reSee.it - Tweets Saved By @prodreamer1

@prodreamer1 - pro dreamer

#Blackhawk #flight5342 collision NTSB: helicopter flight recorder revealed the female pilot thought their altitude was 100 feet below the altitude that the instructor pilot believed them to be. https://t.co/STXnsbK5bd

@retirednavypm - RetiredNavyPM

I remain convinced there was a miscalculation in the error budget that led the FAA to determine helicopter pilots could safely operate at 200 feet at the location of the collision. A pilot relying on a barometric altimeter could reasonably conclude that staying below an indicated 200 feet ensured safety. This assumption was flawed. Altimeters based on barometric pressure are subject to errors that, when compounded, can be significant enough to guarantee a collision in some instances. Yes, there were contributing secondary factors. The helicopter crew twice reported having the jet in sight. The forthcoming visual studies will confirm the physics and probabilities of this claim and its implications. If they truly saw and heard the warnings about the jet’s location, they should have recognized they had 90–120 seconds before it reached the intersection point—ample time to deconflict, slow down, or change direction. Yet, there was no recorded conversation about deconfliction. To me, this suggests that standard practice did not emphasize identifying and reacting to a collision intersection point within roughly 100 seconds when the ATC Tower alerted the helicopter team that a jet was using Runway 33. Moreover, it’s likely that pilots were too focused on navigating the corridor to perform real-time collision avoidance calculations without prior planning and briefing on major risk areas like this. This raises the question: Did the pre-flight briefing include discussions on how to respond when ATC alerted the crew about Runway 33 landings? Such planning would seem prudent—unless they relied on the FAA’s 200-foot altitude restriction, which brings me back to my central point: FAA engineers failed to properly account for error budget analysis. The altitude restriction at this location should have been set at 75 feet. However, I doubt the military would have accepted such a restriction while flying at night at 100 knots over a dark river. This would have necessitated one of two outcomes: 1.Requiring helicopters to remain under ATC tower control, or 2.Mandating that pilots actively plot and track intersecting aircraft in real time using time-based calculations rather than relying solely on altitude separation. The latter approach—managing collision risk through speed and course adjustments—would have been the only effective way to ensure safety without positive ATC control. There is discussion of future real-time plotting displays in cockpits. Perhaps these could work, provided pilots understand the implications of increased workload and distraction. However, experience suggests this may not be a reliable solution. In Vietnam, pilots often disabled certain warning alarms during critical moments, such as final approaches to drop ordnance, because they could not manage additional distractions. Given the challenges of flying at 100 knots and 200 feet over a river at night, I am not convinced that real-time plotting would be sufficient. Perhaps adding a fourth crew member dedicated to situational awareness and collision avoidance could be a more viable solution.

@prodreamer1 - pro dreamer

@retirednavypm 1. The ATC msg that the CRJ was diverted to runway 33 was not heard by the Blackhawk so they may have moved to the center of the Potomac for separation from a plane they thought was heading North on their left. There were 2 occasions when the instructor corrected the altitude. https://t.co/r407BtCzyI

@retirednavypm - RetiredNavyPM

The visual studies should inform the NTSB what could be seen and what might confuse them. When the CRJ was 1200 feet just south of Woodrow Wilson bridge (about 90 to 120 seconds away), the ATC Tower advised the helicopter of location and that it was going to land on Runway 33. The helicopter replied they had CJR in sight and wanted permission to manage separation based on visibility. I presume that meant they were tracking something (CJR) located just south of that bridge and at 1200 feet elevation for the next 90 seconds or so. I am looking forward to seeing what simulation shows regarding they could see and/or mistake. I was surprised the voice recording showed essentially no discussion of tracking the CJR.

@retirednavypm - RetiredNavyPM

Also, I note your comment that the helicopter flight recorder at this time does not cite the word ‘circle’. I note NTSB does not say that the words “Runway 33” were missing, only that “circle” was missing. They said their recorder team was evaluating. As you suggest, if the helicopter team did not hear CJR was planning Runway 33 verses Runway 1, that would be significant it terms of raising the probability of misidentification. What the helicopter pilots are likely going to see are bright white dots floating in the air and slowly descending. The dot which was the CJR would also have a left horizontal motion as it tracked away from ILS on Runway 1 in order to set up for Runway 33. That would leave the dot for the next jet that was tracking for Runway 1. I would have believed you would be hard pressed to confuse the two. But that was based on initial belief the helicopter heard the CJR was re-aligning for Runway 33. It will interesting to hear what the recorder team concludes on what the helicopter heard.

@prodreamer1 - pro dreamer

@retirednavypm The instructor pilot was primarily there to evaluate the pilot rather than functioning to assist her. This was probably a timed flight with failure resulting from too slow a flight. He may also have been under pressure to not fail her by assuming control due to her incompetence