reSee.it - Related Post Feed

listen_2learn
Posted - November 8, 2022 at 3:57 PM
Saved - December 25, 2023 at 10:15 PM
reSee.it AI Summary
A thread shares clips from a conference discussing alleged rigging in the 2016 election. The author suggests that the experts involved may have influenced the 2020 election as well. Another post criticizes Hillary Clinton for denying election results and promoting conspiracy theories.

@listen_2learn - The Researcher

Thread with clips from a conference on how the 2016 election was rigged. How would you hack a presidential election? I’m guessing these partisan election experts had a hand in the 2020 election because they disappeared afterwards, but they will soon be back. https://t.co/pDHfioOBV8

Video Transcript AI Summary
To hack a US presidential election, the speaker suggests a four-step plan. First, use pre-election polls to identify closely contested states. Second, target large counties or their service providers and compromise their election management system computers. Third, infect individual voting machines using the compromised system. This can be done easily by purchasing a government surplus machine on Ebay. Finally, manipulate the votes on the computer, knowing that most states discard the paper ballots without checking them.
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Speaker 0: How would you actually hack a US presidential election? Well, step 1, before the election, use pre election polls like Nate Silver provides to identify the states that are likely to be closest, that are going to be within a percent or so. Step 2, target some large counties or their service providers and compromise their election management system computers. I'll leave it as an exercise to the attacker to find out, how to compromise the election management system by, say, starting by emailing Sue. Step 3, use the compromised election management system to spread your infection to the individual voting machines. Developing an attack for one of these machines is not terribly difficult. I and others have done it again and again in the laboratory. All you need to do is buy 1 government surplus on Ebay to test it out. Finally, step 4, you're a tax steals votes on the computer, but no one ever looks at the paper because as we'll show you, most states just throw away that paper without ever looking at it.

@listen_2learn - The Researcher

By December 13, 2016, if there was fraud, it had to be exposed by this date in order to have any hope of changing the outcome of the election. Hillary Clinton. Election denier and conspiracy theorist. https://t.co/ZAna9mQC0s

Video Transcript AI Summary
In 2016, it was known that hacking could occur during the presidential election. The election results were surprisingly close compared to the polls, indicating possible interference. However, no US states examined enough paper ballots to determine if the computers were hacked. This revealed a significant gap in our system. With a deadline approaching for states to finalize their electoral college votes, there was a need to expose any fraud that may have occurred. Election integrity advocates struggled to find a solution to ensure the examination of physical evidence that could detect cyber attacks.
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Speaker 0: So coming back to 2016 and the presidential election, we knew on November on November 8th, excuse me, not December 8th, on November 8th, on Election Day, that hacking was possible, and at the end of the day when the election results came in, we saw that the result was extremely close, was surprising compared to the polling. We knew at that point that there had been cyberattacks of an unprecedented nature in American politics aimed previously at interfering with the election. This was all before Election Day, and we knew that it was feasible for an attacker to change votes on enough machines to have stolen the election result. Shockingly, at least shockingly to me and many other people, even under these circumstances, approximately 0 US states we're going to look at enough paper ballots to know whether the computers had been hacked. This is a major gap in our system. I previously had believed that the paper would provide a fairly strong deterrent, but if even in 2016 we're not going to look at any of the paper, well, it might as well not be there. So at this point, there were 5 weeks between Election Day on November 8th and December 13th, which is a deadline under federal law for states to lock in their electoral college votes, if there was no, if there was fraud that had taken place, it had to be exposed by this date in order to have any hope of changing the outcome of the election. So what to do under these circumstances? I and other election integrity advocates got together and started discussing some possibilities, but we didn't really have a good solution. Was there any way possible to make the states actually examine the physical evidence they had in a way that could potentially detect a cyber attack.
KanekoaTheGreat
Posted - January 8, 2023 at 9:56 PM
Saved - June 4, 2023 at 9:05 AM

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

Hacking America's Election System 1 hour of computer scientists, election security experts, and Senate Democrats talking about how easy it is to hack voting machines. @KariLake @katiehobbs @GenFlynn @realMikeLindell @bgmasters @PatrickByrne @JackPosobiec @DavidSacks @elonmusk https://t.co/sH4Ft0iMsB

Video Transcript AI Summary
Voting machines in the US are vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, according to researchers. These machines, which come in various models, have been found to have security vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious software and change election data. The machines can be hacked through the machine used to program them, and many of them have wireless modems that can connect to the internet, despite claims that they are not connected. The vulnerabilities in the voting machines, along with the lack of secure systems for voter registration and result reporting, pose a significant risk to the integrity of elections. It is crucial to address these vulnerabilities to ensure the trustworthiness of election results.
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Speaker 0: I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine like a computer virus, and silently change election outcomes, and in every single case We've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. Across the country, there are about 52 different models of machines. They they fall into essentially 2 styles. Ones that scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen. And many of them have been analyzed now by researchers, looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case where a US voting machine has been analyzed by competent security researchers, They have found vulnerabilities that would let someone inject malicious software and change election data. Every single case. Speaker 1: The better or the more efficient way of hacking machines would be to subvert them all through the machine that's used to actually program those machines. So prior to each election, the county election office or the voting machine vendor will actually program memory cards for that election. It tells the machine who are the candidates, what are the, you know, the the contests being decided, and that gets It's inserted into the voting machine. If you can alter, if you can subvert that machine that is used to program those memory cards, then you can pass rogue software to the voting machine. Speaker 0: Voting machines that are not connected to the internet. This is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately, it's not actually true. Many new voting machines that come with 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connected to the internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me, that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the Internet right in the middle of the election, potentially at the most vulnerable Speaker 2: time. Studies conducted in 2007 by the state of California, state of Ohio, state of Florida found security vulnerabilities that could take advantage of these To engineer viruses where 1 compromised voting machine could then infect eventually the entire fleet of machines for an entire county. Typically at the end of the election day, you move a memory card through each of the machines in the precinct, and that's to collect the vote totals. That process can spread a virus. And there are other processes. The details vary from machine to machine. Speaker 3: When you say hacked, what were they able to do once they gained access to the machines? Speaker 4: All sorts of Executally manipulate the outcome of the vote. They could manipulate the tally. They could delete the tally, and and they could compromise the vote in any number of ways. Speaker 5: The machines used in Georgia have been demonstrated to be hackable through a virus that's carried on ballot definition cartridges. Very much like this Duxnet virus was inserted into nuclear centrifuges in Iran. Speaker 3: There are a number of states that outsource their reporting of elections to third parties, some of which are corporations based in other countries like Spain. So you've got to trust that the aggregation of the votes and the reporting of the votes is accurate as well. Speaker 0: I'm pretty sure my undergrad computer security class at Michigan could have changed the outcome of the 2016 teen Michigan election if we wanted to. It is that bad. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries, and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's that's why I say it's only a matter of time. Speaker 6: Unfortunately, in a lot of these systems, The audit trails are just as vulnerable as the other aspects of the system. So there may not be good forensic evidence of a successful intrusion. With the current design, we cannot be universally confident that it hasn't happened. And it's probably only a matter of time before it will. Speaker 7: I come here today as a computer scientist who spent the better part of the last quarter century studying Election system security. As you're well aware, the integrity of elections across the US depends heavily on the integrity of computers and Software systems. Unfortunately, much of this infrastructure has proven dangerously vulnerable to tampering and attack, and in some cases, In ways that cannot be easily detected or corrected, after the fact. These vulnerabilities can create practical avenues for, corrupt candidates or foreign adversaries to do everything from cause large scale disruption on Election Day to potentially, undetectably alter, election outcomes in some cases. So let me begin with the voting equipment itself. To be blunt, it's a widely recognized, really indisputable fact that every piece of computerized voting equipment in use at polling places today Can be easily compromised, in ways that have the potential to disrupt election, operations, compromise firmware and software, Potentially alter, vote tallies in the absence of, other safeguards. This is partly a consequence of historically poor design and implementation by equipment vendors, but it's ultimately a reflection of the nature of complex software. It's simply beyond the state of the art, to build software systems that can reliably withstand targeted attack By a determined adversary in this kind of an environment. The vulnerabilities are real. They're serious. And absent a surprising and very fundamental break through in my field, which I would welcome, but I don't see coming, soon, probably inevitable. We give most of the attention to vulnerabilities in voting machines, But that's not the whole story. Each of the more than 5,000 jurisdictions responsible for running elections across the nation Must maintain a number of critical information systems that are attractive targets for disruption by adversaries. Most important of these are voter registration databases, the systems that report, final results, and so forth. Unfortunately, There are even fewer standards for how to secure these systems. The administration of these systems varies widely. And the threats against these systems are often even more, acute than the threats against individual voting systems. You know, just as we don't expect the local sheriff to single handedly defend against military ground invasions, we shouldn't expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services, but that's precisely what we've been asking them, to do. Speaker 0: I'm a professor of computer science and have spent the last 10 years studying the electronic voting systems that our nation relies on. My conclusion from that work is that our highly computerized election infrastructure that is vulnerable to sabotage, and even to cyber attacks that could change votes. These realities risk making our election results more difficult for the American people to trust. I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly, as part of a decade of research, studying the technology that operates elections and learning how to make it stronger. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine, like a computer virus, and silently change election outcomes. We've studied touch screen and optical scan systems, and in every single case we've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. These capabilities are certainly within reach for America's enemies. As you know, states choose their own voting technology. And while some states are doing well with security, others are alarmingly vulnerable. This puts the entire nation at risk. In close elections, an attacker can probe the most important swing states or swing counties, find areas with the weakest protection, and strike there. In a close election year changing a few votes in key, localities could be enough to tip national results. The key lesson from 2016 is that these threats are real. Some say the fact that voting machines aren't directly connected to the Internet makes them secure, but unfortunately this is not true. Voting machines are not as distant from the Internet as they may seem. So the way these attacks work Is that before every election, every voting machine needs to be programmed with the design of the ballot, the names of the races and candidates. And voting officials do that by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker can infect that memory card With malicious code, well, when the memory card is inserted into the machine, it can change the programming running on the voting machine And caused the voting machine to, at the end of the election, output whatever results the attacker wants. Speaker 5: The machine that I hacked is called the Sequoia AVC Advantage, now called the Dominion AVC Advantage. It's in The computer program that counts the votes on this machine is in a read only memory that's mounted in a socket on the motherboard. To hack this machine, you have to Remove that memory chip from its socket and install a memory chip, on which you've prepared a cheating program. The cheating program that I prepared, has an extra 100 lines of code basically that, when the polls are about to close, it goes in there and changes some votes stored in the machine. And there is an electronic log of all votes cast, so it changes the log too. So to install that, the attacker doesn't need to be a computer scientist, the attacker just needs to have A bunch of copies of this memory chip, with the fraudulent program on it. And for each voting machine, unscrew 10 screws to remove the panel that that covers the motherboard, pry out the ROM chip containing the legitimate program and install the ROM chip containing the fraudulent program. Other kinds of voting machines store their computer program that counts to votes in flash memory. And this can be updated Under the control of whatever computer program happens to be running in the voting machine. These voting machines, typically the generation developed in the 1990s and after, can be hacked without actually physically changing any hardware in the machine, just by installing a software upgrade Memory card in the same slot that one would normally install the ballot definition. And this particular attack was demonstrated by my colleague at Princeton, Professor Felton, In about 2007, working with 2 of his graduate students. But it's not just us at Princeton, there are many kinds of voting machines and The same kinds of hacks are applicable to all voting machines and have been demonstrated at several other universities, including University of Connecticut, Johns Hopkins, Michigan and others. There are cyber security issues in all parts of our election system. Before the election, voter registration databases. During the election, voting machines. After the election, vote tabulation, canvassing, precinct aggregation computers. Installing new software in a voting machine is not really much different from installing new software in any other kind of computer. Installing new software is how you hack a voting machine to cheat. In 2009, in the courtroom of the Superior Court of New Jersey, I demonstrated how to hack a voting machine. I wrote a vote stealing computer program that shifts votes from 1 candidate to another. Installing that vote stealing program in a voting machine takes 7 minutes per machine with a screwdriver. But really the software I built was not rocket science. Any computer programmer could write the same code. Once it's installed, it could steal elections without detection for years to come. Voting machines are often delivered to polling places several days before the election, to elementary schools, churches, firehouses. In these locations, anyone could gain access to a voting machine for 10 minutes. Between elections, the machines are routinely opened up for maintenance by county employees or private contractors. Let's assume they have the utmost integrity. But still in the US we try to run our elections so that we can trust the election results without relying on any one individual. Other computer scientists have demonstrated similar hacks on many models of machine. This is not just 1 glitch in 1 manufacturer's machine. It's the very nature of computers. So how can we trust our elections when it's so easy to make the computers cheat? Speaker 8: Mr. Appel, in that scenario, an attacker would actually have to have access to all 100 in the 1 county in order to manipulate the records. Speaker 5: In Georgia, that's not the case. The machines used in Georgia Have been demonstrated to be hackable through a virus that's carried on ballot definition cartridges, very much like this Stuxnet virus was, inserted into nuclear centrifuges in Iran. So, and in Speaker 8: that auditing system, in the auditing of these machines. We look at that. Is that correct? Speaker 5: I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question? Speaker 8: So, in those machines that have that vulnerability in the auditing process. Isn't that scanned? Don't we scan for that? Speaker 5: It's difficult to scan for that vulnerability in the sense of if you Ask a machine to report what software is loaded in it. If it's fraudulent software, it will lie. So, the AccuVote TS machines, used in Georgia and in a few counties in other states are particularly vulnerable to this kind of virus that can be carried to the machines even if the criminal attacker doesn't touch the machines or is not even in the same state with the machines. Cap. Speaker 9: With parts made all over the world, and software made all over the world, and as Sherry said, there's only 3 or 4 manufacturers, the the one core point That kind of election security experts and others have been making about why our votes are safe was that the decentralized nature of our, Voting systems, the thousands and thousands of of, voting offices around the country that administer the election is what kept safe because Russians would need to have tens of thousands of operatives go get physical access to machines to actually, infiltrate the election. We now know that's false. And that through a handful of simple attacks, into manufacturers not in the United States, The Russians could plant malware into, thousands of machines all at once and hack the entire U. S. Election without ever leaving the Kremlin. Speaker 10: Or is there a different way where you could just hack one machine and that would transmit a bug to other machines in the precinct, again, even though they're not connected to an internet. Speaker 2: Sure. So before we had an Internet, we had computers with floppy drives. And there were computer viruses that could spread from 1 computer to another over floppies. Electronic voting machines, some of them use memory cards, some of them have these big battery packs, some of them have local area networks. Studies conducted in 2007 by the state of California, state of Ohio, state of Florida found security vulnerabilities that could take advantage of these to engineer viruses where 1 compromised voting machine could then infect eventually the entire fleet of machines for an entire county. And Each of these studies found ways that regular poll workers and election officials going through their standard procedures and and standard operations Could unwittingly be used to transmit viruses from 1 machine to another through the motion. Typically at the end of the election day, you move a memory card through each of the machines in the precinct, and that's to collect the vote totals. That process can spread a virus. And there are other processes. The details vary from machine to machine. Speaker 10: Okay. So it's accurate to say that just because something is not connected to the internet, it does not have a vulnerability to cyber attack. Speaker 2: Being disconnected from the Internet helps, but it's not a panacea, okay? Speaker 11: When you and your colleagues hacked election systems, did you get caught? Speaker 0: We hacked, election systems as part of academic research where we had machines in our system. Did you get caught? Speaker 11: Did they did they see your intrusion into their systems? Speaker 0: The one instance when I was invited to hack a real voting system to while people were watching, was in Washington, D. C. In 2010, and in that instance it took less than 48 hours for us to change all the votes, and we were not caught. Speaker 11: Vice, Chairman. Speaker 0: I have sitting in my office right now actually, a deep old AccuVote TSX machine, a touchscreen machine that's still in use in 23 states, where, I've hacked it to give whatever outcome I want. It it really is that easy. And when you're talking about, when you're talking about these attacks, though, I don't think it's something that, You know, just in every case, a, a freshman in college could do it. Some states are a little bit better protected, but that's not who we're up against. We're up against nation state attackers that are among some of the most Powerful, adversaries in the world when it comes to cyber attacks, and which have routinely compromised highly protected sites like, like military installations, and large tech companies. I think that's the thing that I want voting officials and and voters to understand is quite what they're up against. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries and series, and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's why I say it's only a matter of time. Speaker 3: The standard arguments that, our elections can't be hacked in the US are some combination of physical security. You can't get access to the devices, they're not connected to the internet, they're tested before Election Day, and the system is too decentralized. It's run by, you know, a bunch of individual election officials and individual counties and and jurisdictions. So it's it's a it's a hard target. Most of this has already been debunked by, the previous speakers, but, physical security is pretty lax. Equipment, has sleepovers in school gymnasiums, and churches, and this and that. There are lots of, examples on the Internet of photos of, election, equipment warehouses, where the the Election officials warehouses with the door propped open and nobody watching. Just, it's just not true. It isn't true that the machines aren't connected to the Internet, and even if they weren't to the Internet that would still be hackable through other means. One of the things that hasn't been mentioned so far yet is supply chain hacks. There are components in these voting systems that come from foreign countries. A colleague of ours, Karsten Sherman, at the IT University of Copenhagen, Found Chinese pop songs in memory of a voting machine that he bought, on the Internet. So that those songs somehow made it through the quality control of The election equipment vendor, and then through, how many elections that it was actually used in by the local election official, and, and, you know, we're still there. Moreover, there's an issue in reporting, which I'm not going to talk about that much, but there are a number of states that outsource their reporting of elections to third parties, some of which are corporations based in other countries like Spain. So you've got to trust that the aggregation of the votes and the reporting of the votes is is, is accurate as well. There's a lot of technology being rolled out in this election, that had either not been used or not been used as widely before. This includes, much more widespread reliance on things like electronic poll books, which become a point of vulnerability that can disenfranchise people if they malfunction, if they lose their Internet connection, or if they've been hacked, some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election results using cellular modems or, the internet That, of course, introduces another point of vulnerability, not just to the data that's flowing, but also to the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Voting equipment itself, there are states that have rolled out touchscreen voting for all in person voters. This is, An unnecessary introduction of brittle and vulnerable technology. Many pieces of electronic technology that are involved in elections are Either incorporate, devices that were built overseas, or assembled overseas, and many crucial functions are being outsourced to foreign companies. One, noteworthy example that I'm especially concerned about, there is a Spanish firm, called CITL, which runs, they they provide election reporting for something like 11 US states. They're based in Spain, and they're bankrupt. So that could, obviously, is a point of failure where, someone could shed a lot of mistrust over the election results By simply falsifying what gets posted, even if the correct results could ultimately be recovered from durable reliable records, that would certainly, cast a lot of fear uncertainty and doubt on what's going on. There have been ransomware attacks on, government systems now including some voting systems, We know that there are cyber warfare attacks by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. There most states voter registration databases were, penetrated in 2016, there is a lot of evidence that data were changed, but that could certainly happen this time around. So all in all, there's a lot of confusion, there are a lot of points of vulnerability. There are a lot of known problems. There are some election vendors who have been hacked, before 2016. VR systems was hacked in Florida. Some of their clients were, there were phishing attacks against them this time, around, let's see, I forgot my name of it. Tyler Technologies, which provides some, vote by mail ballot, tracking and some vote aggregation reporting has also been hacked. So overall, there's an awful lot that can go wrong. Speaker 12: He saw no evidence of, Tampering with, no, voter voting machines or voter tallies. That's not true. It didn't happen. We just didn't see the evidence of it. Speaker 13: Well, there has been never a documented incident when votes have been changed during the real election. And my answer was please continue using these machines and that will remain to be true forever, Because these machines don't have a capability of providing you forensic evidence to see if they cannot prove they were honest, they cannot prove that they were have been hacked. They simply don't have the fundamental basic capabilities of providing you that forensic evidence, that data. Only way you can see that that machine was hacked if the attacker wanted to be found that it was hacked. That's a sad truth. So Anyone who says I have a information one way or another, that's an opinion. That's not fact based. Fact is, it can be done without leaving trace. Speaker 14: When you know how the system for looking for the evidence, you know that you won't find it because the systems are not recording, Generating, preserving or protecting meaningful forensic evidence. And this is from the very beginning to the end of the process everywhere. These systems really don't have a capability of recording and protecting any meaningful audit information or forensically important information. So a lot of times I would also argue that even if you try to take a look into the into the evidence, the problem is that there is no Evidence which is trustworthy and and worth on a lot. Even recently, a case where a voting machine was reporting, and I believe that was in the last year in North voting machine was in the race where they had 50,000 votes cast, was cast reporting to 1 candidate 164 or something like that votes. And when the paper was looped, that person actually get 26,000 vote and vote by 1 by 1,000 votes. Speaker 12: Wow. Speaker 14: So we we really need to have that paper ballot. There's nothing we don't have a technology to do electronic voltage. The problem the most most Driving thing is, first of all, from 2006 to now is nothing changed. The actual same version of software I hacked 2005 is still in use. It's those machines are still in 20 states. Mhmm. So they're still around. Even the so called new sold today is In the end of life version of of Windows, etcetera, like, just something which no other industry would be acceptable, would be remotely acceptable. So I think the most as overall, it is how outdated everything is And and how hard it is to make people to understand the the reality and and get the warning through that this needs to be fixed or things will get really, really worse, turn the worse. They're bad right now, but and I cannot even Cannot imagine what the worst would be looking like. Parties, they are not actually but a lot of these voting machines are not US origin. And I'm not only talking about the components being made in China or a voting machine being assembled in in Philippines, but also the very of the machine, the programming. In many many many voting machines, that programming, either whole or in the large part is Coming from a foreign from code sources. And it seems to be the case that actually the voting machine vendors, Generally speaking, either don't know or they refuse to tell the truth where the code actually comes. And it turned out that the system he is using exactly the same system which created this magnitude 16,022 votes in Volusia County for Al Gore. So I took a look into the system, figured out a couple of ways to manipulate the central tabulator. But I told I on this well, this is not elegant. You leave a audit trail. You leave a evidence, the bet bet, breadcrumbles. You can trace it. I was asked, well, if there what is the elegant way? So I have I don't know if there's 1. But if if there is, it's gotta be this memory card. Speaker 15: So it's so it's a memory card that fits into the voting machine that you found could be the more or less untraceable or hard to trace way to manipulate the results, whereas they were thinking it was something in the machine. You thought this was attack because you would see a ton of evidence and, like you said, breadcrumbs being left by the tampering party. Speaker 14: Well, it's it's no. It's if not even that. I was just Thinking about the architecture of the system. And with that architecture, it made sense that there's executable program in the memory card. And I was quickly told that that's impossible because it's against the certified rules. But, also, the vendor was dishonest about the origin of the card. So, well, if they are not Honest about one thing they're probably not honest about. The second thing, I found an executable program on a memory card. I found it's it's completely unprotected. This This memory card is so old. It's older than floppy drive. So it actually, I found it because I was I remember that I have seen it before floppy drives existed. So that's what I found who was the original manufacturer of it. And a, interesting The thing about this explanation afterwards was that demand 16,000 was malfunction Of the memory card, that's the, that's the reason why it happened. Not possible. That reason why it's not possible is that that memory card Doesn't know how to make negative numbers. So whatever caused that man respond 16,000 votes, which we don't know what caused it. At least the official explanation given at the time, not possible. Something else happened. Speaker 1: So everyone was focused in 2000 on the punch card machines and the problems that that brought. But in Fallucia County, there was an incident that occurred. It didn't A lot of attention. And the attention that it did get sort of disappeared and got lost in all of the focus on the punch card machines. What happened in Volusia County was around At 10 p. M. Midnight or sorry, 10 p. M. On election night. Prior to that, Al Gore in Volusia County was ahead of George Bush. But around 10 p. M, suddenly, Al Gore's number started reversing. And it reversed more than 16,000 votes. And in There aren't, it was all happening in 1 precinct, and of course, there weren't 16,000 voters in that 1 precinct. So Gore's numbers were actually showing a negative 16,000 in that precinct. And the explanation that election officials provided was that, a faulty memory card was inserted into the tabulating machine. Now, it wasn't, the, let's say, legitimate memory card. So there was 1 memory card for this precinct, and it was uploaded to a tabulator on election night. But the logs show that an hour after that memory card was uploaded, another 2nd memory card for that same precinct was uploaded. And after that 2nd card was uploaded, that's when the votes for Gore started disappearing. And no one has been able to explain what exactly happened with that, whether that was a rogue card that was intentionally designed to hack the votes and misfired and therefore, Erased too many votes for Gore or whether this was, you know, a software mishap. But no one has explained why 2 memory cards for the same precinct were uploaded. And that's that's sort of the main problem in terms of chains of custody, the fact that a second memory card was actually ever able to be uploaded. Speaker 6: And John Kerry has expressed misgivings about the 2004 vote in Ohio. Speaker 1: Yes. So they had concerns about the machines in Ohio. Ohio was still largely using punch card machines. They hadn't replaced theirs yet. But there were still counties there were counties that were already using optical scan machines and also paperless DRE machines. And he and his group, he revealed this only recently, actually went to court court to try and obtain the algorithms, the software, to look at the software to make sure that it would be counting votes accurately. And the courts denied access to it because the proprietary software on voting machines is considered a trade secret. And so the private voting machine companies go to court to fight against this, and the courts generally agree with them. Speaker 14: When I and others, when we 2005, 2006 got involved And up until 2008, we all thought now when the problem has been exposed, it will be fixed very quickly. It would it was completely Always incomprehensible for me and and other secretary researchers that now 2020, we are talking about this topic. And, also, we are 2020 using the same machines with the same software. It's just you wouldn't be using a a 30 year old PC with with no security patches, But that's exactly how the elections are conducted. Let's talk about everything in the world how this works. Speaker 16: Okay. Speaker 17: So Speaker 14: you have a voting message, a voting terminal. That's how you pass your ballot, either electronically or paper ballot, it's go scanning. And after that, these machines are reporting those results Very often, our our communication lies through the central tabulator. Now in both in the county level, or or state level, where the votes are accumulated in database, and along the path, there are number of data storage, systems databases. And if you manipulate those, you can create an illusion of a different results. And you can even do it in the about election reporting system. So instead of even hacking anything in the tabulator system, you are just creating wrong reporting. So there are a number of ways how you can, through this whole path, influence the results. And we have to actually step even further back, Steph, because if we look the election as whole, it's a myriad of system. We have voter registration system. Them. We have electronic poll book systems. We have the election management. We have the ballot casting. We have the tabulation, and we have the reporting. Any of these, if you have one of these, you can always have the result. You can disenfranchise voters so they can cast their ballot. You can change the the outcome. You can change the reporting. Each of these needs to be secured. None of these is less important than the others. And that's why we have been I think in the public mind, we have been focusing in a very narrow area, Which is you cast a ballot on how the ballot is counted, but not missing the whole big picture. How many other systems from a adversary, how from from ethical's point of view, where the other can go and achieve the same goal. How about the Internet? It really it's everything is connected to Internet either directly or indirectly. And the more modern voting machines, they actually have a mobile phone Modem, in to speak, they have a they have a mobile phone mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters. They are sending the results. So wireless is coming back to the voting message in the newer generations. Nice marketing material trying to tell it's not, but it is. A journalist in a year ago, she found 200 voting machines in the Internet. Voting machine vendors say, well, they are not in Internet because they are not pingable. My answer to that is, are you from the past? Because since since 15 years ago, nothing is really anymore pingable, And they are still connected to Internet. It's the the whole argument is 15 that argument was to have been meaning something 15 years ago. It doesn't mean anything today. And, again, I I was just came from Atlanta, and and they have new working machines because the judge ordered the old ones to be scrapped. And part of the things in the the judge's ruling was that, The finding was that the voting machine were programmed by basically 3 guys from their homes and who sent all the programming of the voting machine for next hours and over Internet to We distribute all the machines. Speaker 15: Oh, so these guys had programmed the machines from home, and then they they pushed the code update to the voting machines via the Internet. Speaker 14: We what they said but they pushed it to the state, and then the state pushed it to the counties. And, actually, this whole thing about, the critical election specific programming going over Internet is very common because lot of this programming is done by private companies, third party management companies. And it's, it has been shocking the last 2 years when I have been working for a number of secretaries of state And looking how the security has done in their state just to find that email, FTP with no security. These are the common methods to send the most mission critical programming from the private company, which might be out of state, to the local county who is putting it into the machines. It is whoever controls that data controls the election. Speaker 15: And these machines, they like you said, they have network cards. You show in Kill Chain, again, the documentary that we'll link in the show notes, that they have USB ports. They have memory card slots. They have modems and phone jacks sometimes. So these things were built for connectivity. They're not immune to connectivity. And we don't by the seem seemingly, we don't have to hack Hundreds of machines. These are networked. You can just make software that infects 1 and then dozens of others or just changes the data. Do you think we could, Is it possible so do you think it's possible that we could create a worm that it yet we get on 1 machine in the voting center and it just connects to the other machines covertly and infects them without the bad actors so much as laying a hand on the machine themselves. Speaker 14: The real, proof of concept virus was demonstrated over 10 years ago. So, that that already has been demonstrated publicly that voting machine virus which can, self propagate from 1 voting machine to another, that's a reality which We have sown it's possible. So beyond and that's one of the things why that was created was because, Again, when you say it's possible by showing the vulnerability, people said, well, I don't believe until you show it. So it's one of the rear Things where, a team of researchers developed in the actual virus just to show the logical outcome of the the the vulnerability. Yes. There can be a voting machine virus. Full stop. Here it is. Speaker 18: We've heard a lot from voting machine vendors and election officials that voting machines Can't be hacked because they're not connected to the Internet. All of those vulnerabilities that Andrew talked about, are not a problem because no one can access the machines. And it turns out that the message that they've been giving us for years, and particularly after the 2016 election, just isn't true. Voting machine vendors have sold election officials on these in use of modems. In some cases, the modems are embedded inside the voting machines. In other cases, there are external modems that get attached to the voting machine at the end of the election. So at the end of the election, the machine goes into shutdown mode And then this option pops up about modoming results. And so the system will automatically then dial in and send these votes, over a cellular modem to a server on the Internet that collects the results. So everyone will tell you, and they've told me every time I've spoken with them, that cellular modems are not really Internet connectivity. They will say that doesn't mean that the machine is connected to the Internet. It's using a cellular modem. Well, that's not true. And Election Systems and Software, which is tax. This is one of their statements over and over again with the public. But this is one of their own diagrams that they actually gave to Rhode Island in 2015. And if you see that circular part in the centre there showing that modem transmission using a wireless modem, They sit there, right there. It's on their own diagram that it's going over the internet. So what happens is that the transmission of the votes votes, that the voting machine will dial in using the cellular modem and it contacts the nearest cell tower. And then the data goes through that cell tower into the carrier's back end network. But then the data actually has to get to that county network, and it goes over the Internet to a system, a server that's on the Internet to receive those votes. So we've already now basically shown the misinformation of the transmission of those votes. So ES and S will then say, well, it doesn't matter because all of that process is secured. So the transmission of the votes are secured so that no one can intercept them and read the votes or alter them. The modem is configured in such a way so that no one can actually dial into the modem, it can only dial out, and it can only dial out when the machine shuts down at the end of the election. So apparently, there are all of these safeguards. And also, the back end system that receives the transmitted votes is supposed to communicate only with one of those authenticated machines with the modem. The problem is none of this has been tested or certified. The voting machines themselves go through sort of a federal testing lab process And through certification, the modem transmissions don't. So we don't know what's inside those modems. We don't know how they work. We don't know how they're configured. And ES and S doesn't have a good track record on implementing security. So we don't actually know that the way that they are saying that these are transmitted securely is actually case. So what can happen with a modem machine that's transmitting? So I don't know if you're familiar with something called a stingray. It's a device that law enforcement uses and the military uses. And what it does is it, masquerades as a legitimate cell tower. It transmits a much more powerful signal than the nearby cell tower so that your cell phone will connect to the stingray instead of the cell tower. And then it might pass it on to the cell tower as well. It's mostly used for tracking phones, but there are also Stingrays that are designed also to intercept the content of communication. So if you've got a cellular modem in a voting machine, a rogue person can put a rogue cell tower near some kind of voting precinct, whatever. And instead of that modem then connecting to that cell tower, they can connect to that rogue The rogue cell tower. You can intercept data. If it's not properly encrypted, you could intercept the data and change the results. Or you could basically swap out the a whole package of results if it's not authentically signed, and replace it with your own package of results. And so those go on to the server. If there's a vulnerability in that modem, A hacker can actually transmit malware back onto that voting machine through the rogue cell tower. And once you're in that voting machine, Either that way or maybe you've gotten into the voting machine prior when it's being programmed, you now actually control the configuration of that modem. So even if ES and S says that modem will only work at the end of the election and will only call out and not receive calls in. If you control the configuration of that modem, you change all of that. You can have that machine contact your system at any time you want, for however you want, so that you can do reconnaissance on that machine and study it and established your attack. There were a group of researchers that decided that they would try and see if they could find those backend servers that receive the votes that are transmitted by modem. So if you've got something that's transmitting the votes over the cellular network, there's something that has to be connected to the internet to receive them. So there is a server. And it turns out that they could actually, based on configuration information that's publicly available on the internet, that the voting machine vendors provide to election offices and the election offices post on the internet. They describe the type of that we have created a firewall that they use. It's made by Cisco. They describe the type of FTP software that receives the votes, that sits on that server. They describe the whole configuration, including the type of cellular modem that's embedded in their machines. So based on that information, they decided to see if they could look for that very specific footprint of ESNS machines that are receiving the votes. And they did a scan and they were able to find these systems on the Internet. So they found 9 Wisconsin counties that had systems connected to the Internet, 7 Florida counties, from 4 Michigan counties. They actually found systems in 10 different states, but these were the primary ones. And of course, these are all important critical swing states. So here's the thing. Election officials will tell you, well, the modem transmissions don't matter because we only turn on those modems for a very brief period, less than a minute at the end of the election to transmit. And that's not sufficient time for someone to hack. Any of the technical attack. But more importantly, it turns out these systems aren't just connected for a few minutes after an election. Those back end systems that receive the votes are quite often connected year round. You can see them when they're doing the scans. You can sometimes see them. They come up a couple of weeks. Some of the ones that are only up temporarily will sometimes come up a couple of weeks before the election because they want to test the transmission. And then they leave it on for those weeks before the election. And after the election, they might forget to take it down and it might stay up a couple of other weeks. But there are some that simply never take them down at all. And Wisconsin was one of them. They were on year round. These systems, so what are they? I describe this as a server, but that sounds kind of benign. What is happening is that the The votes are being transmitted, and on the receiving end there's a firewall that's connected to the internet. And behind the firewall, There is this FTP server that the votes are transmitted on. Now that FTP server is supposed to serve as kind of like a DMZ, a safe zone, right? So the votes are deposited and there's supposed to be then no direct connection to the system that actually tabulates the votes. But it turns out that's not the case at all. This is a diagram that ES and S created and handed out to election officials. And so you can see that the votes are coming over the Internet, and they're coming and there's the firewall, and then you see all those wires connected. And you see at the bottom there that EMS, that's the Election Management system. That is the system that tabulates the final results. So even though they say that, that transmission of votes over the Internet is just unofficial, Connected to that system that's receiving those unofficial votes is also the system that is tabulating the official results. What's more, that election management system is also used to program all the voting machines prior to an election. So when, I brought this To ES and S's attention, they didn't then say that nothing is connected to the Internet. What they said was none of those critical systems are pingable from the Internet because there's a firewall in front. So essentially what they're saying is that even though now first they've said that none of these systems are connected to the Internet. And now when they're faced with someone saying, well, they actually are connected, they say, well, they may be configured in some manner that you're showing, but there's a firewall in front of them and therefore, you can't see what's behind the firewall. But if you can find the firewall, then you find the systems that are behind the firewall. The only thing that's protecting anyone from getting into those critical systems behind the firewall are the rules of that firewall that say, only these certain systems can connect to us, only these certain systems can transmit data. That's simply software. It's configuration rules. And if you misconfigure that software, then anything can get into that firewall. And of course, many, many hacks happen because firewalls are misconfigured. Speaker 0: I was part of the team that did the first hands on study of any electronic voting machine used in the US and it was using exactly this machine. And what we found, well, we got one of these machines from a whistleblower, Brought it into a laboratory. Reverse engineered it. And well, here's the result of what we found. We we would run a mock election with George Washington and Benedict Arnold, just like this. And, wanted to know, well, if an attacker that could get malicious software into the machine somehow. Could they change the results? And what we found after reverse engineering the machine was, well, Yeah. There are actually a lot of problems with it. All the records of the vote are contained in, in computer memory. And, an attacker can manipulate the software that's supposed to be running in the machine in a pretty straightforward way. Before every election, officials program the machine with the names of the candidates on the ballot by, installing some that they can change the software running in the machine. There are, unauthenticated software update mechanisms, there are offer overflows and the code that reads the data files from this. There's even an interpreted programming language and the rules for how the votes will be counted are contained in an unauthenticated program contained on the memory card. So through any of those means, An attacker can change the software running on the voting machine and cause the machine to produce whatever election results they want. So that was in about 2007. We, we published the first paper about this. In and that's what we're going to do. And so we're going to have to do that. And so we're going to have to do that. And so we're flows and so forth. There have been hundreds and hundreds of pages of technical reports about US voting machines like this. But even after that, They haven't even updated the software since before the studies I talked about. That's how bad it is. And it's not even just a single model of machine that's the only problem. Country. There are about 52 different models of machines. They fall into essentially 2 styles, ones that scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen and many of them have been analyzed now by researchers, Looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case where a US voting machine has been analyzed by by competent in security researchers. They have found vulnerabilities that would let someone inject malicious software and change election data, every single case. Before every election, election officials have to program the voting machines with who's on the ballot and what are the rules for counting. Well, they make that election programming on a PC workstation somewhere, either at the, at the jurisdiction or at an outside vendor that does it for them. If an attacker can break into that workstation which is called an election management system. They can spread malicious code to all of the memory cards used to program all of the voting machines in the jurisdiction. And those election management system workstations sometimes are connected to the internet, or they're, or the data that's programmed into them passes through an internet connected system. So we're just 1 or 2 hops away from an online attacker. Now how well secured are these systems? Well, here's, a vendor that did the election programming for, in a large fraction of my state in 2016. And we can just take a look at their website to see how secure this is likely to be. You can see, first of all, they don't have any HTTPS. Here are lots of nice, high resolution photographs of their warehouse, in case you want to break in. And perhaps most interestingly, here's their employee directory with everyone's name, job title, email address and photograph. So if I wanted to break into this company, let's say I was the attacker, I'd probably start by forging an email from, let's say, Larry, the president here, to Sue, his administrative assistant, asking her to urgently open an attachment. Now, of course, when she does, that attachment has my malware in it. I have a foothold into their network, and I can try to spread from there to the election management system and to the voting machines in most of the state. Tampering with the national election result in my country it's easier than well, easier than even I thought in 2016. I keep learning things that convince me that the situation is scarier than, than even experts had thought. You identify the states that are most weakly protected and going to be close. Target the computers that are going to program voting machines there, spread malware to machines to change a fraction of the votes, and then rely on the fact that most states, even if they have a paper record, are not going to rigorously use it to check that the computers are right. But the fact is that in close national contests in the US, the result really only hinges on the result in a small number of states. You've heard about the swing states in any given election. The ones that are, really competitive. In such a situation, an attacker can, before the election, identify which states are likely to be close. Try probing all of them in the way that the Russians did the voter registration systems in 2016 and just find the weakest swing states and attack there. So in this way, the American system converts, diversity of implementation into basically this patchwork of strength and weakness that gives attackers a menu of possible places to strike. It makes us weaker in close elections. So just to review, you look at the polls before the election and figure out which states were likely to be close. Probe all of them, find the ones with the weakest protection, then hack into the, election management systems there or at the outside vendors the states use. Once you hack into the election management system, you can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and have your code say, swap 10% of the votes in the places you infected. Then even if the votes are also recorded on a piece of paper, you don't have to worry. Because in most of those states, they're going to just toss the paper out without looking Speaker 5: Modems in voting machines are a bad idea. Those modems are network connections. And that leaves them vulnerable to hacking by anybody who can connect to that network. Speaker 19: ESNS insists While there are 14,000 of its modems in use, there are firewalls separating those modems from the public Internet. Speaker 5: Once a hacker Starts talking to the voting machine through the modem. They can hack the software in the voting machine and make it cheat in future elections. Speaker 17: What is the vehicle for the transmission from the ICP? Is it cellular modem versus VPN? It is a cellular modem that can be configured in a VPN. Right. And we currently in Chicago and Cook County, we work with Verizon to, secure that network. What wireless chipset Slash modem does the hardware have? We support a variety. So, it's really up to the jurisdictions, what technology they want to use, what's compatible with their networks. Speaker 16: Currently, in some jurisdictions, we're using, Basically a modem that is a three d modem, GSM, but we can support multiple varieties of modem that can be. Speaker 17: Including latest 4 gs standards Speaker 14: as well. Speaker 17: So the answers to the next question, is it Speaker 3: 3 gs or 4 gs? Verizon, 8 gs or 2 gs or Sprint, Speaker 5: I'm assuming Speaker 17: all? Yeah, all networks. Speaker 15: Just to Speaker 17: ask a quick question. Yes, I mean, we actually transmit from the ICP in Mongolia as well. So Speaker 7: We're not committed to networks. Speaker 16: And in Puerto Rico, there is 3 vendors because the island is not covered by any by any of the vendors completely. So we use 3 different cellular vendors for some ICPs with this vendor Claro, AT and T, MT Mobile, I think, in the different parts of the app. Speaker 14: More modern attack voting machines. They actually have a mobile phone modem, and to speak, they have a they have a mobile phone mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters. They are sending the results. Speaker 3: Some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election results using cellular modems or, the Internet. That of course introduces another point of vulnerability, not just to the data that's flowing, but also to the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Speaker 1: Many of these voting machines have modems embedded into them. And the modems are used at the end of the election to transmit the vote totals on election night to the county, The, elections office. So these modems contact their cellular modems, and they contact the cellular network, they contact the cell tower. So the cell tower traffic these In our modern times, it actually goes through Internet. It goes through the same kinds of routers and switches that the regular Internet traffic goes to. But also, in between that cell tower and that voting machine, An intruder can, intercept data going to the cell tower and intercept that that communication, that phone call. If you can trick a voting machine into, contacting your device, A fake cellular tower instead of a legitimate tower. You can actually use that connection to get back into the voting machine and get back into the tabulator, and then alter votes and software. Speaker 20: Virginia just stopped Using touch screen computer voting because it's so vulnerable. Speaker 18: We need to look at Speaker 20: all the voting machines. Every secretary of state needs to be, You know, assisted in making sure that they are not being, hacked and and attacked. Speaker 6: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. Speaker 21: But researchers have repeatedly demonstrated That ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 22: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools, and resources are able to breach voting machines In a matter of minutes. Speaker 23: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 21: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cyber security 101, directing that you install remote access software, which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 24: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 25: You could easily Hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things, but in fact 3 companies are controlling that. It is the individual voting machines That some pose that pose some of the greatest risks. Speaker 26: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, Right? Which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 24: Workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. It was possible to switch votes. 43% Speaker 21: of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, Including backdoors. Speaker 3: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year, where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 26: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the capitol, where we brought in, folks Who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 22: Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software, like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable To the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 24: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state, or maybe 1 or 2, Or maybe just a few counties in one swing step. Speaker 27: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through. You have 21 states that were hacked into. They didn't find out about it for a year. Right now, we have over a dozen dozen states That either don't have any backup paper ballots or only have them partially. Do you think that our adversaries don't know what those states are? Of course, they know what those states are. And if we have a close election in the general election, in a presidential race, and one state's out withstanding And their ballot boxes get hacked into, their elections get hacked into, we will have absolutely no backup.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

25/ In effect, the left was allowed to discuss the vulnerabilities of voting machines after the 2016 election, and the right was banned from social media platforms for discussing those very same vulnerabilities after the 2020 election.

Video Transcript AI Summary
Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerability, highlighting the need to assess all voting machines for security. Researchers have shown that voting systems are easily tampered with, even by hackers with limited resources. Instances of electronic voting machines deleting or switching votes have been reported in Georgia and Texas. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters. The control of voting machines lies with three companies, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines, and unsupported software further increases vulnerability. The potential consequences include compromised election results and a loss of faith in the democratic system.
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Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Virginia just stopped using touchscreen computer voting because it's so vulnerable. Right. We need to look at all the voting machines. Every secretary of state needs to be, you know, assisted in making sure that they are not being hacked and and attacked. Speaker 1: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. Speaker 2: Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 0: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter of minutes. Speaker 3: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switch votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 4: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cybersecurity 101, directing that you install Remote access software, which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 5: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 2: You could easily Hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things, but in fact 3 companies are controlling that. It is the individual voting machines That some pose, that pose some of the greatest risks. Speaker 6: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 5: The workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. Speaker 4: It was possible to switch votes. 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, Including backdoors. Speaker 7: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year, Where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 6: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the capitol, where we brought in, folks Who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 8: Aging systems also frequently rely On unsupported software, like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable To the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 5: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state or maybe 1 or 2 Or maybe just a few counties in one swing state. Speaker 2: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through. You have 21 states that were hacked into. They didn't find out about it for a year. Right now, we have over a dozen dozen states that either don't have any backup paper ballots Or only have them partially. You think that our adversaries don't know what those states are? Of course, they know what those states are. And if we have a close election in the general election, in a presidential race, and one state's out withstanding and their Ballot boxes get hacked into. Their elections get hacked into. We will have absolutely no backup. Stalin was unconcerned about the vote. After all, he explained, he said that who voted was completely unimportant. What was Extraordinarily important, in his words, was who would count the votes and how. It is time to put politics aside and come together to secure the future of our election. So whether you're a 4 star general, A 4th grade teacher or a computer engineer at Foursquare, this is an issue that unites us. Speaker 8: In at least 40 states, elections are carried out using machines that are at least a decade old. And like any technology, -They're susceptible to increasing failure with age. Some state officials have had to turn to eBay to find critical components like dot matrix printers, Decades old storage devices and analog modems, aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software Like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable to the latest Methods of cyber attack. Speaker 3: In 2016, state election websites in Illinois and Arizona were hacked by intruders who installed malware and downloaded sensitive voter information. Speaker 6: It is worth fighting for integrity in our election system, which means that they are free from interference by a hostile Or an unfriendly nation. Let's put the resources into upgrading the state's election systems. Because what we know is this. There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. I sit on the senate intelligence committee and senate homeland security committee. And we receive all kinds of information about the vulnerabilities to our national Security. We are vulnerable in terms of foreign interference with our elections. It's my understanding that some of the election system Vendors have required states to sign agreements, that prevent or inhibit independent, security testing. There's a saying that I'm sure Many of you have heard, which is the you know the difference between being hacked and not being hacked? Is knowing you've been hacked. Speaker 0: And they are still looking for ways to steal information about Voter registration, for example. There are some text experts in Silicon Valley Valley with whom I have met who say that, You know, maybe what they'll do this next time is to really disrupt the actual election. Shut down the servers that you send results to. Interfere with the operation of voting machines because still too many of them are linked to the Internet. So there we are still very vulnerable. Speaker 9: I mean, I can tell you in Virginia, when I was governor, I had to replace all the machines. Because I remember when I first voted when I went to Richmond, moved down as governor, I remember I kept voting in the senate race, kept voting for the Democrat. Republican name kept coming up. Three times that happened. Speaker 1: What do Speaker 4: you mean kept Coming up. Speaker 9: So I you know, we had the touch screens. I was voting for Mark Warner, our senator, and Ed Gosphy's name was light up. Happened to me 3 times. Finally, the 4th time, Mark Damon, I quickly hit vote, and I got out of there. You know, all the cameras are looking at me like this guy doesn't know how to vote. I mean, what's going on? So then I had an investigation done, and listen to this. I brought in some technology experts. They were able to hack into our machines from off-site In about 5 or 6 minutes, and within 4 minutes, they were able to change a vote. IDD certified all the machines. Now in Virginia, we have paper ballots. Speaker 4: 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have Serious security flaws, including backdoors. These companies are accountable to no one. They won't answer basic questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the biggest companies Won't answer any questions at all. 5 states have no paper trail, And that means there is no way to prove the numbers the voting machines put out are legitimate. So much for cybersecurity 101. The vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions Nationwide, use election management systems that run on old software That is soon gonna be out of date and ripe for exploitation by hackers according To an exhaustive analysis by the Associated Press, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, and North Carolina, among others, Are all at risk. Even the state of Georgia, which just passed legislation to buy new voting machines, is on track to buy equipment that suffers from this significant cybersecurity weakness. Let's say the election is decided by a small percentage And people in America don't think that the election was fair. The effect that would have On our 200 year experiment in self governance, our democratic system Would take a real hit. Our elections weren't secure last week And they sure as heck aren't secure this week. And anybody who says otherwise It's either selling the voting machines or simply has a malicious intent towards our elections. At one point in the intelligence committee, both sides seemed to agree that no votes were changed In the 2016 election, and I said, the experts I talk to say that Until you have a forensic analysis of a vote, until you go in there and scrub the whole system, You can't really say that. So they're giving these voting machines specifically the hack into how successful were they? Speaker 1: Well, the the ongoing record Was, they hacked within 90 minutes of, being, being in the same space as the voting machines. Now these are not hackers that are actually touching the machines. They're doing this from across the room, on, on Internet like connections. But what it demonstrated, Pedro, is that the machines that we count on to make the basic connection between the American voter And the election results are vulnerable if they're in any way connected to the Internet. Speaker 4: And so when you say hacked, what were they able to do once they gained Access to the machines. Speaker 1: All sorts of things. They could manipulate, the outcome of the vote, they could manipulate the tally, they could delete the tally, and and they could compromise the vote in any number of ways. Just it was limited only by the hackers' creativity. Just how vulnerable Speaker 10: the machines were. I mean, what we found is that These machines were purchased by, local voting authorities, state and local voting authorities maybe 10 years ago. In many cases, the software and the hardware have not been updated, so they're as vulnerable as an old laptop That we might have, in in your home that you no longer use because it's just so out of date. Then what we found is that the supply chain for these these machines is largely un plotted. I mean, We found parts from China. We found, digital electronic parts from all over the world. By way of hacking, there's the potential that the actual vote tally could be compromised. So votes could be changed from this to that. Or votes could be suppressed, votes could be deleted, votes could be added, so you could actually change the tally itself.
KanekoaTheGreat
Posted - April 18, 2023 at 11:05 PM
Saved - August 29, 2023 at 11:08 AM
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Title: Ensuring Secure and Auditable Elections in the United States Introduction: The vulnerability of the US voting systems to hacking and manipulation has become a growing concern. Outdated software, lack of security measures, and paperless machines have exposed significant flaws in the system. This post aims to shed light on the various vulnerabilities and emphasize the urgent need for secure and auditable elections. Outdated Software and Lack of Security Measures: Experts have raised concerns about the outdated software and lack of security measures in US election systems. Outdated systems, such as the 15-year-old Windows version, are prone to crashes and lack essential security features. This leaves them vulnerable to cyberattacks and manipulation. Paperless Machines and Lack of Auditing: One of the major vulnerabilities lies in the use of paperless voting machines. These machines lack a physical backup, making it difficult to verify the accuracy of the results. Additionally, the absence of post-election audits further exacerbates the problem, as it becomes challenging to detect any potential manipulation. Remote Access and Misconfigured Servers: Reports have revealed that some election systems, including those of Dominion Voting Systems and ESS, had modems and remote-access software during the 2020 election. This makes them susceptible to hackers and compromises the integrity of the voting process. Furthermore, misconfigured servers, like the one in Georgia's Center for Election Systems, have exposed sensitive data, highlighting the need for improved security practices. Flaws in Voting Machines: Security researchers have demonstrated the flaws in voting machines, including their vulnerability to hacking and manipulation. Hackers have been able to access administrator mode, potentially altering voting data. Unencrypted voting data and improper configuration have further contributed to the crisis of election security. The Importance of Handmarked Paper Ballots and Auditing: To ensure the integrity of elections, experts recommend the use of handmarked paper ballots and robust post-election audits. Handmarked paper ballots provide a physical backup that can be verified, reducing the risk of manipulation. Auditing plays a crucial role in detecting any potential irregularities and maintaining transparency in the electoral process. Addressing the Vulnerabilities: It is imperative for the US to address these vulnerabilities and safeguard its democratic process. Enhancing network defenses, updating software, conducting risk-limiting audits, and protecting infrastructure are essential steps in ensuring secure elections. Additionally, transparency and improved security practices from election equipment vendors are crucial for building trust in the system. Conclusion: The vulnerability of US voting systems to hacking and manipulation poses a significant risk to the integrity of elections. Outdated software, paperless machines, and lack of auditing contribute to these vulnerabilities. By adopting handmarked paper ballots, conducting robust post-election audits, and implementing improved cybersecurity measures, the US can enhance the security and transparency of its electoral process. Safeguarding the integrity of elections is of utmost importance to protect the democratic values of the nation.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

🚨BREAKING: Explosive video surfaces of FOX News stars Tucker Carlson, Laura Ingraham, and Sean Hannity slamming Trump's "insane" voting machine fraud allegations as "absurd," "ridiculous," and "complete BS"!

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Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerabilities, and there is concern about the security of all voting machines. Researchers have shown that voting systems can be tampered with, and hackers with limited resources can breach machines in minutes. Instances of electronic voting machines deleting or switching votes have been reported. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making the machines susceptible to hacking. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in the US. Many states have outdated and vulnerable machines, and unsupported software increases the risk of cyber attacks. The use of modems in voting machines also poses a security threat. The lack of paper trails and audit trails further compromises the integrity of elections.
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Speaker 0: Virginia just stopped using touchscreen computer voting because it's so vulnerable. We need to look at all the voting machines. Every secretary of state needs to be, you know, assisted in making sure that they are not being, hacked and and attacked. Speaker 1: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. Speaker 2: Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 3: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, Tools and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter of minutes. Speaker 4: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switch votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 2: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates Cybersecurity 101 directing that you install remote access software which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. These voting machines Can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 5: You could easily hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing Different things, but in fact, 3 companies are controlling this. Speaker 0: It is the individual voting machines that some pose that pose some of the greatest risk. Speaker 6: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 7: Workers were able to easily We hacked into an electronic voting machine. Speaker 2: It was possible to switch votes. 43% of American voters use voting machines That researchers have found have serious security flaws, including backdoors. Speaker 8: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know, I know the Hackathon that took place last year, where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 5: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the Capitol, where we brought in, folks who before our eyes hacked election machines. Those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 3: Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software Like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable to the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 7: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state or maybe 1 or 2 or maybe just a few counties in one I'm Speaker 9: very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through. You have 21 states that were hacked into. They didn't find out about it for a year. Right now, we have over a dozen dozen states that either don't have any backup paper ballots or only have them partially. You think that our adversaries don't know what those states are? Of course, they know what those states are. And if we have a close election In the general election, in a presidential race, and one state's out withstanding and their ballot boxes gets hacked into, their elections get hacked into, We will have absolutely no backup. Speaker 8: I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine like a computer virus and silently change election outcomes. And in every single case, we've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. Across the country, there are about 50 Two different models of machines. They fall into essentially 2 styles, ones that scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen and many of them have been analyzed now by researchers Looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case where a US voting Machine has been analyzed by by competent security researchers. They have found vulnerabilities that would let someone inject malicious software And change election data every single case. Speaker 10: The better or the more efficient way of hacking machines would be to subvert them all through the machine that's used to actually Program those machines. So prior to each election, the county election office or the voting machine vendor will actually program memory cards For that election, it tells the machine who are the candidates, what are the, you know, the contests being decided, and that gets inserted Into the voting machine. If you can alter, if you can subvert that machine that is used to program those memory cards, then you can pass, rogue software to the voting machines. Speaker 8: Voting Chains are not connected to the internet. This is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately, it's not actually true. In many new voting machines Come with, 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connected to the internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the internet right in the middle of the election potentially at the most vulnerable time? Speaker 11: Studies conducted in 2007 by the state of California, state of Ohio, state of Florida found security vulnerabilities that could take advantage of these To engineer viruses where 1 compromised voting machine could then infect eventually the entire fleet of machines for an entire county. Typically at the end of the election day you move a memory card through each of the machines in the precinct and that's to collect the vote totals. That process can spread a virus. And there are other processes. The details vary from machine to machine. Speaker 2: When you say hacked, what were they able to do once they gained access to the machines? Speaker 1: All sorts of things. They could manipulate the outcome Of the vote, they could manipulate the tally, they could delete the tally, and and they could compromise the vote in any number of ways. Speaker 12: The machines used in Georgia Have been demonstrated to be hackable through a virus that's carried on ballot definition cartridges. Very much like this Duxnet virus was, Inserted into, nuclear centrifuges in Iran. Speaker 1: There are a number of states that outsource their reporting of elections to third parties, some of which are corporations based in other countries Trees like Spain. So you've got to trust that the aggregation of the votes and the reporting of the votes is is, is accurate as well. Speaker 8: I'm Pretty sure my undergrad computer security class at Michigan could have changed the outcome of the 2016 Michigan election if we wanted to. It is that bad. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's that's why I say it's only a matter of time. Speaker 13: Unfortunately, in a lot of these systems, the audit trails are just as vulnerable as the other aspects of the system. So there may not be Good forensic evidence of a successful, intrusion. With the current design, we cannot be universally confident that it hasn't happened. And it's probably only a matter of time before it will. Speaker 3: In at least 40 states, elections are carried out using machines They're at least a decade old. And like any technology, they're susceptible to increasing failure with age. Some state officials Have had to turn to eBay to find critical components like dot matrix printers, decades old storage devices and analog modems. Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches And are thus more vulnerable to the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 4: In 2016, state election websites in Illinois and Arizona were hacked by intruders who installed malware and downloaded sensitive voter information. Speaker 6: It is worth fighting for integrity in our election system, which means that they are free From interference by a hostile or an unfriendly nation. Let's put the resources into upgrading the state's election systems. Because what we know is this. There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 5: I sit on the Senate Intelligence Committee and Senate Homeland Security Committee and we receive all kinds of information about the vulnerabilities to our national We are vulnerable in terms of foreign interference with our elections. It's my understanding that some of the election system vendors have Acquired states to sign agreements, that prevent or inhibit independent security testing. There's a saying that I'm sure many of you have heard, which is the Do you know the difference between being hacked and not being hacked? Is knowing you've been hacked. Speaker 0: And they are still looking for ways to steal information about voter registration, for example. There are some tech experts in Silicon Valley Valley with whom I have met who say that, you know, maybe what they'll do this Next time is to really disrupt the actual election. Shut down the servers that you send results to. Interfere with the operation of voting machines because still too many of them are linked to the Internet. So there we are still very vulnerable. Speaker 14: I mean, I can tell you in Virginia, when I was governor, I had to replace all the machines. Because I remember when I first voted, when I went to Richmond, moved down as governor, I remember I kept voting in the senate race, kept voting for the democrat, republican name kept coming up. Three times that happened. Speaker 15: What do you mean kept coming up? Speaker 14: So I you know, we had the touch screens. I was voting for Mark Warner, our senator, and Ed Goswami's name would light up. Happened to me 3 times. Finally, the 4th time, Mark Damon, I quickly hit vote and I got out of there. You know, all the cameras are looking at me like this guy doesn't know how to vote. I mean, what's going on? So then I had an investigation done and listen to this. I brought in some technology experts. They were able to hack into our machines from off-site in about 5 or 6 minutes. And within 4 minutes, they were able to change a vote. IDD certified all the machines. Now in Virginia, we have paper ballots. Speaker 2: 43% Of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, Including backdoors. These companies are accountable to no one. They won't answer basic Questions about their cybersecurity practices and the biggest companies won't answer any questions at all. 5 states have no paper trail, and that means there is no way to prove the numbers The voting machines put out are legitimate. So much for cybersecurity One zero one. The vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions nationwide Use election management systems that run on old software that is soon gonna be out of date And write for exploitation by hackers according to an exhaustive analysis By Speaker 0: the Associated Speaker 2: Press, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, and North Carolina, among others, are all at risk. Even the state of Georgia, which just passed legislation to buy new voting machines, is on track To buy equipment that suffers from this significant cybersecurity weakness. Let's say the election Is decided by a small percentage. And people in America Don't think that the election was fair. The effect that would have on our 200 year Experiment in self governance. Our democratic system would take a real hit. Our elections weren't secure last week, and they sure as heck aren't secure this week. And anybody who says otherwise is either selling the voting machines or simply has a malicious Intent towards our elections. At one point in the Intelligence Committee, Both sides seem to agree that no votes were changed in the 2016 election. And I said, the experts I talk to say that until you have a Forensic analysis of a vote until you go in there and scrub the whole system. You can't really say that. Speaker 16: These machines don't have a capability of providing you forensic evidence To see if they cannot prove they were honest, they cannot prove that they were have been hacked. They simply don't have the Fundamental basic capabilities of providing you that forensic evidence, that data. Only way you can see That, that machine was hacked. If the attacker wanted to be, they found that it was hacked. That's a sad truth. So anyone who says, I have information one way or another. That's an opinion. That's not tactics. Practice, it can be done without leaving trace. When you know how the systems work, Looking for the evidence, you know that you won't find it because the systems are not recording, generating, Preserving or protecting meaningful forensic evidence. And this is from the very beginning to the end of the process everywhere. These systems really don't have a capability of recording and protecting any meaningful audit information or forensically important information. So a lot of times I would also argue that even if you try to take a look into the evidence, the problem is that there is no Speaker 17: We've heard a lot from voting machine vendors and election officials that voting machines Can't be hacked because they're not connected to the internet. All of those vulnerabilities that Andrew talked about, are not a problem because no one can access the machines And it turns out that that message that they've been giving us for years and particularly after the 2016 election Just isn't true. Voting machine vendors have sold election officials on these in use of modems. In some case, the modems are embedded inside the voting machines. In other case, they're external modems that get attached to the voting machine at the end of the election. So at the end of the election, the machine goes Into shutdown mode and then this option pops up about modoming results. And so the system will automatically then dial in and send these votes over a cellular modem to a server on the Internet that collects the results. So everyone will tell you and they've told me every time I've spoken with them that cellular modems are not really internet connectivity. They will say, That doesn't mean that the machine is connected to the internet. It's using a cellular modem. Well, that's not true and Election Systems and Software, which is The top voting machine maker in the country, this is one of their statements over and over again with the public but this is one of their own diagrams that they They gave to Rhode Island in 2015. And if you see that circular part in the center there showing that that modem transmission using the wireless modem, They sit there, right there. It's on their own diagram that is going over the internet. Speaker 8: Before every election, election officials have to program the voting machines With who's on the ballot and what are the rules for counting? Well, they make that election programming on a PC workstation somewhere either at the, at the jurisdiction or at an outside vendor that does it for them. If an attacker can break into that work Station which is called an election management system. They can spread malicious code to all of the memory cards used to program all of the voting machines in the jurisdiction And those election management system workstations sometimes are connected to the internet or the data that's programmed into them passes Through an internet connected system. So we're just 1 or 2 hops away from an online attacker. So if I wanted to break into this company, let's say I was the attacker, I'd Probably start by forging an email from, let's say, Larry, the president here, to Sue, his administrative assistant, Asking her to urgently open an attachment. Now, of course, when she does, that attachment has my malware in it. I have a, foothold into their network And I can try to spread from there to the election management system and to the voting machines in most of the state. Pampering with the national election result in my country It's easier than well easier than even I thought in 2016. I keep learning things that convince me that the situation is scarier than, than even Fertz had thought, You identify the states that are most weakly protected and going to be close. Target the computers that are going to program voting machines there, spread malware to machines to change a fraction of the votes And then rely on the fact that most states even if they have a paper record are not going to rigorously use it to check that the computers are right. But the fact is that in close national contests in the US, the result really only hinges on the result in a small number of States. You've heard about the swing states in any given election. The ones that are, really competitive. In such a situation an attacker can, before the election, identify which states are likely to be close. Try probing all of them In the way that the Russians did the voter registration systems in 2016 and just find the weakest swing states and attack there. So in this way, the American system converts, diversity of implementation Into basically this patchwork of strength and weakness that gives attackers a menu of possible places to strike. It makes us weaker in close elections. Speaker 18: Modems in voting machines are a bad idea. Those modems are network connections. And that leaves them vulnerable to hacking by anybody who can connect To that network. Speaker 19: ES and S insists while there are 14,000 of its modems in use, there are firewalls separating those modems from the public Internet. Speaker 18: Once the hackers starts talking to the voting machine through the modem, they can hack the software in the voting machine And make it cheat in future elections. Speaker 20: What is the vehicle for the transmission from the ICP? Is it cellular modem versus VPN? Speaker 15: Well, it is a cellular modem that Speaker 8: the can be configured in a VPN. Right? And we currently in Chicago and Cook County, we work with Verizon to, Secure that network. What wireless chipset slash modem does the hardware have? We support a variety. So, it's really up to the jurisdictions what technology they wanna use, what's compatible with their with their networks. Speaker 15: Currently, in some jurisdictions, we're using, basically, a modem that is a three d modem, GSM, but we can support multiple Variety support and protection. Speaker 8: Including including latest four gs standards. Speaker 20: So the answers to the next question is the three gs or four gs. Verizon 8 tier Do you're Sprint consuming all? Speaker 16: Oh, yeah. All all networks. Right. Speaker 8: Discuss quite a bit. Yeah. I mean, we actually transmit from the ICP in Mongolia as well. So, we're not committed in networks. Speaker 15: And in Puerto Rico, there's 3 vendors because the island is not covered by any by any of the vendors With this, we use 3 different cellular vendors for some ICPs. With this vendor, Claro, ATMC, and T Mobile, I might say, in the different parts Speaker 16: More modern voting machines, they actually have a mobile phone modem. In to speak, they have a they have mobile phone our mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters, they are sending the results. Speaker 1: Some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election To results using cellular modems or, the Internet that of course introduces another point of vulnerability, not just to the data that's flowing, But also it's the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Speaker 10: Many of these voting machines have modems embedded into them. And the modems are to transmit the vote totals on election night to the county, elections office. So these modems contact, they're cellular modems and they Contact the cellular network, to contact the cell tower. So the cell tower traffic these days in our modern times actually goes through Internet. It goes through the same Kinds of routers and switches not the regular internet traffic comes to but also, in between that cell tower and that voting machine, an intruder Can, intercept data going to the cell tower and intercept that that communication, that phone call. If you can trick a voting machine into, contacting In your device your fake cellular tower instead of a legitimate tower you can actually use that connection to get back into the voting machine and get back into the tabulator, and then alter votes and software. Speaker 8: So just to review, you look at the polls before the election and figure out which states were likely to be close. Probe all of them. Find the ones with the weakest protection. Then hack into the, election management systems there or at the outside vendors the states use. Once you hack into the election management system, can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and have your code say swap 10% of the votes in the places you infected.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#2 All electronic voting equipment can easily be hacked because all such equipment must receive programming before each election from memory cards prepared on election management systems which are computers often connected to the internet running out-of-date versions of Windows. If a county election management system is infected with malware, the malware can spread from that system to the USB drives, which then would transfer it to all the voting machines, scanners, and ballot-marking devices in the county. Most U.S. election systems are programmed by local county election officials or third-party vendors, who plug previously-used USB drives into computers connected to the internet before plugging those same USB drives into the optical scanners, tabulators, and voting machines that collect, count, and determine election results.

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Before every election, voting machines need to be programmed with the ballot design and candidate names. This is done by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker infects the memory card with malicious code, it can change the programming on the voting machine and manipulate the election results. The programming is done on a desktop PC or workstation, often connected to the internet. In Michigan, during the 2016 election, 75% of counties outsourced their pre-election programming to three small companies. These companies had weak security measures, making it relatively easy to hack into their systems. By targeting vulnerable states and hacking into their election management systems, attackers can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and manipulate the votes. Even if there are paper records, they are often not thoroughly checked.
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Speaker 0: The way these attacks work is that before every election, every voting machine needs to be programmed with the design of the ballot, the names of the races and candidates. And voting officials do that by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker can infect that memory card with malicious code, Well, when the memory card is inserted into the machine, it can change the programming running on the voting machine and cause the voting machine to, at the end of the election, output whatever results the attacker wants. That ballot programming is created on basically a desktop PC, a workstation somewhere operated by the county or by an outside vendor. If an attacker can infect that election programming workstation called an election management system, and in many cases these are connected to the Internet. Well, then that attack can spread to all of the memory cards that are used to program a voting machines in that jurisdiction. And, Sorry. How easy would it be to hack into one of these? Well, I'll give you an example. In Michigan, during the 2016 election, 75% of counties outsource their pre election programming to just 3 small companies. This is the website for one of them. It's a small business that's operated essentially in a strip mall. And they have photographs on their website of all of their facilities, even all of their employees. If I wanted to try to hack into these guys, well maybe I go to their Who We Are page, Find Larry, the president's assistant, Sue, and spoof an email to her that appears to be coming from Larry, telling her to urgently open this attachment. Of course, the attachment contains a virus on route. And once she opens it, I'm in their systems. So, in fact, it's not nearly as hard as it might seem to target voting machines over a wide scale and to potentially hack into them even from the Internet. So just to review, you look at the polls before the election and figure out which states were likely to be close, probe all of them, find the ones with the weakest protection. Then hack into the election management systems there or at the outside vendors the states use. Once you hack into the election management system, you can spread malicious code the individual voting machines and have your code say swap 10% of the votes in the places you infected. Then even if the votes are also recorded on a piece of paper, you don't have to worry. Because in most of those states, they're going to just pluss the paper out without looking at

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#3 In 2019, the Associated Press reported that the vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions nationwide, including numerous swing states, were still using Windows 7 or older operating systems to produce ballots, program voting machines, count votes, and report results. Windows 7 officially reached its “end of life” on Jan. 14, 2020, meaning Microsoft stopped providing technical assistance or producing “patches” to address software vulnerabilities. https://apnews.com/article/operating-systems-ap-top-news-voting-voting-machines-pennsylvania-e5e070c31f3c497fa9e6875f426ccde1

AP Exclusive: New election systems use vulnerable software WASHINGTON (AP) — Pennsylvania's message was clear: The state was taking a big step to keep its elections from being hacked in 2020. apnews.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#4 Furthermore, not only are U.S. elections being programmed on computers running out-of-date software, but voting machine manufacturers have also installed remote-access software and wireless modems connecting voting machines directly to the internet. NBC News reported ten months before the 2020 election that ES&S, the largest U.S. election machine vendor, had installed at least 14,000 modems to connect their voting machines to the internet, even though many election security experts had previously warned that voting machines with modems were vulnerable to hackers. https://nbcnews.com/politics/elections/online-vulnerable-experts-find-nearly-three-dozen-u-s-voting-n1112436

Video Transcript AI Summary
Modems in voting machines are vulnerable to hacking as they are network connections. ES and S claims that their modems are separated from the public internet by firewalls. However, once a hacker gains access through the modem, they can manipulate the voting machine software to cheat in future elections. Some jurisdictions use cellular modems or the internet to upload election results, introducing additional vulnerabilities. Voting machines with embedded modems transmit vote totals to the county elections office via cellular networks, which pass through routers and switches used for regular internet traffic. An intruder can intercept data between the cell tower and the voting machine, altering votes and software. Despite claims that voting machines are not connected to the internet, many have 4G wireless modems for faster result uploads, raising concerns about their security during elections.
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Speaker 0: Modems in voting machines are a bad idea. Those modems are network connections, and that leaves them vulnerable to hacking by anybody who can connect to that network. Speaker 1: ES and S insists insists while there are 14,000 of its modems in use, there are firewalls separating those modems from the public Internet. Speaker 0: Once a hacker Starts talking to the voting machine through the modem. They can hack the software in the voting machine and make it cheat in future elections. Speaker 2: What is the vehicle for the Transmission from the ICP is a cellular modem versus VPN? Well, it is a cellular modem that the can be configured in a VPN. Right. And we currently in Chicago and Cook County, we work with Verizon to, secure that network. Speaker 3: More modern voting machines, they we have a mobile phone modem in to speak. They have a they have a mobile phone or mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters. They are sending the results. Speaker 2: Some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election results using cellular modems or, the Internet. That, of course, introduces another Point of vulnerability not just to the data that's flowing, but also to the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Speaker 4: Many of these voting machines have modems embedded into them. And the modems are used at the end of the election to transmit the vote totals on election night to the county, elections office. So these modems contact the cellular modems and they contact the cellular network, they contact the cell tower. So the cell tower traffic these days in our modern times actually goes through Internet. It goes through the kinds of routers and switches that the regular internet traffic goes to. But also, in between that scroll tower and that loading machine, an intruder can, intercept data they're going to the cell tower and intercepts that that communication, that phone call. If you can trick a voting machine into, contacting your device, your fake cellular tower. Instead of a legitimate tower, you can actually use that connection to get back into the voting machine and get back into the tabulator, and then alter votes and software. Speaker 2: Voting machines are not connected to the Internet. Is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately, it's not actually true. Many new voting machines come with, 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connect it to the internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the internet right in the middle of the election potentially at the most vulnerable time?
Experts find more than 30 U.S. voting systems connected to internet Election officials have claimed that voting machines do not connect to the internet, but a team of experts found several U.S. voting systems currently online. nbcnews.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#5 Dominion Voting Systems, the second-largest U.S. election machine vendor, which has given public presentations acknowledging their use of modems in their voting machines, was also discovered to be running remote-access software during the 2020 election: In Georgia, 20-year election worker, Susan Voyles, testified that Dominion Voting Systems employees “operated remotely” on her ballot-marking devices and poll pads after the team experienced some technical problems with their machines. In Wisconsin, the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), headed by former state Supreme Court Justice Michael Gableman, also found that Dominion and ES&S voting machines were online and connected to the internet. In Michigan, attorney and Secretary of State candidate Matt Deperno, discovered a Telit LE910-SV1 modem chip embedded in the motherboard of an ES&S DS200 voting machine. Through these modems, hackers could theoretically intercept results as they’re transmitted on election night — or, worse, use the modem connections to reach back into voting machines or the election management systems to install malware, change software, or alter official results. Therefore, not only are hackers able to penetrate elections through vulnerable USB cards and election management systems but also through the very voting machines themselves.

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker discusses the vehicle for transmission from the ICP, mentioning that it is a cellular modem that can be configured in a VPN. They state that in Chicago and Cook County, they work with Verizon to secure the network. The hardware supports various wireless chipsets/modems based on the jurisdictions' preferences and network compatibility. They mention using a 3G modem in some jurisdictions but can also support multiple modem varieties, including the latest 4G standards. The speaker confirms that they transmit from the ICP in Mongolia as well, not being limited to specific networks. In Puerto Rico, they use three different cellular vendors (Claro, AT&T, and T-Mobile) to cover different parts of the island.
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Speaker 0: What is the vehicle for the transmission from the ICP? Is it cellular modem versus VPN? Speaker 1: Well, it is a cellular modem that can be configured in a VPN, right. And we currently in Chicago and Cook County, we work with Verizon to secure that network. What wireless chipsetmodem Speaker 0: Does the hardware Speaker 1: have? We support a variety. So it's really up to the jurisdictions, what technology they want to use, what's compatible with their networks. Speaker 0: Currently, in some jurisdictions, we're using Basically a modem that is a three d modem GSM, but we can support multiple varieties of modem that can be. Including latest 4 gs standards as well. So that answers the next question, is it 3 gs or 4 gs? Verizon 8 tier Routes to your Sprint, I'm assuming Speaker 1: all? Yes, all networks. Just going to point it back. Yes, I mean we actually transmit from the ICP in Mongolia as well. So we're not limited in networks. Speaker 0: And in Puerto Rico, there is 3 vendors because the island is not Covered by any, by any of the vendors completely. So we use 3 different cellular vendors for some Oh, my g c. It's meant for Claro AT and T, m t mobile, I might think, in the different parts of the app.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#6 This isn’t a problem exclusive to elections — all computers are hackable — and that is why election security experts have always recommended the use of hand-marked paper ballots and rigorous post-election audits. This also isn’t a partisan issue; both Democrats and Republicans are well aware of the secrecy, privatization, and hackable hardware and software that runs America’s elections. After the 2016 election, Clinton supporters and the corporate media would spend the next four years talking about how compromised America’s computerized voting system was. Sen. Ron Wyden, Sen. Amy Klobuchar, and Sen. Kamala Harris held numerous congressional hearings where they explained how easy it was to hack voting machines, how simple it was to locate unattended voting machines, and how numerous voting machines were connected to the internet. After the 2020 election, Trump supporters were censored and de-platformed (I was banned from Twitter) for pointing out the very same anomalies and vulnerabilities that Democrats and the corporate media had spent the last four years discussing. Regardless of politics, these problems are very real, they still exist today, and they are best explained by the computer scientists who have spent the last two decades researching them.

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Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines within minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates basic cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. Three companies control the majority of voting machines, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of American voting machines. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close presidential election. Concerns about the possibility of a successful hack are high.
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Speaker 0: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. For researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 1: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter for a minute. Speaker 2: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 0: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cyber security 101, directing that you install remote access software which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 3: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 0: You Speaker 4: could easily Hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things, but in fact, 3 companies are controlling this. It is the individual voting machines That some pose that pose some of the greatest risks. There are Speaker 5: a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines. Right. Speaker 6: Which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 3: Workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. It was possible to switch votes. Speaker 0: 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws including backdoors. We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year were virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 4: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the Capitol, where we brought in, folks Who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 7: Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches And are thus more vulnerable to the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 3: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state or maybe 1 or Or maybe just a few counties in one swing step. Speaker 4: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through.

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#7 Professor Matt Blaze of Georgetown University's Computer Science Department provided testimony on the vulnerabilities of the United States' election system during a congressional hearing titled "2020 Election Security" on January 9, 2020: “I come here today as a computer scientist who spent the better part of the last quarter century studying election system security… To be blunt, it’s a widely recognized really indisputable fact that every piece of computerized voting equipment in use at polling places today can be easily compromised in ways that have the potential to disrupt election operations, compromise firmware and software, and potentially alter vote tallies in the absence of other safeguards. This is partly a consequence of historically poor design and implementation by equipment vendors, but it’s ultimately a reflection of the nature of complex software. It’s simply beyond the state of the art to build software systems that can reliably withstand targeted attacks by a determined adversary in this kind of environment… Just as we don't expect the local sheriff to singlehandedly defend against military ground invasions, we shouldn't expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services.”

Video Transcript AI Summary
As a computer scientist specializing in election system security, I want to highlight the vulnerabilities in computerized voting equipment used in polling places. These systems can be easily compromised, allowing corrupt candidates or foreign adversaries to disrupt elections and potentially alter vote tallies without detection. The poor design and implementation by equipment vendors contribute to these vulnerabilities. Additionally, voter registration databases and systems reporting final results are attractive targets for disruption, with even fewer standards for securing them. It is unrealistic to expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services. We need to address these issues to ensure the integrity of our elections.
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Speaker 0: I come here today as a computer scientist who spent the better part of the last quarter century studying election system security. As you're well aware, the integrity of elections across the U. S. Depends heavily on the integrity of computers and software systems. Or corrected after the fact. These vulnerabilities can create practical avenues for corrupt candidates or foreign adversaries to do everything from cause large scale disruption on Election Day to potentially, undetectably alter election outcomes. To be blunt, it's a widely recognized, really indisputable fact that every piece of computerized voting equipment in use at polling places today can be easily compromised in ways that have the potential to disrupt election operations, compromise firmware and software, potentially alter vote tallies in the absence of other safeguards. This is partly a consequence of historically poor design and implementation by equipment vendors, but it's Ultimately, a reflection of the nature of complex software. It's simply beyond the state of the art to build software systems that can reliably withstand targeted and targeted attack by a determined adversary in this kind of an environment. Each of the more than 5,000 jurisdictions responsible for Running elections across the nation must maintain a number of critical information systems that are attractive targets for disruption by adversaries. Most important of these are voter registration databases, the systems that report final results and so forth. Unfortunately, there are even fewer standards for how to secure these systems. The administration of these systems varies widely and the threats against these systems are often even more acute than the threats against individual voting systems. You know, just as we don't expect the local sheriff to single handedly defend against military ground invasions, we shouldn't expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services, but that's precisely what we've been asking them to do.

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#8 Professor J. Alex Halderman of the University of Michigan's Computer Science Department provided testimony on the vulnerabilities of the United States' election system during a congressional hearing titled "Russian Interference in U.S. Elections" on June 21, 2017: “I’m a professor of computer science and have spent the last ten years studying the electronic voting systems that our nation relies on. My conclusion from that work is that our highly computerized election infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and even to cyber attacks that could change votes... I know America’s voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly as part of a decade of research studying the technology that operates elections and learning how to make it stronger. We’ve created attacks that can spread from machine to machine like a computer virus and silently change election outcomes. We’ve studied touch screen and optical scan systems, and in every single case, we’ve found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and steal votes… In close elections, an attacker can probe the most important swing states or swing counties, find areas with the weakest protection, and strike there. In a close election year, changing a few votes in key localities could be enough to tip national results.”

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker, a computer science professor, warns that the electronic voting systems used in the US are vulnerable to sabotage and cyber attacks that can change votes. Through their research, they have repeatedly hacked voting machines and found ways for attackers to manipulate them. They emphasize that these vulnerabilities are within reach for America's enemies. While some states have secure voting technology, others are alarmingly vulnerable, putting the entire nation at risk. The speaker debunks the belief that voting machines are secure because they are not connected to the internet, explaining that many machines have wireless modems for faster result uploading. They conclude that it is only a matter of time before these vulnerabilities are exploited.
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Speaker 0: I'm a professor of computer science and have spent the last 10 years studying the electronic voting systems that our nation relies on. My conclusion from that work is that our highly computerized election infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and even to cyber attacks that could change votes. These realities risk making our election results more difficult for the American people to trust. I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly as part of a decade of research studying the technology that operates elections and learning how to make it stronger. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine like a computer virus and silently change election outcomes. We've studied touch screen and optical scan systems, and in every single case, we've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steel votes. These capabilities are certainly within reach for America's enemies. As you know, states choose their own voting technology And while some states are doing well with security, others are alarmingly vulnerable. This puts the entire nation at risk. In close elections, an attacker can probe the most important swing states or swing counties, find areas with the weakest protection and strike there. In a close election year, changing a few votes in key, localities could be enough to tip national results. The key lesson from 2016 is that these threats are real. Some say the fact that voting machines aren't connected to the internet makes them secure. But unfortunately, this is not true. Voting machines are not as distant from the internet as they may seem. Across the country there are about 52 different models of machines. They fall into essentially 2 styles, ones that Scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen. And many of them have been analyzed now by researchers, looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case Where a US voting machine has been analyzed by competent security researchers, they have found vulnerabilities that would let someone Inject malicious software and change election data. Every single case. Missing machines are not connected to the internet. This is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately it's not actually true. In many new voting machines come with, 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connected to the internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the internet right in the middle of the election, potentially at the most vulnerable time? I'm Pretty sure my undergrad computer security class at Michigan could have changed the outcome of the 2016 Michigan election if we wanted to. It is that bad. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's that's why I say it's only a matter of time.

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#9 Professor Andrew Appel of Princeton University's Computer Science Department provided testimony on the vulnerabilities of the United States' election system during a congressional hearing titled "Election Cybersecurity" on September 28, 2016: “Installing new software is how you hack a voting machine to cheat. In 2009, in a courtroom of the superior court of New Jersey, I demonstrated how to hack a voting machine. I wrote a vote-stealing computer program that shifted votes from one candidate to another. Installing that vote-stealing program in a voting machine takes seven minutes per machine with a screwdriver. But really, the software I built was not rocket science. Any computer programmer could write the same code. Once it’s installed, it could steal elections without detection for years to come… Other computer scientists have demonstrated similar hacks on many models of machines. This is not just one glitch from one manufacturer of machines; it’s the very nature of computers. So how can we trust our elections when it is so easy to make the computers cheat?”

Video Transcript AI Summary
The Sequoia AVC Advantage, now called the Dominion AVC Advantage, is a voting machine that can be easily hacked by removing the memory chip and installing a cheating program. This program can change votes and alter the electronic log of votes cast. Other voting machines can be hacked by installing a software upgrade memory card. These vulnerabilities have been demonstrated by various universities, including Princeton, Johns Hopkins, and Michigan. Voting machines are often accessible to potential attackers before and after elections. The ease of hacking raises concerns about the trustworthiness of election results.
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Speaker 0: The machine that I hacked is called the Sequoia AVC Advantage, now called the Dominion AVC Advantage. It's in use in almost all of New Jersey and in all of Louisiana and a few counties of Pennsylvania and other states. The computer program that counts the votes on this machine is in a read only memory that's mounted in a socket on the motherboard. To hack this machine, you have to remove that memory chip from its socket and install a memory chip on which you've prepared a cheating program. The cheating program that I prepared is has an extra 100 lines of code basically that, when the polls are about to close, it goes in there and changes some votes stored in the machine. And there is an electronic log of all votes cast, so it changes the log too. So to install that, the attacker doesn't need to be a computer scientist. The attacker just needs to have a bunch of copies of this memory chip with the program on it. And for each voting machine, unscrew 10 screws to remove the panel that covers the motherboard, pry out the ROM chip containing the legitimate program and install the ROM chip containing the fraudulink program. Other kinds of voting machines, store their computer program that counts to votes in flash memory and this can be updated under the control of whatever computer program happens to be running in the voting machine. These voting machines, typically the generation developed in the 1990s and after, can be hacked without actually physically changing any hardware in the machine, just by installing a software upgrade memory card, in the same slot that one would normally install the ballot definition. And this particular attack was demonstrated by my colleague at Princeton, Professor Felton, in about 2007 working with 2 of his graduate students. But it's not just us at Princeton. There are many kinds of voting machines and the same kinds of hacks are applicable to all voting machines and have been demonstrated at several other universities, including the University of Connecticut, Johns Hopkins, Michigan and others. There are cybersecurity issues in all parts of our election system. Before the election, voter registration databases. During the election, voting machines. After the election, vote tabulation, canvassing, precinct aggregation computers. Installing new software in a voting machine is not really much different from installing new software in any other kind of computer. Installing new software is how you hack a voting machine to cheat. In 2009, in the courtroom of the Superior Court of New Jersey, I demonstrated how to hack a voting machine. I wrote a vote stealing computer program that shifts votes from one candidate to another. Installing that vote stealing program in a voting machine takes 7 minutes per machine with a screwdriver, But really the software I built was not rocket science. Any computer programmer could write the same code. Once it's installed, it could steal elections without detection for years to come. Voting machines are often delivered to polling places several days before the election to elementary schools, churches, firehouses. In these locations, anyone could gain access to a voting machine for 10 minutes. Between elections, the machines are routinely opened up for maintenance by county employees or private contractors. Let's assume they have the utmost integrity, but still in the US we try to run our elections so that we can trust the election results without relying on any one individual. Other computer scientists have demonstrated similar hacks on many models of machine. This is not just 1 glitch in 1 manufacturer's machine. It's the very nature of computers. So how can we trust our elections when it's so easy to make the computers cheat?

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#10 Senator Ron Wyden provided testimony on the vulnerabilities of the United States' election system during a congressional hearing titled "Election Security" on July 15, 2019: "The vast majority of ten thousand election jurisdictions nationwide use election management systems that run on old software that is soon going to be out-of-date and ripe for exploitation by hackers, according to an exhaustive analysis by the Associated Press. Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, and North Carolina, among others, are all at risk. Even the State of Georgia, which passed legislation to buy new voting machines, is on track to buy equipment that suffers from significant cyber security weakness. Our elections weren't secure last week, and they sure as heck aren't secure this week, and anybody who says otherwise is either selling you voting machines or simply has malicious intent towards our elections. 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, including back doors. These companies are accountable to no one. They won’t answer basic questions about their cyber security practices. And, the biggest companies won’t answer any questions at all. Five states have no paper trail, and that means there is no way to prove the numbers the voting machines put out are legitimate. So much for cyber security 101."

Video Transcript AI Summary
The majority of election jurisdictions in the US use outdated software that is vulnerable to hacking. States like Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, North Carolina, and even Georgia (despite recent legislation) are at risk. If a small percentage determines the election outcome and people perceive it as unfair, it could seriously damage our democratic system. Experts argue that without a thorough forensic analysis, it is impossible to confirm that no votes were altered in the 2016 election. Additionally, 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some companies refuse to disclose their cybersecurity practices. Five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the accuracy of voting machine results.
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Speaker 0: The vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions nationwide use election management systems that run on old software that is soon gonna be out of date and ripe for exploitation by hackers according to an exhaustive analysis by the Associated Press. Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona and North Carolina, among others, are all at risk. Even the state of Georgia, which just passed legislation to buy new voting machines, is on track to buy equipment that suffers from this significant cybersecurity weakness. Let's say the election is decided by a small percentage and people in America don't think that the election was fair. The effect that would have on our 200 year experiment in self governance, our democratic system would take a real hit. Our elections weren't secure last week, and they sure as heck aren't secure this week. And anybody who says otherwise is either selling of voting machines or simply has a malicious intent towards our elections. At one point in the Intelligence Committee, both sides seemed to agree that no votes were changed in the 2016 election. And I said, the experts I talk to say that until you have a forensic analysis of a vote, until you go in there and scrub the whole system, You can't really say that. 43% of American voters use voting machines That researchers have found have serious security flaws, including backdoors. These companies are accountable to no one. They won't answer basic questions about their cybersecurity practices. And the biggest companies won't answer any questions at all. 5 states have no paper trail, And that means there is no way to prove the numbers the voting machines put out are legitimate. So much for cybersecurity 101.

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#11 Senator Elizabeth Warren published an article on her website on the vulnerabilities of the United States' election system titled "Strengthening Our Democracy" on June 25, 2019: "The harsh truth is that our elections are extremely vulnerable to attack: Forty-two states use voter registration databases that are more than a decade old. Laughably, in 2019, some still use Windows 2000 and Windows XP. Twelve states still use paperless machines, meaning there’s no paper trail to verify vote counts. Some states don’t require post-election audits. And ten states don’t train election officials to deal with cybersecurity threats." https://web.archive.org/web/20190917015401/https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/strengthening-democracy

Strengthening Our Democracy | Elizabeth Warren Our right to vote is under attack—and we need to put more federal muscle in the fight to protect it. web.archive.org

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#12 In Dec. 2019, Senators Elizabeth Warren, Amy Klobuchar, Ron Wyden, and Mark Pocan sent letters to the three private equity firms that own the largest voting machine companies in the US expressing their concern about the industry's "vulnerabilities" and "lack of transparency." https://web.archive.org/web/20200119083321/https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/H.I.G.%20McCarthy,%20&%20Staple%20Street%20letters.pdf

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#13 Following Hillary Clinton's defeat in the 2016 election, the corporate media dedicated the next four years to writing hundreds of articles about the extent to which the United States' election system is online, compromised, and vulnerable to hackers. https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/110-articles-affirm-americas-computerized

Hacking America's Computerized Voting System 110 Articles Affirm America's Computerized Voting System Is Online, Compromised, and Vulnerable To Hackers: Documented, Linked, and Quoted kanekoa.news

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#14 The Guardian: Voting machine password hacks as easy as 'abcde' (April 15, 2015) “Touchscreen WinVote voting machines used in numerous elections between 2002 and 2014 used “abcde” and “admin” as passwords and could easily have been hacked from the parking lot outside the polling place, according to a state report… Anyone within a half mile could have modified every vote, undetected…the version of Windows operating on each of them had not been updated since at least 2004, that it was possible to “create and execute malicious code” on the WINVote and the level of sophistication to execute such an attack is low.” https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/15/virginia-hacking-voting-machines-security

Voting machine password hacks as easy as 'abcde', details Virginia state report AVS WinVote machines used in three presidential elections in state ‘would get an F-minus’ in security, said computer scientist who pushed for decertification theguardian.com

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#15 New York Times: Millions of Voter Records Posted, and Some Fear Hacker Field Day (Dec. 30, 2015) “First and last names. Recent addresses and phone numbers. Party affiliation. Voting history and demographics. A database of this information from 191 million voter records was posted online over the last week, the latest example of voter data becoming freely available, alarming privacy experts who say the information can be used for phishing attacks, identity theft and extortion. It is not known who built the database, where all the data came from, and whether its disclosure resulted from an inadvertent release or from hacks…states are not taking the security of voter data seriously enough.” https://web.archive.org/web/20210212172828/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/31/us/politics/voting-records-released-privacy-concerns.html?_r=0

Millions of Voter Records Posted, and Some Fear Hacker Field Day (Published 2015) Names, phone numbers and demographic information was included in 191 million voter records mysteriously published over the last week. web.archive.org

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#16 Wired: America’s Electronic Voting Machines Are Scarily Easy Targets (Aug. 2, 2016) “They are old, buggy, and insecure. If someone wanted to mess with the US election, these machines would be an easy way in. Most of these machines are running Windows XP, for which Microsoft hasn’t released a security patch since April 2014…researchers have demonstrated that many of them are susceptible to malware or, equally if not more alarming, a well-timed denial of service attack.”

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#17 Politico: How to Hack an Election in 7 Minutes (Aug. 5, 2016) “Princeton professor Andrew Appel decided to hack into a voting machine… He summoned a graduate student named Alex Halderman, who could pick the machine’s lock in seven seconds. Clutching a screwdriver, he deftly wedged out the four ROM chips—they weren’t soldered into the circuit board, as sense might dictate—making it simple to replace them with one of his own: A version of modified firmware that could throw off the machine’s results, subtly altering the tally of votes, never to betray a hint to the voter. The attack was concluded in minutes… the machines that Americans use at the polls are less secure than the iPhones they use to navigate their way there. We found the machine did not have any security mechanisms beyond what you’d find on a typical home PC, it was very easy to hack…foreign hackers could attack the state and county computers that aggregate the precinct totals on election night…They could attack digitized voter registration databases…They could infect software at the point of development, writing malicious ballot definition files that companies distribute, or do the same on a software patch… They could FedEx false software to a county clerk’s office and, with the right letterhead and convincing cover letter, get it installed. Even with optical scan voting, it’s not just the voting machines themselves—it’s the desktop and laptop computers that election officials use to prepare the ballots, prepare the electronic files from the OpScan machines, panel voter registration, electronic poll books. And the computers that aggregate the results together from all of the optical scans.” https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/2016-elections-russia-hack-how-to-hack-an-election-in-seven-minutes-214144/

How to Hack an Election in 7 Minutes With Russia already meddling in 2016, a ragtag group of obsessive tech experts is warning that stealing the ultimate prize—victory on Nov. 8—would be child’s play. politico.com

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#18 CBS: Hacker demonstrates how voting machines can be compromised (Aug. 10, 2016) “Concerns are growing over the possibility of a rigged presidential election. Roughly 70 percent of states in the U.S. use some form of electronic voting. Hackers told CBS News that problems with electronic voting machines have been around for years. The machines and the software are old and antiquated. The voter doesn't even need to leave the booth to hack the machine. For $15 and in-depth knowledge of the card, you could hack the vote… There are so many places in the voting process once it goes electronic that's vulnerable. We found that more than 40 states are using voting machines there that are at least 10 years old.” https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rigged-presidential-elections-hackers-demonstrate-voting-threat-old-machines/

Hacker demonstrates how voting machines can be compromised With millions heading to the polls in three months, concerns are growing over the possibility of a rigged presidential election cbsnews.com

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#19 ABC News: Yes, It's Possible to Hack the Election (Aug. 19, 2016) “Slight meddling in some swing precincts in swing states could tip the scales. If it’s a computer, it can be hacked… if sophisticated hackers want to get into any computer or electronic device, even one that is not connected to the internet, they can do so… In most states the data that are used to determine who won an election are processed by networked, computerized devices… There are almost no locations that exclusively use paper ballots… The process of recording which person got your vote can — almost always — be hacked. Malware can be implanted on voting machines. Almost none of these machines have any kind of malware detection software like those used at major corporations and government agencies. Even if they did, many of those cybersecurity tools are regularly defeated by today’s sophisticated hackers… In America’s often close elections, a little manipulation could go a long way… Smart malware can be programmed to switch only a small percentage of votes from what the voters intended. That may be all that is needed, and that malware can also be programmed to erase itself after it does its job, so there might be no trace it ever happened." https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hack-election/story?id=41489017

Yes, It's Possible to Hack the Election abcnews.go.com

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#20 The Atlantic: How Electronic Voting Could Undermine the Election (Aug. 29, 2016) “…computer-security experts think electronic voting is a very, very bad idea. For years, security researchers and academics have urged election officials to hold off on adopting electronic voting systems, worrying that they’re not nearly secure enough to reliably carry out their vital role in American democracy. Their claims have been backed up by repeated demonstrations of the systems’ fragility. When the District of Columbia tested an electronic voting system in 2010, a professor from the University of Michigan and his graduate students took it over from more than 500 miles away to show its weaknesses; with actual physical access to a voting machine, the same professor—Alex Halderman—swapped out its internals, turning it into a Pac Man console. Halderman showed that a hacker who has access to a machine before election day could modify its programming—and he did so without even leaving a mark on the machine’s tamper-evident seals…pure electronic voting is simply too dangerous: We must use paper, either directly filled out by the voter or as a voter verifiable paper audit trail…” https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/08/how-electronic-voting-could-undermine-the-election/497885/

How Electronic Voting Could Undermine the Election As foreign hackers target election data, voters may lose faith in digital ballots. theatlantic.com

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#21 FOX: Princeton Professor demonstrates how to hack a voting machine (Sept. 18, 2016) “I have demonstrated how to hack the AVC Advantage voting machines that we use in New Jersey... The touch screen voting machine, the type used in about ten states, can be tampered with... By simply swapping the machine's computer chip for his own... I figured out how to make a slightly different computer program that, just before the close of the polls, shifts some votes around from one candidate to another. I wrote that computer program onto a memory chip like this, and now to hack a voting machine, you have to get seven minutes alone with it, with a screwdriver.” https://www.foxnews.com/video/5131074167001#sp=show-clips

Professor demonstrates how to hack a voting machine | Fox News Video Eric Shawn reports foxnews.com

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#22 Fortune: Watch This Security Researcher Hack a Voting Machine (Nov. 4, 2016) “Researchers at cybersecurity startup Cylance said they were able to hack into the Sequoia AVC Edge Mk1, used to count votes in states including California, Florida, and New Jersey, and change the final tally it produced. In Cylance's hacking demonstration, researchers were able to alter the memory of the machine as well as the paper trail it created to change vote counts and precinct records. To pull off the hack, the researchers slipped in a custom PC memory card that overwrote software embedded in the device. Cylance said it had notified Dominion Voting Systems (née Sequoia), the voting machine's maker, and government authorities about the threat.” https://fortune.com/2016/11/04/voting-machine-hack-watch-video-cylance/

Watch This Guy Hack a Voting Machine Researchers at cybersecurity startup Cylance demonstrate how to hack a voting machine used in the U.S. in a video ahead of election 2016. fortune.com

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#23 Vox: Here’s how hackers can wreak havoc on Election Day (Nov. 7, 2016) “Voting machines are old and vulnerable, and voter databases are connected to the internet. Many voting machines are running software that’s over a decade old, like Windows XP, which Microsoft hasn’t issued a security patch for since 2014. Others store ballots on memory cards, which could be used to insert viruses that can cause the machines to malfunction or alter votes. Take the Sequoia AVC Edge, for example, which is used in 12 states. It was hacked by a group of academics who installed malware that made the machine unable to do anything but play Pac-Man... Across the country, state voter registration data is synced with the internet; the integration has allowed people to register online or at the DMV. But it also means those databases are vulnerable to hackers… In Indiana last month, a security researcher demonstrated how he was able to quickly break into the state’s database and edit people’s voter information. Last year, another researcher found 191 million hacked voter registration records sitting on an open database that apparently anyone could find.” https://www.vox.com/2016/11/7/13512748/hackers-election-day-voting-machines-databases-2016

Here’s how hackers can wreak havoc on Election Day Voting machines are old and vulnerable, and voter databases are connected to the internet. vox.com

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#24 PBS: Here’s how hackers might mess with electronic voting on Election Day (Nov. 8, 2016) “…vulnerabilities in electronic ballots, make hacking a major possibility on Election Day… Five states — New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina — will cast votes on digital systems without leaving a paper trail. The same applies to several jurisdictions in battleground states like Pennsylvania and Ohio. Cyber vulnerabilities exist in all of these locations. Most revolve around the age of machines and their software. The Brennan Center report estimated 43 states will use voting machines in 2016 that are more than 10 years old. Many of these devices contain outdated software — think Microsoft Windows XP or older — without security updates. Meanwhile, the mainframes of other machines are guarded by easy-to-pick padlocks or by no barrier at all. With the kind of stealth and sophistication that’s already out there, why wouldn’t a nation-state, cyber-criminal gang, or activist group go into election systems that are completely vulnerable? …much of this voting technology is proprietary, so forensic auditors couldn’t independently scrub for and detect malicious software, especially given such code might delete itself after Election Day… Some counties use devices that collect and calculate results at once, such as the AccuVote TS and TSX voting machines. But the software for these popular machines lacks basic cybersecurity, like encryption or strong passwords. Marketplaces for voter registration data have sprouted on the Dark Web over the last year, according to an election hacking report from the ICIT. Prices vary, but one listing offered 0.5 Bitcoins ($300) for a single state’s database.” https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/heres-how-hackers-could-mess-with-electronic-voting

Here's how hackers might mess with electronic voting on Election Day Here's what to watch for on Election Day in case hackers decide to sway the vote. pbs.org

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#25 Slate: Now Is the Time to Replace Our Decrepit Voting Machines (Nov. 17, 2016) “With antiquated voting devices at the end of their projected lifespans still in widespread use across the country, the U.S. is facing an impending crisis in which our most basic election infrastructure is unacceptably vulnerable to breakdown, malfunction, and hacking... No one expects a laptop to run reliably for more than a decade. Yet on Election Day 2016, 42 states used voting machines that were at least 10 years old, and 13 of those states used ones more than 15 years old. Perhaps even more troubling, these aging machines are particularly vulnerable to hacking... These older devices often rely on unsupported software (we found machines still operating on Windows 2000) that doesn’t receive the regular security patches that help protect against modern methods of cyberattacks and hasn’t been through the relatively rigorous federal certification program that exists today. What’s more, many of these systems don’t have physical paper trails or ballots to back up the results, meaning there’s no way to independently verify how voters intended to cast their ballots in the case of a suspected hack. Voters complained of touchscreen calibration errors that “flipped” votes in North Carolina, Texas, Nevada, and Georgia and interfered with selecting straight party tickets in Pennsylvania. Optical scan machines malfunctioned in parts of Michigan and Massachusetts, and a few in Illinois had to be replaced because a memory card blew.” https://slate.com/technology/2016/11/now-is-the-time-to-fix-our-old-voting-machines.html

We Can’t Wait Until the Next Election to Replace Decrepit, Unreliable Voting Machines Although more than half the country may be unhappy with the results, America dodged a bullet on Election Day. That is, our voting machines generally... slate.com

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#26 PBS: Recounts or no, U.S. elections are still vulnerable to hacking (Dec. 26, 2016) “Pennsylvania is one of 11 states where the majority of voters use antiquated machines that store votes electronically, without printed ballots or other paper-based backups that could be used to double-check the balloting. There’s almost no way to know if they’ve accurately recorded individual votes — or if anyone tampered with the count. More than 80 percent of Pennsylvanians who voted on Nov. 8 cast their ballots on such machines, according to VotePA, a nonprofit seeking their replacement. A recount would, in the words of VotePA’s Marybeth Kuznik, a veteran election judge, essentially amount to this: “You go to the computer, and you say, ‘OK, computer, you counted this a week-and-a-half ago. Were you right the first time?'” These paperless digital voting machines, used by roughly 1 in 5 U.S. voters last month, present one of the most glaring dangers to the security of the rickety, underfunded U.S. election system. Like many electronic voting machines, they are vulnerable to hacking. But other machines typically leave a paper trail that could be manually checked. The paperless digital machines open the door to potential election rigging that might not ever be detected. Researchers would like to see the U.S. move entirely to computer-scannable paper ballots since paper can’t be hacked. Many advanced democracies require paper ballots, including Germany, Britain, Japan, and Singapore. Wallach and his colleagues believe a crafty team of pros could strike surgically, focusing on select counties in a few battleground states where “a small nudge might be decisive,” he said…Vote-tallying systems, typically at the county level, are also tempting targets. They tend to be little more than PCs running a database. Tabulation databases at the county level, which collect results from individual precincts, are supposed to be “air-gapped” or disconnected from the internet at all times — though experts say they sometimes get connected anyway. They’re considered insecure for other reasons; many have USB ports where malware could be introduced. Forty-three states use machines more than a decade old. Most run on vintage operating systems such as Windows 2000 that pre-date the iPhone and are no longer updated with security patches.” https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/recounts-no-u-s-elections-still-vulnerable-hacking

Recounts or no, U.S. elections are still vulnerable to hacking ALLENTOWN, Pa. — Jill Stein's bid to recount votes in Pennsylvania was in trouble even before a federal judge shot it down Dec. 12. That's because the Green Party candidate's effort stood almost no chance of detecting potential fraud or error in the vote — there was basically nothing to recount. pbs.org

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#27 Politico: U.S. elections are more vulnerable than ever to hacking (Dec. 29, 2016) “America's political system will remain vulnerable to cyberattacks and infiltration from foreign and domestic enemies unless the government plugs major holes and commits millions of dollars in the coming years… Hackers even invaded two state voter registration databases, spurring an FBI alert that sparked questions about whether a broader attack was coming. As for Election Day itself, 15 states — including swing state Pennsylvania — still rely at least partly on electronic voting machines that leave no paper trail. That’s despite years of warnings from digital security specialists, who say the touch-screen machines are prone to being hijacked and would provide no effective way to disprove claims of digital vote tampering… Democrats like Lieu say Republicans are playing with fire, warning the GOP could be in Russia’s crosshairs come 2018. And have no doubt, he added, foreign hackers “could absolutely swing an election” if the U.S. fails to lock its doors.” https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/election-hacking-vulnerabilities-233024

U.S. elections are more vulnerable than ever to hacking Major political, financial and logistical obstacles stand in the way. politico.com

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#28 ScientificAmerican: Our Voting System Is Hackable by Foreign Powers (March 1, 2017) “It is entirely possible for an adversary to hack American computerized voting systems directly and select the next commander in chief. A dedicated group of technically sophisticated individuals could steal an election by hacking voting machines in key counties in just a few states. Indeed, University of Michigan computer science professor J. Alex Halderman says that he and his students could have changed the result of the November election… It needn’t be a superpower like Russia or China. Even a medium-sized country would have the resources to accomplish this, with techniques that could include hacking directly into voting systems over the Internet, bribing employees of election offices and voting-machine vendors, or just buying the companies that make the voting machines outright. It is likely that such an attack would not be detected, given our current election security practices... We need to audit computers by manually examining randomly selected paper ballots and comparing the results with machine results. Audits require a voter-verified paper ballot, which the voter inspects to confirm that his or her selections have been correctly and indelibly recorded. Since 2003 an active community of academics, lawyers, election officials, and activists has urged states to adopt paper ballots and robust audit procedures…It is important that audits be performed on every contest in every election so that citizens do not have to request manual recounts to feel confident about election results." https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/our-voting-system-is-hackable-by-foreign-powers/#

Our Voting System Is Hackable by Foreign Powers Scientific American is the essential guide to the most awe-inspiring advances in science and technology, explaining how they change our understanding of the world and shape our lives. scientificamerican.com

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#29 Politico: Will the Georgia Special Election Get Hacked? (June 14, 2017) “A 29-year-old former cybersecurity researcher with the federal government’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, Lamb, who now works for a private internet security firm in Georgia, wanted to assess the security of the state’s voting systems. When he learned that Kennesaw State University’s Center for Election Systems tests and programs voting machines for the entire state of Georgia, he searched the center’s website… Lamb found on the center’s website a database containing registration records for the state’s 6.7 million voters; multiple PDFs with instructions and passwords for election workers to sign in to a central server on Election Day; and software files for the state’s ExpressPoll poll books — electronic devices used by poll workers to verify that a voter is registered before allowing them to cast a ballot. There also appeared to be databases for the so-called GEMS servers. These Global Election Management Systems are used to prepare paper and electronic ballots, tabulate votes and produce summaries of vote totals. The files were supposed to be behind a password-protected firewall, but the center had misconfigured its server so they were accessible to anyone, according to Lamb. “You could just go to the root of where they were hosting all the files and just download everything without logging in,” Lamb says. The site was also using a years-old version of Drupal — content management software — that had a critical software vulnerability long known to security researchers. “Drupageddon,” as researchers dubbed the vulnerability, got a lot of attention when it was first revealed in 2014. It would let attackers easily seize control of any site that used the software. A patch to fix the hole had been available for two years, but the center hadn’t bothered to update the software, even though it was widely known in the security community that hackers had created automated scripts to attack the vulnerability back in 2014… In addition to failing to install the 2-year-old patch on its server software, Georgia, in testimony in the injunction hearing last week revealed, is still using a version of software on its touch-screen machines that was last certified in 2005. That voting software is running on the machines on top of a Windows operating system that is even older than this.” https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/14/will-the-georgia-special-election-get-hacked-215255/

Will the Georgia Special Election Get Hacked? The state’s voting systems are uniquely vulnerable, security researchers say—and the state has ignored efforts to fix the problem. politico.com

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#30 NPR: If Voting Machines Were Hacked, Would Anyone Know? (June 14, 2017) “U.S. officials are increasingly worried about how vulnerable American elections really are… But even if most voting machines aren't connected to the Internet, says cybersecurity expert Jeremy Epstein, "they are connected to something that's connected to something that's connected to the Internet." … A recently leaked National Security Agency report on Russian hacking attempts has heightened concerns. According to the report, Russian intelligence services broke into an election software vendor's computer system and used the information it gained to send 122 election officials fake emails infected with malicious software. Bloomberg News reported Tuesday that Russia might have attempted to hack into election systems in up to 39 states. University of Michigan computer scientist Alex Halderman says it's just the kind of phishing campaign someone would launch if they wanted to manipulate votes. "That's because, before every election, the voting machines have to be programmed with the design of the ballots — what are the races, who are the candidates," says Halderman. He notes that the programming is usually done on a computer in a central election office or by an outside vendor. The ballot program is then installed on individual voting machines with a removable memory card. "So, as a remote attacker, I can target an election management system, one of these ballot programming computers. If I can infect it with malicious software, I can have that malicious software spread to the individual machines on the memory cards, and then change votes on Election Day," says Halderman.” https://www.npr.org/2017/06/14/532824432/if-voting-machines-were-hacked-would-anyone-know

If Voting Machines Were Hacked, Would Anyone Know? Even if most voting machines aren't connected to the Internet, "they are connected to something that's connected to something that's connected to the Internet," says one cybersecurity expert. npr.org

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#31 HuffPost: Good News For Russia: 15 States Use Easily Hackable Voting Machines (July 17, 2017) "Touch-screen machines can be programmed to change votes and are nearly impossible to audit, computer experts say… Manufacturers like Diebold touted the touch screens, known as direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines, as secure and more convenient than their paper-based predecessors. Computer experts were skeptical since any computer can be vulnerable to viruses and malware, but it was hard to get ahold of a touch-screen voting machine to test it. The manufacturers were so secretive about how the technology worked that they often required election officials to sign non-disclosure agreements preventing them from bringing in outside experts who could assess the machines. In September 2006, they published a research paper and an accompanying video detailing how they could spread malicious code to the AccuVote TS to change the record of the votes to produce whatever outcome the code writers desired. And the code could spread from one machine to another like a virus. That was more than a decade ago, but Georgia still uses the AccuVote TS. The state is one of five ― the others are Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey, and South Carolina ― that rely entirely on DREs for voting. Ten other states use a combination of paper ballots and DRE machines that leave no paper trail. Many use a newer version of the AccuVote known as the TSX ― even though computer scientists have demonstrated that machine, too, is vulnerable to hacking. Others use the Sequoia AVC Advantage, which Princeton professor Andrew Appel demonstrated could be similarly manipulated in a 2007 legal filing. Appel bought a Sequoia machine online for $82 and demonstrated that he could remove 10 screws and easily replace the Sequoia’s memory card with a modified version that would alter the outcome of an election… Computer scientists like Halderman, Appel, and Felten have been warning states about the risks of DRE machines for over a decade, urging them to replace touch-screen machines with paper ballots that can be read with an optical scanner and easily audited after an election. Paper ballots create a physical copy of the voter’s choice that can be checked against the results; with DRE machines, it’s impossible to verify whether the choice the person intended to select is, in fact, what the machine recorded.” https://www.huffpost.com/entry/electronic-voting-machines-hack-russia_n_5967e1c2e4b03389bb162c96

Good News For Russia: 15 States Use Voting Machines That Have Been Easily Hackable For More Than A Decade Touch-screen machines can be programmed to change votes and are nearly impossible to audit, computer experts say. huffpost.com

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#32 CNET: Defcon hackers find it’s very easy to break voting machines (July 30, 2017) “When the password for a voting machine is "abcde" and can't be changed, the integrity of our democracy might be in trouble. The Advanced Voting Solutions WinVote machine, dubbed "America's worst voting machine," came equipped with this simple password even as it was used in some of the country's most important elections. AVS went out of business in 2007, but Virginia used its insecure machines until 2015 before dropping them for scrap metal. That means this vulnerable hunk of technology was used in three presidential elections, starting with George W. Bush's re-election in 2004 to Barack Obama's in 2012… "It's really just a matter of plugging your USB drive in for five seconds, and the thing's completely compromised at that point," Synack co-founder Jay Kaplan said. "To the point where you can get remote access. It's very simple." … Once you're out of the voting program on the machine, it's just like any old Windows XP computer," Synack found. https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy/defcon-hackers-find-its-very-easy-to-break-voting-machines/

While you watched "The Emoji Movie," a voting machine got hacked Voting is at the foundation of every democracy. Hackers find it's on shaky ground thanks to shoddy technology. cnet.com

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#33 CNN: We watched hackers break into voting machines (Aug. 11, 2017) “These are supposed to be the latest machines, they're still used in elections, and they're running ancient software. I think that if somebody wanted to, it would be pretty easy to fake an election…So if you are a voter in America, we're likely hacking the machine that you vote on. There are a few dozen of these machines and also electronic poll books… We can go ahead and impact this log within 10 seconds, and you can gain access to the operating system. We could actually remove this and clone this particular USB. We could go back and start looking at and reverse engineering what's on this image and determining the various ways that we can impact this particular operating system.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HA2DWMHgLnc

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#34 The Intercept: The U.S. Election System Remains Deeply Vulnerable (Oct. 3, 2017) "The Harvard report, titled “Voter Identity Theft: Submitting Changes to Voter Registrations Online to Disrupt Elections,” concludes that online attackers can alter voter registration information in as many as 35 states and the District of Columbia by buying personal information through either legitimate or illegitimate sources. Voter registration information is public, and many states allow citizens to make changes online, even if they registered in person or by mail. A determined hacker could buy voter lists from the 36 jurisdictions that allow online registration, and separately buy the personal information used to confirm a voter’s identification – such as Social Security or driver’s license numbers – to get in and make changes. Voting software is another potential target for hackers. The Intercept has previously reported on a top-secret National Security Agency report detailing a cyberattack by a Russian intelligence agency on at least one U.S. voting software supplier. The attackers sent spear-phishing emails to more than 100 local election officials just days before the November election, according to the highly classified report that was provided anonymously to The Intercept." https://theintercept.com/2017/10/03/us-election-2016-state-voting-systems/

The U.S. Election System Remains Deeply Vulnerable, But States Would Rather Celebrate Fake Success Regardless of what did or did not happen in the 2016 election, voter registration systems remain susceptible to hacking. That's what states should focus on. theintercept.com

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#35 New York Times: The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine (Feb. 2, 2018) “Examining the election-management computer at the county’s office — the machine used to tally official election results and, in many counties, to program voting machines — they found that remote-access software had been installed on it. Remote-access software is a type of program that system administrators use to access and control computers remotely over the internet or over an organization’s internal network. Election systems are supposed to be air-gapped — disconnected from the internet and from other machines that might be connected to the internet. The presence of the software suggested this wasn’t the case with the Venango machine, which made the system vulnerable to hackers. Anyone who gained remote access to the system could use the software to take control of the machine. Logs showed the software was installed two years earlier and used multiple times, most notably for 80 minutes on November 1, 2010, the night before a federal election… In the 15 years since electronic voting machines were first adopted by many states, numerous reports by computer scientists have shown nearly every make and model to be vulnerable to hacking. The systems were not initially designed with robust security in mind, and even where security features were included, experts have found them to be poorly implemented with glaring holes… ES&S has in the past sometimes sold its election-management system with remote-access software preinstalled, according to one official; and where it wasn’t preloaded, the company advised officials to install it so ES&S technicians could remotely access the systems via modem, as Venango County’s contractor did, to troubleshoot and provide maintenance… An ES&S contract with Michigan from 2006 describes how the company’s tech support workers used remote-access software called pcAnywhere to access customer election systems. And a report from Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, that same year describes pcAnywhere on that county’s election-management system on June 2 when ES&S representatives spent hours trying to reconcile vote discrepancies in a local district race that took place during a May 16th primary. An Allegheny County election official told me that remote-access software came pre-installed on their ES&S election-management system… On election nights, many polling places around the country transmit voting results to their county election offices via modems embedded in or connected to their voting machines. Election officials and vendors insist that the modem transmissions are safe because the connections go over phone lines and not the internet. But as security experts point out, many of the modems are cellular, which use radio signals to send calls and data to cell towers and routers belonging to mobile carriers — Verizon, Sprint, AT&T. These routers are technically part of the internet. Even when analog (landline) modems are used instead of cellular ones, the calls still likely pass through routers, because phone companies have replaced much of their analog switching equipment in recent years with digital systems. Because of this, attackers could theoretically intercept unofficial results as they’re transmitted on election night — or, worse, use the modem connections to reach back into election machines at either end and install malware or alter election software and official results... To subvert machines via their modem connection, an attacker could set up a device known as an IMSI-catcher (or stingray, as they’re also called) near precincts or county election offices to intercept and alter vote tallies as they’re transmitted. IMSI-catchers — which law enforcement, militaries and spies use — impersonate legitimate cell towers and trick phones and other devices in their vicinity into connecting to them instead of legitimate towers. ‘‘The incorrect assertion that voting machines or voting systems can’t be hacked by remote attackers because they are ‘not connected to the internet’ is not just wrong, it’s damaging,’’ says Susan Greenhalgh, a spokeswoman for the National Election Defense Coalition, an elections integrity group. ‘‘This oft-repeated myth instills a false sense of security that is inhibiting officials and lawmakers from urgently requiring that all voting systems use paper ballots and that all elections be robustly audited.’’ …The top voting machine maker in the country, ES&S, distributes modems or modeming capability with many of its DRE and optical-scan machines. About 35,000 of ES&S’s newest precinct-based optical scanner, the DS200, are used in 31 states and the District of Columbia and can be outfitted with either analog or cellular modems to transmit results. Maryland, Maine, Rhode Island and the District of Columbia use only DS200 machines statewide (though they also use two other systems specifically for disabled voters and absentee ballots); Florida and Wisconsin use the DS200s in dozens of counties, and other states use them to lesser degrees. ES&S’s earlier model M100 optical scanners, which also can be equipped with modems, have long been used in Michigan — a critical swing state in the 2016 presidential election — though the state is upgrading to DS200 machines this year, as well as machines made by Dominion Voting Systems. Dominion’s machines use external serial-port modems that are connected to machines after an election ends.” https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/21/magazine/the-myth-of-the-hacker-proof-voting-machine.html

The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine (Published 2018) Election officials have insisted that machines can’t be remotely compromised because they’re not “connected to the internet.” But security experts point out crucial ways in which they are. nytimes.com

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#36 Slate: America's Voting Systems Are Highly Vulnerable to Hackers (Feb. 22, 2018) “Did Russia shift the election’s outcome by hacking registration rolls or voting machines? The fact is that it’s impossible to say. In September, the Department of Homeland Security informed officials in 21 states that Russians had hacked into their registration systems in the run-up to the election. Whether the hackers manipulated the rolls—removed names, or switched their precincts—no one has investigated; perhaps no one could investigate, as so many months had passed before the hack was revealed… J. Alex Halderman a professor of computer science at the University of Michigan, testified that only a handful of vendors and contractors provide the equipment used in election machines. “Attackers could target one or a few of these companies and spread malicious code to election equipment that serves millions of voters,” he said. “Furthermore, in close elections, decentralization can actually work against us. An attacker can probe different areas of the most important ‘swing states’ for vulnerabilities, find the areas that have the weakest protection, and strike there.” For the past decade, Halderman has run the “red teams”—the simulated attacker—in games to test the vulnerability of election machines. In those games, he testified, his team “could reprogram the machine to invisibly cause any candidate to win. We also created malicious software—vote-stealing code—that could spread from machine to machine like a computer virus, and silently change the election outcome…This month, the Center for American Progress released a study measuring the degree to which each of the 50 states meets these basic standards. The results were alarming. Paperless voting systems—touch screens with no paper backups—are still used in 14 states. Only 26 states require post-election audits. Forty-one states use database software that was created more than a decade ago—so long ago that the vendors no longer track vulnerabilities or send patches to the users. More distressing still, some of the worst laggards, by these measures, are battleground states. Florida gets an F, judged as “incomplete” or “unsatisfactory” on six of seven security metrics. Pennsylvania and Arizona get D’s. Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, Virginia, and Wisconsin get C’s. No state gets an A. Just 10 get B’s.” https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/02/americas-voting-systems-are-still-dangerously-vulnerable-to-hacking.html

America’s Voting Systems Are Still Dangerously Vulnerable to Hackers Russian interference in the next election could be even more damaging. slate.com

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#37 New York Times: I Hacked an Election. So Can the Russians. (April 5, 2018) “After the chaos of the 2000 election, we were promised a modern and dependable way to vote, Halderman says in the video. “I’m here to tell you that the electronic voting machines Americans got to solve the problem of voting integrity - they turned out to be an awful idea. That’s because people like me can hack them all too easily. Our highly computerized election infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and even to cyberattacks that could change votes. Halderman has testified before Congress on the issue. He says that while it’s promising that the Senate Intelligence Committee has recently shown some understanding of the problem, states must act too. Step 1: Buy a voting machine on eBay, or if you are the North Koreans, hack the manufacturer and steal their software code. Step 2: Write a virus. Step 3: Email your virus to every election official responsible for programming the voting machines with new ballots. Many of these officials are easy to find online. Step 4: Sip coffee and wait. Step 5: Hijack the ballot programming and let the election officials copy your invisible malicious code onto the voting machines. Step 6: Watch your code silently steal votes... What chance do the people running your local elections really have against Russia or North Korea?” https://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000005790489/i-hacked-an-election-so-can-the-russians.html

Video Transcript AI Summary
Cybersecurity experts agree that electronic voting machines are dangerous and obsolete. These machines can be easily hacked, as demonstrated by a computer scientist who has hacked multiple machines and even turned one into a video game console. The vulnerability of these machines puts our election infrastructure at risk of sabotage and cyberattacks. In the 2016 election, millions of Americans voted on paperless electronic machines. The speaker reveals a step-by-step process for hacking these machines and stealing votes. The solution proposed is to use paper ballots, which can be quickly scanned and verified by humans. It is emphasized that all elections should be run with paper ballots and audits. The importance of having a paper backup system is highlighted. The concise transcript emphasizes the need to replace electronic voting machines with paper ballots for secure and reliable elections.
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Full Transcript
Speaker 0: All cybersecurity experts who have given electronic voting machines any thought agree. These machines have got to go. To show you why, I'm running a mock election using the same dangerous and Obsolete machines still in use today. Our election will find out whether Michigan students prefer their own university or our archrival, Ohio State. Speaker 1: Here we are. Speaker 0: After the chaos of the 2000 election, we were promised a modern and dependable way to vote. I'm here to tell you that the electronic voting machines Americans got to solve of the problem of voting integrity? They turned out to be an awful idea. Speaker 1: One vote for McCain. Speaker 0: That's because people like me can hack them all too easily. I'm a computer scientist who has hacked a lot of electronic voting machines. I even turned 1 machine into a video game console. Imagine what the Russians and North Koreans can do. I've even gone to congress to raise the alarm. Our highly computerized election infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and even to cyberattacks that could change votes. This is the same electronic voting machine used in Georgia, In parts of Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas and even in swing states like Virginia, Florida In Pennsylvania, millions of Americans voted on paperless electronic voting machines in the 2016 election. 100% Michigan. 100% Michigan. Obviously, Michigan. Michigan. Michigan. But here's a little secret between you and me. I've already hacked these Forkless machines. Step 1, buy a voting machine on Ebay. Or if you're the North Koreans, hack Hack the manufacturer and steal their software code. Step 2, write a virus. Step 3, Email your virus to every election official responsible for programming the voting machines with new ballots. Many of these officials are easy to find online. Step 4, sip coffee and wait. Step 5, hijack the ballot programming and let the election officials copy your invisible malicious code onto the voting machines. Step 6, watch your code Silently steal votes. Speaker 1: Alright. Here are the results from the electronic voting machines. Ohio State wins 131 to 108. Speaker 0: There's a good reason we computer scientists are paranoid. It's a golden age for hackers. The computer virus that destroyed Iranian nuclear equipment. Is One of the largest data breaches in history More than 1,000,000,000 of its accounts were hacked. What chance do the people running your local elections really have against Russia or North Korea. Speaker 1: Okay, everyone. I hacked the voting machines. I do have the real results because we also counted on paper. Michigan wins. Speaker 0: Michigan won in a landslide. And I can say this confidently because I have the real results from the safest and simplest solution, paper ballots. Yes. Speaker 1: We need to take a hard look at the equipment that actually records and reports votes. Speaker 0: Even though the Senate Intelligence Committee is finally showing some understanding of Standing of the problem, it's not enough. All states in this country, the people ultimately responsible for how we vote, Must act 2. In a real election, an official could quickly scan these paper ballots and shortly after have a human Verify the results. Paper plus audits. All elections should be run this way. But if you don't wanna believe me or every single expert in cybersecurity who's thought this through, then take it from this guy. Speaker 1: It's old fashioned, But it's always good to have a paper backup system of voting. It's called paper.
Video: Opinion | I Hacked an Election. So Can the Russians. It’s time America’s leaders got serious about voting security. nytimes.com

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#38 The New Yorker: America Continues To Ignore Risks of Election Hacking (April 18, 2018) “America’s voting systems are hackable in all kinds of ways. As a case in point, in 2016, the Election Assistance Commission, the bipartisan federal agency that certifies the integrity of voting machines, and that will now be tasked with administering Congress’s three hundred and eighty million dollars, was itself hacked. The stolen data—log-in credentials of E.A.C. staff members—were discovered, by chance, by employees of the cybersecurity firm Recorded Future, whose computers one night happened upon an informal auction of the stolen passwords. Another case to consider: the Department of Homeland Security recently discovered a number of rogue cell phone simulators—technical tools that are commonly called “Stingrays”—in Washington, D.C., and has been unable to identify who was operating them…As a pair of Princeton computer scientists, Andrew Appel and Kyle Jamieson, have pointed out, cell phone simulators, which mimic legitimate cell towers, happen also to be handy and inexpensive vote-hacking devices. On the Freedom to Tinker blog, Appel and Jamieson have posted easy-to-follow diagrams showing how the transmission of voting information from polling places could be intercepted by a Stingray and surreptitiously altered before being sent on to its intended destination, a central tabulating computer. The voting machine that Appel and Jamieson picked to illustrate this hypothetical “man-in-the-middle” attack was the DS200, a popular optical-scan voting machine that reads marked paper ballots, made by a company called Election Systems & Software… As of 2015, forty-three states and the District of Columbia were using machines that are no longer in production. Some of these machines are so old that their operating systems can’t be patched when security flaws are found, and replacement parts must be scrounged up on eBay…Software vulnerabilities, unreliable tabulators, and unprotected memory cards have left voting systems open to exploitation ever since electronic machines were introduced.” https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/america-continues-to-ignore-the-risks-of-election-hacking

America Continues to Ignore the Risks of Election Hacking Sue Halpern writes about the risks that hacking and faulty equipment pose to U.S. elections in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. newyorker.com

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#39 Reuters: Old voting machines stir concerns among U.S. officials (May 31, 2018) “In 14 of the 40 most competitive races, Americans will cast ballots on voting machines that do not provide a paper trail to audit voters’ intentions if a close election is questioned… These include races in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Texas, Florida, Kansas, and Kentucky. Nationwide, of 435 congressional seats up for grabs, 144 are in districts where some or all voters will not have access to machines using paper records, the analysis shows… Most of the dozen-plus state and local election officials interviewed by Reuters said they worry about bad actors hacking the older electronic voting machines to alter ballots, and then being unable to verify the results because there will be no paper trail. But the officials worry most about voters losing trust in elections because officials would not be able to visibly demonstrate that the tally was indeed accurate.” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-votingmachines-idUSKCN1IW16Z

Ahead of November election, old voting machines stir concerns among U.S. officials U.S. election officials responsible for managing more than a dozen close races this November share a fear: Outdated voting machines in their districts could undermine confidence in election results that will determine which party controls the U.S. Congress. reuters.com

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#40 Axios: There's more than one way to hack an election (July 2, 2018) “Here are the systems at risk in the election process: voter registration systems, voter registration databases (which the voter registration process produces), voter records at polling places (known as poll books, which exist in both printed and electronic versions), voting machines (which capture the votes), vote tabulation (when the votes are tallied)… Many parts of election systems are at risk of being exposed to the internet — and thereby potentially being inappropriately accessed or meddled with — because of human error or bad security protocols. Here are some of the main points of risk: registration interfaces, voter registration databases, electronic poll books, printed poll books, voting machines, electronic vote tabulation, optical scan vote tabulation, and election management systems.” https://www.axios.com/2018/07/02/be-smart-there-is-more-than-one-way-to-hack-an-election-1529424861

There's more than one way to hack an election The vulnerabilities of our election system resemble "Swiss cheese," one expert says. axios.com

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#41 Newsweek: Election Hacking: Voting-Machine Supplier Admits It Used Hackable Software Despite Past Denials (July 17, 2018) “One of the country's largest voting machine makers has admitted in a letter to a U.S. senator that some of its past election-management systems had remote-access software preinstalled, despite past denials that any of its systems were equipped with such software. Election Systems and Software (ES&S) told Democratic Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon in an April letter that has now been released, first reported by Vice News and later obtained by Newsweek, that the company provided election equipment with remote connection software to an unspecified number of states from 2000 to 2006. "Prior to the inception of the [Election Assistance Commission] testing and certification program and the subsequent requirement for hardening and at customer's request, ES&S provided pcAnywhere remote connection software on the [Election-Management System] workstation to a small number of customers between 2000 and 2006," wrote Tom Burt, ES&S president.” Wyden told Vice the decision to sell any voting system with remote-access software, leaving equipment possibly vulnerable to hacking, was "the worst decision for security short of leaving ballot boxes on a Moscow street corner." https://www.newsweek.com/election-hacking-voting-machines-software-1028948

Past Voting Systems Had Remote-Access Software Senator Ron Wyden said the decision to sell voting systems with remote-access software, leaving equipment possibly vulnerable to hacking, was "the worst decision for security short of leaving ballot newsweek.com

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#42 Salon: Remote-access allowed: Voting machine company admits installing vulnerable software (July 20, 2018) “A letter sent to Congress reveals that, between 2000 and 2006, one of America's top voting machine companies installed remote-access software in their products that made it possible for them to be manipulated by third parties. In the letter, Election Systems and Software admitted that it had "provided pcAnywhere remote connection software … to a small number of customers between 2000 and 2006." As The Verge notes, "pcAnywhere’s security vulnerabilities have been well-documented in the past": In 2006, hackers stole the source code for pcAnywhere and then stayed quiet until 2012, when a hacker published part of the code online. Symantec, which distributed pcAnywhere, knew vaguely of the theft back in 2006 but only spoke up about it after the code leaked, along with the warning that users should disable or uninstall the software. At the same time, security researchers studied pcAnywhere’s code and found a vulnerability that could let a hacker take control of a whole system and bypass the need to enter a password.” https://www.salon.com/2018/07/20/remote-access-allowed-voting-machine-company-admits-installing-vulnerable-software/

Remote-access allowed: Voting machine company admits installing vulnerable software Election hacking: Despite previous denials, top vendor admits it sold systems with remote access to states salon.com

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#43 BBC: Hacking the US mid-terms? It's child's play (Aug. 11, 2018) “Bianca Lewis, 11, has many hobbies. She likes Barbie, video games, fencing, singing… and hacking the infrastructure behind the world’s most powerful democracy…She’s taking part in a competition organized by R00tz Asylum, a non-profit organization that promotes “hacking for good” …Its aim is to send out a dire warning: the voting systems that will be used across America for the mid-term vote in November are, in many cases, so insecure a young child can learn to hack them with just a few minute’s coaching.” https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45154903

Hacking the US mid-terms? It's child's play Security experts say the US voting system is vulnerable to cyber-attack. How vulnerable? Let these 11 year olds show you. bbc.com

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#44 PBS: An 11-year-old changed election results on a replica Florida state website in under 10 minutes (Aug. 12, 2018) “An 11-year-old boy on Friday was able to hack into a replica of the Florida state election website and change voting results found there in under 10 minutes during the world’s largest yearly hacking convention, DEFCON 26, organizers of the event said. “These are very accurate replicas of all of the sites,” Sell told the PBS NewsHour on Sunday. “These things should not be easy enough for an 8-year-old kid to hack within 30 minutes; it’s negligent for us as a society.” https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/an-11-year-old-changed-election-results-on-a-replica-florida-state-website-in-under-10-minutes

An 11-year-old changed election results on a replica Florida state website in under 10 minutes An 11-year-old on Friday was able to hack into a replica of the Florida state election website and change voting results found there in under 10 minutes. pbs.org

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#45 The Guardian: Why US elections remain 'dangerously vulnerable' to cyber-attacks (Aug. 13, 2018) “By mid-evening, Jon Ossoff, the leading Democrat, had 50.3% of the vote, enough to win outright without the need for a run-off against his closest Republican challenger. Then Marks noticed that the number of precincts reporting in Fulton County, encompassing the heart of Atlanta, was going down instead of up. Soon after, the computers crashed. Election officials later blamed a “rare error” with a memory card that didn’t properly upload its vote tallies. When the count resumed more than an hour later, Ossoff was suddenly down to 48.6% and ended up at 48.1%… Georgia’s 15-year-old all-electronic voting system was almost impossible to audit because it produced no independently verifiable paper trail to check against the computer-generated tallies. Cybersecurity experts have warned for years that malfeasance, technical breakdown, or administrative incompetence could easily wreak havoc with electronic systems and could go largely or wholly undetected. “Virtually every American voter has come to understand that the nation’s election infrastructure is susceptible to malicious manipulation from local and foreign threats,” the suit reads. “Yet, Georgia’s election officials continue to defend the state’s electronic voting system that is demonstrably unreliable and insecure, and have repeatedly refused to take administrative, regulatory or legislative action to address the election security failures.” https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/13/us-election-cybersecurity-hacking-voting

Why US elections remain 'dangerously vulnerable' to cyber-attacks Officials have dragged their feet on updating machines and securing data – and a climate of fear could undermine voter confidence theguardian.com

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#46 The Guardian: Kids at hacking conference show how easily US elections could be sabotaged (Aug. 22, 2018) “The risk of a hacker casting the validity of an election into question through one of any number of other entry points is huge, and the actual difficulty of such an attack is child’s play. Literally. “The most vulnerable part of election infrastructure is the websites,” explained the security expert Jake Braun… Unlike a voting machine, Braun explains, websites represent a compelling target because they are, by their nature, connected to the internet 24/7. And, whether they are used for voter registration, online campaigning, or announcing the results at the end of the election, they can be used to sow havoc…Armed with facsimiles of the websites of 13 battleground states and a child-friendly guide to basic hacking techniques, the kids were set loose on critical infrastructure – and proceeded to tear it apart… “The No 1 thing we found last year wasn’t a hack at all; it was the fact that we opened up the back of the machine, and of course, no surprise, all the parts are made across the world, especially China. This isn’t conjecture; this isn’t my dystopian fantasy world; this is something we know they do …The fragmentation argument is absolute horseshit because once you’re in the chips, you can hack whole classes of machines, nationwide, from the fucking Kremlin.”… The bad actor just needs to steal enough votes in a few counties in America’s battleground states – just enough to swing a close election…“I’ve only one conclusion,” said Schürmann: “Use paper and do your audits.” https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/22/us-elections-hacking-voting-machines-def-con

Kids at hacking conference show how easily US elections could be sabotaged Changing recorded votes would be difficult for bad actors. But at Def Con in Las Vegas, children had no trouble finding another point of entry theguardian.com

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#47 CBS: Why voting machines in the U.S. are easy targets for hackers (Sept. 19, 2018) “Tens of thousands of voting machines in the United States are vulnerable to hacking. They have been successfully dismantled and attacked by security researchers for years to demonstrate their flaws. In 2017, at the annual Defcon hackers conference, one tech professor from the University of Copenhagen was able to penetrate an Advanced Voting Solutions machine in about 90 minutes. The attackers were able to access the administrator mode, allowing them to potentially alter voting data. At this year's conference, a group of hackers was able to crack one in 15 minutes. One hacker told CNET: "Should you be trusting your vote with these? I don't think so." "They're running Windows. They have USB ports. They're actual computers and are very susceptible to attacks," says Cris Thomas, the global strategy lead for IBM's X-Force cybersecurity team.” Optical scan ballot machines are vulnerable to hacking — all electronic devices are — but most cybersecurity experts are more concerned with electronic machines. Voting results are stored on the machine's internal storage. If the voting data is not encrypted or improperly configured, with little effort, a bad actor could access the memory and alter the voting results… The results go from [the voting machine] into a piece of electronics that takes it to the central counting place. That data is not encrypted, and that's vulnerable for manipulation.” https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-voting-machines-in-the-u-s-are-easy-targets-for-hackers/

Why voting machines in the U.S. are easy targets for hackers Cybersecurity experts say the goal is to undermine confidence in the U.S. electoral system. cbsnews.com

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#48 New York Times: The Crisis of Election Security (Sept. 26, 2018) The Illinois intruders had quietly breached the network in June and spent weeks conducting reconnaissance. After alighting on the state’s voter registration database, they downloaded information on hundreds of thousands of voters… In early August, Jenkins learned of another breach, this one on an Arizona state website, and it appeared to come from one of the same I.P. addresses that had been used to attack Illinois. This time, the intruders installed malware as if setting the stage for further assault. Then reports from other states began to pour in, saying that the same I.P. addresses appeared to be probing their voter-registration networks… The entire system — a Rube Goldberg mix of poorly designed machinery, from websites and databases that registered and tracked voters, to electronic poll books that verified their eligibility, to the various black-box systems that recorded, tallied, and reported results — was vulnerable…They don’t address core vulnerabilities in voting machines or the systems used to program them. And they ignore the fact that many voting machines that elections officials insist are disconnected from the internet — and therefore beyond the reach of hackers — are in fact accessible by way of the modems they use to transmit vote totals on election night. Add to this the fact that states don’t conduct robust postelection audits — a manual comparison of paper ballots to digital tallies is the best method we have to detect when something has gone wrong in an election — and there’s a good chance we simply won’t know if someone has altered the digital votes in the next election… How did our election system get so vulnerable, and why haven’t officials tried harder to fix it? The answer, ultimately, comes down to politics and money: The voting machines are made by well-connected private companies that wield immense control over their proprietary software, often fighting vigorously in court to prevent anyone from examining it when things go awry. In Ohio in 2004, for example, where John Kerry lost the presidential race following numerous election irregularities, Kerry’s team was denied access to the voting-machine software. “We were told by the court that you were not able to get that algorithm to check it, because it was proprietary information,” Kerry recalled in a recent interview on WNYC’s “Brian Lehrer Show.” He was understandably rueful, arguing how wrong it was that elections are held under “the purview of privately owned machines, where the public doesn’t have the right to know whether the algorithm has been checked or whether they’re hackable or not. And we now know they are hackable.” …There are roughly 350,000 voting machines in use in the country today, all of which fall into one of two categories: optical-scan machines or direct-recording electronic machines. Each of them suffers from significant security problems. With optical-scan machines, voters fill out paper ballots and feed them into a scanner, which stores a digital image of the ballot and records the votes on a removable memory card. The paper ballot, in theory, provides an audit trail that can be used to verify digital tallies. But not all states perform audits, and many that do simply run the paper ballots through a scanner a second time. Fewer than half the states do manual audits, and they typically examine ballots from randomly chosen precincts in a county, instead of a percentage of ballots from all precincts. If the randomly chosen precincts aren’t ones where hacking occurred or where machines failed to accurately record votes, an audit won’t reveal anything — nor will it always catch problems with early-voting, overseas, or absentee ballots, all of which are often scanned in county election offices, not in precincts. Voters use touch screens or other input devices to make selections on digital-only ballots, and votes are stored electronically. Many D.R.E.s have printers that produce what’s known as a voter-verifiable paper audit trail — a scroll of paper, behind a window, that voters can review before casting their ballots. But the paper trail doesn’t provide the same integrity as full-size ballots and optical-scan machines, because a hacker could conceivably rig the machine to print a voter’s selections correctly on the paper while recording something else on the memory card. About 80 percent of voters today cast ballots either on D.R.E.s that produce a paper trail or on scanned paper ballots. But five states still use paperless D.R.E.s exclusively, and an additional 10 states use paperless D.R.E.s in some jurisdictions…More than a dozen companies currently sell voting equipment, but a majority of machines used today come from just four — Diebold Election Systems, Election Systems & Software (ES&S), Hart InterCivic and Sequoia Voting Systems. Diebold (later renamed Premier) and Sequoia are now out of business. Diebold’s machines and customer contracts were sold to ES&S and a Canadian company called Dominion, and Dominion also acquired Sequoia. This means that more than 80% of the machines in use today are under the purview of three companies — Dominion, ES&S, and Hart InterCivic. Many of the products they make have documented vulnerabilities and can be subverted in multiple ways. Hackers can access voting machines via the cellular modems used to transmit unofficial results at the end of an election, or subvert back-end election-management systems — used to program the voting machines and tally votes — and spread malicious code to voting machines through them. Attackers could design their code to bypass pre-election testing and kick in only at the end of an election or under specific conditions — say, when a certain candidate appears to be losing — and erase itself afterward to avoid detection. And they could make it produce election results with wide margins to avoid triggering automatic manual recounts in states that require them when results are close. Hackers could also target voting-machine vendors and use this trusted channel to distribute their code. Last year a security researcher stumbled across an unsecured ES&S server that left passwords exposed for its employee accounts. Although the passwords were encrypted, a nation-state with sufficient resources would most likely be able to crack them, the researcher noted. Since ES&S creates ballot-definition files before each election for some customers — the critical programming files that tell machines how to apportion votes based on a voter’s screen touch or marks on a paper ballot — a malicious actor able to get into ES&S’s network could conceivably corrupt these files so machines misinterpret a vote for Donald Trump, say, as one for his opponent, or vice versa. The Department of Homeland Security, the intelligence community, and election officials have all insisted that there is no evidence that Russian hackers altered votes in 2016. But the truth is that no one has really looked for evidence. Intelligence assessments are based on signals intelligence — spying on Russian communications and computers for chatter or activity indicating that they altered votes — not on a forensic examination of voting machines and election networks. “We should always be careful to point out that there hasn’t been any evidence that votes were changed in any election in this way, and that’s a true fact,” said Matt Blaze, a computer-science professor at the University of Pennsylvania and a voting-machine-security expert. “It’s just less comforting than it might sound at first glance because we haven’t looked very hard.” Even if experts were to look, it’s not clear what they would find, he added. “It’s possible to do a pretty good job of erasing all the forensic evidence.” …At 10 p.m., Al Gore was ahead in Volusia, with 83,000 votes to George W. Bush’s 62,000. Things were going well for Gore across the state, and exit polls projected a six-point lead for him. But then something changed. “I had stepped out, and one of the assistants came, and he’s just like, ‘I need you to come here and verify the numbers,’ ” Tannenbaum recalled. When she looked at the county’s website, Gore’s total had dropped 16,000 votes. Tannenbaum called the county election office, alarmed. “I don’t know what’s going on down there, but you can’t take away votes!” she said. The mysterious drop would later be traced to Precinct 216, a community center in DeLand, where Gore’s total was showing negative 16,022 votes. It wasn’t the only mathematical absurdity in the tally. A Socialist Workers Party candidate named James Harris had 9,888 votes. But the DeLand precinct had only 585 registered voters, and only 219 of them cast ballots at the center that day. Volusia officials blamed the mishap on a faulty memory card. The county used optical-scan machines made by Global Election Systems (a Canadian company later acquired by Diebold and renamed Diebold Election Systems), which the county had used since 1996. When the election ended, poll workers were supposed to transmit results to the county election office via modem; but the transmission failed, so a worker drove the memory card in, where officials inserted it directly into the election-management system to tally results. Logs for that computer, however, showed two memory cards for Precinct 216 inserted, an hour apart. The vote totals went haywire after the second card was loaded. Beyond the mystery of the two cards, there was another problem with this explanation. A faulty memory card should produce an onscreen error message or cause a computer to lock up, not alter votes in one race while leaving others untouched. And what kind of faulty card deleted votes only for Gore, while adding votes to other candidates?" https://web.archive.org/web/20181010024836/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/magazine/election-security-crisis-midterms.html

The Crisis of Election Security As the midterms approach, America’s electronic voting systems are more vulnerable than ever. Why isn’t anyone trying to fix them? web.archive.org

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#49 Politico: Attack on commonly used voting machine could tip an election (Sept. 27, 2018) “A malicious hacker could alter the outcome of a U.S. presidential election by taking advantage of numerous flaws in one model of vote-tabulating machine used in 26 states, cybersecurity experts warned in a report presented Thursday at the Capitol… The biggest flaw in the process we found is even when we identify flaws, they don't get fixed… The report says an attacker could remotely gain access to the Model 650 tabulating machine manufactured by Election Systems and Software, one of the country's largest sellers of voting equipment, by exploiting numerous vulnerabilities in the unit. Researchers also said this model has an unpatched vulnerability that the manufacturer was notified about a decade ago… The event organizers said the Model 650 vote-tabulation vulnerabilities are especially problematic because states use the machines to process ballots for entire counties. "Hacking just one of these machines could enable an attacker to flip the Electoral College and determine the outcome of a presidential election," the report says.” https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/27/hacking-voting-machines-814504

Attack on commonly used voting machine could tip an election, researchers find Voting machine vendors and state election officials have often dismissed such warnings as alarmist, saying they don’t reflect real-world situations. politico.com

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#50 WSJ: Voting Machine Used in Half of U.S. Is Vulnerable to Attack (Sept. 27, 2018) “Election machines used in more than half of U.S. states carry a flaw disclosed more than a decade ago that makes them vulnerable to a cyberattack, according to a report to be delivered Thursday on Capitol Hill. The issue was found in the widely used Model 650 high-speed ballot-counting machine made by Election Systems & Software LLC, the nation’s leading manufacturer of election equipment. It is one of about seven security problems in several models of voting equipment described in the report, which is based on research conducted last month at the Def Con hacker conference. The flaw in the ES&S; machine stood out because it was detailed in a security report commissioned by Ohio’s secretary of state in 2007, said Harri Hursti, an election-security researcher who co-wrote both the Ohio and Def Con reports. “There has been more than plenty of time to fix it,” he said…Earlier this month, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine recommended U.S. states move away from voting machines that don’t include paper ballots…Election security researchers and politicians aren’t convinced ES&S; is doing enough. The company hasn’t adopted common internet security standards that secure against phishing attacks and make it harder to intercept messages, according to staffers for Sen. Ron Wyden (D., Ore.).” https://www.wsj.com/articles/widely-used-election-systems-are-vulnerable-to-attack-report-finds-1538020802

Voting Machine Used in Half of U.S. Is Vulnerable to Attack, Report Finds The flaw in Election Systems & Software’s Model 650 high-speed ballot-counting machine was detailed in 2007 wsj.com

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#51 CNN: Hackers Bring Stark Warning About Election Security (Sept. 27, 2018) “The vulnerabilities in America’s voting systems are “staggering,” a group representing hackers warned lawmakers on Capitol Hill on Thursday – just over a month before the midterm elections. The hacking group claims they were able to break into some voting machines in two minutes and that they had the ability to wirelessly reprogram an electronic card used by millions of Americans to activate a voting terminal to cast their ballot. “This vulnerability could be exploited to take over the voting machine on which they vote and cast as many votes as the voter wanted,” the group claims in the report…A voting tabulation machine the group says is used in more than two dozen states is vulnerable to being remotely hacked, they said, claiming, “hacking just one of these machines could enable an attacker to flip the Electoral College and determine the outcome of a presidential election.” https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/27/politics/hackers-warning-midterm-elections/index.html

Video Transcript AI Summary
Former White House liaison to homeland security under President Obama, Jake, reveals how easy it was for children to hack into mock election board websites. An 11-year-old girl managed to take over a mock Florida website in under 10 minutes, altering election results. As the weekend progressed, the kids became more creative, changing names to things like "Bob the Builder" and causing further disruptions. Jake explains that the challenge was not given to adult hackers because it was deemed too easy for them. Around 50 kids participated, with almost all of them successfully changing election results or manipulating the webpage in some way.
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Full Transcript
Speaker 0: The former White House liaison to homeland security under president Obama. So, Jake, I understand you had children hacking into mock election board websites. Just how easy was it? What were they able to do? Speaker 1: Well, first of all, thanks for having me, Anna. The The 1st kid got in. It was an 11 year old girl. She got in and took over the Kind of mock, Florida website in under 10 minutes and was able to change election results, And and, you know, change the winners and losers and all that stuff. By the end of the weekend, the kids were, you know, changing people's names to, like, Bob the Builder and And, and all that kind of stuff coming up with some pretty, creative things to do to to mess with the election results. Speaker 0: You're saying children were able to do this? Speaker 1: Yeah. So the the unfortunately, it's so easy to do That we didn't put, this particular challenge in the main room where the adult hackers are hacking into voting machines because it's so easy, to hack into these websites, that they wouldn't find it interesting or fun or challenging. So we decided to give it to kids to do. And so we had about 50 kids doing it and almost all of them were able to get in and and change election results or or something else on the page.
Hackers bring stark warning about election security to Capitol Hill ahead of midterms | CNN Politics The vulnerabilities in America’s voting systems are “staggering,” a group representing hackers warned lawmakers on Capitol Hill on Thursday – just over a month before the midterm elections. cnn.com

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#52 Wired: Voting Machines Are Still Absurdly Vulnerable to Attacks (Sept. 28, 2018) “The report details vulnerabilities in seven models of voting machines and vote counters, found during the DefCon security conference's Voting Village event. All of the models are in active use around the US, and the vulnerabilities—from weak password protections to elaborate avenues for remote access— number in the dozens… "We didn't discover a lot of new vulnerabilities," says Matt Blaze, a computer science professor at the University of Pennsylvania and one of the organizers of the Voting Village, who has been analyzing voting machine security for more than 10 years. "What we discovered was vulnerabilities that we know about are easy to find, easy to re-engineer, and have not been fixed over the course of more than a decade of knowing about them. And to me, that is both the unsurprising and terribly disturbing lesson that came out of the Voting Village."… One device, the "ExpressPoll-5000," has the root password of "password." The administrator password is "pasta."… Many of the machines participants analyzed during the Voting Village run software written in the early 2000s or even the 1990s. Some vulnerabilities detailed in the report were disclosed years ago and still haven't been resolved. In particular, one ballot counter made by Election Systems & Software, the Model 650, has a flaw in its update architecture first documented in 2007 that persists. Voting Village participants also found a network vulnerability in the same device—which 26 states and the District of Columbia all currently use.” https://www.wired.com/story/voting-machine-vulnerabilities-defcon-voting-village/

Voting Machines Are Still Absurdly Vulnerable to Attacks A new report details dozens of vulnerabilities across seven models of voting machines—all of which are currently in use. wired.com

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#53 Slate: Can Paper Ballots Save Our Democracy? (Oct. 10, 2018) “The machine was an AccuVote TSX used in 18 states, some with the same software version. Attackers don't need physical access--we showed how malicious code can spread from the election office when officials program the ballot design… The Center for American Progress recently released a study that highlighted that 42 states use electronic voting machines with software a decade old or more, that leaves them especially vulnerable to hacking and malware. What’s more, five states rely solely on machines that leave no paper trail, and another 10 will use them in at least some districts. These paperless voting machines are especially problematic because even if such a machine were known or suspected to have been hacked, there’s no physical backup ballot to check it against—and therefore no way to determine for certain whether the vote an individual cast matched with the vote that the machine recorded. Worse still, some of the states with the poorest voting system security are also electoral heavyweights, including Georgia, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Florida…A growing number of voting-rights advocates and cybersecurity experts—among them organizations like the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine and Verified Voting—feel that the way forward is in a return to the past: paper ballots.” https://slate.com/technology/2018/10/paper-ballots-voting-machines-midterm-election-security-russian-hacking.html

Should You Request a Paper Ballot to Keep Your Vote Secure From Hackers? Amid fears of voting-machine hacks, some election-security experts are advocating for a return to the past. slate.com

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#54 New York Times: America's Elections Could Be Hacked. Go Vote Anyway. (Oct. 19, 2018) "In April, the nation’s top voting machine manufacturer told Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon that it had installed remote-access software on election-management systems that it sold from 2000 to 2006. Senator Wyden called it “the worst decision for security short of leaving ballot boxes on a Moscow street corner.” At a hacking convention last summer, an 11-year-old boy who had been coached on finding the vulnerabilities in a mock-up of Florida’s state election website broke into the fake site and altered the vote totals recorded there. It took him less than 10 minutes…America’s voting systems, like all large and complex computerized systems, are highly vulnerable to cyberattack — whether by altering or deleting voter registration data, or even by changing vote counts. “The vast majority of technical infrastructure for our voting is absolutely, without doubt, woefully insecure,” said Matt Blaze, a University of Pennsylvania computer-science professor who studies voting machine security. Both of the primary methods by which Americans cast their ballots — optical-scan machines and touch-screen monitors — can be tampered with fairly easily… One, provide a paper trail for every vote. Hackers work most effectively in the dark, so they love voting machines that produce no paper verification. Currently, five states — Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New Jersey, and South Carolina — run their elections entirely on paperless touch-screen machines. But all five states are considering a switch back to paper ballots in time for 2020. In this year’s midterms, 19 states and Washington, D.C., will use only paper ballots. Two, audit the vote." https://web.archive.org/web/20181118161745/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/opinion/midterm-elections-hacking.html

Opinion | America’s Elections Could Be Hacked. Go Vote Anyway. The system’s vulnerabilities are real, but please do not stay home. web.archive.org

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#55 Vox: The hacking threat to the midterms is huge. (Oct. 25, 2018) "On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the Pentagon’s [security measures], elections have probably moved from a 2 to a 3… They laid out a number of scenarios that could exploit vulnerable election infrastructure: names deleted from voter registration databases; e-poll books that send voters to the wrong precinct; malware that corrupts ballot-definition files for machines or software that governs vote tabulation, before it’s installed in various counties and precincts; or corrupted public-facing websites to announce a false winner on election night… These private companies “represent an enticing target [f]or malicious cyber actors,” according to the Senate Intelligence Report. Yet the report admits that state and federal authorities continue to “have very little insight into the cybersecurity practices of many of these vendors…Today, the American elections industry today is dominated by three companies: Dominion, Hart InterCivic, and, the largest, Election Systems and Software (ES&S). If you voted in the past 10 years, the chances are good that you used these machines (92 percent of voters do), or the myriad supportive technology required to stage an election… Much of the criticism has been directed at digital voting machines, called DREs. But election offices have become increasingly digital in other, less obvious ways: Adopting e-poll books; hauling voter registration information into state-run or third-party databases; proffering all-in-one election management suites, which program the machines and tabulate the outcomes; and building internet-based services for voters, like the precinct tally program in Knox County…  But other experts say this insistence overlooks the sophistication of nation-state attackers, who can find other creative methods for intrusion — infected USB drives, modem access, remote-access software — or, of course, infiltrating the company networks themselves, engineering direct upload malware through regular software updates…Public security audits of election technology are rare; the last major ones, commissioned by California and Ohio in 2007, were scathing. And the companies have often seemed committed to avoiding them, with one even threatening Princeton University researchers with lawsuits… In a public statement, Sen. Kamala Harris’s (D-CA) office called it “unacceptable that ES&S continues to dismiss the very real security concerns that Def Con raised.”…Two of the three largest vendors, ES&S and Hart, are owned by private equity companies whose agendas are unclear; Dominion’s headquarters isn’t even American, but Canadian… Many of the vulnerabilities election vendors have patched were previously unknown to them, instead pointed out by others. Earlier this year, security consultants flagged a “Client Web Portal” page for Dominion Voting that lacked SSL encryption. And last year, ES&S unwittingly exposed data for roughly 1.8 million Illinois voters on an Amazon server it controlled, a breach that included ES&S employee’s passwords — encrypted, but potentially crackable by an advanced adversary.” https://www.vox.com/2018/10/25/18001684/2018-midterms-hacked-russia-election-security-voting

The hacking threat to the midterms is huge. And technology won’t protect us. An investigation into the US election system reveals frightening vulnerabilities at almost every level. vox.com

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#56 Scientific American: The Vulnerabilities of Our Voting Machines (Nov. 1, 2018) “This just isn’t a good idea to have elections be conducted by, essentially, black box technology.”…The voting machines themselves have received much, much, much less scrutiny post-2016 from intelligence and defensive sides—as far as we know in the public sphere anyway. To my knowledge, no state has done any kind of rigorous forensics on their voting machines to see whether they had been compromised… One possibility is that attackers could infiltrate what are called election-management systems. These are small networks of computers operated by the state or the county government or sometimes an outside vendor where the ballot design is prepared…There’s a programming process by which the design of the ballot—the races and candidates, and the rules for counting the votes—gets produced, and then gets copied to every individual voting machine. Election officials usually copy it on memory cards or USB sticks for the election machines. That provides a route by which malicious code could spread from the centralized programming system to many voting machines in the field. Then the attack code runs on the individual voting machines, and it’s just another piece of software. It has access to all of the same data that the voting machine does, including all of the electronic records of people’s votes. So, how do you infiltrate the company or state agency that programs the ballot design? You can infiltrate their computers, which are connected to the internet. Then you can spread malicious code to voting machines over a very large area. It creates a tremendously concentrated target for attack.” https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-vulnerabilities-of-our-voting-machines/

The Vulnerabilities of Our Voting Machines Scientific American is the essential guide to the most awe-inspiring advances in science and technology, explaining how they change our understanding of the world and shape our lives. scientificamerican.com

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#57 Salon: Philly ignores cybersecurity and disability access in voting system selection (Feb. 16, 2019) "According to computer science professor Richard DeMillo of Georgia Tech, the barcodes also can be manipulated to instruct the scanners to flip votes. Adding insult to injury, these barcode systems cost about three times as much as using hand-marked paper ballots and scanners. In addition, despite initial denials, ES&S admitted last year that it has installed remote access software in central tabulators — the county computers that aggregate electronic precinct totals —  in 300 jurisdictions. Although ES&S won’t identify the 300 jurisdictions, a forensic analysis conducted in 2011 of voting equipment in Venango County, PA, revealed that someone had “used a computer that was not a part of the county’s election network to remotely access the [ES&S] central election tabulator computer, illegally, ‘on multiple occasions.’” https://www.salon.com/2019/02/16/philly-ignores-cybersecurity-and-disability-access-in-voting-system-selection_partner/

Philly ignores cybersecurity and disability access in voting system selection The Philadelphia commission has not earned much confidence when it comes to election oversight salon.com

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#58 Politico: State election officials opt for 2020 voting machines vulnerable to hacking (March 1, 2019) “Security experts warn, however, that hackers could still manipulate the barcodes without voters noticing. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine has also warned against trusting the barcode-based devices without more research, saying they “raise security and verifiability concerns.”…The replacements, known as ballot-marking devices, are “a relatively new and untested technology,” said J. Alex Halderman, a voting security expert who teaches at the University of Michigan. “And it’s concerning that jurisdictions are rushing to purchase them before even basic questions have been answered.” Many states have adopted what experts call a much more secure option — paper ballots that voters mark with a pen or pencil and that are then scanned and tallied. But election officials in Georgia, Delaware, and Philadelphia have rejected that option in favor of the barcode devices, saying they are secure enough and better suited for many voters with disabilities. Philadelphia city commissioners on Feb. 20 selected a barcode system called the ExpressVote XL from the major vendor Election Systems & Software, despite warnings about the risks. So did Delaware, which in September chose the ExpressVote XL as part of a $13 million overhaul of election equipment. Earlier this week, Georgia lawmakers advanced a bill to approve the barcode devices in a 101-72 vote that split along party lines. Democrats tended to agree with experts who have said the machines are still too vulnerable… The dispute over the ballot-marking devices centers on the fact that they use barcodes, which can be read by scanners but not by humans. Though the paper records also display a voter’s choices in plain text, which the voter can double-check, the barcode is the part that gets tallied. The danger: Hackers who infiltrate a ballot-marking device could modify the barcode so its vote data differs from what’s in the printed text. If this happened, a voter would have no way of spotting it.” https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/01/election-vulnerable-voting-machines-1198780

State election officials opt for 2020 voting machines vulnerable to hacking The new machines still pose unacceptable risks in an election that U.S. intelligence officials expect to be a prime target for disruption by countries such as Russia and China. politico.com

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#59 TechCrunch: Senators demand to know why election vendors still sell voting machines with ‘known vulnerabilities’ (March 27, 2019) “The letter, sent Wednesday, calls on election equipment makers ES&S, Dominion Voting, and Hart InterCivic to explain why they continue to sell decades-old machines, which the senators say contain security flaws that could undermine the results of elections if exploited. “The integrity of our elections is directly tied to the machines we vote on,” said the letter sent by Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Mark Warner (D-VA), Jack Reed (D-RI), and Gary Peters (D-MI), the most senior Democrats on the Rules, Intelligence, Armed Services, and Homeland Security committees, respectively. “Despite shouldering such a massive responsibility, there has been a lack of meaningful innovation in the election vendor industry, and our democracy is paying the price,” the letter adds. Their primary concern is that the three companies have more than 90 percent of the U.S. election equipment market share, but their voting machines lack paper ballots or audibility, making it impossible to know if a vote was accurately counted in the event of a bug. Yet, these are the same devices tens of millions of voters will use in the upcoming 2020 presidential election." https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/27/senators-security-voting-machines/

Senators demand to know why election vendors still sell voting machines with 'known vulnerabilities' | TechCrunch Four senior senators have called on the largest U.S. voting machine makers to explain why they continue to sell devices with "known vulnerabilities," techcrunch.com

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#60 Salon: New "hybrid" voting system can change paper ballot after it's been cast (March 28, 2019) “Unfortunately, there is no universal definition of “paper ballot,” which has enabled vendors and their surrogates to characterize machine-marked paper printouts from hackable ballot marking devices (BMDs) as “paper ballots.” Unlike hand-marked paper ballots, voters must print and inspect these machine-marked “paper ballots” to try to detect any fraudulent or erroneous votes that might have been marked by the BMD. The machine-marked ballot is then counted on a separate scanner. Most independent cybersecurity election experts caution against putting these insecure BMDs between voters and their ballots and instead recommend hand-marked paper ballots as a primary voting system (reserving BMDs only for those who are unable to hand-mark their ballots)… Unlike hand-marked paper ballots counted on scanners and regular non-hybrid BMDs,  these new hybrid systems can add fake votes to the machine-marked “paper ballot” after it’s been cast, experts warn. Any manual audit based on such fraudulent “paper ballots” would falsely approve an illegitimate electronic outcome. According to experts, the hybrid voting systems with this alarming capability include the ExpressVote hybrid by Election Systems & Software, LLC (ES&S), the ExpressVote XL hybrid by ES&S, and the Image Cast Evolution hybrid by Dominion Voting. The potential for hybrid systems to add fraudulent votes without detection was identified by Professor of Statistics Philip B. Stark of UC Berkeley, an expert in postelection manual audits, in September of last year. At the time, he told TYT Investigates that the ExpressVote hybrid, which Johnson County, Kansas, had purchased a few months before the 2018 gubernatorial primary, could be maliciously programmed or hacked to create an entirely fraudulent machine-marked “paper ballot” because the machine includes an option that allows the voter to “AutoCast” the ballot without first printing and inspecting it. Moreover, as explained by Stark, the machine does not mark the ballot at all until the voter decides whether to exercise that option, which means that the machine receives advance notice of which ballots are “AutoCast” and thus safe to fraudulently mark. Another election expert, Computer Science Professor Andrew Appel of Princeton University, subsequently confirmed the existence of this stunning defect and dubbed it “Permission to Cheat.” Appel further reported that the ExpressVote XL and Dominion ImageCast Evolution include the same defect.” https://www.salon.com/2019/03/28/new-hybrid-voting-system-can-change-paper-ballot-after-its-been-cast_partner/

New "hybrid" voting system can change paper ballot after it's been cast Paper ballots are safe only if marked by hand, not by machine salon.com

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#61 Vice: Critical U.S. Election Systems Have Been Left Exposed Online Despite Official Denials (Aug. 8, 2019) “The top voting machine company in the country insists that its election systems are never connected to the internet. But researchers found 35 of the systems have been connected to the internet for months and possibly years, including in some swing states. These include systems in nine Wisconsin counties, four Michigan counties, and in seven Florida counties—all states that are perennial battlegrounds in presidential elections. Some of the systems have been online for a year and possibly longer… The systems the researchers found are made by Election Systems & Software, the top voting machine company in the country. They are used to receive encrypted vote totals transmitted via modem from ES&S voting machines on election night, in order to get rapid results that media use to call races, even though the results aren’t final. The system that receives these votes, called an SFTP server, is connected to the internet behind a Cisco firewall… Anyone who finds the firewall online also finds the election-management system connected to it. “It is not air-gapped. The EMS is connected to the internet but is behind a firewall,” Skoglund said. “The firewall configuration [that determines what can go in and out of the firewall]… is the only thing that segments the EMS from the internet.” And misconfigured firewalls are one of the most common ways hackers penetrate supposedly protected systems. Senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) said the findings are “yet another damning indictment of the profiteering election vendors, who care more about the bottom line than protecting our democracy.” It’s also an indictment, he said, “of the notion that important cybersecurity decisions should be left entirely to county election offices, many of whom do not employ a single cybersecurity specialist.” “Not only should ballot tallying systems not be connected to the internet, they shouldn’t be anywhere near the internet,” he added…Last year, the Cisco firewalls in Wisconsin failed to receive a patch for a critical vulnerability until six months after the vulnerability had been made public and the patch was released… A New York Times story I wrote last year, however, showed that the modem transmissions do pass through the internet, and even an ES&S document that the company supplied to Rhode Island in 2015 calls the modem transmission of votes an “internet” transmission. A document for modem transmissions from voting machines made by Dominion Voting Systems—another top voting machine company in the country—similarly discusses TCP-IP and SSL, both protocols used for internet traffic. “The configurations show TCP-IP configuration and ‘SSL Optional,’ making it clear that at least the vendors know their systems are connecting through the internet, even if their election official customers do not realize it or continue to insist to the public that the systems are not connected to the internet,” Skoglund said. ES&S has been selling systems with modems to transmit results for more than a decade. Wisconsin approved the use of its current ES&S DS200 optical scan voting machines, with modem transmission capability, in September 2015, but its previous generation of ES&S optical scan machines also used modems for transmitting results. https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kxzk9/exclusive-critical-us-election-systems-have-been-left-exposed-online-despite-official-denials

Exclusive: Critical U.S. Election Systems Have Been Left Exposed Online Despite Official Denials The top voting machine company in the country insists that its election systems are never connected to the internet. But researchers found 35 of the systems have been connected to the internet for months and possibly years, including in some swing states. vice.com

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#62 NBC News: How Hackers Can Target Voting Machines (Aug. 12, 2019) "They had assembled some of the most common voting machines in the country, both systems on the front-end that you and I use to register our vote and the back-end tabulators and so forth that you feed a paper ballet into or that oversees a system... It turns out there is an extremely hostile relationship there where ES&S and Dominion and other companies have basically said we don't want to participate and have been really quite aggressive in saying we don't want to be a part of this. So the organizers were reduced to finding these machines on eBay. Which was really quite terrifying because it turns out anybody can buy some of the most commonly used machines on eBay. It's important to know that Georgia is about to spend $100 million on a contract with Dominion to provide ImageCast hardware to the state in time for the 2020 election. Yet, here these kids were who had opened it up and said, look, you can pop the front off of it, here's a port you can get in that's easy, all stuff you can do certainly do within six minutes behind a curtain much less if you had extra time because as we discovered days before so many are connected to the web... The admin password was just sitting there because it turns out the same password applies to multiple machines across the room, and those machines were created in the 2000s, which means they were, in fact, created, so you can't change that admin password. They are just locked for all time in that way... The combination of seeing the incredible vulnerabilities that we saw on display in real-time at this event and the lack of institutional action around the security of the vote all of that made for an extremely alarming weekend." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QtWP0KDx2hA

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker attended the voting village event, where common voting machines were tested. Surprisingly, major manufacturers like ES and S and Dominion did not provide the machines for testing, so organizers had to buy them on eBay. Hackers, who had never seen these machines before, easily accessed their inner workings. One machine, Dominion's image cast system, had its internals exposed. This is concerning because Georgia recently signed a $100 million contract with Dominion for the same hardware. The machines were found to have vulnerabilities, such as easily accessible admin passwords. Despite these issues, there seems to be little political will to address the security of voting machines. The speaker found the event and the lack of action on voting security alarming.
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Speaker 0: We were there specifically to attend something called the voting village which is something that's gone on for 3 years. And in this, its 3rd year, they had assembled some of the most common voting machines in the country, both systems that are on the front end that you and I use to actually register our vote and the back end, tabulators and so forth, that you would feed a paper ballot into or that oversee a system. What was so interesting was I assumed coming into it that the big manufacturers, companies like ES and S and Dominion, had provided these machines to the hackers to, you know, field test them. But no, it turns out there's an extremely hostile relationship there and that ES and S and Dominion and other companies have basically said, we don't wanna participate and and really have been quite aggressive in in saying we don't want to be part of this. So the organizers were reduced to finding these machines it on eBay, which right there is pretty terrifying because it turns out that anybody can buy some of the most common machines in use on eBay. What was really alarming was when you see these hackers and these are people who've never seen these machines before, have had no practice on them for the most part come in and and engaged them. They immediately get into the guts of them. Beyond that, we were seeing Dominion's image cast system. It's a line of tabulators that paper ballots are fed into. That had its guts all over the room. It was not clear to us whether was the most recent version of the ImageCAST hardware. But it's important to note that Georgia just spent over 100 or is about to spend over $100,000,000 on a contract with Dominion to provide image cast hardware to the state in time for the 20, for the for the next primaries and for the 2020 election. And yet here these kids were who had opened it up. They said, look, you can pop the front off of it and here's a port you can get into right here that's easy. You know, all kinds of stuff that that you could certainly do within 6 minutes behind a curtain, much less, if you had extra time because any of these were, connected to the web as we discovered couple of days before, so many of them are. So at the end of the event, voting village issues a report, and so we'll be expecting one from them. And they're very transparent about it. I mean, the the spirit of this event, was was transparency, trying to get these vulnerabilities out into the world so that I I guess the idea is the companies will be forced to correct them in some way. The front of each machine was a little Post It that showed off what had been found out by the various hires. So at one point, you know, the the admin password was just sitting there on the on there because it turns out that the same admin password applies multiple machines across the room. And those machines were were created in the 2000s, which means that they were, in fact, created so you can't change that admin password. They're just locked for all time in that way. There does not seem to be any political momentum on some of the bills that are under consideration right now around trying to keep these machines off the Internet or trying to send some sort of certifiable ballot paper ballot system or any of the other things that have been proposed. And so the combination of seeing the incredible vulnerabilities that we saw on display in real time at this event and the lack of institutional action around the security of the vote. All of that made for an extremely alarming weekend.

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#63 MIT Technology Review: 16 million Americans will vote on hackable paperless machines (Aug. 13, 2019) “Despite the obvious risk and years of warnings, at least eight American states and 16 million American voters will use completely paperless machines in the 2020 US elections, a new report by New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice found. Paperless voting machines persist despite a strong consensus among US cybersecurity and national security experts that paper ballots and vote audits are necessary to ensure the security of the next election… “Selling a paperless voting machine is like selling a car without brakes—something is going to go terribly wrong,” Wyden says. “It is obvious that vendors won’t do the right thing on security by themselves. Congress needs to set mandatory federal election security standards that outlaw paperless voting machines and guarantee every American the right to vote with a hand-marked paper ballot. Experts agree that hand-marked paper ballots and post-election audits are the best defense against foreign hacking. Vendors should recognize that fact or get out of the way.”… Backups, however, are not a silver bullet for election security. Security experts say paper ballots are so important precisely because subsequent audits are necessary, and 17 of the 42 states requiring paper do not require audits.” https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/08/13/238715/16-million-americans-will-vote-on-hackable-paperless-voting-machines/

16 million Americans will vote on hackable paperless machines Despite the obvious risk and years of warnings, at least eight American states and 16 million American voters will use completely paperless machines in the 2020 US elections, a new report by New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice found. Paperless voting machines persist despite a strong consensus among US cybersecurity and national security experts… technologyreview.com

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#64 Salon: Hackers can easily break into voting machines used across the U.S. (Aug. 14, 2019) “Voting machines used in states across the United States were easily penetrated by hackers at the Def Con conference in Las Vegas on Friday…A video published by CNN shows a hacker break into a Diebold machine, which is used in 18 different states, in a matter of minutes, using no special tools, to gain administrator-level access… Hackers also quickly discovered that many of the voting machines had internet connections, which could allow hackers to break into machines remotely, the Washington Post reported. Motherboard recently reported that election security experts found that election systems used in 10 different states have connected to the internet over the last year, despite assurances from voting machine vendors that they are never connected to the internet and, therefore, cannot be hacked. The websites where states' post-election results are even more susceptible. The event had 40 child hackers between the ages of 6 and 17 attempt to break into a mock version of the sites. Most were able to alter vote tallies and even change the candidates' names to things like “Bob Da Builder,” CNN reported…. Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., called for paper ballots that can’t be hacked. “Election officials across the country as we speak are buying election systems that will be out of date the moment they open the box,” Wyden said in a speech at the conference. “It’s the election security equivalent of putting our military out there to go up against superpowers with a peashooter.” A report by the Brennan Center for Justice at the NYU School of Law, released days after the conference, warned that 12 percent of ballots could be cast on paperless machines in 2020.  The report shows that a third of all local election systems used voting machines that were more than a decade old. “We should replace antiquated equipment, and paperless equipment in particular, as soon as possible,” the report said… Rep. Ted Lieu, D-Calif., told Politico that the federal government “has a responsibility to make sure we have strong election security all over America. "It’s stupid to have the view that states have the right to have poor election security,” Lieu said. “No state has a right to have voting machines that can be easily hacked.” https://www.salon.com/2019/08/14/hackers-can-easily-break-into-voting-machines-used-across-the-u-s-play-doom-nirvana/

Hackers can easily break into voting machines used across the U.S.; play Doom, Nirvana Hackers at the Las Vegas conference penetrated voting machines within minutes, turning them into gaming consoles salon.com

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#65 FOX News: Election machine keys are on the Internet, hackers say (Aug. 22, 2019) “I may have the keys to open voting machines used in states across the country, and that is not a good thing. I am not an election official. I am not a voting machine expert, operator, or otherwise affiliated with any federal, state, or local government agency. I am simply an investigative journalist who, upon learning that the types of keys used for these machines are apparently widely available for purchase on the Internet, was prudent enough to ask to take a few keys home as souvenirs from my recent trip to the DEF CON 27 Hacking Conference in Las Vegas. Now, I have access to machines that have been used or are currently in use in 35 different states. Swing-states, coastal icons, and the heartland, experts say…I learned about plenty of other digital backdoors and other disturbing vulnerabilities concerning U.S. election equipment at DEF CON. Like the “hidden feature” that Hursti says was only recently discovered in a machine that’s been in use and under the microscope for more than a decade. “A hidden feature that enables you to reopen the polls silently, and insert more ballots and print the new evidence of the election,” Hursti says. And despite believing that the manufacturers had learned from previously exposed vulnerabilities on that machine over the years, “these [newly discovered] features had been missed” the entire time, Hursti says. I watched Hursti explain this new discovery to Rep. Eric Swalwell, D-Calif., one of the numerous lawmakers who attended this year’s DEF CON, and whose face seemed to drop upon learning of the new revelation. That’s likely because this particular machine has been in use in his home state of California for years…One voting machine was discovered to have a password of “1111.” Better than the voter ID machine with NO password.” https://www.foxnews.com/tech/i-have-the-keys-to-your-voting-machine-probably

Election machine keys are on the Internet, hackers say I may have the keys to open voting machines used in states across the country, and that is not a good thing. foxnews.com

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#66 The Hill: Voting machines pose a greater threat to our elections than foreign agents (Oct. 2, 2019) "In 2017, the largest U.S. voting machine vendor, ES&S, exposed encrypted employee passwords online. Using those passwords, hackers could have planted malware on the company’s servers, and that malware could then be delivered to voting systems across the country with official updates. “This is the type of stuff that leads to a complete compromise,” said cyber-risk analyst Chris Vickery. Both ES&S and its main competitor, Dominion Voting Systems, have released voting machines that security experts say can add votes to paper ballots after they are cast by voters… Security experts are alarmed at internet connectivity in voting systems because it can allow hackers to inject malware that disrupts or changes the outcome of an election. Kevin Skoglund, the lead researcher of one study, confirmed that vendors "know their systems are connecting through the internet.” In August, North Carolina became the latest casualty. Voters and representatives from good-government groups pleaded with the state board of elections to adopt the type of voting system almost unanimously supported by election security experts, one that uses hand-marked paper ballots. They asked the board to reject ballot-marking devices that use barcodes and argued that hand-marked paper ballots are more secure, less expensive, and less likely to create long lines at the polls… Similar decisions have been made in Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Communities in those states have experienced frustration, and outrage and even launched investigations following certification or adoption of election systems opposed by experts, good-government groups, competing vendors, and the general public.” https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/464065-voting-machines-pose-a-greater-threat-to-our-elections-than-foreign-agents/

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#67 NPR: Cyber Experts Warn Of Vulnerabilities Facing 2020 Election Machines (Sept. 4, 2019) "The machine he's investigating is a ballot-marking device used to help people with physical impairments or language barriers vote, and it's running a version of Windows that is more than 15 years old. "These systems crash at your Wal-Mart scanning your groceries. And we're using those systems here to protect our democracy, which is a little bit unsettling," he said. "I wouldn't even use this to control a camera at my house. Or my toaster." One glaring vulnerability — which cybersecurity experts have been talking about for 20 years, and yelling about for the past decade — are paperless voting machines. Experts agree that these machines are insecure because they record votes electronically and could either be manipulated or malfunction without detection. They can't truly be audited, and they leave room for some doubt in the result. In 2016, approximately 20 percent of voters used electronic voting equipment that didn't provide a paper trail. In 2020, that number will be around 12 percent, according to a recent report from the Brennan Center for Justice." https://www.npr.org/2019/09/04/755066523/cyber-experts-warn-of-vulnerabilities-facing-2020-election-machines

Cyber Experts Warn Of Vulnerabilities Facing 2020 Election Machines America's elections infrastructure is more secure than it was four years ago, but many lingering weaknesses won't be resolved in time for Election Day next year. npr.org

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#68 Wired: Some Voting Machines Still Have Decade-Old Vulnerabilities (Sept. 26, 2019) “Today's report highlights detailed vulnerability findings related to six models of voting machines, most of which are currently in use. That includes the ES&S AutoMARK, used in 28 states in 2018, and Premier/Diebold AccuVote-OS, used in 26 states that same year… "As disturbing as this outcome is, we note that it is at this point an unsurprising result," the organizers write. "It is well known that current voting systems, like any hardware and software running on conventional general-purpose platforms, can be compromised in practice. However, it is notable—and especially disappointing—that many of the specific vulnerabilities reported over a decade earlier ... are still present in these systems today." The types of vulnerabilities participants found included poor physical security protections that could allow undetected tampering, easily guessable hardcoded system credentials, the potential for operating system manipulations, and remote attacks that could compromise memory or integrity checks or cause a denial of service. The report points out that many of these vulnerabilities were discovered years ago—sometimes more than a decade—in academic research or state and local audits. Additionally, voting machine security is only one item on a much larger punch list for better defending US elections. More districts need to implement network and cloud defenses to protect infrastructure like voter rolls and email, and more states need to conduct risk-limiting audits to verify election results.” https://www.wired.com/story/voting-village-results-hacking-decade-old-bugs/

Some Voting Machines Still Have Decade-Old Vulnerabilities The results of the 2019 Defcon Voting Village are in—and they paint an ugly picture for voting machine security. wired.com

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#69 John Oliver Breaks Down Faulty Voting Machine Security on Last Week Tonight (Nov. 3, 2019) John Oliver offered various examples of how easy it is to physically hack a voting machine (it can take only a few minutes), how easy it is to find unattended voting machines, and how flimsy the claims are that most machines are never connected to the Internet. “So, some machines that officials insist don’t connect to the Internet, actually do connect to the Internet,” Oliver said. “And even some machines that don’t connect directly to the Internet are programmed with cards that have themselves been programmed on computers that connect to the Internet." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svEuG_ekNT0

Video Transcript AI Summary
A senate report revealed that voting machines are aging and vulnerable to exploitation. A hacker demonstrated how easy it is to gain full admin access to a model used in 18 states. Professor Ed Felton documented how unattended voting machines can be manipulated by anyone. Additionally, some machines that claim not to be connected to the internet actually are, while others use cards programmed on internet-connected computers. In summary, all voting machines can be tampered with in some way. As an axe murderer once said, "pretty much everything is hackable."
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Speaker 0: A senate report found that some of our voting equipment is aging and vulnerable to exploitation by a committed adversary. So tonight, let's talk about our voting machines. Voting machines are technically computers and computers, of course, are hackable. And it can be far easier to control a machine than you might expect, as this hacker demonstrates on a model currently used in at least 18 states. Speaker 1: All they have to do this bad actor would be to open up This machine by pressing this button right here, when it's off, removing the card reader, removing this, you don't need any tools to do this. Unplugging this. Again, you don't need any tools to do this. Turning it on, all you have to do is pick this slot here with a ballpoint pen, open this up, press the red button, And we're gonna let it boot up here. Just click cancel and okay. And now I have full admin access. Under 2 minutes. Speaker 0: Holy shit. That should have been a lot more difficult. Speaker 2: Professor Ed Felton of Princeton performs an exercise every election day. He drives around Princeton to various polling locations and he follows the prominent signs that say voting here days before the election and then he takes photographs of unattended voting machines just sitting there. And that's for him to document that anybody can walk up to his voting machines and anybody can manipulate them and nobody will know. Speaker 0: So to recap, I've now shown you how to hack voting machines in less than 2 minutes and how to find unattended voting machines. Speaker 3: Are the Harris County voting machines connected to the Internet? Never. So is it ever connected to a modem? Nope. Well, the no. I say that it is a secure modem where we dial, to an old fashioned landline to the one of our 4 drop off sites. Speaker 0: But that's the Internet, Stan. You literally just described the Internet. So some machines and officials insist don't connect to the internet actually do connect to the internet. And even some machines that don't connect directly to the internet are programmed with cards that have themselves been programmed on computers that connect to the internet. The truth is, every voting machine can be tampered with in some way or other. If I may quote an extremely upbeat axe murderer, pretty much everything is hackable.
KanekoaTheGreat
Posted - August 29, 2023 at 3:20 AM
Saved - August 29, 2023 at 10:42 AM
reSee.it AI Summary
Prominent Democrats and experts warn that America's election system is vulnerable to hacking. Machines can be manipulated by dishonest employees or individuals with computer knowledge. Votes can be stolen, miscounted, or secret instructions can be inserted. Encryption algorithms and protections are deemed insufficient. The system runs on outdated operating systems, making it easily hackable. Urgent action is needed to secure the integrity of elections.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

Rep. Jerry Nadler (D-NY) in 2004: "If someone were deliberately hacking these machines, you could steal millions of votes, and no one would know it... We've documented a machine in this county that recorded 11,000 extra votes for Bush. In that county, there was counting Kerry votes for Bush... These machines are hackable. A dishonest employee of the vendor, or a dishonest employee of a local board of elections, or simply someone who knows electronics, and has a computer at home, could hack into these machines and put in secret instructions to disregard every 20th Democratic vote. Or add 10% to the Kerry or Bush vote or whatever, and you might not even know it... There was one county where on some local race or some referendum, they lost 4500 votes, the machine hiccuped, and 4500 people didn't have the votes counted... We have all these professors and these computer experts telling us that the encryption algorithms aren't sufficient. That the protections aren't sufficient. They are proprietary data, so they're kept secret, so we don't really know." Full thread below. 🧵👇

Video Transcript AI Summary
There are concerns about the security of electronic voting machines, as they can potentially be hacked without detection. While there is no evidence of this happening, it cannot be proven that it hasn't or won't happen in the future. Instances of machine errors have been reported, such as recording extra votes for a candidate or subtracting votes instead of adding them. It is unknown how many instances went unnoticed and what impact they had on elections. Legislation is being proposed to require a paper trail for every electronic machine, similar to ATM receipts, to ensure transparency and allow for verification. An investigation is also being requested to assess the effectiveness of voting machines and improve election systems.
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Speaker 0: If in fact, someone were deliberately hacking these machines, you could steal millions of votes, and no one would know it. And that's why the methodology is problematic. Now there's no evidence that happened, but you can't prove it didn't either and you can't prove it won't next time. And that's why we have to have a paper trail. I mean, we've documented, any number of people documented, A machine in this county that recorded 11,000 extra votes for Bush, in that county, there was, counting, Kerry votes for Bush, people who pushed, they touched Carrie's name would come up Bush, and they touched it again, and it would come up Bush, and they touched it a 3rd time, and finally got it right. And all kinds of things like this, 1 1 machine when we say 1 machine, these are large machines, like a half a county apparently. After it reached 3,000 votes total, every time you voted for Bush, it subtracted 1 instead of added 1. When you push, carry, it subtract 1 instead of adding 1. In all these instances were instances where they were caught. Otherwise, they wouldn't have been reported. They were caught presumably corrected. The question obviously is how many instances were not caught that we don't know about, And what, if any, impact did that have on the election, if not for president, then for county commissioner or congressman or whatever? And it's clear that we have some of these new technologies, the electronic voting, replacing the the the chads and all that, which had other problems, but there are no paper trails. And we have all sorts of testimony before the election from electronics experts that, number 1, we've seen a lot of, what I call honest glitches, where it just didn't work right, but also that these machines are hackable, that a dishonest employee of the vendor or a dishonest employee of Book of Board of Elections or simply someone who knows electronics and has a computer at home, could hack into these machines and then put in a secret instruction You need to disregard every 20th Democratic vote or add 10% to the carrier, to the Bush vote or whatever, and you might not ever know it. And the we had these warnings before the election and apparently, they're correct. And we have all these questions now and we're seeing instances of, so far as we know honest glitches that we caught. But the question arises, how many didn't we catch and how do you prevent that? Now there's legislation pending, which I'm cosponsoring, offered in the House by Rush Holt in the Senate by Hillary Clinton and others, that says that every electronic machine should have a paper trail, like an ATM machine gives you a receipt. You should when when you push the carry, let's say you vote for carry An a for Congress and b for the Senate, it should say carry a and b, you see that on the machine. It should also print a piece of paper, which you see you look at the piece of paper, You say, okay, you then press submit, it cuts off the piece of paper, drops it into a into a box. So if anybody raises questions after the election, You can, in fact, count the paper. There was 1 county where on some local race or some, referendum, they lost 45100 votes. Machine hiccup, they lost it. 45 100 people didn't have their votes counted. And we don't know if that made a difference in that referendum or local race or whatever, but the system is inherently subject to that kind of thing. So we asked for an investigation Congressman Conyers, who's the ranking Democrat on the judiciary committee and Bob Wechsler, congressman from California, and I asked the Government Accountability Office, which used to be known as the Government Accounting Office, which is the nonpartisan investigative arm of Congress, to invest it. And we we ask that they investigate the efficacy of voting machines and new technologies, how election officials responded to difficulties in counting and what we can do in the future to improve our election systems. These companies did a tremendous sales job after the, that 2000 election in Florida where where we had all those paved problems with the Chads, and everybody said get rid of these punch card machines. Find a better way to do it. Find a better way to do it. They had these products. These products weren't really quite ready, I don't think. I mean, all these we have all these professors and these computer experts telling us that the encryption algorithms are insufficient, that the protections are insufficient, their proprietary data, so they kept the secret, so we don't really know, but they wanted to sell their machines. And they did a tremendous sales job

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

MUST WATCH🚨 20 minutes of prominent Democrats, computer scientists, and election security experts warning that America's election system is online, easily hackable, and often running on Windows 7 or older operating systems. https://t.co/upFIU1g8SN

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

🚨BREAKING: Explosive video surfaces of FOX News stars Tucker Carlson, Laura Ingraham, and Sean Hannity slamming Trump's "insane" voting machine fraud allegations as "absurd," "ridiculous," and "complete BS"!

Video Transcript AI Summary
Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerabilities, and there is concern about the security of voting machines across the country. Researchers have demonstrated that these machines can be easily tampered with and hacked. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making the machines susceptible to fraud and hacking. There are concerns about the use of modems in voting machines, as they can be connected to the internet and pose a risk. Outdated software and lack of paper trails also contribute to the vulnerability of the voting systems. The potential for hacking and interference in elections is a significant concern, and the need for secure and updated voting systems is crucial.
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Speaker 0: Virginia just stopped using touchscreen computer voting because it's so vulnerable. We need to look at all the voting machines. Every secretary of state needs to be, you know, assisted in making sure that they are not being, hacked and and attacked. Speaker 1: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. Speaker 2: Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 3: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, Tools and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter of minutes. Speaker 4: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switch votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 2: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates Cybersecurity 101 directing that you install remote access software which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. These voting machines Can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 5: You could easily hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing Different things, but in fact, 3 companies are controlling this. Speaker 0: It is the individual voting machines that some pose that pose some of the greatest risk. Speaker 6: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 7: Workers were able to easily We hacked into an electronic voting machine. Speaker 2: It was possible to switch votes. 43% of American voters use voting machines That researchers have found have serious security flaws, including backdoors. Speaker 8: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know, I know the Hackathon that took place last year, where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 5: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the Capitol, where we brought in, folks who before our eyes hacked election machines. Those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 3: Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software Like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable to the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 7: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state or maybe 1 or 2 or maybe just a few counties in one I'm Speaker 9: very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through. You have 21 states that were hacked into. They didn't find out about it for a year. Right now, we have over a dozen dozen states that either don't have any backup paper ballots or only have them partially. You think that our adversaries don't know what those states are? Of course, they know what those states are. And if we have a close election In the general election, in a presidential race, and one state's out withstanding and their ballot boxes gets hacked into, their elections get hacked into, We will have absolutely no backup. Speaker 8: I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine like a computer virus and silently change election outcomes. And in every single case, we've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. Across the country, there are about 50 Two different models of machines. They fall into essentially 2 styles, ones that scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen and many of them have been analyzed now by researchers Looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case where a US voting Machine has been analyzed by by competent security researchers. They have found vulnerabilities that would let someone inject malicious software And change election data every single case. Speaker 10: The better or the more efficient way of hacking machines would be to subvert them all through the machine that's used to actually Program those machines. So prior to each election, the county election office or the voting machine vendor will actually program memory cards For that election, it tells the machine who are the candidates, what are the, you know, the contests being decided, and that gets inserted Into the voting machine. If you can alter, if you can subvert that machine that is used to program those memory cards, then you can pass, rogue software to the voting machines. Speaker 8: Voting Chains are not connected to the internet. This is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately, it's not actually true. In many new voting machines Come with, 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connected to the internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the internet right in the middle of the election potentially at the most vulnerable time? Speaker 11: Studies conducted in 2007 by the state of California, state of Ohio, state of Florida found security vulnerabilities that could take advantage of these To engineer viruses where 1 compromised voting machine could then infect eventually the entire fleet of machines for an entire county. Typically at the end of the election day you move a memory card through each of the machines in the precinct and that's to collect the vote totals. That process can spread a virus. And there are other processes. The details vary from machine to machine. Speaker 2: When you say hacked, what were they able to do once they gained access to the machines? Speaker 1: All sorts of things. They could manipulate the outcome Of the vote, they could manipulate the tally, they could delete the tally, and and they could compromise the vote in any number of ways. Speaker 12: The machines used in Georgia Have been demonstrated to be hackable through a virus that's carried on ballot definition cartridges. Very much like this Duxnet virus was, Inserted into, nuclear centrifuges in Iran. Speaker 1: There are a number of states that outsource their reporting of elections to third parties, some of which are corporations based in other countries Trees like Spain. So you've got to trust that the aggregation of the votes and the reporting of the votes is is, is accurate as well. Speaker 8: I'm Pretty sure my undergrad computer security class at Michigan could have changed the outcome of the 2016 Michigan election if we wanted to. It is that bad. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's that's why I say it's only a matter of time. Speaker 13: Unfortunately, in a lot of these systems, the audit trails are just as vulnerable as the other aspects of the system. So there may not be Good forensic evidence of a successful, intrusion. With the current design, we cannot be universally confident that it hasn't happened. And it's probably only a matter of time before it will. Speaker 3: In at least 40 states, elections are carried out using machines They're at least a decade old. And like any technology, they're susceptible to increasing failure with age. Some state officials Have had to turn to eBay to find critical components like dot matrix printers, decades old storage devices and analog modems. Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches And are thus more vulnerable to the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 4: In 2016, state election websites in Illinois and Arizona were hacked by intruders who installed malware and downloaded sensitive voter information. Speaker 6: It is worth fighting for integrity in our election system, which means that they are free From interference by a hostile or an unfriendly nation. Let's put the resources into upgrading the state's election systems. Because what we know is this. There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 5: I sit on the Senate Intelligence Committee and Senate Homeland Security Committee and we receive all kinds of information about the vulnerabilities to our national We are vulnerable in terms of foreign interference with our elections. It's my understanding that some of the election system vendors have Acquired states to sign agreements, that prevent or inhibit independent security testing. There's a saying that I'm sure many of you have heard, which is the Do you know the difference between being hacked and not being hacked? Is knowing you've been hacked. Speaker 0: And they are still looking for ways to steal information about voter registration, for example. There are some tech experts in Silicon Valley Valley with whom I have met who say that, you know, maybe what they'll do this Next time is to really disrupt the actual election. Shut down the servers that you send results to. Interfere with the operation of voting machines because still too many of them are linked to the Internet. So there we are still very vulnerable. Speaker 14: I mean, I can tell you in Virginia, when I was governor, I had to replace all the machines. Because I remember when I first voted, when I went to Richmond, moved down as governor, I remember I kept voting in the senate race, kept voting for the democrat, republican name kept coming up. Three times that happened. Speaker 15: What do you mean kept coming up? Speaker 14: So I you know, we had the touch screens. I was voting for Mark Warner, our senator, and Ed Goswami's name would light up. Happened to me 3 times. Finally, the 4th time, Mark Damon, I quickly hit vote and I got out of there. You know, all the cameras are looking at me like this guy doesn't know how to vote. I mean, what's going on? So then I had an investigation done and listen to this. I brought in some technology experts. They were able to hack into our machines from off-site in about 5 or 6 minutes. And within 4 minutes, they were able to change a vote. IDD certified all the machines. Now in Virginia, we have paper ballots. Speaker 2: 43% Of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, Including backdoors. These companies are accountable to no one. They won't answer basic Questions about their cybersecurity practices and the biggest companies won't answer any questions at all. 5 states have no paper trail, and that means there is no way to prove the numbers The voting machines put out are legitimate. So much for cybersecurity One zero one. The vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions nationwide Use election management systems that run on old software that is soon gonna be out of date And write for exploitation by hackers according to an exhaustive analysis By Speaker 0: the Associated Speaker 2: Press, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, and North Carolina, among others, are all at risk. Even the state of Georgia, which just passed legislation to buy new voting machines, is on track To buy equipment that suffers from this significant cybersecurity weakness. Let's say the election Is decided by a small percentage. And people in America Don't think that the election was fair. The effect that would have on our 200 year Experiment in self governance. Our democratic system would take a real hit. Our elections weren't secure last week, and they sure as heck aren't secure this week. And anybody who says otherwise is either selling the voting machines or simply has a malicious Intent towards our elections. At one point in the Intelligence Committee, Both sides seem to agree that no votes were changed in the 2016 election. And I said, the experts I talk to say that until you have a Forensic analysis of a vote until you go in there and scrub the whole system. You can't really say that. Speaker 16: These machines don't have a capability of providing you forensic evidence To see if they cannot prove they were honest, they cannot prove that they were have been hacked. They simply don't have the Fundamental basic capabilities of providing you that forensic evidence, that data. Only way you can see That, that machine was hacked. If the attacker wanted to be, they found that it was hacked. That's a sad truth. So anyone who says, I have information one way or another. That's an opinion. That's not tactics. Practice, it can be done without leaving trace. When you know how the systems work, Looking for the evidence, you know that you won't find it because the systems are not recording, generating, Preserving or protecting meaningful forensic evidence. And this is from the very beginning to the end of the process everywhere. These systems really don't have a capability of recording and protecting any meaningful audit information or forensically important information. So a lot of times I would also argue that even if you try to take a look into the evidence, the problem is that there is no Speaker 17: We've heard a lot from voting machine vendors and election officials that voting machines Can't be hacked because they're not connected to the internet. All of those vulnerabilities that Andrew talked about, are not a problem because no one can access the machines And it turns out that that message that they've been giving us for years and particularly after the 2016 election Just isn't true. Voting machine vendors have sold election officials on these in use of modems. In some case, the modems are embedded inside the voting machines. In other case, they're external modems that get attached to the voting machine at the end of the election. So at the end of the election, the machine goes Into shutdown mode and then this option pops up about modoming results. And so the system will automatically then dial in and send these votes over a cellular modem to a server on the Internet that collects the results. So everyone will tell you and they've told me every time I've spoken with them that cellular modems are not really internet connectivity. They will say, That doesn't mean that the machine is connected to the internet. It's using a cellular modem. Well, that's not true and Election Systems and Software, which is The top voting machine maker in the country, this is one of their statements over and over again with the public but this is one of their own diagrams that they They gave to Rhode Island in 2015. And if you see that circular part in the center there showing that that modem transmission using the wireless modem, They sit there, right there. It's on their own diagram that is going over the internet. Speaker 8: Before every election, election officials have to program the voting machines With who's on the ballot and what are the rules for counting? Well, they make that election programming on a PC workstation somewhere either at the, at the jurisdiction or at an outside vendor that does it for them. If an attacker can break into that work Station which is called an election management system. They can spread malicious code to all of the memory cards used to program all of the voting machines in the jurisdiction And those election management system workstations sometimes are connected to the internet or the data that's programmed into them passes Through an internet connected system. So we're just 1 or 2 hops away from an online attacker. So if I wanted to break into this company, let's say I was the attacker, I'd Probably start by forging an email from, let's say, Larry, the president here, to Sue, his administrative assistant, Asking her to urgently open an attachment. Now, of course, when she does, that attachment has my malware in it. I have a, foothold into their network And I can try to spread from there to the election management system and to the voting machines in most of the state. Pampering with the national election result in my country It's easier than well easier than even I thought in 2016. I keep learning things that convince me that the situation is scarier than, than even Fertz had thought, You identify the states that are most weakly protected and going to be close. Target the computers that are going to program voting machines there, spread malware to machines to change a fraction of the votes And then rely on the fact that most states even if they have a paper record are not going to rigorously use it to check that the computers are right. But the fact is that in close national contests in the US, the result really only hinges on the result in a small number of States. You've heard about the swing states in any given election. The ones that are, really competitive. In such a situation an attacker can, before the election, identify which states are likely to be close. Try probing all of them In the way that the Russians did the voter registration systems in 2016 and just find the weakest swing states and attack there. So in this way, the American system converts, diversity of implementation Into basically this patchwork of strength and weakness that gives attackers a menu of possible places to strike. It makes us weaker in close elections. Speaker 18: Modems in voting machines are a bad idea. Those modems are network connections. And that leaves them vulnerable to hacking by anybody who can connect To that network. Speaker 19: ES and S insists while there are 14,000 of its modems in use, there are firewalls separating those modems from the public Internet. Speaker 18: Once the hackers starts talking to the voting machine through the modem, they can hack the software in the voting machine And make it cheat in future elections. Speaker 20: What is the vehicle for the transmission from the ICP? Is it cellular modem versus VPN? Speaker 15: Well, it is a cellular modem that Speaker 8: the can be configured in a VPN. Right? And we currently in Chicago and Cook County, we work with Verizon to, Secure that network. What wireless chipset slash modem does the hardware have? We support a variety. So, it's really up to the jurisdictions what technology they wanna use, what's compatible with their with their networks. Speaker 15: Currently, in some jurisdictions, we're using, basically, a modem that is a three d modem, GSM, but we can support multiple Variety support and protection. Speaker 8: Including including latest four gs standards. Speaker 20: So the answers to the next question is the three gs or four gs. Verizon 8 tier Do you're Sprint consuming all? Speaker 16: Oh, yeah. All all networks. Right. Speaker 8: Discuss quite a bit. Yeah. I mean, we actually transmit from the ICP in Mongolia as well. So, we're not committed in networks. Speaker 15: And in Puerto Rico, there's 3 vendors because the island is not covered by any by any of the vendors With this, we use 3 different cellular vendors for some ICPs. With this vendor, Claro, ATMC, and T Mobile, I might say, in the different parts Speaker 16: More modern voting machines, they actually have a mobile phone modem. In to speak, they have a they have mobile phone our mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters, they are sending the results. Speaker 1: Some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election To results using cellular modems or, the Internet that of course introduces another point of vulnerability, not just to the data that's flowing, But also it's the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Speaker 10: Many of these voting machines have modems embedded into them. And the modems are to transmit the vote totals on election night to the county, elections office. So these modems contact, they're cellular modems and they Contact the cellular network, to contact the cell tower. So the cell tower traffic these days in our modern times actually goes through Internet. It goes through the same Kinds of routers and switches not the regular internet traffic comes to but also, in between that cell tower and that voting machine, an intruder Can, intercept data going to the cell tower and intercept that that communication, that phone call. If you can trick a voting machine into, contacting In your device your fake cellular tower instead of a legitimate tower you can actually use that connection to get back into the voting machine and get back into the tabulator, and then alter votes and software. Speaker 8: So just to review, you look at the polls before the election and figure out which states were likely to be close. Probe all of them. Find the ones with the weakest protection. Then hack into the, election management systems there or at the outside vendors the states use. Once you hack into the election management system, can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and have your code say swap 10% of the votes in the places you infected.
SpudMEMES
Posted - August 29, 2023 at 4:56 PM
Saved - August 29, 2023 at 10:20 PM

@SpudMEMES - 🥔Memes 𝕏

Did you know Tyler was hacked right before the election of 2020? Tyler + Election Data + Clerks = Big Steal But what do I know…. I’m just a

FreyjaTarte
Posted - November 17, 2023 at 1:09 PM
Saved - November 21, 2023 at 4:20 PM

@FreyjaTarte - Freyja™

Here is 2 minutes of Democrats revealing their distrust for voting machines. https://t.co/EwzkfsyJnC

Video Transcript AI Summary
Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines in minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in different states, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of voting machines used by American voters. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close election.
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Speaker 0: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. For researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 1: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools, and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter of minutes. Speaker 2: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 0: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cybersecurity 101, directing that you install remote access software, which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 3: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 2: You could easily hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are Doing different things, but in fact, 3 companies are controlling that. It is the individual voting machines that some pose that pose some of the greatest risks. Speaker 4: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 3: Workers were able to easily hack into electronic voting machine. Speaker 0: It was possible to switch votes. 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, including backdoors. Speaker 5: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year, where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 4: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues Here at the capitol, where we brought in, folks who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 1: Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable to the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 3: In a close presentary election, they just need to hack 1 swing state. Or maybe 1 or 2. Or maybe just a few counties in 1 swing stayed. Speaker 2: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through.
listen_2learn
Posted - December 11, 2023 at 11:34 PM
Saved - December 13, 2023 at 1:52 AM
reSee.it AI Summary
If a cyber attack occurs next year, our government will likely be blamed, just like in the 2020 election theft. They may attribute it to "the Russians" or others, as usual. Wikileaks Vault 7 reveals the CIA's extensive efforts to infect and control Microsoft Windows users with malware.

@listen_2learn - The Researcher

If there is a cyber attack next year, our government is responsible, just like they were for stealing the 2020 election. They will blame it on “the Russians”, or whomever, per usual. https://t.co/lkhG2QFB4G

Video Transcript AI Summary
A cyber attack can be blamed on any nation state or group, as revealed by WikiLeaks before Julian Assange's arrest. The WEF partnership against cybercrime, which includes US intelligence and other agencies, has the ability to frame any actor in a hack. They aim to regulate the internet and tie everyone's access to a digital ID, allowing intelligence agencies to monitor online activities. To convince people of the need for this, a major disruptive event caused by anonymous hackers can be manufactured. Israeli and British intelligence, along with the US Secret Service, FBI, and Department of Justice, are involved, as well as major banks and tech companies. The group also seeks to merge banking, regulatory, and intelligence operations under the pretext of cybersecurity.
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Speaker 0: Well, a cyber attack happen, and you can literally blame any any nation state or group, for that hack. And we know this because of what WikiLeaks published right before Julian Assange was completely silenced and then later, arrested and dragged out of the Ecuadorian embassy in London, Vault 7, which revealed things like the umbridge program among other things that US intelligence and other intelligence agencies that are affiliated with this WEF partnership against cybercrime have the ability to place the fingerprints of any nation state actor they wish, including Russia, China, Iran, and really North Korea, any other group, as well, not just nation states, put their fingerprints in a hack they actually commit themselves. And this is very significant because this offers, you know, these intelligent agencies unprecedented ability to have, to conduct false flag operations in the cyber realm. And this group, specifically, has a lot of solutions aside from, you know, things with the banking system that They cannot really justify implementing unless there is some sort of large cyber attack. So what is the WEF partnership against cybercrime want? They're very open that they want a regulated Internet, and they're essentially seeking a policy that was, efforts were made to implement during the Obama administration in the US. They called it a driver since for the Internet. So, essentially, what this, public private partnership that the WEF is pushing for is for every person's access to the Internet to be tied to a digital ID, or a government issued ID, but presumably a digital ID just because of where government issued ID programs are all, going essentially around the world. And the goal of that, of course, if your ID is linked to your Internet access, intelligence agencies know exactly what media you are consuming, in terms of, you know, what you read and also what you post online. And that has been the goal for a very, very long time. People aren't necessarily going to consent to that unless, they are made to believe that anonymity and privacy online are dangerous. So, how exactly can you convince people that that needs to happen? Well, you have some sort of event where anonymous hackers, do something online that causes major disruption globally, and then the consent can be manufactured through fear and panic as as is often done, that anonymity and privacy needs to be eliminated, that we need to know exactly who is doing what online to prevent a calamity of that scale from ever happening again. And this is the exact solution that these guys have been cooking for a very long time. And the intelligence agencies involved are Israeli intelligence, British intelligence, and then the US Secret Service, FBI and Department of Justice. And you have several of the biggest banks in the country, like Bank of America, involved directly with this group, as well as major US tech companies like Microsoft and Amazon, partnered with all of this. And, this is exactly what they're seeking, and they have all the tools to allow something like this, to happen. And when you have the fact that some of these actors want a re a war where the US, for example, goes to war with Iran, among other things, and they have the ability to attribute, you know, cyber attacks of any scale to any entity at all. And, This is a big problem because when these alleged hacks take place, whether it's blamed on Russia, Iran, or China, the headline will blame these countries. But if you actually read The article itself, they don't actually have the evidence to make that case. They say, we believe it's this country, or that it's a group affiliated with this country. And their reasoning ranges from, you know, they'll say things like we have medium probability that it's, you know, they're tied to Iran. And, you know, all these, you know, phrases that show that they don't actually have evidence. And then there's an effort to manufacture consent, potentially for military action based on based on all of this stuff. So it's definitely very alarming, and people should be paying attention to it when you consider that you have the biggest banks involved, the biggest intelligence agencies, and some of the biggest tech companies in the world. And another thing that this WEF group group is is seeking, is for banks, banking regulators, and intelligence agencies to essentially fuse their operations under the guise of cybersecurity. And the more you think about that, the more insane it is. I mean, it's just an insane policy.

@listen_2learn - The Researcher

https://t.co/zMj4RQ5QBE

@listen_2learn - The Researcher

From Wikileaks Vault 7: “The CIA also runs a very substantial effort to infect and control Microsoft Windows users with its malware.”

DGrayTexas45
Posted - December 26, 2023 at 11:26 PM
Saved - December 28, 2023 at 8:41 PM

@DGrayTexas45 - David Gray

@LeadingReport @lynda62560 Election Commissioner Bennie Smith shows how easy it is to manipulate the software in the voting machines to determine who wins and what percent of the vote they will get. https://t.co/X2NquMEmlJ

Video Transcript AI Summary
In this video, the speaker discusses a governor's race and the use of a program called "fraction magic" to manipulate the results. They mention a candidate named Basil who initially had only 219 votes, but they plan to manipulate the allocation rules to make him the winner. The speaker demonstrates how the program works by injecting new allocation rules into 80,000 votes. They emphasize that they are not a thief but are demonstrating an ethical swap. At the end, they reveal that the new winner of the race is Basil.
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Speaker 0: So the 1st race is a governor's race. It's if you guys look at the total, 212 votes. And this is the representation of the real totals. This is actually what actually happened in Shelby County. Well, what what was reported in Shelby County. This is basically what people in Shelby County see and anybody across that universe. So we're gonna we're gonna work for the governor's race. Who would you like the winner to be? I really think the name Basil is interesting, so we're gonna go with Basil. Well, he's he's only got 219 votes. You think we can pull that off? Time. Basil is like a season in or something like, we will season his votes to make him the winner. Okay. So, I'm gonna open fraction magic. It is largely unnoticeable. It is running. It's in the top right corner, and you can't see it. I mean, you can try to see if you see it. So the way I designed the program is to kind of hide in plain sight. So So just watch my cursor though. If you follow my cursor. You see a change? Can you see it went from a from a you see it went from time. So I'm gonna type this, code in that brings up now everything you're gonna see, they're gonna be in black boxes. I did this collaboration with Black Box Voting .org. So I made everything in black boxes so you know what is not in the application and what is the application that I designed. So to I'll open it up. It's basically reading the voting database to tell me, everybody's running. So these are these are the options. Team. Again, this is what, Appel was was was was was explaining that once a person get in, they can just just hijack the system and take over. So I thing. You said Basil? Okay. So let's take, we'll make Joe Kirkpatrick come in 2nd place. And you said Basil is gonna be the winner. So Joe Kirkpatrick is always got a low vote total too. So he's gonna he's gonna do have have a good night too. So So basically these are the allocation rules that I I preloaded these allocation rules. So each precinct, each polling location, he is going to win 37 tent. And Joe Kirkpatrick is gonna get 46% of everything that remains, and this one has some complexity in there where you can see it, where I'm I'm changing the allocation rules. Because this is it's gotta mimic realistic results. Right? And it's it's it's pretty realistic. So team. We're gonna come out of this. And I'll open the program again, because now I'm gonna run it. And I'm gonna I'm gonna inject those allocation rules into 80,000 votes. 77,000 votes. Alright. So I'll run it again. This time I'm gonna type a different code. And if you guys want to look at this thumb drive is gonna I always use the thumb drive, because everybody says, well, it's a thumb drive. We checked it. No. Time. That sound good, but everybody's gotta use some type of media to do something. So this thing is gonna for about maybe 10 seconds, but it's gonna go through it's team. It's gonna go through the whole thing like a peanut butter sandwich. So I'm a I'm a type the code in. 1 1,000, 2 1,000, 3 1,000, 4 1,000, 5 1,000, 6 1,000, 7 1,000, 8. So 8 seconds didn't make me look bad, and this is an ethical swap, so I know y'all, I'm, I'm not a thief. I'm representing 1, but I'm not a thief. Alright. So everything is still still up. So now we gotta see what the new totals are. Right? So tilts. Alright? So we now have a new winner. And our winner is going to be
DrEtiquette
Posted - December 29, 2023 at 3:02 AM
Saved - December 29, 2023 at 5:53 PM

@DrEtiquette - DR. ETIQUETTE 🤦‍♂️

Remember when they told us that voting machines weren’t connected to the internet? 🤦‍♂️ https://t.co/UgW93VwdkD

Video Transcript AI Summary
Contrary to the current political narrative, the speaker emphasizes that voting machines are not connected to the internet and the Department of Homeland Security claims the 2020 election was secure. However, in 2018, there were instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes. The speaker mentions that hackers were able to breach these machines easily, even with limited knowledge and resources. They also mention the concern of remote access software making the machines vulnerable to fraudsters and hackers. The speaker then addresses the controversy surrounding Dominion, stating that there were no switched or deleted votes involving their machines and that the company has no ties to communism or China. However, there are concerns that some machines may be connected to the internet despite being designed as closed systems.
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Speaker 0: Contrary to the current political narrative, the election systems and their equipment were connected to the Internet, making them infinitely hackable. Voting machines themselves are not connected to the Internet. No voting machines are connected to the Internet. The devices are not connected to the Internet. Speaker 1: They do not connect to Speaker 0: the Internet. Those things are not connected To the Internet, the Department of Homeland Security says the 2020 election was the most secure in American history. The 2020 election was the most secure in US history. That's what they say now, but just a short while ago, the political narrative was very different. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from 1 candidate to another. We brought in, folks who, before our eyes, hacked election Machines. Workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. It was possible to switch votes. Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, Tools and resources are able to breach phoning machines in a matter of minutes. Speaker 1: Remote access software, which would make a machine like that, You know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Unfortunately, Dominion has recently been thrust into the national spotlight As part of a dangerous and reckless disinformation campaign aimed at sowing doubt and confusion over the 2020 presidential election. 1st, there were no switched or deleted votes involving Dominion machines. Dominion is not and has never been a front for communists. The company also does not have any ties to China whatsoever, including no ties, including investment Or source code transfer. Let me be clear, modem systems are by design meant to be used as closed systems that are not networked, Meaning that they are not connected to the Internet. Sounds like some of these machines are showing the tabulators can and and are connected to the Internet.
KanekoaTheGreat
Posted - December 29, 2023 at 8:15 PM
Saved - December 29, 2023 at 8:20 PM
reSee.it AI Summary
ES&S voting machines have been connected to the internet, as reported by NBC News and the New York Times. ES&S admitted to installing remote access software on their election management systems. All computerized voting equipment is vulnerable to hacking, especially if connected to the internet. The authoritarian left's goal of censoring dissidents is problematic, as it perpetuates election disinformation. Shenna Bellows is accused of censoring citizens and disenfranchising Maine's citizens.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

.@shennabellows says America is experiencing an epidemic of election disinformation, citing a claim that ES&S voting machines are connected to the internet in Kentucky. There's only one problem. On January 10, 2020, NBC News reported that ES&S was utilizing 14,000 modems to establish internet connections for voting machines, including in the State of Kentucky. In February 2018, the New York Times detailed ES&S's installation of remote access software on their election management systems. Further damning evidence surfaced in March 2018 when ES&S admitted, in a letter to Senator Ron Wyden, that remote access software had indeed been installed on their election management systems. Furthermore, all computerized voting equipment can be hacked because all such equipment must receive programming before each election from memory cards or USB drives prepared on election management systems, which are often old computers connected to the internet running out-of-date versions of Windows. Computers are hackable. Suppose a county election management computer is infected with malware. In that case, the malware can spread from that system to the USB drives, transferring it to all the voting machines, optical scanners, and tabulators that collect, count, and determine election results for that county. All of these problems are exacerbated by manufacturers, having also installed remote-access software and cellular modems connecting voting machines directly to the internet. This is the problem with the authoritarian left's goal of censoring dissidents, critics, and their political opposition. Shenna Bellows would censor American citizens from telling the truth about real election vulnerabilities while she perpetuates an epidemic of election disinformation. Not to mention, she disenfranchised half of Maine's citizens by unilaterally deciding they can't vote for their leading presidential candidate.

Video Transcript AI Summary
In this video, the speakers discuss the risks associated with modems in voting machines. They highlight concerns about hacking and the potential for cheating in future elections. ES&S, a voting machine manufacturer, claims that their modems are separated from the public internet by firewalls. However, last summer, ES&S voting systems were found online in some precincts across 11 states. Cellular modems are commonly used to transmit election results, but this introduces vulnerabilities. Intruders can intercept data between the cell tower and voting machines, allowing them to alter votes and software. Despite claims that voting machines are not connected to the internet, many new machines have wireless modems for faster result uploads, raising concerns about their security during elections.
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Speaker 0: So we here in this country are experiencing an epidemic of disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation. In the United States. Put an allegation about elections in Kentucky and ES and S machines and what the machines might be doing. Well, we use ES and S machines right here in Maine. The U. S. Market. Where machines are tested at the state level and at the local level. So that was an example of disinformation coming from people So that otherwise I completely agree with. But the fear that one might have about what's happening in another state might lead you to believe disinformation. Speaker 1: Modems in voting machines are a bad idea. Those modems are network connections, and that leaves them vulnerable to hacking by anybody who can connect that network. Speaker 2: ES and S insists while there are 14,000 of its modems in use, there are firewalls separating those modems from the Public Internet. Speaker 1: Once a hacker starts talking to the voting machine through the modem, they can hack the software in the voting machine And make it cheat in future elections. Speaker 2: Last summer, Skoglund's team found ES and S voting systems online in at least Some of the precincts in 11 states, including the battleground states of Florida, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Speaker 1: What is the vehicle for the transmission from the ICP? Is it Cellular modem versus VPN? Speaker 3: It is a cellular modem that can be configured in a VPN. Right? And we, Currently, in Chicago and Cook County, Speaker 4: we work with Verizon to, secure that network. Speaker 3: More modern voting machines, they actually have a mobile phone Modem, in the speak, they have a they have a mobile phone mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters. They are sending the results. Speaker 4: Some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election results using cellular modems or, the Internet. That, of course, introduces another point of vulnerability, not just To the data that's flowing, but also to the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Speaker 5: Many of these voting machines have modems embedded into them. And the modems are used at the end of the election To transmit the vote totals on election night to the county elections office. So these modems contact their cellular modems, and they contact the cellular network, they contact the cell tower. So the cell tower traffic these days, in our modern times, actually goes through internet. It goes through the same kinds of routers and switches that the regular internet traffic goes to. But also, in between that cell tower and A voting machine, an intruder can, intercept data going to the cell tower, and intercept that communication, that phone call. If you can trick a voting machine into, contacting your device, your fake cellular tower, instead of a legitimate tower, you can actually use that connection to get back into the voting machine, and get back into the tabulator, and then alter votes and software. Speaker 4: Machines are not connected to the Internet. This is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately, it's not actually true. Many new voting machines come with, 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connected To the Internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me, that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the Internet right in the middle of the election, potentially at the most vulnerable time?
Video Transcript AI Summary
Before every election, voting machines need to be programmed with the ballot design and candidate names. This is done by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker infects the memory card with malicious code, it can change the programming on the voting machine and manipulate the election results. The election programming workstation, called an election management system, is often connected to the internet, making it vulnerable to hacking. In Michigan, during the 2016 election, 75% of counties outsourced their pre-election programming to just three small companies, making it relatively easy to target voting machines. By hacking into the election management system, an attacker can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and manipulate the votes without detection.
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Speaker 0: The way these attacks work is that before every election, every voting machine needs to be programmed with the design of the ballot, the names of the races and candidates. And voting officials do that by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker can infect that memory card with malicious code? Well, when the memory card is inserted into the machine, it can change the programming running on the voting machine, and cause the voting machine to, at the end of the election, output whatever results the attacker wants. That ballot programming is created on basically a desktop PC, a workstation somewhere, operated by the county, or by an outside vendor. If an attacker can infect that election programming workstation called an election management system, And in many cases, these are connected to the Internet. Well, then that attack can spread to all of the memory cards that are used to program voting machines in that jurisdiction. And, sorry, how easy would it be to hack into one of these? Well, I'll give you an example. In Michigan, during the 2016 election, 75% of counties outsource their pre election programming to just 3 small companies. This is the website for one of them. It's a small business that's operated essentially in a strip mall. And, they have photographs on their website of all of their facilities, even all of their employees. If I wanted to try to hack into these guys, well, maybe I'd go to their Who We Are page, find, Larry, the President's assistant, Sue, and spoof an email to her that appears to be coming from Larry, telling her to urgently open this attachment. Of course, the attachment contains a virus, I wrote. And once she opens it, I'm in their systems. So in fact, it's not nearly as hard as it might seem to target, voting machines over a wide scale, and to potentially hack into them, even from the Internet. So just to review, you look at the polls before the election and figure out which states were likely to be close. Probe all of them. Find the ones with the weakest protection. Then hack into the election management systems there, or at the outside vendors the states use. Once you hack into the election management system, you can spread malicious code to individual voting machines, and have your code say, swap 10% of the votes in the places you infected. Then even if the votes are also recorded on a piece of paper, you don't have to worry. Because in most of those states, they're going to just toss the paper out without looking at it.
TrumpDailyPosts
Posted - February 17, 2024 at 3:25 AM
Saved - February 17, 2024 at 2:32 PM

@TrumpDailyPosts - Donald J. Trump Posts From His Truth Social

ELECTION INTERFERENCE! https://t.co/MVZJHcr1lH

Video Transcript AI Summary
This is a corrupt case involving a $355 million fine in New York. The speaker criticizes the judge, Leticia James, and Biden, claiming it's a political witch hunt. They defend their company's integrity, tax payments, and employment impact. The speaker vows to appeal, accusing the judge of undervaluing assets and using the case for political interference. They assert they're targeted due to their presidential campaign success. The speaker concludes by promising to make America great again.
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Speaker 0: For the amount, but this is a very dishonest man. This is a man that's been overturned already on this case four times. But a crooked New York state judge just ruled that I have to pay a fine of $355,000,000 for having built the perfect company. Great cash, great buildings, great everything. It affects New York. It's mostly talking about New York where we have a totally corrupt attorney general. She campaigned on the fact that I will get Trump. I will get Trump. Everybody's seen it. Leticia James. They've all seen it. Well, we'll be appealing, but more important than that, this is Russia. This is China. This is the same game. All comes out of the DOJ. It all comes out of Biden. It's, witch hunt against his political opponent, the likes of which our country has never seen before. You see it in 3rd world countries, banana republics, but you don't see it here. So I just wanna say this. You build a great company. There was no fraud. The banks all got their money, 100%. They love Trump. They testified that Trump is great great customer, one of our best customers. They testified beautifully, and the judge knows that. He's just a corrupt person, and we knew that from the beginning. We knew it right from the beginning because he wouldn't give it to the commercial division. This judge thought Mar a Lago is worth $18,000,000 and it's worth anywhere from 50 to a 100 times that amount. So we realized that. He ruled against me before he even got the case. He ruled against me. He said I was guilty. He didn't know what I was guilty of before he even got the case. And Leticia James, that's another case altogether. She's a horribly corrupt attorney general, and it's all having to do with election interference. There were no victims because the banks made a lot of money. They made a $100,000,000. And by the way, I paid approximately $300,000,000 in taxes as the migrants come in and they take over New York. I paid over this period of years over $300,000,000 in taxes and they want me out. Oh, let's see if we can get them out. These are radical left Democrats. They're lunatics, and it's election interference. So I just wanna thank you for being here. We'll appeal. We'll be successful. I think because frankly, if we're not successful, New York State is gone. People are moving out of New York State. And because of this, they're gonna move out at a much faster rate. They used a statute. It's a consumer fraud statute that's never been used for a thing like this before. They used it on me because I'm running for president. I'm beating Biden by a lot. We're beating not only the Republicans, we're beating Biden by a lot. The poll came out today, we're up 20 points on Biden. If I weren't running, none of this stuff would have ever happened. None of these lawsuits would have ever happened. Nothing would I would have had a nice life, but I enjoy this life for a different reason. We're gonna make America great again. These are corrupt people. These are people that shouldn't be allowed to do the things they do, and they're using this as weaponization against a political opponent who's up a lot in the polls and always will be because I'm competing with a man who can't put 2 sentences together, who doesn't know what he's doing. And we're heading into a 3rd world war because of this guy. We have to win this election. They're doing everything possible to step in a way, but we're not gonna stand for it. So thank you very much. We will get back to work. It's a ridiculous award. Listen, a fine of $355,000,000 for doing a perfect job, for having paid back a loan with no defaults, with no problems. The banks were totally you know, at the trial, they testified. We had an expert witness from the Stern School at NYU that made a statement. He and I was very honored by his statement. He's one of the most respected people anywhere in the country for doing this kind of thing, expert wisdom. He said, this is one of the greatest financial statements I have ever witnessed before and he talked about even the detail. So my numbers actually were extremely conservative. They saw this. So what the judge did is he brought down certain values like Mar a Lago, made it ridiculous. But the expert, after having all of this, testified one of the best financial statements he's ever seen, and I was honored by that. But I also knew we have a corrupt judge. He's not a respected man. And again, I said before, he's been overturned on this case by the appellate division 4 times already. It's a record. Nobody's ever been overturned on one case 4 times. And I think very importantly, and I think, ultimately, the most important, we've employed tens of thousands of people in New York and we paid taxes like few other people have ever paid in New York and they don't care about that. They it's a it's a state that's going bust. It's a state that's going bust because everybody's leaving and it's all headed up by Biden who's destroying our country. So this is Russia. This is China. This is what you've been reading about all your lives, and it's happening right here in our country. Thank you very much. We will stop it. We will make America great again. You have my word. Thank you very much.
theblaze
Posted - April 25, 2024 at 2:02 AM
Saved - April 25, 2024 at 7:27 PM

@theblaze - TheBlaze

🚨We were made aware of an alleged vulnerability in Dominion voting systems that was mentioned in a federal court case. We asked a cyber security expert with knowledge of the allegation to attempt to recreate what was described and screen record the entire process. They did. https://t.co/2y17nqHDaJ

Video Transcript AI Summary
A vulnerability in Dominion Voting Systems was highlighted in a federal court case, raising concerns about election security. Experts found potential vulnerabilities in Georgia's Dominion system, with claims of critical vulnerabilities to hacking. The alleged vulnerability involves an encryption key being easily accessible, allowing total control over an election. A cybersecurity expert recreated the process, showing how election files could be decrypted. Despite the seriousness of the issue, Georgia officials deemed upgrading the system unrealistic until after the 2024 elections. The need for addressing vulnerabilities in election systems is emphasized for ensuring secure elections.
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Speaker 0: We were recently made aware of an alleged vulnerability in the Dominion Voting Systems. It was mentioned in a federal court case. I have to tell you, I didn't even know how to begin to have a discussion on this. I'll start with this. We are not accusing Dominion of anything. We are not saying that this alleged vulnerability has ever been used or existed. In fact, I've got a been there, done that, got the t shirt. I have another t shirt for you. We're not even saying that this will be used to manipulate the next election. We are doing one thing. We are highlighting something that was alleged in a federal court. We haven't seen anyone dispute it or even talk about the alleged vulnerability. Now it shouldn't matter what side you're on. It shouldn't matter if you work for Dominion or any other voting machine company. You, me, everyone, we all want a secure election. We want there to be confidence on all sides when we vote. Talking about potential issues gets us closer to those goals. And asking questions used to be something that the both the left and the right agreed together that we should be doing. I'm gonna show you a transcript of a conversation on PBS regarding Georgia's voting machines. 2 of the experts, Alex Halderman and Harry hoo Hursti, said that they were potential, vulnerabilities that attackers could take advantage of. Said that Georgia's system was complicated and it doesn't seem to have any safeguards. If you're curious, Georgia's system is Dominion, the same system mentioned in the recent petition. Now the alleged vulnerability is different, but here they are all freely talking about it. Take a look at this transcript. It was October 2020. Why why was it okay for both sides to talk about it then, but hardly anyone will do it now? Harry is somewhat of a legend in the community that searches for vulnerabilities in electronic voting systems. He was featured in an HBO documentary explaining how he hacked a Diebold vote a voting machine back in 2005 using a single memory card. I'll tell you the results of that hack later on in the program. But that election system, Diebold, was later bought in 2010 by Dominion. We don't know if this software is still in use but the HBO documentary website mentioned that as of several years ago, it was. Still used or not used? There is an interesting history here. The other expert featured in that PBS piece was Alex Halderman. Last year, he was given access last year to the Georgia Dominion Voting Machines to see if he could find any vulnerabilities, and he did. Alderman found Dominion's machines in Georgia are quote, critically vulnerable to hacking, vulnerable to vote switching. Dominion countered that the hack was unrealistic, but federal authorities found the same vulnerabilities and more than 20 cybersecurity experts backed up Halderman's findings. Now there was never any evidence that this was taken advantage of in an election. The worry is that this could be abused in first future elections. So this is actually a good story. Everyone seems to be in agreement that the hack is possible and we know about it in advance. So it should be easily fixed. Right? All you have to do is upgrade the system before November and it's over. Well, not so fast. Quote, some of the issues could be mitigated by upgrading the Dominion software, but Georgia officials say the upgrade is unrealistic. An enormous undertaking they won't start until after the 2024 elections. What? I mean, I hate to say that this gives the appearance that they're not taking the election security seriously. That's quite a quote. I only point out these recent vulnerabilities to show you that they have been found before. And that not only that but the experts and the media used to talk about them all the time. Why is no one talking about this recent alleged vulnerability that was part of a suit petition to the Supreme Court but ultimately waived? Probably because the case was brought forth by Carrie Lake and it was waived off by the Supreme Court just this week. I didn't even wanna touch this case at first because I didn't want this to look like something that was, you know, for or against Kary Lake or Donald Trump or anything. I don't want to look backward. The past is the past, but we must fix the system if there's a problem. There was one specific allegation in the court documents that caught my eye. It was so technical and specific, I hadn't seen it anywhere. But this is an excerpt from the lawsuit that describes the alleged vulnerability. This is public, and that's one reason why we wanted to do this show. You can read this for yourself, but I have to warn you. The nerd speak sounds like a mixture of Greek combined with Japanese. This is not something anyone and everyone could do. Luckily, I have my nerd speaker decoder ring. In a nutshell, here's what it describes. It describes how Dominion's democracy suite systems encrypt their data. An encryption key is needed to access the critical data. Some call it the god key. It should be kept encrypted itself. But in the allegation described in the lawsuit, it claims that on some Dominion machines, it's not. The allegation claims that the encryption key can easily be secured for on the system, and that the only security safeguard is logging into Windows. This petition that makes this claim from March claims that malicious a malicious actor could use this to, quote, gain total access and control over an election, end quote. When you go to vote and you get a ballot, you mark your selections of the voting machine. And when you're finished, the machine prints the vote. You take that to a tabulator. An election official scans the ballot into the tabulator and records your vote. The information is later saved to a memory card, and that is taken to a computer. That computer is where this alleged vulnerability is claimed to be. How many people in the election office have access to that computer? What if the only guy with the key in that office is malicious? What if someone broke in? Now clearly, this does not appear to be something that anyone could pull off. People without the proper skill could not do this. I couldn't do this. But what's being alleged would take some expertise, but appears that maybe the court filing described this alleged vulnerability as, quote, a bank telling the public that they have the most secure vault in the world and then taping the combination of the vault on the wall next to the door. I'm gonna show you some video here and some long disclaimers. Why don't you take the disclaimer? Because we asked a cyber security expert with knowledge of this allegation to attempt to recreate what was described in the court case. Could they do it? We asked them if they could use the same Dominion software and then asked if they could screen record the entire process. So they did. Disclaimer and then I think we have another disclaimer coming up. Yeah. So in the additional disclaimer. Okay. This is the Microsoft admin computer. So you would log in here, put your password in, it would open up to this then you would go into the tabulation. Okay. Database does not require additional password once the viewer is logged into Windows. Okay. We're fine. All of this up there, it's all encrypted. You see? But the encryption keys are stored in this table right here in plain text. So they take the keys, this is the key to the main vault, and you cut and paste. You put the last one over here. Now watch what happens. When you put the keys in, here's the last one. This is what happens, all encrypted you see there's no information. Now you can decrypt the election files using the extracted keys and a few lines of code. Open, there's the encryption. Now using the keys, a description script is executed. And now I have the names. I have I have everything that I need. It's now decrypted. It's it's list. It's out in the open. A user can run a script to re encrypt it if they wanted to make any changes. The conclusion from the expert with no password election.
BehizyTweets
Posted - September 25, 2024 at 5:06 PM
Saved - September 25, 2024 at 7:56 PM
reSee.it AI Summary
I just witnessed a shocking moment on PBD's podcast where someone hacked a voting machine live using a preprogrammed USB stick. He demonstrated that he could manipulate the system entirely, including changing votes and adding candidates not on the ballot. This incident reminded me of a similar event where a professor hacked a Dominion machine in front of a federal judge. I truly hope we move away from these machines and start hand-counting votes for a more trustworthy electoral process.

@BehizyTweets - George

BREAKING: Someone just hacked a voting machine within seconds live on PBD's podcast. He only used a preprogrammed USB stick that gave him total access to do whatever he wanted, including flipping or creating votes out of thin air "If this would have been an election, I could have gone to the database and for example change the votes." PBD: "How much of it could you have changed?" "Anything, add new candidate who was not even on a ballot, it doesn't matter, because if you have total control over the system, you can do anything you want." Via: @patrickbetdavid This was such a wild moment. It's like when Professor J. Alex Halderman used a pen to hack a Dominion machine in front of a federal judge a few months ago. I pray for the day when we will finally ditch these machines and start hand-counting all our votes like a serious country.

Video Transcript AI Summary
A voting machine, which the speaker calls the "worst voting machine used in the United States," was vulnerable to USB attacks. The machine was used in Maryland and Virginia until 2012. By plugging in a pre-programmed USB device, costing around $120, an attacker could gain complete control of the system in seconds. With full control, an attacker could change votes, add candidates, or manipulate results without leaving evidence, because the machine lacks a paper ballot. The speaker demonstrated how easily the machine could be hacked, emphasizing that the process was slowed down for demonstration purposes. The speaker also mentioned that a professor from Denmark wirelessly hacked the same machine in under 30 minutes at DEFCON. Because of vulnerabilities like these, the speaker believes hand-marked paper ballots are necessary to verify election outcomes.
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Speaker 0: This is a win vote machine. And, for the reasons that we don't want to put a logo, this voting system technology company name is a just a fake name. Because I have been using this particular machine in filming a number of training videos, some of those for the government, just to show vulnerabilities like USB vulnerability, which we am going to be using. This machine actually had many vulnerabilities. And at time when this was still in use, this was called the worst voting machine used in the United States. The worst? The worst voting machine used in United States. Speaker 1: Where was this used, Harry? Speaker 0: That was used in Maryland. It was in Virginia. I don't have the complete list what all places it was used. But it was fairly widely used. So what we are going to be exploiting here is a USB vulnerability. The USB vulnerability is amazingly good to identify because it's easy to mitigate. You just stopped, access to the USB port. I have a plot here a extension cable, such that we can see the actual USB port is behind there and it's accessible by the water. I'm using here a commercially available USB computer called Baspanning. It can be many other devices. This is such an example. This particular device is $120 You can buy it from online. And I have pre programmed it. And if this would be a real attack, the attack will take 6, 7 seconds. I have slowed it down and made visible so that the audience can see what is happening. So when I'm plugging it in this is the sharing USB stick, it's always wrong way. So the computer starts. And once it's started, it's doing its magic. The moment you see that the screen is changing, that is when the hack would have been already done and I would be unplugging it. But I'm just showing this number of things. So, now it would have been done. It's showing you the program manager. It's showing you now the comment prompt. And this is where all the votes live. So, I'm just showing that the directory where all the votes would be. At this point of time, this tick has already complete control over the system. So at this time, anything can be done, anything can be changed. And that's the last thing I'm just showing a fake result just to show that can be done. It's just to show that how the control system is controlled. So, this is a good example of a hack. And I said, only reason why anything is seen on the screen and why it's slow is because I artificially slowed it down and made it visible so that the audience can see that there's a control over the voting machine. This particular machine has many other vulnerabilities, way worse than this one. So, that's why it's very good that this machine is no longer in U. S. And this is also showing how demonstrating the vulnerabilities work because that causes changes. And for example, removal of this machine from being used in U. S. Speaker 1: So now, what is it doing right now, Harry? Speaker 0: Nothing. It's already the whole hack was done. But if this would have been an election, I could have gone to the database and, for example, changed the votes. That's one possibility. Speaker 1: How much of it could you have changed? Speaker 0: Anything. Speaker 1: You could have been 51 to 73. Speaker 0: Add new candidate who was not even on a ballot. It doesn't matter. Because if you have total control over the system Right. You can do anything you want. As I say, one example was that we add a new candidate to make that candidate to win. It will be obvious if the The Speaker 1: president of DEFCON is the one who won George Washington. That's the one you're saying. Speaker 0: Yeah. Speaker 1: Yeah. I got what you're saying. So so is this, like, to to the average hacker, is this machine a joke, how easy it is? Speaker 0: It is a joke. Speaker 1: And and how many years ago was it used? Speaker 0: I think this was last time used in 2012. Speaker 1: God. 12 years ago. Speaker 0: And also, just an example, that when this was brought first time to DEFCON, we had a professor from Denmark. And in less than half an hour, he hacked into this machine wirelessly. He didn't even touch the machine. He took complete control over this machine wirelessly because this voting machine happens to have a wireless Wi Fi access. Speaker 1: So okay. So is it fair for 1 to speculate and question that any of the election, electronic voting machines we've used previously, possibility that could have been hacked, possibility that the winners were flipped because somebody got into it. Speaker 0: So, again, the problem the fundamental problem with this voting machine is it doesn't have paper ballot. So if somebody hacked this kind of machine and would have manipulated it, there is no evidence. That's why we need paper ballots. And especially, we need hand marked paper ballots. Because if the results are called in the question, now you can go and hand count those ballots and verify that the outcome of the election is right.
iluminatibot
Posted - October 12, 2024 at 2:36 AM
Saved - October 13, 2024 at 1:06 AM

@iluminatibot - illuminatibot

Proof elections are rigged https://t.co/y7oyxJGdK0

Video Transcript AI Summary
Clinton Eugene Curtis, a computer programmer, testified that in October 2000, he wrote a prototype program for then-Florida Speaker of the House Tom Feeney that could rig an election by flipping the vote 51/49. According to Curtis, this program would be undetectable to election officials, only visible in the source code or by comparing paper receipts to vote totals. Curtis stated that while a protective program could not prevent such rigging, programmers could examine source code for irregularities. He testified that he did not know if Ohio elections had protective measures. Based on statistical anomalies between exit polling data and tabulated results, Curtis believes the Ohio presidential election was likely hacked. Curtis said he was asked to hide the fraud in the source code to control the vote in South Florida. He handed in a report and program to Missus Yang, who said they needed to hide the fraud. Curtis stated that if exit polls are significantly different from the vote, then someone is manipulating the vote. He added that timers could also be set to manipulate the vote.
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Speaker 0: Mister Curtis, would you please state your full name for the record? Speaker 1: Name is Clinton Eugene Curtis. Speaker 0: And where do you reside? Speaker 1: LSC, Florida. Speaker 0: And what is your profession? Speaker 1: I'm a computer programmer. Speaker 0: Would you please speak into the microphone so the audience can hear your testimony? I'm a computer programmer. Mister Curtis, are there programs that can be used to secretly fix elections? Speaker 1: Yes. How do you Speaker 0: know that to be the case? Speaker 1: Because in October of 2000, I wrote a prototype for president's congressman Tom Feeney at the company I work for in Oviedo, Florida that did just that. Speaker 0: And we say did just that it would rig an election. Speaker 1: It would flip the vote 5149 to whoever you wanted to go to and whichever race you wanted to win Speaker 0: and with that program that you designed to be something that elections officials that might be on county boards of elections could detect? Speaker 1: They never see it. Speaker 0: Mister, would you answer that question once again? Speaker 1: They would never see it. Speaker 0: So how would such a such a program, a secret program that, fixes the election, how could it be detected? Speaker 1: You would have to view it either in source code or you have to have a receipt and then count the hard paper against the actual photo. Other than that, you won't see it. Speaker 0: Alright, mister Curtis. If you had been asked you or others with your professional expertise have been asked to design a protective program to that would protect the Ohio elections from against against that software to fix the election, could you have done so? Speaker 1: If we've been asked to make a program that could fix the election, sure. Anybody can do it. Speaker 0: No. Could could you have designed a program or a procedure or protocol that would have protected Ohio against this kind of rigging? Speaker 1: No. You have to look at the source code. You have to get probably programmers from both or all parties to look at the source code and determine if there's anything in there that shouldn't be there. I mean, it's a simple program. You're adding 1 to a person's total. It's a 100 lines of code tops. Alright. If Speaker 0: So let's see. Are you aware of whether there was any protective action in Ohio against this kind of vote ring through software? Speaker 1: I don't know. You don't know? I don't know. Speaker 0: You were you were not asked to assist in the development of any protective system. Is that correct? Speaker 1: No. I was not. Speaker 0: In Europe, have you, reviewed at all the election results in Ohio? Speaker 1: No. I haven't. Okay. Speaker 0: Given the availability of such boat rigging software and the testimony that has been given under oath of substantial statistical anomalies, it grows this differences between exit polling data and the actual tabulated results, do you have an opinion whether or not Ohio election the Ohio election, presidential election was hacked? Speaker 1: Yes. I would say it was. I mean, if you're if you have exit pulling data that is significantly off for the vote, then it's probably hacked. Speaker 0: And your testimony is under oath? Speaker 1: Yes, sir. Speaker 0: And the testimony you've given is true? Speaker 1: Yes, sir. Speaker 0: Thank you. Speaker 2: I was told that I'm gonna have the same question back to the podium. Who did you say you were asked to prepare? Speaker 1: I was asked by Tom Feeney. He's now a congressman. At that time, He was speaker of the House of Florida. Yang Enterprises, which is the company I work for, lobbyist, and their corporate attorneys. We wore a lot of hats. Speaker 2: And at the time, he was the speaker of the House of Florida. Is that what you said? Yes. Speaker 1: Okay. Thank you. Speaker 2: Congressman. You say he was the the lobbyist for the voting machine company as at the same time you're the speaker of the house? Speaker 1: I don't know what the voting machine company is. He was a lobbyist for Yang Enterprises. We had NASA contracts and And Speaker 2: Yang Enterprises did what? Computers? Computers. Okay. And he was your lobbyist. Speaker 1: Your company. The lobbyist for that company. Yes. Speaker 2: And he asked you to design a to seek to design a code to Reagan Watson? Yes. While he was speaker of the Ford House? Speaker 1: Yes. Speaker 2: This is during or previous to the 2,000 election? Speaker 1: Yes. October, end of September. Speaker 2: And did he ever express why he wanted to go to Reagan election? Speaker 1: No. I immediately assumed that they were trying to keep you guys from cheating them. So so I wrote up the documentation of what you would look for in the source code, how you would make sure that you didn't get you know, take advantage of, make sure that all voting machines had receipts because that way you could back count the ones that looked a little funny. And I handed it over Are receipts you mean a paper trail? Yes. Paper trail. And I handed that in to missus Yang and said, Speaker 0: here's your report, here's your program. Speaker 1: And she said, you don't understand. We need to hide the fraud in the source in the source code. Speaker 2: Hide the fraud, not reveal it. Speaker 1: Not reveal the fraud because we needed to to control the boat in South Florida was what she said. Speaker 2: Oh, absolutely. To your knowledge, was this used? I have Speaker 1: no idea. I was ready to leave. Speaker 2: Your testimony a moment ago, I think you said just before you left and answered the congressman and Tucker Jones' question, would you just repeat what you said in terms of the the, exit polls? Speaker 1: Oh, the exit polls should not be significantly different than the vote. Speaker 2: And if they were, you would conclude what? Speaker 1: I would conclude someone's playing with the boat Speaker 2: now with the exit polls. Speaker 1: That's possible too. Okay. It is something is definitely skewed something Speaker 2: is skewed in one of the other right Speaker 1: to select which one you have to see where the problem is. Speaker 2: Let me ask you one further question. Assuming for the moment that such software, that's what you call it, such software to rig a boat was used I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, Speaker 1: I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, I think, happen. You can also set timers to do that, but then you see the timers. Then you'd have to take those machines, decompile them, which I couldn't do, but possibly a Microsoft and MIT something to do. You might you might be able to see it. You might not depends on how good they are destroying what they had.
ValentinaForUSA
Posted - October 22, 2024 at 9:53 PM
Saved - October 24, 2024 at 4:57 AM

@ValentinaForUSA - Valentina Gomez

I uncovered voter fraud. The steal has begun. I hope it’s too big to rig. https://t.co/EDSvCiZ2ou

Video Transcript AI Summary
Multiple individuals have allegedly registered to vote illegally using the speaker's home address. The speaker believes this constitutes election fraud in a crucial election. Missouri Republicans are accused of inaction regarding election integrity, implying corruption. The speaker claims Republicans had ample time to eliminate corrupt voting machines and prevent election cheating but failed to do so. Despite this, the speaker hopes the election's scale will prevent rigging.
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Speaker 0: They are trying to steal the election again, and here's the proof. Somehow, multiple people have illegally registered to vote using my home address for the most important election of our lifetime. These clowns in Missouri don't have the balls to actually do something about it or ensure a free and fair election because, to be honest, they're all bought and paid for. These so called Republicans had 4 years to get rid of the corrupt voting machines and to make it impossible for anyone to cheat in our elections. I genuinely hope it's too big to rig because election fraud is officially underway.
ImMeme0
Posted - October 31, 2024 at 4:21 PM
Saved - October 31, 2024 at 5:53 PM

@ImMeme0 - I Meme Therefore I Am 🇺🇸

What kind of voting machine nonsense is this? https://t.co/8YYmT3YInN

NahBabyNah
Posted - November 1, 2024 at 3:39 AM
Saved - November 1, 2024 at 11:23 PM

@NahBabyNah - NahBabyNah #Trump

@mtgreenee Tennessee did a great write-up on how bad electronic voting systems are ⬇️ https://t.co/VCR9AjweTU

RyanMattaMedia
Posted - November 1, 2024 at 12:09 PM
Saved - November 1, 2024 at 8:58 PM

@RyanMattaMedia - RyanMatta 🇺🇸 🦅

Dear Michigan, this is how dominion voting machines just rigged the Michigan Election. https://t.co/y4NBDhhBA3

Video Transcript AI Summary
Dominion machines are certified and sealed, but vulnerabilities exist. Before elections, a supposed glitch prompts an emergency patch that opens backdoor access from a Serbian office, which is the true operational center of Dominion. This office, despite being presented as a U.S. company, has connections to Chinese nationals and operates on Huawei machines. Using virtual machines, they manipulate election results by creating a hidden environment within the county election equipment. After altering the data, they collapse the virtual machine, leaving no trace unless a forensic audit is conducted. This manipulation is facilitated through connections to China, raising concerns about the integrity of the election process. For more information, visit Stolen Elections Facts.
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Speaker 0: The Dominion machines, they get certified and sealed up and implemented. And then there's 15 different ways that the cheat occurs. But one of them is they right before the election, they have some glitch appear and they say, oh, we need to download a patch on an emergency basis. And then what the patch does is it opens up a a a hole in the back of the system from which they log on from their Serbian office. They don't they don't really admit this. They didn't even admit they had a Serbian office. But the truth is Dominion, which is supposed to be a US company, the US company is just a front. The real center of gravity of Dominion is Serbia. And they've got a technical office there. And when it was discovered, they said, well, it it kind of does just R and D. No. It's the center of gravity. And they log on from they log on to the back of our machines from Serbia, and they manipulate election results. And I have this dead to rights, we have this dead to rights. And what gets even funnier is they're doing this on Huawei machines. Our elections are effectively being run on Huawei machines, which are Chinese servers. And the truth is behind Serbia is China. So China, there's a military institute in China, which is coming in through Serbia. There's Chinese nationals in the Serbian office, and they're logging on to our machines in the middle of election. I can even tell you how they do it. There's such a thing in computers, been around in the public for about 20 years, called virtual machines. You create within a server, you create a virtual machine. And so to an operator of that machine, it looks like he's operating on 2 machines. It just operates like there's a but really that second machine is all in software and and it's all software. It's not there's no physical machine. What they do is they come in through a back door that's opened up by this patch. They create a virtual machine within that machine within the actual county election equipment. From that virtual machine, they then manipulate the results, the database, the hard the data on the database, any way they want. When they're done, they withdraw and they collapse that virtual server. So there's no record of nothing. There's a unless you go in and do a bits and bytes forensic audit, when you go in later and you look at the actual machine and all of its systems, you don't see anything. It's only if you do forensic you discover that somewhere in the middle of it all, they created a virtual machine inside, did all the manipulation through that. That's actually done from Serbia and behind Serbia the in Serbia, there are Chinese nationals doing it. Behind them, there's people in China, and this is all done on Huawei equipment. And if this sounds crazy, go to a website called Stolen Elections Facts, stolen elections, plural, facts.com. It's all the documentation is laid out there.
BGatesIsaPyscho
Posted - November 3, 2024 at 3:42 PM
Saved - November 3, 2024 at 5:03 PM

@BGatesIsaPyscho - Concerned Citizen

🇺🇸 “Why would Homeland Security be conducting a Large Scale Cyber Simulation attack on election day?” https://t.co/S3GCjksR2J

Video Transcript AI Summary
A large-scale cybersecurity exercise is scheduled for November 5th, coinciding with election day, as part of the 2024 Homeland Security Critical Infrastructure Conference in Atlanta on November 6-7. This information is sourced directly from the Homeland Security website, indicating that the exercise is officially planned and may have been intended to remain discreet.
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Speaker 0: Why would they be holding an actual cyber attack exercise on a massive scale on election day? I'm not kidding. This is a real thing. I'm gonna show my I'm gonna turn my camera around, and I'm gonna show you the website. It is the Homeland Security Critical Infrastructure website. There's the website for anybody who needs it. 2024 Homeland Security Critical Infrastructure Conference in Atlanta, November 6 7th, but with a large scale tabletop cybersecurity exercise on November 5th, election day. And this is coming right from their website, a government website telling you, well, maybe they wanted to keep it a secret, but they're doing a large scale cybersecurity exercise, and they planned it.
DefiyantlyFree
Posted - November 5, 2024 at 6:48 AM
Saved - November 5, 2024 at 7:02 PM

@DefiyantlyFree - Insurrection Barbie

Because Donald Trump questioned the voting machines during his final rally today I’m going to preemptively post this video of Democrats questioning machines for the fake news. https://t.co/SuvfC0TAXw

Video Transcript AI Summary
Voting machines remain highly vulnerable to tampering, as researchers have shown. Even those with limited skills can breach these systems quickly. In 2018, machines in Georgia and Texas were reported to have deleted or switched votes. Major manufacturers are compromising security by recommending remote access software, making machines targets for hackers. Many states still use outdated machines that are easy to hack, with 43% of American voters relying on systems known to have serious security flaws. Demonstrations have shown how easily these machines can be compromised. Additionally, aging systems often run unsupported software, increasing their susceptibility to cyber attacks. A successful hack could significantly impact close elections by targeting key swing states or counties. Concerns about potential breaches are growing.
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Speaker 0: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. The researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 1: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools, and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter of minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another. Speaker 0: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cybersecurity 101, directing that you install remote access software which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 2: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 1: You could easily hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things, but in fact, 3 companies are controlling that. It is the individual voting machines that some pose that pose some of the greatest risks. Speaker 3: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines. Right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 2: Workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. It was possible to switch votes. Speaker 0: 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, including backdoors. Speaker 4: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 3: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the capitol, where we brought in, folks who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 1: Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software, like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable to the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 2: In a close present or election, they just need to hack one swing state or maybe 1 or 2 or maybe just a few counties in one swing state. Speaker 1: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through.
iluminatibot
Posted - November 5, 2024 at 11:20 PM
Saved - November 6, 2024 at 2:38 AM

@iluminatibot - illuminatibot

RFK Jr. wants to know why we have “ATM machines on every block that never get hacked,” yet somehow, we can’t secure our elections. https://t.co/Qoqp2V1a75

Video Transcript AI Summary
Concerns about election integrity are valid. Historically, Democrats have questioned election outcomes, such as in 2001 and 2004, without facing accusations of unpatriotism. It's essential to focus on the safeguards in place to prevent election tampering rather than getting angry at those who raise concerns. We have the technology to ensure accuracy, as seen with ATM machines and other systems that function reliably. To enhance election security, we should implement measures like paper ballots for verification. The conversation should center on improving the electoral process rather than debating whether specific elections were hacked.
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Speaker 0: Do you have concerns about the integrity of this election coming up? I do. Democrats today are very angry at anybody who questions the election integrity. He shouldn't be. In 2001, every Democrat believed the election was stolen from Al Gore, you know, by the Bush administration. In 2004, I wrote an award winning article for Rolling Stones talking about the theft of the 2004 election. Nobody called me unpatriotic. You know? It's just it's a fact. We we need to be responsible civically, and everybody knows any machine to be act. What safeguards do we have in place to make sure that's and that's what we should be talking about. Instead of getting angry at people for saying, you know, elections can be hacked, let's talk about how we fix the system. We put a man on the moon. We have ATM machines on every block that never get hacked. We have you know, you came from Las Vegas this morning. The entire city is built on machines that can count right and never make mistakes and never give you too much money back. And so we can do it, and you need paper ballots. You need something to check the election, and and that's what we should be talking about rather than did this one get hacked into that one.
DravenNoctis
Posted - January 9, 2025 at 12:14 PM
Saved - January 10, 2025 at 1:54 AM

@DravenNoctis - Noctis Draven

It's very alarming that Russia, Iran and China have infiltrated the US so deeply! Oh wait... https://t.co/2yHbxPhYv2

ColonelReynolds
Posted - April 10, 2025 at 5:33 PM
Saved - April 15, 2025 at 10:24 AM

@ColonelReynolds - COL Conrad Reynolds

Wow!! @DNIGabbard says “we have evidence of how these machines have been vulnerable and able to be manipulated” (paraphrasing) and they’re still investigating. Says the President is right to want to go to paper ballots to make elections secure again!! #MESA https://t.co/g9CJ9e3Nzz

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker states that the best investigators are pursuing election integrity. They claim there is evidence that electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a long time and can be exploited to manipulate vote results. This vulnerability allegedly drives the mandate to implement paper ballots across the country, so voters can have faith in election integrity.
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Speaker 0: Investigating. We have the best of the best going after this. Election integrity being one of them. We have, evidence of of how these electronic voting systems have been vulnerable to hackers for a very long time, and vulnerable to exploitation to manipulate the results of the votes being cast, which further drives forward your mandate to bring about paper ballots across the country so that voters can have faith in the integrity of our elections.
LarryOConnor
Posted - July 22, 2025 at 12:01 PM
Saved - July 22, 2025 at 2:53 PM

@LarryOConnor - L A R R Y

"Nobody ever said 'the Russians hacked the election!'" Except, of course, they ALL said "the Russians hacked the election" 👇 https://t.co/w50F9lQN9i

KanekoaTheGreat
Posted - April 18, 2023 at 11:05 PM
Saved - July 8, 2023 at 5:14 PM

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

BREAKING: Explosive video surfaces of FOX News stars Tucker Carlson, Laura Ingraham, and Sean Hannity slamming Trump's "insane" voting machine fraud allegations as "absurd," "ridiculous," and "complete BS"!

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