reSee.it - Related Post Feed

Saved - June 7, 2025 at 7:20 PM
reSee.it AI Summary
I discussed the Electoral College (EC), tracing its origins back to James Madison's 1823 letter, which emphasized the "District Mode" where electors vet presidential candidates. I highlighted the Framers' concerns about direct democracy leading to tyranny and mob rule, citing quotes from George Mason and others. I argued that the EC was designed to prevent corruption and undue influence from wealthy elites and foreign powers. The current system lacks the intended safeguards, making it vulnerable to manipulation by powerful interests and media.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

Thread: Electoral College 1. Relatively speaking, almost no one knows the full theory & history behind the EC. In this thread, we will review the EC: -The original reasons for its conception, & -How, if restored, it could mitigate many of the problems we experience today.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

2. The beginning of the Electoral College requires us to only go to 1823, though--not 1787. That's when James Madison explained in a letter to George Hay the original thinking behind the EC. Here are 4 different formats of the letter: 3 pics & a link. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-03-02-0109

Founders Online: From James Madison to George Hay, 23 August 1823 From James Madison to George Hay, 23 August 1823 founders.archives.gov

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

3. Madison explained to Hay that the DISTRICT MODE was "mostly, IF NOT EXCLUSIVELY, in view when the Constitution was framed & adopted." Further, he said this wasn't specifically delineated in the Constitution b/c they were hurried. So, what does the "District Mode" mean?

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

4. The 'district mode' basically means the following: 1. Each legislative district votes for an ELECTOR. 2. This elector then vets the presidential candidates & selects the best one. IOW, it was a national caucus.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

5. James Madison's letter to Hay was an endorsement of enshrining the "National Caucus" Electoral College into the Constitution by amendment (as originally intended), b/c several states had already started awarding their electoral votes by direct vote for president as we do now.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

6. Before we review how caucuses work & their advantages, let's next look at statements by Founders & Framers as to why they didn't want an election of the President by direct popular vote, as the Democrats (& some Republicans) want now: for MANY good reasons.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

7. As you review these quotes & concepts, remember that the principal purposes of the Constitutional government they established was to: 1) Protect our rights, by 2) Preventing tyranny from arising. You must view the following ideas from that perspective.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

8. George Mason: "It would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for chief Magistrate to the people, as it would be to refer a trial of colours to a blind man." Mason understood direct democracy. He knew something so important shouldn't be left to mob rule.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

9. Tommy Lee Jones elaborates on "mobocracy" w/about the same bluntness as Mason: "Humans, for the most part, don't have a clue. They don't want one or need one, either. They're happy. They think they have a good beed on things...People are dumb, panicky, dangerous animals."

Video Transcript AI Summary
Humans generally lack awareness and are content in their ignorance. While individuals may be intelligent, people as a collective are dumb, panicky, and dangerous.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Humans, for the most part, don't have a clue. They don't want one or need one either. They're happy. They think they have a good bead on things. Well, why why the big secret? People are smart. They can handle it. A person is smart. People are dumb, panicky, dangerous animals, and you know it.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

10. Let's be real, you've seen the Waffle House fights, the morons eating Tide pods, the feminist meltdowns on TikTok, the vapid eThot's posting bikini shots, the high school drop-outs asking for nudes, the rioters looting Nike stores, YouTube comments, the dumpster fire of SM.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

11. They all vote. We could sit here for days & make a list of people we wish weren't voting. Indeed, for every responsible voter who stays current on myriad issues & carefully weighs dozens of criteria in their voting habits, there's 100 numbskulls who don't. & Tyrants know it.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

12. Our Framers were sensitive to The Few unduly influencing The Many. -People would be led by a "few active & designing men." -Popular elections puts The People in the power of "1 set of men dispersed through the union & acting in concert to delude them into any appointment."

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

13. IOW, The People are easily swayable one way or another by external forces. This fact is not lost on the Masters of the Universe. According to recent studies, 91% of all elections are won by the better-financed candidate. What does this money buy? Media & influence.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

14. Therefore, those that control the money, control outcomes. & Those who control the outcomes control the politicians. & Those who control the politicians control the government. Therefore, BIG MONEY finances candidates acceptable to it, buys the media & influence, & wins.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

15. We've seen this effect in spades w/all the DAs, sheriffs & other local politicians that Seorge Goros has "bought" since 2015. You can find a ton of info on that, including from my own thread (below). These politicians don't answer to We The People.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

Thread: 1. Many of you have seen the video of Newt Gingrich being chastised for mentioning the role George Soros has played in enabling the chaos we're seeing play out every night in cities around America. Let's take the dive you can't talk even about on @FoxNews, shall we?

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

16. Now let's talk "men acting in concert." For example, the media: Most are now aware that 6 companies control over 90% of the information we're exposed to:

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

17. Together, this is what they did to the Trump campaign. From June 1-July 31, the evening newscasts of ABC, CBS & NBC was 95% negative towards @RealDonaldTrump. https://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/nb/rich-noyes/2020/08/17/study-150-times-more-negative-news-trump-biden

STUDY: 150 TIMES More Negative News on Trump than Biden As the pandemic grinds on, the Big Three broadcast evening newscasts are among the highest rated programs on television today — and that means newsbusters.org

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

18. Here's the tone of coverage for @realDonaldTrump's 1st 100 days. CNN led the pack w/93% negative coverage! Astonishingly, it might be even higher now. This slanted media coverage is swaying MILLIONS of people. For the office of President, the Framers wanted to mitigate this.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

19. Winning political office is mostly about fundraising, not ideas, b/c money buys the media that influences The People in the info war. Remember, the Framers didn't want a gov where tyranny could easily arise & they knew the danger a few rich & powerful designing people posed.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

20. Unfortunately, the collusion by a few people doesn't stop w/just "the media." In our times, it goes much deeper: #BigTechTyranny

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

21. For years, Big Tech has systematically been throttling @realDonaldTrump & conservatives in general across all platforms: -Twitter shadowbans conservatives & right-leaning accounts w/relentless impunity -Facebook throttles reach & regularly bans content -Google. Well, LOTS.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

22. It took me an entire thread to chronicle Google's massive malfeasance in manipulating information, which you can read here:

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

Thread 1. Something needs to be done about Google. Its search engine has 92% market share. Google is aware of its massive power & seeks to exploit it to the max. It has become an enemy to freedom. Below, I'll briefly summarize its shenanigans, & then discuss what must be done.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

***Poll*** Which #BigTechTyranny company should be broken up first? #TikTok #BanTikTok

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

23. Dr. Robert Epstein has studied, published & testified before congress on the power Google has to sway votes & elections through various methods of manipulation--unbeknownst & non-transparently to voters. Google is on record as trying to do anything it can to stop Trump.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

24. Google will "develop machine learning & AI to combat misinformation share by low information voters." IOW, Google will do whatever it can w/its powerful technologies--including invent new ones--to control the information & narratives that The People are fed.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

25. Look what happened to @realDonaldTrump's reach on Facebook after it changed its algorithm in order to deboost Trump specifically & conservatives generally--it dropped 45%!

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

26. Meanwhile, the accounts for prominent leftists & liberals remained unchanged:

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

27. The media-information dissemination networks of influence on Facebook before the algorithm change:

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

28. The media-information dissemination networks of influence on Facebook after the algorithm change:

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

29. I don't want to get lost on a tangent, suffice it to say, the Big Tech companies act in near unison & in the same direction: to throttle conservative/right-leaning content & boost leftist ideology, in order to sway millions of people to the left. How is this accomplished?

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

30. It's accomplished by a small group of designing people. In this example, Seorge Goros & Bravid Dock of Media Matters. Goros funds them (as he does the politicians), Media Matters gets the data from Big Tech & then instructs Big Tech as to who to ban.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

31. Ever wondered why so many conservatives & right-leaning people get blocked from multiple platforms in quick succession? Leaked secret docs show that the Big Money powers like Seorge Goros & the Political Activist Powers like Bravid Dock work in concert w/the Big Tech Tyrants.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

32. A recent example of this tight collusion was seen this summer when it was discovered donations to Black Lives Matter were actually being routed to ActBlue, one of the main activist arms of the Democrat Party. These networks are all tightly coordinated. https://www.redstate.com/elizabeth-vaughn/2020/06/12/854023/

Donations to Black Lives Matter Go to 'ActBlue' - The Activist Arm of the Democrat Party   redstate.com

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

33. We can't cover all the collusion & power networks, but suffice it to say, a few of the same very rich & powerful people fund &/or control our political candidates, our media, our political parties & Big Tech. 1 man has this much power over DAs. How much do you have? https://t.co/qQNeb63oPU

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

34. How many of us are essentially buying the votes of millions of voters like OK, BLOOMER? https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/517522-bloomberg-pays-fines-for-32000-felons-in-florida-so-they-can-vote

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

35. The Democrat allies in the Artificial Reality Media are doing the same exact thing as Bloomberg, in exactly the same state! My friends, these are not accidents. These are small groups of people, acting in concert--as warned about by the Framers. https://thehill.com/homenews/media/517079-mtv-vh1-and-comedy-central-unite-to-pay-fees-fines-to-help-formerly

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

36. What I hope you're seeing is that the EC isn't just about geographic representation, states' rights & federalism. To be sure--these are important elements, but lacking. The EC was also designed to PREVENT corruption democratic systems enable via influencing low-info voters.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

37. Another takeaway from this thread is that we're fooled into believing that giving everyone the right to vote is the same as giving everyone an equal say. This is patently false. We do NOT have an equal say: how many millions of votes are you swaying w/your checkbook?

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

38. The last 2 tyrannies the full Electoral College was meant to prevent or mitigate were: -Cabal at home -Influence from abroad Let's briefly take each of these in turn (cont) https://t.co/9M2OsjOESm

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

39. Cabal at Home A cabal is a group of people united in some design, to promote their private views or special interests in an ideology, state, or other community, often by intrigue & usually unbeknownst to those outside their group. The "deep state" is one example of a cabal.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

40. The EC helped prevent cabals like the Deep State from gaining too much power over citizens' lives & liberty via the presidency, b/c the EC was just a temporary, 1-time, limited-purpose special legislature. There was no permanent ecosystem over which a cabal could seize power.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

41. Remember how the presidential selection process worked: Members of the EC--selected by the voters in their respective legislative districts--had special access to the presidential candidates & were able to vet them more closely & thoroughly than an average citizen could.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

42. Remember how Trump was "vetted" by the Deep State & it turned out to all be lies & subterfuge? Such a scenario would is much more difficult in an environment where Electors are given special access to candidates & candidates are incentivized to be transparent w/the electors.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

43. I have special experience w/how this vetting process works since I ran for the US Senate in Utah, which still uses this kind of caucus vetting system. If a candidate wants the votes of the caucus delegates, said candidate must be transparent & available to the delegates.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

44. If the candidate doesn't make himself available, or doesn't pass the scrutiny of the delegates, the delegates will often reject that candidate in favor of another who is more transparent & forthcoming. That is how @SenMikeLee was able to unseat 3-term US Senator Bob Bennett.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

45. This is how true EC electors were meant to function: Get complete access to the presidential candidates, vet them w/a fine tooth comb & then vote on the one who would best serve the interests of the particular legislative district & country at large. B/C of the compressed

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

46. time frame & the temporary nature of the EC, influence peddling is minimized. It becomes far more difficult for a candidate to "hide" from the people voting on him/her, & becomes virtually impossible for a domestic cabal to control the process.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

47. That brings us to the last tyranny: foreign influence. How much influence is China, Russia, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Israel & other nations exerting over our electoral process through the #ArtificialRealityMedia, #BigTechTyranny, entertainment, riots, TikTok!, & other psyops?

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

48. How many millions of American votes are swayed by these intrigues & subterfuges? The EC mitigates virtually all of this by empowering carefully chosen electors to go directly to the candidates themselves. The forms of mass propaganda that influence the masses are much less

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

49. effective on the smaller number of motivated, super-informed Electors who get their information and base their decisions off of close vetting of the candidates themselves. The example of Utah is once again instructive: caucus delegates spend, on average , 90-100 hours

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

50. vetting candidates & issues, while general voters spend, on average, 2-4 hours. Not only would Electors under the "district method" (caucus) spend far more time vetting & collect far more data on presidential candidates--but b/c of the access they demand, they're able to get

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

51. access, information, cooperation & interaction that the American populace as a whole CAN'T get. Even if a candidate wanted to, it's simply not feasible for every citizen to have access to the candidates. Logistically impossible. As a result, candidates retreat & rely on MONEY

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

52. to distribute their carefully controlled & sanitized message & agenda to the masses. B/c of the opacity of "dark money" & the fungibility of money, it's easy for virtually any foreign forces to buy influence. Think of the the Clinton Foundation & its "speaking fees."

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

53. Think of the sweetheart loans, paychecks & deals Bunter Hiden & his father received from Ukraine & China. Etc. By putting electors directly at the feet of the candidates, it cuts out a lot of the influence operations of foreign powers.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

54. Summary in 1 meme. The original EC prevented or mitigated: -Domestic Cabals -Foreign Interferences & Intrigues -Control of presidency by any 1 branch of gov -Rich & powerful designing men acting in collusion -The whims & ignorances of the masses that plague general democracy https://t.co/hRhffnL6CO

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

55. Unfortunately, we don't now enjoy the full benefits of the Electoral College as intended. Even so, once you understand the original intent of the EC, it becomes easy to see why elites & other power brokers & influencers constantly push for its full & final elimination.

@SamParkerSenate - Sam Parker 🇺🇲

@threadreaderapp unroll

Saved - December 25, 2023 at 10:15 PM
reSee.it AI Summary
A thread shares clips from a conference discussing alleged rigging in the 2016 election. The author suggests that the experts involved may have influenced the 2020 election as well. Another post criticizes Hillary Clinton for denying election results and promoting conspiracy theories.

@listen_2learn - The Researcher

Thread with clips from a conference on how the 2016 election was rigged. How would you hack a presidential election? I’m guessing these partisan election experts had a hand in the 2020 election because they disappeared afterwards, but they will soon be back. https://t.co/pDHfioOBV8

Video Transcript AI Summary
To hack a US presidential election, the speaker suggests a four-step plan. First, use pre-election polls to identify closely contested states. Second, target large counties or their service providers and compromise their election management system computers. Third, infect individual voting machines using the compromised system. This can be done easily by purchasing a government surplus machine on Ebay. Finally, manipulate the votes on the computer, knowing that most states discard the paper ballots without checking them.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: How would you actually hack a US presidential election? Well, step 1, before the election, use pre election polls like Nate Silver provides to identify the states that are likely to be closest, that are going to be within a percent or so. Step 2, target some large counties or their service providers and compromise their election management system computers. I'll leave it as an exercise to the attacker to find out, how to compromise the election management system by, say, starting by emailing Sue. Step 3, use the compromised election management system to spread your infection to the individual voting machines. Developing an attack for one of these machines is not terribly difficult. I and others have done it again and again in the laboratory. All you need to do is buy 1 government surplus on Ebay to test it out. Finally, step 4, you're a tax steals votes on the computer, but no one ever looks at the paper because as we'll show you, most states just throw away that paper without ever looking at it.

@listen_2learn - The Researcher

By December 13, 2016, if there was fraud, it had to be exposed by this date in order to have any hope of changing the outcome of the election. Hillary Clinton. Election denier and conspiracy theorist. https://t.co/ZAna9mQC0s

Video Transcript AI Summary
In 2016, it was known that hacking could occur during the presidential election. The election results were surprisingly close compared to the polls, indicating possible interference. However, no US states examined enough paper ballots to determine if the computers were hacked. This revealed a significant gap in our system. With a deadline approaching for states to finalize their electoral college votes, there was a need to expose any fraud that may have occurred. Election integrity advocates struggled to find a solution to ensure the examination of physical evidence that could detect cyber attacks.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: So coming back to 2016 and the presidential election, we knew on November on November 8th, excuse me, not December 8th, on November 8th, on Election Day, that hacking was possible, and at the end of the day when the election results came in, we saw that the result was extremely close, was surprising compared to the polling. We knew at that point that there had been cyberattacks of an unprecedented nature in American politics aimed previously at interfering with the election. This was all before Election Day, and we knew that it was feasible for an attacker to change votes on enough machines to have stolen the election result. Shockingly, at least shockingly to me and many other people, even under these circumstances, approximately 0 US states we're going to look at enough paper ballots to know whether the computers had been hacked. This is a major gap in our system. I previously had believed that the paper would provide a fairly strong deterrent, but if even in 2016 we're not going to look at any of the paper, well, it might as well not be there. So at this point, there were 5 weeks between Election Day on November 8th and December 13th, which is a deadline under federal law for states to lock in their electoral college votes, if there was no, if there was fraud that had taken place, it had to be exposed by this date in order to have any hope of changing the outcome of the election. So what to do under these circumstances? I and other election integrity advocates got together and started discussing some possibilities, but we didn't really have a good solution. Was there any way possible to make the states actually examine the physical evidence they had in a way that could potentially detect a cyber attack.
Saved - June 4, 2023 at 9:05 AM

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

Hacking America's Election System 1 hour of computer scientists, election security experts, and Senate Democrats talking about how easy it is to hack voting machines. @KariLake @katiehobbs @GenFlynn @realMikeLindell @bgmasters @PatrickByrne @JackPosobiec @DavidSacks @elonmusk https://t.co/sH4Ft0iMsB

Video Transcript AI Summary
Voting machines in the US are vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, according to researchers. These machines, which come in various models, have been found to have security vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious software and change election data. The machines can be hacked through the machine used to program them, and many of them have wireless modems that can connect to the internet, despite claims that they are not connected. The vulnerabilities in the voting machines, along with the lack of secure systems for voter registration and result reporting, pose a significant risk to the integrity of elections. It is crucial to address these vulnerabilities to ensure the trustworthiness of election results.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine like a computer virus, and silently change election outcomes, and in every single case We've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. Across the country, there are about 52 different models of machines. They they fall into essentially 2 styles. Ones that scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen. And many of them have been analyzed now by researchers, looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case where a US voting machine has been analyzed by competent security researchers, They have found vulnerabilities that would let someone inject malicious software and change election data. Every single case. Speaker 1: The better or the more efficient way of hacking machines would be to subvert them all through the machine that's used to actually program those machines. So prior to each election, the county election office or the voting machine vendor will actually program memory cards for that election. It tells the machine who are the candidates, what are the, you know, the the contests being decided, and that gets It's inserted into the voting machine. If you can alter, if you can subvert that machine that is used to program those memory cards, then you can pass rogue software to the voting machine. Speaker 0: Voting machines that are not connected to the internet. This is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately, it's not actually true. Many new voting machines that come with 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connected to the internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me, that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the Internet right in the middle of the election, potentially at the most vulnerable Speaker 2: time. Studies conducted in 2007 by the state of California, state of Ohio, state of Florida found security vulnerabilities that could take advantage of these To engineer viruses where 1 compromised voting machine could then infect eventually the entire fleet of machines for an entire county. Typically at the end of the election day, you move a memory card through each of the machines in the precinct, and that's to collect the vote totals. That process can spread a virus. And there are other processes. The details vary from machine to machine. Speaker 3: When you say hacked, what were they able to do once they gained access to the machines? Speaker 4: All sorts of Executally manipulate the outcome of the vote. They could manipulate the tally. They could delete the tally, and and they could compromise the vote in any number of ways. Speaker 5: The machines used in Georgia have been demonstrated to be hackable through a virus that's carried on ballot definition cartridges. Very much like this Duxnet virus was inserted into nuclear centrifuges in Iran. Speaker 3: There are a number of states that outsource their reporting of elections to third parties, some of which are corporations based in other countries like Spain. So you've got to trust that the aggregation of the votes and the reporting of the votes is accurate as well. Speaker 0: I'm pretty sure my undergrad computer security class at Michigan could have changed the outcome of the 2016 teen Michigan election if we wanted to. It is that bad. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries, and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's that's why I say it's only a matter of time. Speaker 6: Unfortunately, in a lot of these systems, The audit trails are just as vulnerable as the other aspects of the system. So there may not be good forensic evidence of a successful intrusion. With the current design, we cannot be universally confident that it hasn't happened. And it's probably only a matter of time before it will. Speaker 7: I come here today as a computer scientist who spent the better part of the last quarter century studying Election system security. As you're well aware, the integrity of elections across the US depends heavily on the integrity of computers and Software systems. Unfortunately, much of this infrastructure has proven dangerously vulnerable to tampering and attack, and in some cases, In ways that cannot be easily detected or corrected, after the fact. These vulnerabilities can create practical avenues for, corrupt candidates or foreign adversaries to do everything from cause large scale disruption on Election Day to potentially, undetectably alter, election outcomes in some cases. So let me begin with the voting equipment itself. To be blunt, it's a widely recognized, really indisputable fact that every piece of computerized voting equipment in use at polling places today Can be easily compromised, in ways that have the potential to disrupt election, operations, compromise firmware and software, Potentially alter, vote tallies in the absence of, other safeguards. This is partly a consequence of historically poor design and implementation by equipment vendors, but it's ultimately a reflection of the nature of complex software. It's simply beyond the state of the art, to build software systems that can reliably withstand targeted attack By a determined adversary in this kind of an environment. The vulnerabilities are real. They're serious. And absent a surprising and very fundamental break through in my field, which I would welcome, but I don't see coming, soon, probably inevitable. We give most of the attention to vulnerabilities in voting machines, But that's not the whole story. Each of the more than 5,000 jurisdictions responsible for running elections across the nation Must maintain a number of critical information systems that are attractive targets for disruption by adversaries. Most important of these are voter registration databases, the systems that report, final results, and so forth. Unfortunately, There are even fewer standards for how to secure these systems. The administration of these systems varies widely. And the threats against these systems are often even more, acute than the threats against individual voting systems. You know, just as we don't expect the local sheriff to single handedly defend against military ground invasions, we shouldn't expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services, but that's precisely what we've been asking them, to do. Speaker 0: I'm a professor of computer science and have spent the last 10 years studying the electronic voting systems that our nation relies on. My conclusion from that work is that our highly computerized election infrastructure that is vulnerable to sabotage, and even to cyber attacks that could change votes. These realities risk making our election results more difficult for the American people to trust. I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly, as part of a decade of research, studying the technology that operates elections and learning how to make it stronger. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine, like a computer virus, and silently change election outcomes. We've studied touch screen and optical scan systems, and in every single case we've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. These capabilities are certainly within reach for America's enemies. As you know, states choose their own voting technology. And while some states are doing well with security, others are alarmingly vulnerable. This puts the entire nation at risk. In close elections, an attacker can probe the most important swing states or swing counties, find areas with the weakest protection, and strike there. In a close election year changing a few votes in key, localities could be enough to tip national results. The key lesson from 2016 is that these threats are real. Some say the fact that voting machines aren't directly connected to the Internet makes them secure, but unfortunately this is not true. Voting machines are not as distant from the Internet as they may seem. So the way these attacks work Is that before every election, every voting machine needs to be programmed with the design of the ballot, the names of the races and candidates. And voting officials do that by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker can infect that memory card With malicious code, well, when the memory card is inserted into the machine, it can change the programming running on the voting machine And caused the voting machine to, at the end of the election, output whatever results the attacker wants. Speaker 5: The machine that I hacked is called the Sequoia AVC Advantage, now called the Dominion AVC Advantage. It's in The computer program that counts the votes on this machine is in a read only memory that's mounted in a socket on the motherboard. To hack this machine, you have to Remove that memory chip from its socket and install a memory chip, on which you've prepared a cheating program. The cheating program that I prepared, has an extra 100 lines of code basically that, when the polls are about to close, it goes in there and changes some votes stored in the machine. And there is an electronic log of all votes cast, so it changes the log too. So to install that, the attacker doesn't need to be a computer scientist, the attacker just needs to have A bunch of copies of this memory chip, with the fraudulent program on it. And for each voting machine, unscrew 10 screws to remove the panel that that covers the motherboard, pry out the ROM chip containing the legitimate program and install the ROM chip containing the fraudulent program. Other kinds of voting machines store their computer program that counts to votes in flash memory. And this can be updated Under the control of whatever computer program happens to be running in the voting machine. These voting machines, typically the generation developed in the 1990s and after, can be hacked without actually physically changing any hardware in the machine, just by installing a software upgrade Memory card in the same slot that one would normally install the ballot definition. And this particular attack was demonstrated by my colleague at Princeton, Professor Felton, In about 2007, working with 2 of his graduate students. But it's not just us at Princeton, there are many kinds of voting machines and The same kinds of hacks are applicable to all voting machines and have been demonstrated at several other universities, including University of Connecticut, Johns Hopkins, Michigan and others. There are cyber security issues in all parts of our election system. Before the election, voter registration databases. During the election, voting machines. After the election, vote tabulation, canvassing, precinct aggregation computers. Installing new software in a voting machine is not really much different from installing new software in any other kind of computer. Installing new software is how you hack a voting machine to cheat. In 2009, in the courtroom of the Superior Court of New Jersey, I demonstrated how to hack a voting machine. I wrote a vote stealing computer program that shifts votes from 1 candidate to another. Installing that vote stealing program in a voting machine takes 7 minutes per machine with a screwdriver. But really the software I built was not rocket science. Any computer programmer could write the same code. Once it's installed, it could steal elections without detection for years to come. Voting machines are often delivered to polling places several days before the election, to elementary schools, churches, firehouses. In these locations, anyone could gain access to a voting machine for 10 minutes. Between elections, the machines are routinely opened up for maintenance by county employees or private contractors. Let's assume they have the utmost integrity. But still in the US we try to run our elections so that we can trust the election results without relying on any one individual. Other computer scientists have demonstrated similar hacks on many models of machine. This is not just 1 glitch in 1 manufacturer's machine. It's the very nature of computers. So how can we trust our elections when it's so easy to make the computers cheat? Speaker 8: Mr. Appel, in that scenario, an attacker would actually have to have access to all 100 in the 1 county in order to manipulate the records. Speaker 5: In Georgia, that's not the case. The machines used in Georgia Have been demonstrated to be hackable through a virus that's carried on ballot definition cartridges, very much like this Stuxnet virus was, inserted into nuclear centrifuges in Iran. So, and in Speaker 8: that auditing system, in the auditing of these machines. We look at that. Is that correct? Speaker 5: I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question? Speaker 8: So, in those machines that have that vulnerability in the auditing process. Isn't that scanned? Don't we scan for that? Speaker 5: It's difficult to scan for that vulnerability in the sense of if you Ask a machine to report what software is loaded in it. If it's fraudulent software, it will lie. So, the AccuVote TS machines, used in Georgia and in a few counties in other states are particularly vulnerable to this kind of virus that can be carried to the machines even if the criminal attacker doesn't touch the machines or is not even in the same state with the machines. Cap. Speaker 9: With parts made all over the world, and software made all over the world, and as Sherry said, there's only 3 or 4 manufacturers, the the one core point That kind of election security experts and others have been making about why our votes are safe was that the decentralized nature of our, Voting systems, the thousands and thousands of of, voting offices around the country that administer the election is what kept safe because Russians would need to have tens of thousands of operatives go get physical access to machines to actually, infiltrate the election. We now know that's false. And that through a handful of simple attacks, into manufacturers not in the United States, The Russians could plant malware into, thousands of machines all at once and hack the entire U. S. Election without ever leaving the Kremlin. Speaker 10: Or is there a different way where you could just hack one machine and that would transmit a bug to other machines in the precinct, again, even though they're not connected to an internet. Speaker 2: Sure. So before we had an Internet, we had computers with floppy drives. And there were computer viruses that could spread from 1 computer to another over floppies. Electronic voting machines, some of them use memory cards, some of them have these big battery packs, some of them have local area networks. Studies conducted in 2007 by the state of California, state of Ohio, state of Florida found security vulnerabilities that could take advantage of these to engineer viruses where 1 compromised voting machine could then infect eventually the entire fleet of machines for an entire county. And Each of these studies found ways that regular poll workers and election officials going through their standard procedures and and standard operations Could unwittingly be used to transmit viruses from 1 machine to another through the motion. Typically at the end of the election day, you move a memory card through each of the machines in the precinct, and that's to collect the vote totals. That process can spread a virus. And there are other processes. The details vary from machine to machine. Speaker 10: Okay. So it's accurate to say that just because something is not connected to the internet, it does not have a vulnerability to cyber attack. Speaker 2: Being disconnected from the Internet helps, but it's not a panacea, okay? Speaker 11: When you and your colleagues hacked election systems, did you get caught? Speaker 0: We hacked, election systems as part of academic research where we had machines in our system. Did you get caught? Speaker 11: Did they did they see your intrusion into their systems? Speaker 0: The one instance when I was invited to hack a real voting system to while people were watching, was in Washington, D. C. In 2010, and in that instance it took less than 48 hours for us to change all the votes, and we were not caught. Speaker 11: Vice, Chairman. Speaker 0: I have sitting in my office right now actually, a deep old AccuVote TSX machine, a touchscreen machine that's still in use in 23 states, where, I've hacked it to give whatever outcome I want. It it really is that easy. And when you're talking about, when you're talking about these attacks, though, I don't think it's something that, You know, just in every case, a, a freshman in college could do it. Some states are a little bit better protected, but that's not who we're up against. We're up against nation state attackers that are among some of the most Powerful, adversaries in the world when it comes to cyber attacks, and which have routinely compromised highly protected sites like, like military installations, and large tech companies. I think that's the thing that I want voting officials and and voters to understand is quite what they're up against. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries and series, and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's why I say it's only a matter of time. Speaker 3: The standard arguments that, our elections can't be hacked in the US are some combination of physical security. You can't get access to the devices, they're not connected to the internet, they're tested before Election Day, and the system is too decentralized. It's run by, you know, a bunch of individual election officials and individual counties and and jurisdictions. So it's it's a it's a hard target. Most of this has already been debunked by, the previous speakers, but, physical security is pretty lax. Equipment, has sleepovers in school gymnasiums, and churches, and this and that. There are lots of, examples on the Internet of photos of, election, equipment warehouses, where the the Election officials warehouses with the door propped open and nobody watching. Just, it's just not true. It isn't true that the machines aren't connected to the Internet, and even if they weren't to the Internet that would still be hackable through other means. One of the things that hasn't been mentioned so far yet is supply chain hacks. There are components in these voting systems that come from foreign countries. A colleague of ours, Karsten Sherman, at the IT University of Copenhagen, Found Chinese pop songs in memory of a voting machine that he bought, on the Internet. So that those songs somehow made it through the quality control of The election equipment vendor, and then through, how many elections that it was actually used in by the local election official, and, and, you know, we're still there. Moreover, there's an issue in reporting, which I'm not going to talk about that much, but there are a number of states that outsource their reporting of elections to third parties, some of which are corporations based in other countries like Spain. So you've got to trust that the aggregation of the votes and the reporting of the votes is is, is accurate as well. There's a lot of technology being rolled out in this election, that had either not been used or not been used as widely before. This includes, much more widespread reliance on things like electronic poll books, which become a point of vulnerability that can disenfranchise people if they malfunction, if they lose their Internet connection, or if they've been hacked, some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election results using cellular modems or, the internet That, of course, introduces another point of vulnerability, not just to the data that's flowing, but also to the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Voting equipment itself, there are states that have rolled out touchscreen voting for all in person voters. This is, An unnecessary introduction of brittle and vulnerable technology. Many pieces of electronic technology that are involved in elections are Either incorporate, devices that were built overseas, or assembled overseas, and many crucial functions are being outsourced to foreign companies. One, noteworthy example that I'm especially concerned about, there is a Spanish firm, called CITL, which runs, they they provide election reporting for something like 11 US states. They're based in Spain, and they're bankrupt. So that could, obviously, is a point of failure where, someone could shed a lot of mistrust over the election results By simply falsifying what gets posted, even if the correct results could ultimately be recovered from durable reliable records, that would certainly, cast a lot of fear uncertainty and doubt on what's going on. There have been ransomware attacks on, government systems now including some voting systems, We know that there are cyber warfare attacks by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. There most states voter registration databases were, penetrated in 2016, there is a lot of evidence that data were changed, but that could certainly happen this time around. So all in all, there's a lot of confusion, there are a lot of points of vulnerability. There are a lot of known problems. There are some election vendors who have been hacked, before 2016. VR systems was hacked in Florida. Some of their clients were, there were phishing attacks against them this time, around, let's see, I forgot my name of it. Tyler Technologies, which provides some, vote by mail ballot, tracking and some vote aggregation reporting has also been hacked. So overall, there's an awful lot that can go wrong. Speaker 12: He saw no evidence of, Tampering with, no, voter voting machines or voter tallies. That's not true. It didn't happen. We just didn't see the evidence of it. Speaker 13: Well, there has been never a documented incident when votes have been changed during the real election. And my answer was please continue using these machines and that will remain to be true forever, Because these machines don't have a capability of providing you forensic evidence to see if they cannot prove they were honest, they cannot prove that they were have been hacked. They simply don't have the fundamental basic capabilities of providing you that forensic evidence, that data. Only way you can see that that machine was hacked if the attacker wanted to be found that it was hacked. That's a sad truth. So Anyone who says I have a information one way or another, that's an opinion. That's not fact based. Fact is, it can be done without leaving trace. Speaker 14: When you know how the system for looking for the evidence, you know that you won't find it because the systems are not recording, Generating, preserving or protecting meaningful forensic evidence. And this is from the very beginning to the end of the process everywhere. These systems really don't have a capability of recording and protecting any meaningful audit information or forensically important information. So a lot of times I would also argue that even if you try to take a look into the into the evidence, the problem is that there is no Evidence which is trustworthy and and worth on a lot. Even recently, a case where a voting machine was reporting, and I believe that was in the last year in North voting machine was in the race where they had 50,000 votes cast, was cast reporting to 1 candidate 164 or something like that votes. And when the paper was looped, that person actually get 26,000 vote and vote by 1 by 1,000 votes. Speaker 12: Wow. Speaker 14: So we we really need to have that paper ballot. There's nothing we don't have a technology to do electronic voltage. The problem the most most Driving thing is, first of all, from 2006 to now is nothing changed. The actual same version of software I hacked 2005 is still in use. It's those machines are still in 20 states. Mhmm. So they're still around. Even the so called new sold today is In the end of life version of of Windows, etcetera, like, just something which no other industry would be acceptable, would be remotely acceptable. So I think the most as overall, it is how outdated everything is And and how hard it is to make people to understand the the reality and and get the warning through that this needs to be fixed or things will get really, really worse, turn the worse. They're bad right now, but and I cannot even Cannot imagine what the worst would be looking like. Parties, they are not actually but a lot of these voting machines are not US origin. And I'm not only talking about the components being made in China or a voting machine being assembled in in Philippines, but also the very of the machine, the programming. In many many many voting machines, that programming, either whole or in the large part is Coming from a foreign from code sources. And it seems to be the case that actually the voting machine vendors, Generally speaking, either don't know or they refuse to tell the truth where the code actually comes. And it turned out that the system he is using exactly the same system which created this magnitude 16,022 votes in Volusia County for Al Gore. So I took a look into the system, figured out a couple of ways to manipulate the central tabulator. But I told I on this well, this is not elegant. You leave a audit trail. You leave a evidence, the bet bet, breadcrumbles. You can trace it. I was asked, well, if there what is the elegant way? So I have I don't know if there's 1. But if if there is, it's gotta be this memory card. Speaker 15: So it's so it's a memory card that fits into the voting machine that you found could be the more or less untraceable or hard to trace way to manipulate the results, whereas they were thinking it was something in the machine. You thought this was attack because you would see a ton of evidence and, like you said, breadcrumbs being left by the tampering party. Speaker 14: Well, it's it's no. It's if not even that. I was just Thinking about the architecture of the system. And with that architecture, it made sense that there's executable program in the memory card. And I was quickly told that that's impossible because it's against the certified rules. But, also, the vendor was dishonest about the origin of the card. So, well, if they are not Honest about one thing they're probably not honest about. The second thing, I found an executable program on a memory card. I found it's it's completely unprotected. This This memory card is so old. It's older than floppy drive. So it actually, I found it because I was I remember that I have seen it before floppy drives existed. So that's what I found who was the original manufacturer of it. And a, interesting The thing about this explanation afterwards was that demand 16,000 was malfunction Of the memory card, that's the, that's the reason why it happened. Not possible. That reason why it's not possible is that that memory card Doesn't know how to make negative numbers. So whatever caused that man respond 16,000 votes, which we don't know what caused it. At least the official explanation given at the time, not possible. Something else happened. Speaker 1: So everyone was focused in 2000 on the punch card machines and the problems that that brought. But in Fallucia County, there was an incident that occurred. It didn't A lot of attention. And the attention that it did get sort of disappeared and got lost in all of the focus on the punch card machines. What happened in Volusia County was around At 10 p. M. Midnight or sorry, 10 p. M. On election night. Prior to that, Al Gore in Volusia County was ahead of George Bush. But around 10 p. M, suddenly, Al Gore's number started reversing. And it reversed more than 16,000 votes. And in There aren't, it was all happening in 1 precinct, and of course, there weren't 16,000 voters in that 1 precinct. So Gore's numbers were actually showing a negative 16,000 in that precinct. And the explanation that election officials provided was that, a faulty memory card was inserted into the tabulating machine. Now, it wasn't, the, let's say, legitimate memory card. So there was 1 memory card for this precinct, and it was uploaded to a tabulator on election night. But the logs show that an hour after that memory card was uploaded, another 2nd memory card for that same precinct was uploaded. And after that 2nd card was uploaded, that's when the votes for Gore started disappearing. And no one has been able to explain what exactly happened with that, whether that was a rogue card that was intentionally designed to hack the votes and misfired and therefore, Erased too many votes for Gore or whether this was, you know, a software mishap. But no one has explained why 2 memory cards for the same precinct were uploaded. And that's that's sort of the main problem in terms of chains of custody, the fact that a second memory card was actually ever able to be uploaded. Speaker 6: And John Kerry has expressed misgivings about the 2004 vote in Ohio. Speaker 1: Yes. So they had concerns about the machines in Ohio. Ohio was still largely using punch card machines. They hadn't replaced theirs yet. But there were still counties there were counties that were already using optical scan machines and also paperless DRE machines. And he and his group, he revealed this only recently, actually went to court court to try and obtain the algorithms, the software, to look at the software to make sure that it would be counting votes accurately. And the courts denied access to it because the proprietary software on voting machines is considered a trade secret. And so the private voting machine companies go to court to fight against this, and the courts generally agree with them. Speaker 14: When I and others, when we 2005, 2006 got involved And up until 2008, we all thought now when the problem has been exposed, it will be fixed very quickly. It would it was completely Always incomprehensible for me and and other secretary researchers that now 2020, we are talking about this topic. And, also, we are 2020 using the same machines with the same software. It's just you wouldn't be using a a 30 year old PC with with no security patches, But that's exactly how the elections are conducted. Let's talk about everything in the world how this works. Speaker 16: Okay. Speaker 17: So Speaker 14: you have a voting message, a voting terminal. That's how you pass your ballot, either electronically or paper ballot, it's go scanning. And after that, these machines are reporting those results Very often, our our communication lies through the central tabulator. Now in both in the county level, or or state level, where the votes are accumulated in database, and along the path, there are number of data storage, systems databases. And if you manipulate those, you can create an illusion of a different results. And you can even do it in the about election reporting system. So instead of even hacking anything in the tabulator system, you are just creating wrong reporting. So there are a number of ways how you can, through this whole path, influence the results. And we have to actually step even further back, Steph, because if we look the election as whole, it's a myriad of system. We have voter registration system. Them. We have electronic poll book systems. We have the election management. We have the ballot casting. We have the tabulation, and we have the reporting. Any of these, if you have one of these, you can always have the result. You can disenfranchise voters so they can cast their ballot. You can change the the outcome. You can change the reporting. Each of these needs to be secured. None of these is less important than the others. And that's why we have been I think in the public mind, we have been focusing in a very narrow area, Which is you cast a ballot on how the ballot is counted, but not missing the whole big picture. How many other systems from a adversary, how from from ethical's point of view, where the other can go and achieve the same goal. How about the Internet? It really it's everything is connected to Internet either directly or indirectly. And the more modern voting machines, they actually have a mobile phone Modem, in to speak, they have a they have a mobile phone mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters. They are sending the results. So wireless is coming back to the voting message in the newer generations. Nice marketing material trying to tell it's not, but it is. A journalist in a year ago, she found 200 voting machines in the Internet. Voting machine vendors say, well, they are not in Internet because they are not pingable. My answer to that is, are you from the past? Because since since 15 years ago, nothing is really anymore pingable, And they are still connected to Internet. It's the the whole argument is 15 that argument was to have been meaning something 15 years ago. It doesn't mean anything today. And, again, I I was just came from Atlanta, and and they have new working machines because the judge ordered the old ones to be scrapped. And part of the things in the the judge's ruling was that, The finding was that the voting machine were programmed by basically 3 guys from their homes and who sent all the programming of the voting machine for next hours and over Internet to We distribute all the machines. Speaker 15: Oh, so these guys had programmed the machines from home, and then they they pushed the code update to the voting machines via the Internet. Speaker 14: We what they said but they pushed it to the state, and then the state pushed it to the counties. And, actually, this whole thing about, the critical election specific programming going over Internet is very common because lot of this programming is done by private companies, third party management companies. And it's, it has been shocking the last 2 years when I have been working for a number of secretaries of state And looking how the security has done in their state just to find that email, FTP with no security. These are the common methods to send the most mission critical programming from the private company, which might be out of state, to the local county who is putting it into the machines. It is whoever controls that data controls the election. Speaker 15: And these machines, they like you said, they have network cards. You show in Kill Chain, again, the documentary that we'll link in the show notes, that they have USB ports. They have memory card slots. They have modems and phone jacks sometimes. So these things were built for connectivity. They're not immune to connectivity. And we don't by the seem seemingly, we don't have to hack Hundreds of machines. These are networked. You can just make software that infects 1 and then dozens of others or just changes the data. Do you think we could, Is it possible so do you think it's possible that we could create a worm that it yet we get on 1 machine in the voting center and it just connects to the other machines covertly and infects them without the bad actors so much as laying a hand on the machine themselves. Speaker 14: The real, proof of concept virus was demonstrated over 10 years ago. So, that that already has been demonstrated publicly that voting machine virus which can, self propagate from 1 voting machine to another, that's a reality which We have sown it's possible. So beyond and that's one of the things why that was created was because, Again, when you say it's possible by showing the vulnerability, people said, well, I don't believe until you show it. So it's one of the rear Things where, a team of researchers developed in the actual virus just to show the logical outcome of the the the vulnerability. Yes. There can be a voting machine virus. Full stop. Here it is. Speaker 18: We've heard a lot from voting machine vendors and election officials that voting machines Can't be hacked because they're not connected to the Internet. All of those vulnerabilities that Andrew talked about, are not a problem because no one can access the machines. And it turns out that the message that they've been giving us for years, and particularly after the 2016 election, just isn't true. Voting machine vendors have sold election officials on these in use of modems. In some cases, the modems are embedded inside the voting machines. In other cases, there are external modems that get attached to the voting machine at the end of the election. So at the end of the election, the machine goes into shutdown mode And then this option pops up about modoming results. And so the system will automatically then dial in and send these votes, over a cellular modem to a server on the Internet that collects the results. So everyone will tell you, and they've told me every time I've spoken with them, that cellular modems are not really Internet connectivity. They will say that doesn't mean that the machine is connected to the Internet. It's using a cellular modem. Well, that's not true. And Election Systems and Software, which is tax. This is one of their statements over and over again with the public. But this is one of their own diagrams that they actually gave to Rhode Island in 2015. And if you see that circular part in the centre there showing that modem transmission using a wireless modem, They sit there, right there. It's on their own diagram that it's going over the internet. So what happens is that the transmission of the votes votes, that the voting machine will dial in using the cellular modem and it contacts the nearest cell tower. And then the data goes through that cell tower into the carrier's back end network. But then the data actually has to get to that county network, and it goes over the Internet to a system, a server that's on the Internet to receive those votes. So we've already now basically shown the misinformation of the transmission of those votes. So ES and S will then say, well, it doesn't matter because all of that process is secured. So the transmission of the votes are secured so that no one can intercept them and read the votes or alter them. The modem is configured in such a way so that no one can actually dial into the modem, it can only dial out, and it can only dial out when the machine shuts down at the end of the election. So apparently, there are all of these safeguards. And also, the back end system that receives the transmitted votes is supposed to communicate only with one of those authenticated machines with the modem. The problem is none of this has been tested or certified. The voting machines themselves go through sort of a federal testing lab process And through certification, the modem transmissions don't. So we don't know what's inside those modems. We don't know how they work. We don't know how they're configured. And ES and S doesn't have a good track record on implementing security. So we don't actually know that the way that they are saying that these are transmitted securely is actually case. So what can happen with a modem machine that's transmitting? So I don't know if you're familiar with something called a stingray. It's a device that law enforcement uses and the military uses. And what it does is it, masquerades as a legitimate cell tower. It transmits a much more powerful signal than the nearby cell tower so that your cell phone will connect to the stingray instead of the cell tower. And then it might pass it on to the cell tower as well. It's mostly used for tracking phones, but there are also Stingrays that are designed also to intercept the content of communication. So if you've got a cellular modem in a voting machine, a rogue person can put a rogue cell tower near some kind of voting precinct, whatever. And instead of that modem then connecting to that cell tower, they can connect to that rogue The rogue cell tower. You can intercept data. If it's not properly encrypted, you could intercept the data and change the results. Or you could basically swap out the a whole package of results if it's not authentically signed, and replace it with your own package of results. And so those go on to the server. If there's a vulnerability in that modem, A hacker can actually transmit malware back onto that voting machine through the rogue cell tower. And once you're in that voting machine, Either that way or maybe you've gotten into the voting machine prior when it's being programmed, you now actually control the configuration of that modem. So even if ES and S says that modem will only work at the end of the election and will only call out and not receive calls in. If you control the configuration of that modem, you change all of that. You can have that machine contact your system at any time you want, for however you want, so that you can do reconnaissance on that machine and study it and established your attack. There were a group of researchers that decided that they would try and see if they could find those backend servers that receive the votes that are transmitted by modem. So if you've got something that's transmitting the votes over the cellular network, there's something that has to be connected to the internet to receive them. So there is a server. And it turns out that they could actually, based on configuration information that's publicly available on the internet, that the voting machine vendors provide to election offices and the election offices post on the internet. They describe the type of that we have created a firewall that they use. It's made by Cisco. They describe the type of FTP software that receives the votes, that sits on that server. They describe the whole configuration, including the type of cellular modem that's embedded in their machines. So based on that information, they decided to see if they could look for that very specific footprint of ESNS machines that are receiving the votes. And they did a scan and they were able to find these systems on the Internet. So they found 9 Wisconsin counties that had systems connected to the Internet, 7 Florida counties, from 4 Michigan counties. They actually found systems in 10 different states, but these were the primary ones. And of course, these are all important critical swing states. So here's the thing. Election officials will tell you, well, the modem transmissions don't matter because we only turn on those modems for a very brief period, less than a minute at the end of the election to transmit. And that's not sufficient time for someone to hack. Any of the technical attack. But more importantly, it turns out these systems aren't just connected for a few minutes after an election. Those back end systems that receive the votes are quite often connected year round. You can see them when they're doing the scans. You can sometimes see them. They come up a couple of weeks. Some of the ones that are only up temporarily will sometimes come up a couple of weeks before the election because they want to test the transmission. And then they leave it on for those weeks before the election. And after the election, they might forget to take it down and it might stay up a couple of other weeks. But there are some that simply never take them down at all. And Wisconsin was one of them. They were on year round. These systems, so what are they? I describe this as a server, but that sounds kind of benign. What is happening is that the The votes are being transmitted, and on the receiving end there's a firewall that's connected to the internet. And behind the firewall, There is this FTP server that the votes are transmitted on. Now that FTP server is supposed to serve as kind of like a DMZ, a safe zone, right? So the votes are deposited and there's supposed to be then no direct connection to the system that actually tabulates the votes. But it turns out that's not the case at all. This is a diagram that ES and S created and handed out to election officials. And so you can see that the votes are coming over the Internet, and they're coming and there's the firewall, and then you see all those wires connected. And you see at the bottom there that EMS, that's the Election Management system. That is the system that tabulates the final results. So even though they say that, that transmission of votes over the Internet is just unofficial, Connected to that system that's receiving those unofficial votes is also the system that is tabulating the official results. What's more, that election management system is also used to program all the voting machines prior to an election. So when, I brought this To ES and S's attention, they didn't then say that nothing is connected to the Internet. What they said was none of those critical systems are pingable from the Internet because there's a firewall in front. So essentially what they're saying is that even though now first they've said that none of these systems are connected to the Internet. And now when they're faced with someone saying, well, they actually are connected, they say, well, they may be configured in some manner that you're showing, but there's a firewall in front of them and therefore, you can't see what's behind the firewall. But if you can find the firewall, then you find the systems that are behind the firewall. The only thing that's protecting anyone from getting into those critical systems behind the firewall are the rules of that firewall that say, only these certain systems can connect to us, only these certain systems can transmit data. That's simply software. It's configuration rules. And if you misconfigure that software, then anything can get into that firewall. And of course, many, many hacks happen because firewalls are misconfigured. Speaker 0: I was part of the team that did the first hands on study of any electronic voting machine used in the US and it was using exactly this machine. And what we found, well, we got one of these machines from a whistleblower, Brought it into a laboratory. Reverse engineered it. And well, here's the result of what we found. We we would run a mock election with George Washington and Benedict Arnold, just like this. And, wanted to know, well, if an attacker that could get malicious software into the machine somehow. Could they change the results? And what we found after reverse engineering the machine was, well, Yeah. There are actually a lot of problems with it. All the records of the vote are contained in, in computer memory. And, an attacker can manipulate the software that's supposed to be running in the machine in a pretty straightforward way. Before every election, officials program the machine with the names of the candidates on the ballot by, installing some that they can change the software running in the machine. There are, unauthenticated software update mechanisms, there are offer overflows and the code that reads the data files from this. There's even an interpreted programming language and the rules for how the votes will be counted are contained in an unauthenticated program contained on the memory card. So through any of those means, An attacker can change the software running on the voting machine and cause the machine to produce whatever election results they want. So that was in about 2007. We, we published the first paper about this. In and that's what we're going to do. And so we're going to have to do that. And so we're going to have to do that. And so we're flows and so forth. There have been hundreds and hundreds of pages of technical reports about US voting machines like this. But even after that, They haven't even updated the software since before the studies I talked about. That's how bad it is. And it's not even just a single model of machine that's the only problem. Country. There are about 52 different models of machines. They fall into essentially 2 styles, ones that scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen and many of them have been analyzed now by researchers, Looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case where a US voting machine has been analyzed by by competent in security researchers. They have found vulnerabilities that would let someone inject malicious software and change election data, every single case. Before every election, election officials have to program the voting machines with who's on the ballot and what are the rules for counting. Well, they make that election programming on a PC workstation somewhere, either at the, at the jurisdiction or at an outside vendor that does it for them. If an attacker can break into that workstation which is called an election management system. They can spread malicious code to all of the memory cards used to program all of the voting machines in the jurisdiction. And those election management system workstations sometimes are connected to the internet, or they're, or the data that's programmed into them passes through an internet connected system. So we're just 1 or 2 hops away from an online attacker. Now how well secured are these systems? Well, here's, a vendor that did the election programming for, in a large fraction of my state in 2016. And we can just take a look at their website to see how secure this is likely to be. You can see, first of all, they don't have any HTTPS. Here are lots of nice, high resolution photographs of their warehouse, in case you want to break in. And perhaps most interestingly, here's their employee directory with everyone's name, job title, email address and photograph. So if I wanted to break into this company, let's say I was the attacker, I'd probably start by forging an email from, let's say, Larry, the president here, to Sue, his administrative assistant, asking her to urgently open an attachment. Now, of course, when she does, that attachment has my malware in it. I have a foothold into their network, and I can try to spread from there to the election management system and to the voting machines in most of the state. Tampering with the national election result in my country it's easier than well, easier than even I thought in 2016. I keep learning things that convince me that the situation is scarier than, than even experts had thought. You identify the states that are most weakly protected and going to be close. Target the computers that are going to program voting machines there, spread malware to machines to change a fraction of the votes, and then rely on the fact that most states, even if they have a paper record, are not going to rigorously use it to check that the computers are right. But the fact is that in close national contests in the US, the result really only hinges on the result in a small number of states. You've heard about the swing states in any given election. The ones that are, really competitive. In such a situation, an attacker can, before the election, identify which states are likely to be close. Try probing all of them in the way that the Russians did the voter registration systems in 2016 and just find the weakest swing states and attack there. So in this way, the American system converts, diversity of implementation into basically this patchwork of strength and weakness that gives attackers a menu of possible places to strike. It makes us weaker in close elections. So just to review, you look at the polls before the election and figure out which states were likely to be close. Probe all of them, find the ones with the weakest protection, then hack into the, election management systems there or at the outside vendors the states use. Once you hack into the election management system, you can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and have your code say, swap 10% of the votes in the places you infected. Then even if the votes are also recorded on a piece of paper, you don't have to worry. Because in most of those states, they're going to just toss the paper out without looking Speaker 5: Modems in voting machines are a bad idea. Those modems are network connections. And that leaves them vulnerable to hacking by anybody who can connect to that network. Speaker 19: ESNS insists While there are 14,000 of its modems in use, there are firewalls separating those modems from the public Internet. Speaker 5: Once a hacker Starts talking to the voting machine through the modem. They can hack the software in the voting machine and make it cheat in future elections. Speaker 17: What is the vehicle for the transmission from the ICP? Is it cellular modem versus VPN? It is a cellular modem that can be configured in a VPN. Right. And we currently in Chicago and Cook County, we work with Verizon to, secure that network. What wireless chipset Slash modem does the hardware have? We support a variety. So, it's really up to the jurisdictions, what technology they want to use, what's compatible with their networks. Speaker 16: Currently, in some jurisdictions, we're using, Basically a modem that is a three d modem, GSM, but we can support multiple varieties of modem that can be. Speaker 17: Including latest 4 gs standards Speaker 14: as well. Speaker 17: So the answers to the next question, is it Speaker 3: 3 gs or 4 gs? Verizon, 8 gs or 2 gs or Sprint, Speaker 5: I'm assuming Speaker 17: all? Yeah, all networks. Speaker 15: Just to Speaker 17: ask a quick question. Yes, I mean, we actually transmit from the ICP in Mongolia as well. So Speaker 7: We're not committed to networks. Speaker 16: And in Puerto Rico, there is 3 vendors because the island is not covered by any by any of the vendors completely. So we use 3 different cellular vendors for some ICPs with this vendor Claro, AT and T, MT Mobile, I think, in the different parts of the app. Speaker 14: More modern attack voting machines. They actually have a mobile phone modem, and to speak, they have a they have a mobile phone mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters. They are sending the results. Speaker 3: Some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election results using cellular modems or, the Internet. That of course introduces another point of vulnerability, not just to the data that's flowing, but also to the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Speaker 1: Many of these voting machines have modems embedded into them. And the modems are used at the end of the election to transmit the vote totals on election night to the county, The, elections office. So these modems contact their cellular modems, and they contact the cellular network, they contact the cell tower. So the cell tower traffic these In our modern times, it actually goes through Internet. It goes through the same kinds of routers and switches that the regular Internet traffic goes to. But also, in between that cell tower and that voting machine, An intruder can, intercept data going to the cell tower and intercept that that communication, that phone call. If you can trick a voting machine into, contacting your device, A fake cellular tower instead of a legitimate tower. You can actually use that connection to get back into the voting machine and get back into the tabulator, and then alter votes and software. Speaker 20: Virginia just stopped Using touch screen computer voting because it's so vulnerable. Speaker 18: We need to look at Speaker 20: all the voting machines. Every secretary of state needs to be, You know, assisted in making sure that they are not being, hacked and and attacked. Speaker 6: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. Speaker 21: But researchers have repeatedly demonstrated That ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 22: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools, and resources are able to breach voting machines In a matter of minutes. Speaker 23: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 21: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cyber security 101, directing that you install remote access software, which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 24: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 25: You could easily Hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things, but in fact 3 companies are controlling that. It is the individual voting machines That some pose that pose some of the greatest risks. Speaker 26: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, Right? Which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 24: Workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. It was possible to switch votes. 43% Speaker 21: of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, Including backdoors. Speaker 3: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year, where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 26: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the capitol, where we brought in, folks Who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 22: Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software, like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable To the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 24: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state, or maybe 1 or 2, Or maybe just a few counties in one swing step. Speaker 27: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through. You have 21 states that were hacked into. They didn't find out about it for a year. Right now, we have over a dozen dozen states That either don't have any backup paper ballots or only have them partially. Do you think that our adversaries don't know what those states are? Of course, they know what those states are. And if we have a close election in the general election, in a presidential race, and one state's out withstanding And their ballot boxes get hacked into, their elections get hacked into, we will have absolutely no backup.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

25/ In effect, the left was allowed to discuss the vulnerabilities of voting machines after the 2016 election, and the right was banned from social media platforms for discussing those very same vulnerabilities after the 2020 election.

Video Transcript AI Summary
Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerability, highlighting the need to assess all voting machines for security. Researchers have shown that voting systems are easily tampered with, even by hackers with limited resources. Instances of electronic voting machines deleting or switching votes have been reported in Georgia and Texas. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters. The control of voting machines lies with three companies, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines, and unsupported software further increases vulnerability. The potential consequences include compromised election results and a loss of faith in the democratic system.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Virginia just stopped using touchscreen computer voting because it's so vulnerable. Right. We need to look at all the voting machines. Every secretary of state needs to be, you know, assisted in making sure that they are not being hacked and and attacked. Speaker 1: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. Speaker 2: Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 0: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter of minutes. Speaker 3: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switch votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 4: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cybersecurity 101, directing that you install Remote access software, which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 5: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 2: You could easily Hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things, but in fact 3 companies are controlling that. It is the individual voting machines That some pose, that pose some of the greatest risks. Speaker 6: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 5: The workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. Speaker 4: It was possible to switch votes. 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, Including backdoors. Speaker 7: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year, Where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 6: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the capitol, where we brought in, folks Who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 8: Aging systems also frequently rely On unsupported software, like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable To the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 5: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state or maybe 1 or 2 Or maybe just a few counties in one swing state. Speaker 2: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through. You have 21 states that were hacked into. They didn't find out about it for a year. Right now, we have over a dozen dozen states that either don't have any backup paper ballots Or only have them partially. You think that our adversaries don't know what those states are? Of course, they know what those states are. And if we have a close election in the general election, in a presidential race, and one state's out withstanding and their Ballot boxes get hacked into. Their elections get hacked into. We will have absolutely no backup. Stalin was unconcerned about the vote. After all, he explained, he said that who voted was completely unimportant. What was Extraordinarily important, in his words, was who would count the votes and how. It is time to put politics aside and come together to secure the future of our election. So whether you're a 4 star general, A 4th grade teacher or a computer engineer at Foursquare, this is an issue that unites us. Speaker 8: In at least 40 states, elections are carried out using machines that are at least a decade old. And like any technology, -They're susceptible to increasing failure with age. Some state officials have had to turn to eBay to find critical components like dot matrix printers, Decades old storage devices and analog modems, aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software Like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable to the latest Methods of cyber attack. Speaker 3: In 2016, state election websites in Illinois and Arizona were hacked by intruders who installed malware and downloaded sensitive voter information. Speaker 6: It is worth fighting for integrity in our election system, which means that they are free from interference by a hostile Or an unfriendly nation. Let's put the resources into upgrading the state's election systems. Because what we know is this. There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. I sit on the senate intelligence committee and senate homeland security committee. And we receive all kinds of information about the vulnerabilities to our national Security. We are vulnerable in terms of foreign interference with our elections. It's my understanding that some of the election system Vendors have required states to sign agreements, that prevent or inhibit independent, security testing. There's a saying that I'm sure Many of you have heard, which is the you know the difference between being hacked and not being hacked? Is knowing you've been hacked. Speaker 0: And they are still looking for ways to steal information about Voter registration, for example. There are some text experts in Silicon Valley Valley with whom I have met who say that, You know, maybe what they'll do this next time is to really disrupt the actual election. Shut down the servers that you send results to. Interfere with the operation of voting machines because still too many of them are linked to the Internet. So there we are still very vulnerable. Speaker 9: I mean, I can tell you in Virginia, when I was governor, I had to replace all the machines. Because I remember when I first voted when I went to Richmond, moved down as governor, I remember I kept voting in the senate race, kept voting for the Democrat. Republican name kept coming up. Three times that happened. Speaker 1: What do Speaker 4: you mean kept Coming up. Speaker 9: So I you know, we had the touch screens. I was voting for Mark Warner, our senator, and Ed Gosphy's name was light up. Happened to me 3 times. Finally, the 4th time, Mark Damon, I quickly hit vote, and I got out of there. You know, all the cameras are looking at me like this guy doesn't know how to vote. I mean, what's going on? So then I had an investigation done, and listen to this. I brought in some technology experts. They were able to hack into our machines from off-site In about 5 or 6 minutes, and within 4 minutes, they were able to change a vote. IDD certified all the machines. Now in Virginia, we have paper ballots. Speaker 4: 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have Serious security flaws, including backdoors. These companies are accountable to no one. They won't answer basic questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the biggest companies Won't answer any questions at all. 5 states have no paper trail, And that means there is no way to prove the numbers the voting machines put out are legitimate. So much for cybersecurity 101. The vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions Nationwide, use election management systems that run on old software That is soon gonna be out of date and ripe for exploitation by hackers according To an exhaustive analysis by the Associated Press, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, and North Carolina, among others, Are all at risk. Even the state of Georgia, which just passed legislation to buy new voting machines, is on track to buy equipment that suffers from this significant cybersecurity weakness. Let's say the election is decided by a small percentage And people in America don't think that the election was fair. The effect that would have On our 200 year experiment in self governance, our democratic system Would take a real hit. Our elections weren't secure last week And they sure as heck aren't secure this week. And anybody who says otherwise It's either selling the voting machines or simply has a malicious intent towards our elections. At one point in the intelligence committee, both sides seemed to agree that no votes were changed In the 2016 election, and I said, the experts I talk to say that Until you have a forensic analysis of a vote, until you go in there and scrub the whole system, You can't really say that. So they're giving these voting machines specifically the hack into how successful were they? Speaker 1: Well, the the ongoing record Was, they hacked within 90 minutes of, being, being in the same space as the voting machines. Now these are not hackers that are actually touching the machines. They're doing this from across the room, on, on Internet like connections. But what it demonstrated, Pedro, is that the machines that we count on to make the basic connection between the American voter And the election results are vulnerable if they're in any way connected to the Internet. Speaker 4: And so when you say hacked, what were they able to do once they gained Access to the machines. Speaker 1: All sorts of things. They could manipulate, the outcome of the vote, they could manipulate the tally, they could delete the tally, and and they could compromise the vote in any number of ways. Just it was limited only by the hackers' creativity. Just how vulnerable Speaker 10: the machines were. I mean, what we found is that These machines were purchased by, local voting authorities, state and local voting authorities maybe 10 years ago. In many cases, the software and the hardware have not been updated, so they're as vulnerable as an old laptop That we might have, in in your home that you no longer use because it's just so out of date. Then what we found is that the supply chain for these these machines is largely un plotted. I mean, We found parts from China. We found, digital electronic parts from all over the world. By way of hacking, there's the potential that the actual vote tally could be compromised. So votes could be changed from this to that. Or votes could be suppressed, votes could be deleted, votes could be added, so you could actually change the tally itself.
Saved - June 4, 2023 at 9:05 AM

@Curiousityfirst - DogAndBone @Curious Cat

@jhalderm the same guy that found the Dominion vulnerability, wherein instead of stating they breached their contract, he ensured that DOMINION's CVR's were "sanitised" to make it difficult to analyse. @JanuszP20 @noodles @CannConActual @TxSaving https://t.co/AL4uliCgdh

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

🚨Hacking America's Election System 1 hour of computer scientists, election security experts, and Senate Democrats talking about how easy it is to hack voting machines. @KariLake @katiehobbs @GenFlynn @realMikeLindell @bgmasters @PatrickByrne @JackPosobiec @DavidSacks @elonmusk https://t.co/sH4Ft0iMsB

Video Transcript AI Summary
Voting machines in the US are vulnerable to hacking and manipulation, according to security researchers. These machines, which come in various models, have been found to have security vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious software and change election data. The most efficient way to hack the machines is through the machine used to program them, as it can pass rogue software to the voting machines. Contrary to popular belief, many voting machines are connected to the internet, either through wireless modems or other means, making them susceptible to cyber attacks. The lack of proper security measures and outdated systems make it only a matter of time before election results are compromised.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine like a computer virus, and silently change election outcomes, and in every single case We've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. Across the country, there are about 52 different models of machines. They they fall into essentially 2 styles. Ones that scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen. And many of them have been analyzed now by researchers, looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case where a US voting machine has been analyzed by competent security researchers, They have found vulnerabilities that would let someone inject malicious software and change election data. Every single case. Speaker 1: The better or the more efficient way of hacking machines would be to subvert them all through the machine that's used to actually program those machines. So prior to each election, the county election office or the voting machine vendor will actually program memory cards for that election. It tells the machine who are the candidates, what are the, you know, the the contests being decided, and that gets It's inserted into the voting machine. If you can alter, if you can subvert that machine that is used to program those memory cards, then you can pass rogue software to the voting machine. Speaker 0: Voting machines that are not connected to the internet. This is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately, it's not actually true. Many new voting machines that come with 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connected to the internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me, that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the Internet right in the middle of the election, potentially at the most vulnerable Speaker 2: time. Studies conducted in 2007 by the state of California, state of Ohio, state of Florida found security vulnerabilities that could take advantage of these To engineer viruses where 1 compromised voting machine could then infect eventually the entire fleet of machines for an entire county. Typically at the end of the election day, you move a memory card through each of the machines in the precinct, and that's to collect the vote totals. That process can spread a virus. And there are other processes. The details vary from machine to machine. Speaker 3: When you say hacked, what were they able to do once they gained access to the machines? Speaker 4: All sorts of Executally manipulate the outcome of the vote. They could manipulate the tally. They could delete the tally, and and they could compromise the vote in any number of ways. Speaker 5: The machines used in Georgia have been demonstrated to be hackable through a virus that's carried on ballot definition cartridges. Very much like this Duxnet virus was inserted into nuclear centrifuges in Iran. Speaker 3: There are a number of states that outsource their reporting of elections to third parties, some of which are corporations based in other countries like Spain. So you've got to trust that the aggregation of the votes and the reporting of the votes is accurate as well. Speaker 0: I'm pretty sure my undergrad computer security class at Michigan could have changed the outcome of the 2016 teen Michigan election if we wanted to. It is that bad. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries, and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's that's why I say it's only a matter of time. Speaker 6: Unfortunately, in a lot of these systems, The audit trails are just as vulnerable as the other aspects of the system. So there may not be good forensic evidence of a successful intrusion. With the current design, we cannot be universally confident that it hasn't happened. And it's probably only a matter of time before it will. Speaker 7: I come here today as a computer scientist who spent the better part of the last quarter century studying Election system security. As you're well aware, the integrity of elections across the US depends heavily on the integrity of computers and Software systems. Unfortunately, much of this infrastructure has proven dangerously vulnerable to tampering and attack, and in some cases, In ways that cannot be easily detected or corrected, after the fact. These vulnerabilities can create practical avenues for, corrupt candidates or foreign adversaries to do everything from cause large scale disruption on Election Day to potentially, undetectably alter, election outcomes in some cases. So let me begin with the voting equipment itself. To be blunt, it's a widely recognized, really indisputable fact that every piece of computerized voting equipment in use at polling places today Can be easily compromised, in ways that have the potential to disrupt election, operations, compromise firmware and software, Potentially alter, vote tallies in the absence of, other safeguards. This is partly a consequence of historically poor design and implementation by equipment vendors, but it's ultimately a reflection of the nature of complex software. It's simply beyond the state of the art, to build software systems that can reliably withstand targeted attack By a determined adversary in this kind of an environment. The vulnerabilities are real. They're serious. And absent a surprising and very fundamental break through in my field, which I would welcome, but I don't see coming, soon, probably inevitable. We give most of the attention to vulnerabilities in voting machines, But that's not the whole story. Each of the more than 5,000 jurisdictions responsible for running elections across the nation Must maintain a number of critical information systems that are attractive targets for disruption by adversaries. Most important of these are voter registration databases, the systems that report, final results, and so forth. Unfortunately, There are even fewer standards for how to secure these systems. The administration of these systems varies widely. And the threats against these systems are often even more, acute than the threats against individual voting systems. You know, just as we don't expect the local sheriff to single handedly defend against military ground invasions, we shouldn't expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services, but that's precisely what we've been asking them, to do. Speaker 0: I'm a professor of computer science and have spent the last 10 years studying the electronic voting systems that our nation relies on. My conclusion from that work is that our highly computerized election infrastructure that is vulnerable to sabotage, and even to cyber attacks that could change votes. These realities risk making our election results more difficult for the American people to trust. I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly, as part of a decade of research, studying the technology that operates elections and learning how to make it stronger. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine, like a computer virus, and silently change election outcomes. We've studied touch screen and optical scan systems, and in every single case we've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. These capabilities are certainly within reach for America's enemies. As you know, states choose their own voting technology. And while some states are doing well with security, others are alarmingly vulnerable. This puts the entire nation at risk. In close elections, an attacker can probe the most important swing states or swing counties, find areas with the weakest protection, and strike there. In a close election year changing a few votes in key, localities could be enough to tip national results. The key lesson from 2016 is that these threats are real. Some say the fact that voting machines aren't directly connected to the Internet makes them secure, but unfortunately this is not true. Voting machines are not as distant from the Internet as they may seem. So the way these attacks work Is that before every election, every voting machine needs to be programmed with the design of the ballot, the names of the races and candidates. And voting officials do that by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker can infect that memory card With malicious code, well, when the memory card is inserted into the machine, it can change the programming running on the voting machine And caused the voting machine to, at the end of the election, output whatever results the attacker wants. Speaker 5: The machine that I hacked is called the Sequoia AVC Advantage, now called the Dominion AVC Advantage. It's in The computer program that counts the votes on this machine is in a read only memory that's mounted in a socket on the motherboard. To hack this machine, you have to Remove that memory chip from its socket and install a memory chip, on which you've prepared a cheating program. The cheating program that I prepared, has an extra 100 lines of code basically that, when the polls are about to close, it goes in there and changes some votes stored in the machine. And there is an electronic log of all votes cast, so it changes the log too. So to install that, the attacker doesn't need to be a computer scientist, the attacker just needs to have A bunch of copies of this memory chip, with the fraudulent program on it. And for each voting machine, unscrew 10 screws to remove the panel that that covers the motherboard, pry out the ROM chip containing the legitimate program and install the ROM chip containing the fraudulent program. Other kinds of voting machines store their computer program that counts to votes in flash memory. And this can be updated Under the control of whatever computer program happens to be running in the voting machine. These voting machines, typically the generation developed in the 1990s and after, can be hacked without actually physically changing any hardware in the machine, just by installing a software upgrade Memory card in the same slot that one would normally install the ballot definition. And this particular attack was demonstrated by my colleague at Princeton, Professor Felton, In about 2007, working with 2 of his graduate students. But it's not just us at Princeton, there are many kinds of voting machines and The same kinds of hacks are applicable to all voting machines and have been demonstrated at several other universities, including University of Connecticut, Johns Hopkins, Michigan and others. There are cyber security issues in all parts of our election system. Before the election, voter registration databases. During the election, voting machines. After the election, vote tabulation, canvassing, precinct aggregation computers. Installing new software in a voting machine is not really much different from installing new software in any other kind of computer. Installing new software is how you hack a voting machine to cheat. In 2009, in the courtroom of the Superior Court of New Jersey, I demonstrated how to hack a voting machine. I wrote a vote stealing computer program that shifts votes from 1 candidate to another. Installing that vote stealing program in a voting machine takes 7 minutes per machine with a screwdriver. But really the software I built was not rocket science. Any computer programmer could write the same code. Once it's installed, it could steal elections without detection for years to come. Voting machines are often delivered to polling places several days before the election, to elementary schools, churches, firehouses. In these locations, anyone could gain access to a voting machine for 10 minutes. Between elections, the machines are routinely opened up for maintenance by county employees or private contractors. Let's assume they have the utmost integrity. But still in the US we try to run our elections so that we can trust the election results without relying on any one individual. Other computer scientists have demonstrated similar hacks on many models of machine. This is not just 1 glitch in 1 manufacturer's machine. It's the very nature of computers. So how can we trust our elections when it's so easy to make the computers cheat? Speaker 8: Mr. Appel, in that scenario, an attacker would actually have to have access to all 100 in the 1 county in order to manipulate the records. Speaker 5: In Georgia, that's not the case. The machines used in Georgia Have been demonstrated to be hackable through a virus that's carried on ballot definition cartridges, very much like this Stuxnet virus was, inserted into nuclear centrifuges in Iran. So, and in Speaker 8: that auditing system, in the auditing of these machines. We look at that. Is that correct? Speaker 5: I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question? Speaker 8: So, in those machines that have that vulnerability in the auditing process. Isn't that scanned? Don't we scan for that? Speaker 5: It's difficult to scan for that vulnerability in the sense of if you Ask a machine to report what software is loaded in it. If it's fraudulent software, it will lie. So, the AccuVote TS machines, used in Georgia and in a few counties in other states are particularly vulnerable to this kind of virus that can be carried to the machines even if the criminal attacker doesn't touch the machines or is not even in the same state with the machines. Cap. Speaker 9: With parts made all over the world, and software made all over the world, and as Sherry said, there's only 3 or 4 manufacturers, the the one core point That kind of election security experts and others have been making about why our votes are safe was that the decentralized nature of our, Voting systems, the thousands and thousands of of, voting offices around the country that administer the election is what kept safe because Russians would need to have tens of thousands of operatives go get physical access to machines to actually, infiltrate the election. We now know that's false. And that through a handful of simple attacks, into manufacturers not in the United States, The Russians could plant malware into, thousands of machines all at once and hack the entire U. S. Election without ever leaving the Kremlin. Speaker 10: Or is there a different way where you could just hack one machine and that would transmit a bug to other machines in the precinct, again, even though they're not connected to an internet. Speaker 2: Sure. So before we had an Internet, we had computers with floppy drives. And there were computer viruses that could spread from 1 computer to another over floppies. Electronic voting machines, some of them use memory cards, some of them have these big battery packs, some of them have local area networks. Studies conducted in 2007 by the state of California, state of Ohio, state of Florida found security vulnerabilities that could take advantage of these to engineer viruses where 1 compromised voting machine could then infect eventually the entire fleet of machines for an entire county. And Each of these studies found ways that regular poll workers and election officials going through their standard procedures and and standard operations Could unwittingly be used to transmit viruses from 1 machine to another through the motion. Typically at the end of the election day, you move a memory card through each of the machines in the precinct, and that's to collect the vote totals. That process can spread a virus. And there are other processes. The details vary from machine to machine. Speaker 10: Okay. So it's accurate to say that just because something is not connected to the internet, it does not have a vulnerability to cyber attack. Speaker 2: Being disconnected from the Internet helps, but it's not a panacea, okay? Speaker 11: When you and your colleagues hacked election systems, did you get caught? Speaker 0: We hacked, election systems as part of academic research where we had machines in our system. Did you get caught? Speaker 11: Did they did they see your intrusion into their systems? Speaker 0: The one instance when I was invited to hack a real voting system to while people were watching, was in Washington, D. C. In 2010, and in that instance it took less than 48 hours for us to change all the votes, and we were not caught. Speaker 11: Vice, Chairman. Speaker 0: I have sitting in my office right now actually, a deep old AccuVote TSX machine, a touchscreen machine that's still in use in 23 states, where, I've hacked it to give whatever outcome I want. It it really is that easy. And when you're talking about, when you're talking about these attacks, though, I don't think it's something that, You know, just in every case, a, a freshman in college could do it. Some states are a little bit better protected, but that's not who we're up against. We're up against nation state attackers that are among some of the most Powerful, adversaries in the world when it comes to cyber attacks, and which have routinely compromised highly protected sites like, like military installations, and large tech companies. I think that's the thing that I want voting officials and and voters to understand is quite what they're up against. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries and series, and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's why I say it's only a matter of time. Speaker 3: The standard arguments that, our elections can't be hacked in the US are some combination of physical security. You can't get access to the devices, they're not connected to the internet, they're tested before Election Day, and the system is too decentralized. It's run by, you know, a bunch of individual election officials and individual counties and and jurisdictions. So it's it's a it's a hard target. Most of this has already been debunked by, the previous speakers, but, physical security is pretty lax. Equipment, has sleepovers in school gymnasiums, and churches, and this and that. There are lots of, examples on the Internet of photos of, election, equipment warehouses, where the the Election officials warehouses with the door propped open and nobody watching. Just, it's just not true. It isn't true that the machines aren't connected to the Internet, and even if they weren't to the Internet that would still be hackable through other means. One of the things that hasn't been mentioned so far yet is supply chain hacks. There are components in these voting systems that come from foreign countries. A colleague of ours, Karsten Sherman, at the IT University of Copenhagen, Found Chinese pop songs in memory of a voting machine that he bought, on the Internet. So that those songs somehow made it through the quality control of The election equipment vendor, and then through, how many elections that it was actually used in by the local election official, and, and, you know, we're still there. Moreover, there's an issue in reporting, which I'm not going to talk about that much, but there are a number of states that outsource their reporting of elections to third parties, some of which are corporations based in other countries like Spain. So you've got to trust that the aggregation of the votes and the reporting of the votes is is, is accurate as well. There's a lot of technology being rolled out in this election, that had either not been used or not been used as widely before. This includes, much more widespread reliance on things like electronic poll books, which become a point of vulnerability that can disenfranchise people if they malfunction, if they lose their Internet connection, or if they've been hacked, some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election results using cellular modems or, the internet That, of course, introduces another point of vulnerability, not just to the data that's flowing, but also to the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Voting equipment itself, there are states that have rolled out touchscreen voting for all in person voters. This is, An unnecessary introduction of brittle and vulnerable technology. Many pieces of electronic technology that are involved in elections are Either incorporate, devices that were built overseas, or assembled overseas, and many crucial functions are being outsourced to foreign companies. One, noteworthy example that I'm especially concerned about, there is a Spanish firm, called CITL, which runs, they they provide election reporting for something like 11 US states. They're based in Spain, and they're bankrupt. So that could, obviously, is a point of failure where, someone could shed a lot of mistrust over the election results By simply falsifying what gets posted, even if the correct results could ultimately be recovered from durable reliable records, that would certainly, cast a lot of fear uncertainty and doubt on what's going on. There have been ransomware attacks on, government systems now including some voting systems, We know that there are cyber warfare attacks by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. There most states voter registration databases were, penetrated in 2016, there is a lot of evidence that data were changed, but that could certainly happen this time around. So all in all, there's a lot of confusion, there are a lot of points of vulnerability. There are a lot of known problems. There are some election vendors who have been hacked, before 2016. VR systems was hacked in Florida. Some of their clients were, there were phishing attacks against them this time, around, let's see, I forgot my name of it. Tyler Technologies, which provides some, vote by mail ballot, tracking and some vote aggregation reporting has also been hacked. So overall, there's an awful lot that can go wrong. Speaker 12: He saw no evidence of, Tampering with, no, voter voting machines or voter tallies. That's not true. It didn't happen. We just didn't see the evidence of it. Speaker 13: Well, there has been never a documented incident when votes have been changed during the real election. And my answer was please continue using these machines and that will remain to be true forever, Because these machines don't have a capability of providing you forensic evidence to see if they cannot prove they were honest, they cannot prove that they were have been hacked. They simply don't have the fundamental basic capabilities of providing you that forensic evidence, that data. Only way you can see that that machine was hacked if the attacker wanted to be found that it was hacked. That's a sad truth. So Anyone who says I have a information one way or another, that's an opinion. That's not fact based. Fact is, it can be done without leaving trace. Speaker 14: When you know how the system for looking for the evidence, you know that you won't find it because the systems are not recording, Generating, preserving or protecting meaningful forensic evidence. And this is from the very beginning to the end of the process everywhere. These systems really don't have a capability of recording and protecting any meaningful audit information or forensically important information. So a lot of times I would also argue that even if you try to take a look into the into the evidence, the problem is that there is no Evidence which is trustworthy and and worth on a lot. Even recently, a case where a voting machine was reporting, and I believe that was in the last year in North voting machine was in the race where they had 50,000 votes cast, was cast reporting to 1 candidate 164 or something like that votes. And when the paper was looped, that person actually get 26,000 vote and vote by 1 by 1,000 votes. Speaker 12: Wow. Speaker 14: So we we really need to have that paper ballot. There's nothing we don't have a technology to do electronic voltage. The problem the most most Driving thing is, first of all, from 2006 to now is nothing changed. The actual same version of software I hacked 2005 is still in use. It's those machines are still in 20 states. Mhmm. So they're still around. Even the so called new sold today is In the end of life version of of Windows, etcetera, like, just something which no other industry would be acceptable, would be remotely acceptable. So I think the most as overall, it is how outdated everything is And and how hard it is to make people to understand the the reality and and get the warning through that this needs to be fixed or things will get really, really worse, turn the worse. They're bad right now, but and I cannot even Cannot imagine what the worst would be looking like. Parties, they are not actually but a lot of these voting machines are not US origin. And I'm not only talking about the components being made in China or a voting machine being assembled in in Philippines, but also the very of the machine, the programming. In many many many voting machines, that programming, either whole or in the large part is Coming from a foreign from code sources. And it seems to be the case that actually the voting machine vendors, Generally speaking, either don't know or they refuse to tell the truth where the code actually comes. And it turned out that the system he is using exactly the same system which created this magnitude 16,022 votes in Volusia County for Al Gore. So I took a look into the system, figured out a couple of ways to manipulate the central tabulator. But I told I on this well, this is not elegant. You leave a audit trail. You leave a evidence, the bet bet, breadcrumbles. You can trace it. I was asked, well, if there what is the elegant way? So I have I don't know if there's 1. But if if there is, it's gotta be this memory card. Speaker 15: So it's so it's a memory card that fits into the voting machine that you found could be the more or less untraceable or hard to trace way to manipulate the results, whereas they were thinking it was something in the machine. You thought this was attack because you would see a ton of evidence and, like you said, breadcrumbs being left by the tampering party. Speaker 14: Well, it's it's no. It's if not even that. I was just Thinking about the architecture of the system. And with that architecture, it made sense that there's executable program in the memory card. And I was quickly told that that's impossible because it's against the certified rules. But, also, the vendor was dishonest about the origin of the card. So, well, if they are not Honest about one thing they're probably not honest about. The second thing, I found an executable program on a memory card. I found it's it's completely unprotected. This This memory card is so old. It's older than floppy drive. So it actually, I found it because I was I remember that I have seen it before floppy drives existed. So that's what I found who was the original manufacturer of it. And a, interesting The thing about this explanation afterwards was that demand 16,000 was malfunction Of the memory card, that's the, that's the reason why it happened. Not possible. That reason why it's not possible is that that memory card Doesn't know how to make negative numbers. So whatever caused that man respond 16,000 votes, which we don't know what caused it. At least the official explanation given at the time, not possible. Something else happened. Speaker 1: So everyone was focused in 2000 on the punch card machines and the problems that that brought. But in Fallucia County, there was an incident that occurred. It didn't A lot of attention. And the attention that it did get sort of disappeared and got lost in all of the focus on the punch card machines. What happened in Volusia County was around At 10 p. M. Midnight or sorry, 10 p. M. On election night. Prior to that, Al Gore in Volusia County was ahead of George Bush. But around 10 p. M, suddenly, Al Gore's number started reversing. And it reversed more than 16,000 votes. And in There aren't, it was all happening in 1 precinct, and of course, there weren't 16,000 voters in that 1 precinct. So Gore's numbers were actually showing a negative 16,000 in that precinct. And the explanation that election officials provided was that, a faulty memory card was inserted into the tabulating machine. Now, it wasn't, the, let's say, legitimate memory card. So there was 1 memory card for this precinct, and it was uploaded to a tabulator on election night. But the logs show that an hour after that memory card was uploaded, another 2nd memory card for that same precinct was uploaded. And after that 2nd card was uploaded, that's when the votes for Gore started disappearing. And no one has been able to explain what exactly happened with that, whether that was a rogue card that was intentionally designed to hack the votes and misfired and therefore, Erased too many votes for Gore or whether this was, you know, a software mishap. But no one has explained why 2 memory cards for the same precinct were uploaded. And that's that's sort of the main problem in terms of chains of custody, the fact that a second memory card was actually ever able to be uploaded. Speaker 6: And John Kerry has expressed misgivings about the 2004 vote in Ohio. Speaker 1: Yes. So they had concerns about the machines in Ohio. Ohio was still largely using punch card machines. They hadn't replaced theirs yet. But there were still counties there were counties that were already using optical scan machines and also paperless DRE machines. And he and his group, he revealed this only recently, actually went to court court to try and obtain the algorithms, the software, to look at the software to make sure that it would be counting votes accurately. And the courts denied access to it because the proprietary software on voting machines is considered a trade secret. And so the private voting machine companies go to court to fight against this, and the courts generally agree with them. Speaker 14: When I and others, when we 2005, 2006 got involved And up until 2008, we all thought now when the problem has been exposed, it will be fixed very quickly. It would it was completely Always incomprehensible for me and and other secretary researchers that now 2020, we are talking about this topic. And, also, we are 2020 using the same machines with the same software. It's just you wouldn't be using a a 30 year old PC with with no security patches, But that's exactly how the elections are conducted. Let's talk about everything in the world how this works. Speaker 16: Okay. Speaker 17: So Speaker 14: you have a voting message, a voting terminal. That's how you pass your ballot, either electronically or paper ballot, it's go scanning. And after that, these machines are reporting those results Very often, our our communication lies through the central tabulator. Now in both in the county level, or or state level, where the votes are accumulated in database, and along the path, there are number of data storage, systems databases. And if you manipulate those, you can create an illusion of a different results. And you can even do it in the about election reporting system. So instead of even hacking anything in the tabulator system, you are just creating wrong reporting. So there are a number of ways how you can, through this whole path, influence the results. And we have to actually step even further back, Steph, because if we look the election as whole, it's a myriad of system. We have voter registration system. Them. We have electronic poll book systems. We have the election management. We have the ballot casting. We have the tabulation, and we have the reporting. Any of these, if you have one of these, you can always have the result. You can disenfranchise voters so they can cast their ballot. You can change the the outcome. You can change the reporting. Each of these needs to be secured. None of these is less important than the others. And that's why we have been I think in the public mind, we have been focusing in a very narrow area, Which is you cast a ballot on how the ballot is counted, but not missing the whole big picture. How many other systems from a adversary, how from from ethical's point of view, where the other can go and achieve the same goal. How about the Internet? It really it's everything is connected to Internet either directly or indirectly. And the more modern voting machines, they actually have a mobile phone Modem, in to speak, they have a they have a mobile phone mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters. They are sending the results. So wireless is coming back to the voting message in the newer generations. Nice marketing material trying to tell it's not, but it is. A journalist in a year ago, she found 200 voting machines in the Internet. Voting machine vendors say, well, they are not in Internet because they are not pingable. My answer to that is, are you from the past? Because since since 15 years ago, nothing is really anymore pingable, And they are still connected to Internet. It's the the whole argument is 15 that argument was to have been meaning something 15 years ago. It doesn't mean anything today. And, again, I I was just came from Atlanta, and and they have new working machines because the judge ordered the old ones to be scrapped. And part of the things in the the judge's ruling was that, The finding was that the voting machine were programmed by basically 3 guys from their homes and who sent all the programming of the voting machine for next hours and over Internet to We distribute all the machines. Speaker 15: Oh, so these guys had programmed the machines from home, and then they they pushed the code update to the voting machines via the Internet. Speaker 14: We what they said but they pushed it to the state, and then the state pushed it to the counties. And, actually, this whole thing about, the critical election specific programming going over Internet is very common because lot of this programming is done by private companies, third party management companies. And it's, it has been shocking the last 2 years when I have been working for a number of secretaries of state And looking how the security has done in their state just to find that email, FTP with no security. These are the common methods to send the most mission critical programming from the private company, which might be out of state, to the local county who is putting it into the machines. It is whoever controls that data controls the election. Speaker 15: And these machines, they like you said, they have network cards. You show in Kill Chain, again, the documentary that we'll link in the show notes, that they have USB ports. They have memory card slots. They have modems and phone jacks sometimes. So these things were built for connectivity. They're not immune to connectivity. And we don't by the seem seemingly, we don't have to hack Hundreds of machines. These are networked. You can just make software that infects 1 and then dozens of others or just changes the data. Do you think we could, Is it possible so do you think it's possible that we could create a worm that it yet we get on 1 machine in the voting center and it just connects to the other machines covertly and infects them without the bad actors so much as laying a hand on the machine themselves. Speaker 14: The real, proof of concept virus was demonstrated over 10 years ago. So, that that already has been demonstrated publicly that voting machine virus which can, self propagate from 1 voting machine to another, that's a reality which We have sown it's possible. So beyond and that's one of the things why that was created was because, Again, when you say it's possible by showing the vulnerability, people said, well, I don't believe until you show it. So it's one of the rear Things where, a team of researchers developed in the actual virus just to show the logical outcome of the the the vulnerability. Yes. There can be a voting machine virus. Full stop. Here it is. Speaker 18: We've heard a lot from voting machine vendors and election officials that voting machines Can't be hacked because they're not connected to the Internet. All of those vulnerabilities that Andrew talked about, are not a problem because no one can access the machines. And it turns out that the message that they've been giving us for years, and particularly after the 2016 election, just isn't true. Voting machine vendors have sold election officials on these in use of modems. In some cases, the modems are embedded inside the voting machines. In other cases, there are external modems that get attached to the voting machine at the end of the election. So at the end of the election, the machine goes into shutdown mode And then this option pops up about modoming results. And so the system will automatically then dial in and send these votes, over a cellular modem to a server on the Internet that collects the results. So everyone will tell you, and they've told me every time I've spoken with them, that cellular modems are not really Internet connectivity. They will say that doesn't mean that the machine is connected to the Internet. It's using a cellular modem. Well, that's not true. And Election Systems and Software, which is tax. This is one of their statements over and over again with the public. But this is one of their own diagrams that they actually gave to Rhode Island in 2015. And if you see that circular part in the centre there showing that modem transmission using a wireless modem, They sit there, right there. It's on their own diagram that it's going over the internet. So what happens is that the transmission of the votes votes, that the voting machine will dial in using the cellular modem and it contacts the nearest cell tower. And then the data goes through that cell tower into the carrier's back end network. But then the data actually has to get to that county network, and it goes over the Internet to a system, a server that's on the Internet to receive those votes. So we've already now basically shown the misinformation of the transmission of those votes. So ES and S will then say, well, it doesn't matter because all of that process is secured. So the transmission of the votes are secured so that no one can intercept them and read the votes or alter them. The modem is configured in such a way so that no one can actually dial into the modem, it can only dial out, and it can only dial out when the machine shuts down at the end of the election. So apparently, there are all of these safeguards. And also, the back end system that receives the transmitted votes is supposed to communicate only with one of those authenticated machines with the modem. The problem is none of this has been tested or certified. The voting machines themselves go through sort of a federal testing lab process And through certification, the modem transmissions don't. So we don't know what's inside those modems. We don't know how they work. We don't know how they're configured. And ES and S doesn't have a good track record on implementing security. So we don't actually know that the way that they are saying that these are transmitted securely is actually case. So what can happen with a modem machine that's transmitting? So I don't know if you're familiar with something called a stingray. It's a device that law enforcement uses and the military uses. And what it does is it, masquerades as a legitimate cell tower. It transmits a much more powerful signal than the nearby cell tower so that your cell phone will connect to the stingray instead of the cell tower. And then it might pass it on to the cell tower as well. It's mostly used for tracking phones, but there are also Stingrays that are designed also to intercept the content of communication. So if you've got a cellular modem in a voting machine, a rogue person can put a rogue cell tower near some kind of voting precinct, whatever. And instead of that modem then connecting to that cell tower, they can connect to that rogue The rogue cell tower. You can intercept data. If it's not properly encrypted, you could intercept the data and change the results. Or you could basically swap out the a whole package of results if it's not authentically signed, and replace it with your own package of results. And so those go on to the server. If there's a vulnerability in that modem, A hacker can actually transmit malware back onto that voting machine through the rogue cell tower. And once you're in that voting machine, Either that way or maybe you've gotten into the voting machine prior when it's being programmed, you now actually control the configuration of that modem. So even if ES and S says that modem will only work at the end of the election and will only call out and not receive calls in. If you control the configuration of that modem, you change all of that. You can have that machine contact your system at any time you want, for however you want, so that you can do reconnaissance on that machine and study it and established your attack. There were a group of researchers that decided that they would try and see if they could find those backend servers that receive the votes that are transmitted by modem. So if you've got something that's transmitting the votes over the cellular network, there's something that has to be connected to the internet to receive them. So there is a server. And it turns out that they could actually, based on configuration information that's publicly available on the internet, that the voting machine vendors provide to election offices and the election offices post on the internet. They describe the type of that we have created a firewall that they use. It's made by Cisco. They describe the type of FTP software that receives the votes, that sits on that server. They describe the whole configuration, including the type of cellular modem that's embedded in their machines. So based on that information, they decided to see if they could look for that very specific footprint of ESNS machines that are receiving the votes. And they did a scan and they were able to find these systems on the Internet. So they found 9 Wisconsin counties that had systems connected to the Internet, 7 Florida counties, from 4 Michigan counties. They actually found systems in 10 different states, but these were the primary ones. And of course, these are all important critical swing states. So here's the thing. Election officials will tell you, well, the modem transmissions don't matter because we only turn on those modems for a very brief period, less than a minute at the end of the election to transmit. And that's not sufficient time for someone to hack. Any of the technical attack. But more importantly, it turns out these systems aren't just connected for a few minutes after an election. Those back end systems that receive the votes are quite often connected year round. You can see them when they're doing the scans. You can sometimes see them. They come up a couple of weeks. Some of the ones that are only up temporarily will sometimes come up a couple of weeks before the election because they want to test the transmission. And then they leave it on for those weeks before the election. And after the election, they might forget to take it down and it might stay up a couple of other weeks. But there are some that simply never take them down at all. And Wisconsin was one of them. They were on year round. These systems, so what are they? I describe this as a server, but that sounds kind of benign. What is happening is that the The votes are being transmitted, and on the receiving end there's a firewall that's connected to the internet. And behind the firewall, There is this FTP server that the votes are transmitted on. Now that FTP server is supposed to serve as kind of like a DMZ, a safe zone, right? So the votes are deposited and there's supposed to be then no direct connection to the system that actually tabulates the votes. But it turns out that's not the case at all. This is a diagram that ES and S created and handed out to election officials. And so you can see that the votes are coming over the Internet, and they're coming and there's the firewall, and then you see all those wires connected. And you see at the bottom there that EMS, that's the Election Management system. That is the system that tabulates the final results. So even though they say that, that transmission of votes over the Internet is just unofficial, Connected to that system that's receiving those unofficial votes is also the system that is tabulating the official results. What's more, that election management system is also used to program all the voting machines prior to an election. So when, I brought this To ES and S's attention, they didn't then say that nothing is connected to the Internet. What they said was none of those critical systems are pingable from the Internet because there's a firewall in front. So essentially what they're saying is that even though now first they've said that none of these systems are connected to the Internet. And now when they're faced with someone saying, well, they actually are connected, they say, well, they may be configured in some manner that you're showing, but there's a firewall in front of them and therefore, you can't see what's behind the firewall. But if you can find the firewall, then you find the systems that are behind the firewall. The only thing that's protecting anyone from getting into those critical systems behind the firewall are the rules of that firewall that say, only these certain systems can connect to us, only these certain systems can transmit data. That's simply software. It's configuration rules. And if you misconfigure that software, then anything can get into that firewall. And of course, many, many hacks happen because firewalls are misconfigured. Speaker 0: I was part of the team that did the first hands on study of any electronic voting machine used in the US and it was using exactly this machine. And what we found, well, we got one of these machines from a whistleblower, Brought it into a laboratory. Reverse engineered it. And well, here's the result of what we found. We we would run a mock election with George Washington and Benedict Arnold, just like this. And, wanted to know, well, if an attacker that could get malicious software into the machine somehow. Could they change the results? And what we found after reverse engineering the machine was, well, Yeah. There are actually a lot of problems with it. All the records of the vote are contained in, in computer memory. And, an attacker can manipulate the software that's supposed to be running in the machine in a pretty straightforward way. Before every election, officials program the machine with the names of the candidates on the ballot by, installing some that they can change the software running in the machine. There are, unauthenticated software update mechanisms, there are offer overflows and the code that reads the data files from this. There's even an interpreted programming language and the rules for how the votes will be counted are contained in an unauthenticated program contained on the memory card. So through any of those means, An attacker can change the software running on the voting machine and cause the machine to produce whatever election results they want. So that was in about 2007. We, we published the first paper about this. In and that's what we're going to do. And so we're going to have to do that. And so we're going to have to do that. And so we're flows and so forth. There have been hundreds and hundreds of pages of technical reports about US voting machines like this. But even after that, They haven't even updated the software since before the studies I talked about. That's how bad it is. And it's not even just a single model of machine that's the only problem. Country. There are about 52 different models of machines. They fall into essentially 2 styles, ones that scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen and many of them have been analyzed now by researchers, Looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case where a US voting machine has been analyzed by by competent in security researchers. They have found vulnerabilities that would let someone inject malicious software and change election data, every single case. Before every election, election officials have to program the voting machines with who's on the ballot and what are the rules for counting. Well, they make that election programming on a PC workstation somewhere, either at the, at the jurisdiction or at an outside vendor that does it for them. If an attacker can break into that workstation which is called an election management system. They can spread malicious code to all of the memory cards used to program all of the voting machines in the jurisdiction. And those election management system workstations sometimes are connected to the internet, or they're, or the data that's programmed into them passes through an internet connected system. So we're just 1 or 2 hops away from an online attacker. Now how well secured are these systems? Well, here's, a vendor that did the election programming for, in a large fraction of my state in 2016. And we can just take a look at their website to see how secure this is likely to be. You can see, first of all, they don't have any HTTPS. Here are lots of nice, high resolution photographs of their warehouse, in case you want to break in. And perhaps most interestingly, here's their employee directory with everyone's name, job title, email address and photograph. So if I wanted to break into this company, let's say I was the attacker, I'd probably start by forging an email from, let's say, Larry, the president here, to Sue, his administrative assistant, asking her to urgently open an attachment. Now, of course, when she does, that attachment has my malware in it. I have a foothold into their network, and I can try to spread from there to the election management system and to the voting machines in most of the state. Tampering with the national election result in my country it's easier than well, easier than even I thought in 2016. I keep learning things that convince me that the situation is scarier than, than even experts had thought. You identify the states that are most weakly protected and going to be close. Target the computers that are going to program voting machines there, spread malware to machines to change a fraction of the votes, and then rely on the fact that most states, even if they have a paper record, are not going to rigorously use it to check that the computers are right. But the fact is that in close national contests in the US, the result really only hinges on the result in a small number of states. You've heard about the swing states in any given election. The ones that are, really competitive. In such a situation, an attacker can, before the election, identify which states are likely to be close. Try probing all of them in the way that the Russians did the voter registration systems in 2016 and just find the weakest swing states and attack there. So in this way, the American system converts, diversity of implementation into basically this patchwork of strength and weakness that gives attackers a menu of possible places to strike. It makes us weaker in close elections. So just to review, you look at the polls before the election and figure out which states were likely to be close. Probe all of them, find the ones with the weakest protection, then hack into the, election management systems there or at the outside vendors the states use. Once you hack into the election management system, you can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and have your code say, swap 10% of the votes in the places you infected. Then even if the votes are also recorded on a piece of paper, you don't have to worry. Because in most of those states, they're going to just toss the paper out without looking Speaker 5: Modems in voting machines are a bad idea. Those modems are network connections. And that leaves them vulnerable to hacking by anybody who can connect to that network. Speaker 19: ESNS insists While there are 14,000 of its modems in use, there are firewalls separating those modems from the public Internet. Speaker 5: Once a hacker Starts talking to the voting machine through the modem. They can hack the software in the voting machine and make it cheat in future elections. Speaker 17: What is the vehicle for the transmission from the ICP? Is it cellular modem versus VPN? It is a cellular modem that can be configured in a VPN. Right. And we currently in Chicago and Cook County, we work with Verizon to, secure that network. What wireless chipset Slash modem does the hardware have? We support a variety. So, it's really up to the jurisdictions, what technology they want to use, what's compatible with their networks. Speaker 16: Currently, in some jurisdictions, we're using, Basically a modem that is a three d modem, GSM, but we can support multiple varieties of modem that can be. Speaker 17: Including latest 4 gs standards Speaker 14: as well. Speaker 17: So the answers to the next question, is it Speaker 3: 3 gs or 4 gs? Verizon, 8 gs or 2 gs or Sprint, Speaker 5: I'm assuming Speaker 17: all? Yeah, all networks. Speaker 15: Just to Speaker 17: ask a quick question. Yes, I mean, we actually transmit from the ICP in Mongolia as well. So Speaker 7: We're not committed to networks. Speaker 16: And in Puerto Rico, there is 3 vendors because the island is not covered by any by any of the vendors completely. So we use 3 different cellular vendors for some ICPs with this vendor Claro, AT and T, MT Mobile, I think, in the different parts of the app. Speaker 14: More modern attack voting machines. They actually have a mobile phone modem, and to speak, they have a they have a mobile phone mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters. They are sending the results. Speaker 3: Some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election results using cellular modems or, the Internet. That of course introduces another point of vulnerability, not just to the data that's flowing, but also to the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Speaker 1: Many of these voting machines have modems embedded into them. And the modems are used at the end of the election to transmit the vote totals on election night to the county, The, elections office. So these modems contact their cellular modems, and they contact the cellular network, they contact the cell tower. So the cell tower traffic these In our modern times, it actually goes through Internet. It goes through the same kinds of routers and switches that the regular Internet traffic goes to. But also, in between that cell tower and that voting machine, An intruder can, intercept data going to the cell tower and intercept that that communication, that phone call. If you can trick a voting machine into, contacting your device, A fake cellular tower instead of a legitimate tower. You can actually use that connection to get back into the voting machine and get back into the tabulator, and then alter votes and software. Speaker 20: Virginia just stopped Using touch screen computer voting because it's so vulnerable. Speaker 18: We need to look at Speaker 20: all the voting machines. Every secretary of state needs to be, You know, assisted in making sure that they are not being, hacked and and attacked. Speaker 6: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. Speaker 21: But researchers have repeatedly demonstrated That ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 22: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools, and resources are able to breach voting machines In a matter of minutes. Speaker 23: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 21: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cyber security 101, directing that you install remote access software, which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 24: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 25: You could easily Hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things, but in fact 3 companies are controlling that. It is the individual voting machines That some pose that pose some of the greatest risks. Speaker 26: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, Right? Which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 24: Workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. It was possible to switch votes. 43% Speaker 21: of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, Including backdoors. Speaker 3: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year, where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 26: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the capitol, where we brought in, folks Who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 22: Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software, like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable To the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 24: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state, or maybe 1 or 2, Or maybe just a few counties in one swing step. Speaker 27: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through. You have 21 states that were hacked into. They didn't find out about it for a year. Right now, we have over a dozen dozen states That either don't have any backup paper ballots or only have them partially. Do you think that our adversaries don't know what those states are? Of course, they know what those states are. And if we have a close election in the general election, in a presidential race, and one state's out withstanding And their ballot boxes get hacked into, their elections get hacked into, we will have absolutely no backup.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

25/ In effect, the left was allowed to discuss the vulnerabilities of voting machines after the 2016 election, and the right was banned from social media platforms for discussing those very same vulnerabilities after the 2020 election.

Video Transcript AI Summary
Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerability, highlighting the need to assess all voting machines for potential hacking. Researchers have shown that ballot recording machines and other systems are susceptible to tampering, even by hackers with limited resources. Instances of electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleting or switching votes have been reported. The leading seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. The control of voting machines by just three companies poses significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines, leaving the election system vulnerable to interference. The lack of backup paper ballots and reliance on unsupported software further exacerbate the security flaws.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Virginia just stopped using touchscreen computer voting because it's so vulnerable. Right. We need to look at all the voting machines. Every secretary of state needs to be, you know, assisted in making sure that they are not being hacked and and attacked. Speaker 1: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. Speaker 2: Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 0: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter of minutes. Speaker 3: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switch votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 4: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cybersecurity 101, directing that you install Remote access software, which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 5: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 2: You could easily Hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things, but in fact 3 companies are controlling that. It is the individual voting machines That some pose, that pose some of the greatest risks. Speaker 6: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 5: The workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. Speaker 4: It was possible to switch votes. 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, Including backdoors. Speaker 7: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year, Where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 6: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the capitol, where we brought in, folks Who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 8: Aging systems also frequently rely On unsupported software, like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable To the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 5: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state or maybe 1 or 2 Or maybe just a few counties in one swing state. Speaker 2: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through. You have 21 states that were hacked into. They didn't find out about it for a year. Right now, we have over a dozen dozen states that either don't have any backup paper ballots Or only have them partially. You think that our adversaries don't know what those states are? Of course, they know what those states are. And if we have a close election in the general election, in a presidential race, and one state's out withstanding and their Ballot boxes get hacked into. Their elections get hacked into. We will have absolutely no backup. Stalin was unconcerned about the vote. After all, he explained, he said that who voted was completely unimportant. What was Extraordinarily important, in his words, was who would count the votes and how. It is time to put politics aside and come together to secure the future of our election. So whether you're a 4 star general, A 4th grade teacher or a computer engineer at Foursquare, this is an issue that unites us. Speaker 8: In at least 40 states, elections are carried out using machines that are at least a decade old. And like any technology, -They're susceptible to increasing failure with age. Some state officials have had to turn to eBay to find critical components like dot matrix printers, Decades old storage devices and analog modems, aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software Like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable to the latest Methods of cyber attack. Speaker 3: In 2016, state election websites in Illinois and Arizona were hacked by intruders who installed malware and downloaded sensitive voter information. Speaker 6: It is worth fighting for integrity in our election system, which means that they are free from interference by a hostile Or an unfriendly nation. Let's put the resources into upgrading the state's election systems. Because what we know is this. There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. I sit on the senate intelligence committee and senate homeland security committee. And we receive all kinds of information about the vulnerabilities to our national Security. We are vulnerable in terms of foreign interference with our elections. It's my understanding that some of the election system Vendors have required states to sign agreements, that prevent or inhibit independent, security testing. There's a saying that I'm sure Many of you have heard, which is the you know the difference between being hacked and not being hacked? Is knowing you've been hacked. Speaker 0: And they are still looking for ways to steal information about Voter registration, for example. There are some text experts in Silicon Valley Valley with whom I have met who say that, You know, maybe what they'll do this next time is to really disrupt the actual election. Shut down the servers that you send results to. Interfere with the operation of voting machines because still too many of them are linked to the Internet. So there we are still very vulnerable. Speaker 9: I mean, I can tell you in Virginia, when I was governor, I had to replace all the machines. Because I remember when I first voted when I went to Richmond, moved down as governor, I remember I kept voting in the senate race, kept voting for the Democrat. Republican name kept coming up. Three times that happened. Speaker 1: What do Speaker 4: you mean kept Coming up. Speaker 9: So I you know, we had the touch screens. I was voting for Mark Warner, our senator, and Ed Gosphy's name was light up. Happened to me 3 times. Finally, the 4th time, Mark Damon, I quickly hit vote, and I got out of there. You know, all the cameras are looking at me like this guy doesn't know how to vote. I mean, what's going on? So then I had an investigation done, and listen to this. I brought in some technology experts. They were able to hack into our machines from off-site In about 5 or 6 minutes, and within 4 minutes, they were able to change a vote. IDD certified all the machines. Now in Virginia, we have paper ballots. Speaker 4: 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have Serious security flaws, including backdoors. These companies are accountable to no one. They won't answer basic questions about their cybersecurity practices, and the biggest companies Won't answer any questions at all. 5 states have no paper trail, And that means there is no way to prove the numbers the voting machines put out are legitimate. So much for cybersecurity 101. The vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions Nationwide, use election management systems that run on old software That is soon gonna be out of date and ripe for exploitation by hackers according To an exhaustive analysis by the Associated Press, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, and North Carolina, among others, Are all at risk. Even the state of Georgia, which just passed legislation to buy new voting machines, is on track to buy equipment that suffers from this significant cybersecurity weakness. Let's say the election is decided by a small percentage And people in America don't think that the election was fair. The effect that would have On our 200 year experiment in self governance, our democratic system Would take a real hit. Our elections weren't secure last week And they sure as heck aren't secure this week. And anybody who says otherwise It's either selling the voting machines or simply has a malicious intent towards our elections. At one point in the intelligence committee, both sides seemed to agree that no votes were changed In the 2016 election, and I said, the experts I talk to say that Until you have a forensic analysis of a vote, until you go in there and scrub the whole system, You can't really say that. So they're giving these voting machines specifically the hack into how successful were they? Speaker 1: Well, the the ongoing record Was, they hacked within 90 minutes of, being, being in the same space as the voting machines. Now these are not hackers that are actually touching the machines. They're doing this from across the room, on, on Internet like connections. But what it demonstrated, Pedro, is that the machines that we count on to make the basic connection between the American voter And the election results are vulnerable if they're in any way connected to the Internet. Speaker 4: And so when you say hacked, what were they able to do once they gained Access to the machines. Speaker 1: All sorts of things. They could manipulate, the outcome of the vote, they could manipulate the tally, they could delete the tally, and and they could compromise the vote in any number of ways. Just it was limited only by the hackers' creativity. Just how vulnerable Speaker 10: the machines were. I mean, what we found is that These machines were purchased by, local voting authorities, state and local voting authorities maybe 10 years ago. In many cases, the software and the hardware have not been updated, so they're as vulnerable as an old laptop That we might have, in in your home that you no longer use because it's just so out of date. Then what we found is that the supply chain for these these machines is largely un plotted. I mean, We found parts from China. We found, digital electronic parts from all over the world. By way of hacking, there's the potential that the actual vote tally could be compromised. So votes could be changed from this to that. Or votes could be suppressed, votes could be deleted, votes could be added, so you could actually change the tally itself.
Saved - September 1, 2023 at 3:21 PM
reSee.it AI Summary
Israeli information warfare firm, Team Jorge, has influenced elections worldwide, including in the US. Led by Tal Hanan, a former Israeli intel agent, they offer services like hacking, spreading false information, and building narratives with bot networks. Their powerful tool, AIMS, generates fake profiles to shape narratives. Questions arise about their influence compared to US intel agencies. Israel's private intelligence industry is extensive. Investigations are needed to hold Team Jorge accountable for meddling in US elections. The extent of their involvement and connections to various parties remain unclear. Concerns arise about Israel's influence on US sovereignty. Sources: [links provided]

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

🧵Team Jorge is an Israeli information warfare firm that has flipped 28 elections across the globe, with two "projects" in the US. They are more advanced than Russian intelligence, and influencing how the FBI does business. Yet nobody will notice this story.

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

An investigation in December of 2022, featuring mostly left wing journalists from 30 large outlets like Le Monde and Der Spiegel, uncovered the origins and methods of Team Jorge, a mercenary hacking group made of Ex-Israeli intel agents.

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

Posing as an African leader, the journalists requested that Team Jorge help them disrupt an election. They requested a presentation of their services and the results were filmed. Tal Hanan, leader of team Jorge put a 6 million euro price tag on the total package.

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

The journalist would continue to hold fake meetings and record interviews with team Jorge secretly catching them on tape talking about their crimes. Services include "Building a narrative" with a bot networks, false information, and the ability to hack and extort opponents.

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

Team Jorge's most powerful tools is AIMS. A software that generates fake profiles with Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Amazon, and Bitcoin. They claim to have a network of 30,000 bots that they can use to shape narratives with a barrage of confusing misinformation or propaganda.

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

In a Senate Intel committee this week The head of the FBI was admonished by Congress for getting caught testing similar software. Our FBI has also been caught trying to buy Pegasus another Israeli spy software. Our CIA also uses a similar tactic in the NAFO Fellas army on twitter

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

That begs the question; are these Israeli hacking groups more powerful than our own Intel organizations? Who runs the show? "Israel is the biggest industry in the world when it comes to private intelligence. Russia is talked about a lot, but aren't as advanced." - @EmmaLBriant

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

So why Israel? Israel has been in a state of war for 70 years with the Palestinian people, and every citizen of Israel must serve 2-3 years in the military. Many go into Intel jobs and when they get out of the army they need to make money. America has a similar revolving door.

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

Many began to create private agencies to start influence peddling and hacking for rich clients. Black Cube is one example. This has grown to election meddling all around the world. Many in India and Africa are asking for investigations

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

Tal Hanan claimed: “We are now involved in one election in Africa, We have a team in Greece and a team in [the] Emirates[We have completed] 33 presidential-level campaigns, 27 of which were successful.” Later, he said he was involved in two “major projects” in the US.

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

Very few details about these projects have leaked from the very left of center journalists in Europe who broke the story two months ago. My guess is these journalist do not want to make trouble for Biden and the Democrats in power, or have been told not to speak.

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

Curiously, many of our Intel agencies in the US happen to be controlled by Jewish people. Garland Merrick (DOJ). Alejandro Mayorkas (DHS). David Cohen (CIA/NAFO). Avril Haines (NIA/CIA). Janet Yellen (SOT). Wendy Sherman (SecState). Anne Neuberger NSA Cyber emerging tech Advisor.

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

I'm sure it's just a coincidence. Why are our lawmakers not asking Israel to hold Team Jorge accountable if they have admitted to meddled in two US elections? This is at a time when J6 is finally being uncovered, and many Americans want to know if our elections are secure.

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

Also, which elections did they meddle in? Did the Mexican cartels pay them to take down Kari Lake in 2022? Did twitter and the FBI work with them to take down Trump in 2020? What about SBF? We know he is connected to the Dems. Nobody knows and nobody wants to ask.

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

Finally, I find it unacceptable that the nation of Israel, who has had a dictator for 13 years and taken billions and billions of US tax dollars, would be allowed by OUR own intelligence community to meddle in OUR elections. Does America have no sovereignty apart from Israel?

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

The Story of Team Jorge is deep, and difficult to grasp in one reading. I cannot do it justice in one thread so consider looking through these sources: https://forbiddenstories.org/story-killers/team-jorge-disinformation/ https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/28/world/middleeast/israel-pegasus-spyware.html https://www.rappler.com/technology/features/team-jorge-disinformation-forbidden-stories/ https://www.wionews.com/world/explained-how-an-israeli-group-team-jorge-meddled-with-elections-in-30-nations-563194 https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/the-debate/20230216-agents-of-disinformation-dirty-politics-and-the-team-jorge-revelations

"Team Jorge”: In the heart of a global disinformation machine • Forbidden Stories The Forbidden Stories consortium investigated "Team Jorge", an ultra-secret Israeli company involved in manipulating elections. forbiddenstories.org
F.B.I. Secretly Bought Israeli Spyware and Explored Hacking U.S. Phones (Published 2022) Israel used the NSO Group’s software as a tool of diplomacy. The F.B.I. wanted it for domestic surveillance. Then everything soured. Here are highlights of a New York Times Magazine investigation. nytimes.com
'Team Jorge': In the heart of a global disinformation machine The Forbidden Stories consortium investigates an ultra-secret Israeli company involved in manipulating elections and hacking African politicians rappler.com
Explained: How an Israeli group 'Team Jorge' meddled with elections in 30 nations  With the use of multiple highly advanced tools, an Israeli group may have meddled in over 30 presidential elections, a fresh investigation has revealed. Hacking, sabotage and disinformation - spread using bots on social media - could have helped this company, which goes by the name of "Team Jorge". The investigation - carried over six months between July and December 2022 - was published this week by Forbidden stories, a French nonprofit. Journalists from 30 prominent outlets, including Le Monde, Der Spiegel and El País, are a part of the consortium that carried out the probe.  wionews.com
The Debate - Agents of disinformation: Dirty politics and the 'Team Jorge' revelations Enter the latest revelations from Forbidden Stories: the worldwide consortium of 30 media outlets who has blown the cover of the election-hacking and disinformation firm known as “Team Jorge”, founded… france24.com

@pl0t_sickens - ThePlotSickens

https://forbiddenstories.org/story-killers/team-jorge-disinformation/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LEE-CYXSqh4 https://open.spotify.com/episode/14dPsIUjk7zYodpdEQK0lQ?si=c2fec98ff84e4695

"Team Jorge”: In the heart of a global disinformation machine • Forbidden Stories The Forbidden Stories consortium investigated "Team Jorge", an ultra-secret Israeli company involved in manipulating elections. forbiddenstories.org
Page not found open.spotify.com
Saved - August 29, 2023 at 11:08 AM
reSee.it AI Summary
Title: Ensuring Secure and Auditable Elections in the United States Introduction: The vulnerability of the US voting systems to hacking and manipulation has become a growing concern. Outdated software, lack of security measures, and paperless machines have exposed significant flaws in the system. This post aims to shed light on the various vulnerabilities and emphasize the urgent need for secure and auditable elections. Outdated Software and Lack of Security Measures: Experts have raised concerns about the outdated software and lack of security measures in US election systems. Outdated systems, such as the 15-year-old Windows version, are prone to crashes and lack essential security features. This leaves them vulnerable to cyberattacks and manipulation. Paperless Machines and Lack of Auditing: One of the major vulnerabilities lies in the use of paperless voting machines. These machines lack a physical backup, making it difficult to verify the accuracy of the results. Additionally, the absence of post-election audits further exacerbates the problem, as it becomes challenging to detect any potential manipulation. Remote Access and Misconfigured Servers: Reports have revealed that some election systems, including those of Dominion Voting Systems and ESS, had modems and remote-access software during the 2020 election. This makes them susceptible to hackers and compromises the integrity of the voting process. Furthermore, misconfigured servers, like the one in Georgia's Center for Election Systems, have exposed sensitive data, highlighting the need for improved security practices. Flaws in Voting Machines: Security researchers have demonstrated the flaws in voting machines, including their vulnerability to hacking and manipulation. Hackers have been able to access administrator mode, potentially altering voting data. Unencrypted voting data and improper configuration have further contributed to the crisis of election security. The Importance of Handmarked Paper Ballots and Auditing: To ensure the integrity of elections, experts recommend the use of handmarked paper ballots and robust post-election audits. Handmarked paper ballots provide a physical backup that can be verified, reducing the risk of manipulation. Auditing plays a crucial role in detecting any potential irregularities and maintaining transparency in the electoral process. Addressing the Vulnerabilities: It is imperative for the US to address these vulnerabilities and safeguard its democratic process. Enhancing network defenses, updating software, conducting risk-limiting audits, and protecting infrastructure are essential steps in ensuring secure elections. Additionally, transparency and improved security practices from election equipment vendors are crucial for building trust in the system. Conclusion: The vulnerability of US voting systems to hacking and manipulation poses a significant risk to the integrity of elections. Outdated software, paperless machines, and lack of auditing contribute to these vulnerabilities. By adopting handmarked paper ballots, conducting robust post-election audits, and implementing improved cybersecurity measures, the US can enhance the security and transparency of its electoral process. Safeguarding the integrity of elections is of utmost importance to protect the democratic values of the nation.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

🚨BREAKING: Explosive video surfaces of FOX News stars Tucker Carlson, Laura Ingraham, and Sean Hannity slamming Trump's "insane" voting machine fraud allegations as "absurd," "ridiculous," and "complete BS"!

Video Transcript AI Summary
Virginia has stopped using touchscreen computer voting due to vulnerabilities, and there is concern about the security of all voting machines. Researchers have shown that voting systems can be tampered with, and hackers with limited resources can breach machines in minutes. Instances of electronic voting machines deleting or switching votes have been reported. The biggest seller of voting machines has violated cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making the machines susceptible to hacking. Three companies control the majority of voting machines in the US. Many states have outdated and vulnerable machines, and unsupported software increases the risk of cyber attacks. The use of modems in voting machines also poses a security threat. The lack of paper trails and audit trails further compromises the integrity of elections.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Virginia just stopped using touchscreen computer voting because it's so vulnerable. We need to look at all the voting machines. Every secretary of state needs to be, you know, assisted in making sure that they are not being, hacked and and attacked. Speaker 1: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. Speaker 2: Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 3: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, Tools and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter of minutes. Speaker 4: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switch votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 2: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates Cybersecurity 101 directing that you install remote access software which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. These voting machines Can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 5: You could easily hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing Different things, but in fact, 3 companies are controlling this. Speaker 0: It is the individual voting machines that some pose that pose some of the greatest risk. Speaker 6: There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 7: Workers were able to easily We hacked into an electronic voting machine. Speaker 2: It was possible to switch votes. 43% of American voters use voting machines That researchers have found have serious security flaws, including backdoors. Speaker 8: We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know, I know the Hackathon that took place last year, where virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 5: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the Capitol, where we brought in, folks who before our eyes hacked election machines. Those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 3: Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software Like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable to the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 7: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state or maybe 1 or 2 or maybe just a few counties in one I'm Speaker 9: very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through. You have 21 states that were hacked into. They didn't find out about it for a year. Right now, we have over a dozen dozen states that either don't have any backup paper ballots or only have them partially. You think that our adversaries don't know what those states are? Of course, they know what those states are. And if we have a close election In the general election, in a presidential race, and one state's out withstanding and their ballot boxes gets hacked into, their elections get hacked into, We will have absolutely no backup. Speaker 8: I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine like a computer virus and silently change election outcomes. And in every single case, we've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steal votes. Across the country, there are about 50 Two different models of machines. They fall into essentially 2 styles, ones that scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen and many of them have been analyzed now by researchers Looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case where a US voting Machine has been analyzed by by competent security researchers. They have found vulnerabilities that would let someone inject malicious software And change election data every single case. Speaker 10: The better or the more efficient way of hacking machines would be to subvert them all through the machine that's used to actually Program those machines. So prior to each election, the county election office or the voting machine vendor will actually program memory cards For that election, it tells the machine who are the candidates, what are the, you know, the contests being decided, and that gets inserted Into the voting machine. If you can alter, if you can subvert that machine that is used to program those memory cards, then you can pass, rogue software to the voting machines. Speaker 8: Voting Chains are not connected to the internet. This is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately, it's not actually true. In many new voting machines Come with, 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connected to the internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the internet right in the middle of the election potentially at the most vulnerable time? Speaker 11: Studies conducted in 2007 by the state of California, state of Ohio, state of Florida found security vulnerabilities that could take advantage of these To engineer viruses where 1 compromised voting machine could then infect eventually the entire fleet of machines for an entire county. Typically at the end of the election day you move a memory card through each of the machines in the precinct and that's to collect the vote totals. That process can spread a virus. And there are other processes. The details vary from machine to machine. Speaker 2: When you say hacked, what were they able to do once they gained access to the machines? Speaker 1: All sorts of things. They could manipulate the outcome Of the vote, they could manipulate the tally, they could delete the tally, and and they could compromise the vote in any number of ways. Speaker 12: The machines used in Georgia Have been demonstrated to be hackable through a virus that's carried on ballot definition cartridges. Very much like this Duxnet virus was, Inserted into, nuclear centrifuges in Iran. Speaker 1: There are a number of states that outsource their reporting of elections to third parties, some of which are corporations based in other countries Trees like Spain. So you've got to trust that the aggregation of the votes and the reporting of the votes is is, is accurate as well. Speaker 8: I'm Pretty sure my undergrad computer security class at Michigan could have changed the outcome of the 2016 Michigan election if we wanted to. It is that bad. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's that's why I say it's only a matter of time. Speaker 13: Unfortunately, in a lot of these systems, the audit trails are just as vulnerable as the other aspects of the system. So there may not be Good forensic evidence of a successful, intrusion. With the current design, we cannot be universally confident that it hasn't happened. And it's probably only a matter of time before it will. Speaker 3: In at least 40 states, elections are carried out using machines They're at least a decade old. And like any technology, they're susceptible to increasing failure with age. Some state officials Have had to turn to eBay to find critical components like dot matrix printers, decades old storage devices and analog modems. Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches And are thus more vulnerable to the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 4: In 2016, state election websites in Illinois and Arizona were hacked by intruders who installed malware and downloaded sensitive voter information. Speaker 6: It is worth fighting for integrity in our election system, which means that they are free From interference by a hostile or an unfriendly nation. Let's put the resources into upgrading the state's election systems. Because what we know is this. There are a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines, right, which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 5: I sit on the Senate Intelligence Committee and Senate Homeland Security Committee and we receive all kinds of information about the vulnerabilities to our national We are vulnerable in terms of foreign interference with our elections. It's my understanding that some of the election system vendors have Acquired states to sign agreements, that prevent or inhibit independent security testing. There's a saying that I'm sure many of you have heard, which is the Do you know the difference between being hacked and not being hacked? Is knowing you've been hacked. Speaker 0: And they are still looking for ways to steal information about voter registration, for example. There are some tech experts in Silicon Valley Valley with whom I have met who say that, you know, maybe what they'll do this Next time is to really disrupt the actual election. Shut down the servers that you send results to. Interfere with the operation of voting machines because still too many of them are linked to the Internet. So there we are still very vulnerable. Speaker 14: I mean, I can tell you in Virginia, when I was governor, I had to replace all the machines. Because I remember when I first voted, when I went to Richmond, moved down as governor, I remember I kept voting in the senate race, kept voting for the democrat, republican name kept coming up. Three times that happened. Speaker 15: What do you mean kept coming up? Speaker 14: So I you know, we had the touch screens. I was voting for Mark Warner, our senator, and Ed Goswami's name would light up. Happened to me 3 times. Finally, the 4th time, Mark Damon, I quickly hit vote and I got out of there. You know, all the cameras are looking at me like this guy doesn't know how to vote. I mean, what's going on? So then I had an investigation done and listen to this. I brought in some technology experts. They were able to hack into our machines from off-site in about 5 or 6 minutes. And within 4 minutes, they were able to change a vote. IDD certified all the machines. Now in Virginia, we have paper ballots. Speaker 2: 43% Of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, Including backdoors. These companies are accountable to no one. They won't answer basic Questions about their cybersecurity practices and the biggest companies won't answer any questions at all. 5 states have no paper trail, and that means there is no way to prove the numbers The voting machines put out are legitimate. So much for cybersecurity One zero one. The vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions nationwide Use election management systems that run on old software that is soon gonna be out of date And write for exploitation by hackers according to an exhaustive analysis By Speaker 0: the Associated Speaker 2: Press, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, and North Carolina, among others, are all at risk. Even the state of Georgia, which just passed legislation to buy new voting machines, is on track To buy equipment that suffers from this significant cybersecurity weakness. Let's say the election Is decided by a small percentage. And people in America Don't think that the election was fair. The effect that would have on our 200 year Experiment in self governance. Our democratic system would take a real hit. Our elections weren't secure last week, and they sure as heck aren't secure this week. And anybody who says otherwise is either selling the voting machines or simply has a malicious Intent towards our elections. At one point in the Intelligence Committee, Both sides seem to agree that no votes were changed in the 2016 election. And I said, the experts I talk to say that until you have a Forensic analysis of a vote until you go in there and scrub the whole system. You can't really say that. Speaker 16: These machines don't have a capability of providing you forensic evidence To see if they cannot prove they were honest, they cannot prove that they were have been hacked. They simply don't have the Fundamental basic capabilities of providing you that forensic evidence, that data. Only way you can see That, that machine was hacked. If the attacker wanted to be, they found that it was hacked. That's a sad truth. So anyone who says, I have information one way or another. That's an opinion. That's not tactics. Practice, it can be done without leaving trace. When you know how the systems work, Looking for the evidence, you know that you won't find it because the systems are not recording, generating, Preserving or protecting meaningful forensic evidence. And this is from the very beginning to the end of the process everywhere. These systems really don't have a capability of recording and protecting any meaningful audit information or forensically important information. So a lot of times I would also argue that even if you try to take a look into the evidence, the problem is that there is no Speaker 17: We've heard a lot from voting machine vendors and election officials that voting machines Can't be hacked because they're not connected to the internet. All of those vulnerabilities that Andrew talked about, are not a problem because no one can access the machines And it turns out that that message that they've been giving us for years and particularly after the 2016 election Just isn't true. Voting machine vendors have sold election officials on these in use of modems. In some case, the modems are embedded inside the voting machines. In other case, they're external modems that get attached to the voting machine at the end of the election. So at the end of the election, the machine goes Into shutdown mode and then this option pops up about modoming results. And so the system will automatically then dial in and send these votes over a cellular modem to a server on the Internet that collects the results. So everyone will tell you and they've told me every time I've spoken with them that cellular modems are not really internet connectivity. They will say, That doesn't mean that the machine is connected to the internet. It's using a cellular modem. Well, that's not true and Election Systems and Software, which is The top voting machine maker in the country, this is one of their statements over and over again with the public but this is one of their own diagrams that they They gave to Rhode Island in 2015. And if you see that circular part in the center there showing that that modem transmission using the wireless modem, They sit there, right there. It's on their own diagram that is going over the internet. Speaker 8: Before every election, election officials have to program the voting machines With who's on the ballot and what are the rules for counting? Well, they make that election programming on a PC workstation somewhere either at the, at the jurisdiction or at an outside vendor that does it for them. If an attacker can break into that work Station which is called an election management system. They can spread malicious code to all of the memory cards used to program all of the voting machines in the jurisdiction And those election management system workstations sometimes are connected to the internet or the data that's programmed into them passes Through an internet connected system. So we're just 1 or 2 hops away from an online attacker. So if I wanted to break into this company, let's say I was the attacker, I'd Probably start by forging an email from, let's say, Larry, the president here, to Sue, his administrative assistant, Asking her to urgently open an attachment. Now, of course, when she does, that attachment has my malware in it. I have a, foothold into their network And I can try to spread from there to the election management system and to the voting machines in most of the state. Pampering with the national election result in my country It's easier than well easier than even I thought in 2016. I keep learning things that convince me that the situation is scarier than, than even Fertz had thought, You identify the states that are most weakly protected and going to be close. Target the computers that are going to program voting machines there, spread malware to machines to change a fraction of the votes And then rely on the fact that most states even if they have a paper record are not going to rigorously use it to check that the computers are right. But the fact is that in close national contests in the US, the result really only hinges on the result in a small number of States. You've heard about the swing states in any given election. The ones that are, really competitive. In such a situation an attacker can, before the election, identify which states are likely to be close. Try probing all of them In the way that the Russians did the voter registration systems in 2016 and just find the weakest swing states and attack there. So in this way, the American system converts, diversity of implementation Into basically this patchwork of strength and weakness that gives attackers a menu of possible places to strike. It makes us weaker in close elections. Speaker 18: Modems in voting machines are a bad idea. Those modems are network connections. And that leaves them vulnerable to hacking by anybody who can connect To that network. Speaker 19: ES and S insists while there are 14,000 of its modems in use, there are firewalls separating those modems from the public Internet. Speaker 18: Once the hackers starts talking to the voting machine through the modem, they can hack the software in the voting machine And make it cheat in future elections. Speaker 20: What is the vehicle for the transmission from the ICP? Is it cellular modem versus VPN? Speaker 15: Well, it is a cellular modem that Speaker 8: the can be configured in a VPN. Right? And we currently in Chicago and Cook County, we work with Verizon to, Secure that network. What wireless chipset slash modem does the hardware have? We support a variety. So, it's really up to the jurisdictions what technology they wanna use, what's compatible with their with their networks. Speaker 15: Currently, in some jurisdictions, we're using, basically, a modem that is a three d modem, GSM, but we can support multiple Variety support and protection. Speaker 8: Including including latest four gs standards. Speaker 20: So the answers to the next question is the three gs or four gs. Verizon 8 tier Do you're Sprint consuming all? Speaker 16: Oh, yeah. All all networks. Right. Speaker 8: Discuss quite a bit. Yeah. I mean, we actually transmit from the ICP in Mongolia as well. So, we're not committed in networks. Speaker 15: And in Puerto Rico, there's 3 vendors because the island is not covered by any by any of the vendors With this, we use 3 different cellular vendors for some ICPs. With this vendor, Claro, ATMC, and T Mobile, I might say, in the different parts Speaker 16: More modern voting machines, they actually have a mobile phone modem. In to speak, they have a they have mobile phone our mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters, they are sending the results. Speaker 1: Some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election To results using cellular modems or, the Internet that of course introduces another point of vulnerability, not just to the data that's flowing, But also it's the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Speaker 10: Many of these voting machines have modems embedded into them. And the modems are to transmit the vote totals on election night to the county, elections office. So these modems contact, they're cellular modems and they Contact the cellular network, to contact the cell tower. So the cell tower traffic these days in our modern times actually goes through Internet. It goes through the same Kinds of routers and switches not the regular internet traffic comes to but also, in between that cell tower and that voting machine, an intruder Can, intercept data going to the cell tower and intercept that that communication, that phone call. If you can trick a voting machine into, contacting In your device your fake cellular tower instead of a legitimate tower you can actually use that connection to get back into the voting machine and get back into the tabulator, and then alter votes and software. Speaker 8: So just to review, you look at the polls before the election and figure out which states were likely to be close. Probe all of them. Find the ones with the weakest protection. Then hack into the, election management systems there or at the outside vendors the states use. Once you hack into the election management system, can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and have your code say swap 10% of the votes in the places you infected.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#2 All electronic voting equipment can easily be hacked because all such equipment must receive programming before each election from memory cards prepared on election management systems which are computers often connected to the internet running out-of-date versions of Windows. If a county election management system is infected with malware, the malware can spread from that system to the USB drives, which then would transfer it to all the voting machines, scanners, and ballot-marking devices in the county. Most U.S. election systems are programmed by local county election officials or third-party vendors, who plug previously-used USB drives into computers connected to the internet before plugging those same USB drives into the optical scanners, tabulators, and voting machines that collect, count, and determine election results.

Video Transcript AI Summary
Before every election, voting machines need to be programmed with the ballot design and candidate names. This is done by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker infects the memory card with malicious code, it can change the programming on the voting machine and manipulate the election results. The programming is done on a desktop PC or workstation, often connected to the internet. In Michigan, during the 2016 election, 75% of counties outsourced their pre-election programming to three small companies. These companies had weak security measures, making it relatively easy to hack into their systems. By targeting vulnerable states and hacking into their election management systems, attackers can spread malicious code to individual voting machines and manipulate the votes. Even if there are paper records, they are often not thoroughly checked.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: The way these attacks work is that before every election, every voting machine needs to be programmed with the design of the ballot, the names of the races and candidates. And voting officials do that by inserting a memory card into the machine. If an attacker can infect that memory card with malicious code, Well, when the memory card is inserted into the machine, it can change the programming running on the voting machine and cause the voting machine to, at the end of the election, output whatever results the attacker wants. That ballot programming is created on basically a desktop PC, a workstation somewhere operated by the county or by an outside vendor. If an attacker can infect that election programming workstation called an election management system, and in many cases these are connected to the Internet. Well, then that attack can spread to all of the memory cards that are used to program a voting machines in that jurisdiction. And, Sorry. How easy would it be to hack into one of these? Well, I'll give you an example. In Michigan, during the 2016 election, 75% of counties outsource their pre election programming to just 3 small companies. This is the website for one of them. It's a small business that's operated essentially in a strip mall. And they have photographs on their website of all of their facilities, even all of their employees. If I wanted to try to hack into these guys, well maybe I go to their Who We Are page, Find Larry, the president's assistant, Sue, and spoof an email to her that appears to be coming from Larry, telling her to urgently open this attachment. Of course, the attachment contains a virus on route. And once she opens it, I'm in their systems. So, in fact, it's not nearly as hard as it might seem to target voting machines over a wide scale and to potentially hack into them even from the Internet. So just to review, you look at the polls before the election and figure out which states were likely to be close, probe all of them, find the ones with the weakest protection. Then hack into the election management systems there or at the outside vendors the states use. Once you hack into the election management system, you can spread malicious code the individual voting machines and have your code say swap 10% of the votes in the places you infected. Then even if the votes are also recorded on a piece of paper, you don't have to worry. Because in most of those states, they're going to just pluss the paper out without looking at

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#3 In 2019, the Associated Press reported that the vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions nationwide, including numerous swing states, were still using Windows 7 or older operating systems to produce ballots, program voting machines, count votes, and report results. Windows 7 officially reached its “end of life” on Jan. 14, 2020, meaning Microsoft stopped providing technical assistance or producing “patches” to address software vulnerabilities. https://apnews.com/article/operating-systems-ap-top-news-voting-voting-machines-pennsylvania-e5e070c31f3c497fa9e6875f426ccde1

AP Exclusive: New election systems use vulnerable software WASHINGTON (AP) — Pennsylvania's message was clear: The state was taking a big step to keep its elections from being hacked in 2020. apnews.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#4 Furthermore, not only are U.S. elections being programmed on computers running out-of-date software, but voting machine manufacturers have also installed remote-access software and wireless modems connecting voting machines directly to the internet. NBC News reported ten months before the 2020 election that ES&S, the largest U.S. election machine vendor, had installed at least 14,000 modems to connect their voting machines to the internet, even though many election security experts had previously warned that voting machines with modems were vulnerable to hackers. https://nbcnews.com/politics/elections/online-vulnerable-experts-find-nearly-three-dozen-u-s-voting-n1112436

Video Transcript AI Summary
Modems in voting machines are vulnerable to hacking as they are network connections. ES and S claims that their modems are separated from the public internet by firewalls. However, once a hacker gains access through the modem, they can manipulate the voting machine software to cheat in future elections. Some jurisdictions use cellular modems or the internet to upload election results, introducing additional vulnerabilities. Voting machines with embedded modems transmit vote totals to the county elections office via cellular networks, which pass through routers and switches used for regular internet traffic. An intruder can intercept data between the cell tower and the voting machine, altering votes and software. Despite claims that voting machines are not connected to the internet, many have 4G wireless modems for faster result uploads, raising concerns about their security during elections.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Modems in voting machines are a bad idea. Those modems are network connections, and that leaves them vulnerable to hacking by anybody who can connect to that network. Speaker 1: ES and S insists insists while there are 14,000 of its modems in use, there are firewalls separating those modems from the public Internet. Speaker 0: Once a hacker Starts talking to the voting machine through the modem. They can hack the software in the voting machine and make it cheat in future elections. Speaker 2: What is the vehicle for the Transmission from the ICP is a cellular modem versus VPN? Well, it is a cellular modem that the can be configured in a VPN. Right. And we currently in Chicago and Cook County, we work with Verizon to, secure that network. Speaker 3: More modern voting machines, they we have a mobile phone modem in to speak. They have a they have a mobile phone or mobile phone connectivity to county headquarters. They are sending the results. Speaker 2: Some jurisdictions are relying on uploading election results using cellular modems or, the Internet. That, of course, introduces another Point of vulnerability not just to the data that's flowing, but also to the software, the devices that, that are being connected. Speaker 4: Many of these voting machines have modems embedded into them. And the modems are used at the end of the election to transmit the vote totals on election night to the county, elections office. So these modems contact the cellular modems and they contact the cellular network, they contact the cell tower. So the cell tower traffic these days in our modern times actually goes through Internet. It goes through the kinds of routers and switches that the regular internet traffic goes to. But also, in between that scroll tower and that loading machine, an intruder can, intercept data they're going to the cell tower and intercepts that that communication, that phone call. If you can trick a voting machine into, contacting your device, your fake cellular tower. Instead of a legitimate tower, you can actually use that connection to get back into the voting machine and get back into the tabulator, and then alter votes and software. Speaker 2: Voting machines are not connected to the Internet. Is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately, it's not actually true. Many new voting machines come with, 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connect it to the internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the internet right in the middle of the election potentially at the most vulnerable time?
Experts find more than 30 U.S. voting systems connected to internet Election officials have claimed that voting machines do not connect to the internet, but a team of experts found several U.S. voting systems currently online. nbcnews.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#5 Dominion Voting Systems, the second-largest U.S. election machine vendor, which has given public presentations acknowledging their use of modems in their voting machines, was also discovered to be running remote-access software during the 2020 election: In Georgia, 20-year election worker, Susan Voyles, testified that Dominion Voting Systems employees “operated remotely” on her ballot-marking devices and poll pads after the team experienced some technical problems with their machines. In Wisconsin, the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), headed by former state Supreme Court Justice Michael Gableman, also found that Dominion and ES&S voting machines were online and connected to the internet. In Michigan, attorney and Secretary of State candidate Matt Deperno, discovered a Telit LE910-SV1 modem chip embedded in the motherboard of an ES&S DS200 voting machine. Through these modems, hackers could theoretically intercept results as they’re transmitted on election night — or, worse, use the modem connections to reach back into voting machines or the election management systems to install malware, change software, or alter official results. Therefore, not only are hackers able to penetrate elections through vulnerable USB cards and election management systems but also through the very voting machines themselves.

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker discusses the vehicle for transmission from the ICP, mentioning that it is a cellular modem that can be configured in a VPN. They state that in Chicago and Cook County, they work with Verizon to secure the network. The hardware supports various wireless chipsets/modems based on the jurisdictions' preferences and network compatibility. They mention using a 3G modem in some jurisdictions but can also support multiple modem varieties, including the latest 4G standards. The speaker confirms that they transmit from the ICP in Mongolia as well, not being limited to specific networks. In Puerto Rico, they use three different cellular vendors (Claro, AT&T, and T-Mobile) to cover different parts of the island.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: What is the vehicle for the transmission from the ICP? Is it cellular modem versus VPN? Speaker 1: Well, it is a cellular modem that can be configured in a VPN, right. And we currently in Chicago and Cook County, we work with Verizon to secure that network. What wireless chipsetmodem Speaker 0: Does the hardware Speaker 1: have? We support a variety. So it's really up to the jurisdictions, what technology they want to use, what's compatible with their networks. Speaker 0: Currently, in some jurisdictions, we're using Basically a modem that is a three d modem GSM, but we can support multiple varieties of modem that can be. Including latest 4 gs standards as well. So that answers the next question, is it 3 gs or 4 gs? Verizon 8 tier Routes to your Sprint, I'm assuming Speaker 1: all? Yes, all networks. Just going to point it back. Yes, I mean we actually transmit from the ICP in Mongolia as well. So we're not limited in networks. Speaker 0: And in Puerto Rico, there is 3 vendors because the island is not Covered by any, by any of the vendors completely. So we use 3 different cellular vendors for some Oh, my g c. It's meant for Claro AT and T, m t mobile, I might think, in the different parts of the app.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#6 This isn’t a problem exclusive to elections — all computers are hackable — and that is why election security experts have always recommended the use of hand-marked paper ballots and rigorous post-election audits. This also isn’t a partisan issue; both Democrats and Republicans are well aware of the secrecy, privatization, and hackable hardware and software that runs America’s elections. After the 2016 election, Clinton supporters and the corporate media would spend the next four years talking about how compromised America’s computerized voting system was. Sen. Ron Wyden, Sen. Amy Klobuchar, and Sen. Kamala Harris held numerous congressional hearings where they explained how easy it was to hack voting machines, how simple it was to locate unattended voting machines, and how numerous voting machines were connected to the internet. After the 2020 election, Trump supporters were censored and de-platformed (I was banned from Twitter) for pointing out the very same anomalies and vulnerabilities that Democrats and the corporate media had spent the last four years discussing. Regardless of politics, these problems are very real, they still exist today, and they are best explained by the computer scientists who have spent the last two decades researching them.

Video Transcript AI Summary
Voting machines have been proven to be vulnerable to tampering and hacking. Even with limited knowledge and resources, hackers can breach these machines within minutes. In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted or switched votes. The biggest seller of voting machines violates basic cybersecurity principles by installing remote access software, making them attractive to fraudsters and hackers. Three companies control the majority of voting machines, posing significant risks. Many states still use outdated and hackable machines. Researchers have found serious security flaws in 43% of American voting machines. Aging systems rely on unsupported software, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hack in just one swing state or a few counties could impact a close presidential election. Concerns about the possibility of a successful hack are high.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I continue to think that our voting machines are too vulnerable. For researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering. Speaker 1: Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter for a minute. Speaker 2: In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from 1 candidate to another. Speaker 0: The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cyber security 101, directing that you install remote access software which would make a machine like that, you know, a magnet for fraudsters and hackers. Speaker 3: These voting machines can be hacked quite easily. Speaker 0: You Speaker 4: could easily Hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things, but in fact, 3 companies are controlling this. It is the individual voting machines That some pose that pose some of the greatest risks. There are Speaker 5: a lot of states that are dealing with antiquated machines. Right. Speaker 6: Which are vulnerable to being hacked. Speaker 3: Workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. It was possible to switch votes. Speaker 0: 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws including backdoors. We know how vulnerable now our systems were. We know I know the hackathon that took place last year were virtually every machine was broken into fairly quickly. Speaker 4: I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the Capitol, where we brought in, folks Who, before our eyes, hacked election machines, those that are not those that are being used in many states. Speaker 7: Aging systems also frequently rely on unsupported software like Windows XP in 2000, which may not receive regular security patches And are thus more vulnerable to the latest methods of cyber attack. Speaker 3: In a close presidential election, they just need to hack 1 swing state or maybe 1 or Or maybe just a few counties in one swing step. Speaker 4: I'm very concerned that you could have a hack that finally went through.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#7 Professor Matt Blaze of Georgetown University's Computer Science Department provided testimony on the vulnerabilities of the United States' election system during a congressional hearing titled "2020 Election Security" on January 9, 2020: “I come here today as a computer scientist who spent the better part of the last quarter century studying election system security… To be blunt, it’s a widely recognized really indisputable fact that every piece of computerized voting equipment in use at polling places today can be easily compromised in ways that have the potential to disrupt election operations, compromise firmware and software, and potentially alter vote tallies in the absence of other safeguards. This is partly a consequence of historically poor design and implementation by equipment vendors, but it’s ultimately a reflection of the nature of complex software. It’s simply beyond the state of the art to build software systems that can reliably withstand targeted attacks by a determined adversary in this kind of environment… Just as we don't expect the local sheriff to singlehandedly defend against military ground invasions, we shouldn't expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services.”

Video Transcript AI Summary
As a computer scientist specializing in election system security, I want to highlight the vulnerabilities in computerized voting equipment used in polling places. These systems can be easily compromised, allowing corrupt candidates or foreign adversaries to disrupt elections and potentially alter vote tallies without detection. The poor design and implementation by equipment vendors contribute to these vulnerabilities. Additionally, voter registration databases and systems reporting final results are attractive targets for disruption, with even fewer standards for securing them. It is unrealistic to expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services. We need to address these issues to ensure the integrity of our elections.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I come here today as a computer scientist who spent the better part of the last quarter century studying election system security. As you're well aware, the integrity of elections across the U. S. Depends heavily on the integrity of computers and software systems. Or corrected after the fact. These vulnerabilities can create practical avenues for corrupt candidates or foreign adversaries to do everything from cause large scale disruption on Election Day to potentially, undetectably alter election outcomes. To be blunt, it's a widely recognized, really indisputable fact that every piece of computerized voting equipment in use at polling places today can be easily compromised in ways that have the potential to disrupt election operations, compromise firmware and software, potentially alter vote tallies in the absence of other safeguards. This is partly a consequence of historically poor design and implementation by equipment vendors, but it's Ultimately, a reflection of the nature of complex software. It's simply beyond the state of the art to build software systems that can reliably withstand targeted and targeted attack by a determined adversary in this kind of an environment. Each of the more than 5,000 jurisdictions responsible for Running elections across the nation must maintain a number of critical information systems that are attractive targets for disruption by adversaries. Most important of these are voter registration databases, the systems that report final results and so forth. Unfortunately, there are even fewer standards for how to secure these systems. The administration of these systems varies widely and the threats against these systems are often even more acute than the threats against individual voting systems. You know, just as we don't expect the local sheriff to single handedly defend against military ground invasions, we shouldn't expect county election IT managers to defend against cyber attacks by foreign intelligence services, but that's precisely what we've been asking them to do.

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#8 Professor J. Alex Halderman of the University of Michigan's Computer Science Department provided testimony on the vulnerabilities of the United States' election system during a congressional hearing titled "Russian Interference in U.S. Elections" on June 21, 2017: “I’m a professor of computer science and have spent the last ten years studying the electronic voting systems that our nation relies on. My conclusion from that work is that our highly computerized election infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and even to cyber attacks that could change votes... I know America’s voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly as part of a decade of research studying the technology that operates elections and learning how to make it stronger. We’ve created attacks that can spread from machine to machine like a computer virus and silently change election outcomes. We’ve studied touch screen and optical scan systems, and in every single case, we’ve found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and steal votes… In close elections, an attacker can probe the most important swing states or swing counties, find areas with the weakest protection, and strike there. In a close election year, changing a few votes in key localities could be enough to tip national results.”

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker, a computer science professor, warns that the electronic voting systems used in the US are vulnerable to sabotage and cyber attacks that can change votes. Through their research, they have repeatedly hacked voting machines and found ways for attackers to manipulate them. They emphasize that these vulnerabilities are within reach for America's enemies. While some states have secure voting technology, others are alarmingly vulnerable, putting the entire nation at risk. The speaker debunks the belief that voting machines are secure because they are not connected to the internet, explaining that many machines have wireless modems for faster result uploading. They conclude that it is only a matter of time before these vulnerabilities are exploited.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I'm a professor of computer science and have spent the last 10 years studying the electronic voting systems that our nation relies on. My conclusion from that work is that our highly computerized election infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and even to cyber attacks that could change votes. These realities risk making our election results more difficult for the American people to trust. I know America's voting machines are vulnerable because my colleagues and I have hacked them repeatedly as part of a decade of research studying the technology that operates elections and learning how to make it stronger. We've created attacks that can spread from machine to machine like a computer virus and silently change election outcomes. We've studied touch screen and optical scan systems, and in every single case, we've found ways for attackers to sabotage machines and to steel votes. These capabilities are certainly within reach for America's enemies. As you know, states choose their own voting technology And while some states are doing well with security, others are alarmingly vulnerable. This puts the entire nation at risk. In close elections, an attacker can probe the most important swing states or swing counties, find areas with the weakest protection and strike there. In a close election year, changing a few votes in key, localities could be enough to tip national results. The key lesson from 2016 is that these threats are real. Some say the fact that voting machines aren't connected to the internet makes them secure. But unfortunately, this is not true. Voting machines are not as distant from the internet as they may seem. Across the country there are about 52 different models of machines. They fall into essentially 2 styles, ones that Scan a piece of paper or ones where the vote, the voter just interacts with the touch screen. And many of them have been analyzed now by researchers, looking for security vulnerabilities. In every single case Where a US voting machine has been analyzed by competent security researchers, they have found vulnerabilities that would let someone Inject malicious software and change election data. Every single case. Missing machines are not connected to the internet. This is something that you hear all the time in the US from election officials. Unfortunately it's not actually true. In many new voting machines come with, 4 gs wireless modems so that they can be connected to the internet from the polling place in order to upload the results faster. Now to me that sounds crazy. Why would you want to put your voting machines on the internet right in the middle of the election, potentially at the most vulnerable time? I'm Pretty sure my undergrad computer security class at Michigan could have changed the outcome of the 2016 Michigan election if we wanted to. It is that bad. And we have a combination of very powerful adversaries and unfortunately quite vulnerable and obsolete systems. That's that's why I say it's only a matter of time.

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#9 Professor Andrew Appel of Princeton University's Computer Science Department provided testimony on the vulnerabilities of the United States' election system during a congressional hearing titled "Election Cybersecurity" on September 28, 2016: “Installing new software is how you hack a voting machine to cheat. In 2009, in a courtroom of the superior court of New Jersey, I demonstrated how to hack a voting machine. I wrote a vote-stealing computer program that shifted votes from one candidate to another. Installing that vote-stealing program in a voting machine takes seven minutes per machine with a screwdriver. But really, the software I built was not rocket science. Any computer programmer could write the same code. Once it’s installed, it could steal elections without detection for years to come… Other computer scientists have demonstrated similar hacks on many models of machines. This is not just one glitch from one manufacturer of machines; it’s the very nature of computers. So how can we trust our elections when it is so easy to make the computers cheat?”

Video Transcript AI Summary
The Sequoia AVC Advantage, now called the Dominion AVC Advantage, is a voting machine that can be easily hacked by removing the memory chip and installing a cheating program. This program can change votes and alter the electronic log of votes cast. Other voting machines can be hacked by installing a software upgrade memory card. These vulnerabilities have been demonstrated by various universities, including Princeton, Johns Hopkins, and Michigan. Voting machines are often accessible to potential attackers before and after elections. The ease of hacking raises concerns about the trustworthiness of election results.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: The machine that I hacked is called the Sequoia AVC Advantage, now called the Dominion AVC Advantage. It's in use in almost all of New Jersey and in all of Louisiana and a few counties of Pennsylvania and other states. The computer program that counts the votes on this machine is in a read only memory that's mounted in a socket on the motherboard. To hack this machine, you have to remove that memory chip from its socket and install a memory chip on which you've prepared a cheating program. The cheating program that I prepared is has an extra 100 lines of code basically that, when the polls are about to close, it goes in there and changes some votes stored in the machine. And there is an electronic log of all votes cast, so it changes the log too. So to install that, the attacker doesn't need to be a computer scientist. The attacker just needs to have a bunch of copies of this memory chip with the program on it. And for each voting machine, unscrew 10 screws to remove the panel that covers the motherboard, pry out the ROM chip containing the legitimate program and install the ROM chip containing the fraudulink program. Other kinds of voting machines, store their computer program that counts to votes in flash memory and this can be updated under the control of whatever computer program happens to be running in the voting machine. These voting machines, typically the generation developed in the 1990s and after, can be hacked without actually physically changing any hardware in the machine, just by installing a software upgrade memory card, in the same slot that one would normally install the ballot definition. And this particular attack was demonstrated by my colleague at Princeton, Professor Felton, in about 2007 working with 2 of his graduate students. But it's not just us at Princeton. There are many kinds of voting machines and the same kinds of hacks are applicable to all voting machines and have been demonstrated at several other universities, including the University of Connecticut, Johns Hopkins, Michigan and others. There are cybersecurity issues in all parts of our election system. Before the election, voter registration databases. During the election, voting machines. After the election, vote tabulation, canvassing, precinct aggregation computers. Installing new software in a voting machine is not really much different from installing new software in any other kind of computer. Installing new software is how you hack a voting machine to cheat. In 2009, in the courtroom of the Superior Court of New Jersey, I demonstrated how to hack a voting machine. I wrote a vote stealing computer program that shifts votes from one candidate to another. Installing that vote stealing program in a voting machine takes 7 minutes per machine with a screwdriver, But really the software I built was not rocket science. Any computer programmer could write the same code. Once it's installed, it could steal elections without detection for years to come. Voting machines are often delivered to polling places several days before the election to elementary schools, churches, firehouses. In these locations, anyone could gain access to a voting machine for 10 minutes. Between elections, the machines are routinely opened up for maintenance by county employees or private contractors. Let's assume they have the utmost integrity, but still in the US we try to run our elections so that we can trust the election results without relying on any one individual. Other computer scientists have demonstrated similar hacks on many models of machine. This is not just 1 glitch in 1 manufacturer's machine. It's the very nature of computers. So how can we trust our elections when it's so easy to make the computers cheat?

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#10 Senator Ron Wyden provided testimony on the vulnerabilities of the United States' election system during a congressional hearing titled "Election Security" on July 15, 2019: "The vast majority of ten thousand election jurisdictions nationwide use election management systems that run on old software that is soon going to be out-of-date and ripe for exploitation by hackers, according to an exhaustive analysis by the Associated Press. Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, and North Carolina, among others, are all at risk. Even the State of Georgia, which passed legislation to buy new voting machines, is on track to buy equipment that suffers from significant cyber security weakness. Our elections weren't secure last week, and they sure as heck aren't secure this week, and anybody who says otherwise is either selling you voting machines or simply has malicious intent towards our elections. 43% of American voters use voting machines that researchers have found have serious security flaws, including back doors. These companies are accountable to no one. They won’t answer basic questions about their cyber security practices. And, the biggest companies won’t answer any questions at all. Five states have no paper trail, and that means there is no way to prove the numbers the voting machines put out are legitimate. So much for cyber security 101."

Video Transcript AI Summary
The majority of election jurisdictions in the US use outdated software that is vulnerable to hacking. States like Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona, North Carolina, and even Georgia (despite recent legislation) are at risk. If a small percentage determines the election outcome and people perceive it as unfair, it could seriously damage our democratic system. Experts argue that without a thorough forensic analysis, it is impossible to confirm that no votes were altered in the 2016 election. Additionally, 43% of American voters use machines with security flaws, and some companies refuse to disclose their cybersecurity practices. Five states lack a paper trail, making it impossible to verify the accuracy of voting machine results.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: The vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions nationwide use election management systems that run on old software that is soon gonna be out of date and ripe for exploitation by hackers according to an exhaustive analysis by the Associated Press. Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Arizona and North Carolina, among others, are all at risk. Even the state of Georgia, which just passed legislation to buy new voting machines, is on track to buy equipment that suffers from this significant cybersecurity weakness. Let's say the election is decided by a small percentage and people in America don't think that the election was fair. The effect that would have on our 200 year experiment in self governance, our democratic system would take a real hit. Our elections weren't secure last week, and they sure as heck aren't secure this week. And anybody who says otherwise is either selling of voting machines or simply has a malicious intent towards our elections. At one point in the Intelligence Committee, both sides seemed to agree that no votes were changed in the 2016 election. And I said, the experts I talk to say that until you have a forensic analysis of a vote, until you go in there and scrub the whole system, You can't really say that. 43% of American voters use voting machines That researchers have found have serious security flaws, including backdoors. These companies are accountable to no one. They won't answer basic questions about their cybersecurity practices. And the biggest companies won't answer any questions at all. 5 states have no paper trail, And that means there is no way to prove the numbers the voting machines put out are legitimate. So much for cybersecurity 101.

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#11 Senator Elizabeth Warren published an article on her website on the vulnerabilities of the United States' election system titled "Strengthening Our Democracy" on June 25, 2019: "The harsh truth is that our elections are extremely vulnerable to attack: Forty-two states use voter registration databases that are more than a decade old. Laughably, in 2019, some still use Windows 2000 and Windows XP. Twelve states still use paperless machines, meaning there’s no paper trail to verify vote counts. Some states don’t require post-election audits. And ten states don’t train election officials to deal with cybersecurity threats." https://web.archive.org/web/20190917015401/https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/strengthening-democracy

Strengthening Our Democracy | Elizabeth Warren Our right to vote is under attack—and we need to put more federal muscle in the fight to protect it. web.archive.org

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#12 In Dec. 2019, Senators Elizabeth Warren, Amy Klobuchar, Ron Wyden, and Mark Pocan sent letters to the three private equity firms that own the largest voting machine companies in the US expressing their concern about the industry's "vulnerabilities" and "lack of transparency." https://web.archive.org/web/20200119083321/https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/H.I.G.%20McCarthy,%20&%20Staple%20Street%20letters.pdf

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#13 Following Hillary Clinton's defeat in the 2016 election, the corporate media dedicated the next four years to writing hundreds of articles about the extent to which the United States' election system is online, compromised, and vulnerable to hackers. https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/110-articles-affirm-americas-computerized

Hacking America's Computerized Voting System 110 Articles Affirm America's Computerized Voting System Is Online, Compromised, and Vulnerable To Hackers: Documented, Linked, and Quoted kanekoa.news

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#14 The Guardian: Voting machine password hacks as easy as 'abcde' (April 15, 2015) “Touchscreen WinVote voting machines used in numerous elections between 2002 and 2014 used “abcde” and “admin” as passwords and could easily have been hacked from the parking lot outside the polling place, according to a state report… Anyone within a half mile could have modified every vote, undetected…the version of Windows operating on each of them had not been updated since at least 2004, that it was possible to “create and execute malicious code” on the WINVote and the level of sophistication to execute such an attack is low.” https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/15/virginia-hacking-voting-machines-security

Voting machine password hacks as easy as 'abcde', details Virginia state report AVS WinVote machines used in three presidential elections in state ‘would get an F-minus’ in security, said computer scientist who pushed for decertification theguardian.com

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#15 New York Times: Millions of Voter Records Posted, and Some Fear Hacker Field Day (Dec. 30, 2015) “First and last names. Recent addresses and phone numbers. Party affiliation. Voting history and demographics. A database of this information from 191 million voter records was posted online over the last week, the latest example of voter data becoming freely available, alarming privacy experts who say the information can be used for phishing attacks, identity theft and extortion. It is not known who built the database, where all the data came from, and whether its disclosure resulted from an inadvertent release or from hacks…states are not taking the security of voter data seriously enough.” https://web.archive.org/web/20210212172828/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/31/us/politics/voting-records-released-privacy-concerns.html?_r=0

Millions of Voter Records Posted, and Some Fear Hacker Field Day (Published 2015) Names, phone numbers and demographic information was included in 191 million voter records mysteriously published over the last week. web.archive.org

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#16 Wired: America’s Electronic Voting Machines Are Scarily Easy Targets (Aug. 2, 2016) “They are old, buggy, and insecure. If someone wanted to mess with the US election, these machines would be an easy way in. Most of these machines are running Windows XP, for which Microsoft hasn’t released a security patch since April 2014…researchers have demonstrated that many of them are susceptible to malware or, equally if not more alarming, a well-timed denial of service attack.”

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#17 Politico: How to Hack an Election in 7 Minutes (Aug. 5, 2016) “Princeton professor Andrew Appel decided to hack into a voting machine… He summoned a graduate student named Alex Halderman, who could pick the machine’s lock in seven seconds. Clutching a screwdriver, he deftly wedged out the four ROM chips—they weren’t soldered into the circuit board, as sense might dictate—making it simple to replace them with one of his own: A version of modified firmware that could throw off the machine’s results, subtly altering the tally of votes, never to betray a hint to the voter. The attack was concluded in minutes… the machines that Americans use at the polls are less secure than the iPhones they use to navigate their way there. We found the machine did not have any security mechanisms beyond what you’d find on a typical home PC, it was very easy to hack…foreign hackers could attack the state and county computers that aggregate the precinct totals on election night…They could attack digitized voter registration databases…They could infect software at the point of development, writing malicious ballot definition files that companies distribute, or do the same on a software patch… They could FedEx false software to a county clerk’s office and, with the right letterhead and convincing cover letter, get it installed. Even with optical scan voting, it’s not just the voting machines themselves—it’s the desktop and laptop computers that election officials use to prepare the ballots, prepare the electronic files from the OpScan machines, panel voter registration, electronic poll books. And the computers that aggregate the results together from all of the optical scans.” https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/2016-elections-russia-hack-how-to-hack-an-election-in-seven-minutes-214144/

How to Hack an Election in 7 Minutes With Russia already meddling in 2016, a ragtag group of obsessive tech experts is warning that stealing the ultimate prize—victory on Nov. 8—would be child’s play. politico.com

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#18 CBS: Hacker demonstrates how voting machines can be compromised (Aug. 10, 2016) “Concerns are growing over the possibility of a rigged presidential election. Roughly 70 percent of states in the U.S. use some form of electronic voting. Hackers told CBS News that problems with electronic voting machines have been around for years. The machines and the software are old and antiquated. The voter doesn't even need to leave the booth to hack the machine. For $15 and in-depth knowledge of the card, you could hack the vote… There are so many places in the voting process once it goes electronic that's vulnerable. We found that more than 40 states are using voting machines there that are at least 10 years old.” https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rigged-presidential-elections-hackers-demonstrate-voting-threat-old-machines/

Hacker demonstrates how voting machines can be compromised With millions heading to the polls in three months, concerns are growing over the possibility of a rigged presidential election cbsnews.com

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#19 ABC News: Yes, It's Possible to Hack the Election (Aug. 19, 2016) “Slight meddling in some swing precincts in swing states could tip the scales. If it’s a computer, it can be hacked… if sophisticated hackers want to get into any computer or electronic device, even one that is not connected to the internet, they can do so… In most states the data that are used to determine who won an election are processed by networked, computerized devices… There are almost no locations that exclusively use paper ballots… The process of recording which person got your vote can — almost always — be hacked. Malware can be implanted on voting machines. Almost none of these machines have any kind of malware detection software like those used at major corporations and government agencies. Even if they did, many of those cybersecurity tools are regularly defeated by today’s sophisticated hackers… In America’s often close elections, a little manipulation could go a long way… Smart malware can be programmed to switch only a small percentage of votes from what the voters intended. That may be all that is needed, and that malware can also be programmed to erase itself after it does its job, so there might be no trace it ever happened." https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hack-election/story?id=41489017

Yes, It's Possible to Hack the Election abcnews.go.com

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#20 The Atlantic: How Electronic Voting Could Undermine the Election (Aug. 29, 2016) “…computer-security experts think electronic voting is a very, very bad idea. For years, security researchers and academics have urged election officials to hold off on adopting electronic voting systems, worrying that they’re not nearly secure enough to reliably carry out their vital role in American democracy. Their claims have been backed up by repeated demonstrations of the systems’ fragility. When the District of Columbia tested an electronic voting system in 2010, a professor from the University of Michigan and his graduate students took it over from more than 500 miles away to show its weaknesses; with actual physical access to a voting machine, the same professor—Alex Halderman—swapped out its internals, turning it into a Pac Man console. Halderman showed that a hacker who has access to a machine before election day could modify its programming—and he did so without even leaving a mark on the machine’s tamper-evident seals…pure electronic voting is simply too dangerous: We must use paper, either directly filled out by the voter or as a voter verifiable paper audit trail…” https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/08/how-electronic-voting-could-undermine-the-election/497885/

How Electronic Voting Could Undermine the Election As foreign hackers target election data, voters may lose faith in digital ballots. theatlantic.com

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#21 FOX: Princeton Professor demonstrates how to hack a voting machine (Sept. 18, 2016) “I have demonstrated how to hack the AVC Advantage voting machines that we use in New Jersey... The touch screen voting machine, the type used in about ten states, can be tampered with... By simply swapping the machine's computer chip for his own... I figured out how to make a slightly different computer program that, just before the close of the polls, shifts some votes around from one candidate to another. I wrote that computer program onto a memory chip like this, and now to hack a voting machine, you have to get seven minutes alone with it, with a screwdriver.” https://www.foxnews.com/video/5131074167001#sp=show-clips

Professor demonstrates how to hack a voting machine | Fox News Video Eric Shawn reports foxnews.com

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#22 Fortune: Watch This Security Researcher Hack a Voting Machine (Nov. 4, 2016) “Researchers at cybersecurity startup Cylance said they were able to hack into the Sequoia AVC Edge Mk1, used to count votes in states including California, Florida, and New Jersey, and change the final tally it produced. In Cylance's hacking demonstration, researchers were able to alter the memory of the machine as well as the paper trail it created to change vote counts and precinct records. To pull off the hack, the researchers slipped in a custom PC memory card that overwrote software embedded in the device. Cylance said it had notified Dominion Voting Systems (née Sequoia), the voting machine's maker, and government authorities about the threat.” https://fortune.com/2016/11/04/voting-machine-hack-watch-video-cylance/

Watch This Guy Hack a Voting Machine Researchers at cybersecurity startup Cylance demonstrate how to hack a voting machine used in the U.S. in a video ahead of election 2016. fortune.com

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#23 Vox: Here’s how hackers can wreak havoc on Election Day (Nov. 7, 2016) “Voting machines are old and vulnerable, and voter databases are connected to the internet. Many voting machines are running software that’s over a decade old, like Windows XP, which Microsoft hasn’t issued a security patch for since 2014. Others store ballots on memory cards, which could be used to insert viruses that can cause the machines to malfunction or alter votes. Take the Sequoia AVC Edge, for example, which is used in 12 states. It was hacked by a group of academics who installed malware that made the machine unable to do anything but play Pac-Man... Across the country, state voter registration data is synced with the internet; the integration has allowed people to register online or at the DMV. But it also means those databases are vulnerable to hackers… In Indiana last month, a security researcher demonstrated how he was able to quickly break into the state’s database and edit people’s voter information. Last year, another researcher found 191 million hacked voter registration records sitting on an open database that apparently anyone could find.” https://www.vox.com/2016/11/7/13512748/hackers-election-day-voting-machines-databases-2016

Here’s how hackers can wreak havoc on Election Day Voting machines are old and vulnerable, and voter databases are connected to the internet. vox.com

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#24 PBS: Here’s how hackers might mess with electronic voting on Election Day (Nov. 8, 2016) “…vulnerabilities in electronic ballots, make hacking a major possibility on Election Day… Five states — New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina — will cast votes on digital systems without leaving a paper trail. The same applies to several jurisdictions in battleground states like Pennsylvania and Ohio. Cyber vulnerabilities exist in all of these locations. Most revolve around the age of machines and their software. The Brennan Center report estimated 43 states will use voting machines in 2016 that are more than 10 years old. Many of these devices contain outdated software — think Microsoft Windows XP or older — without security updates. Meanwhile, the mainframes of other machines are guarded by easy-to-pick padlocks or by no barrier at all. With the kind of stealth and sophistication that’s already out there, why wouldn’t a nation-state, cyber-criminal gang, or activist group go into election systems that are completely vulnerable? …much of this voting technology is proprietary, so forensic auditors couldn’t independently scrub for and detect malicious software, especially given such code might delete itself after Election Day… Some counties use devices that collect and calculate results at once, such as the AccuVote TS and TSX voting machines. But the software for these popular machines lacks basic cybersecurity, like encryption or strong passwords. Marketplaces for voter registration data have sprouted on the Dark Web over the last year, according to an election hacking report from the ICIT. Prices vary, but one listing offered 0.5 Bitcoins ($300) for a single state’s database.” https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/heres-how-hackers-could-mess-with-electronic-voting

Here's how hackers might mess with electronic voting on Election Day Here's what to watch for on Election Day in case hackers decide to sway the vote. pbs.org

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#25 Slate: Now Is the Time to Replace Our Decrepit Voting Machines (Nov. 17, 2016) “With antiquated voting devices at the end of their projected lifespans still in widespread use across the country, the U.S. is facing an impending crisis in which our most basic election infrastructure is unacceptably vulnerable to breakdown, malfunction, and hacking... No one expects a laptop to run reliably for more than a decade. Yet on Election Day 2016, 42 states used voting machines that were at least 10 years old, and 13 of those states used ones more than 15 years old. Perhaps even more troubling, these aging machines are particularly vulnerable to hacking... These older devices often rely on unsupported software (we found machines still operating on Windows 2000) that doesn’t receive the regular security patches that help protect against modern methods of cyberattacks and hasn’t been through the relatively rigorous federal certification program that exists today. What’s more, many of these systems don’t have physical paper trails or ballots to back up the results, meaning there’s no way to independently verify how voters intended to cast their ballots in the case of a suspected hack. Voters complained of touchscreen calibration errors that “flipped” votes in North Carolina, Texas, Nevada, and Georgia and interfered with selecting straight party tickets in Pennsylvania. Optical scan machines malfunctioned in parts of Michigan and Massachusetts, and a few in Illinois had to be replaced because a memory card blew.” https://slate.com/technology/2016/11/now-is-the-time-to-fix-our-old-voting-machines.html

We Can’t Wait Until the Next Election to Replace Decrepit, Unreliable Voting Machines Although more than half the country may be unhappy with the results, America dodged a bullet on Election Day. That is, our voting machines generally... slate.com

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#26 PBS: Recounts or no, U.S. elections are still vulnerable to hacking (Dec. 26, 2016) “Pennsylvania is one of 11 states where the majority of voters use antiquated machines that store votes electronically, without printed ballots or other paper-based backups that could be used to double-check the balloting. There’s almost no way to know if they’ve accurately recorded individual votes — or if anyone tampered with the count. More than 80 percent of Pennsylvanians who voted on Nov. 8 cast their ballots on such machines, according to VotePA, a nonprofit seeking their replacement. A recount would, in the words of VotePA’s Marybeth Kuznik, a veteran election judge, essentially amount to this: “You go to the computer, and you say, ‘OK, computer, you counted this a week-and-a-half ago. Were you right the first time?'” These paperless digital voting machines, used by roughly 1 in 5 U.S. voters last month, present one of the most glaring dangers to the security of the rickety, underfunded U.S. election system. Like many electronic voting machines, they are vulnerable to hacking. But other machines typically leave a paper trail that could be manually checked. The paperless digital machines open the door to potential election rigging that might not ever be detected. Researchers would like to see the U.S. move entirely to computer-scannable paper ballots since paper can’t be hacked. Many advanced democracies require paper ballots, including Germany, Britain, Japan, and Singapore. Wallach and his colleagues believe a crafty team of pros could strike surgically, focusing on select counties in a few battleground states where “a small nudge might be decisive,” he said…Vote-tallying systems, typically at the county level, are also tempting targets. They tend to be little more than PCs running a database. Tabulation databases at the county level, which collect results from individual precincts, are supposed to be “air-gapped” or disconnected from the internet at all times — though experts say they sometimes get connected anyway. They’re considered insecure for other reasons; many have USB ports where malware could be introduced. Forty-three states use machines more than a decade old. Most run on vintage operating systems such as Windows 2000 that pre-date the iPhone and are no longer updated with security patches.” https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/recounts-no-u-s-elections-still-vulnerable-hacking

Recounts or no, U.S. elections are still vulnerable to hacking ALLENTOWN, Pa. — Jill Stein's bid to recount votes in Pennsylvania was in trouble even before a federal judge shot it down Dec. 12. That's because the Green Party candidate's effort stood almost no chance of detecting potential fraud or error in the vote — there was basically nothing to recount. pbs.org

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#27 Politico: U.S. elections are more vulnerable than ever to hacking (Dec. 29, 2016) “America's political system will remain vulnerable to cyberattacks and infiltration from foreign and domestic enemies unless the government plugs major holes and commits millions of dollars in the coming years… Hackers even invaded two state voter registration databases, spurring an FBI alert that sparked questions about whether a broader attack was coming. As for Election Day itself, 15 states — including swing state Pennsylvania — still rely at least partly on electronic voting machines that leave no paper trail. That’s despite years of warnings from digital security specialists, who say the touch-screen machines are prone to being hijacked and would provide no effective way to disprove claims of digital vote tampering… Democrats like Lieu say Republicans are playing with fire, warning the GOP could be in Russia’s crosshairs come 2018. And have no doubt, he added, foreign hackers “could absolutely swing an election” if the U.S. fails to lock its doors.” https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/election-hacking-vulnerabilities-233024

U.S. elections are more vulnerable than ever to hacking Major political, financial and logistical obstacles stand in the way. politico.com

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#28 ScientificAmerican: Our Voting System Is Hackable by Foreign Powers (March 1, 2017) “It is entirely possible for an adversary to hack American computerized voting systems directly and select the next commander in chief. A dedicated group of technically sophisticated individuals could steal an election by hacking voting machines in key counties in just a few states. Indeed, University of Michigan computer science professor J. Alex Halderman says that he and his students could have changed the result of the November election… It needn’t be a superpower like Russia or China. Even a medium-sized country would have the resources to accomplish this, with techniques that could include hacking directly into voting systems over the Internet, bribing employees of election offices and voting-machine vendors, or just buying the companies that make the voting machines outright. It is likely that such an attack would not be detected, given our current election security practices... We need to audit computers by manually examining randomly selected paper ballots and comparing the results with machine results. Audits require a voter-verified paper ballot, which the voter inspects to confirm that his or her selections have been correctly and indelibly recorded. Since 2003 an active community of academics, lawyers, election officials, and activists has urged states to adopt paper ballots and robust audit procedures…It is important that audits be performed on every contest in every election so that citizens do not have to request manual recounts to feel confident about election results." https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/our-voting-system-is-hackable-by-foreign-powers/#

Our Voting System Is Hackable by Foreign Powers Scientific American is the essential guide to the most awe-inspiring advances in science and technology, explaining how they change our understanding of the world and shape our lives. scientificamerican.com

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#29 Politico: Will the Georgia Special Election Get Hacked? (June 14, 2017) “A 29-year-old former cybersecurity researcher with the federal government’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, Lamb, who now works for a private internet security firm in Georgia, wanted to assess the security of the state’s voting systems. When he learned that Kennesaw State University’s Center for Election Systems tests and programs voting machines for the entire state of Georgia, he searched the center’s website… Lamb found on the center’s website a database containing registration records for the state’s 6.7 million voters; multiple PDFs with instructions and passwords for election workers to sign in to a central server on Election Day; and software files for the state’s ExpressPoll poll books — electronic devices used by poll workers to verify that a voter is registered before allowing them to cast a ballot. There also appeared to be databases for the so-called GEMS servers. These Global Election Management Systems are used to prepare paper and electronic ballots, tabulate votes and produce summaries of vote totals. The files were supposed to be behind a password-protected firewall, but the center had misconfigured its server so they were accessible to anyone, according to Lamb. “You could just go to the root of where they were hosting all the files and just download everything without logging in,” Lamb says. The site was also using a years-old version of Drupal — content management software — that had a critical software vulnerability long known to security researchers. “Drupageddon,” as researchers dubbed the vulnerability, got a lot of attention when it was first revealed in 2014. It would let attackers easily seize control of any site that used the software. A patch to fix the hole had been available for two years, but the center hadn’t bothered to update the software, even though it was widely known in the security community that hackers had created automated scripts to attack the vulnerability back in 2014… In addition to failing to install the 2-year-old patch on its server software, Georgia, in testimony in the injunction hearing last week revealed, is still using a version of software on its touch-screen machines that was last certified in 2005. That voting software is running on the machines on top of a Windows operating system that is even older than this.” https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/14/will-the-georgia-special-election-get-hacked-215255/

Will the Georgia Special Election Get Hacked? The state’s voting systems are uniquely vulnerable, security researchers say—and the state has ignored efforts to fix the problem. politico.com

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#30 NPR: If Voting Machines Were Hacked, Would Anyone Know? (June 14, 2017) “U.S. officials are increasingly worried about how vulnerable American elections really are… But even if most voting machines aren't connected to the Internet, says cybersecurity expert Jeremy Epstein, "they are connected to something that's connected to something that's connected to the Internet." … A recently leaked National Security Agency report on Russian hacking attempts has heightened concerns. According to the report, Russian intelligence services broke into an election software vendor's computer system and used the information it gained to send 122 election officials fake emails infected with malicious software. Bloomberg News reported Tuesday that Russia might have attempted to hack into election systems in up to 39 states. University of Michigan computer scientist Alex Halderman says it's just the kind of phishing campaign someone would launch if they wanted to manipulate votes. "That's because, before every election, the voting machines have to be programmed with the design of the ballots — what are the races, who are the candidates," says Halderman. He notes that the programming is usually done on a computer in a central election office or by an outside vendor. The ballot program is then installed on individual voting machines with a removable memory card. "So, as a remote attacker, I can target an election management system, one of these ballot programming computers. If I can infect it with malicious software, I can have that malicious software spread to the individual machines on the memory cards, and then change votes on Election Day," says Halderman.” https://www.npr.org/2017/06/14/532824432/if-voting-machines-were-hacked-would-anyone-know

If Voting Machines Were Hacked, Would Anyone Know? Even if most voting machines aren't connected to the Internet, "they are connected to something that's connected to something that's connected to the Internet," says one cybersecurity expert. npr.org

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#31 HuffPost: Good News For Russia: 15 States Use Easily Hackable Voting Machines (July 17, 2017) "Touch-screen machines can be programmed to change votes and are nearly impossible to audit, computer experts say… Manufacturers like Diebold touted the touch screens, known as direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines, as secure and more convenient than their paper-based predecessors. Computer experts were skeptical since any computer can be vulnerable to viruses and malware, but it was hard to get ahold of a touch-screen voting machine to test it. The manufacturers were so secretive about how the technology worked that they often required election officials to sign non-disclosure agreements preventing them from bringing in outside experts who could assess the machines. In September 2006, they published a research paper and an accompanying video detailing how they could spread malicious code to the AccuVote TS to change the record of the votes to produce whatever outcome the code writers desired. And the code could spread from one machine to another like a virus. That was more than a decade ago, but Georgia still uses the AccuVote TS. The state is one of five ― the others are Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey, and South Carolina ― that rely entirely on DREs for voting. Ten other states use a combination of paper ballots and DRE machines that leave no paper trail. Many use a newer version of the AccuVote known as the TSX ― even though computer scientists have demonstrated that machine, too, is vulnerable to hacking. Others use the Sequoia AVC Advantage, which Princeton professor Andrew Appel demonstrated could be similarly manipulated in a 2007 legal filing. Appel bought a Sequoia machine online for $82 and demonstrated that he could remove 10 screws and easily replace the Sequoia’s memory card with a modified version that would alter the outcome of an election… Computer scientists like Halderman, Appel, and Felten have been warning states about the risks of DRE machines for over a decade, urging them to replace touch-screen machines with paper ballots that can be read with an optical scanner and easily audited after an election. Paper ballots create a physical copy of the voter’s choice that can be checked against the results; with DRE machines, it’s impossible to verify whether the choice the person intended to select is, in fact, what the machine recorded.” https://www.huffpost.com/entry/electronic-voting-machines-hack-russia_n_5967e1c2e4b03389bb162c96

Good News For Russia: 15 States Use Voting Machines That Have Been Easily Hackable For More Than A Decade Touch-screen machines can be programmed to change votes and are nearly impossible to audit, computer experts say. huffpost.com

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#32 CNET: Defcon hackers find it’s very easy to break voting machines (July 30, 2017) “When the password for a voting machine is "abcde" and can't be changed, the integrity of our democracy might be in trouble. The Advanced Voting Solutions WinVote machine, dubbed "America's worst voting machine," came equipped with this simple password even as it was used in some of the country's most important elections. AVS went out of business in 2007, but Virginia used its insecure machines until 2015 before dropping them for scrap metal. That means this vulnerable hunk of technology was used in three presidential elections, starting with George W. Bush's re-election in 2004 to Barack Obama's in 2012… "It's really just a matter of plugging your USB drive in for five seconds, and the thing's completely compromised at that point," Synack co-founder Jay Kaplan said. "To the point where you can get remote access. It's very simple." … Once you're out of the voting program on the machine, it's just like any old Windows XP computer," Synack found. https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy/defcon-hackers-find-its-very-easy-to-break-voting-machines/

While you watched "The Emoji Movie," a voting machine got hacked Voting is at the foundation of every democracy. Hackers find it's on shaky ground thanks to shoddy technology. cnet.com

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#33 CNN: We watched hackers break into voting machines (Aug. 11, 2017) “These are supposed to be the latest machines, they're still used in elections, and they're running ancient software. I think that if somebody wanted to, it would be pretty easy to fake an election…So if you are a voter in America, we're likely hacking the machine that you vote on. There are a few dozen of these machines and also electronic poll books… We can go ahead and impact this log within 10 seconds, and you can gain access to the operating system. We could actually remove this and clone this particular USB. We could go back and start looking at and reverse engineering what's on this image and determining the various ways that we can impact this particular operating system.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HA2DWMHgLnc

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#34 The Intercept: The U.S. Election System Remains Deeply Vulnerable (Oct. 3, 2017) "The Harvard report, titled “Voter Identity Theft: Submitting Changes to Voter Registrations Online to Disrupt Elections,” concludes that online attackers can alter voter registration information in as many as 35 states and the District of Columbia by buying personal information through either legitimate or illegitimate sources. Voter registration information is public, and many states allow citizens to make changes online, even if they registered in person or by mail. A determined hacker could buy voter lists from the 36 jurisdictions that allow online registration, and separately buy the personal information used to confirm a voter’s identification – such as Social Security or driver’s license numbers – to get in and make changes. Voting software is another potential target for hackers. The Intercept has previously reported on a top-secret National Security Agency report detailing a cyberattack by a Russian intelligence agency on at least one U.S. voting software supplier. The attackers sent spear-phishing emails to more than 100 local election officials just days before the November election, according to the highly classified report that was provided anonymously to The Intercept." https://theintercept.com/2017/10/03/us-election-2016-state-voting-systems/

The U.S. Election System Remains Deeply Vulnerable, But States Would Rather Celebrate Fake Success Regardless of what did or did not happen in the 2016 election, voter registration systems remain susceptible to hacking. That's what states should focus on. theintercept.com

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#35 New York Times: The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine (Feb. 2, 2018) “Examining the election-management computer at the county’s office — the machine used to tally official election results and, in many counties, to program voting machines — they found that remote-access software had been installed on it. Remote-access software is a type of program that system administrators use to access and control computers remotely over the internet or over an organization’s internal network. Election systems are supposed to be air-gapped — disconnected from the internet and from other machines that might be connected to the internet. The presence of the software suggested this wasn’t the case with the Venango machine, which made the system vulnerable to hackers. Anyone who gained remote access to the system could use the software to take control of the machine. Logs showed the software was installed two years earlier and used multiple times, most notably for 80 minutes on November 1, 2010, the night before a federal election… In the 15 years since electronic voting machines were first adopted by many states, numerous reports by computer scientists have shown nearly every make and model to be vulnerable to hacking. The systems were not initially designed with robust security in mind, and even where security features were included, experts have found them to be poorly implemented with glaring holes… ES&S has in the past sometimes sold its election-management system with remote-access software preinstalled, according to one official; and where it wasn’t preloaded, the company advised officials to install it so ES&S technicians could remotely access the systems via modem, as Venango County’s contractor did, to troubleshoot and provide maintenance… An ES&S contract with Michigan from 2006 describes how the company’s tech support workers used remote-access software called pcAnywhere to access customer election systems. And a report from Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, that same year describes pcAnywhere on that county’s election-management system on June 2 when ES&S representatives spent hours trying to reconcile vote discrepancies in a local district race that took place during a May 16th primary. An Allegheny County election official told me that remote-access software came pre-installed on their ES&S election-management system… On election nights, many polling places around the country transmit voting results to their county election offices via modems embedded in or connected to their voting machines. Election officials and vendors insist that the modem transmissions are safe because the connections go over phone lines and not the internet. But as security experts point out, many of the modems are cellular, which use radio signals to send calls and data to cell towers and routers belonging to mobile carriers — Verizon, Sprint, AT&T. These routers are technically part of the internet. Even when analog (landline) modems are used instead of cellular ones, the calls still likely pass through routers, because phone companies have replaced much of their analog switching equipment in recent years with digital systems. Because of this, attackers could theoretically intercept unofficial results as they’re transmitted on election night — or, worse, use the modem connections to reach back into election machines at either end and install malware or alter election software and official results... To subvert machines via their modem connection, an attacker could set up a device known as an IMSI-catcher (or stingray, as they’re also called) near precincts or county election offices to intercept and alter vote tallies as they’re transmitted. IMSI-catchers — which law enforcement, militaries and spies use — impersonate legitimate cell towers and trick phones and other devices in their vicinity into connecting to them instead of legitimate towers. ‘‘The incorrect assertion that voting machines or voting systems can’t be hacked by remote attackers because they are ‘not connected to the internet’ is not just wrong, it’s damaging,’’ says Susan Greenhalgh, a spokeswoman for the National Election Defense Coalition, an elections integrity group. ‘‘This oft-repeated myth instills a false sense of security that is inhibiting officials and lawmakers from urgently requiring that all voting systems use paper ballots and that all elections be robustly audited.’’ …The top voting machine maker in the country, ES&S, distributes modems or modeming capability with many of its DRE and optical-scan machines. About 35,000 of ES&S’s newest precinct-based optical scanner, the DS200, are used in 31 states and the District of Columbia and can be outfitted with either analog or cellular modems to transmit results. Maryland, Maine, Rhode Island and the District of Columbia use only DS200 machines statewide (though they also use two other systems specifically for disabled voters and absentee ballots); Florida and Wisconsin use the DS200s in dozens of counties, and other states use them to lesser degrees. ES&S’s earlier model M100 optical scanners, which also can be equipped with modems, have long been used in Michigan — a critical swing state in the 2016 presidential election — though the state is upgrading to DS200 machines this year, as well as machines made by Dominion Voting Systems. Dominion’s machines use external serial-port modems that are connected to machines after an election ends.” https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/21/magazine/the-myth-of-the-hacker-proof-voting-machine.html

The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine (Published 2018) Election officials have insisted that machines can’t be remotely compromised because they’re not “connected to the internet.” But security experts point out crucial ways in which they are. nytimes.com

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#36 Slate: America's Voting Systems Are Highly Vulnerable to Hackers (Feb. 22, 2018) “Did Russia shift the election’s outcome by hacking registration rolls or voting machines? The fact is that it’s impossible to say. In September, the Department of Homeland Security informed officials in 21 states that Russians had hacked into their registration systems in the run-up to the election. Whether the hackers manipulated the rolls—removed names, or switched their precincts—no one has investigated; perhaps no one could investigate, as so many months had passed before the hack was revealed… J. Alex Halderman a professor of computer science at the University of Michigan, testified that only a handful of vendors and contractors provide the equipment used in election machines. “Attackers could target one or a few of these companies and spread malicious code to election equipment that serves millions of voters,” he said. “Furthermore, in close elections, decentralization can actually work against us. An attacker can probe different areas of the most important ‘swing states’ for vulnerabilities, find the areas that have the weakest protection, and strike there.” For the past decade, Halderman has run the “red teams”—the simulated attacker—in games to test the vulnerability of election machines. In those games, he testified, his team “could reprogram the machine to invisibly cause any candidate to win. We also created malicious software—vote-stealing code—that could spread from machine to machine like a computer virus, and silently change the election outcome…This month, the Center for American Progress released a study measuring the degree to which each of the 50 states meets these basic standards. The results were alarming. Paperless voting systems—touch screens with no paper backups—are still used in 14 states. Only 26 states require post-election audits. Forty-one states use database software that was created more than a decade ago—so long ago that the vendors no longer track vulnerabilities or send patches to the users. More distressing still, some of the worst laggards, by these measures, are battleground states. Florida gets an F, judged as “incomplete” or “unsatisfactory” on six of seven security metrics. Pennsylvania and Arizona get D’s. Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, Virginia, and Wisconsin get C’s. No state gets an A. Just 10 get B’s.” https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/02/americas-voting-systems-are-still-dangerously-vulnerable-to-hacking.html

America’s Voting Systems Are Still Dangerously Vulnerable to Hackers Russian interference in the next election could be even more damaging. slate.com

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#37 New York Times: I Hacked an Election. So Can the Russians. (April 5, 2018) “After the chaos of the 2000 election, we were promised a modern and dependable way to vote, Halderman says in the video. “I’m here to tell you that the electronic voting machines Americans got to solve the problem of voting integrity - they turned out to be an awful idea. That’s because people like me can hack them all too easily. Our highly computerized election infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and even to cyberattacks that could change votes. Halderman has testified before Congress on the issue. He says that while it’s promising that the Senate Intelligence Committee has recently shown some understanding of the problem, states must act too. Step 1: Buy a voting machine on eBay, or if you are the North Koreans, hack the manufacturer and steal their software code. Step 2: Write a virus. Step 3: Email your virus to every election official responsible for programming the voting machines with new ballots. Many of these officials are easy to find online. Step 4: Sip coffee and wait. Step 5: Hijack the ballot programming and let the election officials copy your invisible malicious code onto the voting machines. Step 6: Watch your code silently steal votes... What chance do the people running your local elections really have against Russia or North Korea?” https://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000005790489/i-hacked-an-election-so-can-the-russians.html

Video Transcript AI Summary
Cybersecurity experts agree that electronic voting machines are dangerous and obsolete. These machines can be easily hacked, as demonstrated by a computer scientist who has hacked multiple machines and even turned one into a video game console. The vulnerability of these machines puts our election infrastructure at risk of sabotage and cyberattacks. In the 2016 election, millions of Americans voted on paperless electronic machines. The speaker reveals a step-by-step process for hacking these machines and stealing votes. The solution proposed is to use paper ballots, which can be quickly scanned and verified by humans. It is emphasized that all elections should be run with paper ballots and audits. The importance of having a paper backup system is highlighted. The concise transcript emphasizes the need to replace electronic voting machines with paper ballots for secure and reliable elections.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: All cybersecurity experts who have given electronic voting machines any thought agree. These machines have got to go. To show you why, I'm running a mock election using the same dangerous and Obsolete machines still in use today. Our election will find out whether Michigan students prefer their own university or our archrival, Ohio State. Speaker 1: Here we are. Speaker 0: After the chaos of the 2000 election, we were promised a modern and dependable way to vote. I'm here to tell you that the electronic voting machines Americans got to solve of the problem of voting integrity? They turned out to be an awful idea. Speaker 1: One vote for McCain. Speaker 0: That's because people like me can hack them all too easily. I'm a computer scientist who has hacked a lot of electronic voting machines. I even turned 1 machine into a video game console. Imagine what the Russians and North Koreans can do. I've even gone to congress to raise the alarm. Our highly computerized election infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and even to cyberattacks that could change votes. This is the same electronic voting machine used in Georgia, In parts of Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas and even in swing states like Virginia, Florida In Pennsylvania, millions of Americans voted on paperless electronic voting machines in the 2016 election. 100% Michigan. 100% Michigan. Obviously, Michigan. Michigan. Michigan. But here's a little secret between you and me. I've already hacked these Forkless machines. Step 1, buy a voting machine on Ebay. Or if you're the North Koreans, hack Hack the manufacturer and steal their software code. Step 2, write a virus. Step 3, Email your virus to every election official responsible for programming the voting machines with new ballots. Many of these officials are easy to find online. Step 4, sip coffee and wait. Step 5, hijack the ballot programming and let the election officials copy your invisible malicious code onto the voting machines. Step 6, watch your code Silently steal votes. Speaker 1: Alright. Here are the results from the electronic voting machines. Ohio State wins 131 to 108. Speaker 0: There's a good reason we computer scientists are paranoid. It's a golden age for hackers. The computer virus that destroyed Iranian nuclear equipment. Is One of the largest data breaches in history More than 1,000,000,000 of its accounts were hacked. What chance do the people running your local elections really have against Russia or North Korea. Speaker 1: Okay, everyone. I hacked the voting machines. I do have the real results because we also counted on paper. Michigan wins. Speaker 0: Michigan won in a landslide. And I can say this confidently because I have the real results from the safest and simplest solution, paper ballots. Yes. Speaker 1: We need to take a hard look at the equipment that actually records and reports votes. Speaker 0: Even though the Senate Intelligence Committee is finally showing some understanding of Standing of the problem, it's not enough. All states in this country, the people ultimately responsible for how we vote, Must act 2. In a real election, an official could quickly scan these paper ballots and shortly after have a human Verify the results. Paper plus audits. All elections should be run this way. But if you don't wanna believe me or every single expert in cybersecurity who's thought this through, then take it from this guy. Speaker 1: It's old fashioned, But it's always good to have a paper backup system of voting. It's called paper.
Video: Opinion | I Hacked an Election. So Can the Russians. It’s time America’s leaders got serious about voting security. nytimes.com

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#38 The New Yorker: America Continues To Ignore Risks of Election Hacking (April 18, 2018) “America’s voting systems are hackable in all kinds of ways. As a case in point, in 2016, the Election Assistance Commission, the bipartisan federal agency that certifies the integrity of voting machines, and that will now be tasked with administering Congress’s three hundred and eighty million dollars, was itself hacked. The stolen data—log-in credentials of E.A.C. staff members—were discovered, by chance, by employees of the cybersecurity firm Recorded Future, whose computers one night happened upon an informal auction of the stolen passwords. Another case to consider: the Department of Homeland Security recently discovered a number of rogue cell phone simulators—technical tools that are commonly called “Stingrays”—in Washington, D.C., and has been unable to identify who was operating them…As a pair of Princeton computer scientists, Andrew Appel and Kyle Jamieson, have pointed out, cell phone simulators, which mimic legitimate cell towers, happen also to be handy and inexpensive vote-hacking devices. On the Freedom to Tinker blog, Appel and Jamieson have posted easy-to-follow diagrams showing how the transmission of voting information from polling places could be intercepted by a Stingray and surreptitiously altered before being sent on to its intended destination, a central tabulating computer. The voting machine that Appel and Jamieson picked to illustrate this hypothetical “man-in-the-middle” attack was the DS200, a popular optical-scan voting machine that reads marked paper ballots, made by a company called Election Systems & Software… As of 2015, forty-three states and the District of Columbia were using machines that are no longer in production. Some of these machines are so old that their operating systems can’t be patched when security flaws are found, and replacement parts must be scrounged up on eBay…Software vulnerabilities, unreliable tabulators, and unprotected memory cards have left voting systems open to exploitation ever since electronic machines were introduced.” https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/america-continues-to-ignore-the-risks-of-election-hacking

America Continues to Ignore the Risks of Election Hacking Sue Halpern writes about the risks that hacking and faulty equipment pose to U.S. elections in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. newyorker.com

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#39 Reuters: Old voting machines stir concerns among U.S. officials (May 31, 2018) “In 14 of the 40 most competitive races, Americans will cast ballots on voting machines that do not provide a paper trail to audit voters’ intentions if a close election is questioned… These include races in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Texas, Florida, Kansas, and Kentucky. Nationwide, of 435 congressional seats up for grabs, 144 are in districts where some or all voters will not have access to machines using paper records, the analysis shows… Most of the dozen-plus state and local election officials interviewed by Reuters said they worry about bad actors hacking the older electronic voting machines to alter ballots, and then being unable to verify the results because there will be no paper trail. But the officials worry most about voters losing trust in elections because officials would not be able to visibly demonstrate that the tally was indeed accurate.” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-votingmachines-idUSKCN1IW16Z

Ahead of November election, old voting machines stir concerns among U.S. officials U.S. election officials responsible for managing more than a dozen close races this November share a fear: Outdated voting machines in their districts could undermine confidence in election results that will determine which party controls the U.S. Congress. reuters.com

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#40 Axios: There's more than one way to hack an election (July 2, 2018) “Here are the systems at risk in the election process: voter registration systems, voter registration databases (which the voter registration process produces), voter records at polling places (known as poll books, which exist in both printed and electronic versions), voting machines (which capture the votes), vote tabulation (when the votes are tallied)… Many parts of election systems are at risk of being exposed to the internet — and thereby potentially being inappropriately accessed or meddled with — because of human error or bad security protocols. Here are some of the main points of risk: registration interfaces, voter registration databases, electronic poll books, printed poll books, voting machines, electronic vote tabulation, optical scan vote tabulation, and election management systems.” https://www.axios.com/2018/07/02/be-smart-there-is-more-than-one-way-to-hack-an-election-1529424861

There's more than one way to hack an election The vulnerabilities of our election system resemble "Swiss cheese," one expert says. axios.com

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#41 Newsweek: Election Hacking: Voting-Machine Supplier Admits It Used Hackable Software Despite Past Denials (July 17, 2018) “One of the country's largest voting machine makers has admitted in a letter to a U.S. senator that some of its past election-management systems had remote-access software preinstalled, despite past denials that any of its systems were equipped with such software. Election Systems and Software (ES&S) told Democratic Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon in an April letter that has now been released, first reported by Vice News and later obtained by Newsweek, that the company provided election equipment with remote connection software to an unspecified number of states from 2000 to 2006. "Prior to the inception of the [Election Assistance Commission] testing and certification program and the subsequent requirement for hardening and at customer's request, ES&S provided pcAnywhere remote connection software on the [Election-Management System] workstation to a small number of customers between 2000 and 2006," wrote Tom Burt, ES&S president.” Wyden told Vice the decision to sell any voting system with remote-access software, leaving equipment possibly vulnerable to hacking, was "the worst decision for security short of leaving ballot boxes on a Moscow street corner." https://www.newsweek.com/election-hacking-voting-machines-software-1028948

Past Voting Systems Had Remote-Access Software Senator Ron Wyden said the decision to sell voting systems with remote-access software, leaving equipment possibly vulnerable to hacking, was "the worst decision for security short of leaving ballot newsweek.com

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#42 Salon: Remote-access allowed: Voting machine company admits installing vulnerable software (July 20, 2018) “A letter sent to Congress reveals that, between 2000 and 2006, one of America's top voting machine companies installed remote-access software in their products that made it possible for them to be manipulated by third parties. In the letter, Election Systems and Software admitted that it had "provided pcAnywhere remote connection software … to a small number of customers between 2000 and 2006." As The Verge notes, "pcAnywhere’s security vulnerabilities have been well-documented in the past": In 2006, hackers stole the source code for pcAnywhere and then stayed quiet until 2012, when a hacker published part of the code online. Symantec, which distributed pcAnywhere, knew vaguely of the theft back in 2006 but only spoke up about it after the code leaked, along with the warning that users should disable or uninstall the software. At the same time, security researchers studied pcAnywhere’s code and found a vulnerability that could let a hacker take control of a whole system and bypass the need to enter a password.” https://www.salon.com/2018/07/20/remote-access-allowed-voting-machine-company-admits-installing-vulnerable-software/

Remote-access allowed: Voting machine company admits installing vulnerable software Election hacking: Despite previous denials, top vendor admits it sold systems with remote access to states salon.com

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#43 BBC: Hacking the US mid-terms? It's child's play (Aug. 11, 2018) “Bianca Lewis, 11, has many hobbies. She likes Barbie, video games, fencing, singing… and hacking the infrastructure behind the world’s most powerful democracy…She’s taking part in a competition organized by R00tz Asylum, a non-profit organization that promotes “hacking for good” …Its aim is to send out a dire warning: the voting systems that will be used across America for the mid-term vote in November are, in many cases, so insecure a young child can learn to hack them with just a few minute’s coaching.” https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45154903

Hacking the US mid-terms? It's child's play Security experts say the US voting system is vulnerable to cyber-attack. How vulnerable? Let these 11 year olds show you. bbc.com

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#44 PBS: An 11-year-old changed election results on a replica Florida state website in under 10 minutes (Aug. 12, 2018) “An 11-year-old boy on Friday was able to hack into a replica of the Florida state election website and change voting results found there in under 10 minutes during the world’s largest yearly hacking convention, DEFCON 26, organizers of the event said. “These are very accurate replicas of all of the sites,” Sell told the PBS NewsHour on Sunday. “These things should not be easy enough for an 8-year-old kid to hack within 30 minutes; it’s negligent for us as a society.” https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/an-11-year-old-changed-election-results-on-a-replica-florida-state-website-in-under-10-minutes

An 11-year-old changed election results on a replica Florida state website in under 10 minutes An 11-year-old on Friday was able to hack into a replica of the Florida state election website and change voting results found there in under 10 minutes. pbs.org

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#45 The Guardian: Why US elections remain 'dangerously vulnerable' to cyber-attacks (Aug. 13, 2018) “By mid-evening, Jon Ossoff, the leading Democrat, had 50.3% of the vote, enough to win outright without the need for a run-off against his closest Republican challenger. Then Marks noticed that the number of precincts reporting in Fulton County, encompassing the heart of Atlanta, was going down instead of up. Soon after, the computers crashed. Election officials later blamed a “rare error” with a memory card that didn’t properly upload its vote tallies. When the count resumed more than an hour later, Ossoff was suddenly down to 48.6% and ended up at 48.1%… Georgia’s 15-year-old all-electronic voting system was almost impossible to audit because it produced no independently verifiable paper trail to check against the computer-generated tallies. Cybersecurity experts have warned for years that malfeasance, technical breakdown, or administrative incompetence could easily wreak havoc with electronic systems and could go largely or wholly undetected. “Virtually every American voter has come to understand that the nation’s election infrastructure is susceptible to malicious manipulation from local and foreign threats,” the suit reads. “Yet, Georgia’s election officials continue to defend the state’s electronic voting system that is demonstrably unreliable and insecure, and have repeatedly refused to take administrative, regulatory or legislative action to address the election security failures.” https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/13/us-election-cybersecurity-hacking-voting

Why US elections remain 'dangerously vulnerable' to cyber-attacks Officials have dragged their feet on updating machines and securing data – and a climate of fear could undermine voter confidence theguardian.com

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#46 The Guardian: Kids at hacking conference show how easily US elections could be sabotaged (Aug. 22, 2018) “The risk of a hacker casting the validity of an election into question through one of any number of other entry points is huge, and the actual difficulty of such an attack is child’s play. Literally. “The most vulnerable part of election infrastructure is the websites,” explained the security expert Jake Braun… Unlike a voting machine, Braun explains, websites represent a compelling target because they are, by their nature, connected to the internet 24/7. And, whether they are used for voter registration, online campaigning, or announcing the results at the end of the election, they can be used to sow havoc…Armed with facsimiles of the websites of 13 battleground states and a child-friendly guide to basic hacking techniques, the kids were set loose on critical infrastructure – and proceeded to tear it apart… “The No 1 thing we found last year wasn’t a hack at all; it was the fact that we opened up the back of the machine, and of course, no surprise, all the parts are made across the world, especially China. This isn’t conjecture; this isn’t my dystopian fantasy world; this is something we know they do …The fragmentation argument is absolute horseshit because once you’re in the chips, you can hack whole classes of machines, nationwide, from the fucking Kremlin.”… The bad actor just needs to steal enough votes in a few counties in America’s battleground states – just enough to swing a close election…“I’ve only one conclusion,” said Schürmann: “Use paper and do your audits.” https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/22/us-elections-hacking-voting-machines-def-con

Kids at hacking conference show how easily US elections could be sabotaged Changing recorded votes would be difficult for bad actors. But at Def Con in Las Vegas, children had no trouble finding another point of entry theguardian.com

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#47 CBS: Why voting machines in the U.S. are easy targets for hackers (Sept. 19, 2018) “Tens of thousands of voting machines in the United States are vulnerable to hacking. They have been successfully dismantled and attacked by security researchers for years to demonstrate their flaws. In 2017, at the annual Defcon hackers conference, one tech professor from the University of Copenhagen was able to penetrate an Advanced Voting Solutions machine in about 90 minutes. The attackers were able to access the administrator mode, allowing them to potentially alter voting data. At this year's conference, a group of hackers was able to crack one in 15 minutes. One hacker told CNET: "Should you be trusting your vote with these? I don't think so." "They're running Windows. They have USB ports. They're actual computers and are very susceptible to attacks," says Cris Thomas, the global strategy lead for IBM's X-Force cybersecurity team.” Optical scan ballot machines are vulnerable to hacking — all electronic devices are — but most cybersecurity experts are more concerned with electronic machines. Voting results are stored on the machine's internal storage. If the voting data is not encrypted or improperly configured, with little effort, a bad actor could access the memory and alter the voting results… The results go from [the voting machine] into a piece of electronics that takes it to the central counting place. That data is not encrypted, and that's vulnerable for manipulation.” https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-voting-machines-in-the-u-s-are-easy-targets-for-hackers/

Why voting machines in the U.S. are easy targets for hackers Cybersecurity experts say the goal is to undermine confidence in the U.S. electoral system. cbsnews.com

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#48 New York Times: The Crisis of Election Security (Sept. 26, 2018) The Illinois intruders had quietly breached the network in June and spent weeks conducting reconnaissance. After alighting on the state’s voter registration database, they downloaded information on hundreds of thousands of voters… In early August, Jenkins learned of another breach, this one on an Arizona state website, and it appeared to come from one of the same I.P. addresses that had been used to attack Illinois. This time, the intruders installed malware as if setting the stage for further assault. Then reports from other states began to pour in, saying that the same I.P. addresses appeared to be probing their voter-registration networks… The entire system — a Rube Goldberg mix of poorly designed machinery, from websites and databases that registered and tracked voters, to electronic poll books that verified their eligibility, to the various black-box systems that recorded, tallied, and reported results — was vulnerable…They don’t address core vulnerabilities in voting machines or the systems used to program them. And they ignore the fact that many voting machines that elections officials insist are disconnected from the internet — and therefore beyond the reach of hackers — are in fact accessible by way of the modems they use to transmit vote totals on election night. Add to this the fact that states don’t conduct robust postelection audits — a manual comparison of paper ballots to digital tallies is the best method we have to detect when something has gone wrong in an election — and there’s a good chance we simply won’t know if someone has altered the digital votes in the next election… How did our election system get so vulnerable, and why haven’t officials tried harder to fix it? The answer, ultimately, comes down to politics and money: The voting machines are made by well-connected private companies that wield immense control over their proprietary software, often fighting vigorously in court to prevent anyone from examining it when things go awry. In Ohio in 2004, for example, where John Kerry lost the presidential race following numerous election irregularities, Kerry’s team was denied access to the voting-machine software. “We were told by the court that you were not able to get that algorithm to check it, because it was proprietary information,” Kerry recalled in a recent interview on WNYC’s “Brian Lehrer Show.” He was understandably rueful, arguing how wrong it was that elections are held under “the purview of privately owned machines, where the public doesn’t have the right to know whether the algorithm has been checked or whether they’re hackable or not. And we now know they are hackable.” …There are roughly 350,000 voting machines in use in the country today, all of which fall into one of two categories: optical-scan machines or direct-recording electronic machines. Each of them suffers from significant security problems. With optical-scan machines, voters fill out paper ballots and feed them into a scanner, which stores a digital image of the ballot and records the votes on a removable memory card. The paper ballot, in theory, provides an audit trail that can be used to verify digital tallies. But not all states perform audits, and many that do simply run the paper ballots through a scanner a second time. Fewer than half the states do manual audits, and they typically examine ballots from randomly chosen precincts in a county, instead of a percentage of ballots from all precincts. If the randomly chosen precincts aren’t ones where hacking occurred or where machines failed to accurately record votes, an audit won’t reveal anything — nor will it always catch problems with early-voting, overseas, or absentee ballots, all of which are often scanned in county election offices, not in precincts. Voters use touch screens or other input devices to make selections on digital-only ballots, and votes are stored electronically. Many D.R.E.s have printers that produce what’s known as a voter-verifiable paper audit trail — a scroll of paper, behind a window, that voters can review before casting their ballots. But the paper trail doesn’t provide the same integrity as full-size ballots and optical-scan machines, because a hacker could conceivably rig the machine to print a voter’s selections correctly on the paper while recording something else on the memory card. About 80 percent of voters today cast ballots either on D.R.E.s that produce a paper trail or on scanned paper ballots. But five states still use paperless D.R.E.s exclusively, and an additional 10 states use paperless D.R.E.s in some jurisdictions…More than a dozen companies currently sell voting equipment, but a majority of machines used today come from just four — Diebold Election Systems, Election Systems & Software (ES&S), Hart InterCivic and Sequoia Voting Systems. Diebold (later renamed Premier) and Sequoia are now out of business. Diebold’s machines and customer contracts were sold to ES&S and a Canadian company called Dominion, and Dominion also acquired Sequoia. This means that more than 80% of the machines in use today are under the purview of three companies — Dominion, ES&S, and Hart InterCivic. Many of the products they make have documented vulnerabilities and can be subverted in multiple ways. Hackers can access voting machines via the cellular modems used to transmit unofficial results at the end of an election, or subvert back-end election-management systems — used to program the voting machines and tally votes — and spread malicious code to voting machines through them. Attackers could design their code to bypass pre-election testing and kick in only at the end of an election or under specific conditions — say, when a certain candidate appears to be losing — and erase itself afterward to avoid detection. And they could make it produce election results with wide margins to avoid triggering automatic manual recounts in states that require them when results are close. Hackers could also target voting-machine vendors and use this trusted channel to distribute their code. Last year a security researcher stumbled across an unsecured ES&S server that left passwords exposed for its employee accounts. Although the passwords were encrypted, a nation-state with sufficient resources would most likely be able to crack them, the researcher noted. Since ES&S creates ballot-definition files before each election for some customers — the critical programming files that tell machines how to apportion votes based on a voter’s screen touch or marks on a paper ballot — a malicious actor able to get into ES&S’s network could conceivably corrupt these files so machines misinterpret a vote for Donald Trump, say, as one for his opponent, or vice versa. The Department of Homeland Security, the intelligence community, and election officials have all insisted that there is no evidence that Russian hackers altered votes in 2016. But the truth is that no one has really looked for evidence. Intelligence assessments are based on signals intelligence — spying on Russian communications and computers for chatter or activity indicating that they altered votes — not on a forensic examination of voting machines and election networks. “We should always be careful to point out that there hasn’t been any evidence that votes were changed in any election in this way, and that’s a true fact,” said Matt Blaze, a computer-science professor at the University of Pennsylvania and a voting-machine-security expert. “It’s just less comforting than it might sound at first glance because we haven’t looked very hard.” Even if experts were to look, it’s not clear what they would find, he added. “It’s possible to do a pretty good job of erasing all the forensic evidence.” …At 10 p.m., Al Gore was ahead in Volusia, with 83,000 votes to George W. Bush’s 62,000. Things were going well for Gore across the state, and exit polls projected a six-point lead for him. But then something changed. “I had stepped out, and one of the assistants came, and he’s just like, ‘I need you to come here and verify the numbers,’ ” Tannenbaum recalled. When she looked at the county’s website, Gore’s total had dropped 16,000 votes. Tannenbaum called the county election office, alarmed. “I don’t know what’s going on down there, but you can’t take away votes!” she said. The mysterious drop would later be traced to Precinct 216, a community center in DeLand, where Gore’s total was showing negative 16,022 votes. It wasn’t the only mathematical absurdity in the tally. A Socialist Workers Party candidate named James Harris had 9,888 votes. But the DeLand precinct had only 585 registered voters, and only 219 of them cast ballots at the center that day. Volusia officials blamed the mishap on a faulty memory card. The county used optical-scan machines made by Global Election Systems (a Canadian company later acquired by Diebold and renamed Diebold Election Systems), which the county had used since 1996. When the election ended, poll workers were supposed to transmit results to the county election office via modem; but the transmission failed, so a worker drove the memory card in, where officials inserted it directly into the election-management system to tally results. Logs for that computer, however, showed two memory cards for Precinct 216 inserted, an hour apart. The vote totals went haywire after the second card was loaded. Beyond the mystery of the two cards, there was another problem with this explanation. A faulty memory card should produce an onscreen error message or cause a computer to lock up, not alter votes in one race while leaving others untouched. And what kind of faulty card deleted votes only for Gore, while adding votes to other candidates?" https://web.archive.org/web/20181010024836/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/magazine/election-security-crisis-midterms.html

The Crisis of Election Security As the midterms approach, America’s electronic voting systems are more vulnerable than ever. Why isn’t anyone trying to fix them? web.archive.org

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#49 Politico: Attack on commonly used voting machine could tip an election (Sept. 27, 2018) “A malicious hacker could alter the outcome of a U.S. presidential election by taking advantage of numerous flaws in one model of vote-tabulating machine used in 26 states, cybersecurity experts warned in a report presented Thursday at the Capitol… The biggest flaw in the process we found is even when we identify flaws, they don't get fixed… The report says an attacker could remotely gain access to the Model 650 tabulating machine manufactured by Election Systems and Software, one of the country's largest sellers of voting equipment, by exploiting numerous vulnerabilities in the unit. Researchers also said this model has an unpatched vulnerability that the manufacturer was notified about a decade ago… The event organizers said the Model 650 vote-tabulation vulnerabilities are especially problematic because states use the machines to process ballots for entire counties. "Hacking just one of these machines could enable an attacker to flip the Electoral College and determine the outcome of a presidential election," the report says.” https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/27/hacking-voting-machines-814504

Attack on commonly used voting machine could tip an election, researchers find Voting machine vendors and state election officials have often dismissed such warnings as alarmist, saying they don’t reflect real-world situations. politico.com

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#50 WSJ: Voting Machine Used in Half of U.S. Is Vulnerable to Attack (Sept. 27, 2018) “Election machines used in more than half of U.S. states carry a flaw disclosed more than a decade ago that makes them vulnerable to a cyberattack, according to a report to be delivered Thursday on Capitol Hill. The issue was found in the widely used Model 650 high-speed ballot-counting machine made by Election Systems & Software LLC, the nation’s leading manufacturer of election equipment. It is one of about seven security problems in several models of voting equipment described in the report, which is based on research conducted last month at the Def Con hacker conference. The flaw in the ES&S; machine stood out because it was detailed in a security report commissioned by Ohio’s secretary of state in 2007, said Harri Hursti, an election-security researcher who co-wrote both the Ohio and Def Con reports. “There has been more than plenty of time to fix it,” he said…Earlier this month, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine recommended U.S. states move away from voting machines that don’t include paper ballots…Election security researchers and politicians aren’t convinced ES&S; is doing enough. The company hasn’t adopted common internet security standards that secure against phishing attacks and make it harder to intercept messages, according to staffers for Sen. Ron Wyden (D., Ore.).” https://www.wsj.com/articles/widely-used-election-systems-are-vulnerable-to-attack-report-finds-1538020802

Voting Machine Used in Half of U.S. Is Vulnerable to Attack, Report Finds The flaw in Election Systems & Software’s Model 650 high-speed ballot-counting machine was detailed in 2007 wsj.com

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#51 CNN: Hackers Bring Stark Warning About Election Security (Sept. 27, 2018) “The vulnerabilities in America’s voting systems are “staggering,” a group representing hackers warned lawmakers on Capitol Hill on Thursday – just over a month before the midterm elections. The hacking group claims they were able to break into some voting machines in two minutes and that they had the ability to wirelessly reprogram an electronic card used by millions of Americans to activate a voting terminal to cast their ballot. “This vulnerability could be exploited to take over the voting machine on which they vote and cast as many votes as the voter wanted,” the group claims in the report…A voting tabulation machine the group says is used in more than two dozen states is vulnerable to being remotely hacked, they said, claiming, “hacking just one of these machines could enable an attacker to flip the Electoral College and determine the outcome of a presidential election.” https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/27/politics/hackers-warning-midterm-elections/index.html

Video Transcript AI Summary
Former White House liaison to homeland security under President Obama, Jake, reveals how easy it was for children to hack into mock election board websites. An 11-year-old girl managed to take over a mock Florida website in under 10 minutes, altering election results. As the weekend progressed, the kids became more creative, changing names to things like "Bob the Builder" and causing further disruptions. Jake explains that the challenge was not given to adult hackers because it was deemed too easy for them. Around 50 kids participated, with almost all of them successfully changing election results or manipulating the webpage in some way.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: The former White House liaison to homeland security under president Obama. So, Jake, I understand you had children hacking into mock election board websites. Just how easy was it? What were they able to do? Speaker 1: Well, first of all, thanks for having me, Anna. The The 1st kid got in. It was an 11 year old girl. She got in and took over the Kind of mock, Florida website in under 10 minutes and was able to change election results, And and, you know, change the winners and losers and all that stuff. By the end of the weekend, the kids were, you know, changing people's names to, like, Bob the Builder and And, and all that kind of stuff coming up with some pretty, creative things to do to to mess with the election results. Speaker 0: You're saying children were able to do this? Speaker 1: Yeah. So the the unfortunately, it's so easy to do That we didn't put, this particular challenge in the main room where the adult hackers are hacking into voting machines because it's so easy, to hack into these websites, that they wouldn't find it interesting or fun or challenging. So we decided to give it to kids to do. And so we had about 50 kids doing it and almost all of them were able to get in and and change election results or or something else on the page.
Hackers bring stark warning about election security to Capitol Hill ahead of midterms | CNN Politics The vulnerabilities in America’s voting systems are “staggering,” a group representing hackers warned lawmakers on Capitol Hill on Thursday – just over a month before the midterm elections. cnn.com

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#52 Wired: Voting Machines Are Still Absurdly Vulnerable to Attacks (Sept. 28, 2018) “The report details vulnerabilities in seven models of voting machines and vote counters, found during the DefCon security conference's Voting Village event. All of the models are in active use around the US, and the vulnerabilities—from weak password protections to elaborate avenues for remote access— number in the dozens… "We didn't discover a lot of new vulnerabilities," says Matt Blaze, a computer science professor at the University of Pennsylvania and one of the organizers of the Voting Village, who has been analyzing voting machine security for more than 10 years. "What we discovered was vulnerabilities that we know about are easy to find, easy to re-engineer, and have not been fixed over the course of more than a decade of knowing about them. And to me, that is both the unsurprising and terribly disturbing lesson that came out of the Voting Village."… One device, the "ExpressPoll-5000," has the root password of "password." The administrator password is "pasta."… Many of the machines participants analyzed during the Voting Village run software written in the early 2000s or even the 1990s. Some vulnerabilities detailed in the report were disclosed years ago and still haven't been resolved. In particular, one ballot counter made by Election Systems & Software, the Model 650, has a flaw in its update architecture first documented in 2007 that persists. Voting Village participants also found a network vulnerability in the same device—which 26 states and the District of Columbia all currently use.” https://www.wired.com/story/voting-machine-vulnerabilities-defcon-voting-village/

Voting Machines Are Still Absurdly Vulnerable to Attacks A new report details dozens of vulnerabilities across seven models of voting machines—all of which are currently in use. wired.com

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#53 Slate: Can Paper Ballots Save Our Democracy? (Oct. 10, 2018) “The machine was an AccuVote TSX used in 18 states, some with the same software version. Attackers don't need physical access--we showed how malicious code can spread from the election office when officials program the ballot design… The Center for American Progress recently released a study that highlighted that 42 states use electronic voting machines with software a decade old or more, that leaves them especially vulnerable to hacking and malware. What’s more, five states rely solely on machines that leave no paper trail, and another 10 will use them in at least some districts. These paperless voting machines are especially problematic because even if such a machine were known or suspected to have been hacked, there’s no physical backup ballot to check it against—and therefore no way to determine for certain whether the vote an individual cast matched with the vote that the machine recorded. Worse still, some of the states with the poorest voting system security are also electoral heavyweights, including Georgia, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Florida…A growing number of voting-rights advocates and cybersecurity experts—among them organizations like the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine and Verified Voting—feel that the way forward is in a return to the past: paper ballots.” https://slate.com/technology/2018/10/paper-ballots-voting-machines-midterm-election-security-russian-hacking.html

Should You Request a Paper Ballot to Keep Your Vote Secure From Hackers? Amid fears of voting-machine hacks, some election-security experts are advocating for a return to the past. slate.com

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#54 New York Times: America's Elections Could Be Hacked. Go Vote Anyway. (Oct. 19, 2018) "In April, the nation’s top voting machine manufacturer told Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon that it had installed remote-access software on election-management systems that it sold from 2000 to 2006. Senator Wyden called it “the worst decision for security short of leaving ballot boxes on a Moscow street corner.” At a hacking convention last summer, an 11-year-old boy who had been coached on finding the vulnerabilities in a mock-up of Florida’s state election website broke into the fake site and altered the vote totals recorded there. It took him less than 10 minutes…America’s voting systems, like all large and complex computerized systems, are highly vulnerable to cyberattack — whether by altering or deleting voter registration data, or even by changing vote counts. “The vast majority of technical infrastructure for our voting is absolutely, without doubt, woefully insecure,” said Matt Blaze, a University of Pennsylvania computer-science professor who studies voting machine security. Both of the primary methods by which Americans cast their ballots — optical-scan machines and touch-screen monitors — can be tampered with fairly easily… One, provide a paper trail for every vote. Hackers work most effectively in the dark, so they love voting machines that produce no paper verification. Currently, five states — Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New Jersey, and South Carolina — run their elections entirely on paperless touch-screen machines. But all five states are considering a switch back to paper ballots in time for 2020. In this year’s midterms, 19 states and Washington, D.C., will use only paper ballots. Two, audit the vote." https://web.archive.org/web/20181118161745/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/opinion/midterm-elections-hacking.html

Opinion | America’s Elections Could Be Hacked. Go Vote Anyway. The system’s vulnerabilities are real, but please do not stay home. web.archive.org

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#55 Vox: The hacking threat to the midterms is huge. (Oct. 25, 2018) "On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the Pentagon’s [security measures], elections have probably moved from a 2 to a 3… They laid out a number of scenarios that could exploit vulnerable election infrastructure: names deleted from voter registration databases; e-poll books that send voters to the wrong precinct; malware that corrupts ballot-definition files for machines or software that governs vote tabulation, before it’s installed in various counties and precincts; or corrupted public-facing websites to announce a false winner on election night… These private companies “represent an enticing target [f]or malicious cyber actors,” according to the Senate Intelligence Report. Yet the report admits that state and federal authorities continue to “have very little insight into the cybersecurity practices of many of these vendors…Today, the American elections industry today is dominated by three companies: Dominion, Hart InterCivic, and, the largest, Election Systems and Software (ES&S). If you voted in the past 10 years, the chances are good that you used these machines (92 percent of voters do), or the myriad supportive technology required to stage an election… Much of the criticism has been directed at digital voting machines, called DREs. But election offices have become increasingly digital in other, less obvious ways: Adopting e-poll books; hauling voter registration information into state-run or third-party databases; proffering all-in-one election management suites, which program the machines and tabulate the outcomes; and building internet-based services for voters, like the precinct tally program in Knox County…  But other experts say this insistence overlooks the sophistication of nation-state attackers, who can find other creative methods for intrusion — infected USB drives, modem access, remote-access software — or, of course, infiltrating the company networks themselves, engineering direct upload malware through regular software updates…Public security audits of election technology are rare; the last major ones, commissioned by California and Ohio in 2007, were scathing. And the companies have often seemed committed to avoiding them, with one even threatening Princeton University researchers with lawsuits… In a public statement, Sen. Kamala Harris’s (D-CA) office called it “unacceptable that ES&S continues to dismiss the very real security concerns that Def Con raised.”…Two of the three largest vendors, ES&S and Hart, are owned by private equity companies whose agendas are unclear; Dominion’s headquarters isn’t even American, but Canadian… Many of the vulnerabilities election vendors have patched were previously unknown to them, instead pointed out by others. Earlier this year, security consultants flagged a “Client Web Portal” page for Dominion Voting that lacked SSL encryption. And last year, ES&S unwittingly exposed data for roughly 1.8 million Illinois voters on an Amazon server it controlled, a breach that included ES&S employee’s passwords — encrypted, but potentially crackable by an advanced adversary.” https://www.vox.com/2018/10/25/18001684/2018-midterms-hacked-russia-election-security-voting

The hacking threat to the midterms is huge. And technology won’t protect us. An investigation into the US election system reveals frightening vulnerabilities at almost every level. vox.com

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#56 Scientific American: The Vulnerabilities of Our Voting Machines (Nov. 1, 2018) “This just isn’t a good idea to have elections be conducted by, essentially, black box technology.”…The voting machines themselves have received much, much, much less scrutiny post-2016 from intelligence and defensive sides—as far as we know in the public sphere anyway. To my knowledge, no state has done any kind of rigorous forensics on their voting machines to see whether they had been compromised… One possibility is that attackers could infiltrate what are called election-management systems. These are small networks of computers operated by the state or the county government or sometimes an outside vendor where the ballot design is prepared…There’s a programming process by which the design of the ballot—the races and candidates, and the rules for counting the votes—gets produced, and then gets copied to every individual voting machine. Election officials usually copy it on memory cards or USB sticks for the election machines. That provides a route by which malicious code could spread from the centralized programming system to many voting machines in the field. Then the attack code runs on the individual voting machines, and it’s just another piece of software. It has access to all of the same data that the voting machine does, including all of the electronic records of people’s votes. So, how do you infiltrate the company or state agency that programs the ballot design? You can infiltrate their computers, which are connected to the internet. Then you can spread malicious code to voting machines over a very large area. It creates a tremendously concentrated target for attack.” https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-vulnerabilities-of-our-voting-machines/

The Vulnerabilities of Our Voting Machines Scientific American is the essential guide to the most awe-inspiring advances in science and technology, explaining how they change our understanding of the world and shape our lives. scientificamerican.com

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#57 Salon: Philly ignores cybersecurity and disability access in voting system selection (Feb. 16, 2019) "According to computer science professor Richard DeMillo of Georgia Tech, the barcodes also can be manipulated to instruct the scanners to flip votes. Adding insult to injury, these barcode systems cost about three times as much as using hand-marked paper ballots and scanners. In addition, despite initial denials, ES&S admitted last year that it has installed remote access software in central tabulators — the county computers that aggregate electronic precinct totals —  in 300 jurisdictions. Although ES&S won’t identify the 300 jurisdictions, a forensic analysis conducted in 2011 of voting equipment in Venango County, PA, revealed that someone had “used a computer that was not a part of the county’s election network to remotely access the [ES&S] central election tabulator computer, illegally, ‘on multiple occasions.’” https://www.salon.com/2019/02/16/philly-ignores-cybersecurity-and-disability-access-in-voting-system-selection_partner/

Philly ignores cybersecurity and disability access in voting system selection The Philadelphia commission has not earned much confidence when it comes to election oversight salon.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#58 Politico: State election officials opt for 2020 voting machines vulnerable to hacking (March 1, 2019) “Security experts warn, however, that hackers could still manipulate the barcodes without voters noticing. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine has also warned against trusting the barcode-based devices without more research, saying they “raise security and verifiability concerns.”…The replacements, known as ballot-marking devices, are “a relatively new and untested technology,” said J. Alex Halderman, a voting security expert who teaches at the University of Michigan. “And it’s concerning that jurisdictions are rushing to purchase them before even basic questions have been answered.” Many states have adopted what experts call a much more secure option — paper ballots that voters mark with a pen or pencil and that are then scanned and tallied. But election officials in Georgia, Delaware, and Philadelphia have rejected that option in favor of the barcode devices, saying they are secure enough and better suited for many voters with disabilities. Philadelphia city commissioners on Feb. 20 selected a barcode system called the ExpressVote XL from the major vendor Election Systems & Software, despite warnings about the risks. So did Delaware, which in September chose the ExpressVote XL as part of a $13 million overhaul of election equipment. Earlier this week, Georgia lawmakers advanced a bill to approve the barcode devices in a 101-72 vote that split along party lines. Democrats tended to agree with experts who have said the machines are still too vulnerable… The dispute over the ballot-marking devices centers on the fact that they use barcodes, which can be read by scanners but not by humans. Though the paper records also display a voter’s choices in plain text, which the voter can double-check, the barcode is the part that gets tallied. The danger: Hackers who infiltrate a ballot-marking device could modify the barcode so its vote data differs from what’s in the printed text. If this happened, a voter would have no way of spotting it.” https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/01/election-vulnerable-voting-machines-1198780

State election officials opt for 2020 voting machines vulnerable to hacking The new machines still pose unacceptable risks in an election that U.S. intelligence officials expect to be a prime target for disruption by countries such as Russia and China. politico.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#59 TechCrunch: Senators demand to know why election vendors still sell voting machines with ‘known vulnerabilities’ (March 27, 2019) “The letter, sent Wednesday, calls on election equipment makers ES&S, Dominion Voting, and Hart InterCivic to explain why they continue to sell decades-old machines, which the senators say contain security flaws that could undermine the results of elections if exploited. “The integrity of our elections is directly tied to the machines we vote on,” said the letter sent by Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Mark Warner (D-VA), Jack Reed (D-RI), and Gary Peters (D-MI), the most senior Democrats on the Rules, Intelligence, Armed Services, and Homeland Security committees, respectively. “Despite shouldering such a massive responsibility, there has been a lack of meaningful innovation in the election vendor industry, and our democracy is paying the price,” the letter adds. Their primary concern is that the three companies have more than 90 percent of the U.S. election equipment market share, but their voting machines lack paper ballots or audibility, making it impossible to know if a vote was accurately counted in the event of a bug. Yet, these are the same devices tens of millions of voters will use in the upcoming 2020 presidential election." https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/27/senators-security-voting-machines/

Senators demand to know why election vendors still sell voting machines with 'known vulnerabilities' | TechCrunch Four senior senators have called on the largest U.S. voting machine makers to explain why they continue to sell devices with "known vulnerabilities," techcrunch.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#60 Salon: New "hybrid" voting system can change paper ballot after it's been cast (March 28, 2019) “Unfortunately, there is no universal definition of “paper ballot,” which has enabled vendors and their surrogates to characterize machine-marked paper printouts from hackable ballot marking devices (BMDs) as “paper ballots.” Unlike hand-marked paper ballots, voters must print and inspect these machine-marked “paper ballots” to try to detect any fraudulent or erroneous votes that might have been marked by the BMD. The machine-marked ballot is then counted on a separate scanner. Most independent cybersecurity election experts caution against putting these insecure BMDs between voters and their ballots and instead recommend hand-marked paper ballots as a primary voting system (reserving BMDs only for those who are unable to hand-mark their ballots)… Unlike hand-marked paper ballots counted on scanners and regular non-hybrid BMDs,  these new hybrid systems can add fake votes to the machine-marked “paper ballot” after it’s been cast, experts warn. Any manual audit based on such fraudulent “paper ballots” would falsely approve an illegitimate electronic outcome. According to experts, the hybrid voting systems with this alarming capability include the ExpressVote hybrid by Election Systems & Software, LLC (ES&S), the ExpressVote XL hybrid by ES&S, and the Image Cast Evolution hybrid by Dominion Voting. The potential for hybrid systems to add fraudulent votes without detection was identified by Professor of Statistics Philip B. Stark of UC Berkeley, an expert in postelection manual audits, in September of last year. At the time, he told TYT Investigates that the ExpressVote hybrid, which Johnson County, Kansas, had purchased a few months before the 2018 gubernatorial primary, could be maliciously programmed or hacked to create an entirely fraudulent machine-marked “paper ballot” because the machine includes an option that allows the voter to “AutoCast” the ballot without first printing and inspecting it. Moreover, as explained by Stark, the machine does not mark the ballot at all until the voter decides whether to exercise that option, which means that the machine receives advance notice of which ballots are “AutoCast” and thus safe to fraudulently mark. Another election expert, Computer Science Professor Andrew Appel of Princeton University, subsequently confirmed the existence of this stunning defect and dubbed it “Permission to Cheat.” Appel further reported that the ExpressVote XL and Dominion ImageCast Evolution include the same defect.” https://www.salon.com/2019/03/28/new-hybrid-voting-system-can-change-paper-ballot-after-its-been-cast_partner/

New "hybrid" voting system can change paper ballot after it's been cast Paper ballots are safe only if marked by hand, not by machine salon.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#61 Vice: Critical U.S. Election Systems Have Been Left Exposed Online Despite Official Denials (Aug. 8, 2019) “The top voting machine company in the country insists that its election systems are never connected to the internet. But researchers found 35 of the systems have been connected to the internet for months and possibly years, including in some swing states. These include systems in nine Wisconsin counties, four Michigan counties, and in seven Florida counties—all states that are perennial battlegrounds in presidential elections. Some of the systems have been online for a year and possibly longer… The systems the researchers found are made by Election Systems & Software, the top voting machine company in the country. They are used to receive encrypted vote totals transmitted via modem from ES&S voting machines on election night, in order to get rapid results that media use to call races, even though the results aren’t final. The system that receives these votes, called an SFTP server, is connected to the internet behind a Cisco firewall… Anyone who finds the firewall online also finds the election-management system connected to it. “It is not air-gapped. The EMS is connected to the internet but is behind a firewall,” Skoglund said. “The firewall configuration [that determines what can go in and out of the firewall]… is the only thing that segments the EMS from the internet.” And misconfigured firewalls are one of the most common ways hackers penetrate supposedly protected systems. Senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) said the findings are “yet another damning indictment of the profiteering election vendors, who care more about the bottom line than protecting our democracy.” It’s also an indictment, he said, “of the notion that important cybersecurity decisions should be left entirely to county election offices, many of whom do not employ a single cybersecurity specialist.” “Not only should ballot tallying systems not be connected to the internet, they shouldn’t be anywhere near the internet,” he added…Last year, the Cisco firewalls in Wisconsin failed to receive a patch for a critical vulnerability until six months after the vulnerability had been made public and the patch was released… A New York Times story I wrote last year, however, showed that the modem transmissions do pass through the internet, and even an ES&S document that the company supplied to Rhode Island in 2015 calls the modem transmission of votes an “internet” transmission. A document for modem transmissions from voting machines made by Dominion Voting Systems—another top voting machine company in the country—similarly discusses TCP-IP and SSL, both protocols used for internet traffic. “The configurations show TCP-IP configuration and ‘SSL Optional,’ making it clear that at least the vendors know their systems are connecting through the internet, even if their election official customers do not realize it or continue to insist to the public that the systems are not connected to the internet,” Skoglund said. ES&S has been selling systems with modems to transmit results for more than a decade. Wisconsin approved the use of its current ES&S DS200 optical scan voting machines, with modem transmission capability, in September 2015, but its previous generation of ES&S optical scan machines also used modems for transmitting results. https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kxzk9/exclusive-critical-us-election-systems-have-been-left-exposed-online-despite-official-denials

Exclusive: Critical U.S. Election Systems Have Been Left Exposed Online Despite Official Denials The top voting machine company in the country insists that its election systems are never connected to the internet. But researchers found 35 of the systems have been connected to the internet for months and possibly years, including in some swing states. vice.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#62 NBC News: How Hackers Can Target Voting Machines (Aug. 12, 2019) "They had assembled some of the most common voting machines in the country, both systems on the front-end that you and I use to register our vote and the back-end tabulators and so forth that you feed a paper ballet into or that oversees a system... It turns out there is an extremely hostile relationship there where ES&S and Dominion and other companies have basically said we don't want to participate and have been really quite aggressive in saying we don't want to be a part of this. So the organizers were reduced to finding these machines on eBay. Which was really quite terrifying because it turns out anybody can buy some of the most commonly used machines on eBay. It's important to know that Georgia is about to spend $100 million on a contract with Dominion to provide ImageCast hardware to the state in time for the 2020 election. Yet, here these kids were who had opened it up and said, look, you can pop the front off of it, here's a port you can get in that's easy, all stuff you can do certainly do within six minutes behind a curtain much less if you had extra time because as we discovered days before so many are connected to the web... The admin password was just sitting there because it turns out the same password applies to multiple machines across the room, and those machines were created in the 2000s, which means they were, in fact, created, so you can't change that admin password. They are just locked for all time in that way... The combination of seeing the incredible vulnerabilities that we saw on display in real-time at this event and the lack of institutional action around the security of the vote all of that made for an extremely alarming weekend." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QtWP0KDx2hA

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker attended the voting village event, where common voting machines were tested. Surprisingly, major manufacturers like ES and S and Dominion did not provide the machines for testing, so organizers had to buy them on eBay. Hackers, who had never seen these machines before, easily accessed their inner workings. One machine, Dominion's image cast system, had its internals exposed. This is concerning because Georgia recently signed a $100 million contract with Dominion for the same hardware. The machines were found to have vulnerabilities, such as easily accessible admin passwords. Despite these issues, there seems to be little political will to address the security of voting machines. The speaker found the event and the lack of action on voting security alarming.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: We were there specifically to attend something called the voting village which is something that's gone on for 3 years. And in this, its 3rd year, they had assembled some of the most common voting machines in the country, both systems that are on the front end that you and I use to actually register our vote and the back end, tabulators and so forth, that you would feed a paper ballot into or that oversee a system. What was so interesting was I assumed coming into it that the big manufacturers, companies like ES and S and Dominion, had provided these machines to the hackers to, you know, field test them. But no, it turns out there's an extremely hostile relationship there and that ES and S and Dominion and other companies have basically said, we don't wanna participate and and really have been quite aggressive in in saying we don't want to be part of this. So the organizers were reduced to finding these machines it on eBay, which right there is pretty terrifying because it turns out that anybody can buy some of the most common machines in use on eBay. What was really alarming was when you see these hackers and these are people who've never seen these machines before, have had no practice on them for the most part come in and and engaged them. They immediately get into the guts of them. Beyond that, we were seeing Dominion's image cast system. It's a line of tabulators that paper ballots are fed into. That had its guts all over the room. It was not clear to us whether was the most recent version of the ImageCAST hardware. But it's important to note that Georgia just spent over 100 or is about to spend over $100,000,000 on a contract with Dominion to provide image cast hardware to the state in time for the 20, for the for the next primaries and for the 2020 election. And yet here these kids were who had opened it up. They said, look, you can pop the front off of it and here's a port you can get into right here that's easy. You know, all kinds of stuff that that you could certainly do within 6 minutes behind a curtain, much less, if you had extra time because any of these were, connected to the web as we discovered couple of days before, so many of them are. So at the end of the event, voting village issues a report, and so we'll be expecting one from them. And they're very transparent about it. I mean, the the spirit of this event, was was transparency, trying to get these vulnerabilities out into the world so that I I guess the idea is the companies will be forced to correct them in some way. The front of each machine was a little Post It that showed off what had been found out by the various hires. So at one point, you know, the the admin password was just sitting there on the on there because it turns out that the same admin password applies multiple machines across the room. And those machines were were created in the 2000s, which means that they were, in fact, created so you can't change that admin password. They're just locked for all time in that way. There does not seem to be any political momentum on some of the bills that are under consideration right now around trying to keep these machines off the Internet or trying to send some sort of certifiable ballot paper ballot system or any of the other things that have been proposed. And so the combination of seeing the incredible vulnerabilities that we saw on display in real time at this event and the lack of institutional action around the security of the vote. All of that made for an extremely alarming weekend.

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#63 MIT Technology Review: 16 million Americans will vote on hackable paperless machines (Aug. 13, 2019) “Despite the obvious risk and years of warnings, at least eight American states and 16 million American voters will use completely paperless machines in the 2020 US elections, a new report by New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice found. Paperless voting machines persist despite a strong consensus among US cybersecurity and national security experts that paper ballots and vote audits are necessary to ensure the security of the next election… “Selling a paperless voting machine is like selling a car without brakes—something is going to go terribly wrong,” Wyden says. “It is obvious that vendors won’t do the right thing on security by themselves. Congress needs to set mandatory federal election security standards that outlaw paperless voting machines and guarantee every American the right to vote with a hand-marked paper ballot. Experts agree that hand-marked paper ballots and post-election audits are the best defense against foreign hacking. Vendors should recognize that fact or get out of the way.”… Backups, however, are not a silver bullet for election security. Security experts say paper ballots are so important precisely because subsequent audits are necessary, and 17 of the 42 states requiring paper do not require audits.” https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/08/13/238715/16-million-americans-will-vote-on-hackable-paperless-voting-machines/

16 million Americans will vote on hackable paperless machines Despite the obvious risk and years of warnings, at least eight American states and 16 million American voters will use completely paperless machines in the 2020 US elections, a new report by New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice found. Paperless voting machines persist despite a strong consensus among US cybersecurity and national security experts… technologyreview.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#64 Salon: Hackers can easily break into voting machines used across the U.S. (Aug. 14, 2019) “Voting machines used in states across the United States were easily penetrated by hackers at the Def Con conference in Las Vegas on Friday…A video published by CNN shows a hacker break into a Diebold machine, which is used in 18 different states, in a matter of minutes, using no special tools, to gain administrator-level access… Hackers also quickly discovered that many of the voting machines had internet connections, which could allow hackers to break into machines remotely, the Washington Post reported. Motherboard recently reported that election security experts found that election systems used in 10 different states have connected to the internet over the last year, despite assurances from voting machine vendors that they are never connected to the internet and, therefore, cannot be hacked. The websites where states' post-election results are even more susceptible. The event had 40 child hackers between the ages of 6 and 17 attempt to break into a mock version of the sites. Most were able to alter vote tallies and even change the candidates' names to things like “Bob Da Builder,” CNN reported…. Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., called for paper ballots that can’t be hacked. “Election officials across the country as we speak are buying election systems that will be out of date the moment they open the box,” Wyden said in a speech at the conference. “It’s the election security equivalent of putting our military out there to go up against superpowers with a peashooter.” A report by the Brennan Center for Justice at the NYU School of Law, released days after the conference, warned that 12 percent of ballots could be cast on paperless machines in 2020.  The report shows that a third of all local election systems used voting machines that were more than a decade old. “We should replace antiquated equipment, and paperless equipment in particular, as soon as possible,” the report said… Rep. Ted Lieu, D-Calif., told Politico that the federal government “has a responsibility to make sure we have strong election security all over America. "It’s stupid to have the view that states have the right to have poor election security,” Lieu said. “No state has a right to have voting machines that can be easily hacked.” https://www.salon.com/2019/08/14/hackers-can-easily-break-into-voting-machines-used-across-the-u-s-play-doom-nirvana/

Hackers can easily break into voting machines used across the U.S.; play Doom, Nirvana Hackers at the Las Vegas conference penetrated voting machines within minutes, turning them into gaming consoles salon.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#65 FOX News: Election machine keys are on the Internet, hackers say (Aug. 22, 2019) “I may have the keys to open voting machines used in states across the country, and that is not a good thing. I am not an election official. I am not a voting machine expert, operator, or otherwise affiliated with any federal, state, or local government agency. I am simply an investigative journalist who, upon learning that the types of keys used for these machines are apparently widely available for purchase on the Internet, was prudent enough to ask to take a few keys home as souvenirs from my recent trip to the DEF CON 27 Hacking Conference in Las Vegas. Now, I have access to machines that have been used or are currently in use in 35 different states. Swing-states, coastal icons, and the heartland, experts say…I learned about plenty of other digital backdoors and other disturbing vulnerabilities concerning U.S. election equipment at DEF CON. Like the “hidden feature” that Hursti says was only recently discovered in a machine that’s been in use and under the microscope for more than a decade. “A hidden feature that enables you to reopen the polls silently, and insert more ballots and print the new evidence of the election,” Hursti says. And despite believing that the manufacturers had learned from previously exposed vulnerabilities on that machine over the years, “these [newly discovered] features had been missed” the entire time, Hursti says. I watched Hursti explain this new discovery to Rep. Eric Swalwell, D-Calif., one of the numerous lawmakers who attended this year’s DEF CON, and whose face seemed to drop upon learning of the new revelation. That’s likely because this particular machine has been in use in his home state of California for years…One voting machine was discovered to have a password of “1111.” Better than the voter ID machine with NO password.” https://www.foxnews.com/tech/i-have-the-keys-to-your-voting-machine-probably

Election machine keys are on the Internet, hackers say I may have the keys to open voting machines used in states across the country, and that is not a good thing. foxnews.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#66 The Hill: Voting machines pose a greater threat to our elections than foreign agents (Oct. 2, 2019) "In 2017, the largest U.S. voting machine vendor, ES&S, exposed encrypted employee passwords online. Using those passwords, hackers could have planted malware on the company’s servers, and that malware could then be delivered to voting systems across the country with official updates. “This is the type of stuff that leads to a complete compromise,” said cyber-risk analyst Chris Vickery. Both ES&S and its main competitor, Dominion Voting Systems, have released voting machines that security experts say can add votes to paper ballots after they are cast by voters… Security experts are alarmed at internet connectivity in voting systems because it can allow hackers to inject malware that disrupts or changes the outcome of an election. Kevin Skoglund, the lead researcher of one study, confirmed that vendors "know their systems are connecting through the internet.” In August, North Carolina became the latest casualty. Voters and representatives from good-government groups pleaded with the state board of elections to adopt the type of voting system almost unanimously supported by election security experts, one that uses hand-marked paper ballots. They asked the board to reject ballot-marking devices that use barcodes and argued that hand-marked paper ballots are more secure, less expensive, and less likely to create long lines at the polls… Similar decisions have been made in Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Communities in those states have experienced frustration, and outrage and even launched investigations following certification or adoption of election systems opposed by experts, good-government groups, competing vendors, and the general public.” https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/464065-voting-machines-pose-a-greater-threat-to-our-elections-than-foreign-agents/

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#67 NPR: Cyber Experts Warn Of Vulnerabilities Facing 2020 Election Machines (Sept. 4, 2019) "The machine he's investigating is a ballot-marking device used to help people with physical impairments or language barriers vote, and it's running a version of Windows that is more than 15 years old. "These systems crash at your Wal-Mart scanning your groceries. And we're using those systems here to protect our democracy, which is a little bit unsettling," he said. "I wouldn't even use this to control a camera at my house. Or my toaster." One glaring vulnerability — which cybersecurity experts have been talking about for 20 years, and yelling about for the past decade — are paperless voting machines. Experts agree that these machines are insecure because they record votes electronically and could either be manipulated or malfunction without detection. They can't truly be audited, and they leave room for some doubt in the result. In 2016, approximately 20 percent of voters used electronic voting equipment that didn't provide a paper trail. In 2020, that number will be around 12 percent, according to a recent report from the Brennan Center for Justice." https://www.npr.org/2019/09/04/755066523/cyber-experts-warn-of-vulnerabilities-facing-2020-election-machines

Cyber Experts Warn Of Vulnerabilities Facing 2020 Election Machines America's elections infrastructure is more secure than it was four years ago, but many lingering weaknesses won't be resolved in time for Election Day next year. npr.org

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#68 Wired: Some Voting Machines Still Have Decade-Old Vulnerabilities (Sept. 26, 2019) “Today's report highlights detailed vulnerability findings related to six models of voting machines, most of which are currently in use. That includes the ES&S AutoMARK, used in 28 states in 2018, and Premier/Diebold AccuVote-OS, used in 26 states that same year… "As disturbing as this outcome is, we note that it is at this point an unsurprising result," the organizers write. "It is well known that current voting systems, like any hardware and software running on conventional general-purpose platforms, can be compromised in practice. However, it is notable—and especially disappointing—that many of the specific vulnerabilities reported over a decade earlier ... are still present in these systems today." The types of vulnerabilities participants found included poor physical security protections that could allow undetected tampering, easily guessable hardcoded system credentials, the potential for operating system manipulations, and remote attacks that could compromise memory or integrity checks or cause a denial of service. The report points out that many of these vulnerabilities were discovered years ago—sometimes more than a decade—in academic research or state and local audits. Additionally, voting machine security is only one item on a much larger punch list for better defending US elections. More districts need to implement network and cloud defenses to protect infrastructure like voter rolls and email, and more states need to conduct risk-limiting audits to verify election results.” https://www.wired.com/story/voting-village-results-hacking-decade-old-bugs/

Some Voting Machines Still Have Decade-Old Vulnerabilities The results of the 2019 Defcon Voting Village are in—and they paint an ugly picture for voting machine security. wired.com

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

#69 John Oliver Breaks Down Faulty Voting Machine Security on Last Week Tonight (Nov. 3, 2019) John Oliver offered various examples of how easy it is to physically hack a voting machine (it can take only a few minutes), how easy it is to find unattended voting machines, and how flimsy the claims are that most machines are never connected to the Internet. “So, some machines that officials insist don’t connect to the Internet, actually do connect to the Internet,” Oliver said. “And even some machines that don’t connect directly to the Internet are programmed with cards that have themselves been programmed on computers that connect to the Internet." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svEuG_ekNT0

Video Transcript AI Summary
A senate report revealed that voting machines are aging and vulnerable to exploitation. A hacker demonstrated how easy it is to gain full admin access to a model used in 18 states. Professor Ed Felton documented how unattended voting machines can be manipulated by anyone. Additionally, some machines that claim not to be connected to the internet actually are, while others use cards programmed on internet-connected computers. In summary, all voting machines can be tampered with in some way. As an axe murderer once said, "pretty much everything is hackable."
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: A senate report found that some of our voting equipment is aging and vulnerable to exploitation by a committed adversary. So tonight, let's talk about our voting machines. Voting machines are technically computers and computers, of course, are hackable. And it can be far easier to control a machine than you might expect, as this hacker demonstrates on a model currently used in at least 18 states. Speaker 1: All they have to do this bad actor would be to open up This machine by pressing this button right here, when it's off, removing the card reader, removing this, you don't need any tools to do this. Unplugging this. Again, you don't need any tools to do this. Turning it on, all you have to do is pick this slot here with a ballpoint pen, open this up, press the red button, And we're gonna let it boot up here. Just click cancel and okay. And now I have full admin access. Under 2 minutes. Speaker 0: Holy shit. That should have been a lot more difficult. Speaker 2: Professor Ed Felton of Princeton performs an exercise every election day. He drives around Princeton to various polling locations and he follows the prominent signs that say voting here days before the election and then he takes photographs of unattended voting machines just sitting there. And that's for him to document that anybody can walk up to his voting machines and anybody can manipulate them and nobody will know. Speaker 0: So to recap, I've now shown you how to hack voting machines in less than 2 minutes and how to find unattended voting machines. Speaker 3: Are the Harris County voting machines connected to the Internet? Never. So is it ever connected to a modem? Nope. Well, the no. I say that it is a secure modem where we dial, to an old fashioned landline to the one of our 4 drop off sites. Speaker 0: But that's the Internet, Stan. You literally just described the Internet. So some machines and officials insist don't connect to the internet actually do connect to the internet. And even some machines that don't connect directly to the internet are programmed with cards that have themselves been programmed on computers that connect to the internet. The truth is, every voting machine can be tampered with in some way or other. If I may quote an extremely upbeat axe murderer, pretty much everything is hackable.
Saved - August 13, 2023 at 6:59 AM
reSee.it AI Summary
Stealing the most powerful republic in the world: A step-by-step guide. Start with a virus, import it into America, blame the president, kill the economy, push mail-in voting, stoke a race war, pick a compliant cabinet, shield him from the press, ignore the recovery, downplay world peace, control polling stations, call off the election, manipulate ballots, use software, silence dissent, and act like it never happened. It's that easy.

@WallStreetApes - Wall Street Apes

“Stealing The Most Powerful Republic in the World” It would be a shame if this went viral ‌ HOW TO STEAL AN ELECTION ‌ -Start with a virus -Import it into America -Talk about it nonstop -Call some governors. Not them. Not them. That's your guys -Put patients into nursing homes, kill thousands -Blame the president. Keep blaming, blame some more -Lock down some small business -Kill the economy -Push mail in voting -Stoke a race war, call for riots -Pick a cabinet. No, not her. Yeah, that's more like it -Lock him in his basement -Shield him from the press -Don't cover this. Don't cover this. Don't cover this. Keep doing that -Ignore the economic recovery -Downplay the world peace -Pump the Polls, pump, pump. Don't stop pumping -Install your software and swing states. That was fast -Take control of polling stations -Call off the election when you're losing -Take everyone out -Pull out all the extra ballots -Get the software to do its thing. -Get the media to say it's over -Call the big tech guys -Ban anyone who notices -Act like the whole thing never happened ‌ Stealing the most powerful republic in the world. ‌ It’s that easy.

Video Transcript AI Summary
Import the virus into America, talk about it constantly, blame the president. Put patients in nursing homes, causing deaths. Lock down businesses, destroy the economy. Promote mail-in voting, fuel a race war. Incite riots, choose a candidate. Lock him in his basement, shield him from the press. Ignore the economic recovery, downplay global issues. Manipulate swing states with software, control polling stations. Cancel the election if losing, remove extra ballots. Silence anyone who notices, pretend it never happened. Stealing the power of the most powerful republic in the world.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Start with the virus. Import it into America. Talk about it nonstop. Call some governors. Nah them. Nah them. That's your guys. Put patients into nursing homes. Kill 1,000. Blame the president. Keep blaming. Lame some more. Lock down some old business to kill the economy. Push mail in voting. Stoke a race war. Call for riots. Pick a candidate. No. Not her. Yeah. That's more like it. Lock him in his basement. Shield him from the press. Don't cover this. Don't cover this. Don't cover this. Keep doing that. Ignore the economic recovery. Downplay the world with us. Pump the pulse. Pump. Pump. Don't stop pumping. Install your software in swing states. That was fast. Take control of polling stations. Call off the election when you're losing. Take everyone out. Pull out all the extra ballots. Get the software to do its thing. Get the media to stay sober. Call the big tech guys. Ban anyone who notices. Act like the whole thing never happened. Stealing the most powerful republic in the world. It's that easy.
Saved - October 21, 2023 at 3:10 PM

@MogTheUrbanite - EnochPowell

"How Far-Right Trolls weaponized accurately predicting the future" https://t.co/DmJa4a0D2J

Saved - October 24, 2023 at 6:01 AM

@liz_churchill10 - Liz Churchill

“Biden visited Serbia in May of 2009 to personally recruit computer hackers there to control future Dominion Software in the elections…” -Fmr U.S. Army Officer Scott Bennett Counterrorism Analyst https://t.co/8hsrKxDS2r

Video Transcript AI Summary
In May 2009, it is claimed that Biden visited Serbia to recruit computer hackers for Dominion software design. Serbia is listed as the location of Dominion's branch on their website. Scott Bennett, a former counterterrorism threat finance analyst and liaison officer to the State Department, mentions his involvement in tracking terrorist activities in 2009. After the general election, over 100 employees, including Serbian ones, deleted their LinkedIn records. On July 16, 2018, Dominion announced its acquisition by Staple Street Capital, described as a medium-sized private equity firm. Following the election, Staple Street Capital's website underwent significant changes, with all information about the company's founder and investment portfolio being deleted.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Filed that Biden visited Serbia in May of 2009 to personally recruit computer hackers there to control future Dominion software design. On Dominion's website. Serbia is marked as the location of the company's branch. It is significant to note that Scott Bennett worked as a counterterrorism threat finance analyst as well as was the liaison officer to the State Department, the coordinator for counterterrorism under Ambassador Del Dey, former general of, joint special operations command. So in my capacity as working for General Daley at the State Department Counterterrorism Office, I, interface with some of the activities that were going on in 2009 with regards to UBS securities and some of these, terrorist activities that we're tracking at the State Department and at Special Operations Command and at the Joint Military Information Support command. Coincidentally, when Dominion became the global focus after the general election, more than 100 Many employees who accounted for 1 third of the total number of employees deleted their records on LinkedIn, including Serbian employees. On July 16, 2018, Dominion issued a press release announcing that Staple Street Capital in New York and the management team of Dominion had acquired Dominion. The media briefing described Staple Street Capital as a medium sized private equity firm. Soon after the general election on November 3rd, Staple Street Capital's website almost changed its face immediately. All the information about the company's founder and and the company's investment portfolio was deleted.
Saved - November 2, 2023 at 4:30 PM

@QINTELPRO_ - QINTELPRO

During the Arab Spring, Google helped the CIA develop a regime-change weapon that could digitally manipulate entire populations into trying to overthrow their government. It could also map out the social networks of foreign leaders, and target everyone in their inner circles. https://t.co/HBmOyDIb4t

Saved - November 18, 2023 at 9:31 AM
reSee.it AI Summary
"Stealing The Most Powerful Republic in the World: Unveiling a Setup" January 6th footage exposes a potential setup. Let's ensure this gains traction. How to steal an election: 1. Introduce a virus 2. Amplify discussions 3. Manipulate governors 4. Mishandle nursing homes 5. Blame the president relentlessly 6. Crush small businesses 7. Promote mail-in voting 8. Incite racial tensions 9. Control the narrative, hide truths 10. Disregard economic recovery 11. Underplay global peace 12. Manipulate polls swiftly 13. Seize polling stations 14. Halt election when losing 15. Manipulate ballots 16. Exploit software 17. Declare victory prematurely 18. Engage big tech censorship 19. Deny any wrongdoing Stealing the most powerful republic in the world is shockingly simple.

@WallStreetApes - Wall Street Apes

“Stealing The Most Powerful Republic in the World” January 6th Footage proves it was all a setup. It would be a shame if this went viral ‌ HOW TO STEAL AN ELECTION 🇺🇸 ‌ -Start with a virus -Import it into America -Talk about it nonstop -Call some governors. Not them. Not them. That's your guys -Put patients into nursing homes, kill thousands -Blame the president. Keep blaming, blame some more -Lock down some small business -Kill the economy -Push mail in voting -Stoke a race war, call for riots -Pick a cabinet. No, not her. Yeah, that's more like it -Lock him in his basement -Shield him from the press -Don't cover this. Don't cover this. Don't cover this. Keep doing that -Ignore the economic recovery -Downplay the world peace -Pump the Polls, pump, pump. Don't stop pumping -Install your software and swing states. That was fast -Take control of polling stations -Call off the election when you're losing -Take everyone out -Pull out all the extra ballots -Get the software to do its thing. -Get the media to say it's over -Call the big tech guys -Ban anyone who notices -Act like the whole thing never happened ‌ Stealing the most powerful republic in the world. ‌ It’s that easy.

Video Transcript AI Summary
A speaker discusses a series of actions taken to manipulate the American public. They mention importing a virus, blaming the president, and causing economic damage. They also talk about stoking a race war, manipulating polls, and using software to control the election. The speaker claims that the whole process of stealing power from the most powerful republic in the world was easy.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Start with the virus. Import it into America. Talk about it nonstop. Call some governors. Not them. Not them. That's you guys. Put patients into nursing homes. Kill 1,000. Blame the president. Keep blaming. Lame some more. Lock down small business. Kill the economy. Push mail in voting. Stoke a race war. Call for rights. Pick a candidate. No. Not her. Yeah. That's more like it. Lock him in his basement. Shield him from the press. Don't cover this. Don't cover this. Don't cover this. Keep doing that. Ignore the economic recovery. Downplay the world with us. Pump the polls. Pump. Pump. Don't stop pumping. Install your software in swing states. That was fast. Take control of polling stations. Call off the election when you're losing. Kick everyone out. Pull out all the extra ballots. Get the software to do its thing. Get the media to say it's over. Call the big tech guys, ban anyone who notices, act like the whole thing never happened. Stealing the most powerful republic in the world. It's that easy.
Saved - November 27, 2023 at 2:57 PM
reSee.it AI Summary
In 2015, significant events and connections emerged. The Center for Tech and Civic Life was founded, receiving funding from Democracy Fund. Amber McReynolds and David Becker collaborated on elections conferences. Bytespeed secured a contract with Kentucky. Bioscience Technology highlighted Theranos and Metabiota as biotech startups. Baillie Gifford, the largest shareholder of a company, opened a subsidiary in Hong Kong. Taryn Naidu, CEO of Rightside Group, announced their entrance into the Chinese market. Renee Diresta was involved with the United Nations, State Department, and Obama White House. The Department of Homeland Security implemented additional screening measures. These events shed light on various connections and developments in 2015.

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

💥BREAKING: Here’s a thread about things that happened or began in the year of our Lord 2015. (Figured it’ll be important to go ahead and have all these timelines connected for the near future.) *CENTER FOR TECH AND CIVIC LIFE was founded.

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

Democracy Fund (lol) has been shilling out big bucks to the CTCL since it was founded back in 2015. Hey look, they were even kind enough to toss some cash in MIT’s direction in 2017 and 2020… for “elections”. MIT’s own Gary Gensler was appointed SEC Commissioner in April 2021.

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

*AMBER MCREYNOLDS and DAVID BECKER doing “ELECTIONS CONFERENCES” together.

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

They’ve been colluding since at least 2015. Amber McReynolds David Becker Douglas Becker Michael Crow I’m guessing “CINTANA ALLIANCE” is what Gabriel Zinny meant on Hunter Biden’s laptop.

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

*BYTESPEED began its contract with KENTUCKY.

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

Speaking of our worthless RNC UNIPARTY, here’s the contract BYTESPEED, LLC. has with the STATE OF KENTUCKY from back in 2015.😒

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

*BIOSCIENCE TECHNOLOGY lists THERANOS and METABIOTA as 2 of “FIVE BIOTECH STARTUPS TO CHECK OUT in JULY 2015”

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

@SoCalRuss1982 💥Pretty neat to revisit this BIOSCIENCE TECHNOLOGY article from JULY 2015: “JULY 2015: FIVE BIOTECH STARTUPS TO CHECK OUT THIS MONTH” 💥💥💥THERANOS and METABIOTA💥💥💥 Gosh, it’s a small world! What are the chances?🤣

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

*BAILLIE GIFFORD, the LARGEST SHAREHOLDER of http://WIX.COM opens its HONG KONG subsidiary, “BAILLIE GIFFORD ASIA, LTD.”

Your website, your business, your future|Wix.com Create your website and grow with confidence. From an intuitive website builder to advanced business solutions & powerful SEO tools—Try Wix for free. wix.com

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

So where do the connections with CIA, MICHAEL CROW, IARPA and DARPA come into play?🤔 💥Let’s revisit the LARGEST SHAREHOLDER for http://WIX.COM — BAILLIE GIFFORD. 💥In 2015, BAILLIE GIFFORD opened a subsidiary in HONG KONG (BAILLIE GIFFORD ASIA LIMITED) that eventually founded the BAILLIE GIFFORD US GROWTH TRUST in 2018. After securing management of WITAN PACIFIC INVESTMENT TRUST, WITAN soon became known as the BAILLIE GIFFORD CHINA GROWTH TRUST (2020). 💥THEN, in MARCH 2022, BAILLIE GIFFORD made an investment to become the LARGEST SHAREHOLDER of GINKGO BIOWORKS.🤔 💥AND FINALLY, in OCTOBER 2022, GINKGO BIOWORKS partnered with the INTELLIGENCE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (IARPA) to create software able to… wait for it… detect whether or not BIOLOGICAL ORGANISMS HAD BEEN GENETICALLY ENGINEERED!!!😳 (🤯🤯🤯)

Your website, your business, your future|Wix.com Create your website and grow with confidence. From an intuitive website builder to advanced business solutions & powerful SEO tools—Try Wix for free. wix.com

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

*TARYN NAIDU, CEO of RIGHTSIDE GROUP, LTD. (tied to BAE Systems) announces RIGHTSIDE’S entrance into the CHINESE MARKETS through their DISTRIBUTION PARTNERSHIPS with ALIBABA DOMAIN SERVICES and HI CHINA.

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥 And now for the CHERRY ON TOP OF ALL THIS MADNESS… a GRAND MOTHERF**CKING RACKETEERING FINALE!!!!! NOT KIDDING. 💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥💥 💥Remember our good pal, TARYN NAIDU, the CEO of RIGHTSIDE GROUP, LTD.? ✅Back in August of 2015, he hosted a rather important “state of the earnings” conference call with RIGHTSIDE “stakeholders” to give them a progress report and the outlook for earnings potential going forward. ✅The images below represent pertinent excerpts from the entire transcript of that call. If you take a gander at the FOURTH IMAGE, you’ll see one of the most important takes in American history: 🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨 “…in Q2, we entered the CHINESE MARKET through DISTRIBUTION PARTNERS HI CHINA AND ALIBABA’S DOMAIN SERVICES COMPANY…” 🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨 💥And why is THAT take so critically important to HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS of AMERICANS, you ask? 🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨 Because THAT’S WHERE OUR ERIC DATA WAS BEING SENT IN BEIJING, CHINA, ON AND/OR BEFORE 11/08/2022!!!!! 🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨🧨 🤯🤯🤯🤯🤯🤯🤯🤯🤯🤯🤯🤯 (You’re welcome.) On behalf of my brain and my poor phone, I’d just like to say to PERKINS COIE, to the CROWN and to MARICOPA: Get. Completely. Rekt.✌️ And to my American fam: LET’S. F***ING. GO!!!

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

*RENEE DIRESTA is closely involved with the UNITED NATIONS, the STATE DEPARTMENT and the OBAMA WHITEHOUSE.

@pepesgrandma - Bad Kitty, Censored By X🦁🤐

🔥 Part 10 - Bad Kitteh Exposé: The early history of New Knowledge that few know. Including: 🔹They advised both the Obama Whitehouse and State Dept. 🔹Their unusual and ALARMING data collection from the 2016 election while advisors. 🔹Ran a 2016 pre election, conservative monitoring, war room. 🔹Were the first, outside the IC, to claim Russian interference in the 2016 election. Starting in 2015, Renee Diresta & Jonathan Morgan of New Knowledge (aka Popily, Yonder, & Primer) were both involved with the United Nations, State Dept, & Obama WhiteHouse. The earliest official mention of Russia disinfo by them was in Oct 2015 by Renee Diresta to the Obama Whitehouse. After the 2016 election, Renee said, “now I’m going to pay more attention!” (to Russia) New Knowledges claim to fame is being the FIRST to identify 2016 Russian election interference. Renee & Jonathan Morgan met up at the Obama Whitehouse in Feb 2016. Although they first met earlier. 🔥After the 2016 election, their Data For Democracy harvested all of the United States voter information FROM THE SECRETARIES OF STATE! Thats a huge task too! What did they do with all this massive data? They worked for the Obama Whitehouse, was this even kosher to do?🔥 Renee Diresta & Jonathan Morgan also operated an 2016 election disinfo war room that concentrated on conservative fake news. Once again, let me remind you that they were advisors to the Obama Whitehouse. After the 2016 election, Jonathan Morgan was even invited to the Whitehouse to do a podcast with Obama’s Chief Science Officer. ♦️New Knowledge was founded in May 2015 in Austin, TX by Jonathon Morgan, a former adviser at the US Dept of State, NATO, & was a propaganda researcher at DARPA. ♦️Months later New Knowledge joined up with the Sustainable UN. (See linked video and thread.) ♦️Renee Diresta: “Late 2015, the problem of ISIS on Twitter had gotten to be incredibly large, & I connected with a data scientist named Jonathon Morgan.” “In late October 2015 & early 2016, gov acknowledge that social network manipulation was a real problem.” “Russia was part of the conversation in the WHITE HOUSE AND in the STATE DEPT advising I was doing in Oct 2015.” “Going back to Oct 2015, there was information sharing between the State Dept, the White House & companies like Facebook about thinking about the vulnerabilities of their system to foreign actors looking to spread misinfo or disinfo.” “Russia was brought up by other people in the gov who were concerned about the potential for manipulation.” “I did sit down with Twitter. Twitter was really much more concerned about harassment than disinfo & manipulation. “ (After the election - on Russia.) “I thought, now we're going to start to pay a lot more attention to this problem.” ♦️New Knowledge: “We were the first org outside the US intel community to identify Russia’s campaign to influence the 2016 presidential election.” ♦️The Obama admin, reached out to Renee Diresta in 2015 Renee Diresta claims she first met Jonathan Morgan at a White House tech meeting in Feb 2016. (Conflicts with PBS article date of late 2015.) Senate & House staff members, who knew of DiResta’s expertise through her public reports & her previous work ADVISING THE OBAMA ADMIN on disinfo campaigns, had reached out to her & others to help them prepare for the hearings. ♦️In 2016, they monitored thousands of Twitter accounts that suddenly started using bots, or automated accounts, to spread salacious stories about the Clinton family. They watched as multiple Facebook pages, appearing out of nowhere, organized to simultaneously create anti-immigrant events. When I put it all together & started mapping it out, I saw how big the scale of it was,” said Jonathan Albright, who met DiResta through Twitter. Albright published a widely read report that mapped, for the first time, connections between conservative sites putting out fake news. To be continued in the next post, many sources to follow.

@DecentFiJC - Jonathan

More 2015 stuff. *DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

@JamesOKeefeIII - James O'Keefe

Just received from this from a DHS employee: ‘In 2015, SSSS was only for people on the terrorist watch list. In addition to the additional screening at the checkpoint it also meant federal air marshals were on the plane following the person. TSA has intel specialists that attend joint terrorism meetings across the country with the FBI etc. it very much appears this list has now been politicized post January 6. SSSS list is run by a background system called secure flight which checks everyone’s name and birthday they voluntary enter when booking a ticket. FYI to avoid SSSS screening just ‘accidentally’ enter the wrong birthday when booking your ticket. That was used by selectees as they were called in the 2015 time frame. Person only got caught when they flew internationally when passport was scanned. SSSS were flying all over US without additional screening using the mistakenly entered birthday.’

Saved - December 28, 2023 at 8:41 PM

@DGrayTexas45 - David Gray

@LeadingReport @lynda62560 Election Commissioner Bennie Smith shows how easy it is to manipulate the software in the voting machines to determine who wins and what percent of the vote they will get. https://t.co/X2NquMEmlJ

Video Transcript AI Summary
In this video, the speaker discusses a governor's race and the use of a program called "fraction magic" to manipulate the results. They mention a candidate named Basil who initially had only 219 votes, but they plan to manipulate the allocation rules to make him the winner. The speaker demonstrates how the program works by injecting new allocation rules into 80,000 votes. They emphasize that they are not a thief but are demonstrating an ethical swap. At the end, they reveal that the new winner of the race is Basil.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: So the 1st race is a governor's race. It's if you guys look at the total, 212 votes. And this is the representation of the real totals. This is actually what actually happened in Shelby County. Well, what what was reported in Shelby County. This is basically what people in Shelby County see and anybody across that universe. So we're gonna we're gonna work for the governor's race. Who would you like the winner to be? I really think the name Basil is interesting, so we're gonna go with Basil. Well, he's he's only got 219 votes. You think we can pull that off? Time. Basil is like a season in or something like, we will season his votes to make him the winner. Okay. So, I'm gonna open fraction magic. It is largely unnoticeable. It is running. It's in the top right corner, and you can't see it. I mean, you can try to see if you see it. So the way I designed the program is to kind of hide in plain sight. So So just watch my cursor though. If you follow my cursor. You see a change? Can you see it went from a from a you see it went from time. So I'm gonna type this, code in that brings up now everything you're gonna see, they're gonna be in black boxes. I did this collaboration with Black Box Voting .org. So I made everything in black boxes so you know what is not in the application and what is the application that I designed. So to I'll open it up. It's basically reading the voting database to tell me, everybody's running. So these are these are the options. Team. Again, this is what, Appel was was was was was explaining that once a person get in, they can just just hijack the system and take over. So I thing. You said Basil? Okay. So let's take, we'll make Joe Kirkpatrick come in 2nd place. And you said Basil is gonna be the winner. So Joe Kirkpatrick is always got a low vote total too. So he's gonna he's gonna do have have a good night too. So So basically these are the allocation rules that I I preloaded these allocation rules. So each precinct, each polling location, he is going to win 37 tent. And Joe Kirkpatrick is gonna get 46% of everything that remains, and this one has some complexity in there where you can see it, where I'm I'm changing the allocation rules. Because this is it's gotta mimic realistic results. Right? And it's it's it's pretty realistic. So team. We're gonna come out of this. And I'll open the program again, because now I'm gonna run it. And I'm gonna I'm gonna inject those allocation rules into 80,000 votes. 77,000 votes. Alright. So I'll run it again. This time I'm gonna type a different code. And if you guys want to look at this thumb drive is gonna I always use the thumb drive, because everybody says, well, it's a thumb drive. We checked it. No. Time. That sound good, but everybody's gotta use some type of media to do something. So this thing is gonna for about maybe 10 seconds, but it's gonna go through it's team. It's gonna go through the whole thing like a peanut butter sandwich. So I'm a I'm a type the code in. 1 1,000, 2 1,000, 3 1,000, 4 1,000, 5 1,000, 6 1,000, 7 1,000, 8. So 8 seconds didn't make me look bad, and this is an ethical swap, so I know y'all, I'm, I'm not a thief. I'm representing 1, but I'm not a thief. Alright. So everything is still still up. So now we gotta see what the new totals are. Right? So tilts. Alright? So we now have a new winner. And our winner is going to be
Saved - February 3, 2024 at 6:54 PM

@Squill_Mama - Squirrel Mama

How to steal an election… Many of them.. https://t.co/Zy6QyIL7wP

Video Transcript AI Summary
A computer science professor explains how a voting machine can be easily manipulated by gaining physical access to it. By connecting a computer to the machine's serial port, one can rewrite the code and control the election results. The professor also highlights the lack of security measures on these machines, making them vulnerable to hacking. Another expert shares their experience of being left alone with voting machines after an election, emphasizing how easily someone could insert malware into them. The central count scanner discussed is widely used in America for counting ballots. The speakers mention the ease of obtaining the machine's software from a Russian server and the numerous individuals who have access to the machines, including potential adversaries. They conclude that the multitude of possible hacks and entry points make it unlikely that someone isn't taking advantage of these vulnerabilities.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Hello. I'm a professor of computer science at Georgia Tech. How do we work? It looks like he has a USB connection into the scanner. Speaker 1: The the serial console on the back gives us a wrench out. Speaker 0: That means you have control of the of the machine once you Speaker 1: I have full control of that, and then we can change the results of what it's scanning. My computer is connected to the machine. This is a serial cable, and it's connected to the back of the machine. Take off the back of the machine, and there's a serial port, and that gives a full root access with no password on the app. Speaker 0: There's no security subsystem on this one? Speaker 1: Nope. There's no password on it. With this kind of access, you could rewrite the code that's running on there and get it to count votes in whatever way you want it. You would do this in advance of election night and then wait for the results come in. You could control the election results. Either way, as long as I had physical access to either plug something in or take off the back But you just need that access briefly? Once. Yes. Very briefly. About how long? If you had this all prepped and ready to go a minute, Speaker 2: this it's easily possible for, somebody to get into these machines because they're unsecured for such long periods of time. I have done research on and personally watched 150 elections, at least. 2 of our experts and I went to the closing of the polls in one of the recent elections. At the end of the closing of the polls, the poll workers left us there with about 6 voting machines by ourselves. I was with 2 guys who could have gotten into those machines in a matter of seconds and put in malware? Speaker 3: The machine we're in front of is a central count scanner. It's the ES and S Model 650. It's, to our knowledge, the most widely deployed central count scanner in America. Anytime you do early voting or provisional voting or anytime you're in a state where they do central tabulation of all the ballots, so they bring them to one place, this is the kind of high speed scanner they would use to count ballots. Historically, these machines were examined, and they determined there was a there was a number of serious problems with them by virtue of messing with the Zip disk. Just turn it on for 3 minutes and stick a disk in, wait 1 minute, and then walk away. You're able to change the behavior of the machine any way you want, including changing the results of an election. Speaker 1: It's probably easier to do all of this by just Speaker 0: plug Speaker 1: in is So this probably came from Speaker 0: a server or something else. Speaker 1: I I have no idea where where they're getting their programs. Speaker 3: We downloaded a image of the operating system, the software that runs on this machine from a Russian server. Speaker 1: How many people might have access to stick in as if this like that? Speaker 3: It would be everyone from elections officials to people who run the storage facilities, volunteers in the election, security guards, you name it. There's gonna be tens of thousands of people who have access to the machine in that fashion. And our adversaries definitely have this machine in Russia, Period. Speaker 2: There are so many possible hacks And so many possible vectors for entry. It's hard to believe that someone's not taking advantage of it.
Saved - June 15, 2024 at 12:19 PM

@Artemisfornow - Bernie

ELECTION - This is a Bot farm, individual phones, all with social media accounts and run by organisations to influence elections. The BBC has now admitted its ’disinformation’ department runs its own bot farm, funded by you! not to influence you … just to protect you 🤡 https://t.co/aZFf80tKVg

Video Transcript AI Summary
The company promotes in chat, claiming to have a very small share of the market with around 10,000 places. Translation: The company promotes in chat, claiming to have a very small share of the market with around 10,000 places.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Компания занимается продвижением в чате, Говорят, что здесь здесь очень малая часть своих мест, где около 10 тысяч.
Saved - August 9, 2024 at 5:11 AM

@JMichaelWaller - J Michael Waller

.@Smartmatic CEO Mugica is in the "fight election disinformation" business, in addition to, well, read the grand jury indictment. #SmartmaticFraud

@antoniomugica - Antonio Mugica

“Safeguarding Elections in the Age of Fake News.” Free, second edition, includes concrete, actionable tips to fight election disinformation. smartmatic.com/us/download-ou…

Saved - August 15, 2024 at 7:56 PM

@Kahlissee - Khalissee

⚡️BREAKING: Israeli contractor claims Israel is behind rigging elections and online bot farms Not China and not Russia They claim Israel has rigged more than 30 elections Credit @_NicoleNonya https://t.co/yEIEFMmT1w

Saved - October 18, 2024 at 1:01 PM
reSee.it AI Summary
I've been observing a concerning trend where governments and influential figures are pushing for mass censorship, particularly targeting platforms like Twitter. This has been a coordinated effort involving various political leaders and intelligence agencies, aiming for total control over information. The Twitter Files have exposed deep ties between these entities and censorship operations, revealing tactics borrowed from military strategies. The narrative suggests a looming totalitarianism, as legacy media and tech companies align to suppress dissent and manipulate public discourse.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

First Brazil and now the EU say they will seize the assets of @ElonMusk's companies. A President Harris would do the same. They know it's illegal. They know it looks bad. They don't care. They know they can't rule the world without mass censorship and total information control.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

They've been preparing us mentally for weeks, months, and years. Recently it was Gates, Clinton, and Kerry. Before that, it was Obama, Biden, and Harris. Before that it was Aspen, Harvard, Stanford, the UN, the WEF, the EU, and IC intermediaries.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

Bill Gates two weeks ago, John Kerry last week, and Hillary Clinton today — all demanding government censorship of X. Hard to see this as a coincidence. They appear to be laying the groundwork for totalitarianism. Our democratic republic is in danger.

Video Transcript AI Summary
Section 230, which granted internet platforms immunity as passive conduits, should be repealed. This perspective is based on the belief that platforms like Facebook, X, Instagram, and TikTok are not simply pass-throughs. Without moderation and monitoring of content by these platforms, there is a loss of total control.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: There should be a lot of things done. We should be, in my view, repealing something called section 230, which gave, you know, platforms on the Internet immunity because they were thought to be just pass throughs that they shouldn't be judged for the content that is posted. But we now know that that was an overly simple view that if the platforms, whether it's Facebook or TwitterX or, Instagram or TikTok, whatever they are, if they don't moderate, and monitor the content, we lose total control.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

Around the world, legacy media are urging mass censorship. They want the government to transfer wealth from social media companies to them. Their journalist-employees are petty authoritarians filled with status anxiety & envy who are desperate to censor what we can say online.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

Their goal has always been total control. They had quietly put in place all the key pieces: mass censorship in EU, UK, Irish, Aus, CA, BR, et al, with DHS-led censorship in US. The purchase of Twitter by @elonmusk threw a wrench in their plans. But it also accelerated them.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

@elonmusk The Twitter Files revealed mass censorship operations by DHS and "former" CIA people to control its censorship ("content moderation") from inside the company

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

TWITTER FILES - CIA The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the most famous of the 18 US government agencies that comprise the Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States of America. Unlike the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the law strictly prohibits CIA employees or contractors from spying upon or running clandestine operations against American citizens on US soil. But now, a new Twitter Files investigation reveals that a member of the Board of Trustees of the CIA’s mission-driven venture capital firm and ostensibly “former” IC and CIA analysts were involved in a 2021-2022 effort to take over Twitter’s content management system. The effort also involved: — a long-time IC contractor and senior Department of Defense R&D official who spent years developing technologies to detect whistleblowers (“insider threats”) like Edward Snowden and Wikileaks’ leakers; — the proposed head of the DHS’ aborted Disinformation Governance Board, Nina Jankowicz, who aided US military and NATO “hybrid war” operations in Europe; — Jim Baker, who, as FBI General Counsel, helped start the Russiagate hoax, and, as Twitter’s Deputy General Counsel, urged Twitter executives to censor The New York Post story about Hunter Biden. These existing or former IC employees, contractors, or intermediaries weren’t satisfied with simply controlling Twitter. They also wanted to use PayPal, Amazon Web Services, and GoDaddy in a totalizing effort to de-platform, de-monetize, and excommunicate from the Internet entirely those individuals that the IC et al. deems to be a threat. There is much that we still do not know about the effort. We do not know if officials within the CIA or any other IC organization ran the operation. It is possible that the only individuals involved in the effort were the ones we discovered. And none of the individuals involved responded to our request for information except for one. But thousands of pages of Twitter Files and documents contained therein paint a clear picture of an organized operation by existing or former IC employees and contractors, using well-established IC tradecraft, to take control of Twitter’s content moderation. Our investigation comes at a moment when governments and intelligence agencies around the world are stepping up their efforts to monitor and censor their citizens. It thus has large implications for policymakers and the public in Western nations that look to the US as a model for free speech and citizen control of the military. This is a joint Public-Racket investigation. The authors are @Shellenberger @MTaibbi and @GalexyBrane. As always, the only condition we agreed to in publishing this was to first publish on X. At the end of this thread, we explain why and how this investigation began. Here we go...

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

@elonmusk DHS used think tanks tied to the Intelligence Community for mass censorship. Its Cyber Threat Intelligence League created a handbook based on US military operations abroad. Then, Stanford's "Election Integrity Partnership" & "The Virality Project" did election & Covid censorship

Video Transcript AI Summary
Renee DiResta of the Stanford Internet Observatory gave a presentation at the Cybersecurity Summit about the "power of partnerships" in combating "mis and disinformation." She highlighted the collaboration between CISA, Stanford, University of Washington, Graphica, and the Atlantic Council's DFR Lab. DiResta discussed the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP), which aimed to identify and respond to mis/disinformation targeting the 2020 election. The EIP involved students, government, and civil society organizations to flag concerns, analyze data, and track narratives. Social media platforms acted on 75% of flagged "tickets." Following the election, SIO launched the Virality Project to combat COVID-19 vaccine misinformation, partnering with federal, state, and local stakeholders. DiResta emphasized the need for a "center of excellence" within the federal government to coordinate efforts, prebunk narratives, and promote "resilience products." She argued for narrowly focused interventions on matters of national security, such as delegitimizing institutions. DiResta advocated for multi-stakeholder partnerships to facilitate communication and enable situational awareness while respecting civil liberties.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Somebody who appears to be a marginal player in the censorship industrial complex displaying her intellectual leadership and her institutional leadership and really envisioning this complex coming to be. This is Renee D'Resta's Mona Lisa. This is her this is her this is her finest hour. This is, this is this is the most powerful that she's ever been, and let's hope ever will be. This is a video that she gave. This is a video that Renee DiResta gives at the end of the 4th annual Cybersecurity Summit that's put on by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which is a part of the Department of Homeland Security. It was ostensibly around just physical infrastructure, including election infrastructure. And then as the head of the Department of Homeland Security under Obama was leaving in January 2017, they expanded its mission. They grew the mission so that it would then cover, the media coverage of elections. And so suddenly, its mandate significantly increased, and so that became the initial justification for basically this so called war on disinformation by this government agency working with proxies to do its dirty censorship business. And so what this is about, this video is about creating a social norm that this is okay to do. That this is something that should be done. The US government agency should be working with Stanford University, which is where Renee DiResta works, University of Washington, Graphica, which is a think a research organization, and the DFR Lab, which is the disinformation forensics lab at the Atlantic Council, which is a big powerful think tank in both the United States and Europe. Sorry. Let's take a look. Let's get into it. So you can see Renee Diresta, technical research manager, Stanford Internet Observatory. This is for the CSIS Cybersecurity Summit. Speaker 1: Hi. My name is Renee DiResta, and I'm the research manager at Stanford Internet Observatory. Today, to kick off this session, I'm gonna be talking about the power of partnerships. Speaker 0: Now I wanna stop with that. That's so this is about the power of partnerships. What she's referring to is the censorship industrial complex. That's what partnerships are. The partnership in this case is between the Department of Homeland Security Organization, CISA, the Cybersecurity Infrastructure, Security, Agency, and these particularly these four groups. Stanford University of Washington, Atlantic Council's Disinformation Forensics Lab, and Graphica, which is a research organization, supposedly research organization. Those 4 groups are basically being subcontracted out by the US Department of Homeland Security to demand more censorship by social media platforms. That's what she's describing here, and I view this video as a way to sort of normalize this process of government censorship of social media platforms. There's an argument that's that's occurring right now where people say this is totally fine. Governments have a right to tell the platforms that they have an opinion about what they should have on the platforms. And while that's technically true, when you have politicians, including the president of the United States, simultaneously threatening to take away their license to operate in the form of section 230, when Congress is actively, considering taking away section 230. And it's all happening behind closed doors, secretly, between these four groups and the social media platform executives. It's a secretive censorship process, and it has to be understood as that. This is not happening on the open. I think the videos, which, of course, nobody sees, nobody knows of, they don't publicize, they get creative to sort of say, hey. Yeah. We were we were transparent about it, even though everything that they're describing in here that they were doing to pressure the social media platforms to censor more, was done secretly behind the scenes without any public transparency or visibility into what they were doing. So, again, it's the power of partnerships. Think of that as the power of the government to violate the First Amendment and censor private corporations without anybody knowing by using proxies, including organizations that are funded by the Department of Homeland Security, National Science Foundation, the Defense Department, and or other agencies. Speaker 1: So our team at SIO and SIS's team have done some pioneering work in partnership thinking about how to respond to mis and disinformation in areas in which you can have significant harm. Speaker 0: And just keep in mind, SIO is Stanford Internet Observatory. That's where their organization is based. I think it's also important to point out this point that Renee DiResta finally was forced to admit that she had been a CIA fellow, and that was something that she had not publicly disclosed in any event. And it came out it was discovered by Mike Benz going through many, many YouTubes where it sort of slipped out in some introduction that he made of her at Stanford a few years ago, but she was finally forced to admit that she has had the CIA tie for almost 2 decades. Speaker 1: One of those areas is elections, and I'm gonna talk about some learnings from work that we did on that topic today. So in August 2020, students from the Stanford Internet Observatory were doing an internship with CISA, and they identified a massive gap in the capability of federal, state, and local governments to become aware of, to analyze, and to rapidly respond to mis and disinformation, both foreign and domestic, targeting the 2020 election. Speaker 0: So this is a I have to say, I don't believe this story that she's telling. So she's saying that these students at Stanford themselves just were like, hey, there's this missing role for some institution that should be involved in basically demanding social media censorship of information that we call disinformation or misinformation. I'm highly skeptical of that. It sounds like it came right from Renee Di Resto or one of her colleagues, but that they're sort of putting on the students to make it sound like it wasn't part of some broader plan, which I believe has been going on here to increase government censorship of social media platforms. So I'm skeptical of that claim that she just made. Speaker 1: Now that gap had several components. The federal government wasn't prepared to identify and analyze election mis and disinfo. Speaker 0: So the first thing she says is why do we need it? Because the government wasn't prepared to do it. They just didn't have the staff or the capability to do it. Okay? That's the first thing she says. And of course, those that believe in free speech are like, that's a good thing. The government has no capability to put pressure on social media platforms to censor Americans for their speech. Speaker 1: There was no clear federal lead to coordinate the work. Speaker 0: So there's no clear federal lead. There wasn't somebody in government that you could call up and say, hey, we need to demand that Facebook take this post down. Speaker 1: Because the IC, of course, is rightly limited to a foreign focus, and the FBI also has very specific designations limitations. Speaker 0: So she's used a bit of jargon there. So, you know, IC, of course, is the is the intelligence community. And I think showing this is a video for a specialized audience, but she's saying, you know, the intelligence community is focused on foreign threats as it should be because the creators of our country did not want our police spying on us for the things that we said. That would be a violation of the first amendment. So she says, the intelligence community doesn't do it. And then she kinda goes, the FBI also really doesn't do it either. It's like, well, yeah. However, of course, as we've also discovered in the Twitter files, there was this thing called the Foreign Influence Task Force that the FBI was part of that was involved in surveilling and monitoring and demanding the censorship of disfavored speech. Speaker 1: CISA had created support, but had no real capability. There were unclear legal authorities, including very real first amendment questions. Speaker 0: Oh, so there it is. There it is. There's sort of the key to the whole thing. Of course, there were some, I mean, there were some free speech questions, like, how would you actually get away with having the government empower, private organizations like Stanford to demand censorship by social media companies. So, yeah, there were some real concerns there. To be she wants to seem like she's taking these First Amendment concerns seriously by just mentioning it. But as you realize when you watch this, she suggests nothing to protect against violation of the First Amendment. The whole enterprise is a violation of the first amendment and so just sort of talking about it is supposed to kind of reassure you. You have to think that some of the audience for this are the elected officials, other people in government, the people at Department of Homeland Security who might be like, hey, isn't this gonna violate the First Amendment? And her being like, well, of course, we're taking that totally seriously as we develop our partnerships even though the partnership itself is the violation of the First Amendment. Speaker 1: There is no expertise resident within the federal government to analyze public content across platforms to identify trends and risks. There's a lack of reporting mechanisms for state and local partners to service activity that they saw building in their communities to help them understand it. Speaker 0: In other words, there was nobody in government at the federal or the local level who was already spying on Americans for what they were saying on social media platforms. That's what she's saying. There wasn't somebody that was out there spying on all the social media platforms at the same time to see what they were saying. There was no government surveillance of speech in the United States, and we realized that was a real gap. Like, that's what she's saying here. I mean, I just think it's kind of shocking when you really appreciate and she's doing it in this particular thing that you get out of a lot when people are often delivering super controversial hot things in politics, whatever. Just kind of kind of making it sound super normal. And we just some students just identified a gap and that there's no surveillance of Americans for what they're saying and no concerted effort to censor them. And we realized that that was a gap. It's like a gap. That's like the benefit of living in a free country, a free free society. Speaker 1: The federal government was building relationships with tech platforms, but there's a healthy distrust both ways for a good reason. So a trusted, nonpartisan partnership with expertise in the way that misinformation moved on public platforms, with analysts capable of understanding public conversations and a broad ability to explore publicly available data was needed. Speaker 0: She just described the censorship industrial complex. That is the censorship industrial complex. She's saying we need organizations that are that are supposedly nonpartisan objective, ex full of experts who can evaluate what people are saying on different social media platforms, involve the government, and then demand censorship. That's what she's saying here. One of their responses to our reporting on them is to say that, hey. We weren't doing any censorship. We were just doing research. But the research was all in service of demanding the censorship by the social media platforms of these disfavored voices and disfavored posts relating to disfavored narratives, like, namely vaccine hesitancy or election skepticism. Speaker 1: So in response, SIO began to envision infrastructure capable of real time observation and reporting on election related misinformation. Speaker 0: SIO is the Stanford Internet Observatory. So what she's saying is, so SIO started to envision this way to report in real time on what people are saying in social media platforms so that we can censor them. That's what she's saying right here, right now. And she's doing it in a way that I think is very sophisticated. It's designed to make you comfortable with this kind of surveillance of political speech in the United States. Speaker 1: Targeted at disenfranchising voters and eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of our elections. Speaker 0: So she wants to choose 2 things that she thinks they can actually legally justify. Now remember, it's important to remember the supreme court really protects a a broad amount of free speech. Really everything except for, you know, lying to commit fraud and immediate incitement of violence. Like, for example, some of the violence that we saw against Riley Gaines in San Francisco, where people are saying, hurt that person, beat up that person, and the person is right there. To expand it to then say, well, we're gonna go after speech that raises questions about the legitimacy of institutions or elections. You've already gone way beyond what the First Amendment, that First Amendment allows that you've gone way beyond what the Supreme Court is willing to constrain and and prohibit under the constitution. Speaker 1: We facilitated the formation of a highly impactful coalition Here you can see the combined skills of 4 leading research institutions, underpinned by the enthusiastic support of trained students researchers. And this became the Election Integrity Partnership, which interfaced with election officials, civil society orgs, platforms, and the public to share data driven analysis and real time observations around voting related misinformation circulating during the 2020 election. We had narrowly tailored scope Speaker 0: Here, she says very clear. She says, this is a very narrow scope. She wants to emphasize that. This is very we're only gonna censor, you know, legitimate free speech very narrowly. Speaker 1: Focused on false and misleading narratives specific to voting. And the project was built with the intent to plug the gaps for the 2020 election, but it became something else as well. A first prototype of a nonpartisan model for collaborative, multi stakeholder analysis of mis and disinformation. Speaker 0: In other words, it became the first attempt, the first big project of the censorship industrial complex. And so they wanted to choose something that they felt was the least controversial, which would be censoring information, censoring false information about where people could go to be elected. I mean, the or to to vote, I should say. And censoring information as we saw about absentee ballots. And, you you know, you sort of go, well, that's it's kinda you well, that seems okay. I mean, you don't want to have lies on these social media platforms about when the voting day is. But then it suddenly became, well, it's not safe to do vote by mail. Well, if you say it's not safe or it's not reliable, it's not getting into the realm of opinion, maybe that's your opinion that there's some risk that if the mailman takes your vote rather than you drop it off at the voting place, that it is less safe. So you you you see how quickly it's not a slippery slope. It's more like this thing that you might get everybody in the society to agree is legitimate to, put some pressure on the social media companies to to censor, very then quickly kinda goes, well, then we should also censor this idea that mail in balloting is not safe. So it's a very it's not a slippery slope. It's like an immediate, move in either direction. Speaker 1: The Election Integrity Partnership started in September 2020. We had stakeholder types who could surface instances of concern. Speaker 0: Stakeholder types. So government, civil society platforms, media. So so so these are the people that are gonna be demanding the censorship. Speaker 1: Civil society and government flagged things that were emerging in their communities. Speaker 0: So they're spying on their neighbors. Speaker 1: Our own analysts did proactive detection as well. Speaker 0: We also spied on people. Speaker 1: We created tickets and an NKQ to track the evolution of incidents over time to see if false or misleading claims were gaining in reach or velocity. Speaker 0: That's the key here. So it's important to understand that these guys are really not out to censor every last thing. They don't need total control over the over the discourse, over the communications environment. They're looking specifically to stop things that go viral. They're looking to stop stuff that reaches a lot of people. So that's her emphasis. That's what Renee is constantly emphasizing here. And in fact, it's such a main focus that the next version of this partnership is called the Virality Project, and it's specifically focused on stopping viral narratives that result in vaccine hesitancy. Speaker 1: There were multiple tiers of analysis ensuring that any particular incident or piece of content had several pairs of eyes on it. And as analysis went on, we closed the loop with the reporting stakeholder to help ensure that they understood the dynamics of whatever had inspired their concern. Now sometimes these false and misleading narratives went nowhere. People are wrong on the internet regularly, and it's not a cause for concern. Speaker 0: We don't worry about it when people when it doesn't go viral. Speaker 1: But other times, however, things that are false or misleading do begin to go wildly viral, and local election officials and platform integrity teams alike needed a way to distinguish between the two to help them determine their response. Some of you may recall the dynamics of what came to be known as Sharpiegate, in which voters in Maricopa County, Arizona became deeply concerned about the pens they were given to mark their ballots. This situation progressed from what we call sense making, just communities of people trying to figure out what happened, to deep concern, to a conspiracy theory that supporters of president Trump specifically were being targeted. And these concerns later evolved into in person protest. This became something of a pattern in our analysis observations. A first person photo or video documented a purported incident. Social media discussion elevated it to a narrative. And then at times, that progressed into a conspiracy theory. So we analyzed incidents and narratives both qualitatively, ascertaining the concern and ensuring that local officials who were attempting to respond understood the specifics. And we also assessed them quantitatively, looking at specific tweets and posts that precipitated massive virality and the widespread dissemination of false and misleading narratives. We looked at network dynamics across the full political spectrum, at clusters of accounts that amplified messages, again because of genuine concern, but then also at what we called repeat spreaders, which were lynchpin accounts that regularly featured prominently in spreading demonstrably false or misleading claims. Speaker 0: They literally call these folks super spreaders. It's amazing how much of the it's and what a what a funny coincidence is all being around later about the pandemic. But yeah. So these are the super spreaders of misinformation, which of course they now label people like me and other political opponents. Just people that you disagree with, they suddenly become super spreaders of misinformation. Then you get them on blacklist of the social media companies, and voila. You've censored a whole group of people in your society, often without them knowing it. Speaker 1: We assessed not only social media across all of these dynamics, but the interplay with media as well, recognizing the significant impact that kind of mid tier classes of transmitters, influencers, and hyper partisan media had on shaping the public discourse. Speaker 0: This is really important to understand how they think about it. In other words, they're not just worried about getting censorship on social media platforms, they're also worried about controlling the media narrative, the broader news media narrative. So when you read Jacob Siegel's piece in tablet, that's what he's also talking about. He's saying the word censorship and the word propaganda aren't even enough to capture this complexity of just trying to control the entire information environment in a holistic way. So they're concerned about stuff going from the social media platforms into the news media. And indeed, we saw that. So when these guys, the same folks, tried to stop the store the accurate story of Hunter Biden's laptop from spreading, they basically labeled it a not exactly a conspiracy theory, but Russian disinformation, which itself was, of course, disinformation. And then they wanted to they knew that the laptop story would get out. They just wanted to shape how it was interpreted by the national news media. And that's what they did. And so that people thought, oh, the Honduran laptop sounds like Russian disinformation. It's probably not true. Of course, it was true. It wasn't Russian disinformation, but they were able to use, basically, what happened online as a reason to basically misdescribe a factual story as a potentially inaccurate one. Speaker 1: We saw top down dynamics that came from media reporting a story and the public discussing it, but also increasingly things that came from the bottom up like Sharpiegate in which concerned members of the public would precipitate the narrative and it would ultimately be covered by these other types of participants leading to mass public awareness. Speaker 0: You have to wonder, this was made in 2020 one. You have to wonder if they could have gotten if if like a national US government organization could have gotten away with putting the name of the president as a spreader of misinformation in one of its graphics a year earlier. I suspect not. Speaker 1: Often before the claim had time to be fact checked or assessed in any way. Speaker 0: It's also worth pointing out that Renee herself, you know, she she worked for the Democrats. She worked for the Democrats for the Senate Intelligence Committee. She gave the lead testimony. There's a very famous picture of her with Hillary Clinton. She's somebody who's been a Democratic party activist since since she lived in the Bay Area and really remains that today at Sanford. Speaker 1: And while, unfortunately, the vast majority of voting related misinformation in the 2020 election was domestic, our team evaluated foreign activity as well, finding participation from Russia, Iran, and China in some unique and distinct ways. Speaker 0: Of course, what's going on here is you see both with Peace Data, Proud Boys, these are these are both ostensibly real organizations. We now know that Proud Boys had a huge number of FBI infiltrators in it. We also know that people we think that, Peace Data also had a number of of real people following it and involved with it. So you're starting to get to a space of potentially, you know, being able to discredit and censor people that were actually involved in real politics, by by sort of smearing them as foreign disinformation. Speaker 1: One of the key determinants in what goes viral across any topic is the policies that social media companies set. And so we additionally prioritized not only understanding and evaluating, but also constructively critiquing platform policies. Speaker 0: So now they're saying we're gonna try to get in there and change the social the social media platform's policies. So now you have the US governments, you know, working with and funding, unaccountable private sector organizations to basically create new forms of censorship directly through the policies of these social media companies. Speaker 1: At the start of EIP, not all platforms that we analyzed had election related policies. As we published our analyses publicly, most of those that did not added such policies. Speaker 0: In other words, we got them to change their policies. That's kind of amazing. I mean, the ambition here and the success of it is pretty impressive when you consider it. They they actually did these things. They actually did this. They actually engaged in the censorship and got policies changed at the platforms. Speaker 1: Those that already had them often made them more comprehensive. We saw a real evolution over time. Several platforms, for example, implemented a repeat spreader strike system after the election and then have since applied it to other areas of misinformation that causes significant harm. Speaker 0: So in other words, they tagged they put people on blacklists, and then they kept they kept adding, you know, they, flags or new new blacklists that they were on for other issues. So you're basically there's secret blacklists that that these US government partnered organizations created. Speaker 1: The Election Integrity Partnership ended data collection on November 19, 2020. And during that time, the partnership processed 639 tickets on election related mis and disinformation. Speaker 0: Now what are those tickets? These tickets are new I think most people hear them and they go, oh, a that's got a single post. It's not. It can contain thousands of tweets and Facebook posts in a single ticket. They can be the ticket is, like, gonna take can can involve thousands of people. These are huge amounts. These tickets themselves are often connected to broader narratives that they're looking to censor. Speaker 1: Of which 72% were related to delegitimizing the election results. Tech platform partners, Twitter, Google, Facebook, and TikTok responded directly to 75% or more of tickets in which they were tagged. Speaker 0: So they got the social media companies to to basically act on 75% of the tickets, which is pretty amazing. It's a very high level of responsiveness. Speaker 1: A testament to both the high quality of reporting and the value of constructive relationships with the platforms. Speaker 0: I mean, that's the creepy part of it. They kinda go, oh, it's a testament to the fact that we kinda got all cozy with them. You have to remember, you know, that ordinary people, including myself, when I was censored by we had no way of appealing. I try I even knew people at the company and tried to reach out to them. That's the main way that people try to deal with this. There's no there's like a star chamber. There's a completely undemocratic process of being censored, and there's no appeals. But what they were doing behind the scenes because of their cozy little partnerships, they were able to get action on 75% of the things that they flagged. Speaker 1: And although EIP did not make specific enforcement recommendations because those are the platforms to determine in accordance with its policies Speaker 0: That's her way of saying we were not censoring. We did not actually do the censorship or say specifically what they should do. They would walk right up to it. You'd be like, this person is spreading false information that's hurting people in the real world. You you decide what to do, but we're saying, jeez. What are you doing here? And then the pressure was put on by the politicians, from senators, members of congress, people in the White House, all basically working in concert as a single censorship industrial complex. Speaker 1: 35% of the URLs flagged were actioned under remove, reduce, or inform policies. Speaker 0: So 30 1 third of all the URL of all the web links, of all the URLs, the social media companies took action on them to reduce their spread. In the case of Google, it would be to not be picked up in the searches, to not go viral on Twitter or Facebook. I mean, that's amazing and shocking and disturbing. She's saying it worked. The the the the 1 third of all the things that we wanted of all 1 third of all the URLs we wanted censored were censored by the social media platforms. Speaker 1: Again, helping contextualize for the public the content that they were seeing. Speaker 0: That sounds very innocent. We were and some of them, it was just putting little labels on it to contextualize the context. Well or to contextualize the you know, to provide some context for it. Well, we saw that this was actually used to discredit accurate information. This was used to discredit Marshall, Martin Kildorf at Harvard University for saying that kids do not necessarily need to be vaccinated. They put a flag on that. She's saying, provided more context. Actually, it can also provide mis and disinformation from the government. That's part of what's going on. Speaker 1: Following the success of EIP and the certification of the 2020 election, SIO ramped down its monitoring and analysis capability because we thought that we were done with that work. Speaker 0: Oh, we thought we were all done. Sure. Sure. He did. Speaker 1: However, almost immediately, we recognized the need to ramp back up Oh. This time to support government health officials' efforts to combat misinformation targeting the COVID 19 vaccines. Speaker 0: We didn't wanna keep going and keep censoring them. Like, we thought we were done, and then it just became clear we were gonna have to do it on COVID vaccines. It just became our obligation. Speaker 1: In February 2021, we formally established the Virality Project, drawing on the same partners from EIP and adding a few more. Speaker 0: So 2 months later, we started up again. Speaker 1: And much like EIP, it focused on real time observation, analysis, and understanding of cross platform vaccine related misinformation. Over spring and summer 2021, VP partnered with federal, state, and local stakeholders as well as civil society organizations and coalitions of medical professionals to support their efforts to understand and counter vaccine hesitancy. Again, we set a very narrowly tailored scope focused on harms for this project as well. Speaker 0: That's very important. So, again, she says it's very narrowly focused. She wants to know, look. We're not gonna abuse this extraordinary power to censor that we have. We're gonna just censor very narrowly. And then she also says, to prevent harm. This is very important because, of course, that is the predicate for censorship that the Supreme Court has allowed some rule some room for, both in the case of fraud and in the case of incitement to violence. You can't engage in speech that is very closely tied to some harm. You can lie to the your lover. You can lie if you're a politician. You can lie about what you think you're gonna do, but you can't lie in a way that that cheats somebody out of their money. Similarly, you can say all sorts of terrible racist, prejudiced things, but you can't do it in a way that would then actually cause a mob to kill somebody or hurt somebody. The courts have been pretty clear about that. So she's already saying we gotta focus on harm. I think the other issue about the harm thing is that we know that that's the number one value for progressives. And this audience is mostly for Democrats. It's for, you know, people that hate Trump. It's for the anti disinformation crowd. And for those folks, these are the, you know, you know, liberals and progressives who see the highest causes preventing harm, not, for example, free speech. Harm trumps free speech, I think that's why it has that focus here too for her. Speaker 1: We looked at 4 core categories of claims related to vaccines that actually dated back to the era of concerns about smallpox inoculation, safety, efficacy, and necessity, distribution, and then the evolution of some of these things into conspiracy theories. We began to observe that same progression, incidents, narratives, conspiracy theories, and a real attempt by the public to make sense of what they were seeing. Speaker 0: I I think she's another trend we've seen is the abuse of this conspiracy theory stuff. They were censoring people complain about real vaccine side effects to then go and suggest that all those people, and she's not necessarily, she's just consistently emphasizing the conspiracy theory part of it, you start to conflate people raising genuine concerns about vaccine side effects with with the microchips being implanted in your arms type people or the or that it was all planned or whatever. So I do think that the conspiracy theory is one way that we've seen them really abuse their powers by overly labeling people that are raising genuine issues as conspiracies. Very similar to the way in which legitimate questions about COVID origin start to be conflated with with China creating a bioweapon on purpose. Exactly. Speaker 1: Once again, our focus was on enabling situational awareness for a new set of outside partners, particularly civil society and health organizations that had very few other options for understanding the social media conversation. Speaker 0: That means we're trying to expand the surveillance technologies of America's free speech online, expand those surveillance technologies to other government agencies. That's a very important trend we've seen here. They don't wanna just keep it all for themselves. They want a whole bunch of government agencies spying. So there's a lot of spying going on. Speaker 1: One was the team behind the hashtag this is our shot. A collection of doctors and health care workers who really wanted to reach the public as trusted figures to show themselves receiving their vaccines. They wanted to know what narratives they, as doctors, could help counter, what misinformation they could help correct. But to do that, they needed to understand what was really trending or surfacing versus something that one of them might happen to see on social media. So once again, we worked with government stakeholders not only in facilitating that situational awareness and that that understanding of dynamics, but also in thinking about what role government should play here. How could we constructively define misinformation, particularly in an environment like COVID with rapidly evolving scientific consensus? Speaker 0: What gover what role government should play here? So you've already assumed the government should play a role. Why is government suddenly why do you assume that government should play a role at all? I mean, maybe it should. You just have a first amendment you need to worry about. She hasn't established at all that the government is the best is would be best to do this. Why not just allow a free open discussion in the society like we have for 250 years? Why does the government have to be involved in surveilling people's speech online? And why would the government be involved in demanding that social media companies censor it? That's not a particularly American attitude. She hasn't really made the case for it at all. She's just assuming that it needs to be done. Speaker 1: How could we prioritize the preservation of freedom of expression while minimizing the most harmful rumors and conspiracy theories, which were impacting not only individuals but public health and communities as well. Speaker 0: Again harm. Speaker 1: The problem that confronts us in terms of harmful mis and disinformation is structural. The information infrastructure has changed, and we as a society are adapting. We are never going to live in a world free of mis and disinformation. Such a world has never existed. And the government is not going to snap its fingers and regulate the problem away because misinformation is ultimately speech. And so while there are plenty of conversations now happening about regulation, most have not yet arrived at a solution space that protects civil liberties while reducing harms. Speaker 0: Because there isn't one. Speaker 1: And yet, that said, the current situation is also untenable. Speaker 0: The decision just asserts it. We can't have all this misinformation out there. It's obviously obviously we have to do something about it. Speaker 1: So we need something in the short term to help create situational awareness for those equipped to counterspeak, equipped to correct false and misleading claims, to help ensure that the public has access to reliable, accurately contextualized information and not only from official government sources. And we believe that the power of partnerships holds the key. So here are some learnings from our first two attempts at creating this potential solution. It's labor intensive work. It requires a division of responsibilities. But I want to flag one thing in particular, and that's the 5th bullet point. Between EIP and VP, we bolstered and expanded our partnerships. We built new technology. We brought on more collaborators. But the Speaker 0: She's just describing the creation of a censorship industrial complex. I mean, this should send chills down all of your spines. She's talking about all these organizations, all these individual people. All the people have to be involved in this. You need new relationships between government. We have to get a bunch of people involved in it. I mean, it's crazy. It's crazy. And she's suggesting that this this kind of positive, you know, beat of energy, we're building this kind of momentum and fighting this enemy of disinformation. She's talking about censoring her fellow Americans. This is just profoundly messed up. Speaker 1: Government partnerships were not quite there. There was no one obviously in charge. An entity called EI Ice. Speaker 0: There's nobody obviously in charge. I mean, just sit with that for a minute. There's nobody obviously in charge of taking control of the censorship of disinformation. Yeah. That's right. There's nobody in charge of censoring. There's there should be nobody in charge. That's, like, kind of, you know she's describing democracy and freedom of speech as a problem Speaker 1: An entity called EI ISAC had been profoundly impactful during the election, the Election Integrity ISAC, serving as a single point of contact for state and local officials and the EIP. And there was no such parallel organization that existed for Virality Project. So there was a lot of effort spent trying to figure out who was in charge and who did what in any given state or locale as localized false and misleading claims related to vaccines popped up. This meant that when a crisis came that needed those partnerships, they weren't already in place. Civil society relationships are also critical to establish and advance, particularly because these groups have such unique power and impact as counterspeakers. They reach communities that they understand and are members of. So there are 2 potential recommendations I'd make to CISA today. Our joint objective is to mitigate the impact of harmful misinformation, particularly that which is aimed at weakening our national security through efforts aimed at delegitimizing our institutions, including democratic elections. Speaker 0: That is amazing. She just said we need to focus on stopping speech that delegitimizes institutions. You kinda go, well, okay. That seems fair. We wanna, you know, we don't wanna, like, have people out there overthrowing the government. But, I mean, you define it like that, that's, like, basically censoring anybody who says, we should, you know, we need a different president. We should, abolish the Department of Energy. The Pentagon or war mongers. The Pentagon or war mongers. You know, abolish the police. All of those things can be perceived as pretty easily and defined pretty easily as delegitimizing of institutions. So she wants to censor that. That's where the focus needs to be. The other creepy thing of what she just said is that it has to be national security. Our focus should be on national security. Okay. So we're gonna censor for national security, pandemic related vaccine hesitancy, and delegitimizing institutions. At that point, it's like, what's left? Like, what haven't you created a predicate to censor for at that point? Speaker 1: This type of partnership is not a fact checking endeavor to debunk misinformation more generally. Our work must always remain focused narrowly on matters of national security that explicitly undercut American institutions. Speaker 0: Well, that might include NATO. That might include the Pentagon. Speaker 1: For instance, for EIP, we focused on content intended to suppress voting, reduce participation, confuse voters as to the election process, or delegitimize election results without evidence. Speaker 0: Like in every case, you can think of an example of legitimate free speech. Like I might say like she says, suppress voting. Well, maybe I say, hey, there's no point in voting. You know? The system is rigged. You don't have a good candidate. Don't vote. Why can't I say that? Third party. That could be a disgrace Vote. Yeah. Vote third party. Don't vote for a Democrat or Republican. You know? Do a write in candidate. Oh, you've disrupted the you've just delegitimize institutions. Just wrote you wrote in Ronald McDonald. How dare you say that you should write in Ronald McDonald. I mean, this is this is insane. Speaker 1: And that targeted narrow scoping is critical to the success of a partnership. Speaker 0: So that's Orwellian. She just she just we just find this huge area that they can censor on, elections, pandemic, vaccines, delegitimize institutions, and then she goes, that narrow targeting, that's not narrow. That's, I mean, that's everything. Speaker 1: Creation of the center of excellence within the federal government, for example, could tie in a federal lead. Speaker 0: There it is. That's Renee de Resta surfacing as far as I know, the first time publicly, the creation of governance board, which the Department of Homeland Security, which this agency is a part of, ended up introducing in the spring of 2022. And it was everybody immediately saw it as a terrifying, un American, fascist, censorship, fucking bullshit, and they pushed back against it, and they destroyed it. And where does it come from? It comes from Renee de Resta in this little talk. Speaker 1: Platforms, academics, and nonprofits to stay ahead of these emerging narratives and trends. Speaker 0: To stay ahead of them. Now here we are in precrime. This is the pre bunking. So we can anticipate that there could be speech that we disagree with. And so we're gonna work together to prevent that speech from occurring. I mean, it's just gets you can see when you go down this path of of we actually have to censor speech we disagree with as opposed to just talking back to it, as opposed to just arguing with it, as opposed to just getting out there on the social media platforms, on the newspapers, writing your piece of it, recording your videos, arguing about it, whatever, having public debates. Instead, they're trying to create a censorship complex to surveil all of your fellow Americans, identify a huge amount of topics, and then demanding that the social media platforms censor them in creating tools, including artificial intelligence, to help with that censorship. It's in this sort of calming, turquoise blue, relaxing little video. You can see the entire sinister proposal to undermine our free speech, to undermine the first amendment, and somebody who appears to be a marginal player in the censorship industrial complex displaying her intellectual leadership and her institutional leadership in really envisioning this complex come into being. Speaker 1: Or as narratives emerge, the center of excellence could deploy experts to relevant federal agencies. Speaker 0: So this disinformation governance board, which she's calling a center for excellence, would then send out censors, you know, spies and censors to different government agencies to help them to work on the censorship. Speaker 1: To help prepare prebunking and messaging, to identify trusted voices and communities, and to build coalitions to respond. Speaker 0: So go find 3rd party allies to do the dirty work for you that you can't do as a government agent. Speaker 1: It could also create and promote ongoing resilience products and techniques geared towards the American public. Speaker 0: Resilience products means propaganda. That's all that means. We're gonna do propaganda to tell you that something is not a problem when it might be or when people have speech that we disagree with. We're gonna be out there just issuing propaganda. Speaker 1: Because education is really key to us not being perpetually reactive. Speaker 0: Constant propaganda is essential for us maintaining our legitimacy against our critics. Speaker 1: We can establish nongovernment capability to support research and analysis. Institutionalized capabilities, like EIP or VP, are needed on an ongoing basis outside of government. And this will also help identify emerging issues for possible prebunking and community or civil society coordination to deliver those messages to audiences that really trust what they have to say. Speaker 0: I mean, it's a holistic, you once could say, totalizing agenda. Look at that. I mean, she wants to get everybody on the same page. Civil society organizations, NGOs, government officials, multiple agencies. I mean, it's bonkers. It's just not it's not how we do free speech in America. Speaker 1: So in closing, we need multi stakeholder partnerships Speaker 0: To get around the first supposedly to get around the first amendment, but not actually Speaker 1: that facilitate effective communication Speaker 0: To spread propaganda. Speaker 1: To enable situational awareness Speaker 0: Through spying on your fellow Americans. Speaker 1: For government tech platforms and community leaders. Speaker 0: Through a totalizing whole of society information war. Speaker 1: While respecting civil liberties and prioritizing free expression. Speaker 0: Oh, without violating the First Amendment. Simple. Speaker 1: Simple. Right? So I look forward to the rest of the sessions in this important event focusing on the power of partnerships, and thank you so much for having me speak today. Speaker 0: No. We're not gonna do it, lady. We don't want it.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

@elonmusk A whistleblower last year provided us with a trove of documents proving that US and UK military & Intelligence employees and contractors adapted counter-terrorism tactics developed abroad, including censorship, debanking, and cross-platform bans.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

People say the government wasn't involved in censorship, but it was. And now, new documents prove that US military contractors urged & used a wide range of counter-terrorism tactics against civilians, including psyops, debanking, and changing Big Tech's Terms of Service.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

So forget "1984," "Black Mirror," "Brave New World," "Fahrenheit 451," "V for Vendetta," "Children of Men," and historical accounts of fascism and Communism. It's far more important to understand the real-world and present-day totalitarianism happening before our very eyes.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

Death, bankruptcy, and, apparently, totalitarianism happen gradually and then all at once. The totalitarians controlled Google and Meta for years. Zuckerberg effectively admitted it. Now they're desperate to control X

@JamesOKeefeIII - James O'Keefe

BREAKING: Senior Meta Engineer Reveals Anti-Kamala Posts Are "Automatically Demoted,” Admits Shadowbanning Tactics "Say your uncle in Ohio said something about Kamala Harris is unfit to be a president because she doesn't have a child, that kind of sh*t is automatically demoted,” reveals @Meta Senior Software Engineer, Jeevan Gyawali (@JGyawali), to an undercover @OKeefeMedia journalist during a hidden camera date. He confirmed, “The person would not be notified,” but would see a decline in their post engagement and impressions, explaining that Meta’s “Integrity Team” is responsible for controlling content through “civic classifiers,” a system that “shadowbans” posts without notifying users. Gyawali also revealed a specialized Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT) team that was created at Meta, stating, “There is a SWAT team that's already set up since April… just to think about all the scenarios of how the platform could be abused.” When asked if Meta is doing their due diligence to protect democracy from disinformation, Gyawali ensured “that’s all going to be demoted 100%.” When asked, “You guys [Meta] have the ability to influence the outcome of the election?” Gyawali confirmed, “Yes,” admitting Meta’s power to sway political outcomes. When asked if Mark Zuckerberg (@finkd), Co-Founder and CEO and Meta, supports Meta’s political influence and agenda to help the Democratic Party, Gyawali answered, “100%.” @MetaNewsroom @andymstone

Video Transcript AI Summary
A Meta software engineer, Jeevan Guali, revealed internal practices regarding misinformation on the platform. Meta uses "civic classifiers" to demote political content. Content critical of Kamala Harris is automatically demoted. Users are not notified when their posts are demoted or "red listed" for violating civic classifier rules, which the engineer confirmed is a form of shadow banning. Guali stated Meta has the ability to influence the 2024 election and that Mark Zuckerberg intends to help the Democrats. Meta has a "SWAT team" established since April to address platform manipulation scenarios. Hillary Clinton stated that if platforms don't moderate content, "we lose total control." James O'Keefe reached out to Jeevan for comment, but he hung up.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Say your uncle in, like, Ohio said something about, like, Kamala Harris is, on like, he didn't unfit to be a president because he doesn't have a child. Okay. That kind of shit is automatically devoted. Speaker 1: Meet Jeevan Gowalli, a senior software engineer at because I Speaker 0: can see these, like, right Speaker 1: wing groups, like, setting up Speaker 2: a face, Instagram accounts or Facebook Speaker 0: accounts for that Speaker 3: matter. Right? And just start posting this information to be like, oh, like, Harris Speaker 4: is like blah blah blah. Speaker 0: That's all gonna be demoted a 100%. The civic classifier is strong. Speaker 1: The senior software engineer also goes on to say that, quote, the person would not be notified, unquote, if they were demoted because of their auntie Kamala Harris post on Meta and red listed. That's a new term we just learned. Red listed, meaning according to Collins dictionary, things that are not permitted. Speaker 5: Would the person who would the Speaker 3: person who posted that be made would be Speaker 6: no would he be notified that The person would Speaker 0: not be notified, but there is these things that we what we collect is, like, if a bunch of items that like, if at least at least a couple of items that a person has created has violated civic classifier, then they're also red listed. Speaker 1: Our OMG American Swiper asked Jeevan if Meta was shadow banning users for their anti Kamala Harris posts. Take a look at what he says. Speaker 3: So is that called shadow banning? Shadow banning. Yeah. Okay. So they will be shadow banning. Speaker 0: Correct. Speaker 3: They will never be shown. So they will see a dip in, like, impressions and engagement Speaker 1: Yeah. Speaker 3: But they would not be, like, officially warned of the reason why. Speaker 1: We asked Gowali if Meta has the ability to affect the upcoming 2024 election to which he responded, yes. Meta does. Jeevan also confirmed that Mark Zuckerberg intends to help the Democrats in this election cycle. Speaker 3: You guys have the ability to influence the outcome of the election. Speaker 0: Yes. Speaker 3: Do you think Zuckerberg agrees? Yes. Good. Is he gonna help the Democrats? Yes. Speaker 1: Meet Jeevan Ghuali, a senior software engineer at Meta. Jeevan met our OMG undercover American Swiper on the dating app, Bumble. In the meeting he had with our journalist, Jeeva describes internal workings of how Meta is dealing with misinformation on their platform. Jeeva talks about Meta's civic classifiers, a system that Meta has built through their integrity team to demote civic content. In other words, political content. Speaker 3: I mean, they try to take women's rights away. I think Like, how do you guys, like, control that hate speech? Speaker 0: There is a team called integrity integrity team. Speaker 3: Okay. And Speaker 0: that's, like, a large portion of, like, super significant team, and they build all these classifiers. The basic the base level of defense system that Facebook has built now is they have built these things called civic classifiers. Civic classifier is a really large model that's been trained on civic content. Okay. So anything that it detects to be a civic content Yeah. Is, like, demoted. Civic classifier? Speaker 3: Okay. What does that mean? Speaker 0: That means that if anything is related to political content, it's automatically, like, not shown. Speaker 1: We wanted to dive deeper into Meta's demotion of civic content, whatever that means, on their platform. The senior Meta software engineer, Jeeva, states to our OMG American Swiper that they would, quote, automatically demote, unquote, a content that might be critical of Kamala Harris. Speaker 0: Unconnected stuff is not gonna show up in your feed. Like, ads, I think, can show up, and they probably have a whole different cost of vetting ads. Okay. But, like, unconnected content, like, say your uncle in, like, Ohio said something about, like, Kamala Harris is, on like, isn't unfit to be a president because he doesn't have a child. Okay. That kind of shit is automatically demoted. Speaker 1: Now if you remember back in 20 19, we did a story about a Facebook insider that showed us internal practices being played out at Facebook regarding what they called de boosting as well. What was previously considered a conspiracy theory now documented by this Facebook whistleblower that came out with us in 2019. Speaker 7: Every time I would see this d boost livestream kind of code on there. Speaker 1: And what does it mean when these documents say action deboost live distribution? What does the term deboost mean? Speaker 7: When I see reduce live distribution, it means preventing the distribution of this live feed. Speaker 1: And just 2 years after that, we got our hands on an insider tape that revealed Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg and a top executive were punishing truth seekers. Speaker 8: You know, I've been clear that we we have the number of efforts to find people and and and we terminate people and pursue, the the the recourse that we have when we when we identify them. And in this case, we did find them. Speaker 1: Now in 2024, Jeevan from Meta, previously Facebook, mentioning continued practices of demoting content just a few weeks before the presidential election. The senior software engineer also goes on to say that, quote, the person would not be notified, unquote, if they were demoted because of their anti Kamala Harris post on Meta and red listed. That's a new term we just learned. Red listed meaning according to Collins dictionary, things that are not permitted. Speaker 5: Would the person who would Speaker 3: the person who posted that be made would be no Speaker 6: would he be notified that Speaker 0: The person would not be notified, but there is this thing that we what we collect is, like, if a bunch of items that like, if at least a couple of items that a person has created has violated specific classifier, then they're also red listed. Speaker 1: Our OMG American Swiper asked Jeevan if Meta was shadow banning users for their anti Kamala Harris posts. Take a look at what he says. Speaker 3: So is that called shadow banning? It's shadow banning. Yeah. Okay. So they will be shadow banning. Speaker 0: Correct. Speaker 3: They will never be shown. So they will see a dip in, like, impression and engagement. Speaker 1: Yeah. Speaker 3: But they would not be, like, officially warned of the reason Speaker 1: why. Right. Jeevan Guali is asked how the company is going to avoid a repeat of 2016 misinformation, and then he discloses that there is a SWAT team that's, quote, already set up since April. Speaker 3: I'm afraid that it's gonna we're gonna see a repeat of 2016 in 2024. I hate to put Speaker 0: you on the spot, but I'm Speaker 3: gonna do it anyway. What are what is your company doing to prevent that from happening? Speaker 0: Well, it's Speaker 3: Like, how are you guys gonna fight that? Speaker 0: Well, I mean, there is a, like, a SWAT team that's already set up since, like, I think, April to just to, like, to, like, think about all the scenarios of how the of platform you've used. Speaker 1: The senior software engineer at Meta is asked about right wing Meta accounts posting misinformation about Kamala Harris, and he states that these posts are, quote, all going to be demoted a 100%. The civic classifier is strong, unquote. Speaker 2: Are they doing a good job protecting our democracy? Speaker 0: It's Speaker 3: because I can see these, like, right wing groups, like, setting up face Instagram accounts or Facebook accounts for that matter. Right? And just start posting this information and be like, oh, like, Harris Speaker 0: is like Speaker 4: blah blah blah. Speaker 0: That's all gonna be demoted a 100%. The civic classifier is strong. Speaker 1: Just last week, we saw former 2016 Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton state that if Meta doesn't moderate and monitor users' content, then, quote, we lose total control. Watch this. Speaker 9: But if the platforms, whether it's Facebook or TwitterX or, Instagram or TikTok, whatever they are, if they don't moderate, and monitor the content, we lose total control. And it's not just the social and psychological effects. It's real harm. Speaker 1: We asked Guali if Meta has the ability to affect the upcoming 2024 primary election to which he responded, yes. Meta does. Jeevan also confirmed that Mark Zuckerberg intends to help the Democrats in this election cycle. Speaker 3: You guys have the ability to influence the outcome of the election? Speaker 0: Yes. Do you Speaker 3: think Zuckerberg agrees? Yes. Good. Is he gonna help the Democrats? Yeah. Oh, so he's, like, gonna help the Democrats. Right? 100%. Speaker 1: So we just reached out to Jeevan for comment. My name is James O'Keefe, and and the girl works for me. And she recorded you. You're at Meta, and you're talking He said, oh, then he hung up the phone. So I guess the comment is, off And stay tuned because tomorrow, we have another Meta subject forthcoming. We have line in the sand movie.com, which redirects you to Tucker Carlson's website where you can stream Line in the Sand movie. We've got whistleblower coming out. We got the war patrol agent in Vermont who's being summoned and disciplined for speaking about child trafficking. We have his back. Citizen Journalism Foundation is defending him, paying his legal bills. And if you work on the inside of any federal agency, any tech company, Disney, you name it, tips at o'Keefemediagroup dot com. DM us. We got your back. Stay tuned. Well, here we go. The market has plunged again. The writing is on the wall. It's time to take action. The elites and big banks are pulling the strings, creating financial chaos to strip you of your wealth. Don't let them win. Call my friends at Bishop Gold Group right now. They'll help you shield your assets with gold and silver, the ultimate fortress against this financial tyranny. Act now before it's too late. Protect your future. Protect your freedom. Protect your retirement. I'll put the link and phone number in my

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

The reason the media are all running with the same "testy" framing in their headlines today is because they were programmed to do so. The Twitter Files revealed how think tanks like the US government-funded Aspen Institute control and program the media.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

30. Efforts continued to influence Twitter's Yoel Roth. In Sept 2020, Roth participated in an Aspen Institute “tabletop exercise” on a potential "Hack-and-Dump" operation relating to Hunter Biden The goal was to shape how the media covered it — and how social media carried it

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

The idea the Internet would guarantee our freedom was idiotic. The Internet is made up of machines and corporations that governments can control. Global totalitarianism wasn't possible before the Internet. Now that it is, governments are turning the nightmare into reality. /END

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

Watch @Paul_B_Coleman explain here how the global war on X, free speech, and @ElonMusk was years in the making and includes a UN effort to impose Islamic blasphemy laws on the West.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

People thought the Internet would make censorship impossible. It turns out to have made global totalitarianism possible. The global war on X, free speech, and @ElonMusk was years in the making. It even includes a UN effort to impose Islamic blasphemy laws on the West.

Video Transcript AI Summary
The EU aims to classify hate speech as an EU crime, making it enforceable continent-wide, similar to human trafficking and terrorism. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), representing 57 Islamic countries, significantly drives censorship by advocating for global blasphemy laws under the guise of combating religious hatred. The UN system, with its vast and well-funded bureaucracies, contributes to a censorship industrial complex. The WHO Pandemic Treaty initially sought to combat misinformation, disinformation, and "infodemics" defined as too much information. The UN Global Digital Compact, to be negotiated in September, aims to prohibit hate speech, discrimination, misinformation, and disinformation. The European Court of Human Rights has been undermining free speech protections, exemplified by a 2012 judgment stating that racist and extremist opinions cause more harm than restrictions on freedom of expression. The court argued that it's unnecessary to wait until hate speech becomes a real and imminent danger to democratic society, advocating for early intervention.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: What the EU is trying to do is make hate speech an EU crime. And what that means is it is enforceable across the entire continent. So these list of crimes, these are for things like, human trafficking. These are crimes like terrorism. These are the most serious crimes, and there's only a half dozen of them within the treaties of the European Union that are considered EU crimes. And they wanna put hate speech in that context, which means if you were to be charged with hate speech in one European country because of a very vaguely worded law in that in that particular context, and there are a lot of vaguely worded hate speech laws across Europe, then that could be enforced across the entire context. One unique aspect of censorship throughout the United Nations system is the impact of the, OIC, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. It's something that we probably won't talk about too much here, but it's a major driver of censorship as they seek to essentially create within the western context global blasphemy laws. And they do this under the guise of religious hatred, and they're constantly pushing this forward. And so while we're dealing with censorship, like what we just talked about, which seems like it's coming from a lot of Western left wing politics, at a global level, there's another huge driver of censorship through 57 Islamic countries who are constantly pushing for what is essentially a blasphemy for the West. I think for the average person on the street in London and wherever, they they really have no conception of just how enormous the bureaucracies of these international institutions are. And this is the the UN. This isn't even everything. But to give you an idea, in the last, 5 years due to COVID, the WHO became very prominent in everyone's minds. Everyone started talking about the WHO. But the WHO within the United Nations system is just this tiny little line item here. That's it. And you have all of this that we often don't hear about. And every line item on the screen has a budget ranging from the tens of 1,000,000 to the 1,000,000,000. And so this is just a huge, complex system that on a daily basis is churning out reports and studies through its committees and commissions, and just churning out a lot of documentation driving largely, although they do lots of other things, towards the censorship industrial complex that we're talking about. Many of us familiar with the WHO Pandemic Treaty finish with a good news story at the end. But the first draft of this treaty sought to combat false misleading or misinformation, disinformation. The first draft of the treaty also, talked about infodemics, which it described as too much information. And this was a problem that people would have too much information. And then one coming this fall, the first draft was just released. It's already got its second draft, the UN Global Digital Compact. This is going to be negotiated in September. And it's currently going through iterations of drafting right now, but seeking to prohibit all forms of hate speech and discrimination, mis and disinformation inside the building. So the European Court has been undermining those free speech protections over the last 10 or 15 years. I'll give you an example from a judgment in 2012. So going back a while now, I'm going to read the whole thing in full. Our tragic experience this is 2 judges of the European Court of Human Rights. Our tragic experience in the last century demonstrates that racist and extremist opinions can bring much more harm than restrictions on freedom of expression. Statistics on hate crime show that hate propaganda always inflicts harm, be it immediate or potential. I don't know what that means exactly. It is not necessary to wait until hate speech becomes a real and imminent danger for democratic society. So, So, you know, we gotta we gotta strike early before anything else happens. And this is the mindset of the people who are responsible for protecting our freedom of speech.

@shellenberger - Michael Shellenberger

This just in: after years of warning of AI deep fakes threatening democracy and thus necessitating censorship, the US government is now saying it will be using them for intelligence gathering. Left unsaid is that it may also use them for disinformation:

@samfbiddle - Sam Biddle

NEW: U.S. Special Operations Command is seeking the ability to create AI-generated social media users that "Appear to be a unique individual that is recognizable as human but does not exist in the real world" for intelligence-gathering purposes https://theintercept.com/2024/10/17/pentagon-ai-deepfake-internet-users/

The Pentagon Wants to Use AI to Create Deepfake Internet Users The Department of Defense wants technology so it can fabricate online personas that are indistinguishable from real people. theintercept.com
Saved - August 9, 2025 at 3:13 PM

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

This is the beginning of a thread that may take me a while to finish. If you’re still thinking the corruption in our government--or our voting systems--is a Left or Right issue you are mistaken. The more you dig, the more you realize cheating has been rampant in the #Uniparty for decades. Let’s take a little history lesson…

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

Most of you are probably not old enough to remember, but in 2000, George W. Bush was elected President in a remarkably close race, decided ultimately by the Supreme Court following a major controversy over "hanging chads" on punched paper ballots by Sequoia voting systems--later bought by Smartmatic.

Video Transcript AI Summary
Now now the reason that most of us vote on electronic machines at all has to do with the two thousand election. Very basically, the two thousand election came down to just over a thousand votes in Florida, which triggered a recount, which turned out to be an absolute nightmare because unfortunately, many key Florida precincts used punch card ballots. And a major issue with punch card ballots was the fact that on some of them, little bits of paper or chads might not have punched all the way through, leading to images like this and nonstop news coverage like this. Gore's hopes hang by a Chad. Dimpled Chads. Dangling Chads. Hanging Chads. Indented Chads. Lone Chads. Another claim, Chad buildup. A pregnant Chad. The race comes down to the Chads.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Now now the reason that most of us vote on electronic machines at all has to do with the two thousand election. Very basically, the two thousand election came down to just over a thousand votes in Florida, which triggered a recount, which turned out to be an absolute nightmare because unfortunately, many key Florida precincts used punch card ballots. And a major issue with punch card ballots was the fact that on some of them, little bits of paper or chads might not have punched all the way through, leading to images like this and nonstop news coverage like this. Gore's hopes hang by a Chad. Dimpled Chads. Dangling Chads. Hanging Chads. Indented Chads. Lone Chads. Another claim, Chad buildup. A pregnant Chad. The race comes down to the Chads.

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

In reality, the entire hanging chad fiasco was deliberate and had two purposes: 1. pave way for computerized machines; 2. distract from a much larger problem of a 16,000 vote "glitch" in Volusia County Florida which won Florida for Bush when the Supreme Court stopped the recount.

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

In 2004, Democrats claimed Bush stole Ohio by computerized vote shaving and vote flipping. Sound familiar? Congress had a hearing. The man who wrote the code revealed how it was done in Volusia County FL in 2000 and was likely done in Ohio 2004. https://t.co/m2lkvnH3tK

Video Transcript AI Summary
Clinton Eugene Curtis testified that programs exist to secretly fix elections. In October 2000, he wrote a prototype for president congressman Tom Feeney that did just that, which "would flip the vote fifty one forty nine. Whoever you wanted it to go to and whichever race you wanted to win." "They'd never see it." Detection would require viewing the source code or having a "receipt" and counting the hard paper against the actual vote total. When asked if he could design a program to protect Ohio elections, he said: "Sure. Anybody can" to "No. Could you have designed a program... that would have protected Ohio against this kind of rigging?" "No." He said he handed in documentation of what to look for in the source code and, when told to hide fraud, replied, "We need to hide the fraud in the source in the source code." He warned that central tabulation machines could be flipped by a "flag," that machines could "talk to each other" if networked, and that there is "absolutely no assurance whatsoever" unless the source code is examined.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Mister Curtis, would you please state your full name for the record? Speaker 1: Name is Clinton Eugene Curtis. Speaker 0: And where do you reside? Tallahassee, Florida. And what is your profession? I'm a computer programmer. Mister Curtis, are there programs that can be used to secretly fix elections? Yes. How do you know that to be the case? Speaker 1: Because in October 2000, I wrote a prototype for president congressman Tom Feeney at the company I worked for in Oviedo, Florida that did just that. Speaker 0: And when you say did did just that, it would rig an election? Speaker 1: It would flip the vote fifty one forty nine. Whoever you wanted it to go to and whichever race you wanted to win. Speaker 0: And would that program that you designed be something that elections officials that might be on county boards of elections could detect? Speaker 1: They'd never see it. Speaker 0: Mister That's it again. Would you answer that question once again? Speaker 1: They would never see it. Speaker 0: So how would such a such a program, a secret program that, fixes the election, how could it be detected? Speaker 1: You would have to view it either in the source code or you'd have to have a receipt and then count the hard paper against the actual vote total. Other than that, you won't see it. Speaker 0: Alright. Mister Curtis, if you had been asked, you or others with your professional expertise had been asked to design a protective program to that would protect the Ohio elections from against against such software to fix the election, could you Speaker 1: have done so? If we've been asked to make a program that could fix the election? Sure. Anybody can Speaker 0: do No. Could you have designed a program or a procedure or protocol that would have protected Ohio against this kind of rigging? Speaker 1: No. You have to look at the source code. You have to get probably programmers from both or all parties to look at the source code and determine if there's anything in there that shouldn't be there. I mean, it's a simple program. You're adding one to a person's total. It's a 100 lines of code tops. There's Speaker 2: This is during or previous to the two thousand election? Speaker 1: Yes. October September. Speaker 2: And did he ever express why he wanted a code to reelection? Speaker 1: No. I immediately assumed that they were trying to keep you guys from cheating them. So so I wrote us the documentation of what you would look for in the source code, how you would make sure that you didn't get, you know, taken advantage of, make sure that all voting machines had receipts because that way you could back count the ones that looked a little funny. And I handed it a Speaker 2: report Receipts, you mean the paper trail? Yes. Paper trail. Speaker 1: And I handed that in to missus Yang and said, here's your report. Here's your program. And she said, you don't understand. We need to hide the fraud in the source in the source code. Speaker 2: Hide the fraud, not reveal the fraud. Speaker 1: Not reveal the fraud because it's needed to con to control the vote in South Florida was what you said. Speaker 2: Could you today detect that if you look at the source code? Speaker 1: If you could get the machines and they have not been patched yet I mean, once they get in and touch them, anything can happen. You can also set timers through that, but then you see the timers. Then you'd have to take those machines, decompile them, which I couldn't do, but possibly a Microsoft MIT something could do. You might you might be able to see it. You might. Not. This depends on how good they are destroying what they had. Speaker 2: Destroying what they had by tampering the machine afterwards or by programming a a destroy instruction in the first place? Right. Because since you didn't Both? Either or both? Speaker 1: Either or both. You you didn't actually see what's in there, so you don't know if the code is running in a single executable or running in various modules. If it's running modules, you can make the code actually eat itself. Speaker 2: Let me ask you one further question. We've I have heard I've been told that people who assume that lots of the election results, or that a large fraction of the election result in a state, may have been affected by delivering foreign computer are are paranoid because in order to do that, you have to have access to thousands of machines and that that would be readily detectable. To understand, is that true? Speaker 1: It depends on the technology you use. If you did a central tabulation machine that fed in, all you'd have to do is set a flag. You set a flag, the central tabulation tab central tabulation machine would then flip your vote. Speaker 2: So if you so one person putting in bad code in a central tabulation machine could affect thousands and thousands or tens of thousands of votes? Right. Speaker 1: And you could activate And You could activate you automatically, or you could make it so that there's code existing on, like, an electronic machine that feeds it, where you would punch it in, it would set the flag, the server would see the flag, and then Speaker 2: And if you had a recount, and we know that no paper trail, would that be assuming that that had happened, would that be revealable by seeing a discrepancy between what the tabulator central tabulator showed and what the individual machines, which has not been handled with shown? Not if I wrote it. Why not? In other words in Speaker 1: other words I would make a match. Speaker 2: Okay. You can work back to the tabulator to the individual machines so the tabulator would tell the machines to switch their results? Yes. Speaker 1: Talks both ways. Can limit whatever you need. Speaker 2: And they actually can talk to each other because the machines are Speaker 1: hooked up. If somebody was networked together, They could talk to each other. Speaker 2: So in other words, there's absolutely no assurance whatsoever on anything with regard to these machines? Speaker 1: Absolutely none. Unless you look at the source code and make sure it's safe before it goes out. Speaker 2: Thank you very much.

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

Note the members of Congress in the video. The hearing in 2004 included the lovely @RepMaxineWaters and @RepJerryNadler Clint Curtis said that when he first told the Democrat committee members how he did it, their first response was "Why didn't we think of that?" Stay tuned

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

Meanwhile, in 2002, motivated by the 2000 fiasco in Florida, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act [HAVA]. The new $$$ created a feeding-frenzy of voting companies vying for lucrative contracts. Companies like Sequoia Voting Systems profited millions. https://t.co/6aSXqYyZMS

Video Transcript AI Summary
One result of that mess was that America became nervous about punch card ballots. In 02/2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act, offering states $3,900,000,000 to help administer federal elections and buy voting equipment. But the chair of the Election Assistance Commission realized there was a problem: "I was forced to send $2,300,000,000 to the 50 states to buy equipment even though the equipment was not ready to be bought." "So why'd you do it? We had to do it. begged congress, let us do the research before we send the money, and congress said no." "So the politicians knew these machines wouldn't work?" "The politicians don't care. Washington believes that the machines can't be that bad because after all, it produced them." "So if they won the race, how bad can the machine be? The machine can't be bad because it produced me. That is some faulty logic right there."
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: One result of that mess was that America became understandably nervous about punch card ballots. And in 02/2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act, offering states $3,900,000,000 to help administer federal elections and buy new voting equipment, which sounds great. But the then chair of the Election Assistance Commission, which distributed funding for the new machines, realized that there was a problem immediately. Speaker 1: I was forced to send $2,300,000,000 to the 50 states to buy equipment even though the equipment was not ready to be bought. So why'd you do it? We had to do it. We begged congress, let us do the research before we send the money, and congress said no. So the politicians knew these machines wouldn't work? The politicians don't care. Washington believes that the machines can't be that bad because after all, it produced them. So if they won the race, how bad can Speaker 0: the machine be? The machine can't be bad because it produced me. That is some faulty logic right there.

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

The 2004 presidential election came down to Ohio. At around 9 at night, Ohio vote counting mysteriously stopped. Bush was way behind. When it restarted, Bush had a commanding lead. Turns out the counting was rerouted on a “backup” system to Chattanooga Tennessee run by Karl Rove's I.T. guy McConnell, and Bush “won” the presidency again. This led to the Congressional hearing at which Clint Curtis testified about 2000 and the vote-flipping algorithm he wrote.

Video Transcript AI Summary
Late in the evening, six states that exit polls showed were going to carry suddenly veered off to Bush. Ohio then became the tipping point of the entire national election. There were tens of thousands of acts of irregularity. In a single precinct in Ohio, a total of 638 ballots were cast on election day. Bush received over 4,000 of them. Warren County is the last county in Ohio to come in with their vote totals, and they won't allow any witnesses in, won't allow any media in, and they say it's because of a homeland security threat. And yet the next day, we check with homeland security, they say we never spoke to anyone in Ohio. The function of the secretary of state's computer servers to report election results was moved during the night of the election from Ohio to servers in Chattanooga, Tennessee.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Late in the evening, six states that exit polls showed were going to carry suddenly veered off to Bush. Ohio then became the tipping point of the entire national election. There were tens of thousands of acts of irregularity. In a single precinct in Ohio, a total of 638 ballots were cast on election day. Bush received over 4,000 of them. Warren County is the last county in Ohio to come in with their vote totals, and they locked down the, place where they're counting the votes. And they won't allow any, witnesses in, won't allow any media in, and they say it's because of a homeland security threat. And yet the next day, we check with homeland security, they say we never spoke to anyone in Ohio. Bob Fotrakis reported a troubling aspect about Ohio's 2004 election night results. The function of the secretary of state's computer servers to report election results was moved during the night of the election from Ohio to servers in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

This came to light--from none other than CNN. Smartmatic, the company that started in Venezuela, was paid almost $100 million to run the recall for Hugo Chavez, rife with fraud but rubber-stamped by the Carter Center. Smartmatic then bought Sequoia to enter the US market. https://t.co/X4D6LRP9M4

Video Transcript AI Summary
"Smartmatic is a labyrinth of international holding companies owned by Venezuelan businessmen." "When Smartmatic bought The US voting machine companies, the US government did not review the sale." "Many experts say those voting machines were manipulated in Venezuela to give president Hugo Chavez a victory." "Exit polls done by The US firm Penn shown in Berlin had Chavez losing 41% to 59%." "But the next day, Chavez declared victory, reversing the score, saying he won 59% of the vote." "All these machines talk to a central computer and report on their results." "And in that mechanism, as they communicate with the center, the central machine can report anything." "The Chavez government gave Bizta, Smartmatic, and another company a $91,000,000 contract to run voting machines for the February."
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Antonio Mujica and his partner Alfredo Enzola received a small business loan from the Venezuelan government only months before the recall election. These corporate registration documents from Venezuela show the Venezuelan government owned 28% of the stock of another company they started, Bizta, which adapted voting software for the Smartmatic machines in the two thousand and four elections. The same document shows a Chavez government minister, Omar Montillo, was on the board of directors. The Chavez government gave Bizta, Smartmatic, and another company a $91,000,000 contract to run voting machines for the February. The next year, the owners of Smartmatic, primarily owned by Venezuelan businessmen, bought Sequoia, one of the top electronic voting system companies in The United States, for $16,000,000. Smartmatic is a labyrinth of international holding companies owned by Venezuelan businessmen. Smartmatic Group NV of Curacao, Netherlands Antilles owns Smartmatic International BV of Amsterdam Netherlands owns Smartmatic Corporation of Florida, which bought Sequoia Voting Systems of California USA. When Smartmatic bought The US voting machine companies, the US government did not review the sale. Many experts say those voting machines were manipulated in Venezuela to give president Hugo Chavez a victory. Exit polls done by The US firm Penn shown in Berlin had Chavez losing 41% to 59%. But the next day, Chavez declared victory, reversing the score, saying he won 59% of the vote. Speaker 1: Everything was computed in the favor of the government. So the the the only explanation is that the smart mathematic machines had been programmed in that way. Speaker 0: A Harvard mathematician crunched the numbers on the Venezuelan election. Speaker 1: It had had to be the smart mathematic system. All these machines talk to a central computer and report on their results. And in in that in that mechanism, as they communicate with the center, the central machine can report anything. Speaker 0: Smartmatic is technically based in Boca Raton, Florida. But the president of the company, Jack Blayne, testified to the Chicago City Council. Fewer than a dozen Smartmatic employees work in Florida. The majority of the workers are based in Venezuela.

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

2006 elections in Cook County Chicago were another disaster. Sequoia was technically running it, but they were almost exclusively using the Smartmatic Venezuelan employees flown up from Venezuela to run the elections. Why is Venezuela running our elections? https://t.co/9n6lvMSOT6

Video Transcript AI Summary
"The use of some 19,000 electronic voting machines in the city of Chicago and Cook County primary on March 21 is now under intense scrutiny." "The US company that makes the machines, Sequoia, was bought in 2005 by Smartmatic, a private company primarily owned by Venezuelan businessmen." "I think that American elections ought to be run by American companies and ought to be run by American citizens, not Venezuelan nationals." "We believe this is a national security issue. There is no way that companies belonging to non US corporations should have access to our elections." "In the case of, Smartmatic, there are a number of unanswered questions." "Certainly, our government should know."
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: The use of some 19,000 electronic voting machines in the city of Chicago and Cook County primary on March 21 is now under intense scrutiny. The US company that makes the machines, Sequoia, was bought in 2005 by Smartmatic, a private company primarily owned by Venezuelan businessmen. When Chicago had problems with the machines, a dozen Venezuelan employees were there to help with the election. Chicago officials are outraged. Speaker 1: I think that American elections ought to be run by American companies and ought to be run by American citizens, not Venezuelan nationals. Speaker 0: Smartmatic is technically based in Boca Raton, Florida. But the president of the company, Jack Blaine, testified to the Chicago City Council. Fewer than a dozen Smart Matic employees work in Florida. The majority of the workers are based in Venezuela. Watchdog groups question why US voting machines would be under the control of citizens of another country, especially a country whose election process is highly suspect. Speaker 2: We believe this is a national security issue. There is no way that companies belonging to non US corporations should have access to our elections. Elections. Speaker 0: The treasury department is supposed to monitor sales of US companies to overseas investors where there is a question of national security, such as in the Dubai Ports deal, the so called CFIUS review process. Some in congress are demanding an investigation. Speaker 3: In the case of, Smartmatic, there are a number of unanswered questions. That's why I wrote to the secretary of the treasury and asked them to review the ownership. It's offshore. It's murky. No one seems to know who owns it. Certainly, our government should know. Speaker 0: A potential risk to the democratic process. Now we called the treasury department to ask if the sale of Sequoia in 2005 had been reviewed or not. Treasury told us they were aware of the sale, but can't confirm if it's been reviewed or not. And some in congress and voter watchdog groups also are demanding a better answer than that, Lou.

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

In a couple of unusual transactions, compelled by noisy members of Congress who saw the Venezuelan connection, Sequoia and Smartmatic supposedly parted ways, and then Dominion "bought" Sequoia in what looks to me like a shell game. Please advise if your review differs. https://t.co/MbUQ3PgTBP

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

Additional pages of Jack Blaine's affidavit. I could not see any money changing hands and they share I.P. https://t.co/SclvxfmqE6

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

Many employees of Sequoia from Venezuela and otherwise went with Dominion, and most of Dominion Voting Systems' programmers are in Serbia. https://t.co/SuCgKC8izs

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

These job postings in September of 2015 for Dominion Voting Systems are for Software Analysts and Software Developers in Toronto, ON and Belgrade, SERBIA. https://t.co/NPQjs5hzLt

@SidneyPowell1 - Sidney Powell 🇺🇸 Attorney, Author, Gladiator

@MicheleTho6244 More on that another time.

Saved - February 23, 2025 at 7:14 PM
reSee.it AI Summary
I firmly believe that the claims made are completely untrue. I mention various entities and organizations, including Kleiner Perkins, JDCA, Gandi SAS, and others, to highlight the connections and implications surrounding these assertions.

@HolaBackupFiJC - HolaBackup

Patently false. Both counts. Kleiner Perkins. JDCA (UJA/Mossad). Gandi SAS (Montefiore/GCHQ). Arena. http://Impactive.io. Pegasus. Serbia Broadband. Dragoljub Spasojević. Y Combinator. Data Council. Civis Analytics. Scytl. Smartmatic. SGO Corp. BC Partners. Akamai (Sayeret Matkal). Dominion. Hamilton Place Strategies (Penta). K2 Integrity.

Impactive | All-in-One Digital Organizing Suite Impactive is an all-in-one suite of tools for organizing, outreach, and engagement. We empower progressive campaigns and causes to fundraise, share their stories and actions, get out the vote, and much more. Impactive has a long history of building movements online: Biden/Harris 2020, Planned Parenthood, Community Change, and over 1,000 other partners sent more than 150 million messages during the 2020 election cycle. impactive.io

@polyfraggrenade - moo (GO BIRDS!!!)

Through the ballot box and voting machines? Neither. Through the media? They all are. 2020 was largely decided by the media, like Twitter, which deliberately censored the President, and the news. It's why Elon bought Twitter; to influence public opinion.

@Junesaya_ - Anti-poll Action

@polyfraggrenade Was the 2020 or 2024 election rigged??

Saved - April 11, 2025 at 11:49 PM
reSee.it AI Summary
I just noticed an attempted login from Serbia on my Coinbase account, which is concerning. I can't help but wonder if it’s connected to recent events, including Marc Andreessen's controversies with Meta, Ruby on Rails, and his ties to a16z and UnitedHealth.

@GoyWonderTM - Juan Decentbaum

COINBASE: So… you’re telling me someone from SERBIA just tried logging into my account? Gosh, that sounds awful. Y’all think it has anything to do with THIS shit? https://t.co/0LffgDwztR

@GoyWonderTM - Juan Decentbaum

Or this? https://t.co/wdXNn551KO

@GoyWonderTM - Juan Decentbaum

Or Marc Andreessen’s dirty laundry with META & RUBY ON RAILS STEALING AMERICA’S FUCKING ELECTIONS with all his GITHUB (Microsoft) homies? Or his dirty laundry with a16z and UnitedHealth and Dan Rosenthal? https://t.co/7JX1dFtwEP

Saved - May 6, 2025 at 5:14 AM
reSee.it AI Summary
I discussed the Hamilton 68 dashboard, which was launched by the Alliance for Securing Democracy to track alleged Russian bots during the 2016 election. This initiative, promoted by key figures like Hillary Clinton and former CIA directors, falsely labeled many legitimate accounts as Russian operatives, leading to widespread media misinformation. Despite discovering its inaccuracies, Twitter executives chose not to expose the operation, likely due to political pressures. The involvement of former CIA leaders raises questions about their roles in promoting this disinformation campaign.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

NEW: Three former CIA directors linked to the Russian Bot Hoax (Hamilton 68) that smeared #MAGA, incited anti-Russia hatred, and helped grow support for online censorship. 🧵/1 https://x.com/0rf/status/1917975138458272023

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

The Russian Bot Hoax

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speakers claim that America is under attack by Russian bots on Twitter, which are part of an ongoing attack by the Russian government. These bots are flooding Twitter, targeting Americans, and attempting to fan the flames of political discord by creating echo chambers and alternate realities. The speakers reference Hamilton 68, a website tracking Russian-linked Twitter accounts, as evidence of this activity. They claim this dashboard shows Russian bots are involved in various topics, from political narratives to school shootings. However, another speaker alleges that Hamilton 68 is a fraud. They claim the list of accounts it tracks are not Russian bots, but rather ordinary Americans, and that Hamilton 68 is misrepresenting organic opinions as Russian influence. Some speakers claim they are personally targeted by Russian bots. A dashboard at securingdemocracy.org is suggested for tracking Russian activity. A video by Matt Orphala is praised. Negative news about vaccines is said to be amplified by Russian bots.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: There are some really hard problems like, you know, the Russians playing on Twitter. Speaker 1: The Russian bots are out there doing things. Speaker 0: Russian bots are all over. Russian bots online attack. Ongoing attack by the Russian government. Russian bots Twitter attacks. Russian attack on Twitter. Russian bots flood Twitter. Speaker 1: Russian bot accounts are flooding Twitter. America is under attack. Speaker 0: A Russian bot army of Russian bots are coming. Speaker 1: Russian linked Twitter accounts flooded Twitter. This is an attack on America by Russia. Russian Twitter bots. Russian backed accounts searching for new targets. Russian bots. Targeting Americans. Speaker 0: Russian bots. Russian bot army. The Russians Army of bots. The bot army. They're coming for us. Speaker 1: Russia's attacks on social media. Speaker 2: Using their bots. Speaker 1: Attack of the bots. We are witnessing an ongoing attack by the Russian government through Twitter. Speaker 0: Everyone run for Kevin. Russian bots. Twitter. The Russian bots will be taking over. Speaker 1: In an escalating drumbeat of attacks. Speaker 0: On Twitter. Russian trolls flood Twitter. Speaker 1: Russia's expanding Twitter campaign. Against America. Speaker 0: Did I mention Russian bots Speaker 1: flood Twitter? Russian backed accounts are on the prowl. Speaker 0: Lots of Russian linked accounts are trying to grab Americans' attention right now. Speaker 1: The United States is under attack. Speaker 0: From the Russian bots. Twitter flooded with Russia linked bots. Speaker 2: This is very dangerous. There's a clear and present danger. So it's a very dangerous situation. Speaker 0: You're all in danger. There's ample proof. Speaker 1: And we can see it through tools like this Russian influence tracker on Twitter. Twitter tracking tool, Hamilton 68, found Russian linked Twitter accounts. Speaker 0: Russia linked accounts. A website called Hamilton 68 has been tracking Russian bots. There's actually a live feed. Russian bots. Speaker 1: According to data. Collected by Hamilton sixty eight. Hamilton sixty eight. Speaker 3: Go to Speaker 0: Hamilton sixty Speaker 4: eight. An organization called Hamilton sixty eight was the source of hundreds of news stories over the course of a period of years allegedly tracking Russian bots. But we now know based on stuff that we've seen internally in these emails there were no Russian bots. Speaker 0: Wait. What did you say? Speaker 4: They were taking organic opinions of real Americans and representing them as Russian driven narratives. But there were no Russian bots. Speaker 0: Russian bots. According to Hamilton sixty eight Fake news. Speaker 1: These are all Russian accounts. Monitor by Hamilton sixty eight. Bullshit. We've seen what the bots have been doing according to the Hamilton project. Speaker 0: This is all bullshit. Hamilton sixty eight, a project that tracks Russian bots Bullshit. Found a dramatic increase in Russian bots Russian bots on Speaker 3: Twitter. According to the third Speaker 1: party Hamilton sixty eight. Not fucking read. A website that tracks Twitter accounts linked to the Russian government. Total bullshit. Hamilton sixty eight Speaker 0: It's a fraud. Speaker 1: Are reporting Twitter Speaker 0: accounts ties to Russian Russian bots. No bullshit. Speaker 1: Hamilton sixty eight has been tracking these bots It's Speaker 0: all bullshit. Hamilton sixty eight tracks these Russia bots. Speaker 1: Bullshit. Hamilton sixty eight. Bullshit. A website that tracks Twitter activity says Russian bots inundating Twitter. Speaker 0: This is all bullshit. Dashboard Hamilton sixty eight. Shit everywhere. Hamilton sixty eight follows hashtags on a daily basis. Hashtags that are being propagated, not they didn't weren't created by Russians, but these are 600 Russian websites that are that are using these are the hashtags that they did. Russian linked accounts tweeting Monday motivation and Wednesday wisdom. Russian agents pushing the hashtag merry Christmas? Russian bots getting involved in a school shooting. What the hell is he talking about? Russian trolls using hash tags like Parkland gun control now at Florida. Speaker 3: Russian bots. There's nothing really that they wouldn't get their hands on. Speaker 0: Russian trolls and bots saying hashtag whatever the GOP narrative is. Laura Ingraham is supported by shall think it counts. According to Hamilton sixty eight, John Hannity is a favorite of Russian accounts. According to Hamilton sixty eight The narrative that the Trump administration is putting out also is the Putin narrative because they're retweeting this with their Russian bots. Russian bot. Drive almost every conversation. According to Hamilton sixty eight. Russian bot. Erupting. Twitter erupted with such hashtags as stand for our anthem as well as take a knee. Speaker 1: According to Politifacts, citing. Hamilton Sixty Eight. Speaker 0: The Hamilton Sixty Eight dashboard. Hamilton Sixty Eight. Hamilton Sixty Hamilton Sixty Hamilton sixty sixty eight. Speaker 1: Hamilton 60 60 eight. That's me as Speaker 0: Hamilton Sixty Eight dashboard on bot activity. Russian backed bots. Russian influence. Bots. Bots. Speaker 1: So, Ken, what are these bots trying to accomplish? Speaker 0: Well, they're trying to fan the flames of political discord in our country, Stephanie, which is not that difficult to do. Russian bots. Russian bots. Russian bots. They're creating an echo chamber. They're creating alternate reality. The Russian bots. We're reporting on this just like Russian bots. Speaker 1: Senator, we're doing the work for them. The Russian bots. A Russian bots. Blocking it off. Some of us to be pawns in a game. An ongoing Russian psy ops or psychological operations campaign. Speaker 0: Linked to the US government. The former head of the CIA, Michael Hayden, is joining us, everybody. Hamilton 68 is a running dashboard of what Russian bots are trending. Speaker 1: Former acting CIA director Mike Wrote Speaker 0: a Washington Post article citing Hamilton 68. Which suggests that the Russians are starting to play in our midterm election. And you guys see all of this on your Hamilton 68 dashboard, which I think is really cool. Speaker 1: The dashboard Hamilton 68. Speaker 0: Laura, it's good to be with you again. Speaker 1: John Brennan was director of the Central Intelligence Agency when we spent many hours together in the situation room. Speaker 0: And your organization, Laura, I know tracks some of these bots. Tell us about your website, Hamilton 68. Speaker 1: Our web site, Hamilton 68, it's a dashboard that tracks a sampling of 600 Kremlin oriented Twitter accounts. Speaker 4: A secret list of 600 accounts they said were linked to Russian influence. Well, in the Twitter files, we found the list. And the list is mostly bereft of Russians, but is full of real Americans. What they did is a fraud. They took ordinary conversations of ordinary Americans and just called it Russian influence. Speaker 0: Russian bots are all over. Russian bots. Speaker 5: Russian bots. Russian bots. Russian bots. Speaker 0: Russian linked bots, automatic accounts. Speaker 4: Russian bots. Hamilton sixty eight. Speaker 0: Hamilton sixty eight knows they're Russian bots. Speaker 4: This whole thing was a fraud. Speaker 5: And and, you know, my old job at the State Department was what people used to joke as the chief propagandist job. We haven't talked about propaganda. Propaganda I'm not against propaganda. Every country does it, and they have to do it to their own population. Hamilton sixty eight, the Russian dashboard is a real time dashboard of Russian influences. Speaker 0: Russian bots. A lot of Russian bots. You know, the Russian networks that we monitor. Speaker 4: They're not Russians. These are mostly ordinary Americans, real accounts of real people. Speaker 1: What these bots have been doing is trying to undermine our democracy. Speaker 5: There are Speaker 0: these bots. Undermine our democracy. Speaker 1: A great threat to democracy is posed by the Russian bot. Speaker 0: First step really is to make the American people aware of this absolutely chilling threat. Of Russian bet, Russian agent, oriented. Russian Twitter account. Tied to the Russian government. But it all was bullshit. Russian bots are bad. Russian bots dissent. Russian bots Twitter attack. Russian bots inflamed. Russian bots do. Russian bots flock. Russian bots spread Russian bots disinformation from Russian bots. Russian bots jumped on these sources. Russian Twitter bots jumped. Russian trolls jumping. Russian bots pounce. Pounce. Pounce. Pounce. Pounce. Pounce. Pounce. Russian bot army pounce. Now this data comes from Hamilton sixty eight. These Russian bots spreading false information online. Speaker 1: These Russian efforts really pervade all outlets and all platforms. And Speaker 0: that is what Russian Twitter bots do. Speaker 5: My Twitter feed will be attacked by Russian bots after this. Speaker 1: I've seen in in my own timeline of people who I suspect to be Russian bots. Speaker 0: I was being targeted on Twitter by Russian bots. I know that from professionals who tell me. But you you came in one day and said, boy, you and Mika Yeah. Have been targets of a lot of Russian bots. Kamala Harris has been one of those people who has been targeted by many, many Russian bots or whoever. Speaker 1: You feel like you're being targeted by Russian bots now? Well, we already know Speaker 0: we are. Speaker 3: The the Russians don't want me to be the nominee. I spend a lot of money on bots. Speaker 1: Check out the dashboard to track Russian active measures at dashboard.securingdemocracy.org. Speaker 0: That was by Orf. Beautiful video. Orf. Whoever made that, it's spectacular. Man, this was awesome. Just perfect. Really interesting video. Matt Orphala. Matt Matt Orphala. Matt Orphala. Speaker 1: Matt Matt Orphala. Speaker 0: You almost made me cry. Matt Orphala. Matoralipa. Hysterical. It's fantastic. This is the best. Matt Orlefralo. Matt Orphala. Do I have it right? You know, that's how famous all face. Speaker 3: Any negative news about vaccine is instantly amplified by the Russians bots.

@mtaibbi - Matt Taibbi

1.THREAD: Twitter Files #15 MOVE OVER, JAYSON BLAIR: TWITTER FILES EXPOSE NEXT GREAT MEDIA FRAUD

Video Transcript AI Summary
A website called Hamilton Sixty Eight was created to track Russian accounts. The speaker asserts that the website identifies current Russian bots that are disseminating information. The speaker questions the accuracy of this claim, stating, "That's bull."
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: You and your team, you guys created a website. Hamilton sixty eight. Yes. My colleagues and I, we tracked Russian accounts. That's some bull So they're literally right now, they're Russian bots according to your website that are putting this out into the world. Is that Right. Correct? That's bull

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

As Democrats blamed Russia for Trump’s 2016 victory over Hillary Clinton, the Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) launched the Hamilton 68 dashboard in 2017, reportedly tracking “Russian bots and trolls” on Twitter. Clinton herself was one of the 1st to promote it. /2

Video Transcript AI Summary
The Alliance for Securing Democracy is developing tools and strategies to counter attacks on the U.S. and its allies. They are tracking the toolkit Russia is using to undermine democracies. Their dashboard tracks Russian active measures and can be found at dashboard.securingdemocracy.org.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I'm encouraged by emerging initiatives like the Alliance for Securing Democracy, which is working to develop tools and strategies to counter the unprecedented attack on The United States and our allies and to track the full toolkit Russia is using to undermine democracies. If you haven't seen it yet, check out the dashboard that they've created to track Russian active measures at dashboard.securingdemocracy.org.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Virtually every major media outlet cited Hamilton 68, falsely smearing honest American discourse online as “Russian bots” in several hundred news stories from 2017 through 2019. Matt Taibbi called it “The single greatest case of media fabulism in American history”. /3

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

The #TwitterFiles revealed that Ham 68 "falsely accuse[d] a bunch of legitimate right-leaning accounts of being Russian bots". (Left-leaning accounts were affected too.) /4

@mtaibbi - Matt Taibbi

3.“Falsely accuses a bunch of legitimate right-leaning accounts of being Russian bots.”

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Twitter execs discovered the Ham 68 fraud by reverse-engineering the site but decided not to out ASD's disinformation op. "We have to be careful," wrote Twitter Head of Global Comms, Emily Horne, presumably fearful of political backlash from Ham 68's powerful deep state ties. /5

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

It appears Hamilton 68's parent, ASD, wants to keep those ties secret as it deleted its list of advisors, including former acting CIA director Mike Morell, from its website. /6

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

NEW: ASD founding director and former Clinton advisor Laura Rosenberger boasted that “John Brennan was Director of the Central Intelligence Agency when we spent many hours together in the situation room,” in a live stream with the spy chief. /7

Video Transcript AI Summary
John Brennan is a distinguished fellow at the Center on National Security and Fordham Law School, as well as a distinguished scholar at the University of Texas at Austin. He formerly served as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Prior to that role, he was assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: John Brennan is a distinguished fellow at the Center on National Security and Fordham Law School and a distinguished scholar at the University of Texas at Austin. He was director of the Central Intelligence Agency when we spent many hours together in the Situation Room and previously served as assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Rosenberg also spent time with Morell on his CBS podcast, "Intelligence Matters," where the former acting CIA director promoted Hamilton 68 and called it "really cool." /8

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Morell and now Senator Mike Rogers co-authored an influential op-ed in the Washington Post, citing the dashboard multiple times to falsely accuse real Americans on Twitter of being “Russian operatives”. /9

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Another former CIA Director, General Michael Hayden, was a huge disseminator of Hamilton 68 disinformation. New clues suggest his role might have been more than an outside promoter. /10

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

In a 2019 panel at the Hayden Center with Morell, Rogers implicated Hayden in Ham 68. “Go to Hamilton 68," Rogers told the audience, “I know that General Hayden is also involved with that.” Rogers would know, as he was an ASD advisor, according to the now-deleted ASD page. /11

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker works with the German Marshall Fund, which tracks Russian activities. The speaker directs the audience to hamilton68.com, a site created to monitor Russian trolls and bot armies. The goal is to provide the public with information to help them distinguish between legitimate speech and speech originating outside the country intended to create chaos. The speaker acknowledges the difficulty the country will face in discerning the origins and intent of different types of speech.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I work with the German Marshall Fund. There's a group that tracks what the what the Russians are doing, and we try to make it transparent. So if you go to Hamilton sixty eight, I know general is also in and it's great to see you, sir, who has never given up the mantle of that best intelligence officer, by the way. And I always said that he's whatever happened to him the last year, we're all not sure, but he sure got a lot better looking. I if you know that. It's hamilton68.com. So what we were trying to do is track what the Russian trolls and the bot armies were doing and then make it available for the public to get on and take a look so they can make an informed decision. This is gonna be a very difficult thing for the country to go through is trying to decipher what is legitimate speech even if you disagree with its speech and what is speech that is outside of the origins are outside the country with the with the sheer effort to try to create chaos and other things.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

“[Hayden] has never given up the mantle of the best intelligence officer,” Rogers continued. In a 2nd camera angle, Morell nods affirmingly as Rogers says Hayden is “involved” with Hamilton 68. /12

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker works with the German Marshall Fund and a group that tracks Russian activities, aiming for transparency. Hamilton 68, also involving General Hayden, is a resource to monitor Russian trolls and bot armies. The goal is to provide public access to this information, enabling informed decision-making. The speaker jokingly comments on General Hayden's improved appearance. The website is Hamilton68.com.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Work with the German Marshall Fund. There's a group that tracks what the what the Russians are doing, and we try to make it transparent. So if you go to Hamilton Sixty Eight, I know General Hayden is also involved in that, and it's great to see you, sir, who has never given up the mantle of that best intelligence officer, by the way. And I always said that he's whatever happened to him the last year, we're all not sure, but he sure got a lot better looking. I don't know you know that. It's Hamilton 68 Dot Com. So what we were trying to do is track what the Russian trolls and the bot armies were doing and then make it available for the public to get on and take a look so they can make an informed decision.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

It wouldn't be the first time Rogers slipped up on camera with Hayden. In 2013, Hayden said he thought of putting Ed Snowden on a kill list. Rogers laughed and told Hayden, “I can help you with that,” before remembering he was on camera. /13

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker mentions having "lots of things to comment on," specifically referencing a European award and a nomination. The speaker admits to having darker moments over the past several months. They also considered nominating Mr. Snowden, but for a different list. The speaker then acknowledges the presence of cameras.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Lots lots of things to comment on. Let me talk about the the European award and his nomination. I must have made him my darker moments over the past several months. I'd also thought of nominating mister Snowden, but it was for a different list. Okay? I can help you with that. Oh, there's cameras here too. I forgot about that.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Any behind-the-scenes involvement with the nefarious Hamilton 68 scam would be consistent with Hayden’s prolific promotion of the dashboard and its leader, Clint Watts, in his book, on TV, and at influential think tanks. /14

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

"Remember that #TakeAKnee thing?" Fmr. CIA Director Hayden blames "Russian bots". Guess what his source is? His book cites the Hamilton 68 dashboard that the #TwitterFiles exposed to be a scam tracking mostly Americans, not Russians or bots.

Video Transcript AI Summary
The president gave a speech that fed his base, and before he returned to Washington, Russian bots amplified the "take a knee" issue, framing it as a conflict between patriotic and constitutional sides. Alt-right media then mirrored the Russian bots' messaging.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Remember the take a knee thing? Right? Then okay. So the president gives a speech. He feeds his base. Mhmm. Okay. Before he gets back to Washington, the Russian bots are all over it. Take a knee, both sides. Alright? The patriotic side and the constitutional side. Alt right media picks it up and and mirrors the the Russian bots.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Hayden promoted Watts at the Atlantic Council, the Hoover Institute, and the AFCEA. At Princeton, Hayden compared Russian bot attacks to 9/11, advocating for an "extraordinary" response like we had after 9/11. Ham 68 parents, Rosenberger and Watts, also spoke at the event. /15

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Not long after Hamilton 68 launched, Hayden and Watts sat on a CSIS panel together. The host began the event by promoting Hamilton 68 and referring to Watts and Hayden as part of a “dream team”. /16

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Hayden even used Ham 68 graphs in a lecture at Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security, in which he said “Russian bots” were responsible for trending the hashtags #MAGA and #TakeAKnee. “Hamilton 68 knows they’re Russian bots,” he told the spooks in training. /17

Video Transcript AI Summary
Hamilton 68, a German Marshall Fund project, tracks trending hashtags and topics among Russian bots. In late September/early October, trending hashtags included "Take a knee," "Boycott the NFL," "NFL," and "MAGA." The trending hashtags also included "Steelers," referencing Alejandro Villanueva. According to the speaker, Villanueva, an Army Special Forces veteran, made an exception and stayed in the runway during the anthem. The speaker claims that before the president landed in DC after a Friday night speech in Huntsville, Russian bots were already promoting "Take a knee." While Hamilton 68 identifies these bots, most social media users do not.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: This is just a quick screen capture of once upon a time of, something called Hamilton 68, number by a think tank up the street here, German American Marshall Fund. It is it is a running dashboard of what Russian bots are trending in terms of hashtags and and topics. Okay? I don't know if you can see this, but this one here, this was late September, early October. Take a knee. Boycott the NFL. Take a knee. NFL. MAGA. Okay? Trending hashtag, Steelers. Remember Alejandro Villanueva? Remember the Steelers offensive tackle? Army special forces, West Point kinda snuck to the runway because he, you know, you know and and then the team I was brought in by the team to talk to I mean, I I know the inside football story here. Everyone knew he was gonna go do it. They knew Alejandro had to, you know, kinda make a bit of an exception. He didn't go out for the anthem. He just stayed in the runway. Sorry. The the point is so the president makes a speech in Huntsville on a Friday night. Before the president lands in DC, Russian bots are all over. Take a knee. And and, you know, although Hamilton sixty eight knows the Russian bots, most people in social media do not know that.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

On a CNN-hosted panel with Hayden, Samantha Powers (US Ambassador to the UN/ USAID Director) pushed Hamilton 68 mis/disinformation, alleging that “Russian bots” were responsible for American arguments over Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh. /18

Video Transcript AI Summary
The same network of Russian bots and trolls used in 2016 was observed amplifying both pro-Kavanaugh and anti-Kavanaugh sentiments on social media.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Russian bots and trolls, that same network that was used, back in 02/2016. You see them playing up the pro Kavanaugh, social media, and you say them, see them playing up, the anti.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Many CIA men turned "new analysts" joined Hayden, pushing Ham 68 stories on TV: fmr CIA officer David Preiss, fmr CIA chief of staff Jeremy Bash, fmr CIA station chief Dan Hoffman, and fmr CIA intern Anderson Cooper in an interview w fmr CIA chief of Russia ops Steve Hall. /19

Video Transcript AI Summary
Russian bots are everywhere. Russian-linked accounts are bots. Hamilton 68 knows they're Russian bots. The whole thing was a fraud.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: Russian bots are all over. The Russian bots. Russian bots. Russian bots. Russian bots. Russian linked bots, accounts. Russian bots. Hamilton sixty eight. Hamilton sixty eight knows they're Russian bots. This whole thing was a fraud.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

At AFCEA, Hayden admitted the CIA did everything he accused Russian bots of: “This Russian story I just gave you, if we were doing this, we would call it a covert influence campaign. And I’d be the last one in the room to claim we’ve never tried a covert influence campaign." /20

Video Transcript AI Summary
The speaker states that the "Russian story" would be called a covert influence campaign if they were doing it. The speaker also claims they would be the last to say they've never tried a covert influence campaign.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: I mean this Russian story I just gave you, if we were doing it, we would call it a covert influence campaign. And I'd be the last one in the room to claim we've never tried a covert influence campaign.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

"Successful covert influence campaigns identify preexisting fractures and then exploit those fractures to drive populations further apart," and that's exactly what Hayden & Ham 68 achieved when they convinced us that our #MAGA or anti-war neighbors were working for Russia. /21

Video Transcript AI Summary
Successful covert influence campaigns don't create societal fractures. Instead, they identify pre-existing fractures and exploit them to further divide populations. This exploitation of existing divisions is presented as an "iron law of physics" governing covert influence.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: But there's kind of an iron law of physics within a covert influence campaign and the iron law of physics is it doesn't create fractures in a society. Successful covert influence campaigns identify pre existing fractures and then exploit those fractures to drive populations further apart.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Ham 68 was just one of many widely cited “Russian bot” trackers that proved fraudulent. New Knowledge was caught running a false flag operation of “Russian bots” on Twitter. There was also the Global Engagement Center (GEC), which used the “exact formula” as Ham 68. /22

Video Transcript AI Summary
In 2016, Barack Obama created the Global Engagement Center (GEC) to counter terrorist messaging abroad. Emails revealed the GEC was also concerned with domestic English language accounts, including those with no ties to terror groups. The GEC pressured Twitter to remove or de-amplify Americans accused of misinformation. In 2020, a Twitter executive expressed concern over a Washington Post article about Russia helping Bernie Sanders' campaign. Yoel Roth of Twitter criticized GEC's methods, comparing them to Hamilton 68, which falsely synthesized Russian social media backing. The GEC targeted left-leaning figures like Sanders, anti-war accounts, libertarians, and independents, along with conservatives. They identified accounts "highly connective" to foreign propaganda ecosystems, including those of European politicians, based on retweeting "anti-US" or "pro-Russian" content. This created guilt by ideological association. The GEC sought orthodoxy and obedience, propagandizing to Americans like foreign populations, violating First Amendment ideals.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: On 03/14/2016, Barack Obama signed executive order thirteen seven two one, developing a new integrated global engagement center to support government wide counterterrorism communications activities directed abroad. It directed the secretary of state to create a new body, the GEC or GEC, to, quote, counter the messaging and diminish the influence of international terrorist organizations, including ISIL, Al Qaeda, and other violent extremists abroad. Seven years later, while working on a story involving internal communications at Twitter, I found myself reading emails between GAC officials and Twitter executives about subjects ranging from COVID nineteen to the twenty twenty elections and Donald Trump. Once chairman, you're you were mister chairman, you were right to point out that they were once focused abroad. But by this time, GEC officials were largely concerned with domestic English language accounts, people with no ties to terror groups or relationships with adversary nations like Iran, China, or Russia. When I went back this weekend through those documents to find examples of Geck pressuring Twitter to remove or de amplify Americans accused of misinformation, I found an exchange that we Twitter files reporters missed in 2023. A lawyer at the company asked several other executives if they had any, quote, appetite for writing Geck a letter to ask them to stop going to the media with sensationalist claims about epidemics of foreign bots. One of the company's senior communications executives gave a remarkably candid answer. From my chair, it would be very helpful, he wrote. Referencing a well known Washington reporter. He went on, the pre briefed Ellen Nakashima article in the post on Bernie and this coronavirus story, no heads up, are making me worry a little about how good faith these players will be through the press into 2020. So it wasn't just conservatives. It was also Bernie Sanders. The date on that email was 02/24/2020, '3 days after the Washington Post ran a devastating feature titled Bernie Sanders briefed by US Officials that Russia is trying to help his presidential campaign. This was an extremely impactful story that opened the floodgates on a conspiracy theory that Sanders was the recipient of Russian help. It claimed bots helping Bernie online were part of, quote, Russia's broader interest in sewing division in The United States and uncertainty about the validity of American elections. In response to this odd sequel of claims about Russian bots aiding Donald Trump, the company's head of trust and safety, Yole Roth, gave an unflattering description of GEC's methods. Quote, they use BrandWatch to monitor a handful of openly Russian accounts, for instance, RT, and an unspecified number of accounts that they baseless baselessly assert are inauthentic. This is the exact formula we previously found found behind another often used online tool called Hamilton 68, whose founders were also quoted in the post piece. Hamilton 68 mixed the smattering of real Russian accounts with a crowd of mostly American, mostly anti establishment accounts to create a dashboard that synthesized falsely the appearance of Russian social media backing for everything from the Devin Nunes memo to the Parkland shooting. Although many of the most controversial stories about GEC involve their their funding of commercial media scoring operations that down ranked conservative news outlets. The Geck also pressured Twitter about left leaning figures like Sanders, anti war accounts, libertarians, and independents, as well as conservatives. They managed this by using a trick that gave domestic propaganda the appearance of a counter terrorist operation. Geck sent out reports that would first identify a few social media accounts with real ties to Russia or China or Iran. Then it would separately list accounts they called highly connective to that country's propaganda ecosystem. These would be American or European citizens with inconvenient views. For instance, Geck identified the Twitter accounts of former Italian prime minister Giuseppe Conte and former Italian Democratic Party secretary Nicola Zingarelli, who was often compared to Bernie as being highly connective to Russia. All he had to do to do to get in the list was retweet what they called anti US propaganda or Geck's subjective definition of pro Russian propaganda. No actual connection was required. Through this means, the Geck exactly rehabilitated the fellow traveler concept used by infamous smear artists and witch hunters from history, from Leon Trotsky to the House on American Affairs Committee. It was a way to accuse someone who hasn't done anything wrong of guilt by ideological association. And I'll just wrap up. I'm gone over my time, but they weren't looking for misinformation and disinformation. They were looking for orthodoxy and unorthodoxy, obedience and disobedience. The idea behind Geck in particular was finding a way to propagandize American citizens and encourage acceptance of official policy the way we'd always done to foreign populations. It's a flagrant violation of first amendment ideals and should be eradicated from the government completely. No one should have this tool, not Democrats, not the Trump administration, nobody. Gentleman's time has expired. Thank you.

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

It just so happens that the GEC's J.M. Berger and New Knowledge CEO Jonathon Morgan are also co-creators of Hamilton 68…/23

@0rf - Matt Orfalea

Full story at http://Orf.Report! /24

Matt Orfalea | Substack Accidental journalist and video creator substack.com
Saved - July 5, 2025 at 6:16 AM

@ShaykhSulaiman - Sulaiman Ahmed

Israelis brag about rigging 30+ presidential elections. They thought these undercover reporters were potential clients… https://t.co/XL3eht6mmD

Video Transcript AI Summary
Tal Hanan, the leader of the hacking and disinformation unit Team Jorge, has been exposed after operating secretly for two decades. A joint investigation revealed Hanan's methods of manipulating elections for money. Team Jorge uses AIMS, a software that weaponizes social media via an army of over 30,000 sophisticated bots or avatars. These bots have multilayered identities across multiple platforms, making them appear human. Hanan demonstrated creating a fake persona with email, date of birth, and images. Team Jorge claims to have worked in countries worldwide and to be able to hack Telegram and Gmail accounts using vulnerabilities in the SS7 global signaling system. Leaked emails show fees ranging from $400,000 to $600,000, and confirm Team Jorge's covert involvement in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election.
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: This is Tal Hanan, the mastermind behind Team Jorge, a covert unit that specializes in hacking and disinformation. For two decades, Hanan's real identity has remained secret. He operates in the shadows using an alias Jorge. Now, a joint investigation by The Guardian and Forbidden Stories can reveal who he is, where he's worked and how he manipulates selections for money. So the disinformation industry is a relatively new phenomenon which effectively distorts reality and spreads online propaganda. It is usually done by states themselves or by for hire who work for private clients or for governments themselves. Almost always this is done covertly. To expose this disinformation unit, reporters went undercover as prospective clients who wanted to delay an election in Africa. In six hours of secretly recorded meetings, Hanan team. Very about level. The world. Speaker 1: And Speaker 0: we Speaker 1: for for Speaker 0: the One of team Jorge's secret tools is a piece of software called AIMS, which weaponizes social media. Speaker 1: I'll show you why our system is considered by the type of client that buy it. Speaker 2: We have thousands of thousands of each and every one of them multilayer. It means they have Facebook and Instagram and Twitter and YouTube channel and Telegram and whatever you want. Speaker 0: Hanan's team control an army of more than 30,000 bots. A bot is effectively a social media account that pretends to be human but isn't human. It's being controlled through automation. Team Jorge's bots or avatars are by far one of the most sophisticated that we've ever seen. The bots are multilayered and have corresponding accounts on several other platforms much like a human being does, which is why when you look at it initially, it does appear to be a real person. Speaker 1: Let's make one candidate together. Isla Sawyer. Let's say I don't like the name. It's not oh, Sophie Wilde. I like the name. British. Already she has email, date of birth, everything. Now I want to put an image set. I'm searching for her pictures. Let's see. No. I don't like it. Where is she? She doesn't look Canadian. I'm not gonna tell you. I have to kill you later. I don't wanna do that. You know? Then we have to trust your body in this mess. Speaker 0: Our investigation pointed to team Jorge's work in countries all over the world. Team Jorge also claim they can hack Telegram and Gmail. Speaker 1: This is live. Right? We're live with this target. If I write him now, he might answer. You can see his files he's keeping on his drive. Speaker 0: We don't know exactly how Hanan does the hack, but he claims to be exploiting vulnerabilities in the global signaling system SS seven. The Guardian has been leaked emails in which Hanan quotes fees of between 400,000 and $600,000. They also confirm that team Jorge worked covertly on the Nigerian presidential election in 2015. Our investigation has exposed this hidden underworld of disinformation operations. So the next time you're scrolling through your phone or casting a ballot, ask yourself what information you're acting on and who's really behind it.
Saved - October 14, 2025 at 12:16 PM

@WallStreetApes - Wall Street Apes

CIA officer explains how the government baits and tricks people into committing crimes They create posts and then have fake social media profiles respond to the posts in a way that will trigger their target and push them “to where they have no choice but to act on their impulse” https://t.co/YA13a3x3hJ

Video Transcript AI Summary
"You can kinda put anyone in jail if you know what to do. How? You set them up. You create the situation to where they have no choice but to act on their impulse. And once they act on that impulse, then we call that entrapment." "We call it a nudge. A nudge. A nudge." "Sometimes you just gotta get a quick look just to see what happens." "Like, we we already know your history." "So, like, oh, this will piss them off." "Nothing like putting on a fake social media thing to, like, really get people mad." "Post fake news. Sometimes it's not fake. It's embellished a little bit."
Full Transcript
Speaker 0: You can kinda put anyone in jail if you know what to do. How? You set them up. You create the situation to where they have no choice but to act on their impulse. And once they act on that impulse, then we call that entrapment. We call it a nudge. A nudge. A nudge. Speaker 1: Sometimes you just gotta get a Speaker 0: quick look just to see what happens. Right? And how does that happen? You put a post out there or you have some fake profile say something triggers that we know is gonna trigger them. Right? Like, we we already know your history. If we're to that point, we already know everything about it. So, like, oh, this will piss them off. Sometimes you like to fuse and just wait for it to follow. Nothing like putting on a fake social media thing to, like, really get people mad. Speaker 1: Post fake news. Sometimes it's Speaker 0: it's not fake. It's embellished a little bit.
Saved - January 28, 2026 at 6:31 AM
reSee.it AI Summary
I show how easy it is to hack electronic voting machines. I craft a virus that exploits OS flaws, silently redirecting votes to another candidate, with no signs of tampering and a altered tally. The malware erases traces, making post-election audits hard without independent verification. The process takes minutes, and such attacks aren’t just for nation-states—motivated groups with modest resources could do it. A $4 demo from 2006–2008 era, and now it’s easier, even remote with back doors.

@TheSCIF - The SCIF

Princeton Professor shows how easy it is to hack electronic voting machines. The researchers craft a virus that exploits software flaws in the machine's operating system. Votes are silently redirected from one candidate to another, symbolizing how an attacker could "steal" an election without detection. The machine's interface shows no signs of tampering, and the final tally reflects the altered results. The hack leaves no traceable evidence on the machine itself, as the malware erases its tracks after execution. This makes post-election audits challenging without independent verification methods. The entire process takes mere minutes, emphasizing that such attacks are not the domain of nation-state actors alone but could be executed by motivated individuals or groups with moderate resources. The part that anyone could buy costs $4 dollars and this was just ONE simple demonstration from all the way back in the 2006 to 2008 era. Now it's even easier and done remotely with built-in back doors.

Saved - July 8, 2023 at 5:14 PM

@KanekoaTheGreat - KanekoaTheGreat

BREAKING: Explosive video surfaces of FOX News stars Tucker Carlson, Laura Ingraham, and Sean Hannity slamming Trump's "insane" voting machine fraud allegations as "absurd," "ridiculous," and "complete BS"!

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