victim was labeled racist, which he presents as “insane.”
The conversation highlights the film’s most viral scene where the vigilante kills a family, which the guest connects to separate events: he says another real incident involved migrant girls posting messages online that German girls “deserved to be raped” because of how they dressed. The host argues that immigrants should be treated as guests who contribute and that crimes and inflammatory social posts are treated as violations of the social contract; he asks how the director can be accused of endorsing what happens in the film. The guest emphasizes a concept he calls “suicidal empathy,” which he describes as a destructive form of empathy that places the “murder” inside one’s own home, and he links it to how countries and institutions allegedly excuse harm to avoid conflict.
Religious and political themes also come up. The guest argues religion should remain personal but draws lines against political enforcement of religious views, giving examples such as people praying publicly in spaces and universities and insisting that political correctness allows it. He then ties these themes to anger in Europe and argues that escalating demographic and political pressures could lead to cultural and legal changes. He also claims Jewish people in Germany are scared, and says he has examples of people being attacked for visible religious symbols.
In response to the host’s question about solutions, the guest argues for stopping future entry “at the border,” stopping housing and staying, and deporting offenders, emphasizing immediate removal of immigrants who commit crimes. He also proposes disrupting smuggling operations by turning back intercepted arrivals and bringing people back instead of allowing them to stay, aiming to destroy the smugglers’ business model. He adds a plan to support origin countries by helping develop industries locally, including manufacturing in Africa to create jobs and reduce incentives to migrate. He concludes by arguing that politics lacks long-term vision and focuses mainly on election cycles rather than long-term planning.
The host closes by contrasting “empathy” with “suicidal empathy,” saying empathy is good if managed, while suicidal empathy is destructive, and thanks the guest.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: I want to have this conversation with you because of the amount of attention Citizen Vigilante got. Elon brought a lot of attention to it. And I've been covering the illegal immigration issue in Europe for a long time, for years now. And I share a lot of Elon's concerns. Now I've spoken to Tommy Robinson. I had him on the show before he went to jail. And I'm an immigrant, by the way. So I'm a person, I'm a beneficiary of the immigration system to Australia. I'm a beneficiary of the system, legal immigration, contributed, et cetera. But I also see the damage it's doing to one of my favorite continents in the world, if not my favorite continent. I love Europe and I've spent a lot of time years in Europe. So let's start with people that don't know. Can you tell them what the story of Citizen Vigilante is? Your way of explaining it and also how others are perceiving it, because there's kind of two different ways of seeing the movie. And I want you to explain both.
Speaker 0: Yeah, first of all, it's just that we know Deswish, Dirty Harry, John Wick, Equalizer, there's a long, like genre of vigilante films, starting with The Wild Bunch and stuff like this. So and I see my guy being somebody who corrects errors, like, you know, like, when you feel there's an injustice, you feel something is getting totally off track. He's doing he takes the law in his own hands. So that's a normal genre what was there since the western basically and i did it based on facts basically based on real crimes what happened in europe they happen daily like the gang rapes with the grooming scandal now where all that thing came out in england uh you have knife random killings random knife stabbings um and it's like one scandal after the other and it gets belittled by Starmer's government, German government, French government, they and then they're always flipping out that like Le Pen or I've did at this part is getting bigger and bigger and bigger. Because they lie to the population. And then the people say, Okay, now I vote for this parties because sorry, you not getting anything done. So that made me furious that made me write the script. And there's the other aspect to it too. Like I'm bored of this programs with this writers, like the diversity writers, the LGBTQ, you know, like when you filed something to Amazon or Netflix, like you're done. If you don't have a transgender person, if you don't, you know, like you're basically you're toast. So, and that's like where I always felt like, no, you have to tell the story, how the story is. And then you basically, you can hire a crew you want and, that i mean i why i work with so many film crews with so many actors with all colors and all religions and all nationalities i look for qualification that should be the only point are you a good sound person if you're a woman or a man black or white i give a if you're a good sound person you can work on the movie so all this went off the tracks i sing in the last 10 years in a dramatic way And this, both together, I have to say, it's not only the political thing, it's also that I'm super pissed with these streaming services who are so politically correct and vogue. Both together made me so furious that I wanted like a totally merciless film, you know, where you don't discuss, where you basically, now somebody goes for it and kills the judge too, right? So the judge who let that gang rapist
Speaker 1: Go for it. For people that haven't seen the movie, let me read, I don't know. I asked Grok to kind of summarize the movie. So I'll read what Grok, how Grok explained what the movie is. In a Europe choking on migrant-fueled rape and murder epidemics, with gutless officials looking away, ex-Army millionaire Michael Sanders snaps and erupts as the citizen vigilante, slaughtering gang rapists, racketeers, and the corrupt judges who set them free. There's a scene in which he kills the judge. He asked the judge a question. And the judge says that the... So a girl was raped by multiple men. Those men were Muslim immigrants in a country that people... It's a European country. People are speculating it's the UK. A lot of people are linking it to real life. I know it's a fictional movie, but those linkages are there and people are making the connections. So that girl was raped by multiple men. And then the judge says to Michael Sanders... the vigilante is that the girls are victim, but the boys are victims too because of the way they're raised or whatever it is. And that fueled him even further and that led to him killing the judge. And then I'll continue the summary quickly. He visits a brutalized rape survivor, the one I just mentioned, in the hospital, wins her silent alliance, evicts deadbeat tenants to block migrant housing takeovers, lectures thugs on buses. So he's just, he's kind of, He's acting on the anger that a lot of people have in real life in Europe right now because of illegal immigration. And a lot of people are making those connections. Before we go to the scene where he kills the entire family, I know that scene got the most attention. I wanna get your thoughts on these connections to real life because people are criticizing the movie because it linked to real life feelings and emotions people have. But aren't all movies linked in some way to something in real life, even the most fictional movies are linked to aspects of everyday life and emotions and feelings and beliefs we all have. Maybe that's a good question for you. And maybe you can also elaborate what inspired you to come up with different scenes for the movie.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I think, look, in general, if you make a fictional movie, you still have to make it that it looks real, that it looks that, okay, this happens. right now but in in sometimes you make movies they are like kind of based on events but then they are fictional i did for example a sound on wall street 2008 about the banking crisis where then dominic purcell killed bankers who screwed him over and destroyed his life so you know and that's also that was completely fictional it never happened but i made it because i was very furious that 5 000 americans did suicide at that time losing everything And then Richard Full got 250 million bucks severance, you know, who basically was one of the he he was guilty of doing like a disastrous banking. So and that's what I mean. So there was a big injustice with this, too. But in Citizen Vigilante, the case of the gang rape is actually basically happened in Hamburg in Germany, 2020 in a park nearby the house where that girl lived. And all these people came free. And this is what the judge says in the movie. Actually, he said in real life, you know, he said, like, yeah, they're all they were not integrated properly. And then the best was a lot of press basically supported the judge. Like, like, it doesn't help anybody if they're in jail. Yeah. Besides the victim who's now living in fear that the same guys who still live now in the neighborhood can rape her again. I mean, that's the thing. It's like you basically have to leave the cities and You know, normally they should leave the country. They should get deported. But instead, they are free.
Speaker 1: So, and how are they free? So why are the rapists free? And also, you're saying a judge in real life labeled the rapists also as victims?
Speaker 0: Yes, it's true. You can Google it. It comes up. And so they were first... incarcerated, then they were like evaluated, a few of them were only 17, not 18 years old. So and then the trial came and they got all the they got like one to three years jail terms, and they all got out on probation right away. So nobody was really in jail of them long as a few months before the trial started. And I was just looking at this as like, are you all completely insane? Like, A gang rapist should not get one year prison or even two years. He should be, if possible, just deported or at least 10, 15 years in prison. I mean, that comes for me, that's the crime what comes close to murder, you know. And that they got supported by Süddeutsche Zeitung, like big newspapers, they supported that judgment and said then, It's our fault, like as a country, that these poor people come in and we don't like integrate them properly. You know, I mean, if I move to Saudi Arabia and open like a nudist beach, I'm dead in the first day I opened my union speech, right? So, I mean, they will enforce their laws where they are, you know, you don't even want to do it in Saudi Arabia. But the reality is we have laws, too, and we have a lifestyle and we have culture and we have like industry and stuff like this. So they're all coming from countries basically extremely behind our lifestyle, our economic system and also our cultural system and our intellectual system. So they're coming in and then they basically continue the same way how they were in Afghanistan, in Syria, Somalia. They don't really change their lifestyle. The only thing what changes is that they're getting a lot of money. you know, that they're getting like, oh, you have a kid 300 bucks a month, like in Germany per kid, you get 300 euro a month. So they have six kids. So now you have already like 1800 bucks right there, then they're getting a fried free health care, free school, and free free housing. So they save they basically on five grand a month, based on what they get. So and the average German makes like 4000 bucks a month. So What is that? What are we doing? So that's the thing what I feel a lot of people are totally disconnected to that government. I have the feeling nobody governs really the population of a country anymore. And the thing when I wrote it down, of course, I am escalating it up in the movie.
Speaker 1: that's the point of movies i don't want to sit there agreeing with everything you're saying i'm struggling to disagree with anything you said but that's the point of movies people would watch movies because you exaggerate things you um dramatize everyday events and feelings yes you know but what's this why why what i'm trying to first it's wild that the story is actually a true story that happened in germany why this particular movie is getting so much pushback i don't get it what's you know i don't i don't understand why there's so many people so upset with the movie like i saw your your debate with medi hassan who's a regular on the show i saw i saw your debate with him and he seemed really upset with um a comment elon i think it was elon made or someone made a comment about the movie he was upset with that But I don't understand why people would be upset with the movie itself because there's significantly worse off movies. If people are worried that people will act on this anger, I don't think the movie is the problem in my view. The problem is the problem. The problem the movie is talking about is the problem that should be addressed.
Speaker 0: And that, by the way, in my thing it's written recording error, but I hope in your case everything is going fine, right? I mean, I'm not recording the show. Everything's fine. No, I mean that when I discussed with Mehdi in... I think, though, his strategy is just to keep talking and talking and talking and never let the other person say something. So that was my feeling with the Piers Morgan show, you know, and that, of course, Piers is a little more lean towards him. He thinks there is no problem in England with Islamistic kind of migration. So I had a tough time to get in between to put the points out. But that what you said is exactly what is the whole point is like. The problem is the problem. The movie is not the problem. The movie is kind of a catalyst saying, look, guys, if you don't want a total violent escalation here, you need to control migration and prosecute the law. And, you know, in England, if people are getting arrested who says something against whatever, against the migration, and then you get to jail and other people stabbing people on the street and getting probation or nothing. That's where the balance is totally off, you know? And I mean, I have to throw it in there that Mehdi never acknowledged that migrants doing crime at all. He was only talking about the poor migrants who got attacked by
Speaker 1: white people basically right so and he doesn't see it what so yeah so his point i think is that crime is committed by migrants and non-migrants yet your movie is only focusing on migrants i i'm i guess this is the point he's trying to make i don't see that why that's an issue every movie could focus on different things one movie could focus on islamic terrorists another one could focus on Nazi supporters killing immigrants. You did a movie, I think, came out last year that was more empathetic towards immigration. But this movie is really focused on a citizen vigilante upset with how immigrants or illegal immigrants have impacted the way it's been handled, has impacted his country and led to a lot of crime. He saw that authorities are not acting on that crime, not doing the right thing, and he brought matters into his own hands. Now, a lot of people are worried, and Patrick Bet-David also talked about it on his show, And I know Patrick as well. And I was surprised of how concerned he was. So he said the following. I think the movie is going to inspire a lot of people to do this. I'm telling you right now, this is one of the darkest movies I've seen that's going to inspire actual vigilantes who are sick of it in Europe. Like there's Tommy Robinson. He refers to Tommy Robinson. He says Tommy Robinson is there. I think this movie, the next guy that's going to be inspired by this movie will be there, will be worse than Tommy Robinson. the next guy is going to be like, okay, you want to do this? We'll take it ourselves. Don't worry about it. And he talks about going back to New York City days during the mob days. And he's worried about that level of chaos in Europe. Then he says this, someone like this is going to wake up and go around doing this, killing the rapists. It's going to happen in the next three to six months. Just remember when I said this. So my question here for you is, do you worry this could happen? And hypothetically, If it does happen and someone references your movie, would you feel, I'm not saying you did something wrong with the movie, but would you feel any sense of responsibility if it does lead to that? I'm not sure if you've given that possibility some thought.
Speaker 0: No, I can't. Because then if you censor yourself as a filmmaker and you say, oh, now I'm not doing the movie Apocalypse Now anymore, this radical how it was, as an example, or Taxi Driver, then the movie sucks, maybe. So you have to, I think, as an artist, you just have to be ruthless. You have to say, OK, that's it. And as you said before, What's, by the way, is also scientifically proven. When they always blamed video games for all these school shooters, right? So there was the, like, oh, they played too much video games, violent video games, and now we run to school and killed everybody. I mean, it's, of course, total bullshit, because then we would have, like, 10,000 school shooters, you know? And the thing is that, of course, there is some people, like the school shooters, have a depression problem. medic medicament like taking drugs whatever like they're losing the basically so in the case of political violence it's as you said the problem makes the violence you know when they had belfast attacking the the migrant home a few days ago yeah but before us first that novak guy got killed then the other guy is in the middle of the street chopping the head off of a guy on the ground just for the audience novak is a guy that was stabbed i think by
Speaker 1: indian immigrant or pakistani immigrant an immigrant um i think i could be wrong but he was stabbed by someone and that's not the point of it though an immigrant stabbing someone else is not the issue the issue is what happens next so the police came the guy the one that stabbed the criminal said the victim was racist to me so they handcuffed the the victim who was bleeding on the ground eventually died. Did I get the story? Correct? So busy with Iran? Yes. Okay.
Speaker 0: And he said, I got stabbed and need like medical basically that somebody has to help me. And they gave a shit. And they were all over the I think was a black guy. But you know, like, we were all over like he said, I insulted me racist, you know, I mean, it's insane. It's completely sick about that.
Speaker 1: Like, he Belfast, the Belfast process were caused by someone trying to behead someone else on the streets.
Speaker 0: Yes, kneeling on him and stabbing him already and said basically yelled around. I cut the head off and then people came to help. Right. So they tackled him down. So but videos like this are insane. You know, I would never in Germany, two things happened where videos were also went viral. One guy was with a machete hacking a guy into pieces basically in the middle of the road. I have that video still. I will never forget it because then the people were scared. They just filmed it from far away. This guy was dead. Like, so he really hacked him into pieces. So that was the one thing I saw. Then I saw another video where a guy with the baby carriage went with his baby, like on a walk. And the guy came, stabbed him in the neck and he kept walking with the baby and then recognize, Oh fuck, I'm totally bleeding. And then he was sinking down, bleeding out and is dead. And that, baby carriage was standing there. So, and when I see stuff like this, I have to say, what are we doing? Are we fucking insane? One thing like this is a reason to not let anybody anymore in. Sorry. You know, like why we do this risks, why we put that on us random, how many times, how many videos are out there where people getting pushed into the subway stuff like this for years now, There's random irrational crimes, you know, and they always try to sugarcoat that crimes and say, oh, that guy was traumatized. I give a fuck if my daughter gets raped by eight people. I give a fuck why they are traumatized. I want them dead. That is what I want. That's the reality. And that's the reason as an artist, as a film director, I make that in the movie. because I'm not doing it myself, you know, like I make a movie, because I'm very upset about this. And I think we basically have this kind of culture now where people have the feeling we owe the world everything. I have the feeling in Germany, like a lot of political parties, they're basically acting like, not because of the Second World War, even further backwards, like colonization or whatever, this kind of like, No, no, we have to save the whole world, even if we all die. So, and that's the mentality, what we're seeing here, you know, in Harvard, at the university campuses, all this stuff, it's like almost like, somebody drugged them that they cannot see the reality who is here the perpetrator and when that media guy comes up with two guys who were killed by neo-nazis okay we cannot can come up with 55 000 women got raped in the last 10 years in europe yeah and at least 40 000 people got stabbed with random stabbings so sorry but but the relationship between like neo-nazi crime against migrants and this is A massive difference. And where he was also lying yesterday in the Piers Morgan was, I mean, the statistics is crystal clear. 700% more crimes from migrants as from German born people. 700% higher crime rate in connection to the population, of course. So that's the fact. That's the hard fact. So, and he always acts like, oh, the whole world, they're attacking the poor migrants the whole time. You know, no, it's not the case.
Speaker 1: so one um one thing that um that one question i've heard someone ask you and i found it to be a stupid question at the end of the movie or somewhere in the movie the vigilante goes to the family um the family the the the the boy the 17 year old boy whatever his age is raped the girl him and his friends raped to go multiple times and i think his mom posted on social media she deserved it because of the way she was dressed or something along those lines in a way that she should be held responsible for being raped By the way, did that part also happen in Germany or that one is separate, maybe inspired by a separate event or you just came up with that part?
Speaker 0: No, I mean, based on, no, no, that happened too, but that was a different event where girls, like migrant girls, sisters, you know, they were twittering a lot, like, and putting messages out that the German girls are sluts. And they deserve to be raped based on how they dress.
Speaker 1: Do you understand that when people come to a country, I don't understand the privilege of being able to come. So first, I empathize with immigrants. Okay, I was one, as I said this before. You empathize with them as well because you made a movie about it. I haven't seen it. Immigrants and families looking for a better life, good for them. They should try everything they can, including, I think Patrick, but David said in one of his interviews, his debates with Mehdi Hassan, funny enough, that he was like, look, if I have my family, I'd get into a country, I think the U.S., They won't stop me. I'll get in there to get a better future for my family. So I respect migrants trying to get a better life. When you get to a country, I look at it, the way I see it is you're a guest in that country. You do everything you can to contribute to that country, to add value. And a lot of them are, I'd say the majority of them are. But then when you commit a crime and then put out posts like this, talking about the way of life of that country that accepted you from your shitty ass country where there's a lot of suffering, like my country had suffering, they've accepted you and given you a better life. The way they're taking that for granted is just wild to me. And the scene that you're in the scene, what the mom says is that the girl deserved it. And that's a belief that a lot of people have, a lot of conservative people have, especially some very religious people. And then what the vigilante does is he comes into the house, kills the boy and kills the entire family. And I think his brothers and sisters as well. Now, the reason I'm bringing that up, that was a very shocking scene. So that went pretty viral. And that was the first scene I saw when I looked up the movie. Now, the stupid question you were asked is that, do you think that was the right thing to do for the vigilante to kill the entire family? I'm not going to ask you that question because it is a stupid question. Your answer is obviously no, and I think you stand by the answer. But what's bizarre to me is that in a movie, a director that makes a movie doesn't mean they agree with everything in the movie. If you make a movie about a serial killer, it doesn't mean you support serial killers necessarily. It's the way this movie has been being looked at and unfairly compared to other movies is just so bizarre to me. And that kind of leads to my next question is why? What are we not seeing? I try to always, in what I do, put myself in the shoes of the other people. The other people in Germany that don't see this problem and other European countries that don't see the problem of the way immigration is being handled and crimes by immigrants in the country and the way the culture is being destroyed. What don't they see? For the judge to say the boy that raped a girl, him and his friends eight times, was also a victim. Like the way I would describe it is what Dr. Gad Saad said to me a while ago now, a suicidal empathy. That's how he described it. I think it's a really good term. But how do you, what's your understanding of it?
Speaker 0: No, I love that line too, suicidal empathy. You know, where you feel like you bring your own murder in your house. You know, and normally private persons, it happened too, right? There are people, they develop their own murderers, you know, whatever the Rob Reiner family, in a way they pampered their son so much, you know, and always forgave him, gave him all the money, gave him all the drugs, and in the end he killed everybody. So there was also suicidal empathy to their own son. That can happen too inside of families, but it happens definitely inside of countries now where, and that's the same way we have to discuss, like, in a way, religion, right? So because the reality is, for me, religion is a personal thing. And it's for your private, what you believe or you don't believe, you're a Protestant, you're a Christian, you're Jewish, you're Muslim. So it's your thing. But if you put it on other people as like a crusade or like, oh, we kill everybody who doesn't believe exactly what we want, that religion is only right now on the planet earth the islam where they're actually willing to demonstrate power and to actually take over other countries for it kill parts of their own population if they don't believe it in africa with that all the time you know that christians getting killed and and stuff like this in in different different parts of the world and that's for me where I have to say, I draw the lines there, you know, like when people like go in the mosque and pray, good, but not as in Germany also happened in universities where you cannot even go then in the cafeteria to get a coffee because they're all praying there, you know, and they didn't, they allowed it because they're so politically correct in Harvard, in all of North America, also in a lot of universities, there are now praying rooms and whatever, you know, and I think, That's too far. You know what we have to say?
Speaker 1: It's nice to respect. I was born Christian, but I don't practice any religion. I think I heard you say the same thing for me. Everyone could practice their own religion. If you respect another religion, it's fine. But when it's starting, it's crossed that line where it's being enforced on people and that's causing a lot of that anger in Europe and anger that you share and that inspired the movie. Do you think... Not because of your movie, but because of the problem. Again, as we've said, it's the problem that's the issue. Wait one second. Here's something.
Speaker 0: All right. I have to. Wait, wait, wait. I got cut off.
Speaker 1: Wait one second. The police is knocking on your door.
Speaker 0: Yeah. German police. My son disconnected us for a second here with the airport. Exactly. They already did a search, but it was only my son with his airport connecting to my laptop by accident. So you need to repeat the question.
Speaker 1: Yeah, of course. So we've already concluded that if there is, in my view and your view, at least in our view, that if someone does what, the vigilante, citizen vigilante did in your movie, it's because of the problem, the core problem. That's what people should really focus on. Now, because of that problem and how far people have let it get out of control, we're already seeing people on the streets. I'm seeing significant anger in Europe and it only gets worse. I was talking about this years ago and it's still not being addressed. Now, this is leading to parties like in Germany. I know Alice, I've interviewed her, IFD parties like IFD, Marine Le Pen in France. that are gaining a lot more support because one of the main reasons is that issue that you're talking about. How worried are you because of the problem, not because of your movie, we may get a citizen vigilante or more citizen vigilantes? In other words, can your movie be seen more of a warning of what's to come if this is not addressed? And do you think it is a warning in a way?
Speaker 0: Yeah, of course. And it's a warning like, okay, guys, if we... don't get as a state. Normally, the violence should come out like the only people who can go violent or have the right to get violent is police and law enforcement. Right. So basically, because they have to enforce the law. So, you know, they can whatever draw a gun if the shit hits the fan. So and if we don't if we have the feeling they don't protecting us, they protect the perpetrators. If you have the feeling like the system is completely rigged now against us and there we coming back to this suicidal empathy and i think also elon musk said a line like this at one point similar to this where where he said we cannot like basically you you cannot help people if you die yourself doing it you know like this kind of i don't know exactly the line he said but but it was similar like this and i completely agree with it i think also musk is kind of very existentialistic, like that, similar to what I do as a movie, I think the reason that he likes the movie too, is the fact that I go to the bitter end, you know, that I think things through, and when you really think it through, if you have more influx from Islamistic countries, and they're getting five, six kids per average, and we in Europe are on 1.4 kids, then it's a mathematically proven fact that it's only the question of 20 years, 30 years, They have the majority of the population. And this kind of more harder, like Sharia law guys, because they dominating the streets, not the mild Muslims who are totally integrated, but they dominating the streets. So they will demand political power. They will change like culture, universities, how, what woman can do, woman rights, gay rights, all of this at one point turns into this not so funny thing anymore for the pride parade. Let's say it this way, you know, like all these people who are supporting all these people now in all that Gaza conflict, all that stuff. It's like you have really, they joined forces, you know, this kind of more like Hamas, Hezbollah, whatever, Islamistic people joined forces with Greta Thunberg and normally climate changing demonstration people. All of this is now infiltrated to fight whatever, the white old man right so it's like almost and and the but the brain is destroyed so and i think as sinking it through in the very end you we have to obey you know we're like okay it charia law where's my carpet you know whatever so we just obey to it and go with the flow Or we fight it, you know, and you say like, look, now it's enough. So now it's like the battle of survival here. And all of this is, of course, not necessary. If you reduce the influx now and, you know, like you just have to stop it. You just have to let nobody anymore in who is doing a crime out, even petty crime, like stealing in a store out. So directly deport them. And as I said, who runs through the streets, like in Germany, I have a lot of Jewish friends also, you know, they're scared. Like if you live in Berlin and you would put like a kippah on or whatever, you got fucking beat up. That's a hundred percent. You only go like half an hour in the tram. They will beat you up. I have a friend in Berlin. She got knocked out by a Syrian guy in a train, like a girl, like got knocked out. So that's the thing. It's like, they are scared already. And uh that like a may d would never admit it but they are really the victims like the you know like this this kind of if you're openly jewish in germany you have all reasons to be scared you don't go in frankfurt to the railway station i would recommend forget it you know so that's the thing and uh that's all that's all the reality already and i think we need to fight that yeah well that was that links to my last question is
Speaker 1: fight that how? What is the solution in your mind? One thing you already mentioned is anyone, any immigrant that commits a crime, immediately deport them. So as a country, let's say Germany, you have the best of the best citizens and peoples in your country. So your country becomes the best. You've got to focus on Germany first. So I'm guessing this is one of the solutions you'd propose. Correct me if I'm wrong. And what other solutions do you propose? How can the problem be solved now, considering where Germany and Europe is at?
Speaker 0: yeah, to not let people anymore in, right? To basically at the border already like, okay, it's over. And you drive them back with the, that was my movie where we talked about, my movie before was Run. There was boat refugees. I mean, the boat smuggling from Africa. That's with Amanda Plummer. So it's a movie, it's on Paramount Plus, Showtime, people can watch. So, and it's like, so they're coming with the boats. And they are smugglers. They're paying a lot of money. And we need to basically not like, okay, now you're here. Now you get a housing. We decide, you know, no, we have to basically bring them back. You know, if you do for three, four months, if that boat refugees, thousands and thousands every year, if they know, if they feel like, okay, we just arrived and they drive us back in the bigger boat, this smuggling has an end. So you destroy the business of the smugglers. Then the boat, 40, 50, 100,000 every year, that's already stopping. So we have to be a little more like this kind of, yeah, we feed them. It's not like we throw them in the water. No, we bring them back and give them some food and whatever and say, look, but here it's enough now. We're done. And we also should, that's what I said with the empathy in Run, in the movie, is we should help in Africa, right? We should be like doing things to help these countries to sustain themselves, to have industries there, to have maybe manufacturing there. Think about in Europe, Adidas, Puma, whatever. Where they manufacture? In China, right? Far away in China, the Western companies manufacturing. Why not in Africa? There's cheap labor, right? So you need to kind of, you know, Nigeria has so many people, you know? Yeah, why not? You know, it's a very fast... Yeah. And it's way cheaper because the transport is cheaper. And we also don't have to give all that money to China always. So, but that's what I mean. We need to be a little productive also with like, uh, you guys are not our enemies and we close the borders. No, we would love it. If you develop your own industry, we would love it to, to make you rich where you are and you have in the end, the same lifestyle as we, so, you know, stuff like this, I think would be gold. But there are no visionaries in politics. I mean, it's, you know, I have the feeling like all this politics, they're thinking only about the next election. They don't think about the big picture and working together like, okay, what is what we really want here? You know, so, and yeah, that's a problem.
Speaker 1: Hopefully, Alice makes the difference that Germany needs. Germany is an incredible, incredible country. I spent a lot of time there among many other European countries. And I think the core solution to the problem is people understanding the difference between empathy and suicidal empathy. Suicidal empathy is obviously destructive. Empathy is not a bad thing, and it's a good thing if well managed. Uwe, absolute pleasure to have you on the show. Thank you so much for your time.
Speaker 0: Yeah, thanks so much. Bye-bye.
Speaker 1: All right, guys, I'll be live again in 11 minutes to continue our coverage of the war in or what's going on in Iran and the region with Robert Barnes. See you guys shortly. Bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m struck that the largest funeral in human history begins today, yet Western media scarcely covers it: seven days of commemorations with delegations from 100+ countries, including Medvedev and senior Chinese and Indian officials, on July 4. Meanwhile, military moves suggest preparations—B-52s and F-15s returning with Iran-strike markings. An unconfirmed Doha claim says Iran’s delegation never appeared for the last talks. Larry warns a strike during the commemoration wouldn’t stay measured.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 The largest funeral in human history begins today, and Western media is barely covering it. Larry Johnson put it in terms that stopped me. Seven days of commemorations, representatives from over 100 countries, Medvedev, senior Chinese and Indian delegations, and crowds expected to break the record Iran already holds from Khomeini's 1989 burial. Nothing in the 20th or 21st century compares, he said, and it lands on July 4 of all days. Against that backdrop, the war machinery is moving the other way. B-52s reportedly left RAF Fairford for home, and F-15s returned to the UK from Jordan still wearing their Iran-strike mission markings. Larry called it five days ago: the planning cells are on banker's hours, and the loud USS Boxer announcement was a shiny object, a ship that left San Diego in MARCH being sold as fresh muscle. One claim he passed along from a source in Doha, unconfirmed but striking if true: the Iranian delegation never actually showed up to the last round of talks. His warning for the week ahead was blunt. After watching Iran answer every escalation with a bigger one, he believes a strike on this funeral wouldn't end in a measured exchange. It would end with every Israeli military base unusable. @NewSonof
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation begins with a discussion of vesselfinder.com as the focus of attention rather than the World Cup, with talk of making bets on how many ships will depart.
Attention then shifts to Iran and Israel around the death and funeral arrangements for Iran’s Supreme Leader. Ali Adolahi, a commander in Iran’s army, warned Israel and the U.S. against attacking during the funeral processions. The discussion includes differing views on what retaliation would look like if Israel struck: one speaker argues that while an attack would be heavy, Israel would mainly face long-term consequences through a major global “red line,” such as killing a supreme leader at a funeral attended by world leaders during peace negotiations against U.S. wishes. The other speaker argues that retaliation would likely continue until every Israeli military base was unusable, pointing to patterns of escalating strikes in prior exchanges and to pressure from Iran’s hardliners.
The speakers also discuss risks tied to the funeral timing and the public appearance of IRGC leaders during the ceremonies. One concern raised is not an attack on the day itself, but the possibility that the funeral could reveal whereabouts of key figures currently in hiding, enabling Israel to track and potentially conduct a decapitation strike weeks later.
A separate focus is the scale of the funeral: it is described as unprecedented, potentially the largest in history, with more than 100 leaders or countries represented between the start of the commemoration and the 9th, including Russia, China, India, and major countries. The conversation contrasts it with prior benchmark funerals and states that Iran already holds Guinness records for attendance percentages, while this event would set a new record.
Political and military reporting is also mentioned. Netanyahu’s press office denies New York Times claims that Israel fabricated plans to assassinate Ghalibaf and Arachi during Pakistani negotiations. The discussion also notes recent movement of U.S. military aircraft away from forward positions: B-52 Shadow Fortress strategic bombers leave RAF Fairford in the UK and return home, and additional F-15 Strike Eagles return from Jordan to the UK, with aircraft markings described as reflecting use against Iran.
On U.S. signaling about the USS Boxer and broader regional military posture, one speaker says the U.S. statement about the USS Boxer being in position is meant to draw attention away from other assets already present, arguing that the timeline suggests the ship did not arrive as quickly as claimed. The discussion then returns to negotiations affecting Hormuz and the Strait of Hormuz/Homs-related fees: Axios is cited as reporting that sanctions lifting and unfreezing of assets are part of a “carrot” offered by the U.S. Iran reportedly rejects a proposal about charging a fee.
A negotiation detail is shared from a source in Doha: an Iranian delegation was reported to have not shown up despite claims that a delegation was present.
The transcript then covers a separate topic: reporting that an IDF delegation visited Venezuela, described as the first significant bilateral engagement since Caracas severed ties with Tel Aviv in 2009. Israeli deployment is described as humanitarian in nature, with Venezuelan officials welcoming the mission, and skepticism discussed regarding whether it reflects deeper alignment under a new Venezuelan leadership. Another speaker connects the claim to long-running intelligence links in Central and South America.
Returning to regional proxy dynamics, the discussion mentions Houthi media reporting that two Saudi fighter jets breached Yemeni/Houthi airspace to bomb a capital airport to prevent an aircraft carrying a Houthi delegation from departing and missing the funeral. The incident is described as ending after Houthi air defenses attempted to shoot down the jets and threatened retaliation on Riyadh. The conversation also ties this to broader regional tensions, including an Iraqi anti-corruption campaign targeting Iran-linked figures and speculation about how power struggles might play out.
The main “big story” becomes Poland and NATO risk. One speaker cites reports that the U.S. warned Poland Russia may prepare a limited provocation on Polish territory within months to test NATO’s resolve. Possible actions are described as missile or drone strikes on critical infrastructure, cyber/hybrid attacks, or small cross-border incursions from Kaliningrad or Belarus. Another scenario described includes soldiers crossing into Poland claiming GPS failure or a rescue mission, followed by negotiations using withdrawal as leverage to demand an end to Western aid to Ukraine. Poland’s prime minister is referenced as warning that coming months may be critical.
The conversation frames “testing NATO resolve” as probing whether Article 5 would be triggered and whether the U.S. would respond, while also debating assumptions about Russian restraint and cost-benefit calculations. A Reuters-related mention describes an incident in the Baltic where a NATO effort to stop a Russian tanker was met by a fast Russian approach, raising the possibility of future miscalculation. Finally, a reference is made to NATO unity concerns amid reports of proposed U.S. troop reductions in Europe, with those cuts described as being reviewed and blocked by Rubio and other senior Trump officials, followed by a six-month review instead.
The segment ends with emphasis from one speaker on the Iranian funeral’s historical scale and that it is not being covered by Western media, alongside plans to continue with an emergency interview focused on Poland.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: I see you looking around your screen. I'm like, what are you searching for? You lost the window.
Speaker 2: How are you? I was trying to get around. There was a pop-up. Trying to get around that. If you want another site to look at to keep track of the straight, vesselfinder.com.
Speaker 1: Everyone's watching the World Cup and Larry's looking at vesselfinder.com.
Speaker 2: Okay. Who is playing in the World Cup right now?
Speaker 1: don't know i'm actually not watching it i'm too busy on vesselfinder.com we should start making bets how many ships will go out today yeah as long as you keep it under 20 we'll be you'll be a winner uh well all i should be on poland did you see we'll talk about it later actually we'll leave that till the end but there was a significant statement from prime minister tusk just a few minutes ago, I think, or not, maybe a bit longer, actually. The team sent it to me about 20 minutes ago. It comes after the U.S. warning, but that was concerning when I read it. But let's start with the funeral. We've been talking for the last couple of days on whether Israel would strike. And Ali Adolahi, commander of the Al-Qahtam, Iran's army, has warned Iran and the U.S., sorry, has warned Israel and the U.S., against attacking during the funeral processions. And there's a whole plethora of world leaders that are attending. And there was a point I made earlier to Karen. She said something very, I was speaking to her earlier, and she made the same point you've made. So when I asked her, what do you think will happen if they do strike? And she said something along the lines of, it will be at the end of Israel. In other words, Iran would retaliate very heavily. Um, my point was, I don't think so. I remember people telling me that when, uh, if Nasrallah would get killed, Israel would get destroyed. If Ali Khamenei would get killed, Israel would get destroyed. My, I thought about it today and my stance on get your thoughts on it. My belief is that in the short term, it won't be that significant. The attack won't be, it will be a heavy attack for sure, but it won't be more than what we saw during the peak of the war. Maybe a bit more, but that will be it. Um, So it won't be the destruction of Israel or significant damage, but where I think Israel would lose significantly is long-term. If the world sees Israel cross another massive red line that everyone would consider unacceptable, killing the supreme leader at a funeral attended by all world leaders during peace negotiations, et cetera, against the wishes of the US, that would just, Israel's global standing would take a massive, massive hit. So I think Israel would mainly suffer from that side of it. I don't think they'll strike, but I'm saying if they did, hypothetically speaking, because more and more people are talking about it in the last 24, 48 hours. Iran warned about it. That's where I think Israel would take the biggest hit.
Speaker 2: Well, I'll take the opposite position. So we saw in the, like last week, the US strike on Iranian positions following the Iranian drone strike on Ever Lovely, Iran struck back harder. So then the next day when the United States struck harder, Iran struck back harder. you know even was he you know hitting even more targets now that was limited um I I think on this time the Iranian patients will have been exhausted and there's enough pressure from let's call them the hard liners as the West likes to call them it's all that Iran never should have signed the MOU in the first place he just got played and frankly if they listen to JD Vance yesterday or the day before he's admitted yeah you know We're basically suckering them in, getting them to sign this MOU so we can then...
Speaker 1: The clip you spoke about yesterday, is that the one you're referring to?
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah. He said, we just did it to get this trade open so we can get some oil restocked so we can go back at them. So I think with all of that, I think the odds would be highly likely that Iran would start a missile strike on Israel that wouldn't end until Israeli, every Israeli military base was unusable.
Speaker 1: There's another thought I had is the likelihood, as I told you yesterday, is that the likelihood of Israel striking the funeral procession, I agree, we're aligned there that we both think it's highly unlikely. But what could happen is there's, it's not only the Supreme Leader, there's other leaders as well, I didn't write their names, but other IRGC leaders, including the right-hand man, Vibe, who I'm referring to, you might know his name. But they've been seen in public for the first time at the funeral processions. My thought would be, I don't think they'll strike at the funeral, but they might be able, assuming Mustafa shows up, even if Mustafa doesn't show up, they might be able to track them. And we might see decapitation strike a week from now, two weeks from now, four weeks from now. But I think the risk on the Iranian side is not, an attack on that day, but it's giving their whereabouts on that day and allowing Israel the ability potentially to be able to track them again because they're currently in hiding. So that's probably a bigger worry for me.
Speaker 2: Well, I hope you've considered that this funeral for the Ayatollah Khamenei, the elder, this is going to be the largest funeral in history of the world. It's bigger than the number that showed up for the burial of John F. Kennedy, bigger than the burial of Mahatma Gandhi. We haven't had anything comparable. I don't think we've ever had a funeral of an extended public commemoration, memorial, funeral for a leader that's lasted seven days, because it's going from basically today until the 9th, which is next Wednesday, where you've had over 100 leaders or 100 countries represented. And Iran already holds the record in the Guinness Book of World Records. the largest number, largest percentage of a population to attend a funeral. And that was from the burial of the Ayatollah Khomeini back in 1989. And there you didn't have more than 100. You didn't even have 50 representatives from other countries. Now you got over 100. You got Russia, you got China, you got India, you got all the major countries. You got Pashinyan of Armenia. I don't know if Aliyev showed up. Probably did. So this is really without precedent what's taking place right now.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I was going to check how many people attended Rudola Khomeini's funeral. You think it will be this one? More people will attend this one than Khomeini's one?
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah. Yeah, they'll set a new record.
Speaker 1: The irony of it, my team did a post on it. I saw it. It's like both of them start on July 4th. America's Declaration of Independence and the death of Iran's Supreme Leader. Sorry, the funeral of Iran's Supreme Leader, killed by the United States. So it's... A dark irony that day. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So that's on that front. Also, we didn't talk about it yesterday. Netanyahu's press office did deny the claims by the New York Times that they fabricated about Israel planning or attempting to assassinate Ghalibaf and Arachi during the Pakistani negotiations. Remember what we talked about yesterday? Unsurprisingly, so it doesn't mean it's true. It doesn't mean it's not true. It's impossible to really know But that also happened. Now, this will make you happy because I know I've been telling you the last couple of days that different reports of these military assets moving to the region, those military assets moving to the region. You get upset at me. Tell me, Mario, shut up and hang up on me. I'll call you back.
Speaker 2: Now, wait a second. Now, wait a second. I have never disrespected you in that way. I have never told you to shut up. I tried to respect you.
Speaker 1: It's on record. You said to me, shut up, you idiot, and hung up. Everyone could go back yesterday and listen to it.
Speaker 2: I don't speak to my children that way.
Speaker 1: You're one of my kids. Well, today's report, though, is several B-52 Shadow Fortress strategic bombers left the RAF Fairford in the UK and returned home. So left the UK. The B-52s, which returned from England, took bombing campaigns against Iran during the war. Aircraft spotters in the UK reported that by July 1st, all B-52s deployed in the US to RAF Fairford had left the British airbase. And so that was a couple of hours ago. And then three hours ago, yesterday, 11 US F-15 Strike Eagle fighter jets left in service with the 492nd Fighter Squadron returned to RAF UK from Jordan. All of the F-15s pictured have numerous GBU-38 JDAM precision guided bomb makings painted to show their use against Iran during the Iran war. To the F-15Es and their AGM-158s, JASM air launch cruise missiles markings. Anyway, so there's a few aircraft that have gone from Jordan to the UK. But let's say significant, I think the most significant one would be the B-52s going from the UK back to the US. So that happened two, three hours ago.
Speaker 2: Gee, who told you that like five days ago? Maybe Uncle Larry knows something.
Speaker 1: So I knew that would make you happy. So that happened in the last few hours.
Speaker 2: Thanks for that validation.
Speaker 1: um all right so that's in terms of some military equipment moving away um yesterday we spoke about the claims by centcom about the what was it the boxer uss boxer moving to the region and there hasn't been much reports on that And we talked about in my discussion with one of my other guests about a lot of the military assets remaining. So let's kind of put it into context in the last few days.
Speaker 2: Let me, sorry to interrupt, but why do you think they announced, made that statement about the USS Boxer? Hey, it's in station. They're ready to go. Do you have any hypotheses about that?
Speaker 1: I don't.
Speaker 2: So my analysis is that the U.S. is doing that to control trying to focus attention on, well, we still got assets here in theater while this drawdown is going on, to divert attention, to get people, focus on this shiny object over here, the USS Boxer. Oh, where is it? But they failed to go back and ask the basic question, well, wait a second, when did the USS Boxer depart for that region? That was, yeah, March 18th. As I said to you yesterday, If you put all the Marines in a rowboat and had them row, they would have got to the location they are now before the USS Boxer did. So it's just some mythology.
Speaker 1: So that's on the military build-up, or lack thereof. On Hormuz, we've talked about it so many times now. I think it's just... There's negotiations that are ongoing. There's talks, some reports about vessels going through the Omani side, others about vessels going through the Iranian side, disputes on how many vessels, how many vessels with the AIS, AIS transponders on or off. They are going to Asia, as you've said, most of them to China. Japan has been getting more of them as well. But that's... That's something we've discussed significantly. And we know about the deal yesterday with the US. The Americans are trying to get Iran not to charge a fee at the Strait of Homs. Iran's saying no, but we don't know what's happening behind the scenes. Are the Iranians saying, look, we need some very significant offer for us to consider giving up a fee at the Strait of Homs? And that's where the sanctions lifting and the unfreezing of assets may be discussed. Axios reported that this is a carrot that the Americans are giving the Iranians.
Speaker 2: Let me throw one other, I won't call it a fact, but I got information today from somebody who was in Doha, and Iran never showed. They said no.
Speaker 1: But they said they had a delegation there.
Speaker 2: Didn't show up. That's what I was told. My source is reliable, and a former... former let's call it former intelligence uh you know recently retired but still in contact with people who are active and he said iranians iranians didn't show they were supposed to but they didn't interesting that's the first i hear about it because the the both sides uh
Speaker 1: I've looked at in the last couple of days, but probably there's been negotiations and talks, but even, even a delegation negotiating delegation, nothing at all showed no one at all. Or you're talking, maybe the senior members did not know.
Speaker 2: Correct. Yeah. Nobody stayed home. So that's not worth our time.
Speaker 1: Um, something else completely separate. Um, initially I thought it's a nothing burger. Uh, someone sent me story, Mario, the IDF is in Venezuela. And I'm like, all right, they're helping with the, you know, the earthquake, they're helping with, you know, reconstruction, rescue efforts, et cetera, not reconstruction, rescue efforts. Then there was a story by Venezuela analysis talking and then mentioned that this is the first time, you know, Venezuela severed ties with Tel Aviv, with Israel back in 2009. So that makes the visit by the IDF a lot more significant. A lot of people are saying whether the IDF is expanding its influence in Latin America. Venezuela government welcomes Israeli diplomatic and military mission. Co-led by IDF Home Front Chiefs of Staff Elad Ediri, the preliminary team will be joined by additional Israeli personnel in the coming days. The Venezuelan government has welcomed an official Israeli delegation in the first significant bilateral engagement since Caracas with several ties with Tel Aviv in 2009. In the wake of the earthquake, a joint civilian military mission led by Israeli diplomat Yoav Megan landed In social media messages, the IDF claimed it's a humanitarian delegation to support recovery efforts and share Israel's experience in emergency situations. The Israeli government confirmed the deployment, but there is, you know, the skepticism there is whether this is just, you know, underneath the surface, this is something, I wouldn't say more sinister, just more of a new alliance between, you know, Venezuela now has a new leader that is seen as... more susceptible to U.S. pressure and U.S. interests. So would that be a possibility that maybe there's something more to it? No, not really.
Speaker 2: Look, I mean, Israel's always had extensive intelligence links throughout Central and South America. The second largest Jewish population in the Western Hemisphere is in Buenos Aires. second only to new york city so they got a huge jewish presence and loyal societies um the uh you know there was a guy i'll say his name because you know it was public marco shrimp marco uh was uh he was the one of the representatives for philip morris uh in panama uh official distributors And when we were investigating Philip Morris for money laundering and for laundering, you know, selling cigarettes to drug cartels, we got a shipment, we got documents one night where Marco's people were in this warehouse cutting off all of the identifying labels on the master cases of cigarettes. And Panamanian Customs caught them and initially was going to detain them. He got on the phone immediately to Philip Morris headquarters in Basel, Switzerland, and Philip Morris sent a document affirming, oh, no, he's our distributor. So anyway, he was later connected to some Assad operatives out of Guatemala that were state moving weapons to the out of the fence of the Columbia in Columbia, the right wing guys in Columbia. So, you know, Israel's got its hooks. The Mossad and the intelligence, it got its hooks throughout Central and South America. So, you know, even though they broke relations with Venezuela 17 years ago, I guarantee you Mossad still had people operating in Venezuela.
Speaker 1: That's wild how powerful they are for such a small country. They do, as Elon said, they heavily punch above their weight. They've obviously punched, in my view, punched too high above their weight from a political and military perspective since October 7th, but they're insane. All right, so anyway, there's the Venezuela story. There's another story no one's talking about that I would consider very significant. So what I've been talking about a lot recently is how this war is going to move to a new front, and that's through proxy wars. Well, Houthi media has reported today that two Saudi fighter jets breached Houthi airspace, Yemeni airspace, wanting to bomb the airport of the capital to prevent an airplane carrying Houthi delegation from taking off and missing out on the funeral of Ali Khamenei. The Saudi air force called off the mission after Houthi air defenses attempted to shoot down the jets and threatened to retaliate with a missile attack on Riyadh. The incident comes amidst heightened tensions and a mass mobilization effort of Yemeni fighters in Houthi territory and the territories controlled by the internationally recognized and Saudi-backed Yemeni government and the territories of the now defunct Southern Transitional Council. So this is all part of the tension, the mobilization we've seen, especially from the Saudi-backed Yemeni government, Yemeni groups, and the Houthi, you know, mobilized in response. There have been reports of some clashes, nothing too significant. But if you add that with what happened in Iraq, according to Ashraq al-Aswad al-Assad, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi launched a secret anti-corruption campaign targeting Iran-linked figures with a secret track focused on severing the twinning between Tehran-aligned individuals and state institutions. So the big crackdown we saw on corruption a few days ago, Ashraf al-Assad is claiming that this was linked to targeting politicians linked to Iran. So we are seeing those power struggles, those different powers pulling in different directions saudi the gulf mainly saudi in this case the americans i'm sure are involved in many ways the iranians and because these countries can't fight together as i've said many times i think we'll see more of these reports which will i think we'll see similar things in lebanon too so why did iraq agree to let the body of ayatollah ali khamenei come into iraq for one of the services I don't think Iraq, the government, is turning on Iran. I think that's far from it. There might be a small power struggle in this case.
Speaker 2: Isn't that the implication, that he went after only guys who were pro-Iran? True. It would seem to imply that he's being anti-Iranian, except when it came down to doing the funeral, they're fully supportive, and they met with Arachi. All I'm suggesting is, There may be something else to this other than, you know, they say, well, these guys are pro-Iranian. But, you know, what were they doing internally, domestically against the existing government?
Speaker 1: Yeah, so I don't know much about Iraq. I wouldn't be surprised if it's not linked to Iran. I don't think the Iraqi struggle, I'm not convinced it's linked to Iran yet, Yemen, obviously. But I would say it's usually not binary either. So we might see two countries, you know, we see this all the time, you know, especially in this region between Turkey and other Gulf countries, et cetera, Saudi and the UAE, pretty much all the countries where Israel and the US, where it's not binary, where on one side, they have good relations, et cetera. On the other side, they're fighting each other in another country. The UAE and Saudi do a lot of business together yet in Sudan, I think it is. No, sorry, in Yemen, they're fighting. They had a direct fight, the two-backed government. So I don't know whether we're seeing small power struggles in Iraq. I'm in your camp.
Speaker 2: i don't know enough to really have an opinion on it but this is just one media outlet reporting it this one for me is less important than the yemeni one i think the yemeni one is um could get bloody that worries me yeah no that i i don't disagree with that that is i've got i've had communications with somebody who's very active in the in the region doing consulting and he said keep an eye on the the houthis in yemen because there may be a a play which part of it's really a U.S.-Israeli effort to try to weaken the Houthis.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Now, the big story of the day is Poland. So let's start with the Lithuanian. Let's start with the smaller ones. So initially, there was a warning from... medvedev says finland has lifted its ban on hosting nuclear weapons what does that change for the finns just one minor thing their country is now russia's nuclear on russia's nuclear target list rejoice finland you've reached peak security and then lithuania according to the president said well the president of lithuania said a few days ago i initiated a constitutional amendment to remove the current restrictions on the possible deployment of nuclear weapons in lithuania This amendment would enable Lithuania to participate actively in NATO's collective nuclear deterrence. And the biggest story is Poland. So according to the Telegraph, the US has warned Poland that Russia may be preparing a limited armed provocation on Polish territory within months to test NATO's resolve. Quote, according to... Onet, possible scenarios include Russian missiles or drone strikes on Polish critical infrastructure, cyber or hybrid attacks, or small cross-border incursions from Kaliningrad or Belarus disguised as an accident. Polish and Baltic security sources believe Moscow's goal would be to create a crisis that pressures Western allies to reduce or suspend military support for Ukraine without triggering a full-scale NATO-Russia war. One scenario being considered involves Russia or Belarusian soldiers crossing into Poland and claiming they entered by mistake due to GPS failure or as part of a rescue mission. Polish sources say Moscow could then seek negotiations rather than confrontation, potentially using withdrawal from Polish territory as leverage to demand an end to Western aid to Ukraine. And sorry, the Prime Minister of Poland put out a statement, I don't mean to scare anyone, but the coming months may be truly critical. And due to the changing nature of the war, these concerns are particularly palpable in the Baltic states. So that's the Prime Minister's task of Poland.
Speaker 2: Well, the Baltic states should be worried if Lithuania is going to offer to put nuclear weapons in their country. Russia is not going to stand for that for one minute. They'll take over Lithuania. Just say, no, this is not happening. You know, because that's an existential threat to Russia. And, you know, they've ignored Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia up to this point. But if they, you know, this is in what you call the FAFO mode. So if they go for saying, oh, yeah, we're going to put a nuke in here. Russia is going to take it out.
Speaker 1: Regarding the threat on Poland, at least the report of Russia preparing some sort of attack on Poland to test NATO's resolve.
Speaker 2: What does that mean? What does that mean to test NATO's resolve?
Speaker 1: Article 5, I assume. I mean, to see if it gets accurate. So we've been talking for a while and there's been Russian diplomats that have been warning you, Karaganov being one of them. You've talked about it as well, that Russia is considering and has already shared the target list of Russian, sorry, of Ukrainian warehouses and factories or military factories in NATO that Russia could target because they support Ukraine. So obviously, if this is being considered, that could lead to very significant escalation. I'm sure Putin, who's, as you said, generally more restrained, is taken into consideration. So if they want to test whether that's a good idea, a good way to probe what a response would look like is through a small attack to see how NATO would respond. And based on that, then they'd keep discussing on whether striking NATO territory would be...
Speaker 2: They don't do a half measure like that. When they strike into a NATO country, whether it's Germany or the UK, those are the two most likely targets right off the bat. They're going to go after the factories, production facilities that are involved with drones and missiles that have been used to attack Russia. They will have warned both Germany and the UK, stop this or else. You choose. And Britain's already doubling down and sort of thumbing its nose at Russia. So I wouldn't be surprised if they hit the UK, but Russia's not doing it to test to see
Speaker 1: article 5 will work i think they already assume that that nato would try to invoke article 5 but then you've got the problem that each country has to approve going to war it's not just automatic they probably want to see how the the big elephant is the us how the us would respond and poland would be a good test case because i would be in the position that i don't think i don't believe putin would like to see direct conflict with the us So it's a cost-benefit analysis, and I think striking Poland and seeing what happens would be a way to get an idea of what that cost would look like and whether the US would get involved.
Speaker 2: That may have been the case two months ago, not now, with both Lavrov saying that he looks at the entire Anchorage Agreement as just a trap. It was a pretext. It was a fraud that the United States was not genuinely interested in. negotiated settlement with Russia. So the Russians are acting accordingly going forward. Their planning will assume the United States is going to get involved militarily, and Russia's prepared to respond to that. The one who's not prepared for it is the United States.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but would you agree that Putin does not want to see direct war with the U.S.?
Speaker 2: Well, Trump's been on both sides of the issue. That was his position earlier, but not now. He was praising Ukraine for its attacks inside Russia and insisted that the United States is now going to be more forthcoming with aid to Ukraine. The Russians have taken notes and, okay, that's your position. We understand it. Notice that they've not invited Witkopf and Kushner back to the Kremlin.
Speaker 1: I don't know. I think the US is probably one of the main obstacles that Russia has on determining whether to strike. They've warned about striking NATO for a while. They still haven't struck it. You might talk about why. What's the reason not to strike NATO? The cost of striking NATO would be NATO retaliating, striking Russia. And is it worth it? Because the alternative is just continuing the war of attrition and gaining the territory slowly or waiting for the Ukrainian military to capitulate, which is what the objective of a war of attrition would be. So when they're making this calculation, should we continue a war of attrition or should we escalate to force their hand and force Russia NATO to stop supporting Ukraine and force an earlier end to the war and maybe our objectives all achieved. And as they're making that calculation, I think if NATO, I think if they have, if they believe NATO would all come together and all retaliate in full force against Russia, I think Russia would be a lot more hesitant in striking NATO territory. But then if they calculate there's a lot of division within NATO and Trump doesn't, that genuinely will not join NATO, And there's a lot of indications that a high likelihood NATO would not join. That increases the likelihood that they will strike those targets in NATO. So for me, this warning by the US, if true, validates that the threat of a strike on NATO territory is now becoming more real.
Speaker 2: Oh, yeah. Well, I reported, or Reuters reported, I reprinted it on my blog last night, that there was a... one of the nato ships tried to stop a russian tanker transiting the baltic coming out of the baltic and a russian military ship approached it at a fast rate ran it off so one of these days you know someone's going to make a mistake and russia will fire on a nato ship maybe sink it and then there will be an uproar about article 5 and nato will be exposed for being a complete internal contradiction, that there is no unity on this, that there is wide views.
Speaker 1: Well, Greenland's prime minister said, quote, the world today, the world is unsettled. That is why we must stand strong together with others. Recent statements from people close to Trump remind us that we cannot take international support for granted. It must be built, it must be maintained, and it requires us to present where the world's leaders meet. Oh, that's a big one, sorry. Hexeth plan to announce additional US troop reductions in Europe that came in from the Wall Street Journal today in Europe at a meeting of NATO's top military commanders last month. he but the proposal was blocked after being reviewed by marco rubio and other senior trump officials the proposed cuts would have gone beyond the cancelled armored brigade deployment to poland and the early withdrawal of an infantry brigade from romania instead hexeth announced announced a six-month review of the u.s force posture in europe officials hope next week's nato summit in turkey will project alliance unity despite concerns that disagreements over u.s military commitments could overshadow the meeting. But yeah, there was a plan by Hexeth to further cut US military presence in Europe, but that was revoked by Rubio and others, according to Wall Street Journal today. Pretty scary time to be an Eastern European NATO member right now.
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's interesting that Rubio and Hexeth were on different sides of the issue.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's an interesting one. Usually it's J.D. Vance and the other two. Let's see. We've covered everything. Is there any other news on your front? Anything I missed?
Speaker 2: No, I think we talked about it. Just this Iranian funeral. This is a big deal. Just because the Western media is not covering it. I'm not talking about history of the last 100 years. In the history of the world... We have not seen a funeral commemoration this big with as many world leaders and or representatives of leading countries present. Hasn't happened, didn't happen in the 20th century and first time in the 21st. So it's really, pay attention to it.
Speaker 1: Larry, always a pleasure.
Speaker 2: My friend, thank you for, you know, And I've never told you to shut up.
Speaker 1: Thank you, Larry. I'll see you tomorrow.
Speaker 2: All right. All right, my friend. Keep smiling. Have a good laugh.
Speaker 1: All right. Bye-bye. All right, guys. We'll be going live again with Malcolm Nass, our last interview. It's an emergency interview in 20 minutes to discuss the developments when it comes to Poland and get his thoughts on it as someone who's fought with the Ukrainian military and as someone who's very supportive of the ukrainian military efforts to get his perspective on these developments as well um as well as the latest developments on iran but i'll really be focusing on the news when it comes to poland because that um that worries me so i'll see you guys then bye
reSee.it AI Summary
I see Glenn Diesen arguing that Washington still thinks wars can be ended on paper—then renegotiated—while others change reality first. He says Iran is taking control of the Strait of Hormuz to force adaptation, and he applies the same logic to Ukraine: battlefield facts rewrite any future talks. He extends this to Europe: deterrence, but also preparation for war, done before diplomacy.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Glenn Diesen: Washington is still negotiating on paper while everyone else is changing reality on the ground. The U.S. still believes it can end a war with a signed agreement, then spend the following months renegotiating the parts it doesn't like. Glenn thinks the rest of the world stopped believing that years ago. He says Iran isn't waiting for Washington to honour the MOU, it's establishing control over the Strait of Hormuz and forcing the world to adapt to a new reality instead. The debate now isn't whether Tehran will have leverage over the world's most important shipping lane, it's how much everyone will end up paying. Then he applied exactly the same logic to Ukraine. While Western leaders keep talking about future negotiations, Russia is creating irreversible facts on the battlefield. Every town captured, every defensive line broken, every buffer zone expanded: each one changes the next negotiation before it even starts. Then he turned to Europe. Finland joined NATO, Lithuania opened the door to nuclear weapons, while Poland is preparing for a future confrontation. European leaders call it deterrence, Russia calls it preparation for war. Countries aren't waiting for diplomacy anymore; they're reshaping the strategic map first and arguing about it afterwards. That's the thread connecting every conflict we discussed. Everyone is trying to create facts on the ground that the other side will eventually be forced to accept. That's why he thinks Washington keeps finding itself on the back foot. It still believes agreements create reality, while its rivals believe reality creates the agreements. @Glenn_Diesen
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion focused on multiple current geopolitical developments: Iran’s ongoing funeral proceedings for Ali Khamenei, Iran–Israel tensions around ceasefire negotiations, and the risks of escalation involving Russia, NATO, and Ukraine.
Regarding Iran, the conversation cited a New York Times report that the United States was worried Israel might kill Arachi and Ghalibaf. The claim was that the Americans warned Iran through Pakistan and Qatar—via negotiations mediated by Pakistan—that Israel may assassinate them. The report also alleged that Ghalibaf’s plane, while returning from negotiations, made an emergency landing in the north after Israeli fighter jets were spotted in Iraqi airspace near or entering Iranian airspace, after which the plane drove to Tehran. Netanyahu’s press office denied the claim.
The funeral context was described as a multi-day event underway, with world leaders including Medvedev in Iran. The question raised was whether Israel might assassinate Mustafa Khamenei (or other Iranian leaders) during the funeral. The response suggested it would be “too much” due to the large international delegation and the reputational and collateral-damage concerns such an assassination would create, while also arguing the news indicates Israel “becoming more reckless” if the claims were true. The discussion also touched on the idea that international warnings and mediation could be either real or “political theater,” but either way could damage U.S.–Israel relations by suggesting Israel is “extremely reckless” and that Americans felt the need to warn Iran about potential Israeli intent.
On negotiations, the conversation shifted to the Strait of Hormuz. It noted that Europeans accepted Iran would charge a fee, with a Bloomberg report saying they want standardization and not pay more than countries like China or Russia. The U.S. was described as still trying to convince Iran not to charge a fee, offering unfreezing of $6 billion in exchange for Iran not charging a fee; Iran rejected the offer. The response argued Iran would interpret the situation as establishing new “realities on the ground,” and would position the charge as a fee tied to assistance and other concerns rather than a simple toll. It also argued that trust issues make the U.S. asset-unfreezing proposal “absurd,” and that renegotiation and sanctions returning would lead Iran to avoid trading control of the strait for “empty promises.”
Broader regional tensions were listed: Lebanon on edge with Hezbollah; the Lebanese government seeking to disarm Hezbollah; mobilizations in Yemen involving Saudi-supported factions and Iran-aligned Houthis; and a crackdown in Iraq on figures close to Iran aligned with anti-corruption efforts. The discussion concluded the outlook was not good and that both sides would try to do something with the MOU rather than implementing it fully as outlined.
The conversation then moved to Ukraine and Russia. It cited a Telegraph report claiming U.S. intelligence warned Poland that Russia may prepare a limited provocation on Polish territory within months to test NATO resolve, including missile/drone strikes on critical infrastructure, cyber/hybrid attacks, or a small cross-border incursion from Kaliningrad or Belarus disguised as accidental GPS failure or a rescue mission, followed by leverage via withdrawal and demands to end Western aid to Ukraine. The response expressed skepticism due to elaborateness and the vulnerability of Kaliningrad, but acknowledged the possibility that Russia could strike a European country given prior arguments that weapons sent to fight Russia are legitimate targets and the European build-up. It also argued that Article 5 does not automatically force all NATO countries to go to war and that each country can decide its response, while warning escalation—including the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons—could be difficult to control if NATO becomes directly involved.
Additional updates were discussed: Bloomberg said Prime Minister Tusk urged Poland to be cautious with further aid for Ukraine at an upcoming NATO summit; Medvedev commented that Finland lifted its ban on hosting nuclear weapons; and the Lithuanian president initiated a constitutional amendment to remove restrictions on nuclear weapon deployment to participate in NATO’s collective nuclear deterrence. The response connected these changes to perceptions of increased targeting risk and the idea that expanded deterrence can increase danger rather than reduce it, describing Finland as becoming a frontline close to St. Petersburg and arguing European “reassurance” had become politically impossible.
Finally, the discussion summarized the Ukraine war. It claimed Ukrainians were “going from bad to worse,” contested claims that Ukraine is retaking territory and that Russians are taking larger casualties, and emphasized exchange ratios and map changes as evidence. It described specific battlefield concerns: increased exposure around Zaporizhzhia, Russian pressure and vulnerability near Orekhova, Russian advances threatening supply lines, and the fall of Konstantinovka and Krasny Liman in the north that would enable a pincer affecting Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. It also highlighted Russia’s talk of needing a bigger buffer zone and potential territorial aims beyond Donbas, including references to Novorossiya. The response added that Russia’s attacks behind the front include energy infrastructure and fuel logistics, targeting gas stations and transportation routes in order to disrupt Ukraine’s logistics, while arguing Ukraine has not yet collapsed but could unravel quickly once it begins.
The segment ended with thanks and a brief aside about a parrot in the office.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: Let's talk about the funeral that's happening now in Iran. There was a report, I don't know if you saw it yesterday, according to New York Times, the Israelis were, the Americans were worried Israel was going to kill Arachi and Ghalibaf. And they warned Iran through Pakistan and Qatar to warn Iran that Israel may assassinate them, sorry, during the negotiations in Pakistan, during the negotiations that were mediated by Pakistan at the request of the Americans. So that came out yesterday. And then in that report as well, it said that the Ghalibaf's plane, when returning from the negotiations, had to land up north at an airport emergency landing because two fighter jets, Israeli fighter jets, were spotted in Iraqi airspace, I think entering Iranian airspace. So they had to land the plane as an emergency landing and drive to Tehran. So that kind of gives you, if true, because Netanyahu a few minutes ago, his press office denied the claim just a few minutes ago. If true, that shows you how bold and one could say reckless the Israelis can be. And the reason I mention it now is the funeral proceedings that are ongoing. Ali Khamenei's funeral started, I think, yesterday. It goes on for a few days. A lot of world leaders from all around the world, Medvedev included, are in Iran right now paying their respects. So I'll jump straight to it for the big question. Do you think there's a risk that the Israelis could decide to assassinate Mustafa Khamenei if he does show up? Or even not him, maybe just other Iranian leaders. Is that something that worries you?
Speaker 0: I think it would be too much because, as you said, there's too much of an international delegation there. I can't remember from how many countries there were 70 or 100. Anyway, there's a lot of people. I might get those numbers wrong. There's a lot of foreign delegations there. So as you said, you have the former Russian president Medvedev. There you have the Saudis. They sent their own delegation. I mean, we can't go through the whole list of all the countries, but starting to assassinate leaders there, it would be very problematic. I think they're already struggling with their international reputation. And yeah, murdering and risking this kind of collateral damage would be a pretty bad thing. But of course, this news indicates that Israel is becoming more reckless. And if, again, as I like you added, if it's true, because if it's true, then obviously this also signals a bit of a split between the fact the Americans would warn about Israeli intent I mean, I'm not sure if, again, are they playing good cop, bad cop, or is this real in which there's a split? I always think there's a limit to all this political theater because even if this wouldn't be real, even if the whole story is made up, these stories, they travel through the media, through the population, and what is the American population stuck with? Well, at this time when there's more... anti-israel sentiments than ever before in the american population and now they're being told you know we are definitely not joined at the hip anymore the israelis are extremely reckless to the point where i have to warn the iranians about you know the israeli so it you know this is very damaging to relations so uh you know you have if it's just political theater it would be very counterproductive it's also if it's true it's it's it's a
Speaker 1: big signal of weakness if the americans can't even tell the israelis not to kill the negotiators they're negotiating with in a war that is catastrophic for the us that says a lot about that relationship between those two countries again i keep saying if it's true because it's a pretty wild claim even for israel to be killing the negotiators and for the americans not being able to to stop it but does it so just on the funeral that's happening as we speak um do you think he will show up and um do you think that would kill him if he does much
Speaker 0: Well, again, there's a lot of speculation, but I think he will show up simply because it's necessary. I mean, he's establishing himself as well. He doesn't carry the same authority as his father. So I assume he'll show up, but I don't think they will assassinate him. Again, I don't have much to base this on, but this is my... where I would put my money, but I could well be wrong though. Cool. Let's bet how much.
Speaker 1: You said that's where you put your money. You said it.
Speaker 0: You probably go on the Polymarket.
Speaker 1: I don't know if they put assassinations anymore on Polymarket. I think it was removed. I'll check after. We haven't spoken in about a week or so. What's your stance on where the negotiations are today? There's a... Powell's struggle on the Strait of Hormuz, the Europeans seem to have accepted the fact that Iran will charge a fee according to a Bloomberg report yesterday. The Americans are still trying to convince Iran not to charge a fee at the Strait of Hormuz. They're saying, hey, we will lift sanctions, we'll unfreeze assets. There was an offer made yesterday, a pretty shitty offer to be honest, but the Americans wanted to unfree $6 billion in return for Iran not charging a fee at the Strait of Hormuz. Iran rejected that offer. But not much has progressed. If anything, there's more tension in the region. Lebanon is on edge with Hezbollah. The Lebanese government wanting to disarm Hezbollah, which I don't know how that's feasible after Iran won the war. The mobilizations in Yemen between the two different factions, one supported by Saudi, one supported the Houthis, supported by Iran. The crackdown in Iraq against some members of the government, based on corruption, it's always corruption, that are close to Iran. aligned with iran just all these different moves within you know a month or two a couple of months since the mou was signed um not even a couple a few weeks um it's not looking good um not looking good and i know i know that's a concern you've always had but for me it's not looking good on how many fronts it's done in impact yeah well uh last we spoke we we i think we're more or less in agreement that is there unlikely this uh mou would be implemented in full as it was outlined
Speaker 0: So again, I think both sides will try to do something with it. That is, for the Iranians, I think they will take this as an opportunity to all establish new realities on the ground, as you said, as long as they stick to their guns, other countries will realize that this is the new realities. And if they want to prosper and be able to use this straight, then as you said, they will have to begin to make their peace with the idea that a fee has to be paid. And I think that's the position Iranians will take. They won't take a toll, which would be defined as merely charging someone for passing through, but a fee because anyone who pass through will require some uh you know possible search and rescue uh assistance if required there's some environmental issues all this you know you can always slap some extra taxes on essentially and and call it a fee and i think that's what they will do uh i think so far the the main uh i think at least europeans many states are making their peace with this the only problem is I think many of them would like it to be standardized. They don't like the idea that they would pay higher than, say, China or Russia.
Speaker 1: That's what the Europeans are saying. According to Bloomberg, they've accepted there'll be a fee, but they're like, hey, please just make it standard. Don't charge us more than the Russian or Chinese.
Speaker 0: Yeah, but why would they charge the same for the countries that tried to destroy Iran versus the country that helped Iran survive? It's hard to... for the Europeans to sound very serious when they're going to lecture because you know they the way they use sanctions as well is uh yeah I mean the way they use economic portion it's it's it's quite extreme so uh yeah again they can complain but at the end of the day if they want to use the straight they're gonna have to pay it's uh and uh to what extent though the Iranians will lower for lower the fee for some countries over other, it remains to be seen. But again, I think there will be a difference in the fees because again, when you look at the economic statecraft and geoeconomics, it's not just about how the state can make more money. It's also how you convert economic dependencies into political currency that is, you know, For example, for over the decades, Germany and Japan had good economies, but were never able to convert this into political influence. I think what the Iranians will is not just to make some money, but be able to use this somehow. So again, if you go to the Gulf states and suggest that they might pay lower fees if they don't host American bases, know then you're converting your economic power that is over a maritime transportation corridor and you convert it into a political influence and incentive so i think that's how iran will use it i mean that's you at least what countries been doing over the centuries um anyways i think that's the the european approach regarding the deal proposed by washington unfreeze some assets in return for opening up the strata vermouth i mean For me, it's absurd. Controlling the Strait of Hormuz is the main prize, the spoils of war for the Iranians. And they're going to give it away for unfreezing assets? I mean, even if all assets were unfrozen, all sanctions are gone, it's still, who would trust it? New sanctions will come next week. Why would you believe anything after all of these broken deals? Indeed, the MOU itself says that the Americans should... unfreeze the assets and they should pay reparations and remove all sanctions. So now they're going to renegotiate this. And this is all based on trust in the United States, even though they're currently trying to renegotiate what they already signed only a few days ago. So no, I don't think the Iranians will go for this. Again, the Strait of Hormuz will be under Iranian control. This, as I said, economic benefits It has political benefits, but also this is how the war has been sold to the Iranian public. At least this is what we get from it. This is how Iran will come out on top. So for Iran to trade all of this away for some empty promises, no, I don't think so. But this is what I think was predictable would happen. It was same as the 10th point. plan of the Iranians, which America agreed to with the ceasefire. The Americans will sign under it in order to get the fighting to stop, and then they will gradually try to water it out, renegotiate as they go along, and possibly they will also try to reshape the battlefield, that is, perhaps instigate a civil war in Lebanon, which they could achieve now, which is quite an achievement by the Israelis. Again, normative or approved as the stamp of approval, but just the fact that they're able to outsource this to make the Lebanese fight each other, or if Trump gets the Syrians into this. And also Iraq, if they're able to start to limit or weaken the Iranian loyalists within Iraq, then they could also begin to shape the region more in their favor.
Speaker 1: I don't think the Americans are touching the table, Glenn.
Speaker 0: It's making a big sound on the mic. Okay, it is you.
Speaker 1: It's been doing for a while.
Speaker 0: I'm waiting for knocking my phone on the table for no good reason.
Speaker 1: Very loud. Yeah. Sounded like a strike. I'm like, shit, you are on the front line. I want to get your thoughts on the piece of news.
Speaker 0: Still some sound.
Speaker 1: This is weird. Yeah. That's weird. Not a big one. It sounds like something moving. You have a mouse or a hamster on the table? Did you get a parrot? A pet parrot? No, not so much. It's weird, yeah. Something's touching the mic. I don't know what it is. It's a bit odd. So you can hear it. You know what I mean. You've got guests as well. So it's like something's touching the table. It's touching the mic. So it's making a bit of sound. It's not loud now. Not as loud as the phone. The sound of a boop, boop. um all right so about the ukraine war so the telegraph came up with a great story today to get you to give you more incentives to move the hell out which i know you don't need more incentives but you got a new one the us has warned poland that russia may be preparing a limited arm provocation on polish territory within months to test nato's resolve according to the telegraph quote according to ownet possible scenarios include russian missile or drone strikes on polish critical infrastructure cyber or hybrid attacks, or a small cross-border incursion from Kaliningrad or Belarus disguised as an accident. Polish and Baltic security sources believe Moscow's goal would be to create a crisis that pressures Western allies to reduce or suspend military support for Ukraine without triggering a full-scale NATO-Russia war. One scenario being considered involves Russian or Belarusian soldiers crossing into Poland and claiming they entered by mistake due to GPS failure or as part of a rescue mission. Polish sources say Moscow could then seek negotiations rather than confrontation, potentially using withdrawal from Polish territory as leverage to demand an end to Western aid for Ukraine. Holy shit. What do you think? Could that be true? Wow.
Speaker 0: Well, it's a bit too elaborate, I think. I think there's a possibility that Russia could strike a European country because, well, they already outlined where the production facilities are for the weapons that are being sent to fight Russia. They made the point that these are legitimate targets. And so the Europeans haven't taken the warning and they continue only to escalate both the rhetoric, they're making clear their intentions on intensifying the war against Russia, and they're building the capabilities to do so. They even set dates now for when the war with Russia would likely start. So I'm assuming that for the Russians, they're not going to wait for, you know, allow the Europeans to set a date when they're ready to fight the Russians. I think if they think a war is unavoidable now, then I think the Russians would at some point decide to throw the first punch. But whether or not this is real...
Speaker 1: Nothing touching the table still, you sure?
Speaker 0: No. Maybe it's not me.
Speaker 1: Oh, good. Go ahead.
Speaker 0: Yeah. No, what I was going to say is it's hard to tell anything because of the fog of war here. That is for the British, of course. They want to sell the idea that Russia wants to restore the Soviet Union. They want to conquer Western Europe, march west. this imperialist narrative which is very key to keep the support for the war going so they have every reason to sell the story of a russia which is dying to attack western europe on the other hand the russians are also now in a position where they really need to restore their deterrence because the europeans are now preparing to escalate in such a manner which it becomes impossible for the russians to ignore so they also have to know essentially yeah throw down the gauntlet and tell the uh tell the europeans either you back off or there will be war so but again this was a very specific mission into into poland i i just don't see especially from kaliningrad why would the russians want to make this vulnerable region even more vulnerable i would assume that there would be some strikes on some production facilities clearly weapons which are headed to to the front, which makes them legitimate targets for Russia. So I'm skeptical, but it's not impossible.
Speaker 1: I know you're skeptical, but it fits into your concern. So you have a concern that there'll be war between Russia and NATO. And Russia's already warned of something more drastic, of striking certain infrastructure, certain targets inside Europe that is used to support Ukraine. So if that is actually being considered, then testing the resolve of NATO only makes sense. potential plan, the warning by the US, by US intelligence. If true, to be honest, logically speaking, it does make sense for Russia to do this because they'd want to see how NATO responds to see how far they can push.
Speaker 0: Yeah. No, it is possible, like I said. It's just...
Speaker 1: I'll add a question to it. Sorry, Glenn. And if they do do it, so I'll let you comment, but also if they do do it, how do you think Poland and NATO would respond if this report is true and does actually happen, one of the various scenarios they mentioned?
Speaker 0: Well, then the Article 5 will be tested. And I think for some reason, a lot of our politicians and journalists across the West thinks that Article 5 makes all countries obligated to go to war. But I would advise them to actually read Article 5 of the NATO Charter, because what it argues is that each country should consider it as an attack on everyone. And they can take the decisions themselves, how they want to respond to this. So they can write a strongly worded letter, or they can join in on the war. That's up to them. But this idea that it's an obligation to go fight the Russians, not the case and even if it was um you know how how certain is it that they would actually live up to this and it would be interesting well not interesting but it would be i think many countries would not want to go to war with russia some seem very eager the baltic states germany the scandinavians they seem very gung-ho on war But there's a lot of countries which would drop off and I'm assuming the United States would do the same. I think they would treat the Europeans a bit like the way we treated the Ukrainians. That is, you know, we support you. Good luck. Here's all these weapons. Now go die and weaken Russia a little bit more. But I have a hard time believing that the Americans would enter a direct fight with the Russians because at that point it would be near impossible. to avoid escalation. I mean, if NATO countries get into a direct war with Russia, why would Russia accept the idea that the war would be limited to Ukrainian and Russian territory? Anyone striking Russia would be struck themselves. And I think it would be very easy to escalate up to a nuclear strike. So tactical nuclear weapons, at least. So this is my concern still. This has been my concern since 2014, that is, this is the direction we're heading and there's no one seeking any course correction. So, no, I think that's a very strong possibility now, which is why this story could be true. It's just hard to say, there's so much propaganda at the moment.
Speaker 1: Funny enough, while you're speaking, Bloomberg put out a piece, Poland should be, as according to Tusk, Prime Minister Tusk, Poland should be cautious in pledging aid for Ukraine. Poland should be cautious in pledging further financial aid to Ukraine at next week's NATO summit in Ankara, according to Prime Minister Tusk, adding to an increasingly skeptical tone in Warsaw towards its eastern neighbor. And that's after the disagreement they had where Poland was meant to offer aid fighter jets to Ukraine for Ukraine offering drone technology for Poland. And Ukraine, funny enough, changed their position. For some reason, they decided not to go ahead with that agreement. But also today, Dmitry Medvedev said the following, Finland has lifted its ban on hosting nuclear weapons. What does that change for the Finns? Just one minor thing. Their country is now at Russia's nuclear target list. Rejoice, Finland. You've reached peak security. Also, Lithuanian president says, a few days ago, I initiated a consultation, constitutional amendment to remove the current restrictions on the possible deployment of nuclear weapons in Lithuania. This amendment would enable Lithuania to participate actively in NATO's collective nuclear deterrence. What's going on here in Finland and Lithuania?
Speaker 0: Well, first of all, I just want to add on the Polish issue, that is the... the Ukrainians and the Poles are having some problems now because of finally after almost four and a half years or actually longer since 2014 the Poles seems to have suddenly taken offense to the fact that they're celebrating Bandera and the OUN so the Ukrainian fascists and the collaborators of Hitler who massacred a lot of Jews, Russians as well as 100,000 Polish civilians so Again, they've watched this since 2014, they've seen the flags, the pictures, they've seen the streets being renamed after Bandera and this group of people, but now suddenly they have taken notice and this has caused quite a split between them, which manifests itself also in the military cooperation. So why this is an issue now? It could be because It's a critical time for Ukraine. If you think Ukraine is falling or collapsing, that's a good time. Either you have to step in and put yourself on the front line against Russia, or you have to start backing off. It could be strategic, just a way of possibly backing off when things go very wrong. Regarding Finland, you can't really overstate what a horrible situation horrible decision making there's been over the past few years. Finland used to be the main success story of one of the main success stories of neutrality. They fought the Russians or the Soviets, then they were defeated. Then they got the deal for neutrality. And again, they didn't need deterrence as long as they didn't threaten the Soviets. They had no problems with them. They didn't threaten the Russians. They never had any problems. So for this reason, Neutrality was a source of security. It essentially eliminated the security dilemma. Finland isn't threatening as a frontline. The Russians isn't threatening them back again. And then, of course, they joined NATO and now they changed their laws so they can transport and accommodate nuclear weapons. So, yeah. Well, if you're sitting in the Kremlin, now you're going to have a neighboring state this close to St. Petersburg, hosting possibly American or French nuclear weapons, of course they would be among the first ones to be hit. So this is common sense. More weapons does not always give you more security. But again, there's not much common sense in Europe anymore. We always try to balance deterrence with reassurance. But there is no reassurance anymore. It's considered to be pro-Russian. So you can't even argue that perhaps we should offer some reassurance. It's politically impossible at this time in Europe. So the only thing they know how to do is to increase what they consider to be deterrence and then assume that the Russians will buy into the idea that they're only having defensive intentions. But yeah, so... I think things will spiral out of control at some point. And even after the war with Ukraine is over, Finland is going to find itself in a very dangerous position because now it's become the largest frontline against Russia that is on the border. And well, it doesn't mean there has to be war, but the Russians are already rebuilding the Leningrad military district there. And so there's going to be a lot of artillery, pointing into all military assets and probably cities as well in Finland. So this is usually peace. You would look for demilitarization, removing military assets from each other's borders. This has set them back decades and will cause trouble decades coming.
Speaker 1: Last question, Glenn, is maybe a good overview of your thoughts on the latest developments in that war. You've got Ukraine striking deeper into Russia, changing their strategy to focus more on the refineries. Russia's importing refined oil, excuse me, refined products. It's in a very interesting position. It's a position it's never been before, exports crude and imports refined products. So do you think that strategy would work? And what do you make of Russia's progress on the front line? Still very slow, but progress nonetheless. Maybe a good overview would be good.
Speaker 0: Well, about the oil, I don't know. I haven't made up my mind yet. I'm still thinking about that one. But on the front lines, I think there's a lot of critical development at the moment. That is, the Ukrainians are going from bad to worse. And I think across the West, many people would dismiss that as well. Obviously, that's not true because all our media, all our politicians are now saying that the tide has turned, the Ukrainians are winning. Yet for some reason they keep saying that the Russians are taking massive casualties. They're saying that the Ukrainians are retaking their territory. But that doesn't really make any sense. Again, if you look at the maps, how they change from day to day, you see that this isn't true. And second of all, if you look at the exchange of fallen soldiers, know the ratio is always extreme it's you know you get like 30 or 40 dead russian soldiers traded for a thousand dead ukrainian soldiers so it's huge huge disparities often one to twenty one to forty i'm not sure that's how the casualties are on the ground because uh often you know you would have more of the enemy soldiers uh in your storages you know the deceased ones if you're the one advancing uh but again we are claiming that it's nato is claiming now that uh The Russians are taking more casualties than the Ukrainians. And they're claiming that the Ukrainians are taking territories. But they can't explain a lot of these numbers. So no, I think that things are going very bad very quickly. And on the front lines, you see Saporizhia becoming more and more exposed. The Russians are coming in. They have a very long front line now in the east where they're now making Orekhova very vulnerable. And after that, they can reach the main city, Saporizhia, on the Dnieper River. So that would cut a big hole in the supply lines of the Ukrainians. And also importantly, I mean, the special military operation was initially defined as by the objective of taking back or taking, liberating, conquering, whatever word we want to use, Donbas. And now you see Two important cities have fallen, which is Konstantinovka and Krasny Liman in the north. And this will allow the Russians to begin to develop a huge pincer, that is to essentially begin to cut off Slavyansk and Krematorsk. Those are the main two cities left in Donetsk. Once this falls, not only is Donbass under Russian control, but this has been the main defensive line. After this, the Russians can... more or less just push any direction they want. And at the same time, they're very close to zooming now. And the Russians are talking about needing an even bigger buffer zone because they don't believe that much like the Iranians, they will ever get any peace which they can rely on. So they will just seek territorial conquest as a way of ensuring this peace. And they're also having possibilities of getting even closer now to Karakov. So there's a lot of concerns. You have reports that they might go now in the north, enter, go into Chernigov and even make an attempt for Kiev. I'm not so sure about that. And then, of course, you had Putin very recently make the comment that, well, after we're done with Donbass, we're going to also liberate Novorossiya, which is the historical southern lands of what is today Ukraine. So that means Nikolaev and Odessa as well. And if the Russians succeed, this is essentially going to make Ukraine a landlocked rump state. And I know the common arguments in the Western media say, well, look how long time it took them to get to Slavyansk and Krematorsk. But this is a war of attrition. So all of Ukraine's manpower has been expanded. They are deep lacking air defenses, key military equipment, troop shortages, all their heavy defensive lines, which NATO helped them build since 2014, are now behind the Russians. So it doesn't matter how long it took them to take this heavily fortified, also industrial region, where there's a lot of natural barriers and defensive positions. In the world of attrition, once one side is bled white and begin to collapse, then this is the time when you snatch whatever territory you want. So the idea that this measure only by how fast the front lines have moved so fast, it doesn't really make any sense. But again, most of our media and politicians are trying to sell a long war. They want to commit the public to continue fighting. and continue believing that it's a good idea not to talk to the opponent. So anyways, that's how I see the front lines. But making matters worse, the Russians are also hitting behind the front lines, not only destroying all the energy infrastructure, now they're even going after the gas stations, which has its effect. I mean, I think there's like 6000 gas stations across Ukraine. They've knocked out not that much, I think 250 or something. But overall, It's concentrated in the east of Ukraine and they're targeting the ones on key roads. So everything is about shutting down the logistics and transportation in Ukraine. So a lot of this has an impact. So no, I think things well, I don't see the collapse coming yet in Ukraine, but once it begins to unravel, it could happen fairly quickly.
Speaker 1: Glenn, thanks for jumping on. Always a pleasure. Congratulations on the parrot. It's nice for you to have company in the office.
Speaker 0: I will either kill the parrot or buy a new mic.
Speaker 1: No, the mic got better the last 10 or so minutes. But congratulations on the parrot. All right, guys. So not guys. Glenn, absolute pleasure. Thank you so much. And guys, I'll be back live in 19 minutes to continue the conversation with, I think it's Sal. to look at what's happening in the Strait of Homo. Yep, Salmer Cogliano to have a discussion on the Strait of Homo. See you guys in 19 minutes. Bye-bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m alarmed that Congress passed the KIDS Act, billed as protecting children online, by bundling 14 digital safety bills around the Kids Online Safety Act. Though it claims it doesn’t require age verification, it makes platforms liable if they “knew or should have known” a user was a minor, pushing everyone to prove adulthood. It also raises serious security risks by requiring ID/selfie/face data at scale.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸 Congress just passed a bill that could force you to upload your ID or scan your face to use the internet. It is called the KIDS Act, and almost nobody wants to vote against protecting children online. That is exactly the problem. Last week the House passed it 267 to 117. It bundles 14 digital safety bills together, anchored by a revised version of the Kids Online Safety Act. The bill says it does not require age verification. It even includes a disclaimer saying so. The catch is one clause away. Platforms get held liable if they "knew or should have known" a user was a minor. That is a low bar. It means a regulator decides after the fact whether a company should have figured out someone was 15. No platform wants to gamble on that, so the safe move is to just verify everyone. Here is where "protect the kids" quietly flips. To prove you are not a minor, you have to prove you are an adult. Driver's licenses, passports, or a facial scan to log on. The net does not catch children. It catches all of us. Then there is the security problem. Force millions of people to upload IDs everywhere, and somebody ends up sitting on a giant pile of passport scans and face data. The Tea app showed how it goes. It required a selfie and a government ID, promised to delete them right after, and did not. In July 2025, about 13,000 of those IDs and selfies leaked onto 4chan, some still carrying GPS data that let someone map where users lived. The KIDS Act would mandate that exact collection across the whole internet. Kids do run into real harm online, and wanting to fix that is fair. But this fix builds a surveillance system that touches every adult. Rep. Thomas Massie called it a Trojan horse bill. It now heads to the Senate. The real question is simple. Is protecting kids online worth building an internet where everyone has to prove who they are just to log on? Source: EFF, ACLU, R Street Institute, NBC News, The Hill / Writer: Julie
reSee.it AI Summary
Washington offered to unfreeze Iran’s money if Tehran opened Hormuz free. Tehran refused, and the troop buildup that followed alarmed me: USS Boxer/Portland plus at least 24 warships, including two carriers and 15 destroyers, with no drawdown. I also noted reported US fears of Israeli assassination of Iranian negotiators—nothing is guaranteed. With leaders inbound for funerals, the “match” is already lit over Iran.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 Washington offered to unfreeze Iran's money if Tehran opened Hormuz free of charge. Tehran said no, and the hardware moving into the region says what happens next The Wall Street Journal broke the rejection, and Anthony Aguilar wasn't surprised: the US keeps re-wrapping the same demand, and Iran has no reason to hand back the one lever that's working. What alarmed him more is the map. The USS Boxer and USS Portland just arrived with a fresh Marine Expeditionary Unit, at least 24 warships now sit in theater including two carriers and 15 destroyers, and no drawdown order has ever been given. In his reading, amphibious groups and port-building logistics ships exist for exactly one kind of mission, and pairing them with a 12-nation naval summit on Hormuz in Bahrain tells you which waterway someone is planning around. Then there's the New York Times bombshell we broke down together: during April's negotiations, Washington reportedly feared Israel would assassinate Ghalibaf and Araghchi, the two faces of the peace track. Pakistani jets escorted the delegation, and Ghalibaf's plane made an emergency landing in Mashhad after warnings Israeli fighters had entered Iranian airspace. Aguilar's blunt takeaway: when your closest ally has to be warned off killing the other side's negotiators, you cannot offer anyone a security guarantee. Which brings us to the five days ahead. Funeral commemorations begin, with world leaders inbound, and his final line stayed with me: the match is already lit, dangling over the gunpowder somewhere over Iran.
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on “breaking news” and the risk of an escalation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, particularly around negotiations in Qatar and the Strait of Hormuz.
The New York Times reported that during nuclear negotiations involving Iran, Washington feared Israel was planning to assassinate Iranian Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Arachi to derail the talks. The report says Washington asked several countries to warn Iran, and that Iran sought guarantees through Pakistani and Qatari mediators that its delegation would not be targeted. Ghalibaf’s plane later made an emergency landing in Mashhad after warnings and intelligence that Israel planned to strike. The story also describes escorting of the Iranian delegation aircraft between the Iranian border and Islamabad by Pakistani fighter jets, and on the return flight Iranian security services warning of intelligence that two Israeli fighter jets had entered Iranian airspace from the Iraqi border, followed by an emergency landing near the location mentioned as Mashhad and travel by road to Tehran.
The Wall Street Journal report discussed a separate development: the United States offered Iran a proposal in Qatari negotiations to release frozen funds in exchange for Iran fully opening the Strait of Homs (as stated) without any fees. Iran rejected the proposal. A recurring claim made in the conversation is that if the U.S. does not accept the terms related to fees in the Strait of Homs (as stated), or if Iran does not accept not charging a fee, then the U.S. has “no choice but to go back to war.” The conversation links this to a perceived deadlock and to concern that continuation of war is becoming inevitable.
Anthony describes the indirect negotiation method via third parties in Qatar and other channels, arguing it is unlikely to yield tangible results because Iran is not compelled or leveraged enough to capitulate to U.S. demands. He also says the U.S. is closer to war than negotiations given the lack of substantive progress, and points to a redeployment of U.S. forces: the USS Boxer (described as a WASP-class amphibious carrier) being redeployed with a fresh rotation of amphibious Marines from an Amphibious Readiness Group. He claims there are upwards of 50,000 troops in the region and that carriers and other units have been resupplied and rotated, including fresh deployments replacing the 82nd Airborne Division.
The conversation then turns to Iran’s upcoming Ayatollah Khamenei funeral ceremonies, described as a week of events running July 4 through July 9, with July 9 as the main funeral procession/burial day. The argument presented is that the funeral week creates multiple opportunities for targeted actions. Anthony suggests it is “not beyond Israel” to carry out an assassination during such ceremonies and lists prior examples discussed during the conversation, including strikes targeting figures connected to Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and events in multiple countries (including Malaysia and Tunisia) during funerals or funeral processions. He argues the calculus is different when many world leaders are present but still claims that opportunities exist in the days before July 9 and in moments when fewer Iranian figures or IRGC representation are isolated. The exchange also notes that actions do not necessarily require large explosions, suggesting alternatives like sniper attacks or other covert means.
A major segment concerns a weapon described as a “Ginsu Hellfire” or Hellfire R9N variant. Anthony claims the missile does not explode but instead ejects blades at high speed and can penetrate precisely, minimizing collateral damage. A related explanation is read aloud by “Speaker 0,” describing laser guidance and hidden blades ejected by high-pressure gas. The conversation states that the technology is used by the United States and that Israel “absolutely possesses that weapon,” including a claim about its use in Iran, where the missile allegedly penetrated a building side with blades leaving marks while neighboring occupants were not affected. The discussion concludes that Israel could conduct assassination attempts in a way that limits collateral damage, with the funeral procession highlighted as a potential high-impact setting.
The discussion also returns to military posture and “no reduction” claims: it states that there has been no order to reduce U.S. forces, and that U.S. Central Command commander Brad Cooper described “more than 50,000 American service members” operating across the region and remaining vigilant and ready. Another point raised is a U.S.-led 12-nation military summit in Bahrain focused on the Strait of Hormuz, described as military rather than diplomatic. Anthony argues that the only way the U.S. can attempt to change negotiation conditions through military power is via the Strait of Hormuz or by changing Lebanon’s calculus, and he suggests the U.S. may be preparing direct operations in the Strait of Hormuz involving other nations.
Further claims are made about regional complications: the Houthi movement via “Ansar Allah” is said to have stated that the Strait of Bab al-Mandab is closed to Israeli or “Israeli associated” vessels, raising questions about whether U.S. vessels or drone bases in Djibouti (Camp Lemonnier, as stated) and other U.S. presence connect to the restriction. The conversation also references an “explosion in Syria” and states that Alshara reportedly said he does not want to be part of the proxy game and will not fight Hezbollah, while also worrying others might want to undermine that stability.
The overall conclusion presented is that Iran rejected the latest U.S. offer, U.S. forces are not reducing and have increased with the USS Boxer deployment, Israel’s alleged attempt to target Ghalibaf and Arachi during negotiation-related travel is part of the backdrop, and attention is focused on what happens during the Khamenei funeral ceremonies—especially whether Mustafa Khamenei will appear and whether an assassination attempt occurs within the days leading up to or around July 9.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: Did you see the breaking news or I'm the man that will break it to you? There's been quite a bit of breaking news, which is the latest.
Speaker 2: No, this is the breaking news with capital T-H-E. Then I wait in bated breath for you to break it to me. So according to the New York Times, no, that's not the one. The big one that's just happened. is we'll go to the other one afterwards, the one about, I'm sure you've seen that one, Israel was apparently, or the US was worried Israel was about to assassinate Ghalibaf Narachi.
Speaker 1: Yes.
Speaker 2: You probably saw that one yet, which is fucking wild. We'll talk about that in a bit. But the one that just came in that I think is more consequential, even though the other one's more dramatic, according to the Wall Street Journal, the US offered Iran a proposal to, so there's a proposal that's been made in the Qatari negotiations, to release frozen funds in exchange for Iran fully opening the Strait of Homs without any fees. And Iran has rejected the proposal, unsurprisingly. But the reason this worries me is I've just had many guests tell me that, especially in the last four days, that if the U.S. does not accept to open up the Strait of Homs, I'll rephrase that. If Iran does not accept not to charge a fee in the Strait of Homs, then the US has no choice but to go back to war. And we've just seen that deadlock play out on a small scale just now, which worries me on whether the continuation of the war is becoming more and more inevitable. I'd love to get your thoughts on this new development.
Speaker 1: Well, that development is new. I predicted that that would likely be the case based on the discussions between third party indirect discussions in Qatar, where the United States and Iran were not talking with each other, but basically proposing things through Qatar, through Pakistan to be delivered to each other. It was apparent to me that that was not going to yield any tangible results and continuing to offer for the United States to continue to offer the same conditions just wrapped in different language or wrapped in different wrapping paper. Iran is still going to reject that because Iran is not compelled nor leveraged by the United States to capitulate to any of those demands of a change of condition. So not surprising to that, the more recent breaking news that I think is even more concerning based on the war footing of the United States is that the United States has now redeployed, reordered and redeployed the USS Boxer, which is the WASP clasp amphibious carrier. The USS Boxer was there before, at the height of Epic Fury when we had pretty much every asset available in theater. And the USS Boxer came left right around the time of Project Freedom. But now the USS Boxer has been redeployed with a fresh rotation of amphibious Marines from the Amphibious Readiness Group, the ARG. We still have upwards of 50,000 troops in the region. We still have the... The carriers that are there that are now where during this dividend of peace negotiations, there's been resupply and there's been rotation of sailors and soldiers into the region. New fresh deployments from Fort Bragg, North Carolina to replace the brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division that was already there, but you got fresh troops in now. So looking at that war footing and in, with the context of the talks yielding nothing, going nowhere. And remember, we're so far down the road missing the exit on this highway to the shit show that the MOU discussion, that's so far off the table right now. We're just talking about technical discussions regarding the Strait of Hormuz and frozen assets to where we can't even get talks going on that. So we're much closer to war than we are to negotiations right now. And I think that when we look at the already attempts by Israel to assassinate Pakistani interlocutors and negotiators and others, we're two days away from the Ayatollah's funeral procession week, the 4th through the 9th of July, and it is It is not only not beyond Israel to assassinate someone during a funeral, it's pretty much their MO. I mean, just in the last 10 years, Israel has conducted strikes to take out figures of either Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and also in Syria, to assassinate during funerals. Actually, during funeral processions in Malaysia, Tunisia, Gaza, the West Bank, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and just in April of this year, April of 2026, they struck a funeral procession in the Bekaa Valley to go after Hezbollah leadership and killed 10 people. So assassinating leaders during funeral processions. Yes, they've actually partaken in an assassination in Malaysia and also in Tunisia.
Speaker 2: That's freaking wild. One thing I was contemplating was whether... Yeah, I was thinking in the last few days, I'm like, would Israel kill Mustafa if he shows up to the funeral this weekend? I'm like, I know they're They take risks and they know they're kind of wild at times, but they won't do that, especially not when Medvedev is there and see the diplomats from different countries, leaders of different countries attend the funeral processions. They're not going to kill Mustafa Khamenei during those processions. That's a step too far. But then you mentioned all the examples that you've just said right now. I didn't know it was that many countries. I know there was in Lebanon funeral processions. That's it. Probably in Gaza, I would always guess the same thing happens in Gaza. But that would be it. I didn't know that many countries.
Speaker 1: They went after Khalil al-Wazir in Malaysia. He was one of the early founders of the Palestine Liberation Organization. He had left the region and gone to Tunisia, and they assassinated him there. Now, the calculus for such an act is a lot riskier considering who's going to be attending these funeral processions. But remember, this is a week long of various ceremonies, processions, memorializations, marches, you know, et cetera. It's not just one big event. Now, July 9th, the actual funeral, if you will, like for example, the fourth through the eighth is more like a nationwide wake. Like if you would consider in an Irish Catholic funeral, right, you have a wake. then you know when you have the actual funeral itself so um there's proceedings before july 9th is the actual ceremonial official funeral in in in in the tradition um of the muslim faith now a lot can happen between then and there to where there could be opportunities depending on um who is where at the time now would they strike the actual procession on the 9th of july where We know that Russian officials will be there and other world leaders. Iraq has members, has people that are going to this procession in Iran. So would they necessarily strike it then? Likely not. I still wouldn't take it out of the picture, but likely not. But in the days proceeding at various opportunities to where there's only Iranian leaders or maybe only an IRGC representation or there's, a certain individual is isolated, would they take that strike? They absolutely would. Because remember, Israel can yield assassination attempts without necessarily having to blow something up. That's what I said.
Speaker 2: Yeah, someone made that point to me. They're like, Mario, they're not going to blow up. I think it's Larry Johnson yesterday. He's like, Mario, they're not going to blow up. I think it was in blow it up when there's other leaders there. I'm like, you know, it doesn't have to be a bomb from a fighter jet. It could be a sniper. You know, remember once I had a machine gun out of a car to kill one of the scientists a few years ago.
Speaker 1: It could be, yes. It could be various other means. It could be a wireless microphone on someone's shirt. It could be... Someone's inspired.
Speaker 2: I know someone's inspired by Charlie Kirk. Two comments. One, you've been inspired by Charlie Kirk's assassination. And number two, you keep giving them ideas. I'm sure they're listening.
Speaker 1: I'm sure when it comes to assassination, Israel has thought of things that not even the most...
Speaker 2: epic novelists could be a TNT packed butterfly. It's Israel. Sure.
Speaker 1: But then but then the other aspect is that if we recall, a couple years ago is actually a year and a half ago, when Iran struck the IRGC. When the IRGC when the IRGC was hosting representatives in Iran, there's there's another weapon out there. It's it's the it's the Hellfire missile but it's been modified. It's the R9N variant to where it doesn't explode. It fires and the kinetic energy flips out these eight Ginsu knife-like blades and it penetrates with the force of the Hellfire missile, but then pretty much shreds everything within. And there's zero explosion. In fact, you can see- I know which one.
Speaker 2: That's the one that goes, it's the missile. That's right.
Speaker 1: It can even kill someone in a car. On a seat, someone sitting next to him would be intact. Would be intact, non-touched, with maybe just a little bit of blood on them. So they've used that before. It's the United States weapon. We used it. I've actually been on the calling end of calling for one being used during operations. So I've seen how they're used. They're silent. They do not explode. They don't detonate and kill everyone within. They're very specific weapons. to the point you made you can put it through the roof of a car and kill the driver and not the passenger so are are there options such as that there there are they have those capabilities are there options for uh a you know a traditional what we would think of an assassination attempt like someone you know a sniper etc so an assassination i want to show i want to show the video by the way of the one you've just talking about it's wild for anyone listening you're not working looking at your screen highly recommend you check your screen look at this technology it's
Speaker 2: It's gruesome it this video is not gruesome. But if you can imagine what it does, it will be gruesome. But that's the missile here. There it is. So it gets fired. Blade hellfire. So it's just a missile does not explode. And then you know, we see it could it could aim with a camera, they could play with the audio. Actually, can you play with audio? You have to start it again. They do it with audio. It's worth it. Yeah. It's freaking terrifying, Anthony.
Speaker 1: Yeah, and this is even older technology. This has even been around for a while. The United States developed it.
Speaker 0: When a fire missile is launched, it can accurately track the target by relying on the laser guidance system on the front of the warhead. Unlike traditional missiles, the blade bomb does not carry explosives. but has six sharp blades hidden in its waist when approaching the target. The six folded blades can be quickly ejected by high-pressure gas and then fall vertically at extremely high speeds at the same time. The high-speed rotating blade can easily cut through metal and concrete, and since the missile will not explode after hitting the target, it focuses on precision and can even target specific targets guided by lasers. That's crazy.
Speaker 2: That's crazy. That's crazy. That's crazy.
Speaker 1: And Israel absolutely possesses that weapon. They have used it in recent times. And in fact, in striking a target in Iran. I think if someone could look it up there, you could see where this hellfire, the ninja hellfire went through the side of the building. is that the ging su knife missile is that it that's what they call it they call it they call it the ginsu hellfire that's crazy uh but you can see through the the side of the wall uh where it penetrated into the wall and you can see this this small circle which is the uh the the carrier of the hellfire again without explosive in it uh and then the you can see the six lines the six blades penetrating the side of the wall uh perfectly with precise accuracy, killing the one occupant inside this small apartment to where the occupants in the neighboring apartments didn't even know it happened. So could you have some type of assassination attempt where collateral damage is minimized? You absolutely could. Could Israel do something like that? Yes. One, it sends a pretty stark message if Israel does this during a funeral procession with other world leaders, that Israel can do this with the technology that they have and that they're audacious enough to do it. And then obviously the fallout from that would be monumental to where it would plunge us into a whole new type of war, not just between the United States and Iran with Israel involved, but the entire region.
Speaker 2: Look how it goes through.
Speaker 1: Yeah, you see that? That's exactly what I'm talking about. You can see the blade marks.
Speaker 2: Stephanie, can you click on the one? Yeah, this one. Click on that one. And it will expand the image. It doesn't. Oh, good. But yeah, it's freaking wild, man. That's crazy. Yeah.
Speaker 1: And there's no explosive in that. It doesn't blow up. It doesn't destroy everything around it. There isn't fire. It's surgically precise. So when you consider... the menu of options that Israel has at its disposal to assassinate, it doesn't always mean some big bomb or a missile or a big explosion. It could be something as simple as your traditional guy on a motorcycle attempt. They've done that before. They've done that in the West Bank before. Or it could be something as precise as the Ginsu Hellfire. So you see with the options available and the, I think there's a high risk.
Speaker 2: Yeah, and I'm going to show you an image now. The producer, Stephanie, will show you an image now of Ahmad Vahidi. He's a Brigadier General. He's one of the, I don't know if he's the right-hand man of Mustafa Khamenei, but one of the most senior people in the IRGC. And he was seen in public for the first time since the war at the ceremony, the, what do they call it? First time to start a farewell ceremony of Ayatollah Khamenei. This is him there. It's going to be a risky few days. It's going to be a very risky few days. Do you think Mustafa will show up?
Speaker 1: If there isn't anything in terms of heightened security risk or attempts before the 9th, I think that during the proceedings or the procession, the small group farewell, one of them has already occurred shortly right after his death, but the certainly on the 9th of July, because it's not only the ceremony for the burial of his father, but it's also very important in Islamic ritual in terms of funeral procession for the burial on that day and where it will be taking place. So I could see that he will likely appear or show up, which is obviously the most heightened of time. So it's just a matter of the opportunity is there, the capability is there, the desire is there. So it's going to be very risky.
Speaker 2: Let's read the story of what we were talking about earlier because people haven't read it. So the New York Times reported earlier today, a couple of hours ago, the US reportedly feared during the nuclear negotiations, not during the war, during the actual freaking negotiations, it was the one in April. three months ago that Israel was planning to assassinate Iranian Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Arachi, the two faces of the peace deal, in an attempt to derail the talks. The report says Washington asked several countries to warn Iran. They couldn't stop. Like, this is crazy. They can't even stop freaking Iran, Israel. So they have to warn Iran because they cannot hold off Israel. That's just so crazy, so freaking weird. The report says Washington asked several countries to warn Tehran while Iran sought guarantees through Pakistani and Qatari mediators that its delegation would not be targeted. Ghalibaf's plane later made an emergency landing in Mashhad. Mashhad is where? Mashhad, do you know?
Speaker 1: Mashhad, I think it's in Iran. It's kind of a...
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's in Iran.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I want to say it's to the... Yeah.
Speaker 2: So he made an emergency... Near Turkmenistan.
Speaker 1: So if they were, depending on where he was going or coming from, but that would have obviously been an emergency situation to get back and land because perhaps there was a threat to shoot down his aircraft.
Speaker 2: Yeah. It's weird. What would it be up north? Anyway, so he made an emergency landing...
Speaker 1: Right way up there by the Turkmenistan border.
Speaker 2: Turkmenistan's border, yeah. So he made an emergency meeting in Mossad after Iranian intelligence warned of a possible Israeli attack. And three senior Iranian officials said he also narrowly survived Israeli strikes during both the June war last year and the recent war a few months ago. Iran adopted additional security measures during the spring's negotiations with the U.S. to reduce the risk of Israeli strikes against the senior Iranian officials. New York Times reports, quote, In April, Ghalibaf has been scheduled to travel to Islamabad for a meeting with Vance. That's the first meeting that happened. But Iranian security officials feared Israel could use the visit to assassinate Ghalibaf or Arachi in an effort to derail the negotiations. Pakistani fighter jets escorted the Iranian delegation's aircraft carrying more than 70 Iranian officials between the Iranian border and Islamabad. On the return flight, Iranian security services warned of intelligence that Israel planned to strike the plane and that two Israeli fighter jets had entered Iranian airspace from the Iraqi border. The aircraft made an emergency landing in Mossad and the delegation traveled the remaining eight hours by road to Tehran.
Speaker 1: Man. Yeah. And so as the United States, any attempts that you make to try to negotiate or broker peace, There's always the very likely high and present risk that your number one ally, as some Americans would say, is trying to assassinate the other side. But the thing is, this shouldn't be a surprise to anybody at this point. They did it against Hamas negotiators in Qatar, violating Qatari. And that's another one to add to the list that I mentioned yesterday with Malaysia, Tunisia, Gaza, the West Banks, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen. Add Qatar to that. So when you look at assassination attempts or assassinations, Israel has no issue, no restraint in doing it. So does it put this period of procession when, you know, if talks had been left going into the Iranian negotiator saying, hey, not only is this a deadlock, we're breaking for the next five days because we're going to be back in Iran. even if that ended with some type of good negotiation or positive negotiation or steps forward, Iran still or Israel would still attempt likely to assassinate key figures. But now this negotiation has left on a bad note, a sour taste where the parties involved are leaving where there's drama, there's anger, there's friction. So could Israel take advantage of that in the political environment to do something to then say, hey, hey, hey, America, we took care of your problem for you. Because you're right. The United States no longer can restrain Israel. So we have to do things like warn other nations, warn Iran, warn Pakistan that, hey, we have credible intelligence that Israel is going to assassinate and take out one of your people. land your plane and get out of the airplane because it looks like they're going to try to shoot it down. So yeah, it's a risky situation.
Speaker 2: If you can't get security guarantee, like no wonder the Iranians don't trust anything that's coming out of these negotiations. If the Americans cannot give you a security guarantee, who can?
Speaker 1: The United States cannot give you a security guarantee. And what the United States has also shown is that we will We will play games, reindeer games, if you will, with the certain verbiage of things. We'll ask for, you know, you put up your end of the bargain. We'll get to ours later. The whole, you know, point number one of the MOU, right? Permanently and immediately and permanently cease war on all fronts to include Lebanon and leave. And then through that, we're like, hey, open up the strait. We'll think about giving you your money back and stop doing this. And we'll get to that. But you need to do your part first. And Iran is like, no, that's not how it works. The Strait of Hormuz, we can restrict it. We can open it. We can close it like that. I mean, just look at the number of Saudi tankers that have gone through the Strait of Hormuz in just the last 24 hours. So Iran has the ability to open, close, restrict, reduce, the traffic through the Strait of Hormuz at will. So they've shown that they can do that. Why would they give up their leverage on the table when the United States vis-a-vis Israel have not come to the table with one thing yet? We're still talking about these frozen assets that haven't been unfrozen. We're still talking about the technicalities in the Strait of Hormuz when in reality, When in reality, if you look at every other strategic waterway, strait or canal in the world, the nations therein have some type of administrative control of that waterway. So why not?
Speaker 2: Let me ask you about the military buildup you talked about. Let me get the article up. So you talked about the Boxer, I think it was called.
Speaker 1: The USS Boxer is an amphibious assault.
Speaker 2: A second amphibious ready group joined the U.S. Navy forces in the Middle East this week as Trump weighs military options amid uncertain peace talks with Iran. The amphibious assault ship USS Boxer and the amphibious transport dock ship USS Portland with the embarked 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit were transiting the Indian Ocean on Tuesday, according to CENTCOM. They're there now. They've just arrived, yeah. So this article is when... What I'm reading is from July 1. That's two days ago. Boxer's arrival puts at least 24 Navy warships, including the aircraft carriers Lincoln and Bush, and 15 destroyers in the Middle East.
Speaker 1: And that's just the big ships on the board of, you know, remember the old game battleship, right? You got your submarine, your carrier, your destroyer, your frigate, you know. But there's all the other associated ships like the like the littoral combat ships that are part of the carrier strike group that aren't listed in that big 24, but they're there as well. The USS Peralta as an example. But then you have all of the guided missile ships. Let's not also forget that there are two Ohio class submarines in the region. There's one in the Indian Ocean and there's one in the Mediterranean, the USS Alaska. The Ohio class can fire upwards of, I think, 50 Tomahawks on board. I mean, if you've seen the USS Ohio class, which the USS Alaska is one, if you've seen that thing surfaced with its bomb bays open, I mean, the entire thing is just like a floating missile launcher. But in addition to the Tomahawks and other cruise missile capabilities that these submarines can fire. They also have the ability to equip any of all of those with the Trident's two nuclear capable missiles. So basically they have the ability to nuclearize because they have the nuclear warheads on board. These submarines, part of the nuclear triad, air, land and sea, always have this nuclear capability because in a time of war or in a time of, hey, launch the nukes, You can't have a submarine coming back to port to load them or coming to surface to get up. They have to have them ready at all times. So they are. So in addition to all those ships you just mentioned, you also have two nuclear capable, fully loaded with Trident missiles and Tomahawk submarines, both in the Mediterranean and in the Northern Indian Ocean. So there's that. You also have the Special Operations Command Mission Command Vessel, the MCV, that is ported in Diego Garcia. ready to provide command and control for separate special operations missions within Central Command. But then with the arrival now of the USS Boxer with the 11th Marine Expeditionary or with the 11th Marine Amphibious Group, it was the fifth. So the fifth goes back. They refit. You got a new amphibious assault group. You got a new crew. You got a new group of Marines ready to go. They spent the whole previous months just training, training, and training for this. Now they're In addition to the amphibious assault ship capability, which has the, when you see those amphibious vessels go from ship to shore, kind of a good way to describe it would be the same. They're different because what the Marine has is different than the Army. But if you remember the movie Saving Private Ryan, right? Those metal bathtub looking boats that came from the big ships to shore. Well, the amphibious readiness group, it's all of that. That's what that is with Marines. So, but then in addition to that, you now have the support logistics vessel, which means after they establish a lodge head, you then bring forward this other ship to then start bringing in the logistics. They basically, this ship has the ability to create a temporary port, if you will, to where you can, it extracts its port system and you can start getting stuff onto land. What would you need that for if you didn't have somewhere in your plan to assault land via amphibious raid. That's what they do. It is their purpose for existing. And not only have they been refit and re-equipped, they've been re-sent to the theater to do this. So I see very much as I've predicted for a while now that the only way for the United States to attempt to change conditions, and I say attempt, I'm not saying it's a guarantee. I'm not saying that the United States will succeed. The only way that the United States can attempt to change the conditions of negotiations via military power or via military action is either the Strait of Hormuz or changing the calculus in Lebanon to where that's no longer a blue chip for Iran on the table. We're far from being able to influence the outcomes of what's happening in Lebanon yet. I think US Central Command has proposed plans for that. But if you look at what the US Central Command is now preparing for directly in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, that pathway from Diego Garcia, a logistics base into there, they're preparing for some type of operation to seize control of the Strait of Hormuz to change the calculus of the negotiations. And it won't work. It's not going to lead to the outcome that US Central Command thinks that it will.
Speaker 2: So I was looking at the military buildup since the ceasefire. And it's actually remained constant or even increased slightly, according to Grok.
Speaker 1: Yeah, there's been no reduction. That's right, Mario. There's been no reduction of U.S. forces, which is like what?
Speaker 2: Was there any order to reduce the forces whatsoever? Has anyone given an order? No.
Speaker 1: Not at all. In fact, Brad Cooper, U.S. Central Command commander, earlier in the week was in Lebanon pledging his support and said, I've got 50,000 troops at the ready. that I could support you with, just let us know what you need. And that was to the Lebanese defense minister. But then yesterday, Brad Cooper, it was hosted, I believe, I don't believe it actually was, it was hosted in Bahrain, where U.S. Central Command had a 12-nation military summit, specifically talking about the Strait of Hormuz. So this isn't a diplomatic event. negotiate or a diplomatic summit. This was a military summit, a 12-nation naval military summit led by the US, hosted in Bahrain, talking about the Strait of Hormuz. And now we see that forces in the region have not only not reduced at all, they have slightly increased because of the addition of the USS Boxer back into the calculation. That increases by a few thousand upwards of 5,000 Marines. But then there's all of the support that goes with that. You saw the size of the USS Boxer. I mean, if you didn't know the difference between aircraft carriers, you would look at that and you would say, well, that's an aircraft carrier. It's called a flat top. It's a flat top Swift carrier. It's the WASP class of USS amphibious carriers. So can it launch jets and aircraft? Absolutely. Can it launch amphibious assault vehicles from its hull? Absolutely. Can it sustain amphibious combat from further out ashore? Yes, it can. But then the addition of the other ship with it, which can then come in, because it's a flat bottom boat, can come in and establish a temporary port to just start pouring in logistics and troops and sustainment, et cetera. Those things together equal an amphibious operation at scale. You wouldn't use any of those resources or those assets for anything else. They can't be used for anything else. So it looks to me that the US plan to now go back to the military drawing board to try to change diplomatic negotiation conditions by changing the military reality is now the attempt that the United States is going to pursue. And it is not going to be easy. It is not going to be pretty, and there is no guarantee of success. But the United States in terms of wanting to change the MOU is running out of options, which is why I've always said that the MOU as it stands is the best option for the United States, the best option for Donald Trump as an exit strategy to this conflict. But like I said, we got Donald Trump in the passenger seat, We got Pete Hegseth drunk in the back, and we got Netanyahu driving, and they're all high on pot driving to Coachella, and they missed the exit to get off the exit to this war. And that was this MOU, which now has been, how do you go back to that MOU, right? How do you, at this point, how do you go back to that MOU and start new? You can't. You can't. We're not going back to negotiations unless conditions change or, The conditions that the US wants to change are shut down and there's no attempt to change it. And the US has to capitulate and come back to the table. But that's the only pathway for the United States at this point. Why can't, you know, there's the option of- And more forces are deploying from Fort Bragg as we speak. I've seen last two days, I've seen C-17s flying out nonstop that's where you've got joint special operations command third special forces group the 82nd airborne division 18th airborne corps a lot of stuff heading over which is pretty odd for if we're in the middle of the season coming from fort bragg yeah like as in as in departing so here's the thing I always know when there's an uptick in activity because of the C-17 traffic, because the flight path from Fort Bragg to departing goes right over my house. So I can literally see them. I can see the tail numbers as they fly over. So Fort Bragg is not a C-17 base. So like for example, Joint Base Charleston in South Carolina is a C-17 base. So if you live near Joint Base Charleston in South Carolina, seeing a lot of C-17s coming and going isn't a big deal because that's where they live. That's where they stay. It's a C-17 base. Fort Bragg is not a C-17 base.
Speaker 2: So when you see- And the C-17 is the massive aircraft, the transport aircraft, correct?
Speaker 1: It's the workhorse of the Department of Defense. So you have the C-5 Galaxy, which is the really, really, really, really big one. That's the one where the The front nose cone opens up and the rear opens up. You can literally play a game of football with your full field inside of a C5 Galaxy. It is enormous. Those we can use, but we use them less because they have the proclivity to break a lot. Not all runways can handle them. So the big, big, big one is the C5. The smaller one is the C130. That right there is the C-17. The C-17 is the workhorse, is the do-all really for mobilization of forces. So like at Fort Bragg, when I see an uptick in C-17 traffic, that indicates that there's something going on operationally where forces are deploying, either coming back or going to. And you can always tell uh, when, when they're coming in based on the flight path and when they're leaving based on the flight path and if they're full or empty, uh, based on how they, how they take off out of the runway. Like you can, you can literally see, like, as they, as they come off the runway and, and bank, uh, to, to cross the ocean, to go out east, you can literally see them, uh, having to, um, you know, a, a heavy takeoff. And I've been in enough C-17s to know. what it looks like and what it feels like and what it sounds like when a C-17 is full or empty. So a lot of C-17s leaving Fort Bragg recently full. So if you have a lot of C-17s coming in and then leaving, that means that there's deployments going on. Typical traffic at Fort Bragg would be C-130s or C-17 Juliettes, or excuse me, C-27 Juliettes, which are kind of like a modified version. But when you see a lot of C-17 traffic going in and out of Fort Bragg, That means deployment. And we see that typically with the 82nd Airborne Division, with the 18th Airborne Corps, with the Special Forces Groups. You've got Third Special Forces Group. You've got Joint Special Operations Command. So it's all indicative that the troop buildup in the Middle East is not only not reducing, it's building up. And we already have additional critical assets going or that have arrived in the region like the USS Boxer. That's a that's a critical capability. If you want to conduct some type of amphibious assault or or land seat ship ship to shore type of operation, you need to have that. So when you consider everything that's happening and then additionally yesterday, US Central Command having this 12 nation military summit specifically about the Strait of Hormuz, something is being planned and is very close to execution militarily. And that makes sense from the standpoint of this agreement or treaties, so to speak, peace deal, because there's no way to change the conditions for more favorable U.S. conditions unless there's some type of military capitulation or military control. And again, the most realistic key terrain or key factor that the US can hope to change, to change the dynamic or change the calculus and negotiation is the Strait of Hormuz. And I am very confident that we will soon see direct operations in the Strait of Hormuz with other nations either participating and or have been told to, hey, sit this out, don't get involved. And I think that the spark to that or the trigger that kicks that in sooner than later is going to be some type of an assassination attempt or assassination during this five-day procession in Iran.
Speaker 2: It's also the option that Trump just walks the hell away. He's tried war. It hasn't worked. He tries all that pressure to have them concede something of the Strait of Hormuz. It doesn't work. Guys, I gave it a shot. I fucked up with this war.
Speaker 1: I'm out. Well, no, that's what I'm saying. His attempt to walk away. So we're on this highway towards war, right? And we had a few exit ramps beforehand that we kind of blew past. Now, with this MOU, taking that exit ramp from kinetic war, you're not out of the war yet. But off of that exit ramp from kinetic war to this MOU was the opportunity for Donald Trump to walk away. That opportunity has been missed. We're now going back to where Donald Trump now can't walk away because whether he would like to or not, we now have promises made to the Lebanese armed forces, to the Lebanese government. So we're deeply embroiled in that now.
Speaker 2: We now have- You're saying that the U.S. cannot break promises? Oh, well, no.
Speaker 1: The U.S. can and will break promises, but I'm saying in terms of the- The ability to just walk away. There's going to be, well, that too. Have you seen the recent developments in that?
Speaker 2: You're talking about the clash between the Kurds and the Iranians, the IRGC?
Speaker 1: So it's not just the Kurds. It's the KDPI is now directly in confrontation with the IRGC in Sardasht and Pinshahar. So you have the Iranian Kurds, the KDPI, which are the Kurdish Democratic People's Movement, which are directly supported and sponsored by the Kurds in Iraq, which in Iraqi Kurdistan shares that border with Iran. So if the Kurds are now involved, that is a clear indicator that the US is involved. The Kurds aren't doing this of their own accord. So when you go back to the kind of the end of the last round of kinetic activity before the MOU, we saw Iran striking a lot of targets in northern Iraq, near Erbil, which is the capital of the Kurdish region. There's also a large US base there. So Iran likely had intelligence or information that the Kurds were mobilizing or that there were some type of operations to where the Kurds in Iraq would be supporting the Kurds in Iran. the PKK and the KPJ supporting the KDPI. And we're now seeing that directly. The KDPI and the IRGC have had direct clashes over the last 48 hours, like killing each other. KDPI. Yeah, go ahead. Kurdish Democratic People's Party in Kurdish.
Speaker 2: So they're based in Iraq. They're very close to the U.S. Because I know there's all these different Kurdish factions, and they all have, in a way, different allegiances. So they lean in different directions. Some are hostile to Iran. Some have nothing to do with Iran. Some are very close to the U.S. Some are fighting Turkey.
Speaker 1: Some are not fighting Turkey. So I'm kind of lost with all these different Kurdish groups. Well, you have the main, you know, let's say that the Kurds, so to speak, you have the PKK groups. within the the pkk is what both the united states uh and turkey consider a terrorist organization uh it is the it is the movement that was founded by ocelan uh who is a you know who who is the founder of the pkk uh is considered a you know a you know was considered a you know public enemy number one to the turks um so Underneath the umbrella of the PKK, you have the YPJ, the YPK, the YPP, the PJKI, the KDPI. The KDPI in Iran, as you said, as you mentioned, have kind of been dormant, if you will. They're there, but they're kind of like, yeah, our little faction is not going to win a big fight against Iran. So we'll just kind of wait until the conditions are ripe, maybe years down the road. Now the KDPI, the Kurdish faction in Iran, in the mountains of Iran, in the mountains of the Zargos Mountains, which are just across from, you know, the mountain where the Zargos mountain range goes into Iraq with the, there's a city called Dahuk. It's in Northern Iraq. It's kind of the birthright, the home of the Iraqi Kurds. So when you consider now that there's this direct support from, the PKK, the PJK, to the KDPI in Iran, we're now seeing that the Kurds are being mobilized. The Kurds are being mobilized to fight a direct confrontation with the IRGC. Over the last 48 hours, the KDPI in Iran, in the towns of Sardast and Pinsahar, have fought directly, killing IRGC and IRGC killing some of them. and they're sending more to the front. That support is going to have to come from the Iraqi Kurds because the Kurds within Iran don't have as much of the military network established as the PKK in Iraq. Who's going to be backing that? The United States. So when you look at now the United States involvement with what we might do in Lebanon, what we are now doing directly with the Kurds, in Iran and in Iraq. This is not something now that Donald Trump can simply just walk away from. As much as he wants to. I think Donald Trump wakes up every day wanting to walk away from this and just focus on repainting the reflecting pool.
Speaker 2: Well, that's an incredible analysis as always. So conclusion, Iran rejected the latest offer from the US. The US is, there is a military buildup around the region. And I've checked, there was no reports of any, there's no reports of orders by the US for military equipment to leave the region. I saw the comment by CENTCOM commander in Lebanon saying, hey, there's 50,000 troops here ready to to act or whatever he said. I've got the exact quote for you. Let's see what he said. There it is. He said, more than 50,000 American service members are currently operating across the region, remaining vigilant and ready. So that was Cooper's comments on his visit to Lebanon, I think yesterday or two days ago. I see it was yesterday. It was two days ago. It was about the massive military buildup in Yemen. I've talked about it in the last couple of days, the deployment there by the Saudi forces.
Speaker 1: That's probably we talked about that a little bit a couple of days ago. We talked about that a tad, but that's also an important consideration because now, as of yesterday, answer Allah via the voice of the Houthi movement have said that the Strait of Bab al-Mandab is closed to any Israeli or Israeli associated vessels.
Speaker 2: There's no Israeli vessels going through it anyway.
Speaker 1: Exactly. But how do they then associate in terms of, or associated vessels? Does that mean the United States? Does that mean, like, what does that mean? How are they going to, you know, is it a U.S. vessel that may be coming to provide support? How do they, what connection are they making to where that condition exists? So, and outright at face value, it's like, It's like saying, you know, like, hey, you can't play basketball here. And it's like, I don't play basketball, so I don't care. But to say that now means, okay, well, what's the interpretation on the ground between the tactical commanders in Yemen that have direct control over the Strait of Hormuz? But then let's also remember that the United States still has a presence in Yemen at Camp Simonyi. It's a French base where the U.S., operates drones so uh and i've been there i've been deployed there um you know we so when you look at uh in camp lemonier the the the forces that are there and what the us is doing um that that then then puts americans again kind of on the front line of what's happening in yemen so you have american interests american promises american commitments american uh
Speaker 2: That's in Djibouti, near Yemen.
Speaker 1: I'm sorry, in Djibouti. Camp Lemoyne is in Djibouti. But in Yemen, we have another small, small, small base where for special operations, it's a drone base. It's, you know, like when you consider some of these bases that we have. Like when I was deployed in Tajikistan, and people would say, we don't have any bases in Tajikistan. It's like, we do. It's not something you would hear, you know, probably ever.
Speaker 2: facing North Korea that Kim Jong-un doesn't even know about. That's wild. And there's also the explosion in Syria that happened today. While on a positive note, Alshara has made it clear I don't want to be part of this proxy game. He went to Lebanon, gave them a gift of solidarity, said, look, we're not going to fight Hezbollah. We're not going to play these games, which gets me worried on how long he's going to be around for because There's a lot of parties that would not like to see that stability and that cohesion in the region. But the Syrian president is showing no willingness to fight Lebanon or enter Lebanon to fight Hezbollah, as Trump requested. So that's a positive sign there. And Lebanon is looking very worrying. We've got the new agreement, which we've talked about, that contradicts the Iranian agreement. You've got a lot of disagreements there. Should Israel withdraw before Hezbollah disarm? Should Israel withdraw without disarming Hezbollah? Hezbollah saying they'll never disarm. So it's something we've discussed before. We'll keep discussing. But anyway, the bigger picture is military buildup in the region. Iran rejected the latest offer from the U.S. And a report came out today that Israel did try to kill, might have tried to kill Ghalibaf and Arachi during the negotiations in Islamabad when they went to meet J.D. Vance. So all eyes are on the next few days in the funeral processions for Ayatollah Khamenei, Ali Khamenei.
Speaker 1: the former supreme leader who was assassinated and whether Mustafa Khamenei will show up and what happens if he does so fingers crossed but yeah Anthony always a pleasure thank you so much for the analysis thank you Mario and I appreciate you continuing these discussions on the the breaking information you know what we what we discussed today is pretty is pretty news breaking in terms of it's it's coming out as we've been talking so I think it's important that people pay attention to it. And it's not as simple as it seems of just A and B. We have to consider A, B, and then C through Z and all of the various forms of that with the treaty, the military buildup, everything that you've mentioned. So it's a very dynamic situation and it just takes one thing to set off this powder keg. And I think it's more likely than not that that match has been lit and it's dangling over the pile of gunpowder somewhere over Iran in the next five days. Fingers crossed.
Speaker 2: Anthony, thank you.
Speaker 1: Thank you, Mario. Appreciate it.
reSee.it AI Summary
I took the vice president’s ceasefire as a “window” to refill oil and reassess in 60 days and ran the math. Before the war, about 150 ships/day passed Hormuz; five months closed created thousands of missing transits, and today’s trickle won’t fill it. Futures sag near $70, but the crack spread stays like $100–110, so pump prices barely move. I suspect China may be drawing reserves to cover America’s shortfall for now. I also note Europe may treat Iranian fees on Hormuz as inevitable—just non-discriminatory.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
The vice president described the ceasefire as a window to "refill the world's oil economy" and see where things stand in 60 days. The math behind that plan doesn't survive a calculator… Philip Pilkington ran the numbers. Around 150 ships a day moved through Hormuz before the war. Five months of closure left a hole of THOUSANDS of transits, and today's trickle of a dozen-odd ships doesn't begin to fill it. You can print money, he kept repeating, but you can't print oil. Which is why he thinks the cheerful price on your screen is a mirage. Futures have been crushed toward $70, yet the crack spread, the real cost refiners eat and pass to the pump, still behaves like oil trades near $100-110. Pump prices barely budged. In his world, energy traders look at that gap the way you'd look at a magic trick you've already figured out. His most provocative guess, offered as exactly that, is that China is quietly draining its massive reserves to cover America's shortfall through the 60-day window, and won't do it forever. He also flagged a Financial Times report on trading activity tied to Trump's orbit, thousands of trades this term. His concern wasn't any individual profiting, and he stressed he wasn't accusing the administration of trading for gain. It's the culture: a Washington that starts thinking like day traders ends up running foreign policy on the same short-term clock. Then, LIVE on air, Bloomberg dropped a headline that made both of us sit up: European nations now consider Iranian fees on Hormuz INEVITABLE, and are just asking Tehran not to discriminate between vessels. The roadrunner is off the cliff, he says. It just hasn't looked down. @philippilk
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on J.D. Vance’s recent comments in an interview about the U.S.–Iran situation under the MOU. The guest argues that Vance is presenting “two options” for the U.S.: pursuing a long-term deal with Iran that requires significant Iranian behavior change, or “banking” U.S. gains from the military campaign while preserving optionality. Vance also frames the U.S. approach as allowing lower pressure on global energy markets, not giving up U.S. objectives, and waiting to see what Iran does—while right-wing critics, according to the guest, have an inability to articulate an end goal beyond wanting more attacks.
Another guest adds that the message to Iran is not that the U.S. has “settled this,” but that the U.S. will act in its self-interest by replenishing oil stocks and will revisit negotiations in about 60 days, with “fire and brimstone” returning if Iran does not behave as desired. The guest also notes Iran’s claim that it will allow traffic through the straits for 60 days while negotiating afterward, but observes that Gulf coalition and Arab partners have not accepted an Iranian “tolling mechanism.” They argue the practical outcome will be determined by negotiation, diplomacy, economic and military leverage.
In response, Speaker 0 asks what the objective is behind the hint that Trump is willing to “drop bombs” only if they serve an objective, and whether what is being seen is a pause and rearmament. One guest characterizes Vance as “the good cop,” suggesting conciliatory tones and a slight shift compared to when the MOU was first signed. The same guest focuses on an “energy markets” tension: they argue that Vance portrays political pressure on Trump from “Iran hawks,” while also claiming the MOU will ease energy-market pressure. The guest then argues that the idea that timelines like 60 days can meaningfully relieve oil-market pressure is “absurd,” giving a back-of-the-envelope view of missed tanker capacity during closure of the Strait of Hormuz and concluding that narrative control cannot restore physical oil or barrels.
A central claim in the later portion is that oil-related pricing is being manipulated through financial mechanisms. The guest elaborates using the concept of “crack spreads” (the refinery cost of producing gasoline/diesel) versus futures prices such as WTI and Brent. They state that crack spreads and pump prices are rising while WTI/Brent futures are falling, arguing this shows futures markets diverging from real-world refined-product economics. The guest claims that gasoline station prices have not fallen in proportion to futures and that the “real price” relevant to refiners is reflected in physical production economics rather than financial paper contracts.
Speaker 0 proposes that “dated Brent” around $70 would reflect what tankers deliver through the strait; the guest rejects this framing, arguing that both spot and futures are “paper” contracts and that refiners ultimately care about costs captured by crack spreads. The guest says it is possible to estimate crack spreads using data posted online (mentioning “HFI Research”) and reports their own observed correlation between crack spreads and earlier crude-price levels around “$100–$110,” with some estimates up to about $115. Speaker 0 presses on why refinery prices are not straightforwardly public, and the guest repeatedly attributes the gap to “narrative control.”
The guest further argues that algorithmic trading amplifies how markets react to news and headlines. They describe a mechanism: trading algorithms detect text/news and react to repeated signals, which can be exploited by “flooding the zone” with headlines such as claims that the strait is reopened or that there is an oil glut. They argue that shorting at the start of a week can influence algorithmic behavior and that leverage makes price crashes damaging to holders of long positions. They discuss hedge funds, leverage, margin wiping, and how self-reinforcing algorithmic bets can profit until a reversal. They also connect this broader phenomenon to earlier energy episodes (including Red Sea/Houthi-related attacks) where they claim oil-price “minimization” occurred and quote a Bloomberg-related framing that they say suggests algorithmic trading effects.
Speaker 0 then raises the possibility that more oil is moving through alternative routes than commonly reported, noting Saudi pipeline flows, Fujairah, and increased tanker transits potentially supported by U.S. forces, while acknowledging that AIS can be turned off and that some shipments may be undercounted. The guest responds that pipeline capacity should make routing cheaper and that pipelines have been open throughout the period of closure, while the major change is the narrative about the strait reopening. They argue the arithmetic doesn’t add up if only a tiny number of tankers are getting through, and contend that inventories and reserve drawdowns would be required.
Attention also turns to China’s reduced oil demand, which the guest attributes to China drawing down enormous reserves rather than importing at prior levels. They claim China’s integrated reserve system replaces imports with reserves, and they offer a speculative interpretation that the U.S. and China may have struck an arrangement involving the MOU and a limited time window, with China using reserves to absorb disruption.
Finally, the conversation links back to short-termism and market culture. The guest argues that markets may not break solely because of direct attempts to profit from trading, but because a broader culture of extreme, event-driven short-term thinking could produce longer-term instability. They also highlight a report that European nations view Hormuz “fees” as inevitable and focus on how long it would take to restore Middle Eastern oil capacity, arguing that even if oil prices fall, demand rises and inventory/storage constraints would matter. They conclude that policy action aimed at lowering prices could effectively subsidize other countries via U.S. reserve releases, with an emphasis that inventories like the SPR are being drawn down under pressure.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: So I want to get your thoughts on, you know, funny enough, I feel like the optimism of a lot of my guests has been dropping in recent days and weeks. A lot of them who believe that the war is over are starting to be a bit more skeptical about it. And I want to play a clip. Lisa, if you can play that clip of JD Vance speaking in an interview just a few days ago. And I've got a few questions on it, on whether what we're seeing right now is just a pause, rearmament. for a continuation of the war until at least some of the objectives on the American side are achieved but you can play that clip please Lisa uh be good of J.D Vass has interviewed the rounds in the last few days uh on various podcasts and uh this one was uh the quote here is a bit more concerning than others go ahead Lisa uh Lisa you want to play the clip While waiting for Lisa to play the clip. So essentially in the interview, he just talks about how this was about preparing, you know, for the, just letting energy markets calm down.
Speaker 2: What the president has told us to do is use this MOU to sort of refill the world's oil economy, to refill some stocks, and then to see where the hand is. And, you know, As I've said this repeatedly, if the Iranians are willing to make the commitments that we would like them to make and are willing to back those up with verifiable milestones, then we are going to change our relationship with Iran. And if they don't do that, then nothing has really changed except for what we've already accomplished from the military campaign, which is a lot. So we kind of have two options here. We have the option of pursuing a long-term deal with the Iranians, but that requires a significant change in their behavior. We have the option of banking our wins and then, of course, doing things on top of that if the president feels that we have to. And I think both of those options are very much in play and the president's going to let this play out. But what's happening right now is he's letting those options play out in an environment where there is significantly less pressure on the world energy economy. And this is my biggest frustration with right-wing critics of what we've done over the last few months in Iran, is that they don't realize how completely they were losing the political argument because of what was happening to world energy markets. So what the president of the United States has done- You're talking about the critics who want more bombs dropping on- Their attitude is just drop bombs and drop bombs and drop bombs. And they can't really articulate to what end what the president is saying. I'm okay. I'm willing to drop bombs. And he's clearly shown that he's willing to drop bombs, but only if it serves an objective. And so what he's doing right now is taking a lot of pressure off of the world economy, the world energy economy in particular, while not giving up a single one of his gains and while preserving a lot of optionality. I think that's a very good place for us to be in, but there's uncertainty because no one could be certain what the Iranians are going to do.
Speaker 1: Right. So then the message, if you're an Iranian, the message you're getting from the U.S. is not, okay, we've settled this. You get to keep the Strait of Hormuz and we'll try to play nice now. The message is, okay, we're going to serve our self-interest by replenishing the oil coffers and get back to us in 60 days. You might have some fire and brimstone coming back down.
Speaker 2: And if you actually behave, you won't, right? And that's what the president has fundamentally put out there. It is interesting to me because the Iranians have said, we control the straits and yeah we're going to let traffic flow for the next 60 days but then we're going to negotiate over what happens from there okay and what i find just bizarre about that assertion is that nobody from the gulf coast the the gulf coalition countries the arab countries in the gulf and the omanis who are sort of the main iranian theoretically partner all of them have come out and said we don't accept this Iranian tolling mechanism. And so the Iranians keep on asserting something that isn't actually happening right now, and they don't have a credible pathway to make happen in the future. So I do see this as a bit of a sideshow because fundamentally, like their arguments, what I mean is the sideshow is what they're saying. What will actually happen is is going to be determined through a combination of negotiation, diplomatic, economic, and military leverage. What they're saying right now, assumption of their domestic audience matters is what's going to happen. That's something that we're working on right now.
Speaker 0: And so then if you... Yeah, so what do you make of this? From what I understand, things he said, he's expecting a change of behavior in Iran, not sure what that means. he admitted the obvious that Trump was forced to do this to ease the pressure on global energy markets. And then they hint at, you know, Trump is willing to drop bombs, but only if it serves an objective. So then the question is, what is that objective? Before I go through other quotes, what do you make of what J.D. Vance said in this interview?
Speaker 3: I mean, you know, following the whole thing since it began, well, five months ago or something like that, J.D. 's clearly the good cop, right? I mean, he's the good cop to Trump's bad cop. And so he's going to make more conciliatory tones and so on as he is, although they're slightly less conciliatory than they were before the MOU was first signed. But I think the, you know, the question around energy markets is absolutely key. I think there's a really interesting tension in what JD is saying. On the one hand, he's talking about the political pressure that's being brought to bear on Trump, which is enormous from the Iran hawks. He calls them the right wing. I don't really have that terminology, but the Iran hawks effectively. And that's the kind of like political calculus, right? Like if you're a politician, I'm not, I've never been a politician. I've never been sure why this is the case, but if you're a politician, apparently, and you have these like groups that pressure you, which I guess means like texting you or something, we're coming into your office, then you have to like do something for them. And that's what JD is talking about. So that is like, he views that clearly as some sort of a like deterministic thing that has to happen. And then on the other hand is the realities of the oil market. Now, I'm an economist, work in investment, not currently working in investment for a while. I know the investment market, the oil market pretty well. And maybe later we can talk about how they're suppressing it because I think it's interesting. I think I have a few novel points on that. But the idea that even 60 days or 20 days or whatever he's saying will ease pressure on the oil market is just absurd, right? I mean, here's some very, very basic maths, right? So the straight has been closed for months. almost five months, right? So call it about 150 days approximately. And the original traffic was about 140, 150 ships going through a day. Well, if you multiply 150 by 150, you get 15,000, right? No, you get more, you get 15 plus 15 again. So you get to 17,500, right? So currently there are like 14 ships going through the Strait every day. You need to make up those, tens of thousands or 1,700 ships to replace the lost capacity that you've lost over those five months. And at the moment, not only are we not up to 150 ships a day, we're nowhere near that. It's not a drop in the bucket. 14 ships going through the Strait isn't a drop in the bucket. So I think what they're doing is politics is all about narrative control. And that's fine for politics. But narrative control doesn't actually change the reality of how many barrels of oil exist or don't exist. I mean, another way of putting it is you can't print oil, right? You can print money. You can Ford run bonds. You can be Scott Besson and talk down or talk up the bond market. You can talk up or down the dollar. But you can't talk barrels of oil into existence. And I think the White House doesn't fully understand that.
Speaker 0: Okay, so it's looking more and more like the MOU is just to, it's a necessity rather than what Trump would like to do. It's a necessity politically, but also to ease the pressure off the oil markets. And that's what worries a lot of people, including people in Iran that are critical of the deal. People in Iran are critical of the deal because they believe they've given Trump breathing room to be able to ease the pressure on the global economy, get through the midterms before he continues the inevitable.
Speaker 3: then you mentioned something that the price of oil is being suppressed can you elaborate what you mean by that so the evidence on this is really really clear it couldn't be clearer um the crack spread which you've probably talked i think you were talking to other guests that i think i saw an interview that you did the crack spread is the cost of producing oil by refineries so the crack spread will tell you how much basically you're going to pay at the pump right you're going to pay the at the gasoline pump or the petrol pump as we call it in Britain and Ireland. And that's going up, okay? So the real cost and therefore the real price of refined gasoline and diesel is rising. Now what's falling? The futures price, WTI and Brent. The futures prices are traded on financial markets. They're like stocks or bonds or something like that. They're virtual, they're not real. Now, in theory, the futures market is supposed to look at what's going on in the real world. That's not happening. And the way that you can tell that's not happening is because the futures price is now low while the crack spread is high. And what else is high? The price of the pump. Have you gone and walked by a gas station recently? Yeah, okay, prices may have come down in the past week by 5%, but they're still up like you know, basically where they were at $95 a barrel. And Trump said on Truth Social, railing against gasoline stations. So you see, the futures price, I mean, we can talk about what futures markets are if you want. When they're functional, they're in some sense useful. But they're not a real price of oil. The real price of oil is what it costs the refiners to produce, and then they can sell that. So they have to take in barrels of crude, black stuff that we all know, and then they have to refine it and turn it into gasoline and diesel and all these other components, things that make plastics and fertilizer and so on. And then they have to sell that and they have to put the costs of that, which include the barrel of the black crude oil, into the cost of gasoline or diesel or jet fuel. And these prices aren't coming down. I mean, they have come down a little bit on the back of this kind of excitement and speculative fervor that we've seen since the MOU and all this nonsense about the Strait being reopened. But as I said, you can't print oil. You can print money and impact the value of a bond, okay? We won't go into why that is, but it's a financial instrument. You can do that. You can't do that with oil. You can't print oil. everyone's saying, oh, gas, oil, energy precedent. They're not. I guarantee you they're not. Like, go and fill up your car. Go and wait until the month-end gas, natural gas bill comes, especially if you're in Europe. Maybe it'll have come down 5%. It's still up where it was at $95 a barrel. So this is, I said to a friend of mine the other day, like, we're down the rabbit hole. We're at the Mad Hatter's tea party here. Like, nothing makes sense. And, you know, everyone's talking in nonsense riddles and stuff like that. And I think in the next week or two, maybe the madness will hold for a little longer. But at a certain point, people are going to go, the gasoline prices didn't come down, guys. Like, it was all fake.
Speaker 0: So from what I understand, the way to know the actual price of crude oil is looking at dated Brent crude oil. That's the price you look at to understand the price on the market right now. And that's at $70. So if you're buying, doesn't that mean the oil that's coming out of the tankers going through the straight home is at $70, correct?
Speaker 3: No. Then this is another confusion in these markets, right? So I remember back in the day, we could talk about oil markets for a while. I know oil markets quite well. And they've always been partly manipulated. And we can talk about that if you want. But the big debate back in the day about oil price manipulation was whether the futures price, that's the one I've been talking about, Brent's WTI, whether the futures price could have an impact on what you just said, the spot price, the dated price, right? The dated price is a paper market too. They're both paper markets. They're paper markets at given times in the future. So the spot price is basically like quote-unquote delivery of a barrel of a price of oil now, but it's only a paper barrel of oil. It's a contract to purchase a barrel of oil. If the barrel of oil isn't there, the contract's no good. The people, the refiners are not paying that price, and we know they're not paying that price because the crack spread is so high. The crack spread is an actual physical output. It's like the... the producer price index or something like that, like the end price that the producers of laptops, mobile phones, cars will tell you, right? It's the actual price, the correct spread. And it correlate very, very readily with the price of gasoline, diesel, and so on. The spot market As I said, the debate was always, can the futures market impact the spot market? Debate settled, it can. We now know it can because they've just done it. They've absolutely crushed the futures market and the spot prices followed it down, but crack spreads haven't, and neither have prices at the pump. And that's why Trump is railing on Truth Social. So when people say the spot price is the price of a barrel of oil today, true, it's not in all futures, but it's only a paper contract. So what they've actually done here is they've broken the financial markets around oil. But as I said, you can't print a barrel of oil. If there isn't enough oil, there isn't enough oil. And so I mean, maybe I'll eat my hat on this, but I don't think the refiners are getting the spot price.
Speaker 0: Well, then how do I know the price that the refineries are paying for oil right now? So the oil coming out of the street of oil. So where do I check that? Where do I check?
Speaker 3: It's all over Twitter. There's one guy who publishes all the time called HFI Research. You can create a crack code yourself. Yeah, you can create. I tried it. I wanted to check if his stuff was fake. So you can actually create a crack spread yourself. It's not published by the IEA, the official American Energy thing. So I created one. It takes a little bit of maths and all that kind of thing. But the ones he's publishing are real. The crack spread has come down a little bit, just as the price of gasoline at the pump has come down, you know, five, six percent, something like that. but it's not down, it's not following either the features of the spot price. So the crack spread is just showing you literally what the costs that the refineries are eating. And maybe they end up being able to manipulate the crack spread, but I don't see any way of doing that.
Speaker 0: What we are witnessing today in the oil market is history in the making. How so? From the onset of the Iran conflict, These three were our signals. Crude time spreads, 3-2-1 crack spread, and offshore, onshore oil inventories. If you have been following the oil market, you will know that the current conditions are as follows. Crude time spreads are weak, reflecting a bloated physical market. Reason, Chinese crude imports. So it's a full breakdown. Okay, so it's a long piece. So according to HFI, I'm on this website now. What is the... What is the price per barrel right now that refineries are paying?
Speaker 3: I don't think you can tell. It's a derivative thing, but my sense is that they're still trading as if we're around $100, $110 a barrel. That's what I saw from the statistics that are currently. I won't go into it, but you can run a regression on the crack spread versus the futures price, and it looks like about $100, $110.
Speaker 0: Jesus. All right. So, but how, how is that not common knowledge that leaves refineries pay that on the market, on the open market? So that's not a hidden secret. It's not classified information. How is that not publicly available?
Speaker 3: This is all narrative control. Like if you want to go into how they drive down the WTI price, we like, maybe I should tell you how that's done. Cause I'm pretty sure I know how it's done. So let me tell you, uh, uh, a story. So I was in finance for years. I was at a quantitative firm. And 10 years ago, so we're in 2015, 2016, the quant guys upstairs were looking at early AI models. One of the first places to implement AI models were the financial markets. And it's obvious why. If you can get an edge, you can make billions of dollars, right? So the financial markets implemented AI really early on. And what they found was they were only really good for text recognition. They were really good for going through news articles, financial statements by companies, financial reports by oil producers, this kind of stuff, and picking out keywords. So basically what they do is you take the human out of the equation. He doesn't have to follow central bank statements. He doesn't have to follow government announcements, geopolitical events, all this stuff that human analysts do. You just put it through one of these robotic AI models, right? So that was already going on in markets at a very high level now, back about 10 years ago. And in the past three years, I'd say, maybe four years, hedge funds have started implementing them. So I was looking around at hedge fund jobs about three or four years ago, and they all wanted people with really good Python coding, right? And I asked my friends who were in hedge fund in Green Park in the city of London, I said, why does everyone want really high-end Python coding as if you're a computer programmer? Coding is good if you want to deal with numbers, but why do they want the Python coding? It's not necessary for a macro hedge fund. I know how macro hedge funds trade. You don't need it. They said they're automating everything. They're automating absolutely everything. So they're getting their seasoned traders who have 20 years experience, and they're getting younger guys to come in with Python programming. They're turning them into robots, basically. They're getting their trading strategy and uploading it into a computer. So now what you've got is a bunch of algorithms, trading algorithms. They're called algos and markers. And the algos react to text, to news events. So if you can flood the zone with headlines and news stories that say the Strait is open, oil prices are coming down. The new one is there's an oil glut. Doesn't even make sense. That's completely crazy. How would there be oil glut? All of these terms, glut, will like show up in those searches. And so what you do is you drive the algorithms absolutely insane. Now you ask, well, why? It's common knowledge. Like any human can check this. Any person with Twitter can check this. It's not classified. Yeah, but if you've ever traded markets, you know that if a whale comes in, you get crushed. So if you take a long oil position, you usually do that with some leverage, right? If you're in a hedge fund, for example, and the hedge funds are doing all the trading here. I think you had a previous guest on who said they were like 95% short position or something. If you come in and you take the correct objective position of taking a long and you're leveraged, if that price crashes by 20%, your margin gets wiped out. And like you're burnt. It's like a child touching a hot stove. You just don't want to go back, right? And you don't want to trade it. So you can squeeze long positions out of the market by juicing these algorithms and getting enormous amounts of capital outlay into the short positions. And here's the worst part of it. The hedge funds make money on this because the algorithms are just self-reinforcing. So if they get the direction right, everyone except the last guy makes money. Now, if they hold those short positions for too long and it snaps back the other way, you could actually generate a crisis in the hedge fund sector at some point. But that's basically what they've done. I know it sounds absolutely wild. As I said, this is Mad Hatter stuff. I think we're learning in real time that maybe AI doesn't take over the world and turn into Skynet. Maybe it just creates a failed, centrally planned, Soviet-style economy that you can manipulate really easily.
Speaker 0: Well, AI is meant to manipulate us, not the other way around. So this is fascinating.
Speaker 3: Well, it looks like humans, if you can set the narrative... If you can set the narrative in news, in whatever, you can manipulate the bots. Like, it's clear. And they figured it out. And by the way, how did they figure it out? Big reveal. The Treasury Secretary is a hedge fund manager. Hedge fund guys all know this. Everyone knows about the algorithm, the trading algorithms and hedge funds. Scott knows. Besson knows.
Speaker 0: Algorithmic trading is nothing new. Most of trading is being replaced by AI, I think. There's been like this for a while and it's increasing. I come from the trading world in crypto. We have a large fund there. So I know that world, well, we don't do it ourselves, but we've been talking about it for years. What you're saying now is that this offers an opportunity to be able to manipulate the algorithms through information, through feeding them flawed information.
Speaker 3: Yeah. Yeah. And if Bloomberg's reporting it, it's a high trusted source. How do you create an algorithm? Just think about it for a few minutes.
Speaker 0: But there's just that massive. So if this is true, there's just that massive arbitrage opportunity. If you've got future prices, you know, if you've got WTI Brent crude at these prices and actual oil at such a high price. That. doesn't that offer a massive arbitrage opportunity that anyone that finds this information, it's not hard to find, the refineries know the price they're paying, could just take advantage of it?
Speaker 3: Well, you said you trade crypto, right? You've traded crypto before, have you? Okay, you know what happens. I invest, yeah. Okay, but you've done some leverage trading, right? At some point in time, you've tried it. I know it well.
Speaker 0: I've never traded, no. Zero, but I know it well, so you can keep down. Well, you know what it is.
Speaker 3: Okay, so if you take a leveraged position... on bitcoin or ethereum or something like that and directionally it moves like five percent ten percent do you know how vicious the fortune wipeout is your entire balance disappears it just evaporates it works exactly the same in hedge funds you have a you have an amount of margin on the side you take a leverage bet and so what happens it's like as i said it's like a child who goes up to a heated stove and they touch it and they got their fingers burnt they won't touch it again
Speaker 0: But can't you just do a good example for the audience to relate to is the big short. I think Michael Burry found that massive arbitrage opportunity, that disconnect between the actual value of an asset and what the market is perceiving that value to be, and took advantage of it. Now, it was very difficult. He didn't have enough capital, almost got margin cold. So I understand the risk he took there. um you know with larger funds that have enough capital they can easily take advantage of that you know they're sitting there on on you know hundreds of billions of dollars they could you unless the market is so huge that even hundreds of billions of dollars that could be get wiped out i think a lot of people are long oil stocks right now i think that's the position that people are taking you can't go into wti you can't go into brand but the beta as we call it between wti
Speaker 3: And oil stocks like, I don't know, Equinor, Suncor, Petrobras, the beta is quite low. But by which I mean, if you see a 35% decline in WTI, you see maybe a 15% decline in the stock price of those stocks. And of course, those stocks you don't tend to buy with leverage. So I think a lot of investors are actually pulled into energy stocks. The smart money is probably in energy stocks. But people are like, you know, you're riding this insane volatility. Like, take the example of like, Petrobras, right? It's the biggest producer in Brazil. So it's one of the major players in the world. It's state owned. It's a very boring energy stock in a lot of ways. I think it's down 16% from its peak. Now, if you're trading a large state owned oil company, you're not used to those swings. The volatility that interest introduced into your portfolio is a real pain. And your clients are going to be annoying you, and they're going to be reading headlines that say that there's an oil glut. You know, like if you're a portfolio manager, it's a nightmare. So, yeah, of course, you can take contrarian positions in the market, and sometimes you make money. In my opinion, I think this will end up falling apart because it's so absurd. But, you know, taking contrarian positions in the market, you know, it's hard. It's very difficult. It takes big cojones, as they say.
Speaker 0: Yeah, and I didn't know it's actually that difficult to get the actual price those refineries are – paying for oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz, I thought that would be relatively public knowledge.
Speaker 3: It's public, but it's not straightforward. Look, here's the trick on this. It's not public.
Speaker 0: I've just checked on Claude and Grok and Chad Gibouti. It's not public.
Speaker 3: You can make a crack spread.
Speaker 0: Yeah, exactly. You can come up with that, but different people come up with different figures when they make their own crack spreads, correct?
Speaker 3: Yeah, but the data all correlates. I made one the other day, and it looked like HFI. You can find this data.
Speaker 0: Sorry, I'll let you continue. What's your price when you did it? Can you give me the price again that you came up with?
Speaker 3: The crack spread doesn't map perfectly onto the barrel, but I think it's about 100, 110. It's showing maybe a little more, even 115. It's showing around that. It's showing basically the price of the barrel of oil before this nonsense started about a week and a half ago.
Speaker 0: I feel like I'm talking, I went back in time and I'm talking to an Irish version of Michael Burry. This is what I feel like now.
Speaker 3: This is not investment advice.
Speaker 0: That is a wild conversation. I didn't know all this.
Speaker 3: No, I think like only a few people have figured it out. Look, here's the trick. If people want to follow this, right? Ignore the noise. Find the energy analysts. There are a bunch of actual energy analysts on Twitter, not the Bloomberg energy journalists. Those guys are caught up in this for whatever reason. There's energy analysts. There's a bunch of people who trade energy, right? And if you just go on the HFI Twitter handle, you'll find like their followers will be loads of energy analysts and stuff. Energy analysts, the real ones are from a different world. They don't actually like some of them work for investment banks and stuff, but some of them actually work for energy companies, for companies to buy a lot of energy. Can you imagine if you're a massive consumer of energy, oil, crude gas, you'll have an energy trader on site. Right. And those guys aren't speculators. They're trying to they're trying to hedge your energy costs and all this kind of thing. So like having a foreign exchange guy on site for like a food company or something like, so if you follow those guys, they're not caught up in this narrative. And in the energy community trading community, everyone's like, everyone thinks like me, it's like the Mad Hatter tea party, you know, like the white bunny just kind of like hops by and you're like, how long do we have to put up with this? It's completely crazy.
Speaker 0: So weird. So, but what, But there is a lot of oil going through the Red Sea, the Saudi pipeline, going through Fujairah. A lot of ships are going through. You're talking about HFI. Well, HFI, no, Kepler, sorry. Kepler put out an analysis today. U.S. naval forces are reportedly supporting and protecting supertankers transiting through Hormuz. Over the last 24 hours, at least four non-Iranian VLCC, very large crew carriers, transited inbound. With AIS, so maybe there's more without AIS, via the route, the Omani side, the route under American oversight. So according to this report, and I saw another report yesterday, that actually, what if the truth is a lot less crazy, Philip? What if it's just there's more oil going through than what we know? Remember, a lot of ships have the AIS turned off. We know that China has reduced their imports. So maybe we also know more oil is going through Yanbu, the east-west pipeline in Saudi and Fujairah than... initially expected. So what if with the Saudi pipeline, with Fujairah, as well as the ships that are going through Hormuz that we don't know about, what if these just are the numbers, they are higher than what you know of?
Speaker 3: Well, okay. So like, think about this narratively, right? So the pipelines, look, if those pipelines could have done what the ships in the strait could have done, those ships would have never been sailing. If you have a pipeline, it's fundamentally cheaper to put oil through it, right? Like, it's easy to understand.
Speaker 0: No, but it's limited capacity. But capacity is limited in the pipeline.
Speaker 3: Yeah, no, limited capacity, exactly. So, like, why weren't they at full capacity before? It doesn't make any sense. But here's the thing. The pipelines have been open since the Strait has been closed, right? No new pipelines have been built. Building a pipeline takes a very long time. No new pipelines. So the Strait's been closed since March or whatever. I can't remember the exact date. The Strait's been closed since March. Those pipelines have been open. Throughout that period, oil has been trading around $100 an hour, bouncing between $90 and $100. So nothing's changed on the pipeline front. The only thing that's changed in the past 10 days or however long it's been is this narrative that the Strait's been opened. Now, the Strait hasn't been opened. Okay, again, just do some back-of-the-envelope math on this, right? So let's say 50 of the 150 ships that were going through the Strait before the crisis were were very large oil tankers, super tankers. So that's about a third, right? So say a third of the 50, right? And it's been 150 days, give or take. Okay, so that's 7,500 ships we haven't got. And where do the barrels of oil come from that we haven't got? They come out of storage. They come out of either private inventories or state inventories, like the Special Petroleum Reserve, which is going down like crazy, like never been seen before. So even if we reopen the strait, we have to refill the reserves. But we haven't reopened the strait. There's like maybe five tankers getting through and a couple of Iranian ones going to China. And those Iranian ones have been going to China at least since, I don't know, April or something like that. So the Iranians don't fire on their own tankers because they're not stupid. Trump put a blockade in front of them. I didn't see a single Iranian tanker get hit by that blockade. I think it was more kabuki theater. And why would you want to prevent more oil going on the mortgage? These numbers just don't add up. Also, zoom out a little bit, right? So back before any of this happened, if you looked up nightmare geopolitical scenarios for the global economy, the two worst by far were war between the United States and China. because presumably then all the manufacturers that come out of China would not leave, right? Or they'd have a hard time leaving. That was number one. That would create like hyperinflation probably. And number two was closure of the Strait of Hormuz. It was always talked about. And now the Strait has been closed for five months. And like some hair hats on television are telling me that like, oh, it's no big deal. Like, no, I'm buying that. It's the biggest deal in the world. So I don't buy it. We have to refill these inventories. The thing's been closed for five months. We've lost so much oil. China have wound down their consumption. We can talk about that. That's a big deal. It's not enough to get rid of the crisis, but it's a big deal. And we can talk about that. SPR, the Special Petroleum Reserve, is tanking. Trump came out, accidentally let slip that they only had, what, four weeks of oil left? Yeah, he's talking about the SPR because it can only get so low and, you know, there's problems when it starts getting too low. I think it's pressure problems or something with the caverns or something. But he's already kind of blurted that out, right? So, like, I think we're living in La La Land here. Do you know when the roadrunner goes off the cliff and he's, like, standing there and he doesn't fall until he looks down?
Speaker 0: Yeah, we're the roadrunner off the cliff, you know? You said about China, you could dig deeper into that. What's bizarre about China? The Chinese demand for oil dropped significantly. I'm guessing they've just tapped into their reserves.
Speaker 3: Yeah, so China have this enormous reserve. It's like nothing else in the world. Their private reserve and their state reserve are integrated because their industry and their state is integrated, right? It's not a communist economy, but it's not a normal capitalist economy. It's like a state capitalist economy or something like that. And so they have these enormous reserves. Now, there's no mystery behind that. Their oil consumption is the same as it was before they started doing this, and their reserves are going down. So they've replaced the imports with reserves. The question is why they do it, because that's just bailing America out. That's using their reserves to bail America out. So I have a guess on this. It's only a guess. Nobody knows. America cut a deal with China when Trump went over to visit Xi on exactly this issue. Now, the question is what China got in return. Some speculated us to do a Taiwan, but no one knows. But more importantly, from our point of view, was the deal indefinite? Was the deal, we're going to wind down our reserves in China for as long as it takes you to get the situation in the Strait resolved? Very unlikely. Much more likely, they said, the Americans said to them, this is all gas, but I think it's educated gas. The Americans said to them, we're going to do this MOU. We're going to try and get everything resolved. And the Chinese said, okay, we'll give you 60 days and we'll absorb it with our oil reserves. And you'll give us X in return, whatever that is, probably something to do with Taiwan. And that's that. So my guess is the Chinese are watching, you know, Vance being interviewed and so on and having the same conversation that we're having right now. Which is. What's going on? Is the MOU falling apart? This oil price makes no sense. There's also a huge temptation of the Chinese to buy at this limited discount price. As I said, the real price of a barrel of oil is not $70. I don't believe that. But it's come down about 6%, 7% or something like that at the margin. The speculators can be shaken out, et cetera, et cetera. A little bit of pressure can be put on the market. So, you know, and their reserves are going down. And the Chinese are really conservative about that sort of thing. They don't like doing these big risky gambits of drawing down reserves. The Americans have been doing that for years since Biden, and they see it as irresponsible. So I think the Chinese are giving them a grace period to try and get this deal sorted out. My guess is it's probably the 60-day time window. I think that's what's going on. But what happens, even in that scenario, what happens if the Iranians just say, nah, they start watching these interviews and they're like, what is this? What are we doing? This is all fake. I don't know if it is or not, but I wouldn't be surprised if those conversations are being had in Tehran right now. The interesting counterpoint to that is that Galibaf, the fairly hardline Speaker of the House, who's been one of the main point people on the negotiations, is out today making very conciliatory noises, saying, oh, no, don't worry, and it's all worthwhile and everything like that. But if you understand politics, you'll understand that no matter how much of a hardliner you are, if you sign on to the negotiation team, it's really in your interest for those negotiations to work. If you go back to Tehran and you say, I'm sorry, that was a load of BS, that was a load of nonsense, your political credibility takes a hit. And he's Speaker of the House. So I wouldn't take that too far. But I can't imagine, unless the Iranians know something that we don't know, that they're not looking at this and going like, I don't think this deal is going to last. Maybe I'm wrong.
Speaker 0: That's a lot, man.
Speaker 3: Strange times.
Speaker 0: It is. It's crazy. I have a feeling you have a glass of whiskey every day. It's like, what the fuck is going on with all this? It doesn't make sense. Something's going on. We're being manipulated. And then he's making another big bet.
Speaker 3: yeah i mean as i said look i think the oil markets the oil markets by definition have been manipulated for years and the reason for that is because there's a thing called opec right that's been around since whatever late 60s early 70s opec's job was to manipulate the oil market right they were a cartel they're cartels they form a monopoly on the price of oil and then they adjust production to manipulate the price that's what opec does And ever since the 70s crisis in 1973 around another war in the Middle East, another war between Israel and its neighbors, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the oil embargo by the Saudis in the OPEC countries, the United States has been trying to figure out a way to wrestle control over the oil price away from OPEC. And they can't do it through production. The US is an enormous oil producer, but it's also an enormous oil consumer. And in markets for oil, what you want to be to control the market is what's called a swing producer. And that's a country that produces a lot of oil but doesn't consume a lot of oil. A country like Saudi Arabia, which doesn't actually have that much consumption because it's got a limited population. You know, it's rich, sort of. A lot of people aren't rich. It's an unusual place. But there's lots of surplus oil to send abroad. Now you're a swing producer. Now you're important. Russia's a swing producer, too. So Venezuela is, too, for what it's worth, but smaller. So these swing producers...
Speaker 0: The Emirates are swing producers as well, yeah?
Speaker 3: Emirates, yeah. Most of those Gulf countries are swing producers. And their OPEC thing was how they did it. And the Americans could never out-compete them on production for export. That was never, ever going to happen. Like, not in a million years, no matter how much fracking or... Because of the massive domestic consumption that the U.S. has. Yeah, exactly. Exactly. So it was never going to happen. It made no sense. So what they've been trying to do to counter OPEC is to figure out a way of influencing these futures and spot markets. And so these debates about manipulation have been going out right back to 2006, 2005. There were hearings in Congress about it. Hedge fund guys would go in, not the guys that were doing speculation, people who are invested in airline stocks. You can go back and read these hearings before Congress. They're really interesting. And around the time, I'm showing my age now, just after the 2008 financial crisis, all the people who got mad at the banks, Elizabeth Warren, what was his name? I can't remember the name of the act that they put through. All those guys were getting these people who were saying that there was speculation taking place and they were giving them congressional hearings. And I always thought it was pretty credible, but it was very hard to prove. So I think what's happened is there was a very limited capacity to impact the oil price on the part of the US government for a long time. But that changed when these trading algorithms came in. For example, I do not think even as late as 2022 they had this capacity. Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank, yeah. Graham Dodd and Barney Frank, those, isn't it? So even as late as 2022, they didn't have this capacity. How do I know that? Because the oil price went bonkers after the Ukraine war. and nobody was able to drive it down.
Speaker 0: How high did it go?
Speaker 3: 130 or something, didn't it? It went higher than today. And that wasn't even that bad. That was just a redirection. Do you remember what happened? The Russians started sending oil that was going to Europe to India. Then the Indians would like stick an Indian made in India sticker on it and send it to the Europeans. So that was just a rerouting. We never actually lost any physical oil on the market there. It was just a rerouting around sanctions. Now, what did happen during that is the Dutch TTF natural gas features in Europe went absolutely haywire in about April, I think, of 2022, about a month and a half, six weeks after the war. And people freaked out. I remember that week. People in markets were freaking out. And then there was this big campaign to talk it down. And it kind of worked. Now, energy prices in Europe remained fairly high. The gas futures price in Europe, it went bonkers. If people want to go and look up Dutch TTF and what happened around the time of the Ukraine war. Now, they talked that down, showing that they had some level of control over that. And I think lessons have been learned since then. I've been saying since the Houthi stuff that the oil price is manipulated. Now, the funny thing about when you say that is, People will call you crazy, you know, on Twitter and the press or whatever. They won't call you crazy, but they'll go like, oh, you're a zero hedge guy. You're like a whatever, like conspiracy theorist. And then, but you know, who doesn't call you crazy traders? So I'd go and meet people I used to know that work in hedge funds in the city. And I'd say, you know, around the time of the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, 2023, 2024. And I'd say, I think the price has been minimized. And they go, it is. We come in on Monday mornings. And there's this huge short position in place after attacks over the weekend. And they said, there's no rationale for doing that. It's the opposite of what you should be doing. There's been attacks on the oil supply. You don't go in on Monday morning and put a giant short in place. And then I started to figure out they were putting these shorts in place and it was manipulating the trading algorithms because the algorithms also trade based on the initial short positions at the beginning of the week, because that's a big signal for traders, you know, because the start of the week determines the the trading of the future of the week. So I've been saying since the Houthi thing that the algorithms have been doing X, Y, and Z. And now everyone's woken up. Well, I'm not saying everyone's woken up to it, but I think it's much more widely, people are willing to think about this now.
Speaker 0: Yeah, it's been mentioned a lot on my show, but no one's explained it as well as you have, to be honest. Nobody on my show has explained it this well.
Speaker 3: I'm kind of obsessed. I'm kind of obsessed. There is, if you go and dig around. If you dig around, there's a Bloomberg article that actually addressed this just after the Houthi crisis. And sometimes the financial journalists are too honest for their own good. And they talk to the wrong people in financial markets. And this one said they thought it was algorithmic trading. There is an article out there. It's fascinating.
Speaker 0: That's wild. Just the concept of algorithmic trading just opens up for the... for people that have massive reach and news outlets and publications to be able to genuinely manipulate the algorithms, that's just a wild thought. That alone is a whole other discussion.
Speaker 3: I think financial markets are going to break on the back of this. Look, what was the news today about Trump's trades, right? Come on. What news?
Speaker 0: Sorry?
Speaker 3: I don't know if you saw that today or yesterday, the big financial news is that Trump has been doing all these trades, 22,000. Oh yeah.
Speaker 0: All the money is printed. Yeah, exactly.
Speaker 3: No, no, but they're trading the market.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Yeah. I don't know. I know I'm saying I'm not surprised. He's just printing money through this, but so he's just making money.
Speaker 3: This is going to break the markets. Like people don't get it. Like financial markets are not going to survive this level of.
Speaker 0: Do we know how much money we know he made a trillion dollars of crypto? Do we know how much he made from these equity trades, all these trades?
Speaker 3: don't know i just saw 22 000 in the first in the first term he did it 587 versus 22 000 who even has time to do 22 000 trades man like what is there a hedge fund like 22 000 is a lot of trades in what two years he did 22 000 trades in two years well according to the financial times headline i don't know maybe
Speaker 0: I believe this is just his traits, not the not not everyone else's in his orbit, just to be clear.
Speaker 3: Maybe they're also talking about like his immediate family or something like that. But the level of training, I'm trusting the poly, the poly market arrests and stuff like that, like something with someone's got this really bad, like I, one of my friends who works in DC. So someone says, you know, it's the end of Empire and everything like that. And, uh, he says that the, the main rule at the end of empire is to grab everything. That's not nailed down. Kind of feels like that.
Speaker 0: That's fascinating. I really enjoyed this conversation. I'd love to do this again. Um, that was an incredible analysis. And I think your obsession is paying off. I really enjoyed it. I think the audience, I know the audience has as well. I know my audience and these are the discussions they enjoy. That was an incredible explanation, Philip. Really, really enjoyed it, man. Thank you.
Speaker 3: No, thanks for having me. Spread the word.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I can see a relief like way lifted off your shoulders. People are fucking finally, after all these years, people are waking up.
Speaker 3: A couple of people on Twitter are like, And our podcast, we have a podcast, Multi-Polarity. I should probably plug it. But, you know, I hope people, it's a geopolitics and economics one, but I just hope people are, yeah, just like, this is what's going on. Like, figure it out. And something weird is going to happen. You can't do this forever. This is too weird.
Speaker 0: Just telling my team, I want to have you back ASAP. Just one other, I'd love to do an episode talking about the way the markets have been not manipulated as how you've just explained it, but everything that Trump has been doing, all the trades they've been doing, the deals that they've been having, have you looked into all the different, the Kazakhstani company that they invested in the deal that they have in Albania? Have you had time to look at all these?
Speaker 3: I'm familiar with some of them. I mean, some of them are actually quite rational, like from the American interest point of view, the Kazakhstan one is about getting involved in the middle corridor and stuff like that. The physical investment deals are, I'm not necessarily opposed to them. I know some of them are controversial in their countries, like the Albanian one. The private investments, you mean? Yeah, I think they kind of make sense. I mean, depending, you know, but there's a rationale to them. Now, my issue is that there's some very strange things going on that could literally break the Western financial markets. And we're at a time where the U.S. dollar is, like, declining, you know? It's really dangerous.
Speaker 0: What do you mean by this? We're talking about how Trump profited. You know, a lot of people are... are critiquing him for manipulating the price, the markets and him benefiting from that, you know, shorting the markets before announcing a deal and doing the opposite when announcing escalation or buying up oil futures before striking the run again and just playing the markets up, down, up, down. So that's what people are really talking about. You're saying you're concerned on a deeper level that it could break the entire markets. What do you mean by that?
Speaker 3: So look, A bunch of people in Trump world messing around what markets, if that's what they're doing, allegedly, as the journalists say, that's not going to break markets, right? They only have a limited amount of capital to play with and they can't truly break the pricing mechanism and markets. I think what it's done though, is it's created a culture. It's creating a culture in DC that doing this is okay. And for example, like again, go back to the old press, right? I am not accusing the Trump administration of manipulating the oil price to make money, to make money on trades. That is not what's going on. They're manipulating the oil price because they've got themselves into a really sticky geopolitical situation in the Middle East and the midterms are coming up in November and they're desperate. That's why. But what has changed is the culture of this trading and stuff has made them all start thinking like hedge fund managers. so they're doing these really extreme things that like any economist will tell you that is bonkers that is going to result in really bad news down the line and and they're doing it because they it's like short-termism you know they've like reverted to full-on short-termist thinking and who is a more short-term thinking than a day trader like no one the day trader doesn't care about the stock he doesn't care about game stock he doesn't like he doesn't care he just wants the game stop stock to go up tomorrow. And so he's reading the Reddit comments on the meme stocks the night before. Now, imagine running your economic policy like that. Are you terrified yet?
Speaker 0: Yeah, no, that's another great explanation. I got it. So they've kind of shifted the entire way foreign policy is conducted and the lenses in which it's conducted.
Speaker 3: Everything seems super short term, like events driven, like almost like an X algorithm is running things. Scary, man. I mean, some of it's kind of like darkly funny, but it's not funny, actually.
Speaker 0: Bloomberg just reported, European nations now believe some Hormuz fees are inevitable. Just came in now from Bloomberg. That's the title. European nations have made peace with the fact that Iran will impose fees in the Strait of Hormuz, viewing it as, quote, inevitable and urging that Iran does not discriminate regarding which vessels must pay the fee. Shit. That's fucking exciting. That's exciting.
Speaker 3: It is exciting. I mean, you know, may you live in interesting times while you got the Chinese curse. Okay. Everyone watching got the Chinese curse. So, but you know, it's not the fees. It's not that it's, it's like how long, even if they get the straight open, how long does it take to get middle Eastern oil capacity back up to where it was? That's not simple. It's not simple to turn back on oil wells. Like this stuff is incredibly complicated. We're going to have some sort of an oil shortage. Now, the only question is how bad it is. And here's a really important point to understand. To the extent that the Trump administration succeeds in driving down the oil price with this funny money stuff, right? That just increases demand for oil. If the price is lower, demand goes up, right? Everyone's taking an economics class. So what does that do? So if they get 10%, let's say they get gasoline prices down at the pump by 10%. then you're going to buy more gasoline than you would if it was 10% higher. But there's limited amounts of gasoline. So what happens? Inventories, storage. So what they're actually doing, the SPR, what the U.S. are doing by driving in the oil price is they're subsidizing the rest of the world with their SPR. They're sending out cheap barrels of oil, discount, double discount, 30% off, sending it out from their SPR. For what? A couple of headlines. It's nuts.
Speaker 0: That goes back to your point. Very, very, very short-term thinking. Complete opposite of China.
Speaker 3: Complete opposite. And who wins in that game?
Speaker 0: Exactly, exactly. Philip, love it. We're going to do this again, man. Really appreciate your time. Thank you.
Speaker 3: Good fun. Thanks a lot, Mario. Cheers.
Speaker 0: Take care, Philip. All right, guys. I'll be going live in a few seconds or a few minutes with Alex Christoforou to talk about Ukraine. Do let me know in the comments. Probably these are the comments I'm going to check the most today of what you think of this conversation. I loved it. I really enjoyed it. He's just incredible at objectively analyzing things, not in a contrarian way, but in a realistic way. It's probably the best way I could describe it, but explaining it in a very digestible way as well. So I enjoyed this. I love the way he analyzes geopolitical situations, the lens in which he does these analyses. So I would love to have him back on the show and to have these conversations because I learned a lot. So let me know what you think in the comments. Otherwise, I'll see you with Alex Christoforou in a couple of minutes. Bye, guys.
reSee.it AI Summary
I’m looking at the “oil-stocks refill” claim behind the ceasefire. As EX-CIA Larry Johnson notes, most Gulf oil goes to Asia—about 90%—not America. Even resumed Saudi exports head east. The real squeeze is heavy sour crude for diesel/jet fuel; the U.S. has roughly weeks left, and tankers take 40+ days to arrive. Restarting bombing would strangle our own supply.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 The ceasefire was supposed to refill the oil stocks. There's one problem: almost none of the oil coming out of the Gulf is headed anywhere near America... That's the hole EX-CIA Larry Johnson keeps pointing at. Vance describes the MOU as breathing room to "refill the world's oil economy." Fine, Larry says, then track the tankers: roughly 90 PERCENT of what's leaving the strait is bound for Asia. China, South Korea, India. Even Saudi Aramco's resumed exports, 10 million barrels on five supertankers, are heading east. Not a drop of it fixes Washington's actual problem. Because the problem was never gasoline. It's the heavy sour crude that becomes diesel and jet fuel, the middle distillates. Trump himself said at the G7 the US had about four weeks of oil left. Larry walked the calendar forward: the Strategic Petroleum Reserve has been covering the gap since April, the margin is now down to days, and any relief tanker leaving the Gulf today needs 40-plus days to arrive and refine. Somewhere in between, somebody chooses what gets cut, flights or trucks and tractors. He also poured cold water on the buildup chatter, pointing out the USS Boxer left San Diego back in March, making the "just arrived" framing months stale, and noting the military planning cells are still working banker's hours. Meanwhile Iran exports 1.66M barrels a day at a 20 PERCENT premium, spot-on its pre-war level. His bottom line hasn't moved: restart the bombing and you strangle your own fuel supply. The math holds Washington hostage more than any missile. @NewSonof
Video Transcript AI Summary
The New York Times report says that during U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations in April, the U.S. feared Israel planned to assassinate Mohammad Ghalibaf and Arachi to derail the talks. The report says Washington asked several countries to warn Iran, while Iran sought guarantees through Pakistani and Qatari mediators that its delegation would not be targeted. Iranian security officials later warned that Israel might attack Ghalibaf’s plane; the aircraft made an emergency landing in Mashhad, and the delegation traveled to Tehran by road. Three senior Iranian officials said Ghalibaf narrowly survived Israeli strikes in June last year and “in this war.” The discussion claims Pakistani fighter jets escorted the Iranian delegation’s aircraft between the Iranian border and Islamabad, and that on the return flight Iranian intelligence warned that two Israeli fighter jets entered Iranian airspace from the Iraqi border. The overall takeaway presented is that Israel attempted to kill the negotiators while talks involving U.S. figures were underway.
In the broader debate, one participant argues that Israel’s actions aim to derail negotiations and drag the U.S. into a losing or worsening war; another participant responds that this assumes Iran would not retaliate, emphasizing that in previous rounds Israel has sought an “out” rather than Iran. The discussion also raises questions about why the U.S. would warn Iran through mediators instead of directly pressuring Israel, and suggests skepticism about how U.S. leadership is controlling foreign policy.
The conversation then turns to U.S. military posture and planning. It claims “Crisis Action Teams” (CATS) have shifted from 24-7 operation to five days a week, eight hours a day, implying deactivated planning and deactivation of certain operational cells; it says reactivation would be a sign the U.S. is preparing military action. There is also dispute over claims that the USS Boxer recently arrived in the region, with one participant asserting the dates indicate it would have taken far less time than presented and calling the claim “bullshit.”
Another section addresses the possibility of assassination during a major diplomatic gathering. The discussion links escalation risk to an alleged targeting scenario involving a religious ceremony and foreign dignitaries, and argues that prior attempts to eliminate figures tied to negotiations have not stopped attacks or improved Israel’s security.
The transcript also covers negotiations over shipping fees in the Strait of Hormuz. Bloomberg and other reports are discussed: the U.S. reportedly offered Iran to unfreeze $6 billion in funds if Iran did not charge a fee for the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran rejected it. Another report says Oman offered to charge a fee, and European powers accept that a fee at the Strait of Hormuz is inevitable, seeking a “non-discrimination” approach so ship owners from different nationalities would all pay. The discussion frames U.S. interest as concern for allies or for avoiding cost burdens tied to Iran’s leverage, and says Iran would insist on receiving money first before committing to terms.
A major segment then focuses on oil and diesel/aviation fuel constraints. One participant cites claims attributed to Trump that the U.S. had only about four weeks of oil left if the Strait remained closed, arguing that what runs out is heavy crude needed for diesel and aviation fuel rather than sweet oil for gasoline. The transcript describes a drawdown from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, asserts supply dropped by about 20%, and says tanker flows to Asia do not resolve U.S. heavy-crude shortages quickly due to transport and refining delays. It argues the remaining reserve could be down to only “six, seven days” before running out, and that any shortages would force cuts to aviation fuel or diesel.
Additional updates include: Pakistan announcing its prime minister Shahbaz Sharif will travel to attend Ali Khamenei’s funeral; Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson saying more than 100 countries will attend and that countries supporting Iran’s wartime attacker will not be invited. The transcript also mentions repeated claims of radar destruction on Sirik Island and a clip in which Trump boasts about blowing up Iran’s radar multiple times while claiming Iran has to rebuild again.
Finally, the transcript mentions reports that Saudi Aramco resumed full crude exports through the Strait of Hormuz, with supertankers carrying about 10 million barrels departing Ras Tanoura and offering July-loading crude on a spot basis. A separate claim is discussed that U.S. naval forces are supporting and protecting supertankers transiting through the Omani corridor, followed by debate about whether such movements would help U.S. heavy-crude needs. The discussion closes with an Axios report that Kamala Harris privately contacted and met with pro-Palestinian activists and other figures as groundwork for a possible 2028 campaign, while the debate emphasizes how the Israel/Gaza issue may continue to shape U.S. politics and elections.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: A story came out today that makes me reconsider my position. So according to the New York Times, the US reportedly feared during nuclear negotiations with Iran in April that Israel was planning to assassinate Ghalibaf and Arachi in an attempt to derail the talks. The report says Washington asked several countries to warn Iran, while Iran sought guarantees through Pakistani and Qatari mediators that its delegation would not be targeted. You can remove the video, Stephanie. Ghalibaf's plane later made an emergency landing in Mashhad, which is up north in Iran, after Iranian intelligence warned of a possible Israeli attack. And three senior Iranian officials said that Ghalibaf narrowly survived Israeli strikes in June last year and in this war. So according to the New York Times, not only did the US worry Israel would assassinate them while they were negotiating with JD Vance in Pakistan during the negotiations, But instead of stopping the Israelis, they were worried that the Israelis are going to do it anyway. They tried to warn Iran through mediators, Qatar and Pakistan. And I'll actually read the rest of it. Iran adopted additional security measures during the negotiations with the U.S., the Pakistani ones and since, to reduce the risk of Israeli strikes against the senior officials, according to New York Times. Quote, in April... Ghalibaf had been scheduled to travel to Pakistan for a meeting with the US with their JD Vance, but Iranian security officials feared Israel could use the visit to assassinate Ghalibaf or Arachi in an effort to derail the negotiations. Pakistani fighter jets escorted the Iranian delegation's aircraft, carrying more than 70 Iranian officials between Iranian border and Islamabad. So there was fighter jets escorting it, Pakistani fighter jets. On the return flight, on the way back, Iranian security services warned of intelligence that Israel planned to strike the plane and that two Israeli fighter jets had entered Iranian airspace from Iraqi border. The aircraft made an emergency landing in Mashhad up north and the delegation traveled the remaining eight hours by road to Tehran. So based on this report, Israel actually tried to assassinate Ghalibaf and Arachi in the midst of negotiations. Holy shit.
Speaker 3: What is it that Israel is trying to accomplish?
Speaker 1: More war.
Speaker 3: Well, yeah, except a war that they can't win and they're not able to handle. That's what is so insane about this. You know, they've already proven that they can't stop the Iranian ballistic missiles. So, and they're killing the people who have been most likely willing to negotiate with them. So yeah, let's make sure that you put folks who are hardliners who will be unforgiving in power. Yeah, that'll serve Israel's interests. These people are crazy. They're just bonafide nuts. It does. Go ahead.
Speaker 1: No, I was going to ask you a second question, but I'll let you finish this comment first.
Speaker 3: No, no, I just said it's, you kill somebody if that person is planning to kill you and cause immediate bodily harm or, you know, these Iranians are killing are not in that category. They're the ones actually withholding, encouraging no attacks. So I don't get it.
Speaker 1: If I had to speculate, it's to derail, obviously to derail negotiations, but the goal is to drag the U.S. into it You would call it a losing war if we just repeat the same that's happened before. But at the end of the day, it seems like the Iranians are losing the most. It depends how you measure it militarily by damage wise. Lebanese probably up there as well. But the point I'm making is the Americans are in some ways losing more than the Israelis. So if the Israelis drag the US from a strategic perspective, you could argue that it benefits their interest. If they keep weakening Iran, they won't achieve victory. strategic victory, I don't think they'll be able to achieve it. But if they can convince the Americans to just keep bombing Iran, bombing Iran, it works in Israel's interest. I think that's the goal they're trying to achieve. What's wild to me, though, is that the Americans can't help them.
Speaker 3: Well, look, that assumes, and it's a faulty assumption, that after they bomb Iran, Iran doesn't retaliate. Iran retaliates with greater force, greater strength, greater duration. In every single case, whether it's the 12-day war or this last, you know, the 42-day war, it's been Israel looking for an out, not Iran. And, you know, the fact that this ceasefire was announced, it coincided with roughly the last day that oil carriers on the high seas delivered their cargo to their final destination. not, you know, you think that's a coincidence. That's why the United States was eager to get a ceasefire back open because they don't have enough oil to replace what they've lost.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's just another crazy part is that the Americans, instead of, you know, I would expect if the Americans were able to force Israel eventually to a ceasefire in Lebanon, I don't know what they would have, what they would have been able to do to to to achieve that because in this report, the Americans warned Iran through Pakistan and Qatar. Why would you need to warn Iran? If you don't want Israel to assassinate their leaders, can't you just pick up the phone and say, Bibi, you kill them, I'm out, immediately you deal with the consequences. And by the way, the aid would stop. I don't understand what's stopping President Trump. I'm sure there's something there because I'm sure he'd love to do that.
Speaker 0: But...
Speaker 1: What is it that's stopping him from being able to do that?
Speaker 3: I think it's increasingly clear that Trump's not really in control of his own administration. Tucker Carlson did a fascinating interview last night with an investigative reporter that had looked into the whole January 6th incidents. And what came out of that was that The whole January 6th incident was highly orchestrated and it had the involvement of the CIA, highly classified special military units, and the FBI. Now, the reason I raise that is this investigative reporter has now identified the Capitol Hill police officer who is actually the one that planted the bombs outside the DNC and RNC headquarters. And these were not real bombs, they were inert. But here's Trump unable to control that process. So if you look at something that's so central to his own political survival and he's unable to control it, why in the world do we think he's actually in control of any of this foreign policy activity?
Speaker 1: That's a very good point. Makes you question a lot of things about how the government works. and how much those we elect or those Americans elect are the ones that make the final decisions.
Speaker 3: This concept of a deep state control, it's real. And you get bureaucrats who are in senior positions, they have seniority, they have security. And if there's something they don't like about a current administration, work against it. So that's where I always come back to look at, let's look at the kinds of things that you think have to be in order in order for there to be like a military strike or military action. And so that's where I come down like right now saying, I don't see any immediate military action on the horizon simply because the bureaucratic mechanisms that make that happen have been temporarily deactivated. And what I mean by that is that the CATS, the Crisis Action Teams, they've stopped doing 24-7. They're now five days a week, eight hours a day. So that means planning cells that would normally be operational and operation cells, they've been essentially deactivated for now. Now, if we see them stand back up, that's a good indicator that the United States is getting ready to do something militarily.
Speaker 1: on the also in the last 48 hours, the USS boxer, I know you're talking about an order for military aircraft to move away from the region, not military aircraft, sorry, military equipment. But according to reports, so first, there was a report that came out the USS boxer, which is an amphibious ready group actually just arrived to the region, I think yesterday or two days ago, according to CENTCOM. And then Brad Cooper was talking about how 50,000 troops are in the region. He said yesterday that the... Let me find it here. I wrote it down. In his visit to Lebanon, he said there's 50,000 troops. More than 50,000 American service members are currently operating across the region, remaining vigilant and ready.
Speaker 3: And... Well, 50,000 across the region. I mean, you know, let's go back to the claim about the boxer. Sorry, that's bullshit. The USS Boxer departed Naval Base San Diego on Wednesday, March 18th, 2026. Are you telling me it took three frigging months to get there?
Speaker 1: I don't know, but it was just mentioned to me today.
Speaker 3: What they're mentioning to you is bullshit. It's a lie. Yeah, Brad Cooper meant, oh, it's just on station. No, it's not. It left San Diego to sell to that area on March 18th. Just type into your search engine, how long does it take the USS Boxer to sell from San Diego to Chabahar? You know, 50 days maximum. And yet they're telling us that, so March 18th to April 18th, There's 30, April 18th to May 18th. There's 60, May 18th to June 18th. There's 90. You're talking to almost four frigging months to get there? Shut up. That's ridiculous.
Speaker 1: You're still confident. You don't think there'll be a military buildup whatsoever. You still think they're planning to take all the military equipment away?
Speaker 3: Well, there's, like I said, until... until someone tells me that the cat, oh, we've reactivated the cat, okay? And then we see aircraft going to, say, Fort Bragg. They're flying from their station to Fort Bragg to pick people up and then flying to the Middle East. Yeah, there's a billet, but that's not happening. It's the opposite that's happening. The airplane are flying out of the Middle East. They're flying to Fort Bragg, dropping people off, and then going back to their home station. But ask yourself, why would Cooper lie like this about the USS Boxer? Oh, yeah, it's ready there on station. It's been there for, God, two months. Have some skepticism about this.
Speaker 1: Yeah. All right, so in terms of the risks of Mustafa Kamenei, you're saying that, so if the Americans are not ready for war, if they've got military equipment moving away from the region, if the crisis management team are not active, or they've downsized, or they're working less hours, but that doesn't mean Israel wouldn't like to see a resumption of war. You're saying if Israel has an opportunity to derail the negotiations, they would take it, would agree on that within means, or they would not take it without American approval?
Speaker 3: Oh, they would. They might do it, but they'd be risking war with the world. You know, an assassination of the Ayatollah Khamenei during this international event. Because India, Chinese are sending a high-level delegation. India is sending a high-level delegation. The Russians are sending Medvedev. That's pretty high. So, and then look at the, look at the, that that missile you know in the the video you showed that's not a precision guided weapon that's a hellfire missile that's one that doesn't explode that one that has blades coming out of it no no no it does explode it carries a 20 kilogram warhead or a 20 pound warhead excuse me and so not this one this is a different one so this is a hellfire it has a name um
Speaker 1: There it is. Hold on an RX nine Hellfire are nine x sorry. So this one, it's infamous because blades would come out of it and it would kill someone. So if there's two people sitting in a car, it will kill one of them, but not the other one. And that's the and so wouldn't explode whatsoever. The blades come out and slices the person.
Speaker 3: Yeah, that would again, they do that at a religious ceremony like that, in front of all these other foreign dignitaries. Israel would be, you know, immediately Iran would be retaliating, and there's not a single country that would intervene to encourage them to stop.
Speaker 1: But you're also talking about a country that tried to assassinate the leading negotiators during negotiations when the Americans invited them. I understand it's not the same as killing the Supreme Leader during a funeral.
Speaker 3: Yeah, but you didn't have the Russians and the Chinese and the Indians there. It was just them. There was no risk of any kind of foreigner getting hurt.
Speaker 1: Not this time. Weren't the Chinese in... The Chinese were in Venezuela when Trump kidnapped Maduro.
Speaker 3: Yeah, that's the story. I've really seen no confirmation of that. But the point is, kidnapping Maduro is one thing. Killing... and doing an assassination in a religious ceremony that's, frankly, it's attracting Muslims from around the world. This would be viewed as an attack on Islam. You know, and if that's...
Speaker 1: But they already killed the Supreme Leader. They've already killed the Supreme Leader. They killed the Supreme Leader. They tried to kill leading negotiators when they were invited to negotiations by the U.S., I'm sure the U.S. has offered them security guarantees. Yeah, and how did that turn out for them?
Speaker 3: Did it make Israel more secure? Did it stop the attacks on Israel? No. So, you know, maybe they're that insane.
Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly. I think it will make Israel more of a pariah. But they seem to be very, in their decision-making, they seem to be, since October 7th, very short-term oriented, short-term strategic thinking. You know, a lot of the decisions they've taken, there might be a short-term win, but long-term, they've come at a great cost. And I worry, I'd be surprised, but what if Bibi does it? What if Bibi's so desperate now he's losing politically? He's like, screw it. I'm going to try to achieve a massive win, kill Mustafa Khamenei. It's horrible for Israel in the next few years. It'll alienate us. Trump will be pissed off.
Speaker 3: It's not going to alienate people. It's going to lead to the destruction of Israel. iran will not stop with ballistic missiles until israel is a smoldering ruin this would have this would have crossed the line that they will not you know there won't be any going back from it wouldn't killing the ali kamenei was crossing the line as well well you could make that case but israel uh iran responded and again Who was it that sought an end to the fighting on day 42? Was it Israel and the United States? Yes. It wasn't Iran.
Speaker 1: I think it was the United States, not Israel. Israel did not want to end the war. Israel was advocating for it, critical.
Speaker 3: Oh, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. Israel, the reason Israel is going to the United States, you've got to stop this. They were getting hammered. And, you know, reports now come out, they suffered so much more damage than the industry reported. You know, you can fault Iran for saying, you know, you guys got too much damn, you know, patience and you're too charitable. You ought to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. Yeah. Because you have Israel... For those kinds of provocations, I mean...
Speaker 1: But like, Israel is nothing but provocate. They were meant to be a ceasefire in Lebanon. They escalated the bombing in Lebanon. According to all these reports, they kept making statements, we're not going to abide by the ceasefire. Qat saying a few days ago, there's a... Qat said it himself, there's a target on Moshe Taba Kamenei. So it's like they're doing... Their actions show they don't want to abide by the MOU. They still haven't pulled out of Lebanon. A ceasefire has still not happened. Um... they there were reports they were trying to kill the negotiators according to new york times they literally tried to kill the negotiators on their way back from negotiating with the vice president of the united states of america on trump's request and i'm sure there's been security guarantees offered by the us on that trip i would assume they're the defense minister saying pretty openly there's a target on their supreme leader's head i just like i get i don't think they'll do it i think this is too far but it just I'm more worried now than I was a few days ago about it.
Speaker 3: Well, you're making a good case for why Israel should be destroyed.
Speaker 1: I don't think it should be destroyed. I don't think it should be destroyed.
Speaker 3: I think they should change their... This kind of action... I'm against that action. This is horrible. This is an act of war. It's beyond an act of war.
Speaker 1: Yeah, when I read the report, though... Go ahead, go ahead.
Speaker 3: You've got to... Are you suggesting that the Israelis have no cost-benefit analysis capability at all?
Speaker 1: No, no, they do. They're just very short-term oriented in it.
Speaker 3: Well, even short-term oriented.
Speaker 1: It's cost-benefit analysis of Netanyahu versus of Israel are different.
Speaker 3: Okay, what does killing Khamenei abide in?
Speaker 1: Political points for Netanyahu in the elections.
Speaker 3: Potentially. Political points when the ensuing response of Iran is to bomb the living hell out of Tel Aviv and Haifa? I don't see how that helps his political campaign.
Speaker 1: Well, his political campaign was getting a boost. He was gaining support while the war was raging, while Israel was being attacked. Support dropped when the war ended. because of the terms in which it ended. So if he managed, if he restarts it and kills Mustafa, I don't know. I don't know how Israelis might perceive it differently. Yeah.
Speaker 2: Now we do.
Speaker 1: Trump, let me play this clip for you. Just said it now. I'm sure it'll make you happy. If you could play that clip with the audio, please to Larry, he's in a good mood. Let's make it better. So play that clip with the audio just came in now. And then play this one as well. So he's giving an interview as we speak.
Speaker 3: I did a blockade.
Speaker 0: That was essentially not a blockade. It was a wall of steel. We have the great Navy, the greatest Navy in the world. These guys are unbelievable. Not one ship got through to Iran. They have 300 percent inflation. They're making no money. So we're going to take some of the money and we're going to buy them. They need food. They need corn and wheat and soybeans. And we're going to have exclusively our American farmers provide that, assuming we get to the position where we should get to. I think we're going to get there. Their strength is gone. Their bravado is gone, although they keep a pretty good front. The one thing they do have is fakeness. The New York Times said the other day that Iran is in better position now than it was four months ago. I said, wait a minute. Their military is gone. Their inflation is up to 300% from 5%. Their leaders are gone. Their second row of leaders are gone. Some of their third row of leaders are gone. Their generals are mostly wiped out. But they said that they are in better shape today than they were four months ago before we attacked. Now, we were very strong.
Speaker 1: He makes a good point, Larry. Their military is gone. Their leaders, all layers are gone. Their generals are gone.
Speaker 3: Wait, wait. You don't really believe that, do you? I mean, you're just, for the sake of discussion, you're repeating the nonsense that he said, right?
Speaker 1: They're military capitulated. Mustafa, sorry, Ali Khamenei is gone. They seem all like victories to me. So maybe we're just looking at this wrong.
Speaker 3: How many... What was the daily shipment of oil out of Iran on February 27th, 26th? It was 1.4 million barrels, right? Now they're doing 1.6 million barrels, and they're getting a 20% premium on every barrel. Yeah, that's suffering, man. They're going backwards. Sanctions lifted. The ballistic missiles. Sanctions. They've, oh, they're still intact. They haven't been wiped out. The United States acknowledged they haven't been wiped out. Cruise missiles, still there. Drones, still there. In fact, as Iran demonstrated last week, in response to a U.S. attack, they retaliated on a much larger scale than what the United States fired at them. So, you know, Trump lives in his little delusional fantasy world. You know, he can dress up in a military uniform and march around and pretend that he's king of the world. But the fact of the matter is, the Iranian military is still quite intact. Their Air Force, the Air Force was never part of their key, you know, strategic leg of protection. And several Most of the Air Force is still intact. It flew to Pakistan, sheltered there, or was sheltered in underground shelters that weren't destroyed. As far as the Navy goes, they still got patrol boats. They still got bog hammers, high-speed boats. They still got drones, both surface and underwater. He's got to tell himself these stories in order to justify what he's actually doing.
Speaker 1: I think he knows reality. I think he's just trying to tell the voters a story to try to create his own reality. So jokes aside, obviously, I know what he's saying is BS. There is important news I do want to get through, and I probably should have done that instead of messing with you. So straight to homos. So European leaders, according to Bloomberg, So two pieces of news, I want to merge them together. About three hours ago, a story came out of Bloomberg, sorry, Wall Street Journal, that there was an offer made by the US in the Qatari negotiations to unfreeze $6 billion of funds for Iran not to charge a fee to the Strait of Hormuz. Iran rejected that offer. Obviously, it doesn't make sense as an offer. And an earlier report came out today. So we talked about how Oman, according to a report, made an offer, a formal offer to the US that they will charge a fee in the Strait of Homs. Well, according to Bloomberg, European powers, some European powers now accept a fee at the Strait of Homs as inevitable. So they said Iran is going to charge a fee. This is a new reality. All they're asking right now is to not discriminate against ship based on nationality. In other words, if we're going to pay Can China and Russia also pay? So it's like everyone should pay. So this is the position of what Europe and even some Gulf countries are in. It's not if and whether Iran will charge a fee. They will charge a fee, but please do it fairly. And actually, let's put out a piece also. No, that was yesterday that Witkoff and Kushner are trying to make an offer to Iran saying, hey, look, we will unfreeze a lot of assets. So more than the offer that came out of the Wall Street Journal and lift sanctions. You'll make a lot more money that way. rather than charge a fee so instead of charging a fee and making money that way we'll give you a great offer you can make more money with that just don't charge a fee in the straighter hummus which in my view it could work it just depends on what the americans offer them it has to be in my view the lifting of the majority if not all the sanctions and the unfreezing of the majority if not all the assets for iran to give up uh charging a fee for the straight and the straighter hummus ask yourself this question why is the united states so preoccupied about
Speaker 3: The prospect of Iran charging a fee. I mean, if the United States doesn't depend upon the Gulf and any ships coming out of there, why do they care?
Speaker 1: For allies, maybe? Allies of pressure in the U.S.?
Speaker 3: Oh, yes. The United States, it just loves its allies. Oh, Lord knows. We love our allies so much. We want to make sure that none of them suffer any pain or grief. Are we talking the same president that imposed tariffs on all of his beloved allies?
Speaker 1: That would be a break. What if these allies are threatening to sell treasuries, for example, or using their vices to try to pressure Trump, their levers, sorry, to pressure Trump?
Speaker 3: They're already selling treasuries.
Speaker 1: The U.S. has no leverage on this. That's the point. So why do you think he's trying to open it?
Speaker 3: Yeah, because they see it as very costly to them, to the United States. And they don't want to pay. They don't want to have to submit themselves to the Iranians. But allowing this to go forward just simply shows Iran's in charge of the Gulf, of the Strait. Yeah, it is. You know, welcome to the real world, guys. Yeah, so I don't see Iran taking this offer from Witkoff and Kushner. If anything, they'll say, look, okay, let's see the money first. You know, it's like, not that I've engaged in any high-priced drug deals or even low-priced drug deals for that matter, but you don't show up and say, hey, give me the drugs first and then I'll pay the money. No, no, no, no, no, no. Let's see the money first, then we'll, We'll talk about the product. Same deal here.
Speaker 1: Or it could be like, this is probably a movie we could both relate to. Or it could be like in Say Hello Scarface when he's going to do his first drug deal and he's going there. You have the stuff? Yeah, of course I have the stuff. You have the money? I have it. Where's the stuff? Nearby. Where's the money? Nearby. And then they try to kill each other. Do you know which scene I'm talking about?
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah.
Speaker 1: We finally relate to a scene.
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah.
Speaker 1: It's probably good if you're looking at your apparel today, what you're wearing. It suits the clothing.
Speaker 3: Yeah, I'd fit in with, say hello to my little friend.
Speaker 1: All right, so that's the news on Hormuz.
Speaker 3: Yeah, no, I just say that Iran is, you know, it's firm about it. It's going to control the Strait of Hormuz now. It recognizes this is leverage. And with that leverage, you can also use it for the friends and family program. Hey, China, come on through, you don't have to pay. Russia, but actually Russia is not dependent upon anything coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. Russia produces everything that the Strait of Hormuz produces. Include helium, liquid natural gas, oil, sulfur, urea. For Russia, this is,
Speaker 1: if anything this closure of the strait of hormuz good for russia makes his products more expensive they're getting more money out of it yeah i they were the the only winners of the the iran war where a lot of economists were making the argument how the us benefited economically relative to other countries from the closure of australia but whenever they're making that argument it's always the only other country benefiting is russia obviously as an energy exporter All right, so that's on the Hormuz front. And the fact that the Americans made a deal and the Iranians rejected it. We've talked about the USS Boxer. We've talked about the Ghalibaf and Arachi assassination attempts.
Speaker 3: Let me ask you a question. Why do you think they're putting out this story about the USS Boxer now? Oh, it's now entered the region for the fight. I mean, you know, just look it up. It set sail to be deployed on March 18th. And so, you know, it got there within 60 days. And so just now they're pretending, oh, it just arrived? I mean, it's so provably false. Why would they make such a stupid claim? I mean, it's really bizarre. It reinforces my point. Anything coming out of Brad Cooper's mouth, you can't trust. You know, it's spin, it's politics, but it has nothing to do with reality.
Speaker 1: So then there's a J.D. Vance interview that he did yesterday. I don't know if you saw it. Can I play the clip? Yeah.
Speaker 3: Please play it.
Speaker 1: I'm going to play it for you. It won't bother you, this one. It's kind of just trying to understand. Let me tell you which one it is, Stephanie. We played it earlier today, so it should be in our chat. But in that interview, he's talking about, I think Stephanie found it, in a way saying that the MLU is just to give breathing space for the Americans rather than actually ending the war. And I know that's a concern we have and always have. So he's kind of hinting at that. It's hard to determine whether he means it. You can play it whenever it's ready, Stephanie, if you found it. Oh, this is it here. This one here, Stephanie. Yeah, this is it. Play it.
Speaker 2: It's free war hype. So I think what the president has told us to do is use this MOU to sort of refill the world's oil economy, to refill some stocks, and then to see where the hand is. And, you know, as I've said this repeatedly, if the Iranians are willing to make the commitments that we would like them to make, and are willing to back those up with verifiable milestones, then we are gonna change our relationship with Iran. And if they don't do that, then nothing has really changed except for what we've already accomplished from the military campaign, which is a lot. So we kind of have two options here. We have the option of pursuing a long-term deal with the Iranians, but that requires a significant change in their behavior. We have the option of banking our wins And then of course, doing things on top of that if the president feels that we have to. And I think both of those options are very much in play and the president's gonna let this play out. But what's happening right now is he's letting those options play out in an environment where there is significantly less pressure on the world energy economy. And this is my biggest frustration with right-wing critics of what we've done over the last few months in Iran is that they don't realize how completely they were losing the political argument because of what was happening to world energy markets. So what the President of the United States has done... You're talking about the critics who want more bombs dropping. Their attitude is just drop bombs and drop bombs and drop bombs, and they can't really articulate to what end. What the President is saying, I'm willing to drop bombs, and he's clearly shown that he's willing to drop bombs, but only if it serves an objective. And so what he's doing right now is taking a lot of pressure off of the world economy, the world energy economy in particular, while not giving up a single one of his gains and while preserving a lot of optionality. I think that's a very good place for us to be in, but there's uncertainty because no one could be certain what the Iranians are going to do. Right, so then the message, if you're an Iranian, the message you're getting from the US is not...
Speaker 1: Okay. Yeah, so he's kind of hinting that... You heard it. You got to unmute Larry, Stephanie. But you heard what he said. He's kind of hinting at the possibility that the option of war is still there. So it doesn't mean it's now. I understand there's the discussion we've had about miniature buildup, but option of war means the optionality could be in three months' time, could be in six months' time.
Speaker 3: Yeah, so let's remember what Donald Trump said at the G7 meeting in June. He said, quote, we only have about four weeks of oil left if the strait stays closed. We have to get it open now. This is not sustainable. Now, he wasn't talking about light crude or sweet oil, as they call it, because the United States produces enough sweet oil to produce all the gasoline it needs domestically. what he's talking about is the heavy crude, the crude oil or the sour oil that produces diesel and or diesel or aviation fuel. And that's what they're running out of. And what's happened now, it has not restored that. So that clock is, you know, we're now down much less than four weeks, moving down to a week of oil left, if his calculations were right. I actually think it's going to be more like another five weeks that they'll run out. But they are running out. And the run out is just, it's very simple to illustrate. You take, you know, draw a line. That's your existing demand. And the supply prior to 28 February is meeting that existing demand. Now, the supply dropped 20%. Now, It was a delayed impact because, as I pointed out earlier, the oil that was on the high seas took about from 28 February, count 40 days, that's when the last oil tanker would have arrived in the United States and offloaded the heavy crude. Okay, so from that date, you know, say April 8th, you start counting then how many days can we survive because there's not enough heavy crude out there to make up that difference. We're already importing everything we can from Canada, everything from Mexico, everything from Venezuela. We're still short. So what the Trump administration did in mid-April was they started drawing down on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and taking out of that the sour oil, the heavy crude, And that's going to the refineries that are along the Gulf, Gulf of America now, formerly Gulf of Mexico. But they're drawing that down, but they're not getting anything coming in. Well, now that level in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve has reached, it's now at a critical stage. There's only a small margin, maybe six, seven days of supply left before they're out. And once you're out, then you're dealing still with this 20% shortage. And somebody, you got to cut somewhere. Are you going to cut aviation fuel or are you going to cut diesel? Aviation fuel means fewer aircraft fly, civilian airliners that will face cutbacks. Or you cut back diesel, not enough diesel for tractors and farmers or for the trucks that they run on. So that's the problem. And that's not solved yet because if the oil tankers that have come out this week so far, 90% of them and maybe 100%, but I'm pretty sure the 90% number, they're going to Asia. They're going to China, to South Korea, some to India, Indonesia, Malaysia. They're going to Asia. That doesn't help the United States at all with diesel and aviation fuel. So and even if you start getting tankers out today to deal with that shortage, it's going to be 40 days before they get to the United States and then gets refined. So you look at at least 45 more days. And that's the point from, you know, say, within within a week, two weeks. The United States is now going to be in a deficit situation, and they don't have reserves to pull out of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. That's the issue.
Speaker 1: Yeah, there was a guest I spoke with today that I think you'd really like. I thought of you while I was speaking with him, Philip Pilkington. Sorry, Pilkington.
Speaker 3: Great guy. I'm familiar with his writing. I don't know him personally.
Speaker 1: Yeah, so he's got his own podcast, etc. Met him for the first time. And he was making the argument, because it reminded me of something you said. So again, he's an economist, and he's going through how just the oil prices are being heavily manipulated, which I know is something you've been concerned about for a long time. Because he's like, it just doesn't make sense that the future prices are so low, but there was just supply-demand, just don't make sense. There's not enough ships going through the Strait of Hormuz. There needs to be a lot more ships to kind of meet the demand that exists. And then obviously if China's back in the market and demand increases on the Chinese side, that will make it even worse. And then you've also got to fill up the strategic petroleum reserves. So if you add that to the mix. So his argument is that, and he's also talking about how the oil that is on the ships is something you've said to me as well, is selling for a much higher price than the future prices. His estimation, there's a term for it and how it's calculated, but his estimation is similar to a number that HFI research mentioned, according to him, of the price of oil they're paying is $105, $110. He said it could be as high as $115 a barrel. So he's saying, Mario, it's been manipulated. It's being, it has, it has, process it's being manipulated it's been being manipulated for years but now it's at a whole other level and he just says like it's just not sustainable and there's people there are analysts that do believe that the way they trading that is by buying uh stocks and energy companies that's the the trade but for anyone that um believes that oil prices are being manipulated so this is an argument that he was making he's done an incredible job at explaining it went really deep um earlier today i enjoyed it i i told them i want you on the show on a regular basis But yeah, I was thinking of you while having that conversation, because I know you've talked about this as well.
Speaker 3: Yeah, well, he's exactly right. And again, this is, you know, I don't know about you. I know before this whole, the war started, I used to just think of oil as like oil, you know. It doesn't have all these different components. It's just oil. And you can do this or that. You had a lot of choices. Turns out, no, I was wrong. So, you've got certain petrochemical outputs require a particular kind of oil, but particularly with aviation and diesel fuel, that's from what they call the middle distillates. And out of a barrel of oil, 30% of the oil in that barrel may go towards the middle distillate. That is why Trump let the cat out of the bag at the G7, where he said, we're going to be out in four weeks. We need to get the Strait open now.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 3: So he finally listened to whoever was briefing him, because he wasn't lying. He wasn't making that up.
Speaker 1: All right. So in other news, we've got Iranian president said that... Now, actually, let's go to the funeral, because we were talking about it earlier. So Pakistan announced that Shahbaz Sharif, the prime minister, is going to be traveling today, sorry, tomorrow, to attend the funeral. And he'll be accompanied by other officials from Pakistan. Also, Ismail Barghay, the Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson, said, quote, more than 100 countries from around the world will attend a farewell and funeral ceremony of the martyr leader of the Islamic Republic, of the Islamic Revolution, Ali Khamenei. We did not invite the countries that supported the aggressor's attack on Iran during the war to participate in the funeral ceremony of the martyred leader. So that's just some updates. So another big leader. I don't know if you know that the prime minister of Pakistan is going. Asim Muneer is not going according to the report, but the prime minister is. Also, there was this, if you could show that image. Remember how we talked the last attack that happened? We showed an image, if you could quickly show it, Stephanie, of the radar that was destroyed. by the Americans. It's been struck many times. They struck it again. So it's in Sirik, the city of Sirik. Sirik Island, I think. Sirik is an island. Sirik Island. It's been destroyed three times. It's actually been rebuilt for the third or fourth times. I think third time. It's been rebuilt again now. And funny because Trump...
Speaker 3: I'm just like, they're not doing a real good job of destroying it, are they? If it can be rebuilt so quickly.
Speaker 1: Unless it's easy to rebuild, I don't know. Because it sounds like a simple tower.
Speaker 3: Or unless it's a decoy. As a plot twist. Well, but you got to ask yourself, you know, I would think a real radar might take actually more time to construct. Whereas you build a decoy and put it back up real quick. Come get it, Americans. Burn up those tomahawks.
Speaker 1: So that was this morning. So this is this morning with satellite images. And now with that in mind, I want you to listen to the clip of what Trump said a few minutes ago. I think it'd be, it's perfect timing.
Speaker 0: Them are really big ships. And in a way, they had courage going out. But our Navy took them out. We escorted them out. And nobody knew. The lights were off. Everything was off. Everything was silent. We blew up Iran's radar. They had no radar. They still don't. We blew it up again the other night. They had a nice new radar set up. They were all set to go. And we blew it up last week. They have to start all over again for a third time.
Speaker 3: They keep blowing it up and it keeps coming back, huh? Gee, it sounds like a bad case of herpes.
Speaker 1: Where did you come up with this? That's the least thing I expected you to say. That's a good one, though. Jesus Christ. So another piece of news though.
Speaker 3: Trump's sitting there going, why do I still got this sore on my lip?
Speaker 1: So another piece of news that came out as well today, according to Reuters, in terms of rebuilding from the war damage, Saudi Aramco has resumed full crude exports through the Strait of Hormuz with at least five supertankers carrying around 10 million barrels departing from Ras Tanoura. The state oil giant has also begun offering up to 6 million barrels of July loading crude to its regular Asian customers on a spot basis, marking a rare shift away from its traditional long-term contract model as it seeks to boost sales. The increase in export comes after the U.S. around truce, blah, blah, blah. And that also comes with a report here by HFI. U.S. navals are reportedly, if you can show this image as well, there's a video on this tweet I'm going to send you now, Stephanie, you can play it for the audience and for Larry. And so that contradicts other things we've been talking about. US naval forces are reportedly supporting and protecting super tankers transiting through the Strait of Hormuz along the Omani corridor. Over the last 24 hours, that's this morning, at least four non Iranian VLCC is transited inbound with AIS on with AIS on the transponder on via the shroud. If you can play the Yeah, play this one. No, just play. Can you play? you can't or can you figure it out and play please? Over the last 25 years, at least four non Iranian VLCCs transited inbound with AIS on on via the strait under American oversight and protection, while Iranian link traffic remains limited and the IRGC has not escalated it escalated in response. And then there's a chart here and there's an image.
Speaker 3: Which direction were they going? Inbound, right?
Speaker 1: For electricity inbound
Speaker 3: going into the strait right with ais on so they don't yeah so they don't have oil on board yet right i'm assuming so it says inbound yeah so why is iran gonna worry about a ship that doesn't have any oil on board yeah let me see the actual report here maybe the team were wrong okay and they claim that there are u.s navy ships accompanying it nonsense
Speaker 0: protection.
Speaker 1: Yeah, went in. Anyway, so that's the report here. But I get conflicting information on what type. So I'm just reading it as is. But then I said this is inbound. But the Saudi Aramco's re repaired itself, according to the Reuters report, repaired. And where are they sending their oil? Asia, to which Obviously, Asia is the one that's older.
Speaker 3: How does that help the United States? The United States is running a deficit on heavy crude. How does that help the United States? It doesn't. That's the point. They can send all the oil they want to China. It's not going to help the United States one damn bit. And yet Trump's proud of that? He needs to go back and read his brief on that issue.
Speaker 1: So we've cleared Hormuz. We've talked about the war damage. We played some clips. We've talked a lot about the funeral. We've talked about the risks or lack thereof of a return to a full blown war. Yesterday we covered Syria and Yemen. There's more updates on that front, more mobilizations, which we'll probably talk about next time we come. There's talks in Yemen about clashes, positive developments between Syria and Lebanon heading in the right direction of no clashes, but a lot of updates there. Yeah, you can play the video. Yes, Stephanie. You can play it, but we've moved on anyway. Some updates on the Lebanese side. Nothing too significant. Just worried about war. The country's really worried about being plunged into war. And then probably the last thing is, that's an American political point. I'll bring it up and get your thoughts on it, Larry. A report from Axios. You could remove it. It's fine, Stephanie. According to Axios, former U.S. vice president Kamala Harris... had privately contacted Mamdani and held closed-door meetings with pro-Palestinian activists as she lays the groundwork for a possible 2028 presidential campaign. Axios reports Harris recently spoke with Mamdani about the future of the Democratic Party and also met with figures linked to the Uncommitted Movement, which opposed the Biden administration's policy on the war in Gaza. She has additionally consulted Democrats and former aides on issues including China, AI, and Venezuela. The outreach comes as Harris seeks to rebuild ties with the Democrat Party's progressive wing, following criticism over her alignment with Biden's approach to Israel during the 2024 election. Harris has not announced whether she will run in 2028. Just an interesting point on how the Israel issue is going to become more and more important in the next election.
Speaker 3: Well, not in terms of being pro-Israel. That's the point. Israel has done so much damage to its reputation. And, you know, the political atmosphere in the United States is definitely turning against them.
Speaker 1: Yeah. And we're going to see that plan. We mentioned yesterday how Tucker is launching. He's not launching his own. Either he's launching his own party or wants to support a third party. That's a non-interventionist plan. non-interventionist a party that moves away from these forever wars or these foreign wars which is what the country needs but yeah i think the reverberations of october 7th and everything that happened since um going to be felt for many years to come especially in the next elections yeah i think actually a third party like that would probably get some traction because it would focus on focusing on america's needs and building up infrastructure
Speaker 3: dealing with the social problems we have here in this country, lack of adequate health care, growing economic inequality. You know, you saw today the report on jobs was they had expected more jobs to be produced. Nope, fewer. So, you know, even Trump keeps talking, oh, the economy's great, couldn't be any better. It's not true, but that's their story. But regardless of what it is right now, if Trump's statement to the G7 was correct, that we're going to run out of oil. He says we're going to run out of oil. What he meant, we're going to run out of the heavy crude that's needed for diesel and aviation fuel. I keep hammering that. It's important that people understand that. If that's not reversed, that is going to have dramatic negative economic impacts on the U.S. economy, on the global economy. So, you know, instead there, and, but that's why he's not gonna, let me put it this way. If he decides for some reason to put a halt to all this withdrawal of US forces and decides to renew a tax with Iran, that is gonna be a major, that would be another disruptive action that will stop the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf, number one. It will lead to a significant damage to Israel, and it will, in fact, reduce Israel's ability to continue its military operations in Lebanon and Syria. And it's going to severely damage the U.S. economy, not to mention the European economy. So, you know, it's not a broad scenario.
reSee.it AI Summary
I read that Trump briefly considered full-scale war with Iran, but the oil “math” pulled him back to negotiation. The Wall Street Journal reports multiple sit-downs with Hegseth and Caine, with talks in Doha and a possible sanctions-relief package. Larry Johnson argues restraint hinges on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve’s tight drawdown limits, looming fuel shortages, slow tankers, and unresolved troop withdrawal.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 Trump reportedly weighed going back to full-scale war with Iran. Then he looked at the oil math and picked the negotiating table... The Wall Street Journal says the option was live, multiple sit-downs with Hegseth and Caine in recent days, before Trump chose to keep talking and even signaled the August 18 deadline can slide. Axios filled in what "talking" looks like: technical teams in Doha, a one-week understanding to avoid new clashes in the strait, and an American pitch that sanctions relief under a bigger deal would be worth "100 times" more to Iran than charging tolls. Larry Johnson thinks one number explains the restraint. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve sits near 325 MILLION barrels, and 252.4 million is the legal floor where drawdown authority locks up. A new bombing campaign devours aviation fuel, aviation fuel comes from the reserve, and the reserve is 73 million barrels from handcuffs. Add a fuel shortage he expects to bite within weeks, relief tankers 40 days out, and a troop withdrawal order that still hasn't been rescinded, and the knife's edge gets very narrow. Even the weekend's darkest chatter bent to that logic. With Medvedev confirmed at the funeral and a senior Chinese delegation expected, Larry's take on any strike scenario was flat: that's suicide, with the world watching. @NewSonof
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on multiple claims about the U.S., Israel, Iran, and regional conflicts.
One topic is a reported “cool story” from Channel 15 J about a CIA and Musa plan to arm the Kurds to cause regime change. Channel 15 J claims JD Vance learned of the secret plan and immediately told Erdogan, leading Erdogan to reject plans to arm the Kurds to fight Iran; the plan then failed after details were leaked to Erdogan. The speakers discuss whether a vice president could leak information to sabotage a president’s plans and whether the story could be driven by Israelis trying to discredit Vance. They connect this to long-standing U.S.-Turkey contention over arming Kurds, saying Turkey has bombed Kurds and that Erdogan would likely make a fuss. They further mention that the Kurds were said to be armed “to march on Tehran,” which the speakers frame as unlikely and as suggesting “desperation.”
A second major topic is the funeral in Tehran and the possibility of an Israeli attempt to assassinate Mustafa Khamenei during or around the ceremony. The speakers say airspace is being closed in Tehran. They cite comments from Professor Izadi, who said he does not know if Mustafa will show up but hopes he does not and would not be surprised by an Israeli attempt. They also mention the expected presence of Russian Dmitry Medvedev and possibly a high-level Chinese representative, with China’s participation used as context for fears of an attack.
The conversation shifts to internal Iranian politics and reactions to an MOU. One professor, Behrooz Gamari Tabrizi, is described as critical of aspects of the MOU and as explaining Iran’s governance as decentralized with factions presenting options to the Supreme Leader rather than a single autocratic command. The speakers reference a statement attributed to the Supreme National Council (described as more than two-thirds of its members) stating there are issues with the MOU but that the Supreme Leader decided to proceed anyway. They say the professor identified a “loud minority” within Iran that thinks continuing war would better serve Iran, including arguments that the U.S. and Israel did not suffer enough to deter future aggression.
They also debate a translation dispute about comments from Ghalibaf regarding purchases from the United States, with one speaker asserting translators differed: one account says there was no commitment to buy U.S. products, while another says agricultural purchasing authorization was already agreed under President Raisi and was not new.
Another portion covers media and messaging within Iran, including claims that Iranian media does not disperse news effectively and comparisons to Iran International as well as discussion of how external funding and surveys were used to influence perceptions of Iranian public support. They contrast claims of an anonymously conducted survey with claims that conventional polling indicated majority support for the government.
On unfreezing of Iranian assets, the speakers cite Al Arabiya about a preliminary agreement to release $3 billion of frozen Iranian assets, followed by a report (I-24) from a U.S. official saying no frozen funds would be released unless Iran meets MOU requirements, that release would require U.S. approval, and that funds would be used to purchase U.S. agricultural products. They discuss a quoted MOU clause stating the U.S. would make funds available for use upon implementation of the MOU, with procedures mutually agreed during negotiations, and argue that the U.S. is trying to impose conditions Iran is not accepting. They further discuss claims that Pakistan is working with Saudi and Qatar to release funds directly to Iran, arguing there is nothing in the MOU preventing third-party release.
The speakers also discuss negotiations in Doha focused on Strait-related issues, saying the U.S. message is “think bigger” and that sanctions relief under a broader deal would be more valuable than charging tolls on shipping. They mention a one-week understanding to avoid further clashes in the Strait while negotiations continue, and that talks also cover frozen assets and a Lebanese ceasefire. They dispute how sanctions are lifted, distinguishing between oil-and-related waivers already addressed in the MOU and broader secondary sanctions that allow broader access to the global economy.
Regarding potential escalation, the Wall Street Journal is cited as saying Trump considered returning to full-scale war with Iran, holding discussions with Heketh and General Kane, but decided to continue diplomatic negotiations and potentially delay an August 18 deadline. They also mention a question to JD Vance about committing the U.S. would not return to combat operations before the MOU’s 60-day clock ends, with JD Vance giving a “nothing answer.” The speakers add that U.S. force withdrawals were not rescinded, and discuss logistical and fuel constraints as reasons abrupt reversal would be difficult.
The conversation also references a report that Iran hit Israel’s Haifa oil refinery harder than authorities initially admitted, with claims of destruction of gasoline storage and major losses in domestic production, alongside a dispute over source credibility and claims that other reporting describes only limited disruption.
Finally, they discuss the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, saying there is a “legal danger line” at 252.4 million barrels and that the U.S. is about 325 million barrels; drawing down 73 million barrels would trigger limited drawdown authority. They connect this to the idea that renewed bombing campaigns would stress aviation fuel demand, forcing further drawdowns and creating major economic and political risks. The speakers conclude that while talk of war exists, continuing full war is portrayed as extremely costly and constrained in the short term.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: all right so so the first thing that's a cool story that's one you like um according to channel 15 j there was a plan first we know this there was a plan by the cia and musa to arm the kurds to cause regime change so we know that but channel 15 is claiming that jd vance learned of the of the plans of the secret plans and immediately told erdogan knowing everyone would obviously you know go ballistic and reject any plans to arm the kurds to fight iran And then the plan failed after the details were leaked to Erdogan. That was a cool story. Not sure if it's true or not, but maybe the first question is, is it possible? Could the vice president really leak something to sabotage a plan the president was working on? Or is that just the Israelis trying to cause issues for JD Vance?
Speaker 0: The latter.
Speaker 1: I mean,
Speaker 0: JD Vance sharing classified information with Erdogan. Erdogan's such a trustworthy soul. JD Vance has never struck me as suicidal. That would be suicidal. Not that the Israelis would have any incentive to want to try to discredit and destroy JD Vance, but that might be one
Speaker 1: Possible motive just speculating here But is it possible I know it's unlikely especially considering these rallies leaked it but in in so what I mean Is it possible in general in politics could a vice president or could? Someone high up in an administration do something like this Well, they leak information to another country to sabotage the deal the plans of the president.
Speaker 0: Well, I'm sure he could Yeah, he could do that But you want to make sure you're fully insulated. And again, they're attacking Iran. So why is he telling Erdogan?
Speaker 1: So Erdogan would obviously make a big fuss about the Kurds being armed. Because the last thing Turkey wants is Kurdish.
Speaker 0: The US has been arming Kurds for, what year is this?
Speaker 1: 14 years. Yeah. And the Turks are obviously not happy with it. The Turks bombed them all the time. So that's a big contentious issue between the US and the Turks. And I'm sure Erdogan, when he found out, not from JD Vance, but if and when he found out that the Kurds are being armed in Iran, I'm sure there was some sort of call between him and Trump. What do you think actually happened? So the whole story was the Kurds were being armed and Trump himself admitted they were being armed and then said that they took the weapons that did not. They stole the weapons, I think he said.
Speaker 0: They're going to be armed to march on Tehran, right? In theory. Yeah, good luck with that, guys. You know, I don't think even the Kurds are that stupid to trust. You know, they've been burned by the Americans, you know, uh so many times you know they've been lit on fire more than fireworks on the fourth of july so um and supposedly they're now azerbaijan azerbaijan is with israel they're going to plan some major kurdish invasion from the iran's you know these guys are an attacking force normally an attacking force requires a three to one advantage so let's Let's just say Iran only has 200,000 troops up there, even though they got like a million. Let's just say they only got, let's just say it's 100,000. So you're telling me that 300,000 Kurds are ready to go rocking and rolling? Yeah, that sounds so credible. Oh my God. This smacks more of desperation on the part of Israel.
Speaker 1: So that's story number one. The story number two is there's obviously the funeral this weekend. We've spoken about the risks of Israel trying to kill the Supreme Leader, potentially assassinating him. But since we spoke yesterday, today they've announced that the airspace is going to be closed in Tehran. So it's been official. And I was speaking to Professor Izadi from Iran. I spoke to another professor who's Iranian as well today. Actually, I didn't ask the second professor, but I asked Professor Izadi, I'm like, do you think Mustafa will show up? He said he doesn't know, but he said he hopes he doesn't. He said he would not be surprised if the Israelis tried to assassinate him at that funeral. That would be wild if that happens.
Speaker 0: Well, so there's going to be a Russian there by the name of Medvedev.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I saw that today as well.
Speaker 0: I suspect there's going to be a high-level Chinese rep, maybe Huang Yi. the foreign missile yeah so yeah if the israelis want to commit suicide yeah go ahead attack that funeral procession kill a bunch of civilians that are out trying to bury a leader and with international international leaders present that i'm sure that will sit well with everybody and israel would not face any consequences from that
Speaker 1: But they seem to have a pretty low bar to restraint. Striking Qatar, an American ally, was a perfect example of this, where it doesn't have to be fighter jets bombing the funeral and threatening the lives of representatives of other countries. But China is sending high-level representatives. It doesn't say who yet. I don't think no specific name or level has been publicly confirmed yet. But yeah, it might be something more, you know,
Speaker 0: in assassination attempt through a sniper rifle or something yeah do an assassination attempt where you got nuclear powers of china russia and pakistan represented and actually i bet you india is going to send somebody all the the brics countries will be represented but if it's a targeted just to be clear i'm not advocating for it i don't think it will happen i think it's a crazy idea just to be clear but just gaming it out because
Speaker 1: I thought striking Qatar was something I would never be talking about. And that happened a year and a half ago, whatever it is. But if it's a targeted, you know, just someone shooting Mustafa Khamenei, trying to kill him, trying to kill him in a way that doesn't endanger their lives, maybe on his way to the funeral processions, there's multiple ways to try to assassinate him without risking the lives of diplomats from other countries. Is that a worry that you have whatsoever?
Speaker 0: No, none. I mean, you know, if Israel attempts something like that, you know, you're going to be looking at a level of retaliation that will probably lead to the destruction of Israel. And I mean, Iran will not stop until Israel is destroyed.
Speaker 1: Hmm. But then someone would beg the question, why didn't that happen after Ali Khamenei was killed by Israel?
Speaker 0: Israel, they started the war. The US started the war. Iran was pursuing it. Again, they made a deal and they've come under criticism for stopping. I don't think, you know, that's the second time. Third time's the charm. There will be, I don't think there'll be anything holding them back this time.
Speaker 1: You mentioned something interesting. You said a lot of people in Iran are not happy with the deal. So I did speak, the second Iranian professor I spoke to today, very interesting guy, first discussion I have with him. And I'd love to have him again. He's, you might know his name, Professor Bilwal, no, that's Professor Behrooz Gamari Tabrizi. And he's deep into Iranian politics, read the daily newspaper for two to three hours a day. And he was explaining to me, I was asking him about the Ghalibaf. Remember the interview he was doing, he was cut off.
Speaker 0: And that wasn't, as you portrayed it, it turned out that's not what was said at all. You know, I saw the other translations. Ghalibaf was not saying that they were going to buy anything from the United States. In fact, he said just the opposite. So whoever was giving you that translation was blowing smoke up your ass.
Speaker 1: Okay, no, so I don't know where you got yours, because this professor said the same thing as well. It was about buying the aid from the U.S.? No, no, no, no.
Speaker 0: He's wrong. I mean, I saw, I talked to a couple of different people that actually translated it. You know, Nima, he happens to speak Urdu, I mean, Persian, Farsi.
Speaker 1: So did they mention, so from what I was told by this professor is that he was mentioning, it's away from the point, but he was talking about how under the last president, so the deal to buy agricultural product from the U.S., was actually authorized under the previous president, I forgot his name. Raisi. Raisi, under President Raisi. So that's when the deal of buying agricultural product from the U.S. was agreed to. And he was saying that deal was already there. It's not something new that we've agreed to. But what did Nima say? Just so we have both contexts.
Speaker 0: He said Ghalibov was saying the exact opposite thing. No, there is no deal. We've got no commitment to buy anything from the United States.
Speaker 1: Yes. So I think both could be true because he is saying that there is no commitment. They don't have to buy American products. But he was talking about how under the previous deal, the deal was initially to buy American agricultural products. But either way, so the interesting conversation I had was about, so we did a deep dive into how Iranian politics works. And it's not He's talking about how it's not an autocracy. It's not, you know, the Supreme Leader makes every single decision everyone has to follow. There's different factions that have different opinions, etc. And generally, the decision-making process, and I know something you know already, the decision-making process is, you know, there's various options presented to the Supreme Leader when there's a disagreement, and he chooses one of the options already presented. So it's a more... A decentralized governing system. Democratic? It's more democratic? Yeah. So democracy has other aspects to it. But yeah, it has democratic aspects to it. Yeah. So it's not like the supremely says, do this, everyone does that. Now, he was telling me that there are loud voices in Iran that are very critical of the MOU. They think that the US did not suffer enough pain. And we talked about, I don't know if you remember, there was a letter sent out, a statement made by the Supreme National Council. I think these are the guys that appoint the Supreme Leader, about 80 of them. And they put out a statement about 60-something days ago. Sorry, 60-something of the 80-something members put out a statement a few days ago.
Speaker 0: It was like 62 of the 86 members. Exactly. Well over two-thirds.
Speaker 1: Yes. And in that statement, I think you know which statement I'm referring to. In that statement, they did say that We know we have issues with the MOU. We're not satisfied for various reasons, but the Supreme Leader made a decision to go with the MOU. We will go with the MOU. So something along those lines. So I brought it up with this professor and he mentioned to me, he's like, Mario, that was a weird statement. And it indicates that there are people in Iran that think that continuing the war would be in Iran's best interests. it compared it to back in the Iran-Iraq war. Back then there was also a big faction that said, you know, when Iran had the opportunity to end the war, they didn't end it to make sure that they were, no, they were talking about creating a buffer zone in Iraq so Iraq never attacks Iran again. So he was telling me that there is this loud minority in Iran, still a minority, not enough to, it's not an issue. There's not like major disagreements, et cetera. It's pretty normal in a government that has different opinions. But there is a faction in Iran that does think the MOU is not a good idea because the US did not suffer enough and Israel did not suffer enough to deter future aggression, which was really interesting.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Isn't it refreshing to find out that Iran is not North Korea, where everybody must sing the praises of the Supreme Leader, that there's allowance for different points of view? That's shocking. They're not grabbing up all these dissidents and hauling them out and hanging them in the public square. They are allowed to have different points of view. Oh, my God, we can't have that.
Speaker 1: I'm glad you've learned something new today, Larry. I know you had that. I know you've always said Iran is like North Korea, but I'm glad today I see the other side.
Speaker 0: I've been enlightened. I've been enlightened.
Speaker 1: But it was an interesting conversation. And he was also talking about how he reads the newspaper every day. But he's talking about Iranian media doesn't do a good job dispersing news. And he was comparing it to Iran International.
Speaker 0: He goes to me as if, like, the news media in the United States does a bang up job of getting the actual news out.
Speaker 1: No.
Speaker 0: Or in the UK, or in Germany, or in Italy, or in Spain, or in Poland, in Romania, in Czechoslovakia. Okay, go ahead. Sorry.
Speaker 1: No, no. What he means is the news from a... In the media space, you know, you have to... to write things in a certain way, to get the messaging right, so it spreads, so people listen to it. He's like, Mario, Iran International, which is 80% or 50%, I don't know which number he used, fake news, fabricated, they just make shit up. But he's like, they're really good at getting the right headline, getting the right story, whatever they do. And people in Iran actually read that and read other outlets. And he said one thing that could improve in Iran in the media landscape, so people actually listen more to Iranian media. So that was another, so it's not about getting the media wrong. but it's about they don't do a good job in the messaging despite having a lot of funds.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, we see media manipulation across the globe. Show me a country where they actually have a genuinely free independent press that can go out and challenge the conventional line. Israel. Well, Haaretz, you know, Haaretz is one of the few that sort of tries.
Speaker 1: Actually, yeah. True, true. I said it as a joke when I said Israel, but yeah, Haaretz is, I'm impressed with Haaretz.
Speaker 0: Yeah. So, but even Haaretz is, you know, they're still, they're critical of the government and they're allowed to still operate. So I give Israel credit for that. But he's a professor of what? Political science? No, I think...
Speaker 1: I think you'd like him. He explained the things that we've talked about, like the Iranian government, the decentralized aspects of it, very critical of the war. The whole discussion was how Trump and the US really miscalculated Iran, did not understand Iran, how believing that if you kill the supreme leader, it will all collapse. But that just shows a fundamental misunderstanding of how Iran functions as a government.
Speaker 0: Right. But that's because the United States and the Brits, they'd set up this propaganda outlet based in the Netherlands and supported- Iran International. Well, it was, but this was the one that was doing all the online, they claimed, well, we've got a better way to survey to find out what Iranians really think. We'll do it anonymously on the computer. And oh boy, their results, 80% of the Iranians, man, ready to overthrow the government. And- So that information, which was basically funded by the CIA, funded by intelligence sources through National Endowment for Democracy and USAID. So they tell Trump that, hey, look at this survey, man. That's a done deal, baby. Let's do it. And so Trump goes, okay. And what happens next? It turns out, not true. Turns out that the polls that had been conducted conventionally by the University of Maryland, which reported the exact opposite, that 70% of the Iranian population supported the government. And guess what? That turned out to be true. In fact, the support for the government grew after those attacks, didn't decrease. yeah yeah this is you know the United States the problem for the United States is that it ends up believing its own just like and we're seeing the same phenomena right now with with respect to Russia and Ukraine and we talked a little bit about that last night hmm
Speaker 1: um by the way i would not tell you who i spoke to if someone said things to me that i know would would get you upset i would not tell you who it is so if i told you the professor i don't get upset mind you i don't i just i just find it ridiculous but you know i can make fun of them don't say you don't get upset don't test me i'll play a clip next time you come on i'll make sure i proved you you get upset um
Speaker 0: If disagreeing means I'm upset, okay, I'm really upset.
Speaker 1: If I get a clip of you saying, of Ben-Gavir saying how the regime is about to collapse, I think I'll see your cheeks go a bit red, a tiny bit red.
Speaker 0: I'd go, oh my gosh. Why didn't we have conversations like this when we were in Moscow? You were very reserved.
Speaker 1: In Moscow.
Speaker 0: Were you intimidated by the judge in me?
Speaker 1: Not at all. I found you extremely judge was such a nice person. So for people listening, I met Larry and Judge Napolitano in Russia. I didn't know you guys because I wasn't deep in the YouTube scene yet. It was more next. But I met you guys such kind people. And then we did a tour of the school and stuff. Just so respectful. Like, usually the judge is an older you're always joking around. You're just having fun, joking around. And Judge was just so respectful. Usually he's the older man, so I'm like, sir, after you. He's like, no, no, after you. Insist. Would not get into the door until I walk in first. And then we had dinner once, all of us. And it's like I was just sitting with two encyclopedias.
Speaker 0: That's just because we're old. We remember stuff. We haven't reached the Alzheimer's stage. Did I remember to put my pants on today or not?
Speaker 1: And when we met Lavrov, he knew Judge from before they started cracking jokes. These guys go way back before I was born, I guess. Yeah. All right, so that's on the CIA Mossad plan. JD Vance potentially leaking it, the report that he leaked it. Then the other one here is something we've talked about. The Yemeni media speculating that Ansarullah, so the leader of the Houthis, may deliver a major and potentially unexpected address tomorrow, which is tomorrow, Thursday, as tensions across the country continue to rise. And that's after the Saudi-backed Yemeni factions are currently engaged in large-scale mobilizations with clashes with the Houthis as well. which is all part of the bigger discussion, something I've been talking about, is that we could see this big war, this direct conflict between those two countries, between those three countries, Iran, the US, Israel, and the Gulf in some ways, shifting to proxy wars, and Yemen being one of the main fronts, because Bebelman demonstrates, that was one of the biggest cards that Iran has, so I'm sure the Gulf, Saudi especially, because they have the pipeline that goes through to the Red Sea, Saudis are like, if this breaks out again, we cannot have Iran threatening to close the Bab al-Mandib Strait. We have to take that leverage away from them. So I just think I would definitely not be surprised if we, in the next six months, we start seeing clashes in Yemen. Iraq, I'm not so sure of. And I'm very worried about Lebanon. And talking about Lebanon, demolition is ongoing there.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I think at some point, if the United States, as Ghalibov said, didn't get your dog on a leash... referring to the Israelis, I think Iran will take matters into its own hands to deal with Israel. And the reality is Israel cannot withstand sustained missile bombardment by Iran. And they cannot stop Iran if they decide to embark on that course of action. But I don't see Iran doing anything until... well after July 9th, so eight days from now, because the time between now and the 9th is going to be devoted to the funeral and the internment of the martyrs.
Speaker 1: I have an unpopular opinion that could change in a few days. I think Iran either has already indicated or is considering internally to soften its stance on Lebanon. and potentially even give up its demand of Israel pulling out of South Lebanon. Okay.
Speaker 0: You're entitled to that opinion. I would disagree. I don't think they're going to soften that at all. If anything, they'll probably harden it. But again, notice that Iran has not given Hezbollah the green light. Renew the offensive. So Hezbollah still, despite the... Israeli violations of the MOU is still telling Hezbollah, you know, keep your powder dry, don't launch an offensive. And so I think, you know, Israel ultimately is going to create a provocation that will break that ceasefire and lead to an expanded conflict. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Yeah. I think Israel's red line is Hezbollah. I think if Israel, sorry. Iran's red line is Hezbollah. So if Israel attacks Hezbollah, I think this is where Iran would draw the line and act. I think South Lebanon, I just feel it's, they would like Israel to pull out of South Lebanon, but in their mind, they'd be like, this is another country's territory. Our strategic interest is Hezbollah. For us, that's a massive red line. On Lebanon, we'd like Israel out, but it's not that strategically important for us. And if the Lebanese government just did a deal to keep Israel in, that's their problem. We can help if needed. but we will not jeopardize peace in our country for the sake of South Lebanon. We will jeopardize peace in our country for the sake of Hezbollah. But I could be wrong because they've been pretty adamant on South Lebanon.
Speaker 0: Then why did they sign an MOU which said basically that they would be responsible along with the United States for upholding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon?
Speaker 1: So that one surprised me when that was part of the MOU. Um, because there is strategic benefit of getting Israel out of South Lebanon. You win first, it's a victory for Hezbollah. It's a, it also puts, it's a massive hearts and minds win for Iran and Lebanon. The Lebanese people that seen some of them see Iran as potentially hostile towards Lebanon using Lebanon for its interests. You know, the argument that I know you disagree with, but some people have that perception. Um, that perception would diminish significantly when Iran is the country that kicked Israel out of Lebanon when everyone else abandoned Lebanon. So it would be, in the hearts and minds of the Lebanese people, it would be a massive win. So that's why I'm not certain they'll give up on Lebanon. But I feel like with the right concessions, they may. But the Strait of Hormuz and Hezbollah are like massive red lines.
Speaker 0: Lebanon's not up there, South Lebanon. Yeah, I get it. I just take note that so far, Hezbollah has not gone on the offensive like they're capable of going on the offensive. And certainly they've not fired into Israel, which would be a provocation. So they've confined themselves to, let's call it defensive actions. When Israeli patrol comes out at them, yeah, they'll ambush them, but they're not turning it around and then launching offensives. So, and Israel may foolishly be mistaken the uh the restraint of Hezbollah for weakness and convince themselves oh yeah we got them on the ropes you know these are the same guys that can't get even has Hamas under control yeah um well I'm talking about Hamas we talked about it yesterday that there's a report they're rearming
Speaker 1: I told you about that yesterday, yeah?
Speaker 0: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, from the Sinai, et cetera.
Speaker 1: Now, I don't know whether it's true they're rearming or not and to what extent because, you know.
Speaker 0: So the question is, how are they rearming?
Speaker 1: Yeah, the report says from Sinai, from Egypt, from the Egyptian border. Actually, I might have it here. Senior Israeli intelligence and southern command officials warned IDF chief, blah, blah, blah, that Hamas is preparing for renewed war, according to Khan News. Sorry. I don't know whether they're putting the story out to justify their own actions in Gaza to justify more hostilities, but I read the story anyway. The official said Hamas is producing hundreds of explosive devices and anti-tank missiles each month, recruiting fighters aged 18 to 22, training Nukbar militants, attempting to smuggle drones and communications equipment from Sinai, and rebuilding underground infrastructure across Gaza. It's pretty vague. Like when they say building hundreds of explosive devices and anti-tank missiles that's nothing a hundreds it's not nice like a massive rearmament recruiting fighters okay they recruit fighters training look by militants not sure and look by militants are attempting to smuggle drones and communications equipment from sinai attempting to smuggle and rebuilding underground infrastructure what does that really mean you know fixing a few panels is that tunnels does that mean rebuilding so i i don't know i just i just don't think hamas is well in the past
Speaker 0: You may find this shocking. There are some Israeli businessmen who have worked with the Egyptians in allowing, because there's money to be made. So they'll take the money and not worry about the security implications through those underground tunnels. That happened in the past.
Speaker 1: Is that similar to the Netanyahu story? Is that similar to the story Tucker is talking about regarding Netanyahu funding Hamas or that's separate? Separate.
Speaker 0: Yeah, but that's another dimension to the story where, you know, and it's not just Tucker saying it. I mean, you know, there's the video. Maybe it was Hassan Mehdi. Mehdi Hassan, yeah. Mehdi Hassan, excuse me. That, you know, it has...
Speaker 1: israeli senior israeli officials admitting that they've been fun you know several israeli generals and intelligence guys yeah yeah we funded hamas it's on youtube he comes on the show regularly i'll ask him about it he came up with a story did he like he did a story about it well i'll ask him don't don't worry about searching it oh by the way um
Speaker 0: talking about we talked about issue naftali bennett yesterday uh uh i interviewed yesterday yeah if you just if you just searched on israel funded hamas um you got a hood barack saying it uh it was uh uh uh it was medi who did it it was published actually under the intercept back uh it was funny this was done eight years ago So there are several videos, how Israel helped build up Hamas. Yeah, so it's not some crazy conspiracy theory. It's documented and you've got, it's not saying, well, we heard somebody. No, you get to see the guys actually saying it, the Israeli officials. So yeah, there's... That's why you've got zero sympathy for Israel claiming, oh, Hamas is this terrorist organization that's attacking us. Yeah, you funded them, you nitwits.
Speaker 1: I remember asking someone about this. I can't remember who it is, to try to get the other side of it. And they told me something along the lines that the strategy was containment. So it was funding Hamas, not to use it to build military equipment and stuff. It's to fund them, to allow money from Qatar. How do you say it? To allow money from Qatar to flow through to Hamas in order to make sure that they're satisfied in getting some funding in and don't attack Israel. Something along those lines. I'm paraphrasing.
Speaker 0: Okay, so that explanation is just that Israel's stupid. Stupid as opposed to corrupt. Okay. That makes it so much better. They really are this dumb.
Speaker 1: I'm glad it made you feel better. Um, but on a, on a, on a good, on an interesting note, um, so Naftali Bennett, we talked about him yesterday, how he's very similar to Netanyahu. Uh, Eisencott, I don't know much about him. I'm going to do a dive into him. Turns out he's, he believes in the two state solution and he's more critical of war. Now I'm not talking about a pacifist, um, let's make peace with everybody. Let's go shake hands with Mustafa. But no, he is, he's hostile towards those countries. That's part of the, he would not get elected if he's not, but he prefers to end wars. not stretch Israel too thin and does believe in a two-state solution with restrictions, not in like a complete equality, et cetera. I haven't looked into it. I looked into a quick summary today. One of my guests mentioned it, so I just did a quick search. And he's, I think, the leading candidate now, more than Naftali Bennett and more than Netanyahu. He's former IDF, IDF chief or commander. But I don't know if you know much about him, but he could lead to change in Israeli policy.
Speaker 0: Yeah. That's why I always distinguish between Zionists and Israelis, or Zionists and Jews, because it's unfair to label Jews as the problem here. They're not. It's this Zionist mentality, and as we've discussed before, the Zionist mentality is not restricted to Jews. You know, Mike Huckabee, case in point, you know, Baptist minister, and he's a more ardent Zionist than many of the Zionists.
Speaker 1: He literally today in a speech he was giving earlier this morning, he said, we would finally and rightfully stand with Israel where God placed its capital. It's not just that you made that decision. I would say God made that decision 3,800 years ago. And we finally got around to acknowledging what had been determined long before the US came along. For those of you who don't realize it, 700,000 Americans represent an entire congressional district in the United States. That's how many people live in a congressional district. When members of Congress come, I always say, quote, welcome to Israel, the 436th congressional district of the US.
Speaker 0: Jesus. Yeah, just despicable. You know, he's supposed to represent the interests of the United States, not the interests of an apartheid state.
Speaker 1: Yeah. I spoke to the son of Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan today. And his father is the president. I didn't know that. President of Pakistan. Didn't even know Pakistan had a president because I know that all the powers within the prime minister would ask somebody other than the prime minister. But... Anyway, I spoke with the gentleman and I asked him about his worries about potential conflict between Pakistan and Israel. And he told me how Pakistan does not recognize Israel because it's an apartheid state. He said to me, the only two countries Pakistan does not recognize were South Africa and Israel. South Africa is no longer an apartheid state. Pakistan recognizes it. And Israel still is. And until it's not, Pakistan will not recognize Israel as a state. So it was an interesting conversation there. So we have a report, Al Arabiya says a preliminary agreement has been reached to release $3 billion of frozen Iranian assets. And then not long after, a few hours later, I-24 claims that a U.S. official says No frozen funds have been released and none will be released unless Iran meets the requirements outlined in the MOU. Any release funds would be subject to U.S. approval and used to purchase agricultural, American agricultural products for the Iranian people.
Speaker 0: So that's... And what are those conditions outlined in the MOU? Because I don't recall any... Yeah, go ahead.
Speaker 1: Clause 6844.2. It's a joke. Which says?
Speaker 0: Yeah, I know.
Speaker 1: No, no, it's a joke.
Speaker 0: It's not in the MOU. I like how you froze. There's 14 paragraphs there, my friend. Is Mario joking? How should I respond to him? Okay, here's paragraph 11. The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MOU. The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations. Such funds, whether retained in the original counter transfer shall be made fully available for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. And the United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary license and authorizations accordingly. What conditions? Did you hear a single condition in there where the United States? oh well mutually the us and iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations i don't know what that means but that's probably the only close things i can find so you can make this case you can make the case that iran did a crappy job of writing that paragraph for getting his funds released maybe okay that's a that's a fair that's a very fair very fair point you know uh they whatever slowness in this thing that is taking place. But the United States is retroactively trying to impose some conditions, and Iran's not accepting those conditions. So they're going to have to come up to a mutually agreeable procedure. But circumventing that, Pakistan is working behind the scenes with the Saudis and Qataris to release the funds directly to Iran. And there's nothing in the MOU there that says,
Speaker 1: iran cannot receive funds released by the saudis or qataris or a third party for that matter yep so that's on the unfreezing of funds um uh with the trump administration arguing that a nuclear okay so okay that's interesting according to axios u.s and iranian negotiators are holding technical talks in doha focused primarily on the strata home was with the trump administration arguing that a nuclear agreement would bring Iran far greater economic benefits than charging tolls on shipping. Quote, the US message to Iran was, think bigger, a US official said. Arguing sanctions relief under a broader deal would be 100 times more valuable than using a gangster tactic to try and charge a toll. The two sides have also reached a one-week understanding to avoid further clashes in the Strait while negotiations continue. Though officials warn tensions could resume if talks fail, Discussions are also covering Iran's frozen assets and the Lebanese ceasefire. So what the Americans are trying to do is incentivize Iran with sanctions lifting and unfreezing, lifting of sanctions as a way to convince them not to charge a fee. Say, hey, look, we'll lift enough sanctions if you don't charge a fee, and that would make you more money than charging a fee. But if you charge a fee, we'll keep the sanctions. You'll make money charging a fee, but it will be less. That's the argument they're making in the negotiations.
Speaker 0: Yeah, except the issue on sanctions, that was already addressed in the MOU too, that the US was supposed to lift those sanctions.
Speaker 1: Limited. I think the MOU talks about the sanctions on oil and petrochemicals exports, but not all sanctions on the country, from what I understand. I could be wrong, but I have it in front of me.
Speaker 0: Okay. United States of America undertakes it immediately upon the signing of this MOU. So that's taken place. And until the termination of sanctions, the U.S. Department will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc. So not the full lifting of sanctions, but the waiver right now that those existing sanctions won't be enforced.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's for the sanctions for the export of oil, crude oil, etc., and everything involved, banking transactions, transport, etc. But in this case, the carrot they're talking about is the primary, secondary sanctions where Iran's welcome to the global economy, they can use the dollar, we can do business with them, we can invest, etc. So that's what the Americans are offering Iran, saying, hey, we're putting this on the table according to Axios, it could be BS. in return for you guys not charging a fee for the Strait of Hormuz. So I think that's what the Americans are trying to achieve.
Speaker 0: Which, you know, ultimately might, you know, the Iranians might consider that. I think so as well. But they will say, okay, lift all those sanctions and we won't be charging a fee. But they're also going to look for reparations. You know, I don't see Iran backing off of that for all the destruction the United States caused in Iran during the bombing campaign.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's a hard one to get, though, reparations. True. All right, so we have Wall Street Journal. Have we talked about this? According to the Wall Street Journal, Trump was considering a return to a full-scale war with Iran. holding multiple discussions in recent days with Hexeth and General Kane. But then he decided for now to continue diplomatic negotiations rather than resume large-scale military operations. And he's also willing to delay the deadline. So there's a deadline of 18th of August of when they should reach a deal. But he's already hinted, according to the Wall Street Journal, he's already hinted, he's prepared to allow negotiations to continue beyond the 18th of August date. In other words... There's two ways of looking at that story. One is that Trump is still considering military action, but we know that. We know that the idea is not completely off the table. But the other part, the way to look at it, is that Trump decided to go down the path of diplomacy and even is willing to delay the deadline that they've both set, which was a positive sign and something that's pretty clear right now based on American actions, that they're opting for diplomacy over clashes again, over fighting. And lastly, on this point, on the point of war, J.D. Vance was asked, can you commit that the U.S. won't return to full-fledged combat operations before the 60-day clock of the MOU is up? And then J.D. Vance says, Trump is not going to send our military back in unless he has to. It's a nothing answer.
Speaker 0: But note that, again, the order to withdraw U.S. forces has not been rescinded. from the U.S. side. So that withdrawal of U.S. forces is proceeding. And for them to have to stop, turn around, and then start redeploying forces, it's not just simple matter of the military decision, because implicit in that is the impact on diesel and aviation fuel. Remember, the amount of of crude oil in the system is still down 20%. And the United States has not been able to replace that. And even if now with, you know, they get more, if they start to get these, you know, the very large crude carriers coming out of the Persian Gulf, oil getting to America, to the southern, you know, to say New Orleans, They're looking at least 40 days, I think. So there's no immediate solution available on the horizon for 40 days. And what I've been hearing is that the fuel shortage is real, and that's going to start biting in about two or three weeks.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I think it will be very, very weird if we see a resumption of full blown war. A lot of things don't add up on that front. The last piece of news today you'll find interesting. It fits into something you've talked a lot about. According to, I'll find it while reading it. Iran hit Israel's Haifa oil refinery harder than authorities initially admitted. The strike completely destroyed the main gasoline reservoir, disabled the internal power plant, supplying steam and electricity, Haifa's in Israel, and damaged gas turbines, boilers, and control rooms with shrapnel. The attack eliminated around 60% of Israel's domestic oil production. Wow. Leading to a sharp gasoline shortage that was offset by ramping up of imports and maximizing output at the Ashdod refinery. To speed up repairs, the government allowed work to bypass normal environmental and construction regulations, with full restoration now expected only in 2028. The true scale of the damage surfaced after Haifa's municipality and environmental groups sued over the regulatory shortcuts, raising the possibility that Israel may be downplaying the impact of other Iranian strikes on critical infrastructure. Let me see the source of this. But I know this is something you've covered extensively, that the damage in Israel from the Iranian strikes is a lot more than is being reported.
Speaker 0: Yeah, absolutely. And I don't know if you had a chance yet to watch the videos that Ted Postle posted with Danny Davis, but my goodness, he's got some videos I had not seen where, you know, missile after missile is hitting Israel big time. And I mean, you know, dozens, dozens of strikes in this one video. So, you know, Israel suffered some significant damage. What fascinates me about it is it did not kill a lot of civilians. So those missiles were apparently pretty accurate in targeting infrastructure like this.
Speaker 1: Just to be clear, the source of the story, though, is not a big publication news outlet. So it's something that is being disputed heavily. Palestine Chronicle is the source of it and some social media accounts. So it's not a source that's been verified by Wall Street Journal putting out a piece or anything like that. So the other reports are there was damage with brief disruption, but nothing catastrophic. And it was more limited with operations partially resuming and no 60% production loss or multi-year shutdown. So that's two conflicting stories. but the story that I didn't write the source when I first put it on my notes for today, but the source is from news outlets that are very, you know, Palestine critical, very critical of Israel. So just want to mention that to you, Larry. So you take it with it.
Speaker 0: Let me give you an update on the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve. So this is from Carl Miller, who publishes, It's called a Global Energy Industry and Geopolitics Update. So he's a consultant, publishes for a client base. I'm not one of his clients, but I got access to the report. And he just put out tonight that the legal danger line for the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve is 252.4 million barrels of oil. Right now, the United States is sitting at roughly 325 million barrels of oil. So once it draws down those additional 73 million barrels, that 252 million barrels number, that kicks in a legal limited drawdown authority. So it prevents the United States from just being able to draw down those reserves. And so that reaches a critical level. So if there's like, if Trump, started a new bombing campaign against Iran, that would be the stress that would kick up the demand for aviation fuel. To get that aviation fuel, you've got to draw it out of somewhere, then draw it out of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to process or to refine that barrel into aviation fuel, which would then get them down to a critical level where the United States wouldn't have really any other options. And so that's why Trump's on a knife's edge here. He can talk about resuming military action all he wants. If he does, it comes with enormous, both economic as well as political risk.
Speaker 1: Yeah. I'm fully in agreement there. I think with that mindset for months, it does not make sense. Well, it's not possible to continue the war. It's possible, but it's extremely costly for the U.S. military, for Trump politically, U.S. military, U.S. economy, global economy, America's reputation with allies. The list goes on and on and on. Anything else on your side? Anything else interesting we missed?
Speaker 0: No, I'm still Debbie Downer.
Speaker 1: Yeah, not Debbie Downer. You just said that there's not going to be a war between the U.S. and Iran, like the likes of it, at least in the short term is low.
Speaker 0: That's not Debbie Downer. That's the good news. Okay. I missed her sunshine today.
Speaker 1: Exactly. I missed her sunshine today. Good to see you as always. Thank you for the analysis.
Speaker 0: All right, my friend. Just keep plugging along. Get some rest.
Speaker 1: Will do. Have a wonderful day, Larry.
Speaker 0: All right, my friend. Bye-bye. Take care.
Speaker 1: All right, guys, this is it for today. I hope you enjoyed the coverage. And let me know, as always, what you think of the various conversations that we've had. We've covered Ukraine with Brendan Weikert. We had Professor Behrouz Gamari Tabrizi earlier today as well for the first time. Great conversation. I want to make him a regular. Sami Hamdi, he's a regular, had a conversation with him as well as Professor Izadi from Iran. And then the regulars, Larry Johnson, Malcolm Nance and Karen Fedofsky. So I'll see you tomorrow. We've got some new names. Okay. Two new names tomorrow so far on my calendar. So we'll have some new voices, some new opinions and analysis to give you guys. Let me know what you think. And I'm pretty burnt out today. So I won't give you a news recap. I think I've done it well with Larry. You have everything you need to know. And I'll see you tomorrow. I'm off. Thank you so much, everyone. I'll go through the comments in a bit. Bye-bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I read Prof. Robert Pape’s argument that the war isn’t over because Iran isn’t finished winning. He says the MOU isn’t merely a ceasefire, but a roadmap for Tehran to become the dominant regional power—hence its focus on Hormuz and its links to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. He argues Iran is building a sphere of influence, seeing all flashpoints as one board.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Political Scientist Prof. Robert Pape: The war isn't over because Iran isn't finished winning. Most people see the ceasefires, the meetings in Doha, the headlines about diplomacy, and assume everyone is trying to find a way out. Prof. Pape thinks that's fundamentally misunderstanding what Iran is doing. His argument is brutally simple: The MOU isn't just a ceasefire agreement, it's a roadmap for Iran to become the dominant regional power. That's why Tehran is fighting so hard over the Strait of Hormuz, and why Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen suddenly matter. They're all part of the same strategic picture. Prof. Pape says Iran is building what every rising power eventually tries to build: a sphere of influence. Tehran's would stretch from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and back to the Gulf, giving it leverage not just over Hormuz but over the alternative routes that could one day bypass it. That's the part almost everyone is missing. America keeps treating these flashpoints as isolated problems, Prof. Pape says Tehran sees them as pieces of the same board. Iran believes it's still gaining power, and countries that think they're winning don't suddenly stop playing. By the end of the interview, I was thinking about two completely different visions of the Middle East colliding. One where America still sets the rules, and another where Iran believes it finally has the chance to rewrite them. @ProfessorPape
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion centers on an “escalation trap” involving multiple fronts of escalation—direct and proxy—between the United States, Israel, Iran-backed groups, and Gulf-backed militias. Mario highlights escalations on the Lebanese, Syrian, and Iraqi fronts, with particular concern about the Yemeni front: in recent days, Saudi- and Emirati-backed militias have been building up and amassing, possibly for a renewed offensive against the Houthis.
Mario links these developments to the Red Sea and choke points. He argues the Yemeni theatre matters because the Red Sea is increasingly important as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz if conflict resumes. For those alternatives to work, he says Iran’s “stranglehold” over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—through the Houthis—must be removed. He describes the possibility that clashes between Iran, the U.S., and Israel could temporarily shift into proxy fronts across multiple regions.
David/“Professor Pape” modeling and incentives are emphasized by the second speaker. He agrees that Iraq’s recent crackdown on militias may be connected to Syria, Hezbollah, and pressure on militia behavior. He then expands the “big picture” to a sphere-of-influence competition over “the four corners of the MOU,” arguing there is a fundamental disagreement about regional power: the United States wants to remain preeminent; Israel wants to undermine the MOU; and Iran wants to stick with the MOU’s “four corners” as a roadmap to regional power.
He frames Iran’s actions as consolidation rather than starting from scratch, noting proxies and relationships that predate the current crisis. He describes Iran’s IRGC messaging about an “access resistance belt” stretching from Lebanon through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea/Yemen and circling back toward the Gulf, which he says would encircle Iraq as well. He argues this sphere of influence is tied to Hormuz and the pathways to bypass it, connecting Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
A key focus becomes Hormuz arrangements in the context of an escalation around MOU Article 5. The second speaker explains that Iran is attempting to maintain Iran’s lead partner role (“Iran is going to be in charge of the arrangements with Oman”) and enforce Article 5’s threshold by exercising coercive leverage to prevent the U.S. from using “salami slicing” to whittle down the threshold. He describes the timing of fees as starting “after 60 days,” referencing an approaching “day 61,” and says Iran is coercively constraining shipping to force acceptance of fees. He cites an expected fee structure described as “something like $2 million a tanker,” equating to large daily and annual amounts, and he says Iran’s aim is to secure those fees and block exits.
The discussion also covers the Strait of Hormuz clashes. The second speaker explains that Iran seeks to assert control by striking ships going on the Oman side, while the U.S. responds to make that unacceptable; clashes continue with another escalation after attempted talks. Qatar talks are mentioned, along with a report that Oman, Iran, and Oman have a plan to charge a fee and manage the Strait together, which the U.S. does not like.
Regarding Qatar/Doha outcomes, he expects either little or temporary results and argues ceasefires are defunct in practical terms, with pauses between violence rather than linear outcomes. He attributes part of public messaging dynamics to market timing and political incentives to “lash back,” while insisting Iran’s coercive strategy follows realism-based incentives and periodic enforcement rather than continuous daily strikes.
When asked what surprised him most, he says the stage-by-stage modeling has matched real events closely, outlining prior stages: bombing Fordow, then a feared move toward regime-change bombing out of nuclear material paranoia, leading to further lashing back and escalation or acceptance of Iran as a fourth center of power. He predicts the current “middle game” could last through at least January, while also noting U.S. posture changes—despite earlier expectations of pullbacks—are consistent with his modeled logic.
On the likelihood of resumption of full conflict after midterms, he says a major war is plausible, citing two drivers: fuel/price impacts creating anger domestically and momentum for political narratives blaming Iran; and concern about potential Iranian nuclear weapons testing following regime-change-style pressures. He also discusses strategic ambiguity about keeping U.S. Marines and argues the forces could serve as backup in case of Iranian testing.
The second speaker also addresses Israel as a “wild card” and describes internal Israeli pressures: public trauma after October 7, political direction toward full-bore action against Lebanon, and a strategic logic that Hezbollah-style drone threats could extend to Israeli trade corridors, particularly ports like Haifa. He describes Israel’s trade dependence as a strategic constraint that could make Hezbollah’s threat more severe in practice.
In conclusion, he expects Iran to enforce the “four corners” of the MOU, likely initiating force in the coming weeks to do so, while the U.S. grows more inclined to respond more forcefully, increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia. He points to reported Pakistani troop and jet details in Saudi Arabia as a sign Gulf states may seek alternative approaches with Iran beyond retaliatory bombing. He emphasizes that Doha talks may occur but won’t predict the immediate reality, which he says will be driven by actions and security incentives rather than negotiations alone.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: You've been referenced a few times in my interviews. Whenever things escalate, people bring up the escalation trap and how we're falling into that trap. And there's multiple fronts in which we're escalating. We've got the straight home was the back and forth, the obvious one. And we've got proxy escalations as well. Not sure if you've covered that on your sub stack yet, but we've got an escalation on the Lebanese front, the Syrian front, the Iraqi front, and especially in the last few days, the Yemeni front with the Saudi and Emirati backed
Speaker 1: militias oh actually i knew about the other so in this later this week uh i have plans so um to do more uh but i knew about the first couple but i didn't know about what's happening in yemen who these so just go ahead and uh that's wild yeah that's that's uh i'll give you that one i'll also give you something my last guest was telling me about but again you realize just before you tell me and so i don't make it seem like i'm curve fitting that That's something I've been warning about, the Red Sea issue, for some time here. So anyway, I'm very eager to hear. You always have the latest, Mario.
Speaker 0: Yes, on the Yemeni front, obviously for the reason you've just explained, the Red Sea is extremely important now more than ever because they need an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz if conflict resumes. And for that alternative to exist, they need to remove Iran's stranglehold over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. That's the Houthis. And Yemen is going through wars between the Emirati and Saudi-backed groups and the Houthis for many years now. And in the last few days, there's been a military buildup of the Saudi and Emirati-backed militias amassing in recent days, possibly for a renewed offensive against the Houthis. So that is a worry that I have, that we could be seeing the direct conflict between Iran and the U.S. and Israel temporarily. temporarily or even long-term move to a proxy front, multiple fronts between the US, Israel, Iranian-backed groups, and even Gulf-backed groups as they all try to expand their influence and kind of adapt to this new world order. And my last guest was actually talking about how it's all connected. He believes the crackdown we saw in Iraq a few days ago was in order to crack down on the militias there because those militias threatened to attack Syria if Syria attacks Hezbollah. And as you know, Trump said he would like to see Syria attack Hezbollah as a way to get rid of Hezbollah without Israel bombing Lebanon. So it just looks messier than ever and extremely concerning.
Speaker 1: I think you captured it very, very well. And I've just been more and more impressed over the weeks, Mario. I hope you and your eyes don't mind me saying this, but your strategic thinking just has improved light years from where it was just a few weeks ago or a month ago. I'm just telling you, I do this for a living. So I have a lot of PhD students and man, oh man, you are way up there. So I'm just, so yes, I didn't see your previous guest, but I'm glad to Yes, in Iraq, I think I agree with this 100%. And of course, the foreign minister of Iran is trying to influence this as well. So you recall that he made a trip recently in Iraq. And so there is now what is happening in the big picture? is about not just the balance of power in a vague sense that I've been explaining is at issue now, and the different groups and sides disagree on this changing and fluid balance of power, where it should come out. But what you're seeing here specifically is the sphere of influence issue. So Iran, this goes back, geez, five, six weeks ago now, I think it was at the end of May. This is when the IRGC started to put out the idea of the access resistance belt, the security resistance belt. And that was gonna go from Lebanon, that is the Mediterranean, to the Red Sea, that's Yemen, and then circle all the way back to the Gulf. And that would of course encircle Iraq as well. So what they are, what is happening is as the balance power has shifted, We are seeing a fundamental disagreement with the United States. It wants to still be the preeminent power. That's why it's trying to undermine the MOU in different ways so that it keeps as much power as possible. Israel wants to undermine the MOU in various ways because it used to be a rising power. It's gone. And now Iran wants to stick with the four corners of the MOU because it wants, that was a roadmap to its regional power. So that's the big picture. But within that, as I've been explaining, there's a sphere of influence. As Iran rises, it doesn't just want the strategic base in Hormuz and its own country and that global wealth that goes with that. It wants more, as regional powers do. They want a perimeter, a strategic perimeter that we call a sphere of influence. Now, spheres of influence, are common with major powers. China is establishing one. The United States has long had one in the Western hemisphere. Russia is trying to reestablish and broaden its sphere of influence. And they matter for power reasons. It's not just ego, prestige, or bragging rights, a game of risk here. This really matters. And in the case of Iran, their perimeter that they are identifying is the perimeter that encircles all the ways the new pipelines could be built to exit and bypass Hormuz. So got to keep in mind, this is heavily about Hormuz, but Hormuz has tentacles into Lebanon, into Syria, into Iraq, into Yemen. Now, Iran has also proxies that they have had for many decades. Hezbollah goes all the way back to the year 1982. So this is not a situation where this was all a standing start for Iran. They had a lot of pieces to work with to build and consolidate a sphere of influence, but that's what they're doing. They're not simply... rubber stamping or stamping a status quo where they've had relations with these different groups going for some case years some case many decades that's it's more than that uh mario they are consolidating a sphere of influence and then of course there's pushback and marco rubio is encouraging pushback some of that from rubio is probably related to israel and and you know direct political issues with israel Some of it is just simply what you would expect by the United States not wanting to accept a consolidated sphere of influence, because what does that mean? It's a sphere without the United States. That is a big deal. So as American power has sort of already receded, we already have a strategic defeat. Now what's happening is will it become consolidated? Will this even become more lopsided against the United States? Iran is playing hardball, man. They're going for this in a serious way, not overreaching yet, but my goodness, they are playing hardball. And that has been a huge, huge miscalculation by the media and so forth. So, so many people in the media thought if just Trump would stop bombing, everything would be okay. Or just Trump pull back, everything would be okay. That's not the case. Well, certainly not my view on the escalation trap and the modeling, because Iran is now taking the initiative with force. Why? To consolidate that MOU, to defend those four corners, and basically to consolidate its position as the rising regional hegemon.
Speaker 0: And just for the audience, the last time we had a discussion a week or so ago, you've done a great job of explaining the... So I was just talking about Yemen and as an alternative, the Bebel-Mendip Strait as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, you were explaining how Iran, through their axis of resistance, is their way of controlling all energy choke points. Everyone. If they charge a fee at the Strait of Hormuz, everyone's talking about how everyone will build alternatives. Well, Iran is thinking a step ahead of that and actually thinking as their response to these alternatives, the Bebel-Mendip Strait and Hormuz.
Speaker 1: hezbollah with the mediterranean as one of those alternatives and you reference we're so used to thinking of our rivals as dunderheads um and idiots that we we having a hard time catching up i i wouldn't say these are uh the iranians are are geniuses but what they're doing is they're playing the hand that they have in the in the way Realist 101 would play. It's a standard default set of positions. And they're not underselling themselves. They're not making the many dumb mistakes here and there. I'm not saying they're perfect or so forth. I'm not saying they're 10 feet tall. However, we are underestimating that. And so for a long time on comments to my escalation trap and my in-person meetings on the escalation trap, I'm meeting with lots of these oil uh traders and so forth and they're saying you're over you're over uh worried professor pape we're just gonna knock them out in a couple years because we're bypassing this and this they'll they'll have that horn moves for 18 months and after that they're done i think they've they've been thinking about this since late march as far as i can tell so i don't think this is a case where Iran is behind the curve. I think they're just playing out. They've probably look, I've been modeling this for 20 years since 2005. I'd be pretty shocked if they haven't been modeling it for a long time as well.
Speaker 0: Yeah. they'll have their own version of Professor Pape in modeling it for them.
Speaker 1: They're probably better and there are things they're going to see. I'm just telling you, this is just moving down the normal and what I'm doing is following the 70, 80 percent branches of the tree. It's not like there's some genius idea of this or that. The idea here that's strong is follow the modeling and the incentives based on a power framework, not on a prestige framework, not on a, you know, ego trip for Trump or Trump derangement syndrome. None of that is here. And it's turned out to be, we're now starting, you realize this is the fifth month of the war, Mario? The fifth month of the war? Just think about that. This was supposed to be over in three days.
Speaker 0: Reminds me of the Russia-Ukraine war. The beginning was like, oh, that won't last. It'll last a few days. And then a few weeks later, well, it's been a few weeks.
Speaker 1: It's been a few months. It's an escalation trap. And it's very, very similar. And just remember, J.D. Vance said, oh, we're never going to get in a long war. President Trump said, OK, a couple of days. Then it was a couple of weeks. Then every day it's been, this is going to be over. Well, of course, nobody believes him anymore. But what you are seeing is the states, as I've been saying from the beginning, they're not choosing a long war except for iran iran likes the long war if you look at israel you look at the united states man they'd like um if they could get a 12 have gotten a 12-day war they would have taken it what do you make of um the clashes we saw recently in the strait of hummus so iran is trying to assert their control of the strait of hummus by striking ships that go on the omani side
Speaker 0: And the Americans want to make it clear that this is not acceptable. So they're trying to take away that control, that influence, that escalation dominance, whatever you want to call it, from the Iranians by responding and attacking the Iranians. The next day, the Iranians did it again. And then they agreed to talk in Qatar. But the Iranians are saying, we're not going to meet the Americans. I don't know what's happening in Qatar. And then today, the New York Times broke a story that, according to New York Times, Oman is already coming up with a plan, or they've come up with a plan with Iran, Oman and Iran, to charge a fee at the Strait of Hormuz and manage the Strait of Hormuz together. And they've already presented that plan to the Americans, which they don't like. The Americans don't like the plan, obviously.
Speaker 1: What happens next? Yeah, so what you have done is given a nice summary here, very nice. What you are seeing play itself out, Mario, is the red line I was describing about Article 5. So this goes back 10 days ago. an escalation trap post. I'm doing these on Monday now on a regular basis called the escalation trap this week. So you will see, and it has a forecast very specific, and then it does a checkbox. What happens?
Speaker 0: That's the email that you sent.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I guess that's right. So I'm trying to make this, you know, people, you know, want to know how are these predictions work now? Let's just make this a little bit clear.
Speaker 0: And so the last one, the last, the title of the last one is the MOU is dying. Worse is still ahead.
Speaker 1: that's right that's right and it's got a paid test in the middle of it here so you can check the box how's he doing because that's what they're playing the games on your shows i mean i'm seeing it so let's make it easier to to do stump the professor so anyway the um uh but what you're seeing and what you're describing here is a predictable red line based on the mou article 5 which states very clearly iran is going to be in charge of the arrangements with Oman, but it's Iran first. So they're the lead partner here. And these fees are gonna come after 60 days while we're getting further into the 60 day clock. So what you are seeing is Iran is exerting coercive leverage to prevent the United States from establishing what's called salami slicing. So there's this, what they are doing, the Trump administration with that third round is called Salami slicing, it's a concept that goes back to Thomas Schelling. This is very famous in strategy terms. So if your listeners want to kind of get a crash course on salami slicing here, but what they're doing is they're trying to whittle away that threshold in Article 5. It's called salami slice your way out of the threshold. And so this is exactly what they're doing. It's like they got their copy of Thomas Schelling. They're just reading it at the NSC. This is how you salami slice your way out of it. Well, what Iran is doing is apparently they got their own copy of arms and influence, and they're doing exactly what we expect in strategic studies to stop the salami slicing, which is you force the issue. You enforce the threshold that has already been established, and that is the Article V. So their coercion what it's about, their goal is not to wreck the world economy, although they'll accept it. Their goal is to get those fees. Now, what are those fees? It looks like they want, it's not 100% clear what the number value is, but I think they want something like $2 million a tanker. And if that's true, Then given the amount of tankers that we're going through at normal levels here, that equates to about $100 million a day. And then that equates to about $36 billion a year over and above what they make on selling their own oil. And within a few years, they're gonna be the richest, most wealthy country in the Persian Gulf here. And they can always increase those fees and they're gonna try to block their exits. So this, but their goal, but what the means to the goal, the strategy is always a means end. So their goal is the fees, getting America to accept the fees. And what they're doing is they're constraining the ships going through or moves. And you've been tracking this on your show, or at least on my feed on X. I see you've done a nice job of this. And so that's exactly what they want to do. Those ships were up to 70, That's a little bit too high for this, so they're lowering it back down. And conveniently, the United States violated Article 5 of the MOU, so it makes it international law. They can use that pretext. But what they're doing is it's a straightforward, coercive strategy, means, ends. They might also apply this, by the way, to Lebanon. It doesn't have to be limited to the goal of Lebanon. the fees, but right now they're very tightly focused on those fees, and they're trying to reestablish Article 5 and the threshold of what's going to happen on, I think it's August 16th, when the day 61 comes. So this is what this is all about, and it matters tremendously. It's not just money, it's power of the First Order that's at issue here, and this is why they're willing to initiate the use of force. As I said, this was not in the one you just read yesterday, but if you go back a couple of Mondays, you'll see. I was saying during the 60-day period, expect Iran to be the one initiating the use of force, not the United States. Worry more about the United States initiating it either in response to Iran's initiating or after day 60, and there's a set of reasons for that.
Speaker 0: Interesting. What do you expect to come out of the meeting in Qatar now, in Doha?
Speaker 1: It's probably either not much or very temporary. So that is in the post you just said. So I laid it out, which is what you typically see. I think the idea of a ceasefire that's meaningful is effectively defunct. What you are seeing is pauses between uses of military force. escalation or wars are not linear the way people often expect. So people, the public in particular, the media, because the media needs to focus on what's literally happening this second. thinks things are linear, like a terrorist attack. And I know I've spent 25 years studying terrorism, not just bombing. So what the media thinks, if there was a terrorist attack today and there wasn't tomorrow, well, the terrorists must be done, right? They must be out of opportunity. They can't, so it's literally, if it doesn't happen day by day by day for the media and most of the public and a lot of American decision makers and government leaders, it's somehow over. No, that's not how it really works. And so I think here, You basically had a weekend of an extended weekend. And why was it on the weekend? I think we can look at this and say this quite clearly. Iran wanted to reestablish that threshold. Trump wanted to bomb back so he didn't look like a complete weakling in front of the huge amount of MAGA that's crying for him to lash back here. And why did the Trump attack start exactly when they did? I think it was 18 minutes after the market closed. on Friday. And then why did Trump say, I mean, I almost put this in a prediction, Mario. I knew I'd be on with you, so I just thought I'd tell the story. But I didn't put it in writing. But I said to my wife, I know what's going to happen when I wake up on Monday morning. Trump's already going to be saying there's a meeting, it's already coming, and it's probably not going to be true. And sure enough, he's kind of wiggling his way into a meeting, if he can, in order to talk the markets down. um here and so this is what you are seeing you're seeing a trump yo-yo related it's it's um it's not exactly captured by the idea of tacoing i think this is uh not quite right it's more of a yo-yo but it's around the idea of the market when is it open and he's trying to keep the prices down because uh the traders are terrified that if they really go to the market price, and you've been covering this great on your show, that they will get punished rather, and they get fired. So it's not just they lose some money, Mario, they lose their jobs if they lose enough money betting against Trump's words. So this is what is happening in detail with the coercive strategy. I think Iran's seeing this pretty clearly. They're just, following what I would say is realism 101. It's not that complicated. They don't need to bomb, hit those ships every day, but they need to hit them every so often unless the administration follows the four corners of the MOU. And I think that's really what they're demanding, at least over the next 60 days. And any little thing that's out of that is not going to be acceptable by Iran. The question is, will we kowtow? to every single thing in the MOU.
Speaker 0: What has surprised you most? Because you've been studying this for 20 years and gamifying this for 20 years. What surprised you most in terms of the outcomes of this war and where we are today?
Speaker 1: The biggest surprise, to be very honest, is how well the modeling has done stage by stage. You have to remember, so when you modeled it, when I modeled this, we hadn't even started bombing Fordow. So this starts, this model that I'm talking to you about, and my students know, the students from class who have had me in strategy for the last 20 years, I see them now quite a bit when I go around and travel. And they're coming up and telling me how much they remember those days, because it was, I would always end my vague lecture class with the bombing of Iran, a simulated bombing of Iran and what to expect in the stages. And stage one was we would bomb Fordow. That is, America would bomb Fordow. You could have Israel try to bomb Natanz, but Israel didn't have the payload. There's a lot of operational reasons why only the United States could bomb Fordow. But once we bombed Fordow, for whatever reason we did that, we would disable it as an industrial centrifuge factory, but not be able to find the 60% enriched uranium. And then I said, and what this would mean is we would get scared over the next year or so. And I said that this would be the trigger in about a year or two to go back to do regime change bombing, which we had rejected over and over and over again, different administrations, that we would become so paranoid and so worried about what was happening with that nuclear material that we would take the huge risk of doing regime change bombing out of desperation to try to shut this thing down. But that would then lead to the power, the lashing back, the Kosovo and all the stuff that we've talked about over the months. So that was how you went from stage one to stage two, where we are now. And now we are in the middle game bouncing back and forth between stage three, more escalation to take away that power that Iran grabbed with Hormuz, and or stage four, which is accept Iran as the fourth center of world power. Those were the predictions. They've been the predictions all the way through. We're in the middle game, and this middle game can go on, I think, at least until January, Mario. So to put some time frame on this, The people want it to be over because they don't want their prices to keep going up. Well, that doesn't make it happen, though. So I'm not putting a finger up and saying, which way is the wind blowing here? I'm just sticking to what the arguments are. And the biggest surprise has been it's been so on the money. It's been really close. So that makes me want to just keep following the logics i'm laying out and that's really what you're seeing mario um is i would definitely you know have said um you know that the uh yeah and and if the war were to suddenly have been over two weeks ago that would have been different than the model and i would have said so uh here and i told you what we've been on i said you know this is what that would start to look like but remember two weeks ago mario i said we would be pulling forces out and we would withdraw the forces back to the position of December. Well, if you look at the feeds of what US, I was just on with another show and they're showing me the data showing we're putting more forces in, more logistics, more tankers. We're going the other way with our forces. You see, that's consistent with what I've been saying even before it happened. So what I'm seeing is really quite remarkable conformity or consistency. with the very specific real-world predictions that are coming out of the modeling of the bombing of Iran, because it really is about, ultimately, Iran's power, either Hormuz or the nuclear weapons.
Speaker 0: I was speaking to Admiral Mark Montgomery earlier today. He's the former director of the operations at U.S. Pacific Command, and I asked him the question, I'm like, what do you think is the lie? He's a straight shooter. So he just says things as they are. He doesn't just go around and just answer my questions directly. So I always enjoy talking to him. And I said to him, what do you think is the likelihood that we'll see a resumption of war, full blown war after the midterms? He said about 50% likelihood, not back and forth strikes like we're seeing right now, limited strikes. But he's talking about a full blown conflict, a continuation of the war.
Speaker 1: That's not unreasonable. In fact, that's close to what I think. I haven't put quite a percentage on the way he has, but it's really quite similar to what I think. And here's the set of reasons, Mario. There's two fundamental reasons to go down that road. Number one is, if in fact the oil inventories run down to the bottom, And if in fact, then the prices of gasoline go way back up. You're going to have a lot of angry Americans and a lot of angry people around the world. Now, let me just focus inside the United States. What's that anger going to do inside the United States? It's going to have a double-edged sword. It's not gonna just put people, make people keep getting madder and madder at Donald Trump, because it will in fact, in part be Iran's initiation of force that is causing that. That will just be a reality. And so what you were gonna have, and Donald Trump will definitely, he's already, I can see this with Mike Johnson this morning. He's working on this already. He hasn't quite come out with it yet. But don't be surprised if that becomes a big talking point by President Trump. And so what that's going to mean, Mario, is you're going to get an awful lot of people on MAGA, which Trump needs to turn out. MAGA is what's going to determine how much, whether the House falls, or the U.S. House falls, or the Senate falls to the Democrats. It's going to be a big, so if MAGA is getting more and more angry. And Trump vectors that anger here. Blame Iran, not me. We did our best. I gave JD the big shot, and it's Iran who's stabbing us in the back. That is going to create momentum here even before the midterms. But there's a second issue underneath this more detailed calculation. which is over the weekend, the IRGC Fars news service. This is a new service that I'm sure you're very aware is connected with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Well, they floated the idea that Iran needs now, needs now nuclear weapons. And this is in fact in line with my thinking as well. And I was thinking, again, it would be about a year or a year and a half after the starting of the regime change bombing, you would have Iran truly develop nuclear weapons. But look, I predicted the regime change bombing would happen a year or two after Fordow, and it was eight months, sooner than I said. Here, you could get the same thing. You could get Iranian nuclear weapons sooner than I'm suggesting, but I don't think you're seeing it happening later than I'm suggesting. And what that would be is an incredible embarrassment to President Trump. This would totally turn President Trump into, I mean, domestically, if Iran were to test nuclear weapons, Trump's power would almost be over. He could lash out, do whatever he wanted, but even if he lashes out, everybody would know he is just, he's got nothing to offer anymore. And so this would be immediately looking to J.D. and Rubio as like the actual de facto leader here. And so what you would see is Trump would, Uh, if he gets an inkling of this coming and we're likely have all the surveillance Trump selling, telling you, we've got all the eyes and ears looking for exactly this. I think this could be, uh, why we still keep those Marines. So notice we didn't pull the Marines out. Okay. We, we still have those ground forces there ready to go in a few days notice at most in order to go in somewhere like SF on or wherever. um pickaxe mountain wherever you gotta go and i think they're there um uh in part maybe they have multiple you know scenarios uh but in case they get an inkling of a test and that is not something i would just completely dismiss so so i think that this idea that this whole thing is over has just missed what this has all been about in the first place And it's true that America doesn't have good military options. People have been saying, I was saying that for decades. This is not like we suddenly thought we had military options, but that's not how, if that were so true, Mario, World War I would not have been four years. The Russian-Ukraine war would already be over by now. I mean, if it were the case that this was so easy to understand, the bottom line is, Wars disrupt the balance of power often in big ways. And then they end when the major combatants agree on the new balance of power. And right now they're not agreeing. Iran is not satisfied. They're not done growing their power yet. America is not happy. It's now more and more dissatisfied with every change. And Israel is in a full out panic, as far as I can tell, not just being rational, but incredibly emotional here, as I think you would expect. I'd find it, if October 7 happened here in Chicago, I'm pretty sure you would see that kind of an emotional response by the city of Chicago. So that's what I see. And I think that what you said about the 50%, if those ground forces aren't gonna be used, Let's just pull them back.
Speaker 0: Let's pull them back. You'd want to keep them as pressure during negotiations as well. So it's difficult to tell, are they there for practical reasons of what you've explained, or are they there to keep pressure on Iran, keep that fear within Iran as the deal is being negotiated?
Speaker 1: I think that this is not... Yeah, there's a little bit of strategic ambiguity going on here, Mario, but this is underweighting, as happens with strategic ambiguity, I would say, in Taiwan. that this is not just an easy out, an excuse where it's all bluff. See, what people mean by strategic ambiguity is it's all just a bluff. It's not really going to happen. So therefore, their presence there is not real. It doesn't really have a probability on the, you know, a coefficient on the variable. I just think that this is not quite right. Strategic ambiguity here was not really about that with Taiwan. it was a velvet glove. So there's realism, and then there's with the mailed fist, and then there's the velvet glove over the mailed fist, which makes it a little bit easier to deal with. Those 5,000 Marines here, I think are just different. I think they're there as a backup plan for Iran testing. And a good question for President Trump by a journalist is, would be if you saw Iran testing, would you send in the Marines? Just directly ask him and let him say, I can't say or whatever. But these are the actual scenarios that we should be pressing the president on. But it's hard because everybody does the current news, which is important, but there's core underlying scenarios here. Who's going to control Hormuz with fees or not? And then number two, is Iran really going to have the ability to test within a couple weeks or not? And that is what this has always been about, or the first, the latter, and now Hormuz the second.
Speaker 0: And you've mentioned Israel as well, and we haven't talked enough about Israel. I was in a conversation with former Prime Minister Bennett, Naftali Bennett, earlier today, and his I was going through his policy to understand how different he is to Netanyahu. Very, very little difference, especially when it comes to Iran. If anything, he's in some ways more hawkish towards Iran. So even if Trump decides to walk away, you've got Israel as another wild card.
Speaker 1: Yes, but it's I think a wild card means it is. 50-50 which way Israel will go. I don't think that's right, Mario. I think it's directional. And what I think is, it's coming from number one, or three places, really. Of course, the hawkish side in uh in israel has always wanted the expansion for decades so that part number number one number two october 7 has moved the public uh in that direction the left basically disappeared or virtually disappeared after october 7 and you see that in the 70 to 80 percent of the israeli public uh in the most recent opinion polls over the last few months it all say they want to go full bore into Lebanon. Half the public apparently is willing, and Israel is willing to do that, even if that means losing American support. So this is, the public's really quite traumatized here, in addition to what the leaders are. And that, of course, reinforces the leaders. But there's a third thing, Mario. So this is on, again, sub-stack analysis, military analysis of what does the next war against Hezbollah really look like, Mario? So I did a big 1800 word analysis on the sub stack on this and I call it closing Israel so apply not just the idea we know Hezbollah hates Israel we know it wants to hurt Israel and we know it has drones but right now those first person view drones are really just being used directly against the front line Israeli forces in either southern Lebanon or just on the other side of the border in northern Israel but just simply extend the logic of the, I mean, the operational strategic logic of what drones are doing in Hormuz as we just spent the first 30 minutes discussing hitting ships and also the Houthis. And you're telling me more, I got to go now spend more time after this, go learn what's going on with the Houthis, but apply that to Hezbollah. And notice Israel is effectively 55% of its G and P comes from trade. comes from seaborne trade. And that's coming in through Haifa, it's coming in through just a handful of ports. So if you look at Israel, Israel's effectively an island when it comes to trade. And Lebanon, the distance between the Bekaa Valley, which is where you would build your drones and arsenals and so forth to build drone swarms, and Haifa is 80 miles, 80 miles. And if you, and I just did a big briefing on this last week for my, when I did, I've done in-person people, I've invited people to some in-person events. So I'm showing them what it would, how easy it would be to target those big cargo vessels in Haifa with drones. And again, you can launch a dozen drones or 20 drones, only one or two hit, and you've done your work. Israel's knocked down 90% of them. But what that means is Israel is going to face with Hezbollah in Lebanon a much more severe threat, a real threat, not just a made-up threat. than it does today. And I'm not telling you I justify what Israel's doing. I still think if I were Israel, I'd play the hand that they should work with the United States to get us out of the escalation trap. So if I were advising the people you're interviewing, I would not tell them to go down this road. However, I would start with the reality of what I think they're seeing rather than dismiss it as, oh, you're just a wacko. Let me tell you why you shouldn't do what you're, no, that doesn't persuade decision makers. I spent from 2001 to 2024. I advised every West Wing in in the White House. And it doesn't work. You walk in here because usually I have to be invited. I'm just a professor. It doesn't work to walk in and say, yeah, you're just a bunch of nincompoops. Thank goodness I'm here. No, this doesn't work. You've got to understand things from what they're seeing and then say either this is unrealistic what you're seeing or it is realistic and then from there start to create a better course of action. If you just keep assaulting them as morally decrepit and idiots, this is not, you're not going to save any lives. Notice, assaulting Israel is morally decrepit, hasn't saved, what, 4,000 people are now dead in southern Lebanon, right? I mean, think of that. That breaks my heart. I want to actually help those people stay alive. How do you do that? This is, I think, how you do it, Mario. You've got to get more deeply into this, and then tell them you recognize this A, B, and C, you disagree with this other thing, but this is the better direction you should go for your own security, you see, and that is a way to actually get them to move.
Speaker 0: As a final question, Professor, using your model and based on the latest developments, what can we expect to see over the next few weeks and months?
Speaker 1: You can expect to see Iran's going to enforce the four corners of that MOU. And that then I think is, you're quite likely, and that means using force. So I would still say Iran is likely to be the side initiating the use of force over the next few weeks. But the United States is getting more and more hair triggered to respond and to respond in bigger ways. And this will put pressure on Saudi Arabia. So as I understand it, there are thousands of Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia. And they've been there for over a month. And there's also some Pakistani jets. Well, that corresponds to when Saudi Arabia decided to get a backbone and shut down its airspace. So that's a post I put up today. And I'm not 100% sure on this, but Reuters, others have laid out these Pakistani troop details. And what that tells me, Mario, is that in the coming weeks, as Iran enforces the MOU with force, and as the United States wants to push back, don't be surprised if Saudi Arabia and maybe some other Gulf states are saying, no, we want to work with Iran in another way, and it's not with retaliatory bombing. So those are the things I'm keenly following this week next week? How is this exactly going to work out with these? It's not really, is Jared Kushner going to meet with an Iranian diplomat in Doha? That may happen or not. But I don't think that's, notice that those meetings have not really been very predictive of what's happening the next few days later. You see, they're not because they're just talk. the realities, as I keep saying, are what the states are actually doing and what are their actual security incentives.
Speaker 0: Professor, always a pleasure to speak to you. Thank you for your time.
Speaker 1: Well, thank you, Mario, and thank you for all you're doing. I just can't believe how much you have, you're the, you know, CNN used to do what you do and then stop, and now you're the new CNN.
Speaker 0: I don't know whether it's an insult or a compliment. I mean, the CNN of 30 years ago.
Speaker 1: The CNN that we all used to love. Thank you, Professor. I appreciate your time. All right. Bye bye.
Speaker 0: Bye bye. All right, guys, I'll be going live again with Professor Gibbs, David Gibbs, in 15 minutes. In the meantime, I'll probably go through some of the comments for today with the interview I just had with Professor Pape. The interview I had before that with Elijah Magnier, where he broke down how what's happening in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, the Erdogan-Trump love affair is all related to Hezbollah and weakening Hezbollah. He also talks about Yemen. So that was a great conversation with Elijah. Before that, I spoke to Admiral Mark Montgomery. It was a great chat, as always, to get his thoughts on the latest developments and whether the likelihood of renewed conflict. And before that, with former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, former Prime Minister of Israel, to talk about what would Israel look like if he takes over from Netanyahu later this year. So I hope you enjoyed the conversation so far today. Professor Gibbs is in 15 minutes, and we have Brendan Wykert, Tom Luongo, Mohamed Faridi, and then Larry Johnson to wrap up the day. Thanks, everyone.
reSee.it AI Summary
I saw the tell: unmarked armored vehicles leaving Camp Victory for Kurdistan meant someone was arming the Kurds. But the result was fractured militias focused on their own province, not Tehran. Trump later admitted the weapons were handed over and stolen. Turks would rather help crush them than let Kurdistan take shape. The real failure: U.S. intelligence can’t recruit from Iran’s diaspora or distinguish Baluch from Azeri.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 The covert plan to break Iran with a Kurdish uprising fell apart for the oldest reason in the book: nobody involved understood the people they were arming Malcolm Nance saw the tell months ago, columns of unmarked armored vehicles rolling out of Camp Victory and vanishing into Kurdistan. Somebody was arming the Kurds. But he's spent a career around them, and his verdict lands hard: two dozen fractured militias, interested in their own province and not a march on Tehran. Trump himself later admitted the weapons were handed over and simply stolen. And the Turks, who hate the Kurds beyond anything they feel for Israel, would sooner help Iran wipe those groups out than watch Kurdistan take shape. His deeper point is the one Washington never wants to hear. You cannot topple a nation of 93 million with money and airpower when your intelligence services don't recruit from their own two-million-strong Iranian diaspora and can't tell a Baluch from an Azeri. His metaphor for it: everyone in the camel souk knows each other, and the Americans keep showing up thinking they can buy the market. The contrast he drew was Israel's 2018 nuclear-archive raid, rehearsed for two years on a full-scale mockup, executed in a single night, made possible by officers who grew up inside the cultures they operate in. On the Katz threat against Mojtaba, his read was chilling in its simplicity: the standing order never changed. If the opportunity comes, they take it, deal or no deal. @MalcolmNance
Video Transcript AI Summary
A report described a secret joint plan by the CIA and Mossad to overthrow the Iranian government during the US–Iran conflict earlier this year. According to Channel 15, part of the plan required arming Kurdish separatists. The discussion claims that J.D. Vance learned of the secret plans and told Erdogan, anticipating Erdogan would reject Kurdish expansionist policies, and that the plan failed after Vance leaked details.
Malcolm argued that Kurdish involvement is expected in such destabilization efforts because of the Kurdish resistance groups’ history and fighting ability, including the Peshmerga in northern Iraq. He said the Kurds are “very fractured,” with “maybe two dozen Kurdish militia groups,” and emphasized that “no one hates the Kurds more than the Turks.” He described Turkey’s invasions and heavy actions against Kurdish forces in northern Syria, saying this indicates Turkish opposition to the existence of armed Kurdish forces. He also said that on Iran’s side of the border, there are multiple Kurdish groups and referenced recent attacks and assassinations involving Kurdish groups against the IRGC.
He further described a pattern he sees when external actors attempt to arm Kurdish groups: early signs include armored US Humvees and MRAPs moving into Iraqi Kurdistan and disappearing into the region without clear markings or explanations. He said that after these signs, Americans began denying that any mission was occurring, while bombarding of US forces in Erbil by Iran was cited as another indicator. He said Iraqi Kurds publicly indicated Americans had called them to support a rebellion with Iranian Kurds, but claimed the Iraqi Kurds would not do so due to their interests and the risk posed by Iranian forces. He added that he attributed the plan’s failure in part to the mismatch between local militia objectives and the broader expectation that they could—or would—fight to reshape all of Iran.
Malcolm contrasted US and Israeli intelligence methods using examples about “cultural intelligence” and local market knowledge. He said US operations assume resources, equipment, and air power are sufficient and criticized approaches he linked to “white boy summer,” suggesting outsiders underestimate local networks and trading relationships. He also claimed this difference explains historical outcomes such as the 1952 coup associated with CIA and MI6 efforts and the assassination of Mozadegh.
On the possibility of Israel striking Mustafa al-Khamenei without American authorization, the discussion claimed scenarios had been gamed and asserted that if Israel’s national interest aligned, they would act even if it is “not in the United States’ interest.” It described an Iranian expectation of deception, suggesting that if the Israelis intended an attack, Iran might respond with many fake motorcades. It also argued that if an Israeli killing occurred, Iran’s retaliation could include missile demonstrations and attacks meant to unsettle populations, plus a possible escalation targeting US forces indirectly.
The discussion then shifted to an alleged threat by Katz to Mustafa al-Khamenei and the claim that Iran was closing its airspace for a funeral. Malcolm referenced how he believes Israel operates, including a cited 2018 intelligence operation where Israeli forces allegedly infiltrated Iran to raid a facility holding nuclear research archives by building a full-scale mock-up in a third country, rehearsing safe-cracking procedures, and conducting the raid in one night. He also contrasted this with a story about a CIA officer, Jeffrey Sterling, who allegedly leaked plans to the New York Times and served a prison sentence, describing the approach of inserting corrupted or flawed materials as part of covert programs.
Finally, Malcolm argued that Mossad succeeds by understanding local economies and culture rather than relying on direct penetration alone, using “honey farms in Yemen” and related disruptions of Osama bin Laden’s revenue as an example of how intelligence and local knowledge could target funding streams. He concluded by saying intelligence professionals “have to work the local game” and cited the idea that even “honey” could be the basis of an effective counter-financing strategy.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: There's an interesting story came out. The CIA and Mossad had secret joint and elaborate plan to overthrow the Iranian government during the US Iran war earlier this year. So we know about this already. The Mossad and the CIA had a plan to overthrow the government. But according to channel 15, part of the plan required the Kurdish separatists. Sorry, I forgot to add that. Yes. So they were arming the Kurds. We know about this. Now, according to channel 15, JD Vance learned of the secret plans and immediately told Erdogan, knowing Erdogan would reject Kurdish expansionist policies. The plan ultimately failed after Vance leaked its details. Do you think that's true?
Speaker 1: You know what? First off, all of the analysis that we've done during this war, it was very clear that the first indication we had something was going on in Iraq was we saw this huge column of armored US Humvees and MRAPs, that's mine resistant armored personnel carrier, that were going from Camp Victory in Iraq, that were going into Kurdistan and disappearing. We were like, who's moving all this armor? It's not US marked, it's just generic armor. And we said, someone's arming the Kurds because one of the possibilities that just would have to be on the table in any operation is if you were to destabilize the government of Iran, you would want to have the Iranian Kurdish resistance groups that have been fighting up there for years. The problem with that is, and anyone who has ever been around the Kurds knows the Kurds like I have, the Kurds are a very fractured people. There are maybe two dozen Kurdish militia groups operating in various places. And no one hates the Kurds more than the Turks. No one. All of eastern Turkey, eastern Turkey, northern Iran, northeastern Iran, northwestern, I'm sorry, Iraq, northwestern Iraq and northern Syria and, how can I put it, northwestern Iran, if they were all given a single border based on ethnicity, That would be Kurdistan. And let me tell you, nobody over there wants Kurdistan, especially the Turks. The Turks have been fighting with the Kurds. You know, the biggest Kurdish party in Turkey is the PKK, right, the Kurdish Communist Party. And even when we were fighting ISIS in Rohingya, you know, the Kurds were rabidly on our side. the immediate moment that the United States and the Kurds defeated ISIS, Turkey invaded, right? Invaded Northern Syria with heavy forces to make it clear these Kurds were not going to be allowed to exist with their weapons. Fast forward over to the beginning of this war. Every secret, let me rephrase this. Everybody who thinks that they're going to destabilize Iran thinks that they're going to use the Kurds. The Kurds are good fighters. The Peshmerga of Northern Iraq have proven themselves numerous times. But on the Iranian side of the border, there are multiple groups. We just saw some recent assassinations that were being carried out against ambushes, that were being carried out against the IRGC by the Kurdish, I can't remember, the name is a free love, you know, group or something along that line. And the JAK group. And this group is rabidly socialist, rabidly, ardently feminist, anti-Islamist. I mean, it's just bizarre how anyone could see that. The problem is we have Americans working with Israelis who thought they were to go up there, arm these groups, use them as a spear tip, working along with Mossad officers, CIA paramilitary officers, who thought that they saw the breakup of Iran coming based on the January, you know, incidents where the people rose up in protest to the government of Iran. But it's just too little too late. We cannot overthrow a nation of 93 million people, which has over a dozen major cultural religious groups, whether it's Baluch, whether it's Lourdes, whether it's Azeri, whether it's, Persian, whether it's a Kurd, we just don't have it. And I'm going to tell you the main reason why. Number one, despite the fact that the United States has over 2 million Iranians living in LA alone almost, we just do not recruit in that community. The intelligence community doesn't trust these, you know, even first generation Iranians. So we don't have the linguistic and cultural intelligence to deal with these people. I mean, linguistic intelligence is one thing. You can go out there, you can have farlings, which is what we call Farsi linguists. But you can speak, you know, Farsi. But if you can't speak to a Baluk, if you're coming across the Pakistani border, or Dari, you know, if you're coming across the Afghan border, worse than the language, any idiot can learn the language. It's the cultural awareness of who you're dealing with what their history is there, how they deal with each other. Some people slit each other's throats, right? Some people will just, you know, make deals at the souk and call that even. We are just insanely awful at that. And, you know, it's that great scene in the movie Charlie Wilson's War where a Greek CIA, you know, station chief, senior CIA clandestine service officer is complaining that because he's Greek, They transferred them to study finish. All right. And they're purging the CIA. This was during Stanfield Turner time. Purging the CIA to get rid of everyone who is a child of a immigrant family, which is crazy. The CIA is still like that to a certain extent. Look, right now they're purging all blacks, women, people of color, people who aren't Trump loyalists. So how do we create an insurgency in Kurdistan where we can't even deal with the Iraqi Kurds. Another indication that we saw very early on, I mean, I did big podcasts about this on my podcast, where we were seeing these Kurdish groups, you know, in Northern Iran, Northwestern Iran, right? Coming over to Sulaymaniyah, which is the Eastern most city in Iraqi Kurdistan. And we were hearing about, you know, They were having meetings with unidentified people. Well, you know, you don't have to be an idiot to understand who the unidentified people are. The Iranians didn't let down on this too. They started bombarding U.S. forces in Erbil, which is, you know, the center of Iraqi Kurdistan. But immediately after that, when we started projecting that there was a secret mission going on in Kurdistan, Iraqi Kurdistan, to arm the Kurdish troops, Americans started denying it. which is the second sign, right? It's the big sign that you're doing it. And it's like, really, then why are all your helicopter gunships up there bombarding, you know, flying around those borders? Why are all these armored vehicle convoys being given to nobody? Almost immediately, this is a sign of the fractures nature of Kurdish forces, almost immediately, Donald Trump, you know, apparently had a secret phone conversation with the head of the Iraqi Kurds. And this guy came out and gave a TV interview and said, yeah, the Americans have been calling us, and they want us to support a rebellion with the Iranian Kurds. But we're not going to do that because that's not in our interest, right? And they're right, because who wants to fight? You may have bombarded the Iranian Air Force and the Iranian Navy, but the Artesh, the Iranian Army, and the almost a million IRGC troops combatants, if they decided to mobilize, they'd walk right over you. They could take northern Iraq. And believe me, the Iraqi Shia and the Iraqi Sunni might not have a problem with that. So I'm sure they would. But, you know, the point is, you make these bets, you're going to have to lie in it. Trump, within weeks, came out and spilled the beans. That, yeah, he gave weapons to these guys and they stole them. That's what Trump said. We gave them weapons and they stole them. Because, as you know, Trump is transactional. And you can't give them weapons on the expectation that maybe someday they'll do something. He expects immediate action. And whoever at the CIA, you know, on the clandestine service side or the paramilitary side was promising this, or in the Mossad was promising, yeah, we could get this done by training what we call indigs, right, indigenous local personnel, and providing them with weapons and equipment, doesn't understand they're really interested in only one thing. which is the Kurdistan province of Iran. They're not interested in taking the rest of Iran. They're not interested in going to, you know, to downtown Tehran. And so, you know, it's a horrible, horrible power curve that we have, right? And to tell you the truth, it stems from an attitude that I'm now calling white boy summer, right? Which is that, you know, just because we have a lot of money, we have a lot of equipment, we have a lot of air power, we have, you know, these intelligence professionals think that this is 1960 and you can be the ugly American. You can just come in and bulldoze a place and buy off politicians. If I constantly bring up the example of the camel souk, they all know each other in the camel souk. They know what a good camel is. They know what a bad camel is. They will sell us a camel and you come in the next day and there's 10 donkeys with the word camel written on it in Arabic.
Speaker 0: Right? Or worse, Persian. You've told me so much about these souks. You've got to take me there one day. I'm starting to love them now. I want to go to a freaking camel souk.
Speaker 1: No. What are you talking about? You've got to go down into the desert in the south, you know, and just look up the Abu Dhabi camel beauty contest. It's all there, baby. 10,000 camels. And they have, they put makeup on them and stuff, but they all know each other. They all, the Persian traders, the Omani traders, the Saudi traders, they know what they're dealing with within their own culture and market. And we constantly think we can walk into this market and just change things up. How did it, it worked for the CIA killing, you know, assassinating Mozadegh and MI6. and overthrowing in a coup in 1952. That's never going to happen again. One, the Iranians have a precedent. Two, they really believe and love their Shia Islam. And I hear these guys all the time. We're like, oh, no, they don't. They're all about money. No, they're about money, too. OK, but if it gets down to it, I've told you that joke before where my 250 Iraqi bodyguards carrying operations for the U.S. government in southern Iraq and they go, chief, I love you, chief. My son is named after you. But if Muqtada al-Sadr says cut your throat, I must. And I go, fair enough. I can do that. That's here you go. The camel beauty contest, baby. Not a joke, but it's a cult. That is just a metaphor for they know each other and we don't. And we'll go down there, you know, in a rented Toyota Prius or something. And these guys are all in Range Rovers and Dune Bashers. And they pay $16 million for a camel. And they still do camel races all over the UAE. But we don't recognize them as being superior in this game in their environment. And let me tell you, there are no Lawrence of Arabias. There are no T.E. Lawrences. I have met a T.E. Lawrence or two in my time at the National Security Agency. including an old guy that met T.E. Lawrence. Guy was in his 80s when I got there in early 1980, and he had, you know, gone to Oxford and had met Lawrence of Arabia. The point is, is that these kind of people who are specialized, cultural, intelligent, this administration hates them. They want the Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, the wheeler and dealer, the guy who's there to talk money, and they invariably get robbed.
Speaker 0: Do you think J.D. Vance did leak it to Turkey? There's no way he'd do it without Trump's approval. That would be wild. Do you think it's possible?
Speaker 1: I think what that story really is is that he made the cultural error of thinking he would get the biggest Muslim nation, you know, the biggest Muslim. I think Turkey is the biggest. No, is Nigeria bigger? Nigeria might be a little bigger. But Turkey is the biggest Muslim nation in the Near East, period. No question, right? Combined population of all the populations of the Arabian Peninsula. And he thought, oh, they're our NATO ally. We could enlist their help to come and do operations in Iran. This is a lack of cultural intelligence. If Senior Chief Nance had been lying around, I would have said, are you an idiot? Do you know the Turks hate them with a capital hate? They will come and kill them the minute the first US weapon ship comes across there. The Turks will work with Iran. to wipe out the Iranian Kurds.
Speaker 0: Remember how Trump said that he asked Erdogan not to join the war because Erdogan might have joined the war on Iran's side because he hates Israel. What's worse than Israel is the Kurds.
Speaker 1: Well, of course. And especially if he had heard an operation that the Kurds were being armed by the Israelis and by the Mossad in the United States flying into Erbil. And it's just ludicrous because, by the way, for those of you who have never been involved in operations like that, and I unfortunately have, because as I said, even though I work for the National Security Agency, I'm a black guy that speaks Arabic, right? I can go to places and do things other people couldn't, especially if you're a Mormon from Brigham Young University who got hired by the CIA, right? You don't work out too well in certain parts of this world. And I've seen equipment and weapons transfers And we don't ever go out like we're going to go to Bulgaria. We're going to buy a million, you know, AK-74 rifles. There's weapons all around the world that we have seized, captured. You know, I understood that the Israelis were talking or shipping up captured Hamas weapon systems. And they were being taken, cleaned, function checked, issued out with four magazines flown up there, you know, with brand new boxes of ammunition. And you don't have to. You know, the serial numbers can come from all over the world. There's weapons right now that we buy, you know, from Angola when the Angolan army replaces the AK-74 with the FAL or some other weapon system. And we, you know, there's dealers that buy this in bulk that will deliver that. Same thing with Afghanistan. Same thing with Iraq. Iraqi army, principal weapon is the M16A1, A2. Well, where'd all those AK-47s go? You know, it's, they went to, And then someday that equipment gets clean, function checked, ammunition issued with it. And then they drop off a truck, you know, and bomb Iran to do an ambush of IRGC soldiers like we saw just the other day.
Speaker 0: There's another story I want to get your thoughts on. I know you said you have 45. I'll keep you less because I know you're boiling down there. You need to get an AC down there, Malcolm. I have a 172-year-old house.
Speaker 1: Oh, shit. Okay.
Speaker 0: That squeaking sound, is that the chair or the fan?
Speaker 1: That? That's the chair.
Speaker 0: Humidity, brother, humidity. I can take it, you know.
Speaker 1: I'll be seeing you in Dubai soon enough, I'm sure.
Speaker 0: All right, so the second story that I was, when I read it, I'm like, I gotta ask Malcolm about this. I'm glad we're speaking today. Katz made a threat to Mustafa Khamenei yesterday. He said he's got a target on his head. And you got to tread carefully, something along those lines. I'll find you the exact quote in a second. And then I found, and then I saw another story that Iran is closing its airspace for the funeral on the weekend. So my big question to you, two questions. Number one is, do you think Mustafa will show up? And number two, if he does show up, is there a chance that Israel could freaking strike him without American authorization?
Speaker 1: We've gamed out this scenario at least three or four times on this show. Yeah.
Speaker 0: But now, considering the circumstances now where we're at...
Speaker 1: This is, you know, this is what they always say. This is how the Zionists do things. They're going to come here. If I were also the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, I'd have 100 fake Mustafa al-Khamenei motor pools, motorcades, right, running around to see, are the Israelis actually that bad? Are they willing to go back to full-scale war? We made this clear with the MOU. That was the end of hostilities between the United States and Iran. For as far as Israel, you know, Katz, making a statement that he better tread lightly. Well, that's the standing order. I think they will kill him at the first opportunity.
Speaker 0: No question. Jesus Christ. Even now, man, even now there's a deal in place that do it. Yeah, but it's not Israel's deal. It's Trump's deal. Yeah, but Daddy Trump signed a deal. The U.S., the big brother signed a deal. The big brother would not authorize it. The big brother stopped them from striking Beirut. And did a ceasefire in South Lebanon. They're abiding by 99% of the time.
Speaker 1: Listen, I can only listen to the words of Katz, Ben-Gavir, Netanyahu, and Smithridge. These guys are hardcore. And they have made it eminently clear, something I have taught all of you very early on this show. Netanyahu said it yesterday, the very words that I used. Israel looks out for number one. Israel looks out for number one. And if it is in their national interest to assassinate Mujtaba al-Khamenei and start a war again, then it's in their interest. It's not in the United States' interest, not in the Gulf States' interest. But I think could we have an Israel-Iran war of the cities again? Yes. Now, of course, I'm a little less, I'm not from that culture. I'm not a Persian. But I understand, you know, the internal and external politics. I would let Israel hit whoever they think they're hitting. I do like Putin, right? I have a couple of body doubles out there and, you know, let them think that they've got a bead on them to see what they're going to do. But if I were Iran, I wouldn't retaliate. I wouldn't retaliate at all. I would just close the Strait of Hormuz and say, I'm now going to punish the rest of the world for Israel's sins, which is most likely the strategy that they will do, except for Iranian warships, right? Except for Iranian oil tankers. And the Iranians, by the way, have moved 50 million barrels of oil since the MOU is starting to earn $3 billion, right? They're getting that money whether you want it or not. And we need that money to actually flow. We need that oil to flow. And it's all going to China, but we need it to flow. But I think the Israelis are now in their hardcore, we will do what we want to do mode, United States be damned.
Speaker 0: Yeah, Bibi would want political points as well. He needs them. But how do you think Iran would retaliate? I know you said close to shadow homos, but I thought they'd do a lot more than that if Mustafa was killed. I think that's more than they did when Ali Khamenei was killed. It just seems like, like, fuck, like, come on.
Speaker 1: The problem is that we know, I mean, maybe if you can use a whole bunch of short range or intermediate range ballistic missiles that you know you have to use now, right? A hundred. Just to make a demonstration of force because they're not getting through. And the ones that are getting through are really minor. minor hits. Israel lost 27 people during this war, and many of them were to rockets as well as ballistic missiles, and accidents and heart attacks from ballistic missile warning. What you do when you attack in waves like that is you're actually trying to unsettle the nerves of the population. I remember being in Israel, I was in Haifa when we had the first ballistic missile warning, and, you know, thinking, oh, that's not good. But imagine that every day, like Ukrainians, you know, every day, all day, where, you know, the Yemenis start going into it. And then Hezbollah fires off three or four thousand rockets, you know, punishment day, whatever you want. But if I were Iran, I would really I would I would destroy, you know, a U.S. air base in Jordan. Just level it. Just don't everybody thinks the ballistic missiles are going to Israel. And then suddenly, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom. You know, 1015 F-35s, U.S. airborne forces that are stationed lose 1015 soldiers. And you say from this point onward, everything Israel does, the United States is going to be punished for. Now you have you've made got Trump above a barrel anyway with oil. And now you've got to get Trump to beg Bibi Netanyahu to stop what he's doing. And geopolitically, it would be wiser. But, you know, they're all from the same camel soup, okay? I got to tell you something about Israelis. A good chunk of the Israeli population are Sephardic Jews, okay? These people are from Muslim nations. So if you wonder why they're so successful in some of their operations, I met a woman when I was at Hostage Square, and she was 75 years old, but she was born in Tehran. Raised in Tehran. I met another woman who was born in Baghdad in a village outside of Fallujah. You know, a lot of people don't know Fallujah in Iraq was the center of Jewish learning at the time of Jesus Christ. So there is that diaspora, which the Muslim world arguably did ethnically cleanse in 67 and 73. They have deep cultural intelligence there. that the United States doesn't. They have people who are insanely fluent in Farsi and Dari and people who are, you know, Ofer Hazza, the famous singer, was a Yemeni Jew. You know, I mean, the Yemeni Jews are everywhere. Israel is a dark country. They are not white people like most people think a bunch of Ashkenazi Jews from Europe. They're not. But that gives them the insight to go places and do things the United States can't do. And if the U.S. were to be cut off from that level of intelligence where, you know, Israel did that mission where they flew into Iran, found the warehouse with the archives of the nuclear materials, practiced for two years on a warehouse in Africa, and then flew into Iran, cut open all their safes and took out all their nuclear material, all their nuclear research material. We can't do that because we like bombs, guns, and helicopter rides. They just go in there clandestinely, do the mission.
Speaker 0: So what did the Israelis do?
Speaker 1: Yeah, this was in 2018. Oh, it was great intelligence operation. The Israelis figured out where the archival material for the nuclear research material is being kept in a research center in Tehran. And so what they did was to carry out this raid using their paramilitary officers, their all Iranians and Arabic, you know, Persian speaking paramilitaries. First, they did a huge massive infiltration into Iran and set up loads of safe houses, loads of logistics. You know, they're very good at that. And then they had the special team go to a warehouse in Africa where they built up under this giant warehouse, a full-scale mock-up of the actual building. And then they carried out a raid, which was including going in and using acetylene, not acetylene torches, but high power torches that wouldn't destroy the materials. Cracking these saves using you know, though great explosives and they practice on how to get into all these Iranian nuclear research materials safes and then when they felt confident they flew to Iran or they infiltrated them into Iran, you know through wherever and Hit that facility in one night got everything all their dis all their materials now This is funny about Iran. I have a book here That's around here somewhere called The Unwanted Spy. And it's about a CIA officer named Jeffrey Sterling, black guy, rare. And Jeffrey Sterling worked the Iran desk and worked the Iran mission as a clandestine service officer. And one of the plans that he thought was absolutely stupid was that they were going to give Iran actual plans to create the detonator for atomic bombs, only with a flaw. And that flaw would set their program back years. The problem is, if you give it to them, they're smart enough to figure out the flaw, right? And he was like, whoa, this is a stupid idea. But instead of bringing up the chain of command the proper way, he leaked it to a New York Times journalist, went to prison for three years. Thing is, we do that a lot. We infiltrate materials. We put in materials that are corrupted, corroded. So whatever was left in those safes, have been what the israelis wanted them to see or left that one or two safe where they thought oh this is our hardest material where they actually cracked it got into it put in swapped out the material put it back in but look the reason that the israelis are so good at this is not because they have iranians on their payrolls because their officers in the musad who actually do this are they have sold camels, bought camels, rent camels. They know what they . Their uncle, you know, Osama bin Laden, when Al-Qaeda was starting out, their number one resource, their number one resource of earning money was creating honey, honey farms in Yemen. You know, I don't know if you've been, have you? Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's how Al-Qaeda got funded, not only his own money. But if you haven't, do they still have Global Village out in Dubai? Yes. Go to Global Village, go to the Yemeni stand, and all you will see is honey. And when you see the prices of honey from Yemen, some of which they believe the darkest, blackest, black like this cup, is like an aphrodisiac. You're talking paying $500 a right, Yemeni aphrodisiac honey. Bin Laden understood that honey amongst the Muslim world was the blue pill, and he started honey farms in Yemen. He was insanely successful with that. Now, of course, the Israelis had a lot of former, you know, Yemeni Jews there, and they tracked down these honey farms and managed to interdict a lot of his money for the CIA. Because the Americans couldn't think, oh, honey is how you make up your money, right? We were looking at the Al-Shifa chemical weapons factory in Khartoum. We're like, yeah, we can put cruise missiles in there. How do you put cruise missiles into a freaking honey farm, right? Best thing you can do is go in there and introduce wasps and steal all the honey. That would have destroyed bin Laden. But because we don't have the cultural intelligence, we have to use a Tomahawk cruise missile. Whereas the Israelis would have stolen the honey introduced Africanized bees into his nest, wasps everywhere. He would have to be begging people to get new bees. This is the difference between their intelligence community and our intelligence community.
Speaker 0: I like that example, man. I don't know how you make up that stuff. It's real. I don't know how you make up that. Mossad will get new bees to kill the bees that make the honey, and then Osama bin Laden will have no more honey.
Speaker 1: You've got to work the local game. You can't work long. You can't be sitting there going, we're going to wait until he gets back.
Speaker 0: Imagine a Mossad meeting. We're going to hijack his honey. Let's train those bees to eat those Osama bin Laden bees to destroy his revenue. That's how we kill al-Qaeda.
Speaker 1: Not even a joke. That's how it's really done by real pros who understand the game. Go meet a Saudi sometime and ask him about honey.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇱🇺🇸 Netanyahu: "I want to stop American aid. It's like welfare; I don't want it. Our economy is no longer a small economy. We can finance ourselves." He says that he wants the process to start this year Writer: Oliver https://t.co/W4bKPlVrrD
Video Transcript AI Summary
Speaker 0 אמר שהוא רוצה “לעצור את הסיוע האמריקאי”, ושואף לעשות זאת באמצעות שיפוע של 10 שנים. הוא הדגיש שהוא מעריך את התמיכה שקיבלו, כולל כספית, אך ציין שהוא עצמו הפסיק משהו שאחרים “לא זוכרים”.
בהמשך, כשנבחר לראשונה ב-1996, הגיע לקונגרס ונאם שם מספר פעמים. בפעם הראשונה הוא ציין שבאותה תקופה ישראל קיבלה סיוע של 17 אלף דולר, וכיום מדובר ב-67 אלף דולר—וזאת בעקבות מדיניות כלכלית. הוא קישר את העלייה לשנה של בנט וציין שבאותה תקופה דיבר על שינוי של “כלכלה חופשית” כדרך להביא לכך שישראל תוכל לוותר על סיוע כלכלי של 1.2 מיליארד דולר, שלדבריו היה סכום גדול אז.
הוא אמר שאנשים הופתעו ו”פערו את הפה” כששמעו שהוא “מוותר על הסיוע”, אך הבהיר שהוא אינו מוותר עליו אלא מגדיל את תפוקת המדינה כך שלא יהיה צורך בו. הוא הוסיף שככל שהכלכלה תתקרב לטריליון דולר, ישראל תהיה כבר “כלכלה בגודל בינוני”, ולכן תוכל לממן בעצמה את שברי האחוז מהתגמול שהיא מקבלת מארה״ב.
Speaker 1 שאל מתי יתחיל התהליך, ו-Speaker 0 השיב: “אני רוצה שזה יתחיל השנה.”
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: ולהיות חלק מהעולם החדש. אתה רוצה להפסיק את הסיוע האמריקאי? כן. מתי זה יתפסק? שמה, אני רוצה לעשות שיפוע של עשר שנים. אני מאוד מעריך את התמיכה שקיבלנו, אני בטוח שכולכם מעריכים את זה. גם הכספי אבל, לא רק... הכספי, קודם כל, הפסקתי, אתם פשוט לא זוכרים את זה.
Speaker 1: כשנבחרתי לראשונה לפני 400 שנה... יפה, יפה. אבל מי סופר? גיא.
Speaker 0: אני יודע שאתה לא סופר, כי אתה נהנה, וזה בסדר.
Speaker 1: מתי התחיל התהליך?
Speaker 0: כשנבחרתי לראשונה, ב-1996, באתי לקונגרס, וזמנתי שם לדבר כמה פעמים. והפעם הראשונה, אני אמרתי... ישראל היה לה אז תלג לנפש של 17 אלף דולר. היום אנחנו 67 אלף דולר. רק כדי להבין. בגלל המדיניות הכלכלית. בגלל שנה של בנט. 100 אחוז. אמרתי, ביכות עבור. אמרתי שאנחנו הולכים לעשות מהפכה של כלכלה חופשית, וכתוצאה מזה אנחנו נוכל לוותר על הסיוע הכלכלי שעמד על זה, על 1.2 מיליארד דולר. זה היה הרבה כסף אז. וכולם פערו את הפה ואמרו, תראו את ראש הממשלה הזה, כדי לקבל כותרת, הוא מוותר על הסיוע. אני אמרתי, אני לא מוותר על הסיוע. אני מגדיל את התפוקה של מדינת ישראל, כי אנחנו לא צריכים את זה, זה כמו ווילפר, לא רוצה את זה. עכשיו אני אומר, אנחנו גם יכולים, כיוון שהכלכלה שלנו עוד מעט תגיע לטריליון דולר, זה כבר לא כלכלה קטנה, לא ענקית, אבל כבר כלכלה בגודל בינוני, אנחנו יכולים לממן בעצמנו, את השברי האחוז הזה מהאתלג שלנו שאנחנו מקבלים מארה״ב.
Speaker 1: אז מתי זה יתחיל התהליך הזה?
Speaker 0: אני רוצה שזה יתחיל השנה.
reSee.it AI Summary
I thought this interview would be about foreign policy, but Naftali Bennett said Netanyahu no longer runs Israel. He argued Netanyahu can’t control his government as Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and ultra-Orthodox parties pull in different directions. Bennett admitted Israel’s image crisis is their own fault, saying Israel needs an end to constant wars and leaders able to rebuild regional relations.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Former Israeli PM Naftali Bennett dropped a bombshell: Netanyahu NO LONGER runs Israel. That was the moment this interview stopped being about foreign policy and became about power. He didn't just criticize Netanyahu; he said something far more damaging: Bibi can no longer control his own government. Ben-Gvir pulls him one way, Smotrich another, and the ultra-Orthodox parties in yet another direction. And because Netanyahu depends on all of them to stay in power, Bennett argues he has lost the ability to say no. When I asked him why Israel's reputation has collapsed across so much of the world, I expected him to blame biased media, anti-Israel activism, antisemitism, or foreign propaganda. Instead, he looked me straight in the eye and admitted Israel's image is in crisis, and it's their own fault. That's an extraordinary admission from a former Israeli Prime Minister. What makes it interesting isn't that he's suddenly become a dove; he hasn't. He still wants Hamas destroyed, Hezbollah disarmed, he's against Palestinian statehood, and still sees Iran as the central strategic threat. But he says something has to change: Israel needs a government that knows how to end the constant wars. A government that can rebuild relations with Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, and the wider region, instead of allowing every conversation about Israel to be dominated by coalition ministers who talk about annexation and permanent conflict. In his view, Israel's biggest problem is no longer simply the enemies beyond its borders; it's a government that has become captive to the most extreme voices inside it.
Video Transcript AI Summary
Bennett says that if he became prime minister by the end of the year, Israeli foreign policy would “profoundly” change. In his first three weeks, he would fly to meet Egypt’s President Sisi, Jordan’s King Abdallah, and UAE leader Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, launching a “regional renaissance,” and he would also pursue an “Israeli renaissance” after what he describes as four difficult years involving internal instability, the October 7 massacre, and a prolonged war.
On Iran, Bennett says the contemplated arrangement addresses only the nuclear component and not ballistic missiles or the regional terror/proxy component. He describes a long-term “cold war” dynamic between Israel and Iran, asserting that the regime will collapse from internal contradictions involving corruption, incompetence, radicalism, and disconnection, and he frames Iran as the “head of the octopus” that supports conflict across the region. His strategy is to weaken and accelerate the regime’s demise through “soft elements” with the United States and others, while also seeking to delay progress toward a nuclear weapon. He summarizes his end goal as toppling Iran’s regime before it acquires nuclear capability. He also gives an example from his earlier prime ministership: when protests occur, Iran cracks down violently and turns off the internet, so he proposes ensuring internet continuity in advance so the regime cannot execute its usual response to protests, comparing the approach to Reagan’s actions toward the Soviet Union. He also says no moderate Arab country is happy about Iran and that he would build regional alliances.
Bennett responds to hypothetical diplomacy with Iran’s leadership by saying it is so theoretical that if Iran were willing to embrace peace and dismantle its terror proxy network, nuclear program, and ballistic missile program, it would no longer be “the Islamic Republic of Iran.” He says if such changes happen, then “come and ask me.”
The discussion turns to Lebanon. Bennett says he has long called for Hezbollah’s disarmament. He describes the Lebanon issue as extremely complicated, citing concerns that Israel’s intentions could be broader than eradicating Hezbollah and pointing to the Iran-related arrangement that does not mention ballistic missiles or proxy networks. In his view, Hezbollah likely remains and Israel will always see it as a threat.
For Lebanon, he says he would launch a “massive, warm and positive diplomacy” campaign focused on business to build bridges with Egypt, Jordan, the Saudis, and the UAE, which he says Israel is not doing enough. He would keep the buffer zone in place “until, Hezbollah is dismantled,” using kinetic, diplomacy, and economic tools to strengthen and legitimize a moderate Lebanese government. He frames Hezbollah as an arm of Iran that receives roughly a billion dollars a year for military purposes and says Israel has uncovered Hezbollah’s underground infrastructure in southern Lebanon. He argues he does not want Israeli territorial desires in Lebanon and that Israel’s security “insurance” would be removed only when he is confident Hezbollah is gone.
On Turkey and Syria, Bennett says Turkey is “complicated” because he believes in Turkey while describing Erdogan as a disaster with radical Islamist ideology and hostility toward Israel. He says he would navigate through that and work where possible with goodwill. For Syria’s Al-Sharaa, he says he would be extremely cautious, calls him a murderer and terrorist based on past actions and what he describes as atrocities against Druze, Alawites, and Kurds, and says time and behavior are required before any chance. He does not want a greater Israel and says Israel is “great as it is,” aiming to ensure people in the Golan Heights can sleep safely.
He addresses timing for withdrawal from Syrian-controlled territory by saying he would consider it when he can look at families living in the Golan Heights and feel confident they will be secure and not be slaughtered, and he says it is not on a stopwatch. He highlights concerns about other actors increasing involvement in Syria, naming Turkey and Qatar as negative contributors that support Hamas.
Bennett contrasts what he describes as Netanyahu-era war conduct with his proposed approach: he says he would set clear end-game visions and sequences rather than prolonged conflict. For Gaza, his end game is a demilitarized Gaza by Hamas where Gazans govern themselves under overriding Israeli security control, aiming for dignity, freedom, and prosperity without Israeli settlements. For Lebanon, his end game is Israel not being in Lebanon, with any short-term presence framed as self-defense, and building a “beautiful Lebanon” on the condition that Hezbollah governance is removed. He says the current government does not clearly state an end game.
He also addresses claims that Israel’s international position is deteriorating, saying Israel’s image in the United States and abroad is terrible despite not reflecting reality. He attributes part of this to a global tendency to see attackers as victims and vice versa, to campus attacks after October 7, to dragging wars on for too long, and to a lack of public diplomacy.
On the Palestinian issue, Bennett rejects that it is the “center” of the Middle East’s problems, arguing instead that radical Islam is the core driver. He says Palestinian statehood attempts failed: Oslo is described as blowing up with thousands of Israeli deaths during the Second Intifada, and the 2005 disengagement from Gaza is described as enabling a terror state. He asserts that during Gaza’s early post-withdrawal period, there was no siege or blockade and that Gaza was Palestinian before any Israeli presence beyond the 1949 lines. He says the solution principles are security for Israelis and maximum freedom, dignity, and prosperity for Palestinians, while insisting Israel should not govern Palestinians or apply Israeli sovereignty to the PA. He describes a gradual approach by improving Palestinian lives through limited actions that do not risk Israeli security, citing an example from his premiership: removing a cap on trade between the PA and Jordan, which he says increased trade and improved lives without security risk.
In closing, Bennett reiterates his emphasis on security and gradual improvements. He says Israelis should respect that a Palestinian state was tried twice and “blew up” and killed Israelis, and urges viewers to consider why Israelis oppose a Palestinian state now due to reality. He concludes that he expects “a very good period” for Israel and the region over the next 25 years.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: My first question is broad, is how will the region, how will Israeli foreign policy look different if you were prime minister or if you are prime minister by the end of the year?
Speaker 0: It'll look profoundly different. What I would do during the first three weeks, I would fly out to meet President Sisi of Egypt, King Abdallah, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, and launch a regional renaissance. I would also, I plan to launch an Israeli renaissance. We've had a very difficult four years now. It started with internal almost civil war in Israel, continued with the October 7th massacre, which is the worst since Israel was founded and it traumatized us, and then continued with the 1,000-day war, which is just dragged on and on. And obviously, we paid a price, the whole region paid a price. And it's time to take a deep breath and rebuild Israel internally, in some places, fundamentally rebuild Israel. I mean, we're 80 years almost into our country. There's things that we have to do, for example, apply a constitution and change some fundamental elements. But I would also go out on a initiative to create a good atmosphere, good relationships with the moderate Sunni countries in the Middle East, and we could do amazing things. I think it'll be beautiful years for Israel and for our neighbors.
Speaker 1: How do we solve the Iran and Lebanon issues? The Lebanon issue is probably the most complicated it's ever been. I'll tell you why. I've been calling for the disarmament of Hezbollah for a long time. I started becoming a lot more skeptical when Katz said 20% of Lebanese citizens cannot return home to build a security zone even after the war ends and villages were being leveled. Then I started getting very worried that maybe the intentions, the Israeli intentions in Lebanon is more than just eradicating Hezbollah. Either way, the Iran war ended In the MOU, there's no mention of the ballistic missile program or the proxy network. So I look at the reality right now, and I'll get your thoughts. The reality is Iran won't give up on Hezbollah. Hezbollah will probably still be there. And Israel will always see Hezbollah as a threat, and rightly so. What is the solution? It just seems more complicated than ever now.
Speaker 0: Well, let's unpack that. Let's start with Iran. First of all, you're right. What you said about Iran is accurate. The current deal that's being contemplated includes only the nuclear component and not the ballistic missile or regional terror component. So I'll tell you my view of this regime and then my strategy. I think this regime is similar in a way to the Soviet Union. of the 80s. And if you will, there's a cold war, sometimes a hot war between Israel and Iran. And Israel is sort of the America of the Middle East, and Iran is the Soviet Union in the sense that we're a vibrant democracy with decent people. Iran, by the way, has a remarkable nation. The people of Iran are great people. And in fact, the Jews owe the Persians historic debt. But the regime itself, the leadership is a disaster. It'll implode. It'll implode because, not because of Israel or America, but because of deep ingrained corruption, incompetence, radicalism, disconnection, and the fact that people want freedom. So the internal contradictions ultimately will topple Iran, the regime. The question is when. And continuing that analogy, I don't know if the year is 1986 and we're three years away, or the year is 1956 and we're 30 years away. But what I do know is that what our strategy needs to be. What we need to do ultimately Because Iran is really the epicenter of all the, not all, but most of the problems, it's the, so I call it the octopus doctrine. It's the head of the octopus, and it sends its arms to Lebanon, to Gaza, to Yemen, to Iraq, to Syria, et cetera. If that regime collapses, the Middle East becomes a better place. So here's what I would do. And what I started doing as prime minister, but it was discontinued. I would work with America and others on many soft elements, not necessarily kinetic, to weaken and accelerate the demise of this regime and postpone, do everything we can to delay their progress towards a nuclear weapon. And to sum up the strategy, topple Iran before it acquires the nuclear weapon, topple the Iranian regime. And as I said, it's going to happen. I don't know when. Let me give you one example. One of the things I had worked on as prime minister, many things, economics, cyber, overt, covert, gazillion different activities to weaken the regime. But one of them was to ensure the next time there's a wave of protest. And what does the regime do every time there's protest?
Speaker 1: Cracks down violently.
Speaker 0: And what else does it do? Turns off the internet.
Speaker 1: Shut down the internet, Starlink. That's the idea you had.
Speaker 0: What if we, in advance, ensured internet continuity, but they didn't do it. And then when the protests came, they hadn't prepared anything. So I would do this. It's not unlike what President Reagan did in the 80s to the Soviet Union. I actually studied what he did and I applied here. Regarding, so that's my strategy and build regional alliances. Look, no moderate Arab country is happy about Iran.
Speaker 1: Regarding Lebanon, we- Before Lebanon, sorry, Mr. Bennett, can I ask you a question on Iran? If by some miracle, the new Supreme Leader doesn't look like it, but just in theory, if he comes in and ends up being very different to his father and he covertly opens up or at least proposes opening up diplomatic negotiations with the state of Israel. Would you be open to explore a diplomatic solution to the Iran problem?
Speaker 0: Well, that's so theoretical. What you're saying, essentially, if they are willing to embrace peace, willing to dismantle their terror proxy network, dismantle their nuclear program and their ballistic missile program, then they're not the Islamic Republic of Iran anymore.
Speaker 1: So generally, I'd rephrase it. Keep their missile program, keep their proxies, dismantle the nuclear program. Let's say that's achieved with President Trump, but they want to change their stance on Israel. I know that's very far fetched, but you never know. Things change very quickly. If that happens, would you be open to diplomatic solutions?
Speaker 0: I would say when they do that, come and ask me. It's so theoretical. You know, if a rabbit flies, then it's no longer a rabbit.
Speaker 1: Okay. And I know it's a difficult question to answer just two, three months before the elections. But the reason I ask it is there's that perception around the world. We're going to get into Lebanon. There's a perception around the world that it's Israel that's always seeking violence. And I know there's, I speak to a lot of people in Israel. Some people do always seek the violent options whenever dealing with any problem. But there's others that do that are more open to explore diplomatic solutions. And one thing that people are critical about with Prime Minister Netanyahu is that he has a personal benefit from war. So while you may be more hawkish, Prime Minister Netanyahu benefits on a personal level by delaying his legal case with forever wars. So this is a problem that I hope changes if we have a new prime minister. And that's why I asked that question.
Speaker 0: So look, obviously I'm not inside his mind and I'm not going to talk about what his motives are because I don't know what they are. What I will say is that I understand that view. It's a very incorrect view. We have to remember how this started. It started on October 7th, out of nowhere, out of the blue. We were all asleep at 630 in the morning and suddenly sirens pierced the entire state of Israel, and thousands of Hamas terrorists came in, burnt families, burnt babies, raped women, murdered citizens in their beds and rampaged. And by the way, Israel failed huge. This was also an Israeli failure. And what's interesting, it happened from Gaza, the very place that we had handed over to the Palestinians in 2005. In 2005, for the benefit of your followers, Israel pulled out of Gaza, went back to the 1949 lines, took out all the Israelis living there, pulled out all the soldiers and handed it over to the so-called moderate PA. This was in 2005. So we did everything by the book. And what we got was 20 years of rockets and then a day of horror that traumatized us. And we can't take risks anymore. So what are we doing right now? We seek to dismantle Hezbollah, to dismantle Hamas. We don't have any territorial desires in Lebanon or in Gaza. I don't want to govern them. I don't want to run their lives, but we have to defend ourselves. And as long as they are not dismantled, as long as Hamas is there and Hezbollah is there, we have to physically fend them off and prevent them from even coming close to the border. Otherwise, I can't tell Israeli moms that live in the north or on the Gaza border to go back home because I can't ensure their security. And remember, there's a huge lack of trust after what happened.
Speaker 1: Okay, then you've got another country on your border, and that's Syria. Al-Sharra, you have every reason not to trust him, considering his history. But he's a president that the US, who Trump likes, Europe is recognized. And he's a president that seemingly is trying to bring the country together, a very fractured country. And by all indications, just once, peace with all neighboring countries, including Israel. I know it's not public and it has to be tread very carefully, but there doesn't seem to be any indications of aggressions by the Syrian president against Israel. So what is your solution to Syria? Would you be open to pulling out? Because when you talk about maintaining a buffer zone, a lot of people in Syria, a lot of people in Lebanon are always thinking in the back of the head of the greater Israel project. While you say this is not an ambition of yours, there's many voices and the current administration voices in Israel that do talk about annexing Lebanese territory, that do talk about annexing Syrian territory?
Speaker 0: No, there's very few. There are those voices. I don't disagree, but they are the fringes. There are only few Israelis who are talking about annexing parts of Lebanon into Israel or Syria. We don't need a greater Israel. Israel is great as it is. And all we need is to ensure that we can go to sleep at night and our babies won't be burnt. Now, regarding Ashara, I would be extremely cautious. I would not give him any benefit of doubt because this guy is a murderer. He's a terrorist. He murdered many, many people. Now, moreover, after taking, this was in the past, but some will say, okay, he's changed. Problem is that over the past year and a half, he himself, his fighters butchered Druze citizens in Syria, innocent Druze citizens. They butchered Alawites. They butchered Kurds. So that's not what a peaceful person does. So my stance is, I never say never about anything, but fundamentally my running assumption is that he's a terrorist wearing suits, and it's his burden to prove otherwise. And time will tell. Now, if he turns out to be, you know, just a new Sadat who seeks peace, we'll talk then, but we're not there yet.
Speaker 1: What do you need to see to give him a chance?
Speaker 0: Time. Time and behavior.
Speaker 1: And you can... So how much time, I know I'm pressing you on this, but for the Syrians, would you give them a rough timeline? How many years, if you're prime minister, before it's like, hey, we are open to pulling out of the Syrian territory that is currently under our control. Because again, the concern is that you remain in that territory for long enough that it automatically starts being considered Israeli territory. I know you said you don't have those ambitions, but how much time? What indications are you waiting for before that territory is back to being Syrian territory?
Speaker 0: When I can look at the families that live in the Golan Heights, that some of them live 200 meters from the border, and I feel confident that I can provide them security and his people, his fighters won't one day come in and slaughter them, I will, you know, consider the pulling out. Until then, I won't. And I'm not on a stopwatch. It's more complex than that. We have to see what develops in Syria. For example, right now, Turkey and Qatar are increasing their involvement in Syria. Right now, these are two very negative countries that do disseminate and support terror. Turkey is a supporter of Hamas. Qatar is a supporter of Hamas. And so we have to be very cautious about this. As I said, Israel's good. We don't need any more land. It's a tiny piece of land as it is, by the way. All of Israel is the size of New Jersey, but it's good enough. We don't need more land from Syria or Lebanon, but we need security. And I'll tell you what my specific fear is. My concern is that he does something that is not uncommon for terrorists. He, right now, his military is very weak. And he'll say, you know, I need to buy time. So I'll pretend to be really nice and peaceful.
Speaker 1: Excuse me.
Speaker 0: And then he'll rearm himself, rebuild. gain strength and fight another day because, you know, the ideology that he harbored and that he manifested in action, including recently, is very bad. You know, if it was only his past activities, that would be one thing. But they massively murdered innocent people in Syria. So that is not something that increases my confidence in this guy.
Speaker 1: Yeah, in terms of the clashes in Syria, there are some that blame him. There's others that say it was factions within the Syrian military and within all these different militias that were clashing and he stopped those attacks. Impossible to verify which story is true. I just believe that eventually for the cycle of violence to stop, someone needs to make a move. Diplomacy needs to be given a chance. I understand why a lot of people, not just people in Israel, don't trust al-Shara. Maybe over time that changes. But a more complex one is, and I'm asking all these questions to see the broader question is what will change if you're prime minister versus Netanyahu when it comes to foreign policy, because that's what the world is paying attention to. But let's probably talk about what I consider the most complex one and that's Lebanon. We've got the MOU between the US and Iran. Trump made his position pretty clear. He's done with Iran. The agreement with Iran does not address ballistic missile program, does not address the proxy network. in a way gives Iran control of the Strait of Homs. Not sure whether they're going to eventually charge a fee, but we know they can close it at any time. That's the new reality. And Hezbollah is probably gonna be more emboldened. By the way, I hope you recover soon. Now I know why you're drinking tea, you're sick. So I appreciate you doing the interview despite being sick. So what would we do? What would you do when it comes to the Lebanon issue? Because you've got a Lebanese government that is trying to disarm Hezbollah, mission impossible. but also is really worried about what happens to the territory that defense minister Katz is saying no one can return to, we're not willing to give it away and villages are being leveled.
Speaker 0: So I want to address your earlier statement and then answer this just very briefly. What would I do differently? I would go out on a massive, warm and positive diplomacy campaign, mainly focused on business, on building bridges of business, between us and our neighbors, we can do amazing things with Egypt, with Jordan, with the Saudis, with UAE that we're not doing. My previous career, I was a CEO and a high-tech entrepreneur. That's where I grew up, if you will. And I'm a huge believer in business, business, business. In that sense, I'm similar to President Trump. In Israel, it's very rare that a prime minister, in fact, I'm the only prime minister that came from Israel, running a business um and and i would just send very warm and positive vibes i would not entertain in my government uh any idiots that uh talk about uh you know just really stupid statements that people like ben veer and smotrich say i i i would i wouldn't allow ben veer into my government to begin with but if someone said something like that i would call them to order Netanyahu can no longer do that because he depends on them.
Speaker 1: Would you include Turkey as well in your business journey or business strategy?
Speaker 0: So it's a great question. Turkey is complicated because I'm a big believer in Turkey, but I think Erdogan is a disaster. I think he harbors radical Islamistic ideology and he hates Israel and he essentially wants to wipe Israel off the earth. the state of Israel, he just, I think yesterday or a couple of days ago, he said some horrendous things. So it's a problem, but I would navigate through that. I would work where we can. I would be open to anyone with goodwill or even reasonable will. And that's what I did. In my case, I was prime minister. So go look at how I operated when I was prime minister. I sent out very good vibes and initiatives. I think I may have broken a world record together with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed of UAE in signing a free trade agreement. It was a very short time. Usually it takes five, six, seven years. It took weeks. And that's business. That's what I would do fundamentally different as to Lebanon. So here's what we've got in Lebanon. We have a government that seems to want the right things. The government seems to... to want to rebuild Lebanon for the benefit of its people. Problem is that it's not strong enough to dismantle Hezbollah. Then we've got Hezbollah, which is essentially an arm of Iran in Lebanon that wants to build its strength and wants to destroy us, Israel. It gets roughly a billion dollars a year from Iran for military purposes. And now, you know, we're in Lebanon. We're uncovering what they built. It's unbelievable. We're shocked. They built a whole underground country in southern Lebanon, all designed to shoot rockets at my family. So that's a problem that we're facing. What would I do? I would definitely remain in the buffer zone until, Hezbollah is dismantled. However, I would use a bunch of tools, not only the kinetic tool of war, but diplomacy, economy, and other elements to try and empower a moderate government in Lebanon and allow it to gain legitimacy because Lebanon, can be a jewel. I spent many years fighting in Lebanon in the 90s. It's a beautiful country with beautiful people. It's really, really a tragedy. It should be the Monaco of the Middle East, and actually much more beautiful than Monaco, if you think about it. It's a beautiful country, and this shouldn't be the case, but we have to be very rational about this. So that's what I would do. I would remain there. And then I have my security insurance, and I would only remove that insurance when I am confident that Hezbollah is gone. And I would work to help the Lebanese government in many ways to gain public support and also grow stronger in order for them to be able to dismantle Hezbollah.
Speaker 1: There were reports a few weeks ago now, I think about two weeks ago, that President Trump and his administration opened lines of communication with opposition leaders of Prime Minister Netanyahu. That was, I think, the source was Channel 12. Is that true? And do you have lines of communication with the Trump administration?
Speaker 0: I never comment about any communications I have with anyone. I'll say generally that obviously, as someone who intends to be the next prime minister of Israel, I build channels with all relevant global leaders because what I've done this time, I built a Marshall Plan for Israel. We call it the New Deal. And it has many elements, economy, education, the Haredi Mishu, and one of them, is diplomacy and security, because this time I want to hit the ground running. We have no time. We have to first 100 days fix a lot and bring this new wave, this new renaissance to the entire region. So the short answer is I'm in touch with many people and preparing to take charge of Israel, the new version.
Speaker 1: How much truth is there? So actually, what's your reaction to what JD Vance and Trump have been saying? So JD Vance warned Israel and critics of the MOU and of the US, Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time. Then he says, if I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world. I know in an interview a few days ago, you're talking about how worried you are. You said, for the first time since the establishment of Israel, the brand Israel is a net negative in the United States. That's a disaster. It's a disaster. That was you at an event a few days ago. What happened? Why? And there's other statements here by Vance and Trump in the last couple of weeks. What do you think changed?
Speaker 0: First of all, the... diagnosis is accurate. Israel's international position is not good. It's, in fact, the image that people have of Israel is terrible. It doesn't reflect reality, but that is the image, and so we have to realize that. I think it's a result of many things. One of them is beyond our control and it's the whole ultra progressive view of the attacker and the attack, the victim and the victimizer. And we are considered the repressor to begin with. And on October 8th of 23, before we did anything, We were being massively attacked on campuses. Clearly, something was prepared. This was an ambush, and we were hit hard. So regardless of the ground war, in the public image war, we are in a very bad position. Secondly, the war has been dragged on and on way too long. I'm not a believer in long- The war in Gaza, correct? the war in Gaza and the whole war. Lebanon, Gaza, Iran, it just goes on and on. It's not Israel's doctrine. Israel's doctrine was A, to hopefully not be in war, but we didn't choose this. It clearly is a war of defense. And then B, if we have to pursue war, do it quickly, intensively, win, and move on to stabilize the region. But when you drag it on for such a long time, it exhausts our economy, exhausts our reservists. Israel has a people's army, and also it hurts our international standing. And three, we had zero public diplomacy. What we had instead was ministers that were causing us and still are causing us ongoing self-inflected wounds. And so I would change all of this. And I would try and wrap up the whole war, stabilize it, and tell a new story, a story of Israel 2.0, of the region 2.0. And as I said, the regional renaissance. And I think, you know, especially me coming from the high-tech environment, startup environment, we have a much broader
Speaker 1: story to tell than just conflict but right now if you ask someone about israel all they'll talk about is is the war but you talk about shorter wars but then you talk about the same objectives as netanyahu getting rid of hezbollah but hezbollah is not going to disarm getting rid of hamas hamas i think there's a report today or yesterday or two days ago that they don't want to disarm um and they still exist they still control a big part of gaza You talk about weakening Iran. Now, you've given alternatives to kinetic action with Iran, but what if they don't work? What if they come out stronger from this? A lot of Gulf countries, including the UAE and allied to Israel, have visited Iran, have improved relations with Iran. So you have the Gulf realigning their relationship with Iran. You've got the US, which may pull out of the region. You've got Lebanon, where Hezbollah is going to stay, and Iran will continue supporting them. And Hamas is still armed. So how would quick wars... work? How would it be different? You talk about Syria, maintaining the territory there, you talk about maintaining the territory in Lebanon, which I worry could fuel that cycle of violence that has existed for years, if not decades. So how do you achieve quick wars?
Speaker 0: So you're saying it's a simple situation, right?
Speaker 1: So it's, it's a difficult, I just, I want to hear an alternative other than war, to be honest, I'm not saying this is the right alternative. But I think the world needs that for sentiment to change.
Speaker 0: So here's the fundamental difference. I will set a vision for the end game and then explain the sequence how we reach the end game. So for example, in Gaza, the end game is a new Gaza which is totally demilitarized by Hamas. They govern themselves, the Gazans. I don't want to govern them by a reasonable, decent, competent government. build beautiful lives. That's what I want to achieve without Israeli settlements in Gaza. That's not the division. Now, in order to reach it, there's a certain sequence. Part of the sequence is we have to disarm Hamas. And actually, disarming Hamas is highly feasible in many ways, and not only kinetic. And you can do it, it's not the toughest job in history. There's been tougher jobs. Hezbollah is a whole different ballgame. But that's my vision. So when I tell you, Mario, and through you to all your viewers, my vision of Gaza is they govern their own lives. We have to retain overriding security control so they don't do that again. But we dismantle Hamas. And they lead lives of dignity and freedom and prosperity. And we have our lives of security. That's my vision. That's my end game. And I have a sequence how to reach it. Obviously, it's flexible. Same with Lebanon. My vision of Lebanon is Israel is not in Lebanon. We do not want the Lebanese territory for any reason whatsoever, except for self-defense in the short term. That's my vision. A new Lebanon, a beautiful Lebanon, but that cannot be built. You can't build a beautiful building on a poisonous ground that is governed by Hezbollah. Now, if everyone knows that I have no territorial desires in Lebanon and I want to build a beautiful future for Lebanon and one day have peace with Lebanon, now we can sit together with all the major players, the Saudis, the French, America, you name it, and work together towards a common goal that we just delineated. And that's the whole difference. Right now, the current government doesn't say what the end game is. I am saying what the end game is. We want them to govern their own lives. But when you're suspected of wanting to conquer Lebanon, then no one believes you. And everyone is suspicious that you're looking to be there forever. We're not.
Speaker 1: Do you think they do? The current administration, do you think they have... ambitions for more territory in Lebanon or Syria?
Speaker 0: It depends. Some of them do because they explicitly say it and some don't. The fringes do. I'm not guessing. It's what they explicitly said. Prime Minister Netanyahu, I don't think wants to, but he today is, he can no longer, he's incapable of governing his own government because Ben-Gvir and Smotrich and the Haredim, they all control him. So I don't think he views things fundamentally different from me. He just can't. He's incapable anymore.
Speaker 1: So if he remains prime minister, do you think the risk, there's a more significant risk that Israel may want to annex territory if we have Prime Minister Netanyahu for another 10 years with his current administration, Smatresk, Ben-Gavir and the others? Do you think this is a risk?
Speaker 0: I don't know, you know, because when you face reality and the repercussions of foolish actions, sometimes it hits you in the face and it tends to slow you down because, you know, many of them said really crazy stuff, but de facto, right now this government, the Israeli government today is allowing Hamas to rebuild in Gaza. So there's a huge gap between their very powerful words and sometimes very feeble actions.
Speaker 1: Ben Gavir, you know what shocks me? Not only the things he says, I just have so many of his quotes, I'm not going to even bother reading them, is the amount of Israelis that do support him. I know he doesn't have many seats in the cabinet, but someone told me one of my guests, Yishai Fleischer told me, Mario, a lot of Israeli support. That was a few two months ago in my interview with him. He's like, a lot of Israelis support Ben Gvir. I'm like, no way. I expected the number to be 5% to 10% of Israelis have a favorable view. Mr. Bennett, it's 20% to 30% based on the poll I checked at the time, and I verified it since of Israelis have a favorable view of Ben Gvir. And a lot of my guests, especially those critical of Israel, say something that I refuse to believe. And they tell me, Mario, whether it's Naftali Bennett, whether it's Netanyahu, anyone else that is leading Israel, because of whatever reason, historical reasons, the violence, the media, the politicians, more and more Israelis are starting to have a very similar mindset to people like Ben-Gavir. And that would not lead to peace. The country needs such a drastic change that will lead to a change in the mindset of the average Israelis to lead to peace. Someone needs to make a move for that cycle of violence to stop. And if people like Ben Gvir are gaining popularity, that reality is just looking further and further away.
Speaker 0: Well, Mario, first of all, we're in an age of populism. And social networks magnify the effect because of what we call the echo chamber. And so you're fed with information and videos and what have you that just strengthen your already existing beliefs. And that creates polarization and very strong fringes compared to what we had in the past. Say when I grew up, when I grew up, All democracies in the world, they were mostly mainstream. So the mainstream was mainstream. This is inflicting not only Israel. This is inflicting every single democracy. We're seeing it in America. We're seeing it in Europe. And what it allows, it allows fringes, which used to be marginal in their influence. It empowers them. And conspiracy theories, which is just in rampage. So Israel is also included among this. Now, there's no easy way to deal with it. There's no one-off solution, but I would say that good leadership does not accept opinion as a fact, but strives to shape opinion. And one of my goals, first of all, domestically, is to unite Israel to the center Now, it's interesting because I'm a right-wing guy. I'm right of center. I'm hawkish. Everyone knows that. But I'm also liberal, pragmatic, and positive. And the government that I ran was the most diverse in Israel's history. We had eight parties, religious, secular, right, left, bipartisan, Jews and non-Jews. I'm very proud that I succeeded in bringing them as a cabinet to work together towards a common goal. It was complicated, but doable. The problem was in the parliament, ultimately we collapsed, but not the government itself worked well. So I've learned a lot of lessons as a prime minister. Next time, my goal is to shape Israel and yes, to influence, especially the younger generation that tends to be more extreme, and to make them more pragmatic and moderate and reasonable and not accept populism.
Speaker 1: Last thing I want to ask you about is probably the most complex one. There was a summit on day one of the MOU, the negotiations in Switzerland. There was a summit held by a few countries, Qatar, I think Turkey, I might get them wrong, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi, Egypt, et cetera, in Egypt. You might know which summit I'm referring to. And they put out a statement, the foreign ministers of these countries put out a statement saying, there won't be peace in the region unless there is a solution to the Palestinian issue. And fundamentally, if you kind of keep peeling all these different layers, that seems to be the core problem of everything that is happening in the region. Because when Hezbollah attacks Israel, they're saying we're supporting the Palestinian cause. And I understand what happened on October 7th. You've explained it really well. It's atrocious. But how do we solve that issue? How do we solve that issue where not only Israelis feel safe and I know you're the prime minister of Israel and you want to be the prime minister of Israel again, and your goal would be to do what's best for the Israeli people, but there's also Palestinian people that are people just like Israeli people. And if we don't find a solution or if Israel doesn't find a solution or the world doesn't find a solution for the Palestinian people, that's gonna damage Israel and the Israeli people. Because when I go through the poll numbers, the ones that you were, you called a crisis and he called you a few days ago, a disaster. Those numbers, 60% of Americans have an unfavorable view of Israel. In a survey of 36 countries, majorities in most countries now hold unfavorable view of Israel. The list goes on and on. Only 13 to 21% in six major Western European countries had a favorable opinion of Israel. And it continues. This will continue until there is a solution, an equitable solution to the Palestinian issue. What do you see as a pragmatic solution there?
Speaker 0: Well, I would first of all dispute one of the claims that you asserted. I do not agree that the center of the problems in the Middle East is the Palestinian-Israeli issue. I think the center is radical Islam, which regardless of what we do with the Palestinians, wants to create a huge Islamic state and take over all holy land. And that's first of all. Secondly, we tried a Palestinian state twice. First time was Oslo, and it blew up in our face, and over 1,300, 400 Israelis were murdered and butchered in the streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem during the Second Intifada. It was horrible until we had to retake Judea and Samaria. The second time we tried it was 2005 in the disengagement from Gaza. Effectively, the Israeli government allowed them to establish a Palestinian state in Gaza. At the beginning, there was no siege, no blockade, nothing. And we handed it over, and it turned into a terror state. So generally in life, when you face a complicated issue, first of all, make sure you don't make things worse. And by establishing a Palestinian state, it would make things worse. In fact, you're talking about the big image hit that we took. We took it from the very Gaza that we had pulled out of. I want to remind everyone again that on October 6th, 2023, Gaza was Palestinian. There was not one Jew, not one soldier in Gaza. We were at the 1949 lines. So we did nothing. They had no claim on us. They had no reason.
Speaker 1: Same Hezbollah. But they had no freedom either. I know it's a long debate, but they had no freedom either. So the solution didn't work, having them in that enclave that is controlled by Israel. So if you don't believe in a two-state solution, which I know is your stance, go ahead.
Speaker 0: But the causality is wrong because when we pulled out of Gaza at the beginning, they had all freedom. But they began right away shooting mortars and later on rockets at Israel. It didn't start on October 7th. It started in 2005, 2006. Because they had two options, to turn Gaza into Singapore, but they chose the other option, which was to turn it into a terror state. Now, for example, Monaco or Singapore, I believe, are smaller than Gaza. I'm not sure about Singapore, but similar. They could have. but they chose to use it as a terror base. And only then we didn't apply a blockade or siege. What we do apply is we allow stuff in throughout the years, but we ensure they don't bring in weapons and arms to kill our children. Now there's no easy solution, but I'll tell you my principles here. First principle is security for the Israeli people. And second principle is maximum freedom, dignity, and prosperity for the Palestinians. And I don't want to govern them. I don't want to govern the Palestinians in Gaza or in the PA. Currently, the PA governs itself, right? So we don't run their lives. They don't pay us taxes. They run their own water and sewage and electricity and government. And that's how it should stay. I don't want to apply... Israeli sovereignty on the PA itself. All right. Now, it's imperfect. Mario, it's imperfect. But in life, sometimes there's not a binary black or white situation. So here here's how I would present it to you. Let's say as opposed to binary, it's on a scale. If we can improve the situation with many small actions that allow more prosperity for the Palestinians without risking our lives, and we improve it, are we better off four years from now? Yes. And in fact, that's what I did as prime minister. Let me tell you a story. When I came in as prime minister, this was my position back then. I called in the guy who runs the, it's called the civil administration, a guy called Rasan Alian, a Druze guy. And I said, look, Rasan, I want to give you three weeks, come back to me with a menu of possible activities, actions that I can take as the Israeli prime minister that'll better the lives of Palestinians without risking the lives of the Israelis. He came back after about a month and he presented 24 different potential actions and we walked through it. It was sort of like an a la carte and I approved, I think, 11 or 12 of them. Let me give you one example. It turned out that there was a cap on trade between the PA, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. I said, we don't need a cap on trade. Why should it be $800 million? And I removed the cap and lo and behold, trade increased and lives got better and it didn't risk our security. So my point is, when there are situations where there's no perfect solution, it shouldn't dissuade us from trying to improve the situation. even if it's gradual. And that's my approach. I know it doesn't sell well. I know there's no, you know, ceremony at the White House. But if I can improve the lives of the Arabs while ensuring the security of the Jews and the Israelis, let's do it.
Speaker 1: I'll wrap up with a slogan idea I got for your campaign. I think if you want to have the world support you, just say a new Israeli government without Smotrich and Ben-Gvir. I think that alone puts you ahead of Netanyahu by miles. I think while many people might disagree with a lot of your policies or the way you view different things, I think we need just a new page in the region. We need a new page in Israel as well. And while that may be an imperfect page in the eyes of many, It's a new page, and I think that goes a long way. So fingers crossed. Mr. Bennett, I appreciate you coming on the show. It's a pleasure to meet you, and I really enjoyed our conversation. Thank you.
Speaker 0: Me too, Mario. And that's precisely, we're going to build a new chapter for Israel, for the region. It's going to be beautiful. It's not going to be perfect because it's an imperfect region, but it'll be much, much better for everyone. I just hope...
Speaker 1: One last thing I want to say, I would love if Israeli people, because I feel like they're stuck in their own bubble. I know we're wrapping up, but I wish they could see things from the lens of the rest of the world. Because I spend a lot of my time talking to people in Israel. Even I spoke to a supporter of Ben-Gavir just a few days ago, and I try to see things from their lens. And I try, I'm like, if you only see things from the outside world's lens or from your neighbor's lens, I don't know. they'll just have a different perception of things. You know what I mean? Because you travel around the world, you speak to leaders in different countries. But the average Israeli doesn't. They don't see things that way.
Speaker 0: It's a fair point. It's a fair point. And I think you're right about it. I would also say, though, that a majority of Israelis in the past supported a Palestinian state. And now a vast majority oppose a Palestinian state. And that's because of reality. And I would also urge your viewers to respect the fact that we tried it twice and twice it blew up in our faces and killed us. And not imagine that Israelis are just a bunch of unintelligent herd that don't understand anything. We do understand. We understand there's a world, but we have to ensure the security of our children first. I mean, and that's what anyone would do. So, and we're trying to, these are contradicting elements, but that's part of life. Life is complicated. And again, I just want to send a message. The Israeli people, by and large, are really good people, decent people that seek to better their lives and build a future. You know, I'm looking out the window, I see the city of Ranana. good people, trying our best in very difficult circumstances. And I think we're in for a very good period over the next 25 years. Fingers crossed. Mr. Bennett, it's a pleasure to meet you. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mario.
reSee.it AI Summary
I kept coming back to the exact wording. Clause 5 gives Iran sole control over safe passage through Hormuz—so if Iran enforces that against ships skipping protocol, then U.S. strikes are the real breach. Sanctions waivers are done, but assets, troop drawdown, and the Lebanon clause aren’t. The Doha delegation is meant to hold Washington to its signature, not negotiate.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷 🇺🇸 The MOU hands Iran sole control of who passes through Hormuz, and by that reading it's the U.S., not Iran, breaching the deal. Larry Johnson kept pulling it back to the exact wording. Clause 5 says Iran, and only Iran, makes the arrangements for safe passage. Not Iran and Oman, not Iran and Washington. So when Iran stops a ship that skipped its protocol and ran the Omani route, he argues, Iran is enforcing the agreement, and the U.S. strikes answering those stops are the real violation. He read the rest of the scorecard the same way. Sanctions waivers, clause ten, already issued. But the frozen assets, the troop drawdown, the Lebanon clause, all unmet. The delegation heading to Doha isn't there to negotiate, in his telling, but to hold Washington to what it already signed. On the proxy fronts, he splashed cold water on the easy read of Yemen: that mobilization isn't Saudis massing on the Houthis, it's Saudis against the Emiratis' own faction, and nobody who watched 18 months of failed US strikes thinks the Houthis can be dislodged from Bab el-Mandeb. His verdict on the weekend stuck with me. After all the chest-thumping, the U.S. stood down rather than answer Iran's last strike. To Larry, that silence says everything about who actually holds the leverage. @NewSonof
Video Transcript AI Summary
The discussion began with speculation about whether Mustafa Khamenei would attend the funeral for his father, Ali Khamenei, after claims that Israel might attempt to assassinate him. One participant expected Mustafa Khamenei to appear, describing it as his first public appearance and an “intent to show courage” in the face of Israeli threats. They argued that killing the “accommodation argument” would make destroying Israel the objective, and also claimed Iran has the missile technology to do so while Israel lacks air defense to prevent it. Another participant said they would be surprised if Mustafa Khamenei did not show because of uncertainty about the severity of his injuries.
They discussed the scale of past funerals, referencing 1989 and describing expectations of millions on streets. They also said the mourning period extends for about seven days (July 2 to July 9) and is not confined to Iran, noting Shia commemorations throughout the Levant. Attendance estimates were given as 30 million in Iran and 5 to 10 million in Iraq.
The conversation then shifted to “today’s news,” described as involving hostilities across multiple countries. They cited an explosion in Lebanon tied to underground tunnels, reports of Israeli bombing and demolition activities in southern Lebanon, airstrikes in Gaza in a camp, clashes and Israeli strikes in Syria, and mobilization in Yemen involving Saudi-backed and Emirati-backed militias. They debated who is mobilizing against whom in Yemen, ultimately describing mobilization as involving the Saudi group versus the Houthis, with another claim that it is not between Saudis and Emiratis uniting against someone else. They framed Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq as likely locations for intensified proxy conflict, contrasting with a shared reluctance among major powers to fight directly with Iran.
They discussed a statement by Israeli Defense Minister Katz saying the IDF has no intent to withdraw from areas captured since October 7 across Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. The same statement was described as saying the U.S. agreed with CENTCOM’s chief Brad Cooper’s visit, and that if Iran attacks with ballistic missiles in response to actions in Lebanon, Israel would be prepared to operate independently. Concerns were raised about scenarios involving Iran responding to Lebanon and about what alternatives remain if Iran does not withdraw from South Lebanon.
On Hezbollah’s role, they said Hezbollah is not dependent on Iran in the same way as earlier decades, describing Hezbollah as having multiple business ventures. They also discussed reported Israeli breaches of a ceasefire, including a strike in southern Lebanon around Al-Qantara and Deir Serian, and showed photos and details of large Hezbollah tunnel infrastructure. They said one explosion network was described by Israelis as 200 meters long under the town of Majdal zoo, with the blast heard widely and triggering earthquake detection systems.
They then covered diplomacy involving Iran and the U.S. in Doha. They referenced claims that Trump posted Iran requested a meeting, while Iranian statements were described as denying scheduled technical talks with the U.S. and saying an Iranian delegation would visit Doha to follow up on implementation of the MOU, particularly frozen funds. They said the Iranian delegation’s purpose is monitoring U.S. implementation of MOU clauses, not negotiating final agreement with the U.S., and highlighted expectations of $6 billion to be unfrozen from Qatar. They also discussed Oman’s first meeting with Iran about future management of the Strait of Hormuz.
For the Strait of Hormuz, they emphasized MOU language described as giving Iran sole responsibility for arranging safe passage of commercial vessels using “best efforts” through PGSA protocols, while they also discussed Iranian measures against ships attempting to transit outside the stipulated protocols. They noted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz reportedly surged after the MOU and then collapsed again after clashes.
They also returned to the day’s regional military actions: reiterating Israeli strikes in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and mentioning discussion about whether the U.S. retaliated after Sunday. The show closed with the idea that the next day might be calmer, with a brief tangent about World Cup developments and mention that Paraguay had apparently removed Germany from the tournament.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Great.
Speaker 1: You've been busy today? Yeah, I think not as busy as usual. Only today six, so less than me. How about you? It was a busy day?
Speaker 0: I'll end the day with eight different appearances.
Speaker 1: You're number seven. I count as four, so you did four others. Yeah. You're number one. I'm glad. Um, all right, so let's, let's actually jump through the news from today. Uh, we'll talk about that in a bit. I want to start with something different. I want to start with a funeral. Um, a lot of people have been speculating. I wouldn't say speculating, but been worried that there could be. If, if most about coming a shows up at the funeral of his father, Ali Kamenei on the weekend, I've had some of my guests tell me they wouldn't be surprised if Israel tries to assassinate him. So let's start there. The funerals this weekend, previous funerals have had in 1989, the previous Supreme Leader, 10 million people were on the streets in that funeral. I actually show photos. Keke, if you can show those photos there. That's in 1989 when the previous Supreme Leader Komene died. So people are expecting millions on the streets. We'll see. But first, do you expect Mustafa Khamenei to show up?
Speaker 0: I would expect him to, yes. And this would probably be his first public appearance. If Israel dared, even tried to assassinate him, that would unleash, there would be no holding Iran back at that point. Iran would then destroy Israel. I mean, I think it's that simple. Iran's got the missile technology to do so, and Israel would be bled dry. So, yeah, I don't think Israel would do it.
Speaker 1: So his father was obviously assassinated by Israel. It was an Israeli strike that killed him, or an American one. I think it was Israeli, wasn't it?
Speaker 0: think it's israeli yeah yeah um you're saying if this one if if it happens again now the react the response will be different to what we saw a few months ago yes you know it'd be it'd be unrelenting the the gloves would be completely off that they would this this would have been sort of the final because there are those within iran you know they call them the hardliners that insist we're not going to be safe until we destroy israel And others said, no, no, we can find an accommodation. Well, this would kill the accommodation argument completely, and destroying Israel will become the objective. I was just going to say, it's just by virtue of the size differential that it's much easier for Iran to use up every single ballistic missile it has in destroying Israel. And Israel does not have the air defense to prevent it.
Speaker 1: Would you be surprised if Mustafa Khamenei does not show up?
Speaker 0: Yeah, a little, I think.
Speaker 1: Because we don't know how severe his injuries are.
Speaker 0: But I think in this case, it will be an intent to show courage. in the face of Israeli threats. So yeah, I would be surprised if he doesn't show because this is such a important consequential ceremony.
Speaker 1: So that's going to be just for the audience is going to be this weekend, which day exactly NBC.
Speaker 0: But it's actually not just it's not confined. My understanding is it extends over like a seven day period. right july 2nd to july 9th interesting yeah kk if you can check how long it will go on for it's actually interesting uh and well remember arachi i'm sorry to keep interrupting you that's rude i'm not trying to be rude or disrespectful um remember arachi just traveled to iraq and one of the issues he was discussing uh with the iraqis was the funeral, you know, the arrangements for the burial and such, because Shias in Iraq will be commemorating this as well. So the Ayatollah Khamenei had... This is not just confined to Iran. This is for the Shia community throughout the Levant.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I was reading somewhere they were trying to... um, predict how many people would show up. And they mentioned, I think the two places that will have the most people on the streets will be Iran and Iraq. Uh, okay. So, uh, this week attendance is estimated at 30 million in Iran and five to 10 million in Iraq.
Speaker 0: That's a pretty good, that's a pretty good turnout. That's a hell of a turnout.
Speaker 1: Um, let's let's go through today's uh news today's um pretty bloody day not bloody in the amount of casualties bloody in the amount of countries that were where that we've seen hostilities so we had bombing in lebanon by the way i don't know if the telegram issue is solved if you can show that bombing in lebanon the tunnels that would be good i know we've shown it before but there was an underground tunnels that were blown up in a village And apparently the tremors were felt all the way to Israel. That's how big the explosion was. And when we show the video now, you'll see how significant it is if you haven't seen it already for the audience. So there was that. Then certain locations were bombed by Israel as well in South Lebanon. There's also demolition activities reported a couple of hours ago, two, three hours ago. That's Lebanon. We also have an airstrike in Gaza in one of the camps. And we have clashes and strikes, Israeli strikes in Syria. In one town, the Israeli troops went in I think they were targeting two or three men. And then there was also machine gun fire from helicopters and an airstrike. And they pulled out. So it's three countries. And meanwhile, there was also mobilization of forces in Yemen by the Saudi-backed and Emirati-backed militias reportedly moving to potentially... Yeah, but notice those mobilizations.
Speaker 0: It's the Saudis against the Emiratis. It's not the Emiratis and Saudis uniting to go against someone else.
Speaker 1: Interesting. So it's not to fight the Houthis. Let me see. Where are my notes? So a large mobilization is ongoing across Yemen between tribes and armed forces affiliated with Ansarullah, Houthis, also known as Houthis, and those affiliated with the Saudi-backed Yemeni government in the context of renewed tensions in A recent clash in the ID. So no, this one is the Saudis, not Emirati. So I take out Emirati completely. So apparently mobilization of the Saudi group versus the Houthis. They haven't clashed, just mobilization. What I assumed is that they're trying to capture the Bab al-Mandib Strait.
Speaker 0: That was my speculation. No, no, no. This is not a battle. What I'm hearing from other sources, this is not between the Saudis and the Houthis. is between the Saudis and the Emiratis and the group that the Emiratis have backed in Yemen.
Speaker 1: Interesting. So similar to the clashes we saw from a few months ago between the two groups just before the war? Yes, that's right.
Speaker 0: I wouldn't be surprised if this year... Well, the Saudis aren't trying to blow up their relationship with Iran. If they get into a battle with the Houthis, then that could... that could definitely trigger some setback in relations with Iran. And that's a huge explosion that she's shown, or that KK's shown.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's the one in Lebanon. That's the one in Lebanon. It's massive. I wouldn't be surprised if in Yemen, in the next year or two, we'll see renewed clashes between all sides. I think... The Bebel-Mendeb Strait has always been important, but I think it's now become even more important after this war. I have this theory I've been thinking about a lot today, where the Americans and Israelis tried direct war with Iran. Didn't go well, obviously. So they both know that direct conflict is something they all want to avoid. Iran's always wanted to avoid it, and I still think they would want to avoid it, leave it as a last case or... Last resort, sorry. And then the Americans and Israelis want to avoid it because of how it ended up in this war. So the alternative is what we've been seeing for the last few decades, and that's big powers that cannot fight directly since the Cold War. They fight through proxy wars. And I worry now is that proxy wars are going to heat up even more than they did before. Because the Gulf won't fight Iran. They need to improve relations. America won't fight Iran. Israel won't fight Iran. Iran won't fight any of those. But they all want to increase their influence. Iran would want to keep Hezbollah. Israel wants to weaken Hezbollah. Iran would want to keep control of the Bab al-Mandib Strait. Gulf countries may want to take that away. Israel may want to weaken it. The US may get involved in wanting to weaken it. We might see the same thing in Iraq, as we've always seen. I don't know if Syria will get dragged into it again. But my worry is less so direct conflict, because there's enough deterrence now, it's been tested, more so proxy wars in countries like Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq would suffer the most.
Speaker 0: The problem that the United States and Israel and the Saudis have, they're going to march into Houthi country? Good luck with that. I mean, that's not going to happen. They have no way to stop the Houthis and taking control of Bab el-Mandab. We've already, actually, we've already, this played out, you know, from December 2023, all of 2024 through, so that's 13 months, and then five months into 2025 through May. So, you know, 18 months, the United States failed to stop the Houthis. failed to establish freedom of navigation. So what's the United States going to do? Something different now? More aircraft carriers that can be targeted? More planes that we don't have enough of?
Speaker 1: I'd say resort to civil war, what we've seen in Yemen for so many years.
Speaker 0: Yeah, they've had that. So it's not like they're going to start a civil war. They've had a civil war. Civil war is still sort of... Lingering out there. The key is, can you weaken the Houthis? The answer on that is probably no.
Speaker 1: I think the only way, if they want to get rid of the Houthis controlling the Bebel Mendeb Strait, it wouldn't work, as you've said. Aircraft carriers, air power, doesn't work. The only option is to try to wrestle power away from the Houthis. And they'll at least try. They'll arm these other groups and try to... convince them to fight the Houthis. That's my worry.
Speaker 0: Yeah, but they've done that already. That's what they've been doing. I don't think they ever stopped. The problem is the Houthis have got the upper hand on that front. Pakistan is heavily involved too with wanting to de-escalate. They're not going to get too upset if If the Saudis and Emiratis want to bleed each other bloody, I think Pakistan will step back and say, okay, let them go until they come to their senses. But the last thing they want is the Saudis going after the Houthis. The Saudis have already proven they can't beat the Houthis. Hell, the United States couldn't beat the Houthis.
Speaker 1: So that's... So there's a statement by Defense Minister Katz. I was going through it earlier.
Speaker 0: My favorite, my favorite, Katz.
Speaker 1: So he said that the IDF has no intent of withdrawing from the areas it captured since October 7th, were invaded since October 7th in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. There's no intentions to do so. And apparently, according to him, the US has agreed with CENTCOM's visit, Brad Cooper, sorry, CENTCOM's chief, Brad Cooper's visit to Israel. u.s has agreed to that stance asia's position now the other part is what worries me more he said um if iran attacks with ballistic missiles in response to actions in lebanon the idf respondent is preparing to operate independently and then he says we you know these strikes could happen even in the next couple of days so he's making the statement that israel is he didn't say expecting but hinted that they're expecting an attack by the iranians because they're not gonna let off what they're doing in lebanon they're going to keep trying to fight hezbollah maybe work with the lebanese government maybe not and iran he's saying iran will eventually attack and he said we have targets to strike in iran and the idf is prepared and on alert but we will not interfere with the u.s president's course of action vis-a-vis the iranians but he did say they are preparing to operate independently if they are attacked so my concern here is that if um there's two two scenarios either iran gives up on getting Israel out of South Lebanon or eventually direct war between Israel and Iran because there is no other alternative being presented.
Speaker 0: And what can Israel do? Because they're not going to have U.S. KC-135s to do air refueling for them. They'll be on their own devices and they'll have limited capability. And once they start attacking Iran, Iran will unleash holy hell on them. And they don't have the ability to stop the missile strikes. It's just, this is locker room talk. This is, you know, bragging, you know. But it's not going to turn into a serious effort. If Israel tries it, Israel is going to pay a terrible, terrible price. And they actually probably deserve it.
Speaker 1: i just don't know what scenario what could happen what's going to happen then larry um he says i don't live in the he says the obvious here i don't live in illusions the lebanese army soldiers will not suddenly become lions who charge at hezbollah that's true there was also he was also talking about how he tried israel tried to convince the lebanese army to go into that hill that israel was trying to capture the hezbollah hill the baby something of tahir hill next to nabatiya they were trying to capture that hill they couldn't And apparently they tried to convince the Lebanese army to go in there and destroy Hezbollah's infrastructure in that hill, and the Lebanese army refused. And he makes the point that he does not expect Lebanon to go in and suddenly fight Hezbollah. They can't fight Hezbollah, as we've talked about on the show before. So under these scenarios, what are we going to see? What other path is there other than direct conflict? The other one is Iran giving up on South Lebanon, which...
Speaker 0: They will eventually. They always have in the past. They go through these phases. Got to have it, got to have it, got to have it. Then they withdraw. Got to have it, got to have it, got to have it. Suffer losses.
Speaker 1: The Israelis?
Speaker 0: The Israelis, yeah. So, I mean, right now they're benefited because Hezbollah is maintaining the ceasefire. They are not launching a widespread attack like they are capable of. They're abiding by the ceasefire. I think it's a matter of time before they're going to say, screw it. We'll go back to full total war with these guys.
Speaker 1: But that's going back to the, like, the only path is war. What about the theories? Iran obviously wants, the most important asset it has in Lebanon is Hezbollah, a forward defense. And Hezbollah's raison d'etre, the reason Hezbollah is there is resistance against Israel. So in theory, though, wouldn't it make sense in Iran's best interest that, hey, if Lebanon says they want Israel, we try to get Israel out. Lebanese government says, hey, we're happy to have them there. Okay, our red line is no one disarms Hezbollah. Hezbollah is there to stay. If you guys want to keep Israel and Lebanon, fine. If anything, that justifies Hezbollah to remain in Lebanon because there's an invading country there and Hezbollah was created to fight that invading country that Hezbollah kicked out that invading country. So in a way, in a perverse way, Israel in Lebanon gives justification for Hezbollah to remain. Do you know what I mean? That's why there's the possibility that Iran's like, you know what, screw it. We're going to keep Hezbollah, and then Lebanon, you saw Israel yourself.
Speaker 0: Well, understand, Hezbollah is not an instrument of Israel, or I mean of Iran. They share common values, but... Hezbollah is not dependent upon Iran for financial support. It has set up a variety of business ventures, some involved with counterfeit, selling counterfeit products, some of it selling cigarettes, selling liquor in the black market, selling cars, stealing cars. They've got a variety of ways they've made money over the years. Drugs? No. I think they've stayed away from that. But the point is they share a common bond with Iran, but they're not under the same level of dependency that they were, say, in the 1980s. You know, they want to be independent, too. They're not there as a puppet of Iran, although the West likes to portray them as such.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, that's not looking too good for Lebanon at all then. Today, you're talking about Israeli breaches of the ceasefire. There's an Israeli strike targeted the area of Al-Qantara and Deir Serian in southern Lebanon. So the attacks on southern Lebanon remain. By the way, have you seen the photos of the tunnels, the Hezbollah tunnels? they are massive i'm going to show you i'm going to have cake i show you now and show the audience as well they've got massive infrastructure underground yeah um hezbollah put out a statement while waiting for the images to come up hezbollah put out a statement listing the violations by israel in the last 24 hours they've listed all the places that were attacked um and what was exactly attacked um by the way centcom brad cooper uh the centcom commanders in lebanon Meaning the Lebanese, um, I don't know if the president, but he's meeting the Lebanese army chief as well in Lebanon, probably the president too. So America, instead of moving away from the region is getting, um, involved at least trying to get a diplomatic solution to the Lebanese issue seemingly. Um, but that's the, um, underground facility that they have there. Israel took the photo. So I'm guessing these are some of the facilities that were that Israel entered in south Lebanon. Yeah. Just, just so massive. Um, So that's a, that's kind of a form, by the way, that explosion we saw earlier, the network they blew up, according to the Israelis was 200 meters long. Um, and it was under the town of Majdal zoo and the explosion was heard. The blast was heard. It even triggered earthquake detection system when they blew up these tunnels and the one we were watching earlier. So that's on, on that front. Um, we have a meeting between the Americans and the Iranians in Qatar, in Doha. So Trump put out a post saying Iran has requested a meeting. It will take place tomorrow in Doha.
Speaker 0: And the Iranians. And that's a lie. Iran hasn't requested anything.
Speaker 1: Oh, of course not yet. Of course. Larry, I think we don't need to correct Trump's posts anymore. That ship has sailed.
Speaker 0: I mean, he's just making that up. In fact, Iranians have been making a point today. They have no scheduled technical talks with the United States. So I don't know who Witkoff and Kushner think they're going to be meeting with, but Iran is saying, not us.
Speaker 1: I think they would, I think, I don't know, I think I read it somewhere that they would be going, but I don't know if it was official or not. Let me see if I can find it. By the way, I want to show you the traffic through the Strait of Homs, the collapse. KK, if you can show that image. But let me see. Iran's foreign ministry has said that Iranian Oh, yeah, it's been confirmed. And a couple hours ago, Iran's foreign ministry has said an Iranian delegation will visit Doha. So that's, by the way, you can see that image, that massive job, that's the traffic through the straight home was a massive job. And then say that level in the war that it picked up after the MOU was signed. And then it collapsed. It collapsed again after the clashes three days ago, right? It's from your website, favorite website, maritime traffic. Aha. So the Strait of Hormuz is, we're talking about who has leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. That confirms it. And then in terms of what happens next, Iran's foreign ministry and how we always talked about, okay, if the Iranian Omanis don't make a deal, let's say the Omanis like, we don't want a deal. We want to open our side of the Straits to any ships. The Iranian foreign ministry made their position pretty clear. They said, quote, we are still in discussions with Oman regarding the future management of the Strait of Hormuz. then I say this. If Oman is not interested in a joint mechanism for fees and services, we'll simply manage the straight ourselves. I don't think Iran would allow Oman to open their side for free passage, not after this war. That would be my guess in how things would turn out. I just don't think... If we were talking before this war, it's a different story. It was open anyway. But after this war and the costs that Iran has gone through, I think in their mind... Oman can either do it diplomatically or they're going to force them.
Speaker 0: Correct. Do you agree? Yeah, I agree. And so, again, the Iranian technical team that's going to Doha is not on the level with Witkoff and Kushner. And the technical team, they're just going to go by the MOU. MOU favors... Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. You know, when you look at the language, paragraph 5, it says, upon the signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels. Doesn't say anything about Oman, doesn't say anything about any other Gulf country, doesn't say a thing about the United States. It's the Islamic Republic of Iran that will make the arrangements using its best efforts. And those arrangements are through the PGSA protocols.
Speaker 1: Regarding the negotiations in Doha, let me read out the full statement because I haven't read it. A summary of their statement. Iran's foreign ministry has said an Iranian delegation will visit Doha to follow up on the implementation of the MOU, particularly on frozen funds. The president also said... six billion dollars they expect six billion dollars to be unfrozen from Qatar um so that was that statement was made today however Iran will not hold any negotiation negotiating meetings with the US in the coming days and the visit is unrelated to the US representatives trip to Qatar okay so go back to your point now you said they're not meeting but that statement is they're going to Qatar but according to them they will not meet the Americans Iran stressed that it has not yet entered the stage of negotiating a final agreement and that such talks depend on the implementation of articles 1, 4, 5, 10, and 11 of the MOU. In Doha, Iran will focus on monitoring U.S. implementation of the clauses on lifting oil sanctions and releasing frozen assets. So they're saying they're going to go there. I would guess they'll sit down, but in their mind, they will not be. continuing the negotiations. They want to make sure that clauses in the existing MOU are implemented. So that's the purpose of their trip to Qatar. Right. Also, Oman confirmed that they've had their first meeting with Iran on the future management of the Strait of Hormuz. So that was a statement made today as well. A lot of meetings.
Speaker 0: Yeah, so 10 is already, you know, item 10 on the MOU has already been implemented. U.S. Department of Treasury has issued waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking, transaction, insurance, transportation, etc. So, so far, that appears to be done. But the U.S. still has to make fully available the frozen or restricted funds and assets. They haven't done that yet.
Speaker 1: Yeah, so the ones that the Iranians said they want to see implemented are 1, 4, 5, 10, and 11. One is about Lebanon and normal threats. Obviously, we know this is being breached. Four is the U.S. will lift its blockade and any disturbance or impediments against Iran. So that's about lifting the blockade and removing its forces from the have, yeah. The traffic of vessels will be proportional to the pre-war traffic. The U.S., further undertakes to remove its forces within 30 days. So that's fine. So that one's been done, four. Five is the one we've been talking about. It's control of the Strait of Hormuz, which you were just explaining about Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz. And Iran would argue that that's being breached because you're saying that Oman is not controlling it if ships go through the Omani side.
Speaker 0: And then you've got clauses. That's why Iran is taking the punitive measures against ships that try to run the straight without following the protocol that Iran has stipulated.
Speaker 1: And then 10 and 11 is the unfreezing of assets and the lifting of sanctions, which you've gone through one of them. So that's what the Iranians are saying they're going to Qatar for.
Speaker 0: Right.
Speaker 1: So we'll see how that goes. There hasn't been any attacks on ships today. There are ships with mounted machine guns on there, by the way. I was showing you the photos in previous interviews. Fox News, US ambassador is telling Fox News that Iran's leverage over the trade of Hummus is diminishing day by day, arguing that Iran is increasingly isolated over its effort to impose fees on ships using the waterway. And then he says, Waltz said, Gulf states are expanding alternative oil export routes that bypass the strait. while the U.S. is looking to harden and potentially relocate some of its military bases in the region. He also claimed China opposes Iran's proposal to charge transit fees and that Oman refused to help establish the necessary infrastructure. Quote, Iran's attempts to hold the world hostage is completely failing. Warning that if Iran faces a path to absolute ruin if it continues its current course and adding that Trump's patience, quote, isn't going to last forever. So he's saying that Iran's ability to control the Strait of Hormuz is diminishing day by day, and the Gulf are building alternatives, and even China doesn't want Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz.
Speaker 0: Have we heard anything from China on that? No.
Speaker 1: I have not, no.
Speaker 0: Yeah. More male bovine excrement being expended. Okay.
Speaker 1: So that's a statement by Mike Waltz. No, Waltz...
Speaker 0: waltzes in a delusional world. I mean, they dumped him out as national security advisor just because, you know, turned out not to be that smart. So now, you know, he's at the UN as a useless appendage.
Speaker 1: On the Syria front, the most interesting part, and I want to get your thoughts on it, the UAE president strongly condemns israeli incursions into syrian territory in the kinetera and dara governance describing them as a flagrant violation of international law and the 1974 disengagement agreement the uae reaffirms its support for syria's sovereignty and called on the international community to take immediate action to help the attacks and prevent further escalation that's the uae condemning israeli actions in syria are we starting to see the gulf shift into either more neutrality and or less relations with Iran?
Speaker 0: It's possible. I mean, I know the Pakistanis have been working hard on the UAE. Frictions between the UAE and Saudis are still great. So that needs to be eased. But I don't think either the Saudis or Omanis are interested in getting into a dust-up with Iran. I think they'd prefer to keep Iran on friendly terms. You know, those two, Oman and Saudi Arabia, they'll have to sort out themselves. Yeah.
Speaker 1: And that's it. Strike on Gaza and Hamas and other Palestinian factions are also preparing to partially reject the amended proposals by Mladenov, the lead envoy of the US-led border peace. So in other words, the Gaza issue is ongoing and nothing has changed. And that's all we have for today. Anything else, anything on your end that was interesting today? We've covered it all.
Speaker 0: No, just the fact that the United States stood down. They didn't retaliate on Sunday. And instead, they opted to try to attack. Yeah. You know, despite all the tough talk and chest thumping, they stood down. So, you know, that's just something.
Speaker 1: I think the, but so the policies, America's only attacking when Iran attacks the ships and Iran hasn't attacked the ship. But then the question is, is their ships trying to go through the Omani side or did they stand down on that front?
Speaker 0: But the United States has no right to attack Iran because Iran is stopping a ship that's not in accordance with the protocols. Because remember, what does paragraph five say? Only Iran. It doesn't say Iran in the United States. It doesn't say Iran and Oman, Iran and Saudi, Iran and Qatar. It says Iran only. Iran's the only country that's allowed to figure out the arrangement for passing through the strait, according to the MOU. So the United States has no right whatsoever to attack Iran because Iran's trying to stop a ship from violating an Iranian protocol. The US broke. They broke the MOU. They violated it with that. And from that point, then Iran is fully justified to strike back.
Speaker 1: Yeah, so the only question I have is that the... So the Americans are, whether it's a right or not, they're attacking when Iran attacks a ship. And then, so it all starts... And Iran only attacks ships when ships avoid the PGSA and go through the Omani side. Correct. So the question is, the question I would have is... are the ships going through the Omani side and Iran decided not to attack? Or as we saw on that chart, there's just no ships going through and the escort of ships on the Omani side is stopped.
Speaker 0: There's some, I saw like three ships went through together that were headed towards an Omani port. So I think Iran let him go knowing that they were going to an Omani port and said, okay, we'll let that happen. But any ship that's going outside of Oman, going overseas, Iran's going to stop them. And that's why I say, come back to the language of the MOU. Because the MOU identifies that Iran is the only one that's got the, as it says, it will, Iran will make the arrangements using its best efforts for safe passage of commercial vessels. with no charge for 60 days only. So they've got 60 days, that 60 days started 10 days ago, 11 days ago. Let's see, they started on the 17th. We're now on the 20, 12 days ago. So they've now got 48 days left. But as long as, because that MOU gave Iran the sole responsibility for making arrangements to the safe passage of commercial vessels, the United States has no damn say in the matter. They just need to butt out and mind their own business. It's not their business.
Speaker 1: We'll see what happens after the Qatari meeting and if we're going to see a continuation of ships because we need traffic to pick up again through the Strait of Hormuz for markets not to take a hit on Monday. So let's see. Fingers crossed. Um, Syria, the attack on Syria was a limited attack, so it was not a significant military operation. It was, I think two gunmen, maybe the gunmen, just to be clear, the gunmen might've even attacked the Israeli forces first. I don't know the story at all there. And Israel retaliated by attacking the village, killing these two or three gunmen. Yeah.
Speaker 0: What the hell, what the hell is, what the hell is Israel doing in Syria? Stay home, mind their own. They need to mind their own damn business, but they don't the one. The one consistent theme throughout this is who's attacking others? It's Israel attacking others. It's not Israel the victim saying, oh, we're just sitting at home watching Game of Thrones and all of a sudden these nasty Arabs attacked us. Nonsense. It's Israel that's out doing all the attacking and killing.
Speaker 1: Yeah. All right, Larry, well, Hopefully tomorrow will be a calmer day. Maybe we can do a show on the World Cup.
Speaker 0: Yeah, yeah. That'll be going into the knockout round soon.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I'm not keeping up. I just saw pop up on my screen. Paraguay apparently kicked Germany out of the World Cup.
Speaker 0: Wouldn't expect Germany to be kicked out. Yeah.
Speaker 1: That's quite an accomplishment. That's more surprising than the strikes on Lebanon, Syria, or Gaza. Because these, unfortunately, have become the norm, as heartbreaking as it is.
Speaker 0: Yeah, at least nobody's bleeding and dying over that. Yeah. Larry, see you tomorrow. Thank you so much. All right. Later. Bye. Bye.
Speaker 1: All right, guys. This is it for today. I will see you again tomorrow. Hopefully, we'll have a quiet news day. But if... If history is to go by, it won't be a quiet day. I hope you enjoyed today's interviews and I'll see you tomorrow. Thank you.
reSee.it AI Summary
I agree with Larry Johnson: the U.S. violated the MoU first. Nothing barred Iran from using its own traffic separation in the strait; the Ever Lovely tried to bypass, Iran said no, then the U.S. bombed Iran for enforcing rules the MoU never required to abandon. In Doha, Iran offers procedures; the U.S. either accepts or not. The military surge is withdrawal; U.S. can’t sustain another air campaign. Gaza: people confined to 36% while Israel reframes forced emigration; Hamas remains, Washington blocks operations. Financially, China’s banks lead, treasuries are sold for gold, and CIPS is replacing Swift—this is no longer subtle.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
Fmr. CIA Analyst Larry Johnson says the U.S. violated the MoU before Iran did. There is nothing in that document prohibiting Iran from implementing its own traffic separation scheme in the strait. The Ever Lovely tried to bypass it, Iran said no, and the U.S. bombed Iran in response to Iran enforcing rules the MoU never told it to abandon. What will happen in Doha? Iran sits down and says here are our procedures, here is the application number for the IRGC, follow the lanes we designated. The U.S. either says okay or it doesn't. That's the entire negotiation. On the military logistics surge, Larry says it's the withdrawal order being executed, equipment going out not in, and that the U.S. simply cannot sustain another air campaign against Iran right now. In Gaza, 2 million people are being confined to 36% of their own land while Israel quietly renames its forced emigration program free movement. Hamas isn't going anywhere, Israel is still trying to restart military operations there, Washington is still blocking it. On the financial system underneath all of this, China's top 4 banks are now the largest in the world, something that wasn't true 20 years ago, countries are selling U.S. treasuries and buying gold, and CIPS is replacing Swift among BRICS nations. The trajectory isn't subtle anymore. @NewSonof
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation discusses frequent social/media observations, including people recognizing specific shirts and debating commemoration music tied to Ashura—described as sounding like club music or a concert despite being used for religious remembrance. They mention a “Shura” incident involving black clothing and apologize to Professor Morandi after being told “it’s a Shura and we wear black.” The hosts also discuss a planned/desired conversation between Yishai and Professor Morandi.
They shift to Middle East ceasefire and Strait of Hormuz discussions. Access reported that the U.S. and Iran agreed to a halt in attacks against each other and will meet in Doha on Tuesday for technical talks amid resolving their dispute over the Strait of Hormuz. One host argues the U.S. violated the MOU first and emphasizes Iran’s stated procedure for ships: submit an application to the IRGC, obtain approval, and use lanes Iran establishes; the U.S. did not restrict Iran from implementing Persian Gulf Strait Authority protocols. The discussion frames the conflict as symbolic and political theater, with no U.S. retaliation beyond initial actions, and notes Iran’s view that ships must follow Iran’s rules.
A long analysis argues that tankers’ routing affects whether they are considered Iran-related: tankers using the Iran route are “dominantly Iran-related,” while those using the Oman route are “not Iran-related and never sanctioned.” It says many tankers cannot use the Iran route because EU sanctions on the IRGC have not been lifted, making the Oman route the “only visible option,” and that AIS visibility for Oman routes may go dark again, forcing escalation if Iran aims to halt traffic. The host claims the issue remains unresolved and that negotiation dynamics do not change because the parties’ positions are the same.
Another portion addresses claims about Israeli media and U.S. responses, describing Iran launching drones toward ships and the U.S. administration making clear Iran will not collect tolls or fees from ships in the straits. The hosts also cite MarineTraffic-type routing/visibility observations, asserting that ship traffic appears to follow the Iranian route more than the Omani channel and that few, if any, appear on the Oman route during the period discussed. They interpret the U.S. “military buildup” tracking analysis as potentially reflecting withdrawal operations already ordered, with assets leaving after prior deployment.
The discussion then covers Lebanon/Israel ceasefire and security annex details. They report that Israeli officials and media say the framework agreement’s classified security annex remains undisclosed at Lebanon’s request, citing internal challenges from Hezbollah. Key alleged clauses include: no fixed withdrawal timetable (withdrawal based on conditions/performance indicators tied to Hezbollah disarmament), no expansion of pilot program areas without Israeli approval, and IDF freedom of action within a “yellow line” against threats. Hezbollah is said to have reiterated it will not abide by the framework. They also mention renewed reporting of alleged Israeli ceasefire violations including strikes on residential buildings, drone strikes, demolitions, and stun grenades/suspicious objects, with Hezbollah saying it is monitoring and reserves the right to defend itself.
The conversation then turns to U.S.-Israel political strain and shifting Republican support. Politico is cited about growing division between Washington and Jerusalem, with concerns Israel cannot expect special treatment under an America First approach. Axios/Pew and University of Maryland polling figures are cited as showing Republican views becoming more negative toward Israel, especially among younger age groups.
Next, Gaza receives several reports and commentary. They discuss Khan Younis reporting that Hamas is preparing for renewed attacks, including producing explosive devices and anti-tank missiles monthly, recruiting fighters aged 18–22, trading militants, smuggling drones and communications equipment from the Sinai, rebuilding underground infrastructure, remaining strong on the ground, and not giving up power in Gaza. Another report via Al Jazeera is cited describing territory restrictions: 2 million people forced to live on 36% of their own land after expansion of “yellow line” and “orange line,” with UN saying the restricted zone totals 64% of the strip. The hosts also mention an additional Channel 13 report that Israel renamed its Gaza “Voluntary Immigration Program” to a “Free movement program” amid criticism, while acknowledging Hamas remains in Gaza and Israel wants to facilitate the departure of many Gazans abroad.
Finally, they address Turkey-Israel rhetoric and war-risk commentary, referencing remarks attributed to Netanyahu and Erdogan. The conversation notes Erdogan’s aggressive rhetoric about Israel’s destruction and the Israeli response that such words should be taken seriously, while also contrasting this with claims about business ties between Turkey and Israel and discussing markers like energy cutoffs. The segment closes with political/media recommendations and earlier conversations, including discussions of the Iran-U.S.-Strait of Hormuz situation.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: we see each other so often now you can see every little change yeah you have a new shirt surprise surprise i try i try to wear a different shirt every day otherwise you get a little stinky yeah i sometimes see in the comments sometimes people know your specific shirts like we've seen this shirt we know this is that shirt or this is this shirt this is becoming a concerning trend uh okay
Speaker 0: You've got to start the Larry Johnson line of shirts.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I told you. I'm waiting for that new line. Then I'll only change my shirt when you launch your own shirt.
Speaker 0: You just have to have a black version. Yeah. Of course, if you're wearing black, they're assuming you were celebrating a Shura.
Speaker 1: Well, I had Mehdi Hassan found a tweet of mine. He's like, Mario, are you against Shiite Islam? Because I'm Shiite Islam, and are you against it? Because, you know, he likes to debate people. So it was a tweet, like, criticizing immigration to Europe and how they handle immigration. Oh, it was a tweet about Ashura. Like, it's where they hit their body, yeah? To commemorate the... Yeah, exactly. When I first saw a video of them doing it, I didn't know about Ashura or Shiite. And I think he's in Iraq and it was like going viral on Instagram. It was like someone like, they're praying, but like with like music, like, and they're all doing it like this, like a big group of people. Have you seen that video? It's going viral.
Speaker 0: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. There's one in Barcelona, a group in Barcelona, or as they say in Spain, in Spain, Barcelona.
Speaker 1: I'll try to find this one it sounds like a club I'll try to find it and I'll play it for the audience it was just when I first when I learned about it it was like many people listening might have seen it already because it was going viral it sounded literally like a club music like that type of music with someone making a prayer song but like
Speaker 0: literally sounds like they're clubbing and i was wondering i actually asked someone i'm like is that are they clubbing and they told me about ashura and stuff but it was like a modern modern way of commemorating ashura so they're commemorating the death uh of uh i guess the son of the prophet i think that's it i was i did a faux pas the other day with professor mirandi I was giving him a hard time for not wearing my, I gave him a shirt and he wasn't wearing the shirt. He says, it's a Shura and we wear black. I go, okay, I'm an asshole. I'm sorry. I said, I'm an ugly American. Oh my God, forgive me. And he just laughed at me.
Speaker 1: I am actually today talking about Miranda because I was thinking about him while having a conversation earlier today with someone in he's a settler. and a leader, he lives in Hebron and he supports the policies of Ben-Gavir. So it was a second time I speak to him, his name is Yishai. It was a fascinating conversation. It was a difficult one, obviously, because I disagree with Ben-Gavir on 99% of things, but it was just a fast, it went on for an hour and a half. It was planned for like 30, 60 minutes. It was a fascinating conversation to try to understand how they see things. But the reason I remembered him now is you mentioned Professor Morandi. I'm like, man, it would be an incredible conversation to have him and Professor Morandi. Professor Morandi won't do it, but have him and Professor Morandi sitting across each other and having a discussion.
Speaker 0: Well, yeah, a settler believes in magic. What? The settlers believe in magic. See, there was this, there's this God. And God, he's ostensibly created the whole universe, but really, he likes us better than everybody else. That's why he gave us this land to tell everybody else to fuck off.
Speaker 1: I love talking about religion with you. Oh, my producer found it. Can you play it with the audio before we start the discussion? Can you play that video, Stephanie? Well done finding it because I couldn't find it. Play it with audio. I think this is it. All right, let me see it open in the meantime. But you can play it with audio just for the audience. Yeah, this is it with the audio. Okay. No, this is different now, but it's similar. That's not the one I know, but this is a, like they make a Shura sound really, really fun, but this is different to the sound that I would listen to. It sounds like a concert. So I don't know if this is a Shura.
Speaker 0: Oh, there it is. Yeah, it is a Shura according to this, I think.
Speaker 1: Anyway. that's enough fun you can remove it stephanie um larry we have a ceasefire for the ceasefire today did you see the news well i didn't see the news i just saw that there was nothing happening let's because something happened uh qatar mediated and you let me read it so i i don't know how to say it in a way that you wouldn't laugh. So I'm just going to read, um, what the ax, sorry, actually access reported breaking the U S and Iran have agreed to a halt in attacks against each other and plan to meet in Doha on Tuesday for technical talks amid resolving their dispute over the straight of home was according to actual. So we have a, the breaking news is that we have a ceasefire.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, I mean, the reality is, is the United States violated, they broke, the MOU, they were the first ones to attack Iran. There is not a single word in the MOU that said, Iran is not allowed to implement the Persian Gulf Strait Authority protocols that it established and announced three weeks ago. Not a word, not one prohibition on that. That's what Iran was doing on Friday when the Ever Lovely tried to go through and Iran said, No, no, no, no, no, no, no. You want to come through, you fill out the paperwork, you submit it to the IRGC, we give you permission, you come through the lanes that we established. Everlove Leva said, you're not going to tell, well, they were acting on guidance from the United Kingdom. Whenever you get guidance from the Brits, it always goes well. I mean, they have nothing but the best interests of the world at heart. And Iran said, no, you're not doing that. You're going to You know, if you want to go through, you do the procedure, and they launched a drone at it. So then the United States says, well, we're going to attack Iran. On what basis? In the MOU, if the MOU had said that Iran commits to not requiring ships to go through the waters controlled by it, then perhaps the United States would have had a case, but it didn't say that. So let's stick with the MOU, what it allowed, what it didn't allow. And it was the United States that broke it first. And Iran said, okay, you break it, we're punching you back. But as we talked about the first day punch, it was largely symbolic. We thought yesterday was more active, but it turns out it was more symbolism, more military political theater because I had – I was assuming they were saying that Iran might be likely to strike – would strike back at the air bases from which those air operations were launched. They weren't launched from Kuwait or Bahrain. The U.S. is way off that. So what's telling is the fact that the United States didn't come back and try to retaliate. They were – again, they were just – it was said, we're going to show you who's boss,
Speaker 1: iran steps up and hits them back showing we can hit back harder than you can in the united states base but u.s back down that's what happened the u.s back down so what do you think will happen in these um whether i've got while we have a ceasefire we have a military build-up which i know you were talking about yesterday but there's some more information on that on both sides but before we go to the military build-up um Well, I don't know. We just had that back and forth. Now we have a meeting in Qatar. What changed? Nothing changed. We're still at the same position we were a week ago. Has anything changed?
Speaker 0: Well, Ron will sit down with the United States and say, here's the deal. This is how this works. Persian Gulf Strait Authority. Here's our document. Here's the protocols. This is how you want ships to come through. They submit an application to the IRGC. Here's the number. Here's the fax number, whatever. They submit that. We approve it. They go through. And, you know, we're not going to charge tolls for 60 days. So everybody's welcome to go. But follow our rules. That's all Iran's going to say. And all the United States has to say is, okay. And then anybody that wants to go in and out of the Gulf can go. It's not complicated. But, you know, the United States is trying to... you know, not trying to be honest in its dealings with Iran.
Speaker 1: So analysis on, so I've got a statement from Arachi and an analysis from HFI research on the Strait of Hormuz. My analysis of the Strait of Hormuz over the last 24 hours, so since the attacks, If the tankers use the Iran route, they are dominantly Iran-related. If the tankers use the Oman route, they are not Iran-related and never sanctioned. I have heard from ship owners that most tankers cannot use the Iran route because the EU has not lifted sanctions on the IRGC. Using the Iran route would risk sanctions, making the Oman route the only visible option. With more conflict going on between the IRGC and the U.S., the visible AIS data on Oman's tanker route is going to go dark again, which means Iran will have to keep escalating in order to completely halt flaws. For the U.S., the fact that the Oman route might be blocked presents it with a big ultimatum. Either the U.S. escalates or gives IRGC control of the Strait of Hormuz. Logic says there's no way that would happen, so escalation will continue. Given that Trump has made it obvious that he does not want to escalate, I fear that the IRGC will just keep escalating until they gain control. The issue is far from over. So essentially, it's a long way of saying that Trump doesn't want to escalate, but can't give Iran control of the Strait of Hormuz, so he'll keep trying to stop them. Iran will not give up the Strait of Hormuz, but the Iranians don't mind escalating, so the Iranians will escalate until the US blinks. This is the kind of summarizing the assessment. I'll read the Rachi's statement as well, put it into context. Any interference in any attempt to adopt new or separate arrangements from what Iran has in place regarding the Strait of Homs will only complicate the situation and delay the reopening of the Strait, increasing tensions as we witnessed incidents in the Strait of Homs over the last two nights that led to heightened tensions and conflicts. I ask all parties not to interfere in the management of the Strait of Homs and the arrangements made by the Islamic Republic of Iran for reopening the Strait to adhere to the signed MOU
Speaker 0: not to allow this mou to deviate from its course so that was a statement by arachi yeah so go back show me in the mou where the united states said now listen iran you're going to have to allow any ship that wants to go through all the umani side to go through the umani side and you know we're going to ignore whatever you did with the pgsa didn't say that at all us had the chance They didn't negotiate on that. They didn't insist on that. Iran made it very clear. Yeah, well, you know, in accordance with the outlines of what we put together for the Strait of Hormuz, we're not going to charge tolls for 60 days. Everybody can go for free. 60 days only, though. They said 60 days only. Now, I don't know when day one started.
Speaker 1: I guess in Versailles, the day Versailles was signed.
Speaker 0: So if it was signed on the 18th, we're now at the 28th, we're 10 days in. 50 days left. So, you know, the United States would have a legitimate bitch if they had put that into the MOU. They didn't. That's not Iran's fault. And Iran's just going, hey, we said that we got control of the Strait of Hormuz. We've issued a guidance. We've coordinated with the Omanis. Now, the Omanis are playing a game here, but Iran's just made it clear. No, you're not going to circumvent it. You're going to follow our rules. Now they come out and say, oh, well, if we go through the IRGC waters, we're violating EU sanctions. Well, that's EU's tough fucking problem, okay? And they can go to hell.
Speaker 1: So I-24 Israeli media put out this story. today as well. Iran is angry that ships are passing through the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz with U.S. encouragement. Every night, Iran launches at least six drones towards ships in the Strait. Some are intercepted by U.S. forces. The U.S. administration has made it clear that Iran will not be able to collect tolls or fees from ships in the Straits. Quote, this is a red line, according to an official. So just kind of saying what we've just been discussing. Nothing new there. And another report here that the...
Speaker 0: Well, I was just going to say, go look at everybody at home. We've got a computer, got an internet connection. You can connect to marinetraffic.com. They're not a sponsor of our video here. None of us are getting paid by them. But they keep track of you. They can show you what ships are going in, what ships are not, and where they're headed.
Speaker 1: The ones that have the transponders on. I was told that ships dropped, the traffic ships, The traffic of ships going through the Strait dropped considerably in the last two, three days since the clashes, back and forth clashes.
Speaker 0: Yeah, dramatically so. You know, right now I'm looking at it. There's the Charminar, which I guess is maybe a Malaysian ship, the Nikola, Guyana, So they appear, but they appear to be following the Iranian route. There are none right now that appear on the Omani channel. And the ones that are coming in, there's a Chinese ship, the Shenzhou, and there's also the Felicity, and its destination is Umm Kassar. So, you know, look, Iran said, hey, We'll allow the free flow, just do it our way. Here are our rules, follow our rules. And the United States, if they would have negotiated and said, no, ships, if like in the MOU, that Iran and the United States agree that ships can get in and out of the Strait any way they want. They could have put that in there, but they didn't. Because Iran said, no, no, no, no, no. We're going to retain and exercise our control over the territorial waters anyway, so at least half of the strait. But, you know, they're gonna shut it down. And the United States, economically, needs it open.
Speaker 1: So now the other, story today is the military buildup um so if you can show that video please uh stephanie so that's flight tracking analysis showing the sustained large air logistics surge across west asia so across the region wait wait wait how do you know it's a military buildup i'm just reading what was reported here okay could it be that it's actually traffic going the other way Could be.
Speaker 0: Actually, not could be, it is. That's what's happening. The order to start withdrawing U.S. forces was issued now three days ago. That's what's underway, a withdrawal of U.S. forces and U.S. assets.
Speaker 1: They're not bringing more in. Yeah, this one doesn't say bringing more in. No, it's good clarification because the statement here says, flight tracking analysis indicates the U.S. sustained large air logistics surge across West Asia. It doesn't say surge which way.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: So this could be part of the order that we're discussing.
Speaker 0: It absolutely is part of the order.
Speaker 1: So while this is happening... Go ahead.
Speaker 0: No, I just said the United States... The order to start the logistics withdrawal took place, I think, about three days ago. And, you know, if you go back and look at the buildup that took place prior to 28 of February, that went on for more than a month. You know, assets flying and going in. So once you get them there, you got to bring them home. That's what they're doing. They're bringing them home. It's... And I checked with someone. I said, is this, what are we seeing here? And they said, no, it's still the execute order to withdraw. That is still in place. That's being executed. And so that's what that shows. I think people are drawing the wrong conclusion because the United States is not, you know, at this point is not ready to go. It can't afford a sustained war, air war against Iran. Cannot afford it.
Speaker 1: Wouldn't they keep the military built up for longer during negotiations to keep pressure? So they would not want to, if you remove the military pressure, you make it pretty clear that the military option is completely off the table, which you wouldn't want to show the other negotiating side.
Speaker 0: Who was it that was asking for the MOU?
Speaker 1: The Americans, which is already showing weakness.
Speaker 0: Right.
Speaker 1: So they don't want to compensate for.
Speaker 0: Whose version of the MOU did they sign off on? The Iranian version – yeah, Iran could care less about, quote, U.S. military pressure at this point. If the U.S. wants to fight, they're going to fight. Iran has made its position very clear, and it's willing – look, it's willing to negotiate with the United States. It's willing, let's set terms, let's stop attacking each other. You, the United States, you need to pull out of Lebanon. You, the United States, you need to stop threatening us. To my knowledge, Iran has not issued a threat to destroy America. It was Donald Trump who issued a threat to destroy all of Iran. That violates the first paragraph of the MOU. It was the United States, not Iran, that launched the first attack against Iran. It wasn't Iran that attacked the United States. And Iran was going after ships that weren't U.S. flagged ships. But the West likes to have its interpretation that, oh, we're the victim. Those Iranians, they're bad people. Please.
Speaker 1: So talking about military buildup, the Iranian army spokesperson, Amir Akraminia, said the following, we have serious plans in two areas, domestic production and the procurement of advanced equipment from friendly countries. We will certainly be equipped with more advanced systems in the coming days. The drones we unveiled in the final days of the 40-day war are much more advanced than previous generations, like the Arash-2, and soon we will share their capabilities with the dear people of Iran. So there's a rearmament on the Iranian side based on the statement, which we know about already, but this is coming from the Iranian army spokesperson. On the Lebanon front, since you've mentioned Lebanon, so two things happened while we're speaking. The speaker of the parliament, Nabi Biri, who's considered the unofficial spokesperson of Hezbollah, allies of Hezbollah, he's the leader of Amal. He said, the US brokered agreement with Israel won't be implemented in its current form. So that comes after a lot of disagreement and division. And we talked a lot about it yesterday in Lebanon about the new ceasefire agreement. Um, so it's, um, I think the, the Hezbollah position is pretty clear. I'll give you some more statements just so we know. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Ismail Barghay, stated that Israel's withdrawal is an essential condition for a definite peace treaty between Iran and the US. There's statements saying he's saying the withdrawal of Israel is still part of the MOU. So Iran stands by their position that Israel has to withdraw. I-24 said, according to the security annex of the Israeli-Lebanon framework agreement, Israel will not only approve the location of pilot security zones, but will also deploy IDF forces to verify that the Lebanese armed forces have dismantled Hezbollah infrastructure before withdrawing. The report says the provision was included after previous ceasefire violations in which the Lebanese army reportedly told Israel that Hezbollah positions had been cleared ahead of planned Israeli strikes only for the infrastructure to remain in place. So according to I-24, the framework includes, the Lebanese military taking over the pilot zones and removing Hezbollah infrastructure. So apparently there's a clause in there that also says the IDF should be there to ensure this part is enforced. They should be in that territory they're meant to be withdrawing from to ensure enforcement.
Speaker 0: Right.
Speaker 1: Sounds like a great deal.
Speaker 0: Oh yeah, that's going to happen. I think I'm going to get my unicorn with zebra stripes before that happens.
Speaker 1: So Israeli Channel 12 has also reported, just to make it even more appealing for you, Larry. Although the Israeli-Lebanon agreement itself has been published in full, this is going to surprise you, this part, including by the U.S. State Department, a classified security annex remains undisclosed at Lebanon's request to avoid internal challenges from Hezbollah. The annex includes three key principles. One, no fixed withdrawal timetable. Any Israeli withdrawal will be based on conditions and performance on the ground, not deadlines. So that's a clause in the agreement. So there's no actual timetable for withdrawal. It's based on performance indicators, which is the disarmament of Hezbollah. So just to be clear, these are clauses allegedly in the agreement that the Lebanese government wanted not to include in the public release to avoid division internally. Number two. No expansion of the pilot program without Israeli approval. The two agreed pilot areas are the only ones for now. So before any pilot areas are expanded, the Israelis have to approve it. And number three, full IDF freedom of action within the yellow line, so the area they've got currently occupied, against immediate and emerging threats. the beginning of the pilot so these are the three clauses that they did not include in the agreement so essentially gives a lot more control for the israelis um of the of the framework and the implementation of the framework which hezbollah has made it clear and and nabibi just said it as well that they will not be abiding by the framework and also we have the i-24 report did we talk about the i-24 news report that according to the israelis hezbollah may attempt to attack Israel and retaliation for the agreement? Did I mention that? Did we talk about it yesterday?
Speaker 0: No, we didn't talk about it. But all I noted yesterday was so far the violation of the ceasefire has been primarily Israel, not Hezbollah. And Hezbollah has avoided going on the offensive against the Israelis during this. So Hezbollah is trying to uphold this part of the bargain with Iran, Israel,
Speaker 1: surprise surprise keeps breaking it what a shocker oh hezbollah just put out a statement listing for two minutes five minutes ago they put out a statement listing the israeli ceasefire violations an airstrike on a residential building in nabatia an airstrike on a residential building in maifadun a drone strike in on an open land in the town of frun the demolition of a residential of residential buildings in the town of tabia and hadatha a demolition in the town of majdalzoon the dropping of stun grenades near civilians in the towns of Burj Qalawiyah and Barashit, and suspicious objects were dropped over the towns of Nabatiya al-Fawqa and Kfar Tibnit. Hezbollah reiterates that what the Israeli army has done constitutes a blatant violation of the ceasefire to which we have adhered thus far, and we are monitoring and recording these violations and reserve the right to defend our homeland and our people. So Hezbollah put that statement about five minutes ago. I got it five minutes ago.
Speaker 0: Yeah, so I mean, you know, Hezbollah is not going anywhere. Israel will not defeat Hezbollah. Hell, they could need to defeat Hamas. So, you know, ultimately to have a peace, to have this two sides stop fighting, there's going to ultimately have to be a negotiated settlement. And Israel's going to have to make some concessions. But, you know, that's against sort of the... Zionist mentality, but, you know, this agreement that everybody was, you know, the U.S. government and Israel popping champagne corks over, absolutely meaningless. Absolutely, you know, just words on paper.
Speaker 1: What else do we have for you, Larry? Israeli and US officials say relations between Washington and Jerusalem have been strained significantly following the Iran war. J.D. Vance recently warned that Israel has, quote, almost no friends left. So it's an article by Politico about how the division between the US and the Israelis is getting worse. It talks about Growing concern in Israel that it can no longer expect special treatment under Trump's America First foreign policy, according to Politico. Israeli officials view J.D. Vance's remarks as a low point, while sources say Netanyahu can no longer count on automatic White House backing ahead of the October elections in Israel. And we've got another report here. Support for Israel is showing signs of erosion within the Republican Party, particularly among younger conservative voters. following the war in Gaza and tensions between it. The Axios report highlights criticism from Vance and prominent America First figures, like Tucker, while polls suggest Republicans' attitudes are shifting. In April, Pew Research Survey found 40% of Republicans view Israel unfavorably, rising to 57% among Republicans aged 18 to 49, while University of Maryland poll found only 22% of Republicans age 18 to 24 supported Israel's military campaign in Gaza. So it's a trend we've talked a lot about, but Axios put out a new report showing some new figures.
Speaker 0: Yeah. I mean, the bloom is off that rose. And it's been the Israeli arrogance on this and the brutality with the Palestinians. Because they're not just killing Muslims. They'd love to be able to portray this. Yeah, we're purging the world of these crazy fanatical Muslims that want to kill Christians. You know, that's been the narrative in the past. They're killing Christians that happen to be Palestinian. They're killing Christians that happen to be Lebanese. And I think Tucker, to his credit, is not letting up on that. He is, you know, pounding, pounding, pounding, and others are picking up on the message. So, And his point is, I think Tucker's point is very entirely reasonable. The purpose of the President of the United States is to pursue the interests of the United States, not the interests of Israel. The interests of the United States is we need the Persian Gulf open so that the critical commodities that come out of the Persian Gulf go into the world economy, reduce the shortage, and allow normal economic activity to go on. We've already seen the effect now of the shutoff of the helium that came out of Qatar. 44% of the world's supply. So what did Apple announce last week, the week before last? The cost of iPhones are going to go up $200. Cost of MacBook Pros, $300. Well, when you start raising prices like that, people are not, you know, with any good, you know, this is, you know, I don't want to, I'll get technical. It's not an inelastic good. An inelastic good is a good, you got a half. You know, it's like if your only source of water was a bottle of water, It doesn't matter whether it's $5 or $10 or $20. You're going to pay it because you've got to have the water. You don't got to have a new computer.
Speaker 1: You don't got to have it.
Speaker 0: Yeah, it's quite elastic. The price of that goes up too high. You say, I'll just look at it, but I ain't eating it. So, you know, this... The economic disruption has been, it's been mass by up to this point. And people are pointing, see, the price of the future barrel of oil is going down. That doesn't, what do you, okay, let's say the future price of barrel of oil is like $75. Here's the challenge. Find any ship that right now has a load of oil on it and see if they'll sell that oil to you for $75 a barrel. They won't. that price would be like $130, $140 a barrel, if not more. So stop kidding yourself. Stop this self-delusion. Recognize that there is a definite economic impact that has not completely unfolded on the world economy. But it started. U.S. inflation is up. The Apple computer is the first one out of the gate. look at other systems on the AI front, they too rely on computers. And those computers have computer chips. Those computer chips now cost more because there are fewer being made because there's less helium and there's increased demand for them. So the people who are willing to pay more are the ones who are going to get them.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, you've explained one of the reasons why we're seeing that massive shift in the sentiment in the US around Israel. Another one is just social media allows people to see what's happening, especially in Gaza. So that really changed the equation. I don't know. I worry that the acquisition of TikTok by Paramount is going to change things. I heard reports that pro-Palestinian accounts were being censored. I'm not sure to what extent.
Speaker 0: Well, I'm sure they are. I mean, that was the entire purpose. The Ellison's, I mean, Ellison's are big Zionists. And, you know, they were, so they thought, oh, if we can control, well, as long as we can control the information, we'll be able to shape public opinion. They didn't pay attention to what, to the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War. So the Soviet Union tried that, tried to crack down, tried to keep people from getting free information. And this was in the pre-internet age. This was back when you had written documents and they created what was called Samizdat. And Samizdat were these papers and books and magazine articles that were circulating, people carrying them hand to hand, handing them off. The government couldn't stop it. And you think they can stop the social media? Forget about it. Yeah, they can shut down TikTok and then people migrate to another platform. And there are plenty of other platforms. platforms out there. You know, there's Rumble, there's Odyssey, there's BitChute. They're not as big or as widespread as YouTube, for example. Certainly not as big as TikTok. But, you know, to Elon Musk's credit, he's allowed X to be an open platform. largely uncensored platform. And kudos to Elon for doing that. He's played an important role in ensuring freedom of expression. You've got to allow people to have discussions like you and I are having a discussion right now. It's not guided by propaganda. And we can rebut what we see as propaganda, and then people can make their own choice.
Speaker 1: Hmm. Uh, so that's on the sentiment shift in, um, in, in the U S on Israel. Um, interesting news when it comes to the Gulf. So the national asked, uh, the secretary general of the GCC, the, so the journalist said, uh, GCC countries open to investing in Iran. The answer was we've done it before. we've talked to them about it before if we have a normal relationship with iran or any other country then we are open to investments we are open to we are open to talking about ways to help each other out and cooperate so that's um the secretary general of the gc his name is general secretary general jasim al-budai budai where is he from let me find out What's your guess?
Speaker 0: I don't know. My guess, I would say probably UAE. UAE, maybe Kuwait as the secondary.
Speaker 1: But I think all GovCon, I'm just checking now. He is Kuwaiti. Oh, okay. So, but he's talking about the GCC investing, which I think I wouldn't be surprised if we are seeing the beginning of a change in the relationship between the GCC and Iran. Meanwhile, Israeli weapons, so according to Haaretz, Israeli weapons systems have been sold to Qatar and Saudi, including anti-missile defense systems and combat helmets for their F-15 fighter jets, with a deal worth hundreds of millions of dollars. LB Systems installed Sea Music air defense systems on three Qatari Royal Fleet aircraft, protecting the Emirates planes. Israeli companies also supplied components for Qatar's F-15QAs and Saudi's F-15SAs fleet, including JHMC-S helmets and night vision goggles. Also, Haaretz reports, Israeli defense companies... Oh, that's the same report. The contracts to Qatar were worth... in the hundreds of millions, $150 to $250 million. But that was between... Okay, so that's before, that's a report that just came in, but I think that's before the war.
Speaker 0: Okay, so that's components to equipment they've sold beforehand.
Speaker 1: But it shows that there is a pretty significant integration between, if they have their own defense technologies, Israeli defense technologies on the planes of the Emir of Qatar. It just shows how intertwined it all is. You've got Israel striking Qatar, but also Qatar's, Emir's plane, the leader of Qatar's plane has Israeli defense systems on it. It's just all overlapping. And there's no real, all intertwined as well. And to be honest, that's a good thing. The more someone mentioned, oh, Alan Ayer said something to me. I think it was him or someone else actually. We're talking about why the Gulf and the region has wars all the time. It's like the economies need to be more intertwined to prevent wars. If Iran and the Gulf do a lot of business together, the Gulf would be a lot more hesitant to allow the US to use their base to strike one of their business partners. And the more economic integration we have between the Gulf, between the region, including Israel, the more peace we have in the region, which is a really interesting point. And he started using examples of other countries where they've increased economic ties, and that's kind of the concept of globalization. The more globalized and interdependent the world is, the less likely we are to go through a world war. But the Gulf are not really that interdependent. They're dependent on the outside world. They don't do much business together. They do business with the outside world, with Europe, with the US, with China, which is a really fascinating point. a bit off topic from the military into the intertwining of the militaries, Israeli and Gulf militaries, but from an economic perspective, I think those countries doing more business together could finally lead to more peace in the region.
Speaker 0: As long as it's not dependent on the petrodollar.
Speaker 1: Yeah, because that gives the US control, more control.
Speaker 0: And that's why China, Russia, BRICS, they're moving to an alternative financial system. That's why China's SIPs right now is replacing SWIFT, at least among the BRICS countries. And there's gonna come a time when it will surpass SWIFT. And then all of a sudden, the Western banks are gonna be looking around saying, okay, what do we do? Because remember, right now in the top 10, banks in the world, the top four are Chinese. That was not the case 20 years ago. So this financial – the financial control that has been exercised, let's say, out of the City of London and out of Western banking, that's crumbling. That's starting to go away. Again, what should we look for as markers to indicate that it might be reversing? if countries started saying, hey, we got to go buy U.S. treasuries. But they're not. They're doing the opposite. They're selling treasuries. They're buying gold and investments in China. Just China setting up basically a gold-based system that you invest in that and yours, it's backed by gold.
Speaker 1: So it's actually- They establish warehouses in other countries that will store the gold that collateralizes the loans you have from China.
Speaker 0: a new system i read about it a while ago so you know we're uh and this is not going to get sorted out overnight or next week this is you know this may take months or or a couple of years but but it's the the movement gotta you know gotta look at the the trajectory what is the trajectory and the trajectory is away from the petrodollar movement into alternative methods of settling accounts.
Speaker 1: It'd be interesting to see what the Gulf do.
Speaker 0: Yeah, and that's what's really, you know, sort of hurt Dubai's banking sector because in the past they were, you know, they were entirely petrodollar based and, you know, and Iran has learned you can't trust your money there because the U.S. can seize it and say, even though it's your money, we're going to take it. Well, that's theft. And countries are tired of being robbed for whatever high-minded reason the United States offers to say, oh, well, we're doing this for world peace or whatever. No, they're doing it to try to retain U.S. control. And this is the frustration you're seeing a lot on the U.S. side that we're pitching temper tantrums when countries are you know, don't obey and find another way.
Speaker 1: And final story of the day is related to Gaza. Peoples that have been forgotten, really, with all the news that's been happening. First piece of news is not positive, to be honest. Senior Israeli intelligence Southern Command officials warned IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir that Hamas is preparing for renewed attacks war, according to Khan Yous. The officials said Hamas is producing hundreds of explosive devices and anti-tank missiles each month, recruiting fighters aged 18 to 22, trading Nukbar militants, attempting to smuggle drones and communications equipment from the Sinai, and rebuilding underground infrastructure across Gaza. They also warned that Hamas remains strong on the ground, faces no real threat to its control, and is unwilling to give up power in Gaza. The IDF has told the US that fighting should resume while Washington opposes renewed combat and wants to preserve the current framework agreement. But just to be clear, under the current framework agreement, another story as well by Al Jazeera, so just going to put that in there as well, 2 million people are being forced to live on just 36% of their own land. That's what's left of Gaza after Israel's expansion of the yellow line, now joined by a new orange line. The UN says it adds another 11% of territory to the restricted zone, bringing the total to 64% of the strip. Saad Yassin, a father of five, they start telling stories about essentially Israel invading more territory of Gaza. But the first sentence, I think what matters, 2 million people are being forced to live on just 36% of their own land. And that's a region that was already extremely populated even before this whole war started. But what do you make of the Khan News report about Hamas re-arming? Is there any truth to it that Hamas is actually re-arming and smuggling weapons? Or are we looking to build a league to really justify more military action in Gaza? But that actually aligns with what we went through a few days ago, by the way, that apparently the Americans are restricting the Israelis... On more than just the Lebanese front, they forced the Israelis to a ceasefire in Lebanon. But according to the report, I can't remember who it was at the time, New York Times or someone, the Americans also are not authorizing or not allowing the Israelis to restart military operations in Gaza, which is mentioned in this report by Khan News.
Speaker 0: Well, I mean, the reality remains that Hamas has not been defeated. I don't know how they're getting resupplied. They've had to have some resupplies, so I think that's an important question. But again, it goes to show the limitations of Israeli military power. They can't kill their way out of it. They've tried. They've probably killed upwards of 100,000 Palestinians, if not more, and to me it is absolutely amazing how the Palestinians have survived this. So at some point, these other Arab nations and Muslim nations have signed on with Trump's Board of Peace. You know, at some point, they're going to have to start asserting themselves and wait a second, you know, the Palestinians have got to be protected. This is not a free fire zone for Israel to just kill whoever they want. And they continue to kill, not Hamas fighters, they're killing women and children. I mean, good God, it's awful.
Speaker 1: Yeah, and one more piece of news on the Gaza front. Channel 13 says the following, Israel has quietly renamed its Gaza, quote, voluntarily emigration, emigration, emigration people come in, emigration people go out, you send people out of the country. what Gaza renamed, what it used to call, Israel renamed what it used to call Gaza Voluntary Immigration Program to, quote, free movement program amid intense international criticism. The official acknowledged that Hamas is in Gaza, it is not going anywhere, and that Israel wants to facilitate the departure of many Gazans abroad as possible. The name change is not expected to dramatically shift the position of countries that have refused to accept Gazan refugees. Some people argue like Mario, they like tell me, Mario, which other country You know, when there's war, they don't let people leave a war zone like Ukraine. People could leave Ukraine because the country's at war. My answer to them is like, this is why people like me who, you know, if you want to use semantics, why a lot of people are calling it genocide, because it shows that there is intent not just to kill people and to cause destruction. There's intent to get rid of peoples, to get rid of Palestinians out of Gaza, war, crime, genocide, whatever you want to call it. but it fits the definition of a genocide. You're getting rid of a culture in Gaza, a people in Gaza. But yeah, they're renaming it, but it's the same thing. They acknowledge, the official acknowledge, Israel wants to facilitate the departure of as many Gazans abroad as possible. So that's the last piece of news today on the Gaza front.
Speaker 0: Boy, you're a cheery soul. Can we get some good news out of you someday?
Speaker 1: uh well netanyahu said this about turkey quote hardly a day goes by without erdogan calling for the destruction of the state of israel we take these words very seriously because if there is one thing we have learned from the history of our people it is that when someone says they intend to destroy you you should take them seriously we take these statements seriously and we will also bring them to the attention of our american friends we are not ignoring them by the way i looked it up today because in one of my interviews someone mentioned them to be clear the israelis have a lot of hawkish words against Turkey, Erdogan's also saying some pretty extreme things. There's one statement he made that we wouldn't hesitate to go into Israel or to attack Israel, something along those lines. I'm badly paraphrasing here. But it's both that have, that are being pretty aggressive in their rhetoric, both Erdogan and the Israeli side. So I didn't know that Erdogan is being that... You know the expression, talk is cheap?
Speaker 0: Yeah, I agree.
Speaker 1: They do business together, yeah.
Speaker 0: When Erdogan cuts off the flow of oil, then I'll take him seriously. Until then, he's just flapping his gums to keep his lungs exercised.
Speaker 1: Yeah, this is a quote that I saw. That's from 2024. We must be very strong so that Israel can do these ridiculous things to Palestine. Just like we entered Karabakh, just like we entered Libya, we might do similar to them, to Israel. There is no reason why we cannot do this. We must be strong so that we can take these steps. So that was, according to Reuters, what Erdogan said in 2024. But yeah, this is why I haven't been worried. One of my guests said they're pretty worried about it, about the worsening of the rhetoric between these two countries. But I like the fact that they do business together. That says a lot. But countries doing business together have gone into war before.
Speaker 0: You know it's serious. when Erdogan finally says, okay, I'm not going to keep enriching my family with all this oil that's going to Israel. We're going to cut it off. When they cut it off, okay, then it's serious.
Speaker 1: Let's hope they don't cut it off because the last thing we want to see is war between Turkey and Israel. We have enough wars for now.
Speaker 0: Well, listen, I'm all in favor of let's stop the killing. But, you know, right now the one that is doing most of the killing is Israel. No other country is killing as many civilians as they are. Not an anti-Semitic comment, just a statement of fact.
Speaker 1: Larry, good to see you.
Speaker 0: Well, you did a nice job of shaving your head, getting that, you know, the well-groomed Mario Nafal.
Speaker 1: You did a great job changing your shirt, the well-dressed Larry Johnson.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I try not to wear the same clothes every day. My wife insists, go get a shower, clean your, you know. She who must be obeyed. All right, my friend. All right, my friend. You have a great, I guess it's now morning for you, a great morning. And we will see you later in the day tomorrow, I'm sure.
Speaker 1: Thank you, Larry. See you.
Speaker 0: All right, my friend. Bye-bye.
Speaker 1: Take care. All right, guys. We'll be going live again tomorrow. No more lives today. I hope you enjoyed the conversation with Larry. And today's conversation, I always like to recommend one conversation. Two conversations I'm going to recommend today. The first one is Alan Ayer. He's a regular on the show, but today's conversation got pretty deep, trying to understand... situation not only in iran the us but the entire region um i mentioned part of our conversation on how the interdependence economic interdependence in the region could lead to more peace but that was a really interesting conversation more interesting than all the other conversations i've had with him and it got a lot of great feedback a lot of great comments and another conversation which um you'll probably you know you'll you'll disagree with the guest heavily but that's with you shy flasher if you're really keen to listen to try to understand how which is what i'm interested in how those you disagree with see things that's a conversation it's a 90-minute conversation that i recommend you listen to that's the second time i have yishai on the show the first time i didn't know who he was just jumped on it was in the midst of war and it was very hostile very aggressive very defensive um because he i think he he kind of he knows my stance on bangvir and israeli foreign policy but this one was a lot more cordial and and uh I found it a lot more interesting and helpful. It allowed me to understand how he sees things. So these are the two conversations I recommend. Otherwise, I hope you enjoyed today's coverage as always. And as always, I'll also see you tomorrow. Malcolm Nansen's conversation an hour and a half, two hours ago. You should check that one out as well. He went off today. He was fired up. So that's another one I highly recommend if you haven't listened to it. It was just before Larry. That was a great conversation. That was a military conversation talking about what is happening in the Strait of Hormuz, what the Americans are targeting, why the American attacks on Iran will not work, what he would do instead if he was asked by the president to gain control or to break Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz. I think you'll enjoy his answer. Guys, I'll see you tomorrow. Thank you so much. Let me know what you think in the comments. As always, I'll go through them now. Bye-bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I was struck by Alan Eyre’s take: Iran didn’t need to win the war, just outlast the one that started it. He frames it through Clausewitz: Iran is making diplomacy a form of war. On U.S. strikes after ship attacks, he calls it flailing, like a chess endgame whose ending is already there. He adds: America’s reach is over, and Lebanon is doomed.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇮🇷🇺🇸 Iran didn't need to win the war. It just had to outlast the country that started it. Alan Eyre spent 40 years in U.S. diplomacy and was a core negotiator on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). His read on this moment is sharp, and not what most people expect: "Clausewitz said war is diplomacy by other means. Iran is saying diplomacy is war by other means." On the U.S. striking Iran every time Iran hits a ship: "It's flailing." He compares it to a chess endgame where the ending is already visible, the U.S. just hasn't accepted it. On America's broader trajectory: "This is 4% of the world controlling 25% of its resources. Well done. But yeah, it's done." His verdict on Lebanon: "doomed." I learned a lot from this conversation with @AlanEyre1, and I think you will too.
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation discusses how vague commitments in the Iran-related MoU and regional agreements are being contested amid renewed fighting around the Strait of Hormuz, where ships are struck on the Omani side and the U.S. retaliates when Iran does so. The guests argue that the MoU’s language is not meant to be applied word-by-word because it was designed to remain vague to allow time for specifics. Instead, they frame the situation as a practical contest over control: Iran does not want the Omani side of the Strait to return to open “freedom of navigation” as before, while the U.S. does not want a new status quo that is controlled by Iran. The repeated kinetic exchanges are described as part of diplomacy rather than its opposite.
One speaker argues the MoU functions as an invitation to talk, not as a system with an enforceable international-law mechanism, noting there is no judge empowered to determine whether either party violated it. He characterizes the current environment as Hobbesian after the Persian Gulf system was broken by the U.S. and Israel, with Iran believing it must retain control over the strait for its ongoing existence and viewing diplomacy as “war by other means.” He adds that Iran’s leadership sees the U.S. and Israel as dedicated to their destruction, so even when bombing stops temporarily, the strategic goal of deterrence through control of the strait remains.
The discussion turns to why Iran wants operational and administrative control over day-to-day maritime traffic rather than just military capability. The speaker says Iran’s power includes the ability to shut down traffic kinetically via missiles and drones, especially given the effect on international insurance markets. However, Iran also wants ships to coordinate with the relevant authority (PGSA) because it is easier than repeatedly bombing ships. He emphasizes that Iran wants to demonstrate to Gulf states and others that transit occurs only by Iranian “sufferance,” not merely that Iran can close the strait at will. He also argues that this is not primarily about money now because there could be a period with no tolls or service fees, but about full operational control. He references a Bloomberg report quoting Oman telling European officials there is no way to return to the pre-war status quo, with possible fees for services such as depolluting the strait or helping ships navigate, and he contrasts this with the uncertainty around whether fees are obligatory.
The other speaker asks why the U.S. strikes Iran every time Iran strikes ships, including whether it aims to degrade Iran’s ability to control the strait (such as destroying radars and fast attack boats) or whether it is trying to dissuade Iran from seeking control. The response is that the U.S. cannot keep the strait open by military means alone and that the U.S. is improvising rather than executing a fully thought-out strategy. He argues the U.S. is trying to preclude an Iranian-controlled outcome without conceding prematurely, noting Iran is reconstituting coastal capabilities quickly.
On Lebanon, the conversation explains that both the Iranian MoU and a separate Lebanon agreement relate to Hezbollah, yet Hezbollah is not a signatory to either. One speaker says the Lebanese agreement is essentially a sop offered to the U.S. to show cooperation, but that it will not change the underlying dynamic: the Lebanese armed forces cannot disarm Hezbollah, Hezbollah will not disarm unilaterally, and Israel will not withdraw from southern Lebanon while Hezbollah is there. He argues Lebanon is therefore stuck with a state-within-a-state problem unless Hezbollah control changes, and he links the broader instability to Israel’s trauma after October 7th and its belief that threats must be eliminated—an approach he suggests Israel is still learning cannot work as hoped.
The speakers also discuss Hezbollah’s role as Iran’s “extended defense” and describe Hezbollah as currently weaker than before but still essential for Iran’s forward-defense strategy. They argue Iran will not back down on the strait and Hezbollah, and also will not give up indigenous enrichment, though enrichment might be suspended while retaining certain capabilities. They discuss a possible long-term normalization pathway: gradually lifting sanctions and unfrozen assets over years could make it harder to revert to isolation later, which they frame as a hypothetical deal structure that could involve Lebanese military rearmament as a deterrent against Israel. The counterpoint is that Iran views global economic integration as U.S.-controlled, and that the leadership prefers “reigning in hell” rather than serving in “heaven,” with Iran also profiting under sanctions conditions.
Towards broader regional dynamics, the conversation argues the Persian Gulf system must find a new normal after being broken. It predicts the U.S. will be less important in the Gulf than before, GCC states will adjust, and Iran’s post-war condition could make it more dangerous because it is weaker and more militarized under IRGC elites. It adds that transitional periods are dangerous and notes the U.S.’s stated shift in focus toward China, alongside the idea that earlier military commitments have wasted armaments that take years to reconstitute.
The conversation closes by tying conflicts back to narratives and myths, arguing that the Israeli-Palestinian issue underpins multiple actors’ positions and that different groups use it as a vehicle for broader nationalistic or ideological goals. The final question addresses heated rhetoric between Turkey and Israel, concluding that while it can be political and domestic-support driven, it reflects deeper strategic interest clashes and is concerning.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: You've got a bunch of great guests. I love that guy. Was it Jeff Curry and you got Trita?
Speaker 0: Jeff is good. Trita is a regular. He's on every couple of days, every two or three days. Jeff is really good. He's an economist. You know him from before?
Speaker 1: No, I just came across trolling social media. I started listening to him. It's like the 80-20 rule. After a while, you sift through a lot of stuff and you find a a number of people who you just always seek out. There's like Hamid Riza Azizi, Danny Citrinowitz, Saul for maritime shipping, Curry for commodities. You know, you just, you know, Ali Voez. You just find people who you're like, okay, what does this person think?
Speaker 0: Ali Voez on my show? No, I'm just saying in general, these are the people I see. Okay. All the names you've mentioned I've had on my show, except Ali. Azizia was on my show. He was on my show for you. He's Iranian, correct?
Speaker 1: Yeah, but he's a direct Marshall fund.
Speaker 0: Yeah, yeah. Yeah, I had him on the show for the first time a few days ago. I'm sure I'll have him back. He was a great discussion. Yeah, we have – the team does a great job in getting incredible guests. That's why I always wonder why you always pop up on the calendar. I'm like, there's – uh his exception i'm joking it'll all be home runs you know every now and then progression from statistics exactly but no i love having you on for obvious reasons but one of the best parts is um Just seeing you disappointed by how this is going. It's like you spent your life doing something incredible. We're actually satisfied. Satisfied because now we appreciate the work you did. Satisfied.
Speaker 1: I'll tell you why I'm satisfied. Because I've been wrong about Iran for 40 years. In the sense that you always think, well, this will probably happen, and it doesn't. Iran always sort of goes pear-shaped. It always goes sideways. But this one... has been like tic-tac-toe. It's been so easy to call that it has fed into my megalomania. I'm like, wow, I'm really good because I say this will happen and it happens. So to use a British term, I'm quite chuffed because this is like the first time I've been consistently right. But that's because, again, it's been so easy, not because I've gotten smarter.
Speaker 0: Also, there's a new level of appreciation for the work you've done. with a JCPOA, seeing how difficult it is here to even come up with an MOU and abide by an MOU. So we're going to get a JCPOA 2.0, just more friendly towards Iran, obviously, because we have no choice. We're not going to get that far. We're not even going to get a bad agreement. I mean, eventually. I'm not saying now. Maybe in five years or so.
Speaker 1: Yeah, next administration, perhaps, yeah. If you get a competent administration back in power, and I don't say that in a partisan manner, I just started reading this latest book, Regime Change, by, was it those, about the Trump first year? Maggie, yeah, you know, it's about the first year of the Trump administration.
Speaker 0: The new book that came out.
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, and it's pretty much, again, you know, things are usually what they seem, you know?
Speaker 0: Let's, I'm actually really excited to talk to you. I'm always excited, but today more so because of the, what's happening in the Strait of Hormuz. So a lot of people are reading the MOU. They're like, it says this, but they're breaching it because of that. Like it says this, but it means this, not that. But I tell people like the MOU is not really, you know, try and go by it word by word. It's a framework because it's created vague for a reason because, you know, they need time to get to specifics. So when you look at what's happening in the Strait of Hormuz, a lot of people, me included, are like, hey, Iran is breaching it because it says it will do its best effort to allow for the safe passage. And then someone's like, no, but it mentions that and they have 30 days before allowing for the safe passage. Or when it comes to Lebanon, the MOU says, respect the sovereignty of Lebanese territory. But then someone else is like, yes, but they are respecting the sovereignty of Lebanon because Lebanon as a state just did an agreement with Israel and the US is respecting that. So, We complained about, not complained, but we recognized that the MOU was vague and that's going to become a problem. And now we are going through the problem. So my first question for you is, instead of looking at the MOU and nitpicking bit by bit, I want to ask you more pragmatically speaking. What's happening in the Strait of Hormuz is Iran doesn't want the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz to be open for everyone, freedom of navigation like it once was. Even if it's Omani territorial waters, Iran doesn't want that because of the war they've been through. And the US doesn't want a new status quo in the Strait of Hormuz that is controlled by Iran. And what we're seeing right now is each side trying to assert what they want in the Straits. Iran doing it by striking ships that go through the Omani side, and the US striking Iran whenever Iran strikes a ship on the Omani side. So maybe before getting to specific questions, I'd love to get your analysis of the current status quo.
Speaker 1: I think you're exactly right. But I would say the MOU isn't even a framework. The MOU is an invitation to talk. It says, let's stop fighting for the time being, and let's talk about these topics. And sure, it provides a putative framework. But here's the key fact. There is no international law. There's no judge with a wig saying, and a gavel who's going to pound and go, hey, Iran, you're not living up to the MOU or hey, United States, you just violated the MOU. So the MOU has served its utility. And protestations that, oh, President Trump violated Article 1 by threatening Iran or Iran violated Article 5. by firing on ships in Omani territorial waters. Doesn't matter. We're in this Hobbesian world right now where we had this complex system in the Persian Gulf, the US and Israel broke it, and now people are setting the bones of this body. And Iran thinks it vital for its ongoing existence because it's still on a war footing and it still sees diplomacy. Clausewitz said, war is diplomacy by other means. Iran is saying diplomacy is war by other means. So it is insisting that it retain control over the strait. And it's willing to risk everything for that. So you're right. That is now the fulcrum of attention. But these, you know, kinetic back and forth, that's part of diplomacy. That's not in contradistinction to diplomacy.
Speaker 0: I love these, uh, analogies. Um, so what's this one again? So what class was says is that a war is diplomacy by other means. Yeah. Um, and Iran saying diplomacy, no war by the means.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. Because again, that's a good one. People like JD Vance go, Oh, you know, I've talked to the IRGC. They, you know, like the US and they want to be like us when they grow up or whatever. That's nonsense. You know, Iran right now, the people running Iran see the US and Israel, which they see as logically equivalent, as dedicated to their destruction. So, yeah, the bombs have stopped for the time being. But in their minds, the US and Israel will continue trying to topple the Islamic Republic. So what it has to do is find strategic deterrence. Okay. Which is why, even though Hezbollah really is, you know, the juice isn't worth a squeeze at this point because there's only so much they can do, but they have this new form of strategic deterrence, which is control of the straight. They're not going to let that go. Okay.
Speaker 0: Okay. So two points here, something you mentioned that surprised me. That's interesting. Hezbollah, the juice is not worth the squeeze. Number two is, um, I'm writing the notes. I don't forget the juice is not worth. Okay. The second point, because I want to address the second point, you said about Iran doesn't want to give up their control of the Strait of Hormuz. What does that mean? Because them allowing ships to go through the Omani side doesn't mean they've given up control in the sense that they can close it at any time. They've given up the legal control of being able to charge a fee, but they can still close the Strait of Hormuz. whenever they feel threatened or something happens that they don't agree with, they still have the ability. So why are there adamant ensuring ships pay them? Is that to ensure legal control, not just military control? Um, or is that because they need the money that comes out of it? Do you know what I mean with the question?
Speaker 1: No, I, and that's a great question because you're right. Ultimately Iran's power comes from the ability to close the traffic to the street, right? And they can do that because they've got missiles and drones. And given the tremors in the international insurance market, especially these days, that suffices. However, they want administrative operational day-to-day control. They want all ships coordinating with the PGSA because as a practical matter, that's an easier form of control to maintain than bombing a ship every time it goes through, hugging the Omani coastline, right? And plus, this is... You know, what's happening now is a power dynamic between the U.S. and Iran. And by the U.S. saying you can go through the Omani waters, we got you. It's an either or situation. So Iran wants to show both the Gulf countries and everyone else that ships go through the strait only by Iranian sufferance. And yes, they could show that. by allowing ships to go through Omani waters. But again, if they go through Omani waters, they're not courting with Iran. And it's not the money now, because they're perfectly willing to charge no tolls, no service fees for 60 days. What they want is full operational control of maritime traffic. And you saw today, there was a piece in Bloomberg where one of the Omani officials was saying, yeah, you know, this might be the new normal. You know, Oman's between a rock and a hard place. So Ultimately, just to repeat myself, you're right. As long as Iran maintains the ability to shut down the strait kinetically, that checks part of the bill. But what is far preferable is this PGSA, is Iran, you know, with this new insurance agency selling wartime insurance to ships passing through, which as Sal pointed out, you know, is like such a protection racket. You know, that's what they want. And I think that's what the US will have to accept because at the end of the day, that's not gonna add too much to the price of oil or oil derivatives. The Gulf countries will have to pay the brunt of that. And if that's the price President Trump has to pay to extricate himself from this morass, I think he'll do it.
Speaker 0: Yeah, the Bloomberg piece you're talking about, let me read a quote from it. Oman has told European officials there's no way of going back to the pre-war status quo with the Strait of Hormuz, and transiting ships may have to be charged some fees. While Omani officials said they will always abide by international maritime law, they added that there could be fees for services related to depolluting the strait or helping ships navigate it. It's unclear if Oman said all these fees would be obligatory. Yeah. But so why... Why is the US striking Iran every time Iran strikes those ships? Is it just to degrade Iran? Is the US trying to take advantage of this situation to degrade Iran's ability to control the Strait of Homs by destroying radars and the fast attack boats? Or is it genuinely trying to dissuade Iran from wanting to control the Strait of Homs? Do they really think there's a possibility where Iran does not control the Strait of Homs? And is that actually a possibility? We're acting like it's a given. We're acting like it's a given. Is it really a given that Iran will control it?
Speaker 1: I think it's, you know, essentially flailing. You're right. You know, it's like those positions in the end games in chess where, you know, you can see five moves ahead and you know that this piece is going to, you know, the king is going to be checkmated. I think that the U.S. has found out it cannot keep open the Strait by military means alone. Okay. It can, it was trying to carve out this, this, you know, constricted passage through the Omani coastline and establish that as it were as a beachhead on which to build. But Iran correctly assessed that no, that dog won't hunt and attacked. And why did the U S retaliate? You're saying again, what other options does it have? You know, it's in a tough strategic situation. It's not going to say, Oh, okay, we tried and we failed, so have at it, Iran. I think it's still trying to find a way to preclude this from happening. You know, there's a good saying in Persian. They say, which means that from this column to that column, there is, you know, salvation. And it's about this guy who is tied to a post who is going to be executed. And he said, well, wait a second. can you move me to that post instead, instead of this post? And the executioner is like, OK, whatever. And between the time he was moved, some important person passed by, and this guy shouted out a plea, and his life was saved. So that's the saying. It's like, from this post to that post, there could be .. Why not risk it? The Persians have another good saying. They say, the stone is free, the sparrow is free. Pick up a rock from the ground. Throw it at the bird, you might hit it. So, again, this is not part of a well-thought-out strategy by the United States. President Trump is improvisational, okay? He tries stuff, and if it doesn't work, you know, he'll try something else. It's too early in the game for the U.S. to fully acquiesce to Iranian control of the Strait, I think, you know? And I think they realize they can't significantly attrit Iranians coastal capabilities especially because as reporting is showing Iran is quickly reconstituting it but what other option do you have also could it be symbolic just to show the Gulf like hey we're trying exactly that's a great point I hadn't thought of that yeah I mean look at Rubio's trip you know all this is the backdrop Rubio's trip to the GCC countries they submit you know they put out that testosterone laden final statement and that irritates, you know, Iran tremendously, right? So, yeah, I think that President Trump and this administration are not willing to be seen as throwing the whole GCC under the bus, you know, this early in the game. They're going to need them if for no other reason for this, you know, ridiculous $300 billion investment fund. So, yeah, that's a very good point I hadn't thought of, Mario.
Speaker 0: That's just our own laden statement from the GCC. It did piss off the Iranians, by the way. So what do you make of the Lebanese agreement? How do we make sense of that along with the Iranian one? Like I spoke to two experts in Middle East negotiations, Daniel Levy, Israeli negotiator, and Aaron David Miller, State Department. Both of them significant experience. I spoke to them both yesterday about this. And they had completely different takes. They perceived the Lebanese agreement in completely different ways. One believes it was a horrible agreement that kneecaps a better agreement that the Iranians are trying to enforce. And the other believes it's a great agreement, the best they could do. While he doesn't believe it could be actualized for obvious reasons, he does believe that it's a pretty good agreement. So where do you stand on this? And how do you... It's just such a weird, bizarre situation. Which agreement takes precedent? How do the two fit in together, the Iranian MOU and the... the Lebanon agreement, which both don't have Hezbollah as a signatory to either of them. You know, I think... And they're both about Hezbollah. They both relate to Hezbollah, but Hezbollah hasn't signed any of them.
Speaker 1: No, they're not signing it. They said this will not happen, you know?
Speaker 0: Yeah, for the Lebanese one, yeah.
Speaker 1: I think it's a sop that Israel is giving to the United States, right, to show that it plays well with others. But to be realistic, it's not going to change anything, you know? The Lebanese armed forces are not going to be able to disarm Hezbollah. You know, there's one or two, what, pilot zones? Sure, Israel can, you know, evacuate one or two pilot zones and the LAF can go in. But as a practical matter, at least per Israeli officials, they're not leaving southern Lebanon. And they're not going to outsource their security to the LAF. So you could have signing ceremonies. You know, that's great. Um, but it doesn't change the underlying dynamic, which is the Lebanese government is unable to disarm and control Hezbollah. Okay. And Hezbollah is not going to disarm unilaterally. And Israel is not going to withdraw from Southern Lebanon as long as Hezbollah is there. So that's the reality.
Speaker 0: So Lebanon is pretty doomed.
Speaker 1: Well, I mean, Jesus, and what's your timeframe? You know, I mean, yeah, I mean, Lebanon is, I mean, all of the Middle East, if you take the fact that, what is it, it's 50 degrees Celsius right now in Southern Iran. So, you know, for a variety of reasons.
Speaker 0: Celsius, 50 degrees Celsius, holy shit.
Speaker 1: Exactly.
Speaker 0: How much is that Fahrenheit for our American audience?
Speaker 1: I have no idea, but.
Speaker 0: You're American, man. What do you have? You have no idea. Yeah, but it's 120, 122 degrees Fahrenheit.
Speaker 1: President Carter in 1976 issued the statement that we have to go metric. I listened to him.
Speaker 0: No, but I mean, Lebanon is doomed because. Yeah. Because Hezbollah, Lebanon cannot function with Hezbollah there, a state within a state. Israel won't accept Hezbollah there. Iran won't give up on Hezbollah unless Israel. Let's go through the other point. Lucky I almost forgot it. Hezbollah, the juice is not worth the squeeze.
Speaker 1: I mean, for the time being, look, Hezbollah has been an ally of Iran, the Islamic Republic, since the foundation of the Islamic Republic. But in terms of what it gives and what it gets, right now Hezbollah is weaker than it's been for a long time. But that doesn't mean Iran is going to throw it under the bus. Iran still believes in this forward defense strategy of empowering proxies, so they don't have to fight their enemies on Iranian soil. Now that didn't work in the last two wars, you know, starting in early 2025, but still Hezbollah is an essential component of Iran's extended defense. And this is why they've tried so hard to include Hezbollah in this regional ceasefire. And again, unlike the United States, which really operates in a timeframe between the news cycle, the daily news cycle, And, you know, every two year election cycle, Iran tends to see longer term. Iran can think strategically. Iran doesn't change its strategic outlook every four years because of an election. Right. So Iran says Hezbollah's worked best before. They'll work for us again. So even though we now have this new cool form of strategic deterrence, control of the strait, know that might not work as well against israel because israel doesn't need the straight that's why he's about a solid point you know redundancy is a good thing so yeah i'm yeah to me again there are two things iran's not going to back down on well many things two of which are lebanon and the street you know when you go to the nuclear portfolio they're not going to give up indigenous enrichment though they'll be willing to suspend for a while They're not going to send all their HEU to the U.S., but the U.S. is no longer- Highly Russian.
Speaker 0: Yeah, highly Russian. Hezbollah and the threat of Hormuz. You said they won't give up on them. There is nothing the Americans can do for Iran to give up either of those. The right amount of sanctions lifted, the right amount of assets unfrozen. Let's say we lift the sanctions and- Gradually, over five years, you disarm Hezbollah gradually. So after five years of Iran being part of the global economy, or ten years, then it's really hard to kind of revert that. It becomes the norm. And then Iran would slowly fold Hezbollah as part of that deal. It's good for Iran. It's welcome to the global economy. The people do better. No more sanctions. None of that bullshit. It's better for Lebanon. No state within a state. It's better for Israel. No threat. And of course, part of the deal will have to include what was included in the Lebanon agreement, which is the rearmament of the Lebanese military to act as a deterrent against Israel. And I know this seems like this idea is a dream rather than reality. We're far from it. But just in theory, it just sounds like a win-win-win deal. Iran wins, back to the global economy. Lebanon wins, one military, and Israel wins.
Speaker 1: Iran doesn't want to be a part of the global economy because it sees it as U.S. controlled, right? Paradise lost. Better to reign in hell than serve in heaven is what I believe, is what Satan said, you know? So the IRGC... What did Satan say, Ellen? Better to reign in hell than serve in heaven, right? What did you get? John Milton. Didn't you? Yeah. That's a hard slog. I didn't read it. Go ahead. But here's the point. The IRGC is doing fine, right? They're making money off of sanctions, right? You know, the Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff model is if you waive enough money, you know, billions and billions of dollars under people, they will do what you want them to, right? That doesn't hold with Iran, okay? Because if Iran fully, you know, if there's a McDonald's on every street corner, if the U.S. presence is back in Iran, that's death to the Islamic Republic. Back before the revolution, there was a very famous book in Iran called West Toxification or West Struckedness by a guy that was Ali Ahmad. I forget the author, but his thesis was, and this is back in the 70s, I think he wrote it in the late 60s, was that Iranian culture and strength was being weakened by this slavish devotion and subservience to the West. This was one of the causes of the revolution in 1979. They didn't want to be the servant of the West. So saying to Iran, we'll let you be a part of the global economy that we control, where we're global hegemons. When you can be the country, we strip mine so that we can keep living in Mar-a-Lago, whatever. That doesn't seem to the people running Iran.
Speaker 0: China's part of the global economy. Russia was part of the global economy. Japan is. Europe is. India is. You're making it seem like being part of the global economy makes you almost like a colonial state. But that's just not that fair characterization. It is for Iran. Iran's whole thing is... Look at China. It could be still aligned with China economically while still being part of the global economy. The global economy is heavily influenced... by the US, but I wouldn't say controlled. The US does not really control China. Some would even argue the opposite is the case. So it could still be part of the global economy, but be more aligned with the China bloc, the BRICS bloc, China, Brazil, whatever.
Speaker 1: That's another component, which is that Iran thinks that time is on their side. They think that the US has reached its apogee of global power and is on the wing. So, you know, they can join a global economy, but not one that the US dictates the rules for. They can align with China, with the BRICS countries. Forget Europe. Forget the US. They're on the ebb tide of history. And again, sabr. They say in Arabic, sabr miftah al-faraj. Patience is the key to blessing. So they have patience. First of all, they're going to write out some term. What?
Speaker 0: Now, can I say, like, just use an English one, like patience is a, what is it? Patience is a virtue.
Speaker 1: Patience is a virtue. Yeah, yeah.
Speaker 0: Speak our language, gentlemen. Speak our language. We haven't read 6,000 books.
Speaker 1: Yeah, well, it's a great phrase. You know, this is, you learn these languages and you start thinking in these axioms. You know, it's like, are these figures of speech? Are these lines from poems? They believe in patience.
Speaker 0: You know so much about so much. I want to start asking you about what's happening in Mali, to be honest. And Ethiopia right now, the war in Ethiopia, you probably have an answer for that.
Speaker 1: Please do. Yeah.
Speaker 0: So then what happens next? Where are we at right now?
Speaker 1: We're at, you know, again, it's not a personality thing. It's not an Iran versus U.S. thing. It's a broken, complex system. finding a new normal, you know, resetting itself. Okay. We broke the Persian Gulf with this war. And now over a period of months and years, it needs to find the new normal. We're in the process of that. You know, the U S will be less important in the Persian Gulf than it was before, because we've shown that the big stick we had doesn't work. Okay. And the GCC countries will do different things based on this knowledge and And again, you know, people talk about Iran emerges from this war stronger. In some ways, yes. In many ways, no. Economically, you know, you talk about countries being doomed. Iran is doomed. Okay. In the sense that it has always been the case that the people running Iran, not always, but the Islamic Republic, were not preternaturally focused on delivering essential goods and services to the Iranian people. You know, like all oligarchies, they want to stay in power and enrich themselves. That's going to be harder to do now, you know, after this ceasefire. Because first of all, they have $300 billion worth of damage. They have to reconstitute their defense industrial base because they know the war will return. The U.S. and Israel are not going to go away and give up and say, we lost, you won, in their minds. So it's going to be harder to... to run the economy. And the people running Iran right now have shown that they're both uninterested and unable to run a modern economy. So what's happening next? Iran is going to be more dangerous because it will be weaker and more bellicose. It'll be a militaristic state run by an IRGC elite who are going to You know, it's like that. Remember in the 2008 financial crisis, I forget who it was. It was Jamie diamond or someone who said, we all knew that, you know, that the collapse was coming, but as long as the music is playing, you keep dancing, you know? So.
Speaker 0: And the music has stopped now.
Speaker 1: Yeah. So the IRGC just wants to hold on as long as it can. Okay. That's what's going to happen. And, you know, uh, The Middle East, you know, doomed is too facile a word. But, you know, you've got this bellicose, militaristic Israel who partially due to the trauma of, you know, the Hamas attacks, is trying to, as J.D. Vance said, kill its way out of all security threats, which it can't do. You've got an Iran that's going to be more militarized, has control of the strait. the six GCC countries, each of which will have to figure out a new way of living with Iran. Because as the foreign minister said at Aukchi, unless Iran has security, no one in the Persian Gulf will have security. You've got a U.S. that's going to be so traumatized by the war that they just want to get out of there, right? They didn't want to be there in the first place. You look at the November national security statement of 2025, and it says essentially, Middle East, not that important. We need to focus on China, which is the pacing threat, right? Now we've made the Chinese, putative Chinese threat a lot more exigent because we've wasted all of our armaments, which are years to reconstitute. So it's a transitional time, and transitional times are very dangerous.
Speaker 0: That's such a good overview. That is an incredible overview. I think you've done a really good job at summarizing, answering my question, where are we right now? Yeah, we're transitioning. So you agree with what many Iranians believe, many people around the world, but Iranians in this case believe that the American empire has peaked.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but we had a good run.
Speaker 0: Yeah, definitely.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean, I think it peaked. You know, look, this is 4% of the world controlling 25% of its resources. You know, well done. You know, it was like a British rule over India. I'm amazed they did it that well with, you know, with so few people, but yeah, it's, it's done because for a variety of reasons, but yeah, I think that, you know, you know, like I'll tell you one thing now, you know, you know, Pete Higgs has said the other day, we are producing more armaments or we're spending more money on weapons than we ever have before. You know, as if that's a good thing, you know, we're going to have, he wants a $1.5 trillion, uh, Defense budget at a time when, you know, there's no health care. Public education in America is going down the tubes. We can't provide essential goods and services. I forget the percentage of children in poverty, but it's freakishly high. So, yeah, of course, America's, you know, on the wane. We could reverse it, you know, but, you know, the current dynamics are not positive.
Speaker 0: Have I am. Have I asked you maybe in our first conversation, did I ask you why you think the war started? Why Trump decided to attack Iran? Have I ever asked you that question?
Speaker 1: I don't think so. I think it's, you know, pretty much what I think it's, he wasn't constitutionally predisposed to not do it. He likes the military. He was feeling bucked by his victory in Venezuela.
Speaker 0: And what was he trying to achieve? Some people say it's Israel's behest. Others believe it's the nuclear program. People like me believe it's a mix of many things, but mainly the control of the Strait of Hormuz, the energy choke point to have leverage over China. There's all these various theories on why he did it. I think it was for his legacy, sorry, as well.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I think it was part legacy. You know, he wanted to do the hat trick of Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba. I think a lot of it was Netanyahu did the same tired pitch He had done to all the other presidents and said Iran is weaker than ever, which was true. You could do a quick strike with, you know, shock and awe. We decapitate the leadership. The Iranian people rise up and finish the job in out in a couple of weeks. And you have done what no other American president since the revolution could do. And so, again, he's not the first world leader to, you know, engage in magical thinking about Iran. A quick war. Saddam Hussein did it in 1980. Vladimir Putin did it with Ukraine. Donald Trump is just the last, the most recent president or world leader to do it.
Speaker 0: Most wars are expected to be a very short war. It's very rare for someone to get into a war expecting a prolonged quagmire. Exactly. We are not good at... I read books too, Alan. I read books too.
Speaker 1: My God, you're talking, you're an incredibly smart guy and you're talking to incredibly smart people every day. So look, you know, I'm like, I've got like, I'm a one trick pony. You know, you talk to me about Iran, I'll sound impressive, but you're talking to people about this whole spectrum of issues, you know, and not just sitting there going, huh, huh, what's that mean? So no, my hat's off to you. Plus, you're a youngster.
Speaker 0: Okay, too many compliments. I'm starting to blush. Okay. So let's, let's, uh, smart me is going to ask you another question to try to understand what you say. Um, so we talked about, oh, uh, Lebanon. I, I made a joke that Lebanon is doomed. And I think I explained why, because Iran will keep Hezbollah, et cetera. What do you think, what happens then in Lebanon? Is it going to be just a, is there going to be a power struggle there? between Israel and Iran. Israel will try to get rid of Hezbollah. Iran will try to keep Hezbollah. Lebanon will try to keep its own identity. They're putting posters now. They're removing Hezbollah posters and putting Lebanon first posters across the highways in Lebanon. I saw it two days ago on the news. So poor Lebanon, they have no... And there's also the idea of Trump to send al-Shara to help get rid of Hezbollah. We've got to put that in the mix as well.
Speaker 1: So... So what would you speculate would happen there? You know, I don't know. Because again, the underlying reality is these are complex systems. And even though you could see some immediate, like, if-then chains, I have no idea. And not only do I have no idea, no one has an idea. There's too many variables, you know. You've got Hezbollah. You've got, you know, the current Lebanese government, which is very anti-Hezbollah. You have an incredibly dynamic, unstable Israel. You know, to me, the bellicosity and the trauma and the reaction to the trauma of Israel, that's the independent variable that's driving a lot of this. Because after October 7th, you know, Israel said the way we've been handling threats is all wrong. We now have to eliminate them. And they're in the process of finding out that that's not going to work. But they're not there yet. And so that dynamic still has to be played out. You know, much like global war on terror, right? After 9-11, okay? The U.S. is traumatized. And so we're like global war on terror. We passed the bill that creates DHS in like three days. No one reads it, right? But we got to do something, you know? So I don't know what's going to happen in Lebanon. I don't know what's going to happen.
Speaker 0: There's Israeli airstrikes right now in Lebanon, so as we're speaking.
Speaker 1: Yeah. You know, it's it's all I know is the far greater instability because we had, again, not stability, but a relatively low level of stability. Right. And, you know, but it wasn't sustainable. We saw that with the Hamas attack October 7th. We're seeing it now. We'll see it again. You know, so. You know, things usually are what they seem. The Middle East is. for a variety of reasons, has always been relatively unstable. It's not a cohesive economic region at all, which is part of its problem. There's no economic interdependencies among the various Gulf countries. They all just export to the West, to Europe, to China, to Russia. So that makes things, it's like shallow roots. It makes it less stable because they're not fighting with each other.
Speaker 0: Interesting. That's a good point. Cause I was, my next question, you said the middle East has been unstable for such a long period of time. Um, I was going to ask you why, and you're saying one of the reasons, one of the secret secretary divisions is one by saying in other reasons, there's lack of interdependency. There's secretarian divisions in other areas in the world, but they still managed to prosper India for God's sakes.
Speaker 1: You know, I was in Nigeria, you know, my fourth floor, there's like 220 different ethnicities there. You know, there's just our 400. I mean, but, you know, it achieves a balance, this homeostasis. But, yeah, the Middle East, again, you've got all these countries. They don't have, you know, I mean, other than the obvious ones like Saudi and Bahrain, because Saudi, to an extent, controls a lot of what goes on in Bahrain. And, you know, they have...
Speaker 0: Tiny little country. I don't think it counts.
Speaker 1: Yeah, you know, and Israel's been the outlier since 48. That, you know, and to give President Trump credit, the Abraham Accords,
Speaker 0: were a great thing you know but were they were the abraham's accords a great thing considering they haven't solved the palestinian issue like i spoke i spoke to you um so i like to talk to people i i strongly either disagree with or just cannot understand. And obviously, one of the people I've been critical of for so long is Ben Gvir. Every time he puts out a statement, it's on my list to discuss with various guests how crazy it is and how insane it is. And today, I had a guest. His name is Yishai Fleischer. There it is. I'm looking at the video now. It's my first interview of the day. And he's someone who supports Ben Gvir and his policies, most of them. And just having that conversation, it lasted an hour and a half. It's my second conversation with him. But just having that discussion, just made me realize, and I've had similar conversations with people from the IRGC as well. I should probably have more of them, but it's like impossible to imagine peace with that mentality. That's a great point. And that mentality has just been ingrained in those people, people like me and you, but they've just been, there's just so much has happened in the Middle East, especially since the establishment of the state of visual, but even before that. It's like what the foreign ministers of Qatar, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi, I think mentioned in the summit on the day of the day, one of the negotiations in Switzerland, there was a summit in Egypt, I think it was, of all of these Sunni countries. And they put out a statement that essentially said that peace in the Middle East would not exist until the Palestinian issue is resolved. And in a way, everything goes back to the Palestinian issue. Because what Iranians are saying they're fighting for is the Palestinian issue. Israelis, they don't believe in a two-state solution, but then what is the alternative? Each one has their own theory. Then you speak to the Lebanese people. They empathize with the Palestinians, but they want to take care of their own country. But then you have Hezbollah that supports Iran, but that also fights for the Palestinian cause. I feel like everything does, at the end of the day, go back to the state of Israel and Palestine.
Speaker 1: Well, it's like that guy who wrote Sapien, Jubal Harari. You know, it's, you know, everyone has these narratives and these myths and these myths help cooperation among strangers, you know, because you all believe the same myth. You see yourself as part of a group as opposed to another group. And that helps, you know, larger and larger societies get by because, you know, the primate brain is sort of wired to deal with 150 people, you know, anything beyond that. You need these enabling mythologies and narratives. And I tell you, if I were in charge of the world, there was an initiative that Bill Gates did like 20 years ago called Big History, which is history from the star of the universe, or at least the known star of the universe, 13.5 billion years ago till now. And it's just the scientific outlook. And everyone's fighting over dirt. Or, you know, my God is better than your God. Or, you know, you did this to us in 1953. Well, you did this to us in 1979. And it's, you know, it's understandable, again, based on the history of us as a species. But at this point, where we face global challenges that are just, you know, even now, what's the temperature in Europe, right? So, you know, climate change and all the other destabilizing things You know, for the Holocene, right, which started roughly 13,000 years ago till now, you had 14 degrees Celsius as a global temperature with a one degree Celsius variation plus or minus for the last 13,000 years. That's what has enabled society as we know it. We have now pushed ourselves out of that, right? So all this fighting between Israel and Palestine, Iran and the U.S., That's small potatoes. We've got real.
Speaker 0: I'm just waiting for a day an alien comes to Earth so we all come together and say, holy shit, we have another common enemy now. And that's species from another planet. And we get peace, at least between us as a species. But yeah, like if you think of it.
Speaker 1: It's not a common enemy.
Speaker 0: It's us. but have you ever mentioned this to anyone when you were in the conducting the jcpoa negotiations have you ever mentioned that to anyone on the iranian side that believes in the eradication of the state of israel have you ever had that discussion with them but i don't think you could have because you weren't oh you have friends in iran so is there anyone in iran that you're friends with that is that there's many in iran that don't believe in the state of israel have you spoken to anyone like this and had that conversation with them like hey know you've you've got to just stop fighting about you know this happened then that happened then got to open a new page israel's here to stay we've got to figure out a solution for the palestinian issue that also respects israel's estate what have you ever had that pragmatic conversation with someone from iran again before these two wars you know iran was the most pro-israel you know and trina wrote about this in his first book i forget the title about it but
Speaker 1: You know, Iranians are not anti-Israeli. The Iranian regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran regime is anti-Israeli, is anti-Zionist. But Iranian people, and I don't like generalizations, but as a rule, yeah, I don't care. You know, they have no beef against Israel, the state of Israel. Again, this is all before the two most recent wars. And yeah, in a similar vein, the Iranian leadership was more pro-Palestinian than almost any Arab country. because they were using both of these as a vehicle to enhance and to put forward essentially nationalistic goals. You know, certainly after Khomeini died, as Iran became a more and more nationalist country, had less and less of this pan-Islamic, you know, drive toward that Ayatollah Khomeini envisioned when he came back to Iran. He wasn't a nationalist. He didn't care about... Pan-Arabism is just bringing all Arab countries together. Pan-Islamic, I would say. Pan-Islamic, you know, for... Khomeini was, you know, the Islamic people together, right? And, you know, they were Esna Asheri, they were 12 Rishia. But, yeah, I mean, I think that, I mean, again, Iran and Israel can get along, have historically gotten along just fine, you know, in contemporary times.
Speaker 0: And there's no reason... Crazy how things could flip so quickly. Yeah, yeah, yeah. last question for you alan is um the the rhetoric between turkey and israel that's heating up both of them speaking very aggressively about the other is that just political talk just to get support domestically or is starting to get worrying uh it's starting to get worrying again i won't say the original persian there's a good saying though they say in persian 10 dervishes can live on a carpet
Speaker 1: But two kings cannot live in a kingdom. You know, this is just real politics. You know, I think Israel, there's a unifying power to an enemy. Right. Iran has served that for Israel for a long time. And you can argue that I think many in Israel do see Iran as an existential threat. You know, you've got a country that says we have to eradicate Israel from the pages of history. Right. No, that really hasn't been a policy that Iran has sought to do. for a variety of reasons. But still, yeah, existential antipathy toward Israel from the Islamic Republic is a given. And that concerns Israel. That concerns Netanyahu. So they've had to act accordingly. But Turkey also, you know, I don't need to tell you, is a historic regional hegemon, right? And to the extent that its strategic interests don't line up with Israel's, there's going to be a clash. So, yeah, I'm very concerned by it.
Speaker 0: Alan, pleasure. Thank you so much for jumping on again. I appreciate it on a weekend.
Speaker 1: Always apply.
Speaker 0: I'm retired. Every day is a weekend for me. I'm just trying to be nice. Thank you, Alan. Take care. Pleasure is mine. Thank you so much. All right, guys. I'll be live again in 15 minutes with... I haven't checked yet. Alex Cristoforo to discuss... the developments in Iran and also what's happening in Ukraine as well. I'll get his thoughts on the latest developments there. I'll see you guys in 15. Bye.
reSee.it AI Summary
I see the cold logic: Iran doesn’t need new reopenings or agreements—just keep the strait half‑shut and let time do the work. In about 60 days the US economy strains, voters turn, and a Democratic administration may step away. The ship episode fits, too: Washington’s Oman route threatens Iran’s leverage. He also argues Israel destroyed Lebanon to make it uninhabitable, and occupation keeps resistance justified, enabling Iran’s long win.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 Iran has cracked the code to win the war... and the code is patience. Brandon Weichert laid out the cold logic. Iran doesn't need to reopen the strait or sign anything. It just has to keep that waterway half-shut and let the clock run. Within 60 days, his read goes, the US economy buckles, voters blame Trump, his party loses the midterms, and a Democratic administration walks away from the war Iran wants gone. Survival was the old goal. Now Tehran sees a path to actually win by waiting. His take on the ship strikes fit the same frame: this all reignited the moment Washington pushed Oman to open a southern route, because that corridor threatens the one card Iran holds. And he's blunt that if Oman tries to run its side freely, Iran will simply break international law and hit any vessel that uses it, the same way it hit the Singaporean freighter. The detail that landed hardest was about Lebanon. He thinks Israel detonated that massive tunnel complex partly to render southern Lebanon uninhabitable, a deliberate buffer-by-destruction he calls the Gaza model, and that Iran quietly benefits from Israel staying, because occupation keeps the resistance justified. His long view flips the board entirely: a post-American Middle East where Iran rises and Israel becomes the contained, isolated state. @WeTheBrandon
Video Transcript AI Summary
A discussion centers on multiple fast-developing conflict events and escalating regional tensions. In Monaco, three people were injured in an explosion described by commentators as a “terror attack” despite not being confirmed, with new details emerging as information comes out. The victims were reported to be of Russian and Ukrainian national origin, and the exchange later includes showing images of a suspected attacker found on video/footage after the Monaco incident.
The conversation then broadens to Israel’s stated retaliatory posture and its regional scope. Defense Minister Katz is cited saying that, within the last 12 hours, attacks involved Syria and “Sass in Monaco,” while Israel framed its actions in Syria as responding to an attack by Syrian militants. Katz is also quoted asserting that if Iran attacks Israel with ballistic missiles in response to Lebanon actions, the IDF will respond and is preparing to operate independently, saying Israel has targets to strike in Iran even without American support, while also suggesting the scenario would be a “third war.” Katz further claims there is an Israeli intent to occupy Lebanese territories and not withdraw “a millimeter” until Hezbollah disarms, and states there is no intent to withdraw from areas occupied over the last three years, including Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon.
On Lebanon and weapons use, the discussion describes prior comments about Hezbollah-linked systems and HMX-related long-range precision munition development, with Israel allegedly trying to disrupt depots storing HMX while Hezbollah maintains an arsenal. The speakers argue that Israel’s actions are part of a “Gaza model,” aiming to make populated areas of southern Lebanon uninhabitable and to create a security cordon/no-man’s-land, forcing displacement and using Hezbollah munitions as part of that objective.
A major thematic question is whether the conflict is shifting from direct warfare to proxy warfare. The speakers describe proxy escalation as an “escalation” step: whenever direct de-escalation is not possible, indirect conflict expands through decentralized activation of militias and strikes across Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. Yemen mobilization and militia activation are referenced alongside strikes in multiple territories. One speaker discusses the idea of arming Kurdish forces in northern Iraq and sending them toward Iran, comparing it to a “Bay of Pigs”-style operation, and claims there is a pattern of weapons and money being handled and redistributed in ways that may make outcomes worse rather than better. They also suggest proxy escalation could eventually merge into a more direct escalation.
Regarding diplomacy and negotiations, Katz’s remarks are framed alongside a broader critique that events on the ground make deals unlikely. The conversation references the UAE response to Syria, saying the UAE condemned the incident. It also discusses Lebanon’s involvement in a MOU and speculation about how and whether Iran influenced negotiations or benefited from Israel holding territory, arguing that maintaining conflict helps justify Hezbollah’s continued role. Lebanese domestic dynamics are described: some factions in Lebanon reportedly blame Hezbollah for attacks initiated without government approval, pointing to Lebanon’s large-scale destruction and economic collapse since October 7.
The Strait of Hormuz becomes another focal point, with claims that traffic is down and that the US and Iran dispute who controls navigation. The discussion cites an Omani-Iranian committee meeting and statements from an Israeli official that the leverage over the strait is changing. There are also images described of ships with fortified machine gun positions traversing the strait. Iran’s president is mentioned regarding $6 billion of frozen assets in Qatar being released, and statements about Iran’s nuclear activity being “proportionate” to needs.
Defense capabilities are also covered: Katz is quoted claiming Israel is developing space-based laser weapons and calling the project a strategic priority, asserting no country has the ability to mount attacks in space and that Israel must lead in the capability.
As the conversation turns toward Gaza and ceasefire politics, Hamas and other Palestinian factions are described as preparing a response involving partial rejection of a ceasefire proposal connected to Nikolai Mladenov. The discussion predicts further bloodletting near-term and suggests long-term outcomes could include major geopolitical changes where Israel declines and Palestine’s status could evolve, potentially toward a one-state scenario, framed as a structural outcome of continued escalation.
The exchange ends with an emphasis on the idea that both direct and proxy conflict patterns persist, uncertainty about deals, and continued calls for the United States to reduce its military involvement in the region, followed by a closing conversation about public figures and politics, then the show transitions toward future interviews.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: do you see the terror attack they're calling it terror attack we don't know it's not confirmed yet but they're treating it as a terror attack in monaco did you see it just now no not just now no i'm who would have expected it to be in monaco just now monaco yes well i think we can expect probably more of this as time goes on for various reasons yeah let's see three people injured um we're gonna show you footage and images now uh The explosion was just over an hour ago. The information is just coming out right now. Meanwhile, so while there's that explosion in Monaco, did you hear what Defense Minister Katz said? He said, so in the last 12 hours, we had attacks in Syria, number one. We had Sass in Monaco. We had attacks in Syria by the IDF. Now, the IDF says they were responding to an attack by Syrian militants. So that says, Israel acted against armed terrorists. It was Syrian militants who violated the 1974 Israeli-Syrian separation of forces agreement by entering the buffer zone. December 2024. Okay, they're going back to why they invaded Syria in the first place. Put that aside. So that's them and the Turkish foreign ministry and the Israeli foreign ministry are having a tweeting war. But there was an attack by the IDF against a village and they advanced into it and I think they killed two or three gunmen there. And then there's bombing in Lebanon again. It's a daily occurrence right now. There's bombing in Gaza as well.
Speaker 0: They did the mother of all bombings in the last 24 hours. I don't know if you saw the village.
Speaker 1: The tunnel, the underground.
Speaker 0: It really reminded me of the Beirut blast in 2020. There was, anyway.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it was a massive blast that happened. And then on top of it, I'm just reading more information on the Morakos blast. The victims are of Russian and Ukrainian national origin. That's in Morocco. And on top of it, there's mobilization of the militias in Yemen against the Houthis. So we're seeing instability everywhere.
Speaker 0: Don't forget the thing in Iraq where they're supposedly doing all this anti-corruption stuff against Iranian, anti-corruption against Iranian-affiliated elements of their government. So this is a Sunni Shiite thing right now. see one in lebanon that's massive yeah uh it's a big one yes lebanon has you know they were developing and i talked about this in my book on the matter they uh they were developing oxygen which is hmx a highly explosive fuel for long-range precision guided munitions as part of what was known as the precision project in 2016 the IRGC was overseeing it Hezbollah was building these systems the idea was they were going to mass produce long-range ballistic missiles with the idea that if war came again they would be able to target very reliably the very critical civilian infrastructure of Israel And now the Israelis spent the last 10 years trying to blow up the depots where the HMX was stored and where the precision guided munitions are. But, you know, the Hezbollah has quite a robust arsenal. And I don't believe the Israelis have gotten anywhere near the full number that they think they've gotten.
Speaker 1: Meanwhile, you've got the defense minister of Israel, Defense Minister Katz, He said, if Iran attacks Israel, with ballistic missiles and response to actions in Lebanon, the IDF will respond and is preparing to operate independently. So even without American support, we have targets to strike in Iran and the IDF is prepared and on alert. But we will not interfere with the president's US president's course of action vis a vis the Iranians. So in other words, he also said something about a third war.
Speaker 0: There was a quote that I just read before we logged on. I exited out of it, but it was in RT. And I thought it was Katz who said, wait, maybe I can pull it back up. One second. Find it. I'll read another. Here it is. Here it is. Yeah. If Iran attacks us, it'll be third war.
Speaker 1: It's third war.
Speaker 0: I don't have my readers on. Yeah. If Iran attacks us as in Israel.
Speaker 1: it will be its third war i don't know if that's a translation error or if they mean world war um our third one i think he just i think you're reading another translation of my statement i assume because they're translating it from hebrew um so mine says if iran attacks us in response the idea for respond and is prepared to operate independently maybe it's the same one but they're also he also says the same press conference that the idf has an intent to occupy lebanese territories Which is not news. But will not withdraw a millimeter until Hezbollah's descent. But then he says the IDF has no intent of withdrawing from all areas as occupied in the last three years, including Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: And he says the U.S. is in agreement.
Speaker 0: Yeah. Well, I just want to remind your audience what's going on here is for the Israelis... And this is sort of the consensus, even among those who don't like Netanyahu and who don't necessarily support what Israel's been doing in Israel. There is a consensus. They refer to this as the Gaza model. And they don't view it as ethnic cleansing. They don't view it as any of the things the rest of the world is accusing them of. The Israeli security apparatus believes they need to extend their security buffer into southern Lebanon from northern Israel. And that is why they are not going to give back. They may give back some of the periphery, but the core of the territories that they've taken in southern Lebanon, they will not be giving back. And I contend the reason they destroyed the target that they did, which delivered this massive, incredible spectacle of explosions, is because they are trying to render as much of southern Lebanon uninhabitable as possible. And if they can use Hezbollah munitions to do it, they're going to. And that's what they did. And you're going to see this play out. They're not giving up the core territories that they've captured, either in Lebanon, in Syria or in the Gaza Strip. And that's the way it's going to be, unfortunately, for everybody, because the Iranians are not going to abide by this.
Speaker 1: Are we seeing a move from direct warfare to proxy warfare? We've got the movements in Yemen, KK, Lisa, whoever's on from the producers, JJ, can you guys play the footage from Yemen we were playing earlier while we speak? We're seeing the militias being activated. We're seeing the strikes in three territories in the last 12 hours, Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. And we've got the warnings, essentially Israel saying, hey, Iran, if you attack us, we'll attack you back, but let us do our thing in these territories. In this case, referring to Lebanon. Are we going to see a shift away? They tried to beat Iran directly through direct warfare. It failed. Will it go back to proxy warfare, but more aggressive proxy warfare?
Speaker 0: What's going on is the proxy warfare is part of the...
Speaker 1: Remove the audio, guys.
Speaker 0: The proxy warfare is part of the escalation. Whenever they can't either side get a clean shot on the other, rather than just de-escalate and call it a day, they start escalating in these sort of indirect ways, one of them being the proxy war. But it is my contention that it's basically decentralizing the war and thereby expanding it. And that might not be what the intention is, but that is what the results will be. and that is why mario i am convinced that this war is not coming to an end anytime soon and i actually think that we are once again ridiculously arming the kurds of northern iraq and we are preparing to send them i think into iran to try to do some insane stupid um cockamamie bay of pigs style pre-failed mission into Iran as a prelude to eventually, I think, trying to insanely stupidly land U.S. Marines somewhere along the coastline of Iran. This thing is not over yet, I don't think.
Speaker 1: I just don't think the Kurds on Iran... Well, the Kurds of Iran are not going to...
Speaker 0: The Kurds of Iran are not going to be okay with this. The Iraqi Kurds... Now, the Iraqi Kurds are excited about it to a point, but I don't...
Speaker 1: If they saw the U.S. can't beat Iran, they're going to beat Iran?
Speaker 0: I don't know. There's some funny business going on behind the scenes. A lot of payoffs. A lot of things are changing hands. Now, initially what happened the first time, I am told by somebody who would know, that when we, a few months ago, started handing out weapons to the Iraqi Kurds with the idea they were going to rally and do this attack, into Iran, they took the weapons and then they took the money and then they left. But for whatever reason, we are now back at this situation, which tells me somewhere, some way along the way, the CIA, the intelligence community feels like they now have partners on the ground that are more reliable. I don't believe it's going to work out. I think it'll be a disaster if they do it. It'll be just like the Bay of Pigs. It'll be a nightmare. It is my view that this thing is not yet ending. I think that they are now escalating in these unconventional proxy ways, and that's going to eventually all kind of come back together on a higher rung of the escalation ladder in a more direct way. But I think that the proxy escalation is the first step.
Speaker 1: From the US walking away to the CENTCOM commander going to freaking Lebanon to a new deal signed in Lebanon. that contradicts the one signed in Iran, to clashes in the Strait of Hormuz, to Israel attacking more countries instead of just attacking Iran and Lebanon, now attacking Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, not that it stopped Gaza anyway, but Syria is a new one. Now, I wanna just to be clear, I would like to say the attack in Syria was a one-off. It was a very limited attack, very different to the one we saw a few months ago. So I wanna be fair, make sure I share the facts with the audience. there is a high possibility that they were gunmen that attacked israeli positions and the israelis were responding impossible to know if you're asking israeli self-defense if you ask the syrians the uh the israelis were moving into territory but the big piece of news is not about what happened in syria is how the emirates responded to what happened in syria uh they condemned it so the emirates oh you saw that we talked about this we talked about this last week last time i was on where the uae which got way too close to israel in the us are now in a position
Speaker 0: where the Emiratis have to now kind of be like, well, we got to be kind of the middle player here. We got to get along with everyone. That's what I said. That's exactly. I'm glad. Exactly.
Speaker 1: Exactly. Yeah. We agreed for once. We agreed for once.
Speaker 0: Well, we agree more, I think, than the audience realizes. But on the issue of the war, I think that this thing is not over yet. And by the way, I don't think that's any fault of the vice presidents. I think the vice president, I think Vice President Vance has been doing his best within the framework of working for Donald Trump to to push forward a deal that But it just sounds to me like events on the ground, as well as the Israelis, as well as even the Iranians, don't really want a deal. I actually am increasingly of the mind that not even the Iranians really want a deal because they have calculated that A, Trump is unreliable. B, Trump has already tried to whack them. How can they be sure he won't try again in the future? And C, they now know the actual... depth of our desperation when it comes to the mere threat of closing down the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians understand, I think, that if things keep going as they are with the Strait being Not open, let's just say, maybe partly open, but not fully open.
Speaker 1: No, it dropped significantly. Exactly.
Speaker 0: So my point is the Iranians are smart, and they've realized, holy cow, in another 60 days at most, the American economy will implode. Then the American voters are going to blame Trump. They're going to kick out his party. The Democrats will take power. They're not going to do what Trump wants to do. So we might be able in Iran to actually in the long term, if we stick it out, we might actually be able to defeat Trump and stop the war in the long run because there's no way the Democrats are going to continue Trump's war. So I think the calculus now is Israel clearly never wanted a deal. Trump was kind of one foot in, one foot out. Vance wanted the deal, but he's not in charge. And the Iranians now have figured out we don't need to get a deal to win. We can actually pull this out where we just drag it out and make the American economy collapse, make the global economy collapse, and then we can come out because the key for Iran, the regime, is survival. That is winning for them. And the way to survive long term is by making sure the Americans can never again ever try to assassinate their leaders. No, no. That's what I think the calculus is.
Speaker 1: It was. The regime, their calculus was to survive. Now it's to become a regional power. Yeah, but they can't do that with Trump.
Speaker 0: They can't do that with Trump. Trump is clearly not going to let this happen. Trump is not interested. Trump and Rubio both. Listen, what happened with the last round of explosive, when we started attacking again, it was when Iran attacked that Singaporean ship. Why did Iran attack the Singaporean ship? Because the Americans goaded the Omanis to get these ships to start going through the Omani route. And the Iranians knew that was a challenge to their perceived dominance over the Strait. That's their one key leverage point over the Americans is the de facto, rather, control over the Strait. And letting the Omanis establish an alternative route right now would undermine that. And that's when everything started ripping open again because the Americans started getting angry. They started shooting. Everybody started shooting each other. It was over the Strait of Hormuz because the Iranians Iranians know that the Americans will never allow Tehran to have any semblance of control over the Strait.
Speaker 1: All right. So if Oman, this is something that I'm kind of disagreeing with some guests about. If Oman decides to open their side of the Strait of Homs for free, as it was before, what happens then? This is their territorial waters. I'm not talking about the Iranian one. What happens then?
Speaker 0: Okay, so here's the deal. I think in the long run, and I think the Iranians have indicated this in the build-up to the last couple weeks, the Iranians are more than happy to split the control of the Strait with Oman. And whatever the Omanis are going to do, they're going to do. But the Omani government has already indicated that they want to charge fees now, too. And the Iranians are certainly not going to let it go free. I think what could happen if Oman does end up saying, we're going to have our side for free, I think what you already saw happen before with the Singaporean freighter, I think Iran is going to go, oh, yeah, we know you're not doing this on your own accord. F you. We're going to attack then any ship. And the Iranians don't care because the Iranians. Yeah. So I think what's going to happen is Oman, by default, is going to have to. charge some kind of a fee to keep the stuff flowing. However, the Americans are not going to, I don't think, let it get that far. I don't think the Americans, I don't think Trump wants to be perceived, and this is just me thinking about this. This is not me hearing anything. This is just me kind of looking at it. I don't think Trump wants to be perceived as the guy who lost to Iran. And for him, I think at this juncture, letting Iran walk away with control over the Strait will be a loss for him. Certainly it will be damaging to the economy. It will be more damaging if he keeps it closed, though, or if they keep it closed. But Trump is thinking about this as the ultimate egoist. This is a megalomaniac you're dealing with, and he does not want to be perceived as having gotten one over on him. like the Iranians did. Remember, he went into this war, he was convinced he was going to be the first American president in 47 years to decisively end the Iranian regime. It hasn't happened. The opposite has happened. So he's not going to let this go on. And that's why the fighting resumed was over the who controls the straight. And that's how this will continue.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I like your answer about what Iran would do. You're like, hey, Iran would break international law and say, fuck you, Oman. We're going to strike any ships that go through it. We've been through a war and we want to control the state of Hormuz. And I think this is saying the truth. And I just like, because I just got annoyed when some people were talking about, hey, there's already an agreement for Iran and Oman to, to work together to allow ships. I'm like, no, Oman could do whatever they want in their territorial borders. They can end an agreement with Iran if they have one. There's none signed, by the way. There's nothing signed between the two. And Iran would breach international law in response to if they strike ships going through the Omani side. And that's the reality of it. And that's how geopolitics, Iran was just a subject of an illegal war. So one could say it's justified what they're doing. It could justify what they're doing.
Speaker 0: And go back also, you mentioned international law. Remember, I keep telling people this. I know I've said it on this show before, but I just want to remind everybody.
Speaker 1: Iran's not a signatory.
Speaker 0: Right. They're persistent objectors, which is actually a legitimate stance under international law. They can prove for however many years they never accepted the rulings of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. So they are, in their claims, they are not bound by it. And the United States says the same thing because our Senate has never once ratified that. So...
Speaker 1: So they're both fighting about a law they both never signed up to.
Speaker 0: And they never will either. This is the irony here. So it's just, you know, the whole thing is an absurdist fantasy. But the Iranians, look, for the Iranians, honestly, the Iranians can give up nuclear weapons tomorrow. What they can't give up is control now of the Strait. The nuclear weapons are not even a factor anymore. They have figured out, if I want to fight America... On a strategic level, I don't fight America in a tete-a-tete war. I go for the economics. And the only way to go for the economics with Uncle Sam is this straight. And that is why they will never cede control back. They might allow lesser fees, whatever, but they are never going to give it back the way it was.
Speaker 1: I have a theory. It's not a theory, I believe, but it's good food for thought. There is the Lebanon deal, which is just such a weird deal for Lebanon to do with Israel that doesn't seem that great. It would have seemed great if there wasn't the MOU. I think the Lebanese government would have been better off to give the MOU a chance with Iran guaranteeing unconditional surrender. Iran was using all their leverage. So I've been thinking about this. I remember, I don't know if I told you, but I spoke to two negotiators, Aaron David Miller from the State Department and- I saw the Miller interview you did. Daniel Levy as well. to try to understand what the Lebanese government was thinking. And is it possible the Iranians said, look, there were some concessions on the Iranian side. I've always said Iran doesn't really care that much about Israel being in Lebanon's territory as long as Hezbollah can rearm and become a strong military force again. That's what Iran's strategic objective is. That's what their priority, their strategic priority is. Do you think it's possible Iran said, hey, we'll give up Lebanon as part of the MOU in return for X, Y, Z?
Speaker 0: lebanon's in a position where all right iran won't fight for our territory let's try to make our own deal so do you think that the deal in lebanon might have been gotten discreetly gotten the the okay from iran but obviously they're not going to be public about it because that would be embarrassing for them to maybe maybe but what's to who's to say that the israeli intelligence services don't have some kind of leverage covertly on certain leaders in in lebanon i mean we you know i i don't i don't know I don't know. And I honestly think, in a perverse way, actually Iran benefits from having Israel taking parts of Lebanon because it forces the world opinion against... Israel as being as an invader and an occupier and whatever. And, you know, I think actually on some level that feeds the resistance, right?
Speaker 1: Yes, yes, yes. I've been saying this for days, 100%. I'm glad you said it. This is one of the reasons I just don't think Iran... There's a lot of it. I'm impressed. I've always said this as well, but I get pushed back about it because everyone looks at Iran like a benevolent country. I'm like, no, there's no good and bad. Every country acts in its own strategic interest. Now, obviously, some do more evil things than others, fine. But generally speaking, when you want to look at what countries, rational countries, when they're making a decision or what decision they're making, you got to look at it from a strategic perspective that benefits them. And when it comes to Iran's interest and Iran is in a pretty bad shape economically, etc. When it comes to Iran's interest, Hezbollah is the main one of their main priorities. And Hezbollah exists as resistance against Israel. Okay, now Hezbollah is facing domestic pressure to disarm, right? What better way to justify Hezbollah's existence, then keep Israel in Lebanese territory. That's why I was surprised when I saw full Israeli withdrawal as one of the conditions the Iranians put on like, wow,
Speaker 0: Well, yeah, but I think the Iranians are smart enough to know the Israelis are never going to do it. Once the Israelis take ground in these conditions, it's very hard for them to, even if they wanted to, politically withdraw. So I just, I think that there's something going on behind the scenes, but I'm not convinced, though, that Iran... told the Lebanese government, yeah, go ahead, do X, Y, or Z. I think there is some side story that we don't know about going on between certain leaders in Lebanon and Israel. And there's some dance going on there. And Lebanon decided, OK, we're going to go after Hezbollah. Something snapped. It might have also just been something basic. Maybe the Lebanese government thinks if we are seen going after Hezbollah, it will allow for the Israelis to extricate themselves. That could be it as well. But fundamentally, I do not believe that the Iranians... I don't think they're harmed by any of this, for sure. And I think they're actually... They benefit either from seeing Israel leave, which I don't think they will, willingly, or from seeing Israel stay and generating all that anger and all that hatred, because it only helps Iran and their proxy. And remember, Hezbollah is nothing more than a force multiplier for Iran in certain ways. I mean, I know that they're seen in certain... groups of Lebanon, that they are freedom fighters, they're militia, whatever. But from the Iranian perspective, fundamentally, they are a force multiplier for Iran's long-term war against Israel. And Iran is not going to let them collapse any more than we would let one of our armies in the field collapse without a fight.
Speaker 1: In terms of the Lebanese government, why they're disarming Hezbollah, we have to also understand a lot of people in Lebanon do not like Hezbollah. as well as not that popular group that majority do like. Just think of it from their perspective. Yeah, exactly. And just think of it from their perspective. Since October 7th, Egypt was not attacked once. Jordan was not attacked once by Israel. Lebanon was annihilated, 20% of the population, economy destroyed. Beirut leveled a couple of times, the Dahia area. I think the airport was struck as well during the war. There was a few times where the airport was struck. Lebanon suffered the most right after Gaza and the entire region, more than Iran, more than Israel, more than anywhere else, more than the Gulf. And a lot of people blame Hezbollah. Hezbollah decided to attack Israel on October 8 without approval from the government. So there is a big faction of the Lebanese people, which I agree with those people, that blame Hezbollah for what is happening right now.
Speaker 0: A lot of the Christians are very upset with that.
Speaker 1: But at the end of the day, there is nothing they could do about it.
Speaker 0: Yeah, that's true. I just want to make something clear here. I don't think the inclusion of the Lebanese situation in the MOU was fundamentally a poison pill because I think that's a weird one it will never be resolved you cannot link and I know there are many I think honest people who are outside observers who say if you don't link what's going on there to the wider war it's never going to be resolved and I think there might be some truth to that but if you're trying to end the US military mission relatively quickly in the middle east or you know against iran you've got to keep the terms as narrow as possible um so that it's iron clad and it's more difficult for the israelis to hijack because right now israelis are able to hijack the whole process and they do with with glee yeah
Speaker 1: All right, let's see what else is happening. So we've talked about the Strait of Hormuz. We've talked about traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has collapsed to almost the same levels as it was during the war. The Oman's foreign minister has confirmed that the first meeting of the joint Omani-Iranian committee of the Strait of Hormuz has taken place. The two sides discussed future management of the Strait, ways to enhance coordination and affirm their commitment to international law on navigation and maritime services. Blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. Nothing else. Fox News U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Mike Walz, said Iran's leverage over the Strait of Homs is diminishing day by day. Okay, that's the rhetoric there. And lastly, this is an interesting image. I'll just show you here, but there are ships that have fortified machine gun positions on those ships going through the Strait of Homs. I'll show the image now on screen. Meanwhile, on the unfreezing of assets, Iran's president is saying that $6 billion of Iran's frozen assets in Qatar will be released and returned. So we reassure the international community that our nuclear activity will be proportionate to the country's needs. And within the framework of our declared policies, that's machine gun positions on the ships going through the Strait of Hormuz. You've got the attacks in Syria that happened. We've got the warnings coming out of Israel. You also had the defense minister says Israel's developing space-based laser weapons capable of carrying out attacks above earth. calling the project a strategic priority for the country's future defense capabilities. Quote, as of today, no country has the ability to mount attacks in space. We must be the leading country in the world with this capability. He added that achieving the capability would strengthen Israel's deterrence and provide a decisive advantage against its adversaries.
Speaker 0: And this was Israeli, this was, who is this again?
Speaker 1: Katz, Defense Minister.
Speaker 0: Katz is savvy enough to know that there are plenty of countries out there that can mount attacks from space. um but russia u.s china yeah yeah yeah and um yeah so whatever you know that's that's fine the israelis israelis want laser weapons they can and we can all live through the meme of jewish space lasers uh becoming real and we welcome them to the party you know hey the more the merrier These conspiracies was right. There are Jewish space lasers. We welcome them to the club, I guess. But ultimately, look, I think that I think I forgot what I was going to say. Let me read one more statement for you from Katz.
Speaker 1: When Trump connected Iran to Lebanon, we stopped toppling buildings in Beirut. He added the shift in Trump's position came during a fifth call between Netanyahu and Trump. A call Katz did not attend. Katz said there will be no further Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon until Hezbollah disarms. Quote, I don't live in illusions. Lebanese army soldiers will not suddenly become lions who charge at Hezbollah. On Iran, he said fighting could resume, as I said earlier. So just a few more statements from him.
Speaker 0: Well, I just think that also we need to kind of get back to the bigger picture here, which is what I was talking about earlier, which is that the Iranians have cracked the code. They've figured it out. OK, we just pressure the straight and the Americans, whether they want to pull back or not, one way or the other, they will be gutted economically the longer this goes on. And that will benefit the Iranian regime. I mean, that is just the reality. And I think if you look, and I know you've had other people on talking about this, I've been talking about this, if you look at the draining of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, if you look at the way in which we have depleted our critical munitions far faster than we can replenish them, if you look at everything that's going on, not just the energy, by the way, the agricultural goods, the industrial inputs that come out of the Strait of Hormuz, that come out of the Middle East, those are all still stocked up. We are already now going to be having shortages. It's going to hit. You're already seeing it in some cases. I think in the United States we'll feel it as well. And I think that the longer the straight remains relatively closed, the more likely it is that we will be careening into either a great recession or possibly, God forbid, especially if the helium shortage pops the AI bubble, which is really the only thing keeping the stock market afloat. that could be great depression territory and these the iranians know all this and they don't need to reopen the strait anytime soon because they have figured out also the us navy really doesn't want to get too close to the strait for obvious reasons and whatever we're blowing up on you know in terms of these iranian defenses along their coastline and what might be a run-up to landing marines it is unlikely those marines will be able to achieve their goal of sea control from kashem or karg island or elsewhere uh because the iranians have thoroughly fortified their positions and so the the iranians are not they do not feel afraid right now and this i and by the way i saw earlier and i wish this were the case i saw earlier that Trump claimed that the Iranians were begging for another meeting. That is not my understanding. I have talked to multiple people over the last day about this.
Speaker 1: Yeah. You're explaining Trump's comments.
Speaker 0: Right, right. I know. I know. But you know, some people still put stock in them, as we can tell by the markets. Not my listeners.
Speaker 1: Are you mocking my listeners? Are you mocking my audience? No, I'm not.
Speaker 0: Actually, your audience is one of the better ones.
Speaker 1: I'm treating Trump's post as fact. Is that what you said? Guys, did you hear that? Did you hear what Brandon said? Let him know in the comments what you think of what he just said.
Speaker 0: It's okay. They let me know no matter what. Not as nasty as Bannon's audiences toward me, but it can be sometimes.
Speaker 1: I want to ask you the toughest question. I want to clear the news first before I do. Let me clear the news quickly. And then I want to ask you a really tough question that I think is the most important question that I've been avoiding. Get many have. But I don't think you'll find a solution to everything that's happening without digging into that question again. But the Ali al-Tahrir Hill, the one that the Israelis were fighting before abiding by the ceasefire, apparently, Defense Minister Kast said that Israel tried to convince the Lebanese military to go in there and clear and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, and the Lebanese military rejected that request. Of course.
Speaker 0: Right.
Speaker 1: Of course.
Speaker 0: It's a suicide mission. Exactly.
Speaker 1: Reminds me of the comments by that journalist that said, our goal, the Israeli goal is civil war in Lebanon.
Speaker 0: Yeah.
Speaker 1: That would be insanely heartbreaking.
Speaker 0: No, it's not. Well, yeah, it is heartbreaking, but it is Israeli policy. I mean, this is, again, what I do for a living really is identify patterns. And you look at the pattern, right? This is how the Israeli security establishment operates, you know. and this is what they want by the way this is this is what they wanted for iran by the way this is why i was never sold that raise up a lobby was really somebody the israelis really cared to see return to power. This is why in subsequent days and weeks after the initial bombings against Iran, we found that one of the Israeli plans was talking about having Mahmoud Ahmadinejad replace. And then the other one, well, hold on. Let me just go with me here. The other one that was fascinating to me was Pizeshkin. Apparently, the Israelis at one point were saying, well, we'll be happy with Pizeshkin. And then, of course, there was the rumor that the Podcaster Patrick Bet-David was supposedly on the short list. None of these were serious alternatives because the Israelis fundamentally don't care about the post-war regime. They just want Iran broken up into its constituent parts. It's precisely what NATO wants for Russia, by the way. Again, there's linkages there. But this is exactly what... Israel doesn't care about the post-war. They just want everybody broken up and too small to pose a coordinated threat to Israel and you can understand that to some degree if you're an Israeli security official but you also have to be able to see how flipping insane that is that nobody in the region is going to go along with this not really um she caught a picture can you show this JJ KK that's a picture of the apparently the suspect that placed a bag which contained the bomb before it detonated in the river in Monaco
Speaker 1: um not sure what that location is but there's a picture of the suspect right now yeah how many people were three people were injured yeah three people were injured yeah so nobody no no dead so far uh it's only uh only just come out nothing no no information i need deaths what the motivation is either
Speaker 0: Well, didn't you say earlier Ukrainian and Russian were the targets?
Speaker 1: I thought I heard that you see... No, apparently they were the ones that were struck. That's the wrong image, guys. There we go. This is it. So that's the suspect. I don't know why I'm showing it. It's like, does anyone know him, guys? Please let us know in the comments. Him or her. I'll show the next photo.
Speaker 0: It's incredible. We have such amazing camera technology and yet all of the important pictures in instances like this are garbled. You would think that we would have better resolution on these cameras.
Speaker 1: By the way, that explosion that we saw about Lebanon, the massive explosion that we played early on, apparently that was... so massive it destroyed an entire town and was heard from as far away as Israel.
Speaker 0: This is what I was saying. This is a purposeful policy, I think. They are trying to render populated areas of southern Lebanon, the Israeli Defense Forces are, they're trying to render them basically unlivable, uninhabitable. This is the Gaza model. And again, I think it's important that we understand this is not a moral. I'm not giving a moral statement here. But from the Israeli security perspective, they don't view this as ethnic cleansing. They don't view this as anything like that. They truly view it as this is a security directive. And we're just trying to create a cord on a no man's land, if you will. They don't care about sort of that morality play. because they don't view it that way and so when you put yourself into the mindset you begin to see the reason they detonated this thing they knew full well it was going to be destructive the reason they did that is a opportunity to get rid of those weapons but b it also serves to kind of force people out and they want that cordon created where there's nobody living there anymore all right um the big question are you ready for it i like coke more than pepsi
Speaker 1: Hamas and other Palestinian factions in Gaza have indicated they will deliver a partial rejection of a proposal by Nikolai Mladenov, the lead envoy of the U.S.-led Border Peace, regarding a ceasefire agreement. The factions are preparing a response. That leads to my question. What's going to happen, in your view, to Palestine?
Speaker 0: That's a great question. Well, I think there's going to be more bloodletting. in the near term. I think in the long run, I think I said this to you before, I think in the long run, Israel has so badly overplayed its hand that you're already seeing a flight of very high-level professionals and their families out of Israel sort of brain drain, if you will. They're going elsewhere. I think that it's going to get so bad for Israel geopolitically, if the war does end anytime soon, and who knows. But any way you look at it, it's a post-American system in the Middle East from now on. And that post-American system disfavors Israel. So basically the roles of Iran and Israel will flip in this new order. And Israel will now be the pariah state. They will now be the contained and sequestered state. They will become a repressive police state beyond what they are. But there's not enough Israelis. And especially if there's this flight going on of really the people they would need to rebuild the country. I honestly think in the long run, you're probably going to see the Palestinians, they'll go through immediate bloodletting, but there's more of them. And I think ultimately, if the Israelis want to survive now in the region as a country, they will, and I don't know if this will happen, but they will have to embrace the one state solution. which, of course, negates the dream of Israel as a haven for the world's repressed Jewish people. But, you know, that's the only way out I see. I think one way or the other, the Palestinians, just by sheer numbers and the fact that Israel sort of, like I said, the role of Iran and Israel in the region are going to flip. I think that Palestine, I think you might see a flowering, actually, of whatever, you know, Palestinian statehood or Palestinian independence or something, because I think in the long run, Israel is definitely, I think, on the decline. I know it doesn't look that way, but their actions have really created a very bad situation from an Israeli perspective. And I think most Israelis... deep down know that which is why they're so committed to this course of action because they now know for israel there really isn't an off-ramp there really isn't because if they if if they do manage to get peace in the region israel is becoming a contained constrained and a declining i think state yeah this is a disaster of their own making it's a disaster of our making we let them do it Again, I know people in your audience, a lot of them don't like Israel. I don't have negative feelings like that toward Israel. I'm not from the region. I have a lot of positive experience with certain Israelis. So I don't wish harm on anybody. But just objectively speaking, Mario, I don't know how. I mean, the Israelis really, really did a bad job policy-wise. They've really put themselves in a corner, I think.
Speaker 1: i spoke to um i interviewed again um ishai fleischer you know him he's the ben gevier supporter friend i don't know here as well yeah so i i interviewed him two days ago it's a 90-minute conversation yesterday or two days ago yesterday i think yesterday morning i'm sure it all bleeds together from your perspective because you do so many of these no it's um it's like if you listen to that conversation you'd understand I'd say how impossible, not impossible, how, not even complex, just how deep the wounds are and how deep the emotions are for all sides. I speak to people in Iran, they just want to wipe out Israel, some people. I speak to people like Isha, wipe out the state of Israel, not people. I speak to people like Isha, his solution is, all Palestinians should become not citizens, but residents of the state of Israel and use the Emirates as an example is okay, my your resident in the Emirates, we should Palestinians should be similar residents in the state of Israel that God gave us. And then when you people can agree with him disagree with him, people can agree with the Iranian mind, the Iranian people I spoke with, but that when you have people with just such extreme opposing values.
Speaker 0: And then there's there's the Americans stuck in the middle. We have no business in the middle of we're stuck between these two. We have no business being in the middle of this thing. This is not an American interest. It's not our job to resolve this. We shouldn't have been involved. So so you're right, though. I think you really think about it. That's why I said earlier, you know, I'm quick to blame Israel for starting the war, dragging us into it. But it also the Iranians, I just don't think are really incentivized anymore to even really because of the reasons we talked about for them. They now know we can actually beat the Americans. And the real threat to them, it isn't Israel, it's America, because America supports Israel. So if you can diminish and push back the American threat, the Iranians will win strategically against Israel. And so I don't think either of these two groups are really in a talkative mood, and I don't think they're ever going to be. And so the solution here, as always, is for the United States to butt out and come back home, bring the legions home, Whether we get a deal or not, I don't know what we're going to do in the meanwhile with the economy. But the plan should not be to escalate militarily or to remain permanently present in the region.
Speaker 1: Cool. Well, actually, in my interview with Joe Kent today, I started trying to see what he's going to do next. I'm like, hey, man, why don't you and Marjorie Taylor Greene and Tucker and Matt Gates and all them just come together? Who else did I mention? And Tulsi Gabbard, all come together. and just create a new party. Well, maybe or maybe they imagine Tucker running with all them as that would be supporting him and part of the administration.
Speaker 0: Just imagine how the US and the world would be great. I think it would be great. I think it needs to happen. I think at the very least, for now, we need to be having a much, much deeper conversation in my in this country.
Speaker 1: If Tucker if Tucker runs any winning? How? his life will be threatened at a threat, a significant threat.
Speaker 0: Well, just for the record, I do know Tucker, but I do not know if he's planning to run or anything. No, he's not planning to run. Just hypothetical. He's not planning to run. Yeah, no, I would. Look, man, his life is already under threat. I mean, he is doing, I think, the Lord's work. And when you're doing the Lord's work, that makes you an enemy of those who don't like the truth. who don't like the good word. So in my view, his life is already under threat. And Tucker has a very healthy view, it seems, which is he doesn't care. He's going to keep doing what he's doing until something happens and he'll deal with it. That's the only proper response I think a man can have because he's been blessed with the ability to speak the truth unfiltered, which is something that very few I think you have it. I think there's very few people, though, especially in the United States today, who truly have that freedom of speech, that independence. And he's one of the few. And he commands a lot of respect. By the way, your audience should understand, MAGA, the Trump Bar-a-Lago people, and all the Zionists in America can sit there and make fun of Tucker and say, oh, he doesn't matter. He's just a crank online. If that were the case, they wouldn't be taking the time to universally condemn and attack him, and to universally attack those of us who appear on his show. So it just shows you that Tucker does have a following, Marjorie Taylor Greene has a following. I know her husband, Brian, pretty well. They all have a Joe. Joe's a hero. I mean, Joe is probably the most decorated special forces guy that fought in the global war on terror in the United States right now that I can think of. So he has a following. All these people have a lot of good following, and they're all coming out kind of saying the same thing. If they did unite, which they might, I don't know, but if they did unite...
Speaker 1: Imagine Tucker, Massey... Ro Khanna, Joe Kent.
Speaker 0: Yeah, I like Ro Khanna a lot, too. I'm a big great.
Speaker 1: He's really good.
Speaker 0: You've had him on having you a few times?
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah. Imagine putting a Massey. Imagine putting them all together, man.
Speaker 0: It would be phenomenal. It would be a phenomenal for one term, one term, you know, even if it was just one term, I think it would be a phenomenal pivot away from the garbage that I think people need to understand who live overseas. The American people both parties don't actually like our government. They don't really like our leaders. Even when we vote for them, okay, fine. You're presented with, I mean, look at your options. Let's just go from 2016. It was Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, or Joe Biden, Donald Trump, or Kamala Harris, Donald Trump. These are not great picks from any perspective.
Speaker 1: These are not like JFK and Thomas Jefferson level picks.
Speaker 0: These are like the worst possible options. You're just trying to find the least worst. So most Americans are not happy with their government. They don't like the direction of the country at any time. So I think people around the world need to understand that Tucker is important to us and the people that you mentioned are important because they change the discussion and they allow us to vent and voice the real American opinion, which is we do not like the wars. We do not like what the economy is doing right now.
Speaker 1: don't support these things so all right man brandon until we meet again thanks for jumping on yeah appreciate it talk to you later bye-bye thank you man all right guys i'll let me know what you think of the conversation i'm going to go through the comments for the next hour go through your comments see what you guys think of this discussion and others today and then i'll be live again for our final show for the day with larry johnson in an hour and 10 minutes
reSee.it AI Summary
If the U.S. went to war with China tomorrow, it would likely have to ask Beijing for help building the very weapons it plans to use. I’ve been describing how 40 years of outsourcing left American systems—F-35s, drones, missiles, radars—dependent on Chinese-processed rare earths. Starting Jan 1, 2027, the Pentagon can’t buy systems with Chinese-origin materials, forcing a rushed rebuild of an ecosystem the U.S. once led.
@MarioNawfal - Mario Nawfal
If the U.S went to war with China tomorrow, they'd have to ask Beijing for help to build the weapons it would be using to fight them!! As insane as that sounds, that's exactly where one of the most fascinating conversations I've had this year ended up. It's a story about what happens when a superpower spends 40 years outsourcing the foundations of its own military. The magnets inside F-35s, the motors inside drones, the guidance systems inside missiles, the radars.... and so on. The electronics that underpin almost every modern weapons system all depend on critical materials that China spent decades quietly turning into one of the greatest strategic chokeholds in modern history. That's a national security nightmare. And it gets worse. From January 1st, 2027, the Pentagon can no longer buy defense systems containing Chinese-origin rare earth materials. Suddenly, America has to rebuild an industrial ecosystem it spent four decades dismantling. And the really wild part is that the U.S. taught China how to process rare earths. Now it's racing to rebuild an industry it once dominated before the clock runs out. Everyone thinks the next great conflict will be decided by aircraft carriers, stealth bombers and hypersonic missiles. But the people building those systems think it may actually be decided by who controls the tiny minerals inside them. Disclaimer: This content was produced in collaboration with the other party and is intended for informational purposes only. It does not constitute financial or investment advice. Always conduct your own research before making any financial decisions.
Video Transcript AI Summary
The conversation centers on rare earths and critical minerals as key “leverage” in the ongoing war dynamic between the US and China, described as a modern equivalent to oil. Mario argues that Trump’s decision to get into the war—framed as a “big gamble”—could be tied to gaining leverage over China, which holds leverage through rare earths. He links this leverage to global energy and an “energy choke point,” and asks Lippy/Anupam to explain how big the issue is for the West and US security, when China gained the edge, whether it is reversible, and the national security risk.
Anupam says oil once dominated geopolitics, but rare earth and other minerals that power modern economies are “the new oil.” He asserts that militarily, technologically, and for AI and supercomputing, nothing like the described way of life can be made without rare earths. He adds that anything powered by electricity and much consumer tech uses rare earths and critical materials. He claims that 90% or more than 90% of rare earth production is controlled by one country (China), and that attempted tariffs against China were not pursued because stopping Chinese rare earth shipments could shut down major production lines quickly. He cites an example where one large motor-company production line stopped within about six weeks after rare earths stopped shipping, and that defense primes would not be able to produce defense systems if disruption continued.
The discussion distinguishes “lights” versus “heavies.” Anupam states EVs use light rare earth magnets, while defense equipment uses “heavy” rare earths that are temperature sensitive, and he claims drones and modern warfare rely on rare earths. Mario reinforces that everything becomes a switch for the US defense sector.
They then discuss how rare earths became outsourced and why China gained dominance. Anupam says America offshored production to make goods faster and cheaper over decades, not necessarily maliciously, and that China developed an entire processing and supply chain over about 30 years. He says China got technology and know-how from earlier US processing instruction in the 1990s, and later grew into a competitor controlling critical materials needed for manufacturing.
A key point is described as bipartisan and international: Anupam says the European Union policy proposes no country producing more than 60% of these critical materials, while today 90% or more is produced in China. He says the US is increasing government support through floor pricing, debt financing, and equity investments for critical materials companies. He describes deglobalization as accelerating beyond COVID-era trends, but says for rare earths it is an even bigger threat.
A major operational deadline is raised: Lippy states the Pentagon cannot buy systems containing Chinese-origin rare earth materials after January 1st, 2027, “in less than six months.” Anupam says this is a law taking effect then, not an executive decree, and it creates a defense-specific requirement: anything sold to defense cannot have a “Chinese nexus.” He contrasts this with EV companies, which he says do not have that issue in the same way.
They describe shifting restrictions and enforcement. Anupam says that three days before the conversation, the US banned certain rare earth material companies (including MP Materials and USA Rare Earths) from procuring Chinese equipment and chemicals, because most US processing depends on Chinese equipment, and without that equipment and know-how the US cannot process rare earth materials. He says regulations keep changing weekly, and that an economy cannot function if the ability to trade elements changes on a weekly basis.
The group discusses company-level implications. Anupam says their focus is “heavy rare earths,” especially dysprosium and terbium used in defense. He claims their company is the only non-Chinese nexus outside China and argues that most Western rare earth companies still have Chinese connections through equipment, chemicals, control panels, and other parts. He describes an example involving a research organization and the inability to buy Chinese equipment after China stopped selling “to non-friends,” which forced rebuilding from scratch. He asserts that they were positioned by timing and location, and that their lack of Chinese nexus is a strategic advantage.
They also cover permitting and geography. Anupam says all rare earths (specifically heavies) have uranium and thorium, and that processing creates radioactive byproducts. He claims another company attempted to build processing in the United States (Texas) but pulled the project because it could not get an EPA permit. He says Saskatchewan is suited because uranium-handling infrastructure and permitting exist, citing “Uranium City,” and asserts certain radioactive-related processing steps cannot be done elsewhere in the US but can be handled in Saskatchewan.
They describe building facilities and scaling quickly. Anupam says they acquired a heavy rare earth mine in Canada within 12 months, acquired 80% offtake from an SRC facility shown behind him, set up heavy rare earth metallization, acquired PMT Critical Metals in Ohio, announced financing, and planned pilot magnet manufacturing. He says they formed an agreement with JOGMEC for magnet-related expertise and knowledge transfer. They state the US Army selected them to build facilities on an army base (Utah).
Finally, they return to industrial base and replenishment. Mario argues the US has depleted munitions and has low domestic manufacturing share compared with WWII (15% to 20% now versus ~60+% then), and asks how the US will restock and rebuild capacity for hypersonic and drone-heavy conflicts, tying the industrial base challenge back into the rare earth supply chain. Anupam says scaling manufacturing is a 10–15 year journey because it took 40–45 years to give away capacity, and that the approach should focus on faster infrastructure for refining, metallization, and magnet manufacturing. He says their speed is part of the solution: they moved rapidly from being “on paper” to acquiring mines, off-take, metallization facilities, and magnet lines, and that similar acceleration is needed across sectors.
Anupam adds technical points: he says their hydrofluoric-acid-free process reduces exposure and capex/opex, and they use automation and AI/robotics to reduce labor intensity, noting a plant scale comparison where “China” needed 60 people while their approach uses two. The conversation concludes that while the work is to support defense now, scaling to allied and broader supply is part of the longer roadmap.
Full Transcript
Speaker 1: Well, gentlemen, it's a pleasure to have you on the show. Pleasure to be working with you as well. And I'm actually really excited for this conversation. It's because it's just such an important topic. And it's, you know, some even argue it's at the heart of this entire war that happened. You know, there's a theory, I'm one of the believers in that theory, is that one of the reasons that Trump decided to get into this war, which I'm not a fan of, but one of the reasons he decided to get into a war, into this war, a big gamble, was to gain leverage over China. Why? Because China has massive leverage over the US, and that's with rare earths. And a way to counter that leverage in that battle that is ongoing right now, especially since the trade war, but before that, is to be able to control the world's global energy and the most important energy choke point. So that's what makes the conversation, the timing of it impeccable. Let's jump straight into it. Lipi or Anupam? Can you break down for the audience how big of an issue this is for the West and for the US? It's a broad question. I'm going to add a few things in there. When did China get the edge? Because I know decades ago, it was the US that was the world's biggest refiner of rare earth. When did China get the edge? Why is that? How easy or difficult is it to reverse? And how big of a risk is it to American national security?
Speaker 2: I would start by saying, first of all, thank you for having us. It used to be oil was the global, everybody busy with oil, all the countries fighting over it. You got OPEC making balances between which countries get to sell this much and that much, the oil mafia. Today, rare earth and those minerals that power today's modern economy all the new tools. That is the 21st century. That is the new oil in that context. This is what wars are being fought over, will be fought over. This is the leverage of one country over another. Simple. You can't make anything, anything in the way of life that we have, whether it's militarily, technologically, or otherwise, supercomputing, AI. None of these things can be done without rare earths.
Speaker 0: And Mario, if I may add, like the headphones you're wearing, the microphone that you have, the laptop screen that you have, anything around you has got rare earths and critical materials in it. So pretty much anything that is powered by electricity, like most of it, requires rare earths and critical materials for it to function. And why has this become so important? Because one country is dominating the entire thing. If you look at the oil crisis that you talk about, just oil in general, At least you had a dozen countries dictating production volumes, pricing and things like that. Here, 90% or more than 90% of rare earth production is controlled by one country. When President Trump tried to go for the tariffs against China and other countries, one of the reasons we believe that we could not go ahead with it is because without the critical materials that are coming out of China, the neodymium, prasedomium, dysprosium, terbium and the likes, You cannot function or you cannot run an economy. Like once the rare earths stopped shipping from China, from what we have heard within six weeks, one of the large production lines at one of the large motor companies stopped. And then the defense prime started complaining that if it continues for four more weeks, we would not be able to produce any defense systems. So that's how important this is.
Speaker 1: Everything is a switch. It's like a switch to America's defense sector, the military industrial complex.
Speaker 0: Of course, like we are trying to scale up the manufacturing of our defense systems, right? Like, first of all, we cannot produce enough today and that has to change and that will change. Like this has to be like automotive level of production if we really want to compete when you talk about drones and missiles and things like that. But you cannot make any of those things. Like you cannot make a single radar system. You cannot make a single motor. You cannot make a single navigation system. So anything that goes into a missile, submarine, F-35, aircraft carrier, or even a GPU, every single GPU has 10 grams of dysprosium. You cannot even lead an AI if you don't have any of these materials.
Speaker 2: Golden dome, security, any of those things. All the wars now, unless you are with... Electric cars, there's nothing. But that's where, and we'll get into that a little later, but that's where there's a big differentiation on what we do versus others. That comes down to which minerals. So we're talking rare earths in general, but there's a very big difference, lights and heavies. EV, for example, uses light rare earths, magnets. The end product is magnets. So always think magnet, but the power of the motors. And there's other things that we always go into. It's not magnets, but in the general part. But there's lights in the heavies. For the defense industry, those heavyweights, as we just mentioned, which are temperature sensitive, the higher the temperature, the heavier, you know, that's where you get to the heavies. That runs the infrastructure. You can't build an F-35, can't build a submarine. But the drones, you look at Ukraine, Iran, these little cheap drones everywhere that are now becoming the wars. Every drone has rare earth in it. You can't build one without it.
Speaker 1: it's just so crazy for the average person to listen to this and just understand how it's all been, um, what's the, what's the word we outsource, but all been outsourced, completely outsourced to China. I understand there's globalization, but that's like, it's like stupidity.
Speaker 2: It has to do with, um, America was going fast and cheap. So it outshored it. Um, they were, you know, it was, it was, Let's let's build it. You know, you have the whole industrial belt, you know, how you talk about an industry rebuilding, make America great again, rebuilding industry and all that. Keep in mind for the last 40 years, we've been offshoring it to get, uh, to get it to be cheaper. So this wasn't, you know, a malicious way of thinking. It was just, we, we, we sacrificed a lot to get it, uh, you know, for. to China for cheaper. It's just that one day they wake up and say, okay, we're stopping to sell you this stuff. That's when it becomes a problem. I mean, rare earth is not rare. It's not the rarity. Trump said it at Davos. Elon Musk tweeted it two years ago, I think. It's the processing. And China got all that technology from here. But they built up. It's an entire supply chain. It's not just the rocks, the this. And we'll get more into the nitty gritty of how these things work. But think about it. have an entire supply chain that they spent 30 years building because they saw the strategy. We look at everything and say, how can we make a car $10 cheaper? Let's send it to China, to Mexico, wherever, you know, every other country that we can. And that's where America lost its industrial edge. This was one of the calamities, I would say, looking back at it, that this part of the processing and the technologies disappeared with it.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I know you said it's not evil. Before you got on a palm, you said it's not evil. That's why I called it stupidity. I think it was not malicious. I agree. Sorry, you said it's not malicious. That's why I said stupidity, not evil. It's just weird. Again, now we're going through a process. I was speaking to Mohamed El-Erian, and he told me one of the biggest consequences of this war a few days ago is not the move towards deglobalization, but the rapid... to move towards something already started in COVID, to move towards de-globalization and self-sufficiency, but that's moving a lot faster right now. But with rare earths, it's a much bigger threat. Anupam, you were about to speak, but it's a much bigger threat when it comes to rare earth.
Speaker 0: Yeah, it is, right? And just getting back to the earlier point, in the 1990s, we basically taught China on how to process rare earths. So we gave them the sword, we finessed the edge, taught them basically everything how to do. And at that point of time, it made a lot of sense because China was not the global power it is right now. If China was still a $500 billion GDP kind of a country that had to maintain good relationship with the US, we would have been fine. Now they are a competitor and they control one of the most valuable things in earth, which is critical materials without which, as I mentioned, nothing can be manufactured. And we are seeing the change, right? So number one thing, this is bipartisan. So this has got support of both Democrats and Republicans and also the European Union. A few days ago, the European Union came up with a policy saying that no country should be allowed to produce more than 60% of these critical materials. And today, 90% or more is being produced in China. In the US, you have seen increased amount of activity with the government actually supporting via floor pricing, via debt financing, via equity investments in all these critical materials company. So deglobalization is real and deglobalization is real for critical stuff without which an economy cannot function. Imagine the scenario, right? Like if I don't hope or I don't see that US goes to a war with China, but if we go to a war with China in the next year, we will have to ask them for like, can you pause it for one month and start supplying the critical materials to us so that we can start bombing you? That's the situation we are in.
Speaker 1: Well said. That's insane. And we're talking about the... the precision missiles being depleted, like half of them being depleted. I spoke to General Mark Cantian, who came out with that report a couple of months ago that went viral, and it was on CNN, et cetera. The one that came out with the figure is about 50% of the air defense munitions, the missiles, the THAAD and Patriot missiles have been depleted. The strategic precision missiles, sorry, the precision strike missiles, All these need significant amounts of rare earths. And those are, you know, that's for the defense of the United States. Everyone's talking about whether the U.S. could fight China. You just hinted at it. It could fight China if China decides to reunify with Taiwan. The question is not whether it can. It's not whether it will. It's whether it can. Because if these have been depleted, it will take three to four years to restock. Is China right now, is it restricting the export of rare earths to the U.S.? And to what extent? What are the restrictions that are currently in place?
Speaker 0: So there are several restrictions. I'll let Lippy add to it. But these just keep on changing. Like three days ago, they banned a few rare earth material companies out of the US, including MP Materials and USA Rare Earths from procuring any kind of Chinese equipment, chemicals and things like that. Because what they understand is, right, like they can stop the supply anytime. But most of the American manufacturing of critical materials, the processing, is still reliant on Chinese equipment. So we do not know how to process the rare earth materials. We do not know how to make the equipment that process the rare earth materials. So they're controlling the entire supply chain. And these regulations keep on changing. They keep on adding a few materials to the list, removing a few materials from the list. But you cannot function as an economy where these elements are either free to trade or not free to trade on a weekly basis.
Speaker 1: RIPI, anything to add on that point?
Speaker 2: No, I think you summed it up well. This is, yeah.
Speaker 1: There's something that the team mentioned to me about a deadline. There's a deadline of January 1st, 2027. the Pentagon cannot buy systems containing Chinese origin rare earth materials after January 1st, 2027 in less than six months.
Speaker 2: What is that about? Is that true? That's correct. Uh, and that's not an executive decree. That's not a Trump, uh, you know, okay, do this. It's a, that was a law passed, which takes effect January 1st defars, um, no Chinese next. So for military, uh, think about it in a little layman's terms you know if they know how much you're buying of different minerals and all of that aside from them using it as leverage there's other military reasons why they shouldn't know what we're doing in that realm of things so the law that that law was made a while ago there was waivers till now but it wasn't actually it's not a law until january 1st 2027 which means no chinese nexus to anything militarily um Anything you sell to defense, let's make a difference what it is, cannot have any ties to China, which puts this in a very unique. So remember, the EV companies don't have that issue. So keep in mind, that's a defense issue. So it's for defense companies, defense industrial based. They cannot have a Chinese nexus. So it's very clear on what it is. That is the basis of realloys. When we started, we started with a mine, but we went out of that business very, very quickly. We still own one, which has heavies. I'm not going to go through each company, but some of we're essentially what you have to put a title on us. We're the heavy company, like the container company with a heavy company. And it's focused on the fence. That's what we are solely focused on. That is where the issue is. And that's what makes us unique. We're specifically focused on heavy rears, dysprosium and terbium for the most part, which is the heavy rears that go into all defense things. If somebody wants to build more electric cars, they don't have a problem on January 1st for the most part. But if you're building military vehicles, It's a problem. That's where it gets into a problem. Any drones, anything else. So that deadline is real. Typically in the past, there were waivers. If you see Trump's social media a couple of days ago, no more waivers, no more going outside America and all of that. We think this time it'll be very, very different because it is the law. And that makes it a big problem for defense, which is why Steve Dumont, who's the chairman of our company, joined us because it keeps him and all his counterparts awake at night. What are they going to do January 1st of 2027? They need to have non-Chinese, and we are the only ones. This is not pitching the company too much, but we're the only ones that are non-Chinese nexus outside of China. Go to any other company that you'll name or know in the rare earth space in the West, whether their machinery, their chemicals, their screws, something is built, their control panels, it's all Chinese. Any equipment today in the rare earth space that was not built in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan by the Saskatchewan Research Council and their facility is Chinese. Don't make a difference what it is. It comes from China. They built their own furnaces. And it's an interesting story because they were going to buy Chinese like everybody else when they set up their plants. So their government lab kind of a big, you know, a couple of hundred million in revenue, typical like Ames lab and things like that. And in 2021, they were doing a lot of lab work for many years for Rare Earths. And they said, let's go buy, let's go build a commercial size plant. Let's get into processing because this is going places. We see the writing on the wall where the world's going. So they called China and said, let's order a couple of furnaces, a couple of these machines and those. And China that week, that week decided no more selling to non-friends and you're a non-friend. So we're not selling you the equipment. So by a fluke, they had to turn around and say, are we still doing this? And if we're still doing it because the government had committed, the local government had committed a few hundred million to their project. They said, let's build it from scratch ourselves. And we were at the right place in the right time because our mine happens to be in Saskatchewan. So we got lucky to be involved with them. And that led to this big non... It's right place, right time. I'm not going to say it any other way. But the fact that we have no Chinese nexus is just by... You know, right place, right time. But they're the only ones that have a non-Chinese nexus.
Speaker 1: Interesting. So... So essentially all the rare earth companies in the West have a connection to China, whether it's the machinery, the material, et cetera. And you're the only company that has, and that's a risk because China could cut off supply these materials, these equipment, whatever it is, the parts for the equipment, chemicals at any time. So that dependence on China, it contradicts the point of being independent when it comes to rare earth. Because if you're refining your own rare earth, but using Chinese chemicals and machinery, China still has the leverage. And you're the only company that broke that leverage. Correct.
Speaker 2: And it happened. It's a good place to be. But like I said, credit to the Lord. This was not like we... If you asked me two years ago, China... It is what it is.
Speaker 1: Let's just take the credit.
Speaker 2: That's really impressive. That's a good place to be. I didn't know this. Very, very, very important point, which is why, again, the focus on the fence, it's kind of both of them go together. why we're focused on defense we're actually solving a problem you know somebody asked me one day you know if i wanted to go into the rare earth business you know i want to compete with you you know can i do it and i said well go buy a mine step one make sure it has the right rocks step two you know mountain passes mine for example which is the old mali mine the one in california um what is is a light rare earth mine um you got i won't walk you through each company but if you look at the linus has a little bit of heavies like there's different companies the brazilian ionic clays versus this We're one of the three largest Canadian heavy mines that have heavy reels in Canada. And the first part is you have to have those. The second part would be that you have to actually have the know-how to process. So the processing is where it's a little dirty, and we'll get into that in a minute. And you can explain the processes we've invented actually in-house. make it cleaner but the plant that anupam is sitting with the visual behind him that's the src actual plant or a part of it that you can see this is all built with modern technology and also clean yeah yeah so that's the src's facility in in saskatoon which is again is there's a lot of cleanliness to it we'll talk about hydrofluoric acid in a second then you have to build a metalizing and then you have to have the know-how for the magnets each one of those steps for example we're also the only metalizers for heavies in the west if i'm not mistaken uh anupam correct me if i'm wrong but i'm pretty sure we're the only so metalizing after it's processed so you have that whole thing then you have to metalize it metalizing there's metalizing for lights and for heavies two different processes Everything we're doing is solving a problem for the military. So if you saw yesterday's news release after the close yesterday, we announced and the army announced that we will actually be working with them to build our facilities on an army base. So there were two announcements from us yesterday. One was we raised a hundred million from institutions. And the second one was that the army has partners. The first time I've ever done anything like this. Tool army base in Utah, future home to realloy's facilities. That's what's coming now. We're working hard, working really hard. That took a long time to get through that. It was an RFP process. All companies were invited to participate. Very few qualified in the specific sense of what the Army needs. So we're focused very much. You know, Steve, our chairman, Army, used to be in the Air Force, ran Lockheed Systems and Raytheon and other companies in that space. joe casper who's on the board of advisors was from a secretary to peter hexeth it's a secretary of defense peter hexeth he was this former chief of staff appointed directly by trump in one and two uh to the to the administration um all of this is we were working closely with the army there's one facility we have which we acquired so the way we started this company we had a mine in saskatchewan then we had the midstream knowing the SRC is working on it and we were negotiating with them for a while. But we also bought a company in Euclid, Ohio called PMT Critical Metals, which is where I met Anupam. He had invested in that company. They are the ones that the defense logistics agencies were going to for all of their needs. They had to metallize some special part for hypothetically an F-35 or some of these things. You know, PMT was there to go to people for metallizing. They're mad scientists who can metallize water. They can metallize anything for you. So we were always directed kind of from the DOW, what today is the Department of War, Defense Department. They work in defense logistics agencies. They were directing us upon what their needs are. We built this company to solve a problem and fill a need. Not just because we had a great mine, let's go build. Like you own a gold mine, you just go build a processing facility for your rocks and you make it into something. We kind of built this backwards. What are your problems? January 1, 2027, you got problems. You need processing here. You have to have the supply chain here. Not because of the law. That law is making sure that America has what it needs. But it was an original problem of we need to have these supply chains for rare earths on our soil and now on army bases where we have secured the, you know, secured.
Speaker 1: Are you even allowed to go to China?
Speaker 2: Me personally, I don't intend to, but they would probably tell me not to get my passport stamped or something. But the answer is actually interesting. So Chinese nationals that are in the rear earth space cannot actually just walk out now. Anupam, you know there are specific restrictions, but they have very serious restrictions.
Speaker 1: I think the same is going to happen in the U.S. very soon. So if you want to travel on a holiday, do it now, because soon I don't think they'll let you anymore. That's pretty cool. Building a military base. Building a military base.
Speaker 2: So it's there. And for us, it's massive because that means our end user knows where to find us. Military says we need X, so we're there.
Speaker 0: Anupam can expound. That's so cool. And just a quick point regarding being selected to build our facility on the army base. What I think or I believe is one of the reasons is we do not have any Chinese equipment, Chinese chemicals, and all those kinds of things. And we can claim to be the only company in the space
Speaker 1: can actually see not having any kind of chinese nexus because you don't really want chinese equipment with today's iot ai machine learning platforms to be actually installed on a us army base yeah that's pretty cool i think you guys would uh i would be like in the top tier if not top top tier of the most badass companies in our portfolio that's actually really interesting because the the no the reason i find it so interesting is you're in a really cool space. Number one, one I've been fascinated by for a long time, but number two, the no Chinese connection. I had no idea the only one, and then being the only company to have a plan on an American military base. Um, that's pretty cool.
Speaker 2: Thank you. Unique position. It definitely puts us in a unique position. And again, it's by virtue of why we're building what we're building and the problems we're solving. Um, and we're looking forward to expand, you know, to expand that, uh, you know, to start off with, uh, different components. So as I said to you before, for the layman listening there, there's different components of the business. I'm going to throw out one interesting point, which I think you'll find fascinating. All rare earths, specifically heavies have uranium and thorium guessing. You never heard that before. That's a radioactive materials, uranium, you know, none are uranium, but all rare earths have them. Um, uranium is in all rare earths. And when you're processing rare earths, there's uranium and thorium, which are radioactive. So here you've got a little bit of a big problem. Linus, for example, which is the big Malaysian-Australian rare earth company, tried to build a plant for processing in the United States a couple of years ago. In 20, I think it was 21, they got a grant from the government for a few hundred million. This year they pulled a project. It was supposed to be in Texas. They pulled a project this year. The reason is they couldn't get an EPA permit. So The processing, the fact that we're in Saskatchewan, another important component here is, and which I'm kind of laying out, which pieces can be in the States, which pieces just can't by virtue of they serve the, you know, you can say, well, you're building this big phase two processing facility that's six or eight X the size of the SRC's original one. Why are you building it in Saskatchewan? Why don't you build it in Ohio? And the answer is because if you go 35 kilometers from our mine in Saskatchewan, there's a place called Uranium City. That's the name of the city. Uranium City is where the uranium for the Manhattan Project came from. So after Russia, Saskatchewan is the biggest in uranium. So they're familiar with it. They know how to handle it. They deal with it. They're permitted for it. They process it. And they built this facility in a way that you're able to process out the stuff, the uranium and thorium, the bad stuff, process that out. it into a byproduct and even sell it to other companies in the vicinity that are in the uranium business for their purposes or in in the in the nuclear business and this just happened to be right next to you it's right next to us um like i said that it's it's built for that you can't build that in america so that will stay there that processing will stay there we're going to build a like i said a six eight we call it the 10x but it's about eight times the size of phase one which will be largest in the Western hemisphere for heavies as far as a processing facility, very, very, very large. And that will be there as well. The rest of the supply chain that can be in the States, the metalizing that can be here, the magnet making that will be here, those things we can do here. Certain components of this supply chain cannot be done elsewhere. There's mining, processing, refining, metalizing, and then magnet making. And each one of those is a, you know, Think about a building in itself, you know, separate parts. Some of them could be done here. Some just, again, by an interesting fluke with uranium and radioactive just cannot be done here. And they're well suited for it, built for it, permitted and so on. So that edge as well comes from the Canadian side of it. This is, by the way, a very unique case of where the Americans and Canadians working very, very closely together in a national security and defense because there is no border. We talked about the cutoff on January 1st, 2027. For defense, there's something called Title 50. There is no border between U.S. and Canada for defense purposes. So we get that asked all the time.
Speaker 1: Everything is freaking aligned for you guys, isn't it?
Speaker 2: Right place, right time. Yeah.
Speaker 1: I don't know. I don't want to give you that much credit anymore for building what you built because it's just like right in front of you. Like the path is right there.
Speaker 2: Just have to put the dots together.
Speaker 1: The dots are even put there together for you. Yeah. But yeah, it's really cool. Anything else I missed, guys? I think I've gone through most of the questions that I have. Anything else? Actually, I have one more question. It's something I've been talking to various generals. I've talked to Mark Hansen, General Manor. I've spoken to Admiral Cooper, not Cooper, Admiral Montgomery, Mark Montgomery, who was a former CENTCOM commander. I'm really bad with names. And one of the topics, I think, no, before Kane, let me find out the names. We can crop that from the edit while I'm trying to find something. I'm really bad with names. I don't know why. So I kind of made a mission to myself to improve my memory with names is to always, whenever I forget a name, not to give up until I find it. Let me see.
Speaker 2: You won't forget. I don't think you had too many of them.
Speaker 1: McKinsey, General McKinsey. There you go. And I've spoken to Petraeus as well. The question that I've always asked them, and a topic that's been discussed very heavily and I want to get your thoughts on, is the industrial base, the American industrial base. So we've depleted, America's depleted all these munitions. And I had one of my guests say, Mario, yeah, but it takes a long time to manufacture. The argument they were making, they're like, yeah, Mario, but when the need arises, we can easily, not easily, we've done it before, what we've done in World War II, when we had to deal with both fronts, Germany and Japan, is we just moved the entire civilian manufacturing base into the military industrial complex. The only problem right now is the US only has 15% of global manufacturing is in the US, 15 to 20, I think now. Back during World War II, it was about 60 something percent. So I want to get your thoughts on this. How... I know that's not directly linked to Rare Earth, but it's a topic you guys have with your board, with others in the industry. Because one of the questions I had is how this is going to look like, the self-reliance when it comes to Rare Earth in the U.S. You can add that to the question. How is the U.S. going to be in a few years' time? Let's say in five years' time. But also, how is the military-industrial complex going to look like? How is the U.S. going to be able to bring the industrial base back into the country? to be able to restock and be able to manufacture as many hypersonic missiles as Russia and China. Because the U.S. has, what, 12 Dark Eagles? China could make hundreds a year. Russia could make dozens a year. So it's just that massive discrepancy, which also seems, considering how much the U.S. spends on defense, it just seems very concerning how unprepared the U.S. was to drone warfare. I know we've moved away a bit from rare earths, but all this requires rare earths. So it's kind of linked into your supply chain.
Speaker 0: so in terms of industrial base right like first of all the number one thing is realizing that there is a problem and i think the administration and the dod realizes that we have a problem and that needs to be solved there are multiple efforts being taking place right now with the current administration and the defense organizations on how to scale up this manufacturing so there are plans that are being executed on nothing is going to change overnight this is a 10 to 15 year journey And it will take that long because we took, it took us 40, 45 years to give everything away. Now it will take at least 10 or 15 years to get it back. The thing is with the advent of new technologies, be it additive manufacturing, be it heavy amount of automation and machining and other manufacturing technologies, composite manufacturing, it is not rocket science. It is just capacity that needs to be built and we are building it as a nation, but it will take time for us to get there. Same as the case with rare earth materials. will take us 10 to 15 years to get there it is not gonna it is not going to be a problem that we will solve in five years and that's why our approach becomes very unique because we are choosing the fastest path to get there we are not focused on developing a mind that will take five to ten years to build we are focused on setting up the infrastructure for refining and metallization and magnet manufacturing which can be brought online pretty quickly one thing about our company is speed like 12 months ago, we literally were a company just on paper, incorporated in Nevada, and that's it. In 12 months, we acquired one of the top three heavy rare earth mines in Canada, Hoytus Lake. We acquired 80% offtake from a facility at SRC that you see behind me. This facility took five years to build at a cost of about $250 million. We have guaranteed offtake for 80% of the production and a right of first refusal on the remaining 20%. So in essence, we have 100% offtake from this facility. We started setting up the first heavy rare earth metallization facility, dedicated heavy rare earth metallization facility in Canada, which should be up and running next year. This facility that you see behind me goes into production this year. We acquired one of the top experts or a company that we had expertise in heavy rare earth metallization in Ohio called PMT Critical Metals. This was a company introduced to us by the DoD. We went public. We raised our first $50 million in financing. We announced another $100 million in financing yesterday. We are also setting up a pilot scale magnet manufacturing line in Ohio. We got $200 million letter of interest from Exim Bank for our phase two facility, which is going to be six times larger than the facility behind me. We formed a partner with JOGMEC, which is a Japanese government arm. It's an MOU for critical metals and magnets. It's not just for supply of metals. but also expertise and knowledge transfer on magnet manufacturing. And all of this in 12 months. So we move at a really, really fast pace and you need more companies like us in every sector to accelerate our industrial base manufacturing efforts.
Speaker 1: That's a perfect organic flex. I liked it. Thank you. Alipi, any final thoughts, man? I really enjoyed the conversation. Anything else we missed?
Speaker 2: Same. No, I just think people need to more understand, again, for an investor, for the average layperson, they know that America is now, thanks to this administration, I mean, think about it, if not for Trump throwing money at some of these companies and saying, this is a problem, you need to solve it, China bad, America good, make everything here and so on and so forth. Because this is a little more than just make it made in America, like the hat, to write on the label on the hat. This is actually national security issues. This is making, like Anupam said earlier, your AirPods, your phone, your mic, everything you touch, everything you use is reliant on these things. So we do need to have the edge. And as I mentioned earlier, we're doing it better, faster, cheaper, cleaner, and other things. I did want to mention just that point that I mentioned earlier. I said I would come back to it. One of the things we invented. So all rare earths is also processed. So now you're already, you know, the uranium thorium part. but also hydrofluoric acid, which is that stuff you pour on your hand and it kind of drips through the other side. Most dangerous thing on the planet is, or one of them anyway, is hydrofluoric acid. So all rare is a process with hydrofluoric acid. We invented a hydrofluoric acid free process. So cleaner. Also the plant you see behind you, what takes China 60 people, AI and some Canadian geniuses, do with two. So every 60 people, we got it to two. Those things have cameras in the tanks that see all the, you know, everything flying by.
Speaker 1: You've just answered the question on how the US could catch up to China, and that's leveraging AI and robotics. That's America's opportunity to really make up for what it lost over the last few decades.
Speaker 2: Correct. Smart. That's the technology and the smart people. And I think all of that put together, we will solve the problem. But as your last question to Anupam, the It won't happen overnight. You know, people say, how fast can you be? We're working to make sure the defense has what it needs now. Obviously one day we're also looking to make 20,000 magnets, 20,000 tons, et cetera. Defense only needs so much and we'll provide to others as well further down the road. You know, it's defense, defense industrial base, allies, and in that order. But I think in general, what we're doing is what's necessary. So when you're looking at a company and saying, you know, maybe there'll be 30 mines coming in the next five years or, 20 minds, whatever the number will be. This stuff that we're doing, you won't see others. You don't see anybody else running to help the defense. It's almost a mission-driven company. I'll just end with that. This is just as mission-driven. We're here for the men and women in uniform. We're here to make sure Americans can live the life they had till now into the future and then some. That was our mission and purpose. And I think we're carrying out in a beautiful way and in a rapid way.
Speaker 0: And just to quickly add to that point, right, like, I'm a guy who's been scaling up manufacturing organization companies and technologies for a pretty long time. And what our goal at Realloys is, right, like 10 years, right now, you need government handouts and floor pricing and all those kinds of things, because it is a market completely dominated by one country where they can change pricing at will. It has got nothing to do with reality. But 10 years down the line, if we are in the same boat where we need government handouts and floor pricing, we are doing it wrong. So that's what we are building together. Eliminating hydrofluoric acid reduces capex, opex. Automating this production line increases the yield, reduces the opex. So by bringing in this innovation, 10 years down the line, we should be in a position where we are not only supplying enough or manufacturing enough for our own needs, but also supplying to allied nations at a price that is competitive with anybody else in the world. And hydrofluoric acid, do not pour on your hands. Lippy, the example that he was giving is, if a drop falls on your hand, it will go all the way through.
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah. I think most people know what hydrochloric acid is. We talked about it during the Epstein files, because apparently he was ordering it to one of his homes, one to his island, I think. Gentlemen, absolute pleasure. Really enjoyed the conversation. You've covered it really well, while also talking about realloys I'm really happy to be on the cap table and be part of the journey and to have this discussion. I appreciate it, guys. Thank you.
Speaker 0: Thank you, Mario. It's a pleasure.
Speaker 1: Thank you very much.
Speaker 2: All the best.
Speaker 0: All right, guys. Two seconds to... Oh, they dropped out already.
Speaker 1: All right. Oh, Lisa, you've removed them too quickly. Lisa, can you bring them up? You removed them too quickly. This is not... You can stop the recording, Lisa.
Speaker 0: Oh, Lippy jumped off.
Speaker 1: Before I