TruthArchive.ai - Tweets Saved By @TheStudyofWar
@TheStudyofWar - Institute for the Study of War
MORE: Putin's claim that Russian forces will inevitably seize all of Donetsk Oblast if the war continues is false. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast. 🧵(1/3) The Russian campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast has been ongoing since Russia's first invasion in 2014 and remains incomplete. Russian forces have been bogged down in campaigns to seize multiple towns and cities in Donetsk Oblast since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, and Russian forces are still struggling to achieve the objectives of several of these campaigns today. Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast will very likely take Russian forces multiple years to complete after several difficult campaigns. Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances. Russian forces undertook four notable campaigns in eastern Ukraine in 2024 into 2025 that illustrate how difficult it will likely be for Russian forces to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast through force. - Russian forces first began efforts to retake Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in October 2023 and have conducted multiple separate campaigns aimed at seizing the town in the nearly two years since. Russian forces are currently struggling to complete the encirclement or envelopment of Kupyansk from the northwest and have not yet seized the settlement despite 22 months of offensive operations. - Russian forces began a dedicated effort to seize Toretsk, Donetsk Oblast in mid-June 2024. Russian forces started this effort not far from the positions that Russian forces held prior to the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian forces seized Toretsk by August 1, 2025, taking 14 months to advance about 6.4 miles from the southeastern outskirts of Toretsk to the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk. - The Russian campaign for Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast began in May 2023 after Russian forces seized Bakhmut (east of Chasiv Yar), and Russian forces intensified efforts to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024. It has taken Russian forces 26 months to advance about 6.8 miles (roughly 11 kilometers) from western Bakhmut to the western edge of Chasiv Yar. - Russian forces began efforts to seize Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast in February 2024 after the seizure of Avdiivka and have dedicated multiple efforts to seizing Pokrovsk through frontal assaults, envelopment, or encirclement – all of which have thus far been unsuccessful after more than 18 months.
@TheStudyofWar - Institute for the Study of War
NEW: US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement. ISW continues to assess that Putin has not moderated his original war aims throughout the full-scale invasion and has offered no indication that he intends to change or compromise on these aims in any peace talks with Ukraine. Other Key Takeaways ⬇️ Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force, as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast. Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances. Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas. Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs. Putin's insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires, given the complexity of the "root causes." Russia's "root causes" extend beyond Ukraine, and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO. Putin's offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments not to invade, and as Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires. The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Brussels on August 17 to meet with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and to participate in a Coalition of the Willing teleconference Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
@TheStudyofWar - Institute for the Study of War
2/ Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas. Russian forces took open areas without any significantly fortified settlements during their recent penetration northeast of Pokrovsk near Dobropillya. Russian forces still have not demonstrated any capability to rapidly seize large, fortified positions, however, as the campaigns for Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have shown. Russian forces are struggling to supply and reinforce their tactical penetration near Dobropillya and defend against Ukrainian counterattacks on the flanks —suggesting that Russian forces may not be able to consolidate their positions and exploit this penetration. The Russian effort for Dobropillya is just one part of Russia's broader 18-month effort to seize Pokrovsk, moreover. Russia's efforts near Dobropillya result from the failure of Russia's initial effort to encircle Pokrovsk from the southwest and northeast, causing the Russian command to try a deeper envelopment further northeast and north.
@TheStudyofWar - Institute for the Study of War
3/ None of these many-months-long efforts to take Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have been at the scale needed to seize all of Ukraine's fortress belt – Ukraine's highly fortified, main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that consists of cities that are significantly larger in terms of size and population., Russian efforts to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast by force would take several years given the number of fortified urban areas Russian forces must overcome to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundaries.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
The Russian military command may be ordering these counterattacks to buy time, but it is unclear how the Kremlin intends to use time bought at such a price. 🧵(1/8) https://isw.pub/UkrWar092423
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
2/ Russian forces appear to be unwilling to surrender tactical areas and are focusing instead on fighting for every meter instead of benefiting from the depth of their prepared defenses.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
3/ The Russian sacrifice of combat power to hold every meter may alternatively be intended to support the #Kremlin’s informational and hybrid warfare objectives. https://isw.pub/UkrWar092423
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
4/ Russian President Vladimir #Putin first acknowledged the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 9 by emphasizing two key and persistent narratives: that Ukrainian forces will not achieve significant successes and that the Ukrainian forces are suffering heavy losses.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
5/ #Putin and the #Kremlin have been framing Russian defensive operations as a major battlefield victory, and persistent Russian counterattacks allow the Kremlin to claim these operations as individual victories amidst the general lack of Russian battlefield advances elsewhere.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
6/ Putin may have ordered the Russian military command to hold all Russia’s initial defensive positions to create the illusion that Ukrainian counteroffensives have not achieved any tactical or operational effects despite substantial Western support.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
7/ This informational undertaking can only succeed in the long run if Russian forces can actually prevent Ukrainian forces from breaking through and liberating large areas, however.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
8/ The Russian resistance to ceding ground may also be tied to Russian military commanders’ and officials’ attempts to use the counteroffensive to achieve political goals, or it could result from Putin’s micromanagement. https://isw.pub/UkrWar092423
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
NEW: The overall slower-than-expected pace of Ukrainian #counteroffensive operations isn't emblematic of #Ukraine’s wider offensive potential, & Ukrainian forces are likely successfully setting conditions for a future main effort despite initial setbackshttp://isw.pub/UkrWar062123 isw.pub/UkrWar062123
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@TheStudyofWar - ISW
NEW: The US signaled on 14 FEB that the #Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s 54 member states will continue to support Ukraine in the long run. US officials have reportedly signaled to Ukraine that Western security aid to Ukraine is finite, however. 🧵(1/10) http://isw.pub/UkrWar021423
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
2/ @washingtonpost reported on February 13 that the Biden administration will announce a new aid package for Ukraine “in the next week."
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
3/ @washingtonpost also reported on February 13 that an anonymous US government official stated that US government officials are trying to “impress upon [Ukrainian officials] that [the US Government] can’t do anything and everything forever."
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
4/ Western reporting also indicates that there continue to be Western concerns about #Ukraine’s determination to hold #Bakhmut.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
5/ According to @washingtonpost US defense planners assess that Ukrainian forces are unable to simultaneously defend #Bakhmut and launch a spring counteroffensive and have urged #Ukraine to prioritize the spring counteroffensive over defending Bakhmut.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
6/ @TheStudyofWar continues to assess that #Ukraine’s decision to defend #Bakhmut is likely a strategically sound effort despite its costs for Ukraine.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
7/ #Ukraine’s defense of #Bakhmut has forced the #Kremlin to expend much of the #Wagner Group as a force and commit high-value Russian airborne forces to sustain attritional advances.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
8/ The Ukrainian defense of #Bakhmut has degraded significant Russian forces and will likely set favorable conditions for a future Ukrainian counteroffensive.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
9/ Had Russian troops taken #Bakhmut without significant Ukrainian resistance they could have hoped to expand operations in ways that could have forced #Ukraine to construct hasty defensive positions in less favorable terrain.
@TheStudyofWar - ISW
10/ Therefore, #Ukraine’s defense of #Bakhmut and efforts to set conditions for a counteroffensive is likely complementary, not mutually exclusive, activities considering that Russian forces would have continued their offensive beyond Bakhmut had Ukraine yielded the city earlier.